Opinions

This is a civil asset forfeiture case in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether a district court properly struck a claimant's claim to seized currency based on allegedly insufficient responses to government interrogatories. The claimant, Oak Porcelli, challenged the district court's discovery sanction that resulted in a default forfeiture judgment in favor of the government.

1. Whether a claimant who asserts an unequivocal ownership interest in property seized from his possession has established sufficient standing at the pleading and summary judgment stages of a civil forfeiture action
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in striking a claimant's claim as a discovery sanction based on allegedly deficient responses to Supplemental Rule G(6) special interrogatories
3. The proper scope and application of Rule G(6) interrogatories in civil forfeiture proceedings and when terminating sanctions are appropriate
4. The relationship between standing requirements and the government's burden of proof under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA)
5. The applicability and importance of Fourth Amendment protections and the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture cases

The en banc Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order striking Porcelli's claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Porcelli established legally sufficient standing through his unequivocal assertion of ownership combined with the fact that the currency was seized from his possession, which is sufficient to survive both the pleading stage and summary judgment stage
2. Although the government may use Rule G(6) interrogatories to investigate and test the veracity of a claimant's ownership claim, striking a claim based on allegedly insufficient interrogatory responses constitutes an abuse of discretion when: (a) the claimant has provided a legally sufficient claim of standing; (b) the interrogatory responses provide a sufficient basis for further investigation; (c) the property was indisputably seized from the claimant's possession; and (d) the case is at its inception
3. Dismissal for discovery violations is warranted only in "extreme circumstances," and this standard is even more demanding when a case-ending sanction is imposed at the beginning of litigation
4. Rule G(6) permits "limited interrogatories" and the government cannot use Rule G(6) to shift CAFRA's burden of proof to claimants, to seek excessive and unduly burdensome discovery, or to obtain dismissal when adequate responses have already been provided
5. The district court erred in striking Porcelli's claim without identifying specific additional information he should have provided and without allowing the government to conduct further discovery or subject Porcelli's account to adversarial testing
6. On remand, the district court should consider Porcelli's pending motion to suppress and other procedural matters, as these issues may be determinative of the forfeiture action

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Terrence Smith, sentenced to life imprisonment in 2001 for firebombing two storefronts that resulted in one death and injuries to others, sought sentence reduction more than twenty years later based on his youth at the time of the offense, rehabilitation while incarcerated, and an unusually long sentence.

1. Whether Smith established "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)
2. Whether Smith's youth at the time of the offense constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for release
3. Whether Smith's rehabilitation while incarcerated qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason
4. Whether Smith's sentence qualifies as "unusually long" under § 1B1.13(b)(6), considering intervening changes in law such as Amendment 829 to the Sentencing Guidelines
5. Whether the district court abused its discretion in applying the § 3553(a) sentencing factors

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Smith's compassionate release motion. The court held that: (1) Smith's youth at the time of the offense does not fall within the enumerated categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b) and is not similar in gravity to those categories; (2) rehabilitation alone is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d); (3) Smith's sentence does not qualify as unusually long because Amendment 829 (which would have allowed consideration of youthfulness as a downward departure factor) was never made retroactive and therefore cannot be considered under § 1B1.13(b)(6), and Smith failed to identify any other intervening change in law that would produce a gross disparity in sentencing; and (4) because no extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist, the court did not need to address whether the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release.

This is a copyright and bankruptcy law case involving whether a member of the rap group 2 Live Crew could exercise copyright termination rights after those rights had entered his bankruptcy estate. The court addresses whether copyright termination interests under the Copyright Act are property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate despite being inalienable under copyright law.

1. Whether termination interests under 17 U.S.C. § 203 (which allow authors to reclaim copyrights after a certain period) constitute "property" that enters a debtor's bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
2. Whether the Copyright Act's restriction on alienability of termination interests prevents them from becoming part of a bankruptcy estate
3. Whether unscheduled, unadministered termination interests remain property of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate after the case proceeds
4. Whether a termination notice is valid when signed by fewer than a majority of co-authors due to one member's termination interests being held in bankruptcy

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held that Mark Ross's termination interests became property of his bankruptcy estate under § 541(a)(1) despite the Copyright Act's inalienability restrictions. The court reasoned that: (1) termination interests are contingent rights in property that fall within § 541's broad definition; (2) federal bankruptcy law, not copyright law, determines what property enters a bankruptcy estate; (3) § 541(c)(1) explicitly applies "notwithstanding any provision in applicable nonbankruptcy law" that restricts transfer; and (4) because Ross's interests were never scheduled, administered, or formally abandoned, they remained estate property when he attempted to exercise them. Consequently, Ross could not validly exercise his termination interests, and without his participation, only two of four group members' interests were exercised—one short of the majority required under § 203(a)(1) to terminate a copyright grant made by four authors. Therefore, the termination notice was ineffective and Lil' Joe Records retained ownership of the copyrights.

This is a breach of contract case brought by Greenfield One III GmbH & Co. KG against Chris Chaney involving alleged misappropriation of corporate funds and breaches of investment agreements. The court addresses a request for leave to file a motion for summary judgment on the two remaining counts.

1. Whether Chaney breached a Side Letter Agreement (SLA) by routing over $2.7 million in corporate capital to pay personal debts, including disputes over document authenticity, backdating, and causation related to NFT market decline
2. Whether damages can be calculated for breach of Simple Agreements for Future Equity (SAFEs) based on contract interpretation alone, or whether factual analysis of liquidation priorities, senior obligations, and insolvency is required
3. Whether summary judgment is appropriate when the case involves credibility determinations and factual disputes unsuitable for resolution on the papers

The court denied the plaintiffs' request for leave to file a motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that Count IV requires credibility assessments and weighing of evidence regarding document authenticity and causation, making summary judgment inappropriate. Count V requires further factual development regarding liquidation priorities and insolvency to clarify the application of contract law. The court determined that proceeding to trial in July as scheduled would be the most efficient course, as summary judgment proceedings would waste judicial and party resources.

This is a federal habeas corpus case in which a death row inmate challenges his murder conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct involving false testimony from a jailhouse informant. The Supreme Court vacates the lower court's decision and remands for reconsideration based on the appellate court's improper consideration of post-trial DNA evidence.

1. Whether the prosecution violated the defendant's due process rights under Giglio v. United States by presenting false testimony from a jailhouse informant (Jake Ozio) who testified he had no prior criminal history when he actually had a juvenile record.
2. Whether any Giglio error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Brecht standard, which requires determining whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict.
3. Whether a federal appellate court may consider post-trial DNA evidence when assessing whether a state court's determination that other evidence was "overwhelming" was reasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
4. Whether the defendant exhausted his Giglio claim based on Ozio's false criminal history testimony in state court proceedings.

The Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the Eleventh Circuit erred by considering post-trial DNA evidence (from 2002 retesting showing the blood on the defendant's boots matched the victim's DNA) when evaluating whether the Florida Supreme Court's determination that other evidence was "overwhelming" was reasonable. The Court reasoned that because the post-trial DNA evidence was not presented to the jury at trial and did not exist at the time of trial, it could not have influenced the jury's verdict and therefore sheds no light on whether the jailhouse informant's testimony affected the verdict. The Court emphasized that the relevant standard under Brecht requires assessing whether constitutional error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict—meaning the analysis must focus on evidence actually presented to the jury. The Court expressed no opinion on whether the Florida Supreme Court's determination was reasonable based on trial evidence alone, nor on the State's argument that the defendant failed to exhaust his Giglio claim in state court, leaving these issues for the Court of Appeals to address on remand.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Stephen Pilson challenges his convictions for kidnapping his girlfriend in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and for violating a protective order in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1). The crimes arose from a December 2019 incident in which Pilson held his girlfriend captive while driving from Massachusetts through New Hampshire into Maine, just three days after his release from jail for similar Massachusetts state charges involving the same victim.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Pilson kidnapped his girlfriend across state lines, specifically whether the victim's withdrawal of consent occurred before or during interstate travel, establishing the required nexus between seizure and interstate transportation under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
2. Whether the Massachusetts "stay-away, no contact" order qualified as a "protection order" under 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A), given that the victim testified in opposition to the order at the Massachusetts sentencing hearing.
3. Whether the district court properly applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on Pilson's pre-trial phone calls attempting to influence the victim's testimony.

The First Circuit affirmed Pilson's convictions and sentence in their entirety. On the sufficiency of evidence for kidnapping, the court held that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could conclude that the victim withdrew her consent to travel before or during the interstate journey. The court relied on the victim's written witness statement (Exhibit 305) describing threatening statements made by Pilson as they departed Massachusetts, combined with her trial testimony about multiple attempts to escape during the drive through multiple states, to establish that the kidnapping began before crossing state lines. On the protection order issue, the court held that the Massachusetts no-contact order qualified as a "protection order" under the federal statute. The court adopted a broad interpretation of "on behalf of" in the statutory definition, finding that the order was issued in response to the victim's initial complaint to police following the October 2019 kidnapping. The court reasoned that Congress intended an expansive definition of "protection order" to include criminal orders issued by prosecutors or courts to protect domestic violence victims, even when the victim later opposes the order—particularly given the well-documented phenomenon of domestic abuse victims being coerced or intimidated into recanting or opposing protective measures. The court rejected a narrow interpretation that would require the victim's express consent or direct request for the order. On the obstruction enhancement, the court found harmless error because the district court explicitly stated it would have imposed the identical sentence regardless of any errors in calculating the sentencing guidelines range, thereby insulating the sentence from appellate reversal.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a defendant charged with using a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in death. The case addresses two novel questions: whether district courts can set and enforce deadlines for the government to notify its intent to seek the death penalty, and whether Virgin Islands territorial offenses can serve as predicate crimes of violence under federal law.

1. Whether a district court has the inherent authority to set and enforce a deadline by which the government must file notice of its intent to seek the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)
2. Whether Virgin Islands territorial offenses can qualify as predicate "crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for purposes of federal firearm charges and capital prosecution
3. Whether the government's attempt to seek the death penalty more than a year after its deadline violated the district court's order and the defendant's rights

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's order striking the government's death penalty notice and reversed the dismissal of certain counts. The court held: (1) District courts have inherent authority to set and enforce reasonable deadlines for the government to file death penalty notices under § 3593(a), as part of their case management powers. The government's representation that it would not seek death, combined with the court-ordered deadline, created an obligation the government could not unilaterally breach more than a year later without violating the defendant's rights and the court's authority. (2) Virgin Islands territorial offenses can serve as predicate crimes of violence under § 924(c) because the statute's plain language applies to any crime of violence "for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States," and the District Court of the Virgin Islands is defined as a "court of the United States" with jurisdiction over territorial offenses. The court rejected the district court's application of the absurdity doctrine, finding no absurdity in allowing § 924(c) charges based on territorial crimes given Congress's plenary power over territories and the court's concurrent jurisdiction over such offenses.

This is an immigration appeal case in which a Salvadoran woman and her minor child seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) final removal order, challenging the denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

1. Whether the BIA committed reversible error by mischaracterizing which particular social groups (PSGs) the applicant raised before the immigration judge (IJ)
2. Whether the applicant established persecution "on account of" a protected ground (political opinion or membership in a PSG) as required for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA
3. Whether the applicant demonstrated that she would more likely than not be tortured by or with the acquiescence of Salvadoran public officials, as required for relief under the CAT

The court granted the petition in part and denied it in part, vacating and remanding for further proceedings.

1. Particular Social Group "Salvadoran Women": The court found reversible error because the BIA incorrectly stated that the applicant raised the PSG "Salvadoran women" for the first time on appeal, when in fact she had raised it before the IJ. The BIA then improperly declined to consider the merits of this claim based on this mischaracterization. The court remanded this issue for the BIA to reconsider on the merits.
2. Particular Social Group "Family Members of Witnesses to Crime": The court found no reversible error, concluding that the applicant created confusion by using different terminology before the IJ and BIA. The applicant bore the burden of specifying the exact delineation of her proposed PSGs before the IJ, and she failed to do so with sufficient clarity for this variation.
3. Political Opinion Claim: The court denied the petition, finding substantial evidence supported the agency's determination that the applicant failed to show she espoused a genuine political opinion of opposing violence in favor of the rule of law. Her advocacy was limited to seeking justice for her mother's murder and did not reflect a broader commitment to the rule of law.
4. Remaining PSG Claims: The court denied the petition regarding the PSGs of "females viewed as property by virtue of their status in a family relationship," "nuclear family of Porfiria," and "family members of prosecutorial witnesses." The court found the BIA properly conducted clear error review and that substantial evidence supported the IJ's determination that the applicant failed to establish the requisite nexus between her persecution and membership in these groups.
5. CAT Claim: The court denied the petition, finding substantial evidence supported the agency's conclusion that the applicant failed to demonstrate she would more likely than not be tortured by or with the acquiescence of Salvadoran public officials. The court noted that generalized country conditions reports regarding gender-based violence were insufficient to meet her burden.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Christopher Filline, a former police chief, was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud for allegedly orchestrating the destruction of his wife's Lincoln Navigator and then filing a false insurance claim. Filline appeals on the grounds that the government failed to prove the existence of an agreement, which is an essential element of conspiracy.

1. Whether the government presented sufficient evidence to prove that Filline agreed with at least one other person to commit wire fraud, as required for a conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1349
2. Whether circumstantial evidence, presented cumulatively rather than through direct proof of an explicit agreement, can support a conspiracy conviction
3. Whether the court properly maintained appellate jurisdiction when Filline's notice of appeal referenced the original judgment rather than a subsequently amended judgment

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Filline's conviction. The court held that the government presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a rational jury's finding of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence, viewed cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the verdict, included: (1) Filline's financial distress and repeated requests to "get rid of" the Navigator; (2) his recruitment of Ambrose Rymers, who then recruited his criminal relative Oscar Hernandez; (3) the coordinated execution of the plan, including staging the vehicle with keys inside near the police station for two weeks, Hernandez's retrieval and burning of the vehicle, and Rymers following him; (4) Filline's command that they never speak of the matter again and his threat to kill Rymers; (5) the suspicious false theft report and insurance claim with inconsistent timelines; and (6) post-destruction concealment efforts, including missing video and reports, and Filline's recorded conversation with Rymers discussing the reopened investigation. The court emphasized that conspiracy need not be proven through direct evidence of an explicit agreement but may be inferred from concert of action, coordinated conduct, and surrounding circumstances. The court rejected Filline's argument that the lack of payment to co-conspirators defeated the inference of agreement, noting that no case law requires compensation for participation in a fraudulent scheme.

This is an employment discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in which a Mexican-American teacher fired by the Dallas Independent School District for allegedly making racially insensitive remarks sued for race and national origin discrimination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff.

1. Whether a plaintiff alleging Title VII employment discrimination must establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when relying on circumstantial evidence
2. Whether a plaintiff must produce evidence of a similarly situated comparator employee as part of the prima facie case
3. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services implicitly overruled Fifth Circuit precedent requiring a similarly situated comparator

The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant school district. The court held that: (1) under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff using circumstantial evidence must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which requires showing they were treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside their protected class; (2) the plaintiff failed to offer evidence of a similarly situated comparator and therefore failed to establish a prima facie case; (3) the Supreme Court's decision in Ames, while cautioning against inflexible formulations of the prima facie standard, did not unequivocally overrule Fifth Circuit precedent requiring a comparator, as the Fifth Circuit's approach is flexible enough to survive Ames and does not place a greater burden on protected classes; and (4) because the plaintiff failed to carry his prima facie burden, summary judgment was properly granted.

This is a First Amendment retaliation case in which a former Coast Guard Auxiliary member challenged his removal from the organization after he posted crude and derogatory statements on LinkedIn while depicting himself in uniform. The court upheld the Auxiliary's disciplinary action against him.

1. Whether the Coast Guard Auxiliary's removal of Wenzler violated his First Amendment right to free speech
2. Whether Wenzler's LinkedIn posts constituted protected speech on matters of public concern
3. Whether the Auxiliary's interest in maintaining discipline, harmony, and public confidence outweighed Wenzler's speech interests under the Connick/Pickering balancing test
4. What level of deference should be afforded to the Auxiliary in assessing the impact of members' speech on the organization's mission

The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Although the court assumed Wenzler's speech touched on matters of public concern, it held that the Auxiliary's interests substantially outweighed his speech interests. The court reasoned that the Auxiliary, as a congressionally-established uniformed organization with a military-like structure and significant statutory missions, deserves deference in assessing how members' speech impacts the organization. Because Wenzler held a leadership position and publicly identified himself with the Auxiliary while wearing its uniform, the court found the Auxiliary could reasonably determine that his derogatory posts would harm discipline, morale, public confidence, and the organization's reputation and recruiting efforts. Therefore, the Auxiliary did not violate the First Amendment by removing him.

This is an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference case brought by an inmate against prison medical providers and a private medical contractor. Leon Barnes, an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections, sued Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Dr. Evaristo Aguinaldo, and the Estate of Dr. Saleh Obaisi, alleging they violated his constitutional rights by delaying surgical treatment for prolapsed hemorrhoids.

1. Whether Dr. Obaisi and Dr. Aguinaldo were deliberately indifferent to Barnes's serious medical condition (prolapsed hemorrhoids) in violation of the Eighth Amendment
2. Whether the delay in providing hemorrhoidectomy surgery constituted deliberate indifference
3. Whether verifying medical evidence is required to show that a delay in treatment caused harm
4. Whether Wexford's collegial review process was the "moving force" behind any constitutional violation under Monell liability

The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. The court held that: (1) Dr. Obaisi was not deliberately indifferent because he exercised reasonable medical judgment by prescribing fiber supplements, made appropriate referrals for specialist evaluation, and did not cause delays in treatment—the offsite physician (Dr. Nordenstam) did not place a timeline on surgery; (2) Barnes failed to provide verifying medical evidence that the delay in treatment caused him harm, which is required in cases alleging delayed rather than denied care; (3) Dr. Aguinaldo was not deliberately indifferent because he performed appropriate examinations, found no external hemorrhoids, and Barnes failed to follow up or complain about hemorrhoids during subsequent visits; (4) Barnes waived his arguments against Dr. Aguinaldo by failing to raise them in his opening brief; and (5) Monell liability against Wexford cannot attach without an underlying constitutional violation by the individual defendants, which was not established here.

This is an immigration appeal case in which the petitioner, Heriberto Perez-Castillo, challenged a removal order, but the court's opinion primarily addresses the serious misuse of artificial intelligence in the preparation of his appellate brief. The case raises significant issues regarding attorney responsibility and the use of AI-generated content in legal filings.

1. Whether Perez-Castillo is eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), specifically: (a) whether his battery conviction constitutes a "crime of domestic violence" that bars relief, and (b) whether his wife would face "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" if he were removed.
2. Whether attorneys Abdullah Salah and Farah Chalisa should be sanctioned for submitting briefs containing numerous AI hallucinations, including fabricated quotations, false case citations, erroneous legal propositions, and factual misrepresentations contradicted by the record.
3. The appropriate standard of review for discretionary immigration relief decisions and the proper use of AI technology in legal practice.

1. On the Merits: The court denied Perez-Castillo's petition for review on multiple independent grounds. First, Perez-Castillo waived his challenge to the immigration judge's hardship determination by failing to raise it before the Board of Immigration Appeals. Second, even if the waiver issue were overcome, the record does not compel reversal under the substantial evidence standard—his wife's hardships, while real, were not "exceptional and extremely unusual" given available family support. Third, Perez-Castillo is categorically ineligible for cancellation of removal because his battery conviction against his mother and siblings constitutes a "crime of domestic violence" under federal law, which bars such relief.
2. On Attorney Sanctions: The court imposed a $5,000 fine on attorney Abdullah Salah under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c) for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. Salah violated his professional obligations by: (a) signing and submitting a brief containing approximately 24 fabricated or unattributable quotations and at least 7 mislabeled or nonexistent cases without reviewing it; (b) certifying that the brief's representations were warranted by law and supported by the record when they were not; (c) failing to review a revised brief even after the court put him on notice of serious deficiencies; and (d) submitting the revised brief without review despite knowing it might contain errors. The court reasoned that Salah's conduct displayed "egregious misjudgment" and was "inimical to the administration of justice."
3. On Attorney Chalisa: The court declined to impose monetary sanctions on Farah Chalisa at that time, finding insufficient evidence of fraud or bad faith. However, the court admonished her for her role in creating the AI-generated errors and referred the matter to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois for further investigation. The court expressed concern about: (a) the implausibility of Chalisa's explanation that such pervasive errors arose solely from a grammar check; (b) her failure to catch obvious factual errors despite being familiar with the case; and (c) potential violations of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct regarding fee-splitting arrangements and client consent.
4. Reasoning: The court emphasized that attorneys have a fundamental duty to review all work product bearing their name before submission to the court. The use of AI for "stylistic and grammatical review" does not absolve attorneys of this responsibility, particularly when AI systems are known to hallucinate facts and citations. The court noted that while not every AI error merits sanctions, this case involved egregious and pervasive misrepresentations of law and fact that undermined the integrity of the appellate process. The court also stressed that outsourcing legal work does not diminish an attorney's personal responsibility for accuracy and compliance with professional conduct rules.

This is an immigration appeal in which a Salvadoran national seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. Petitioner claims he was entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture based on alleged persecution and detention in El Salvador.

1. Whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reopen as untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), which requires such motions to be filed within 90 days of a final removal order
2. Whether Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline based on his pro se status, detention, lack of counsel, limited access to resources, and language barriers
3. Whether the BIA provided adequate reasoned decision-making in rejecting Petitioner's equitable tolling arguments

The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely. The court found that:

1. The BIA's decision satisfied the standard for reasoned decision-making by demonstrating that it understood and considered Petitioner's arguments regarding his pro se status, resource constraints, and inability to obtain new evidence until after the deadline
2. Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing due diligence required for equitable tolling because he provided only conclusory statements without specific details about his efforts to obtain counsel or prepare his motion, and he spent weeks preparing an affidavit containing largely material that was not relevant to a motion to reopen
3. Petitioner failed to establish extraordinary circumstances preventing timely filing, as lack of counsel and resources are common in deportation proceedings, and the single new piece of evidence (his partner's detention) did not justify the two-month delay in filing after learning of it

This is an appeal concerning whether a Florida attorney has Article III standing to sue debt collectors under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) for alleged violations committed against his client. The attorney sought damages for emotional distress, lost time, and reputational harm allegedly suffered while representing a consumer in a debt-collection action.

1. Whether an attorney representing a consumer in a debt-collection matter has Article III constitutional standing to sue debt collectors for FDCPA violations directed at the client rather than the attorney
2. Whether a plaintiff can establish a concrete injury in fact based on time and effort spent remedying harm suffered by another party
3. Whether professional embarrassment or reputational harm arising from an adverse development in client representation constitutes a cognizable concrete injury under Article III standing doctrine
4. The distinction between statutory standing (whether a plaintiff falls within the class authorized to sue under a statute) and Article III standing (constitutional requirement of concrete injury)

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the attorney failed to establish Article III standing. The court reasoned that: (1) all of the attorney's alleged injuries were derivative of harm suffered by his client Rodriguez, not independent injuries to the attorney himself; (2) time and effort spent remedying another party's injury cannot manufacture standing, as established in Nelson v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.; (3) the alleged reputational harm was not cognizable because the false statements concerned the client's debt, not the attorney, and no damaging information about the attorney was communicated to third parties; and (4) the attorney's embarrassment from an adverse development in client representation is merely professional disappointment, not a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing. The court emphasized that a statutory violation alone does not establish standing without a concrete, particularized injury, and that downstream consequences of another party's harm do not automatically become the plaintiff's own injury in fact.

This is a bankruptcy appeal concerning whether a bankruptcy court properly ordered the substantive consolidation of four non-debtor entities into the estate of No Rust Rebar, Inc., based on findings that the entities were alter egos of the debtor and operated as a commingled group under the sole control of Donald Smith.

1. Whether bankruptcy courts have the power to order substantive consolidation of entities found to be alter egos of a debtor
2. Whether substantive consolidation requires an adversary proceeding rather than a motion
3. Whether the non-debtor entities were entitled to an additional evidentiary hearing
4. Whether any procedural error in granting the consolidation motion was harmless

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's substantive consolidation order. The court held that: (1) bankruptcy courts have the power to order substantive consolidation where entities share substantial identity and operate as alter egos; (2) the bankruptcy court properly applied the Eastgroup factors and found that No Rust and the non-debtor entities operated as one commingled group with common ownership, location, assets, and failure to maintain corporate formalities; (3) even if substantive consolidation technically requires an adversary proceeding rather than a motion, any such procedural error was harmless because the non-debtor entities received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and they failed to demonstrate how the procedural defect affected their substantial rights; and (4) the non-debtor entities were not entitled to an additional evidentiary hearing because they raised only procedural objections and failed to challenge the bankruptcy court's factual findings or explain how additional evidence would change the outcome.

This case involves a constitutional challenge to the Hegseth Policy, an executive order and Department of Defense guidance issued in 2025 that disqualifies transgender individuals and those with a history of gender dysphoria from military service. The plaintiffs, both active-duty servicemembers and prospective enlistees, challenged the policy as violating their Fifth Amendment equal protection rights.

1. Whether the Hegseth Policy violates equal protection by discriminating based on sex, transgender status, or gender dysphoria
2. Whether the policy is rationally related to legitimate government interests in military readiness, unit cohesion, and cost reduction
3. Whether the policy is based on animus toward transgender individuals rather than legitimate military concerns
4. Whether the policy treats gender dysphoria differently from other medical conditions in the military
5. Whether a preliminary injunction should apply differently to current servicemembers versus prospective enlistees

The court affirmed the preliminary injunction as applied to current servicemembers but vacated it as applied to prospective enlistees. The majority found that plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their equal protection claim because: (1) the policy contains classifications not sufficiently related to legitimate government interests (such as disqualifying anyone with any history of gender dysphoria, even from childhood); (2) the policy is based on archaic and overbroad generalizations about sex rather than solely on medical conditions; (3) gender dysphoria is treated differently from other medical conditions without justification; and (4) the policy is motivated by animus toward transgender persons, as evidenced by the Executive Order's language characterizing transgender identity as "false" and demeaning transgender individuals as lacking honesty, humility, and integrity. The court rejected the government's argument that the policy merely regulates a medical condition, finding instead that it targets transgender individuals. However, the court distinguished between current servicemembers (who have demonstrated their fitness through years of honorable service) and prospective enlistees (where the balance of equities and public interest considerations differed), resulting in a split decision on the scope of the injunction.

This is a post-judgment interest calculation case remanded by the Delaware Supreme Court. The Court of Chancery addresses the appropriate rate and method for calculating post-judgment interest following a damages award in a business dispute between William Brown and Matterport, Inc.

1. Whether post-judgment interest should be calculated at a fixed rate of 10.50% (as mandated by 6 Del. C. § 2301 based on the Federal Discount Rate on July 1, 2024) or at an alternative rate
2. Whether post-judgment interest should be compounded and at what rate
3. Whether the court should apply a floating rate versus a fixed rate for post-judgment interest
4. Whether post-judgment interest should continue to accrue or be terminated as of a specific date

The court rejected both the plaintiff's argument for a fixed 10.50% rate and the defendants' argument for a fixed 5.25% rate. Instead, the court exercised its equitable discretion to impose a floating rate equal to 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate, compounded quarterly. The court reasoned that a fixed 10.50% rate would create an inequitable windfall for the plaintiff and effectively sanction conduct stemming from good-faith misunderstanding, while a fixed 5.25% rate would fail to fully compensate the plaintiff for the loss of use of his funds and would subsidize the defendants' retention of the judgment amount. The floating rate appropriately accounts for economic realities and significant interest rate fluctuations during the relevant period. The court also denied the defendants' request to terminate interest accrual as of June 1, 2025, holding that interest will continue to accrue until the judgment is paid in full.

This is an appeal of a criminal conviction and sentence for illegal machinegun possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The defendant challenges the sentence as a breach of the plea agreement, arguing that the government failed to genuinely advocate for a within-guidelines sentence as promised.

1. Whether the government breached the plea agreement by failing to genuinely recommend a sentence within the agreed-upon guideline range of 27-33 months
2. Whether the government's sentencing memorandum constituted "lip service" to its obligations through "wink-and-nod advocacy" designed to encourage an upward variance
3. Whether the government impermissibly emphasized community-based concerns about Puerto Rico's violence problem and the defendant's prior weapons conviction in a manner that undermined the plea agreement
4. Whether the defendant satisfied the plain error standard of review, requiring proof of an obvious, undeniable error affecting substantial rights

The First Circuit affirmed the sentence and judgment. The court held that the government did not breach the plea agreement. The court reasoned that: (1) the government affirmatively requested a within-guidelines sentence (33 months) as permitted by the agreement; (2) prosecutors are entitled to emphasize facts supporting the higher end of a guideline range when the defendant argues for the lower end; (3) community-based concerns about crime trends are properly intertwined with deterrence considerations; (4) the government's citation to case law affirming above-guidelines sentences did not constitute an implicit request for an upward variance, as the memo itself did not seek such a variance; (5) the government's reference to the defendant's prior weapons conviction as a failed deterrent was a legitimate point made in support of a high-end within-guidelines recommendation; and (6) the defendant failed to cite binding authority establishing that the government's level of emphasis on community concerns constituted a breach. The court distinguished the case from Mojica-Ramos and other precedents where prosecutors had engaged in more egregious conduct such as presenting extensive extraneous evidence, labeling crimes as "exceptional," or expressing regret about plea agreement terms. The court concluded that even assuming arguendo that some error occurred, it was not clear or obvious under current controlling law, and therefore the defendant could not satisfy the plain error standard.

This is an immigration appeal case in which a Colombian citizen challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) dismissal of her adjustment of status application and denial of her motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner's attorney failed to file a timely brief with the BIA, substantially limiting the scope of her appeal.

1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the BIA's dismissal of an adjustment of status appeal based on discretionary grounds
2. Whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel
3. Whether the petitioner substantially complied with the Lozada requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
4. Whether there was a reasonable probability of prejudice from counsel's failure to file a timely brief
5. Whether the immigration judge fulfilled her statutory duty to develop an adequate record at the hearing

The court denied the petition challenging the BIA's dismissal of the adjustment of status appeal because it lacked jurisdiction to review discretionary determinations in adjustment of status cases, and the petitioner's only exhausted claim was a discretionary challenge. However, the court granted the petition challenging the BIA's denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the BIA abused its discretion. The court held that: (1) the BIA provided no explanation for concluding that the petitioner failed to substantially comply with Lozada requirements, making meaningful review impossible; (2) there was a reasonable probability of prejudice because the immigration judge based her decision on topics never explored at the hearing, violating the judge's statutory duty to develop the record, and the petitioner's counsel had consistently attempted to raise this substantial argument; and (3) the petitioner's brief was apparently submitted to the BIA at some point. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

This is an immigration appeal in which Patria Laureano, a Dominican Republic citizen and former lawful permanent resident, challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of her applications for statutory withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) following reinstatement of her 2008 removal order after her unlawful reentry in 2009.

1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to review withholding-only and CAT relief orders absent a challenge to the underlying final order of removal, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Riley v. Bondi (2025)
2. Whether the Attorney General's opinion in Matter of Y-L- (2002), which creates a rebuttable presumption that drug trafficking crimes are "particularly serious crimes" (PSCs), is consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)'s requirement for individualized case-by-case assessments
3. Whether Laureano established sufficient evidence to qualify for CAT relief based on her fear of torture from her former partner in the Dominican Republic

The court issued a fractured decision with no majority on the withholding claim. On jurisdiction, the majority (Judges Shwartz and Fisher) held that the court has jurisdiction to review Laureano's withholding and CAT orders under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), relying on the 2023 reinstatement order as a final order of removal and Riley's recognition that courts may review withholding-only determinations. Judge Matey dissented, arguing the court lacks jurisdiction because Laureano's petition challenges only the denial of withholding relief, not a final order of removal.

On the CAT claim, the court unanimously denied relief, finding Laureano failed to demonstrate it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if removed to the Dominican Republic, particularly given that the alleged abuse occurred approximately fifteen years ago and there was no evidence of ongoing threats.

On the withholding claim, the panel deadlocked: Judge Shwartz concluded that Matter of Y-L-'s mandatory presumption violates § 1231(b)(3)(B) by precluding individualized assessment and would grant the petition and remand; Judge Fisher concluded that Matter of Y-L- is a valid exercise of delegated authority and would deny the petition; and Judge Matey would dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Because there was no majority, the petition for review was denied by an equally divided vote, leaving the BIA's decision intact without the weight of an affirmance.

This is a criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of wire fraud, identity theft, and related offenses as part of an international cybercriminal conspiracy. The defendant challenges the imposition of restitution for the first time on resentencing after his initial sentence was vacated on appeal.

1. Whether the government waived its right to request restitution by affirmatively stating at the initial sentencing that it was not seeking restitution, thereby precluding restitution on remand
2. Whether the district court complied with the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 by failing to disclose to the defendant the underlying victim loss information and calculations used to determine the restitution amount
3. Whether the imposition of restitution for the first time on resentencing constituted vindictive sentencing in violation of due process rights

The court AFFIRMED the imposition of restitution but VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing on the restitution amount. On the waiver issue, the court held that the government did not waive restitution. Following the Sixth Circuit's established precedent, a general remand "wipes the slate clean" and permits de novo resentencing, allowing parties to raise issues they may have forfeited or waived at the original sentencing. The court rejected the defendant's attempt to import appellate-forfeiture doctrines into the resentencing context. Additionally, the MVRA mandates restitution for qualifying offenses, removing judicial discretion; the defendant's wire fraud convictions triggered mandatory restitution obligations. On the procedural issue, the court found plain error. The district court violated both the MVRA and Rule 32 by failing to: (1) include information about the restitution amount in any version of the presentence report; (2) disclose to the defendant the underlying victim loss calculations and amounts; and (3) provide the defendant notice and opportunity to respond to the information relied upon in determining restitution. This violated the defendant's due process rights and the adversarial scheme established by Rule 32. On the vindictiveness issue, the court held that no presumption of vindictiveness applied because restitution was mandatory under the MVRA and should have been imposed initially. The defendant bore the risk that errors favoring him at initial sentencing could be corrected against his favor on remand. The defendant failed to raise an actual vindictiveness argument.

This is an immigration appeal in which Odinaka Ethelberth Nwosu, a Nigerian national facing removal from the United States, challenged the denial of his requests for withholding of removal and cancellation of removal. Nwosu based his withholding claim on alleged kidnapping of his father in Nigeria and his cancellation claim on the hardship his removal would cause to his U.S. citizen children.

1. Whether Nwosu adequately corroborated his testimony regarding his father's kidnapping to support his withholding-of-removal claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)
2. Whether Nwosu established that his removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his children to qualify for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)
3. The standard of review applicable to immigration judges' determinations regarding corroborating evidence and the Board's mixed questions of law and fact regarding hardship
4. Whether an immigrant's credible testimony alone is sufficient to meet the burden of proof without corroborating evidence

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Nwosu's petition for review on both claims. Regarding withholding of removal, the court held that under the highly deferential standard of review, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Nwosu should have produced corroborating evidence (such as police reports, court records of the kidnappers' prosecution, and affidavits from family members in Nigeria) to support his kidnapping claim. The court rejected Nwosu's argument that credible testimony alone must be accepted as true, noting that immigration law permits judges to require corroborating evidence. The court also found that Nwosu had adequate opportunity to explain the absence of corroborating evidence during cross-examination but provided only vague or inadequate responses. Regarding cancellation of removal, the court held that under the substantial-evidence standard, a reasonable adjudicator could conclude that Nwosu failed to demonstrate the exceptionally high threshold of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his children. The court reasoned that his children would remain in the United States where they are healthy and doing well in school, and his partner (a full-time nurse) could support them financially. The court rejected arguments based on general country conditions in Nigeria and emotional strain, finding these to be ordinary hardships that accompany any removal case.

This is a class action breach of contract case against Fifth Third Bank regarding its "Early Access" short-term loan program. The class alleges that the bank's contract contained conflicting price terms—a flat 10% transaction fee and a stated 120% Annual Percentage Rate (APR)—and that customers were actually charged APRs exceeding 120%, constituting a breach of the contract's price term.

1. Whether the voluntary-payment defense under Ohio law bars recovery when a plaintiff makes payments with full knowledge of the relevant facts, even if the plaintiff mistakenly interprets the legal consequences of those facts.
2. How "relevant facts" are defined for purposes of the voluntary-payment defense—specifically, whether knowledge of the actual APR is required or whether knowledge of the 10% fee is sufficient.
3. Whether the voluntary-payment defense is available when a contract contains two potentially conflicting price terms.
4. Whether the contract's APR disclosure was ambiguous and whether it constituted a breach of contract.

The Sixth Circuit certified two questions of law to the Supreme Court of Ohio rather than deciding the case itself. The court found that Ohio's law on the voluntary-payment defense is unsettled and unclear as applied to modern consumer contracts of adhesion with conflicting price terms. Specifically:

1. The court rejected the class's other arguments on appeal (regarding jury instructions, verdict form, and sufficiency of evidence), finding no abuse of discretion by the district court.
2. The court held that the applicability of the voluntary-payment defense is outcome-determinative and therefore certified the following questions to Ohio's Supreme Court: (1) How are "relevant facts" defined for purposes of the voluntary-payment defense? and (2) Is the voluntary-payment defense available as a matter of law for contracts that include two potentially conflicting price terms?
3. The court reasoned that while Ohio has articulated general principles of the voluntary-payment defense, its decisions provide little specificity in application, particularly regarding modern standardized consumer contracts. The court noted that Ohio's appellate courts have reached inconsistent results when applying the defense to price-related errors, and no controlling precedent from Ohio's Supreme Court addresses the specific scenario presented here.
4. The court emphasized that certification serves important federalism interests by allowing Ohio's highest court to determine how its own law applies to this recurring issue in contemporary consumer contracting, rather than having a federal court speculate about the state's law.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which a plaintiff challenged the lawfulness of a frisk and subsequent use of force during a traffic stop. The court addresses whether police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a lawsuit alleging excessive force.

1. Whether the officers violated Dannah's clearly established Fourth Amendment rights during the frisk and subsequent physical restraint
2. Whether qualified immunity protects the officers from liability for excessive force claims
3. The appropriate standard for determining when force used during active physical resistance crosses the line into unconstitutional excessiveness
4. Whether body camera footage creates genuine disputes of material fact precluding summary judgment

The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officers did not violate any clearly established Fourth Amendment right. The court reasoned that: (1) Dannah engaged in active, volitional, and conscious defiance from the start of the encounter by repeatedly refusing to place his hands on his head during the frisk; (2) when Dannah broke away mid-frisk and attempted to run, the officers were permitted to use increasing force to subdue him; (3) the force used—takedown, restraint, and punches while attempting to handcuff him—was proportionate to his continued physical resistance and did not cross clearly established constitutional lines; (4) the body camera footage established the material facts and did not create genuine disputes; and (5) the fact that no weapons were found does not undermine the officers' reasonable justification for the frisk and subsequent force. The court distinguished the plaintiff's cited cases (LaPlante and Grawey) as involving different factual circumstances without active physical resistance or involving assault on an unconscious suspect.

This is a diversity jurisdiction case involving a breach of contract claim by a Michigan trustee against a Lloyd's of London insurance syndicate for denial of coverage on fine art lost in a house fire. The district court dismissed the case, but the appellate court vacated and remanded to determine whether proper diversity jurisdiction exists.

1. Whether federal diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) when a Lloyd's Syndicate (an unincorporated association under British law) is sued by a U.S. citizen
2. How to determine the citizenship of a Lloyd's Syndicate for diversity jurisdiction purposes
3. Whether the citizenship of the Syndicate's Managing Agent (HSL) alone is sufficient to establish diversity, or whether the citizenship of all underwriting Names must be considered
4. The proper interpretation of the court's prior decision in Certain Interested Underwriters v. Layne regarding Lloyd's Syndicates and diversity jurisdiction

The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. A Lloyd's Syndicate is an unincorporated association for diversity jurisdiction purposes, and its citizenship must be determined by the citizenship of each of its members (the underwriting Names), following the Supreme Court's rule in Carden v. Arkoma Associates
2. The citizenship of the Managing Agent (HSL) alone is insufficient to establish diversity jurisdiction, as the Managing Agent is not listed on the policy and carries no liability
3. The prior Layne decision does not require a different analysis; Layne addressed only the narrow circumstance where no Syndicate was listed on the policy at all, whereas here Hiscox Syndicate 33 is clearly identified as the underwriter
4. The district court must conduct further jurisdictional discovery to determine the citizenship of each underwriting Name of Hiscox Syndicate 33 before the case can proceed on the merits

This is a trademark infringement and counterfeiting case brought by Kangol LLC against Chinese e-commerce vendors, including Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd. The central issue is whether service of process by email on a defendant in China complies with the Hague Service Convention.

1. Whether the defendant waived its service objection by engaging in settlement negotiations before challenging the default judgment
2. Whether the defendant's motion to vacate was timely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1)
3. Whether the Hague Service Convention applies when the defendant's address is disputed
4. Whether the Hague Service Convention permits service by email in China
5. Whether the default judgment order violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) regarding post-judgment collection procedures

The court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to vacate and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that: (1) the defendant did not waive its service objection through settlement discussions; (2) the motion to vacate was timely because the defendant filed it shortly after learning of judgment enforcement; (3) the Hague Service Convention is exclusive and enumerates all permissible service methods, excluding all others; (4) the Convention prohibits service by email in China because China has objected to service under Article 10(a), and no other Convention provision authorizes email service; and (5) the Rule 69(a)(1) challenge was waived and lacks merit. However, the court did not resolve whether the Convention applies at all, finding that the district court must first determine applicability by examining whether the plaintiff made reasonably diligent efforts to ascertain the defendant's address, as required by Article 1 of the Convention.

This case involves a dispute between Penske Truck Leasing and the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan regarding the plan's authority to expel one of Penske's bargaining units (Local 745) from a multiemployer pension plan and the resulting withdrawal liability calculations. The central issues concern whether the plan trustees had authority to expel a single bargaining unit and whether the effective withdrawal date must be determined through arbitration before federal court review.

1. Whether the Central States Trust Agreement grants the trustees authority to expel a single bargaining unit rather than requiring expulsion of an entire employer
2. The appropriate standard of review for interpreting ERISA-governed plan documents when the plan grants trustees discretionary interpretive authority
3. Whether the trustees' decision to expel Local 745 was arbitrary and capricious
4. Whether a dispute over the effective withdrawal date must be arbitrated under 29 U.S.C. § 1401 before proceeding in federal court
5. Whether the expulsion violates the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act's uniformity requirement or the National Labor Relations Act

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues. First, the court held that deferential review under the Firestone standard applies because the Trust Agreement explicitly grants the trustees discretionary authority to interpret plan documents. Under this deferential standard, the trustees' reasonable interpretation permitting expulsion of a single bargaining unit was upheld. Second, the court rejected Penske's arguments that the expulsion violated the MPPAA's uniformity requirement or the NLRA, finding that § 1394(b) applies only to withdrawal liability calculations and that expulsion constitutes an impasse in negotiations. Third, the court affirmed that the trustees' decision to expel Local 745 was not arbitrary and capricious, noting that the trustees owed no fiduciary duty to the employer and that Penske's complaints amounted to minor quibbles about the investigation. Finally, the court affirmed dismissal of Central States' counterclaim seeking a declaration of the effective withdrawal date, holding that 29 U.S.C. § 1401 imposes a mandatory exhaustion requirement requiring arbitration before federal court review of withdrawal liability disputes, and that no exception to this requirement applied to the unusual procedural posture of this case.

This case involves a dispute between Penske Truck Leasing and the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan regarding the plan's authority to expel one of Penske's bargaining units (Local 745) from the multiemployer pension plan and the resulting withdrawal liability calculations. The dispute arose when Central States sought to prevent Penske from manipulating its withdrawal liability by synchronizing the expiration dates of its collective bargaining agreements.

1. Whether the Central States Trust Agreement granted the Trustees authority to expel a single bargaining unit (Local 745) rather than requiring expulsion of the entire employer
2. Whether the Trustees' decision to expel Local 745 was arbitrary and capricious
3. Whether Central States' counterclaim seeking a declaration of the effective withdrawal date must be arbitrated before proceeding in federal court under 29 U.S.C. § 1401
4. The appropriate standard of review for interpreting ERISA-governed plan documents when the plan grants trustees discretionary interpretive authority

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues. First, applying deferential review under the Firestone standard, the court held that the Trustees' interpretation of the Trust Agreement—permitting expulsion of a single bargaining unit—was reasonable and entitled to deference because the Trust Agreement explicitly granted the Trustees discretionary authority to interpret its provisions. The court rejected Penske's arguments that the interpretation violated the uniform application requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 1394(b) or forced Penske to violate the National Labor Relations Act. Second, the court upheld the Trustees' decision as not arbitrary and capricious, finding that Penske's complaints amounted to minor quibbles about the investigation and that Central States owed no fiduciary duty to Penske as an employer. Third, the court affirmed dismissal of Central States' counterclaim regarding the effective withdrawal date, holding that 29 U.S.C. § 1401 imposes a mandatory exhaustion requirement mandating arbitration of all withdrawal liability disputes before federal court review, and that no exceptions to this requirement applied to the unusual procedural circumstances of this case.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in which an inmate, David Watts, sued two detectives for allegedly exposing him to risk of harm from other inmates by appearing at his cell and mentioning a letter, thereby allowing other prisoners to infer he was cooperating with law enforcement. The case also addresses the procedural issue of whether the litigation should proceed under seal with the plaintiff's identity concealed.

1. Whether detectives violated a clearly established constitutional right by exposing an inmate to risk of harm from other inmates when no actual physical injury occurred
2. Whether a prisoner can recover damages under §1983 for risk of harm or emotional injury without physical injury, in light of 42 U.S.C. §1997e(e)
3. Whether qualified immunity protects the defendants from liability
4. Whether the litigation should proceed under seal and whether the plaintiff is entitled to anonymity

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and granted qualified immunity to the defendants. The court held that: (1) no clearly established law prohibits exposing a prisoner to risk of harm that does not result in actual physical injury; (2) cases like Monfils, which involved actual death, do not establish a right to recover for unrealized risk; (3) the informant privilege belongs to prosecutors, not informants, and does not create a constitutional right to confidentiality; (4) the Constitution does not ensure that crimes can be solved painlessly; and (5) the plaintiff failed to identify a violation of a clearly established right necessary for §1983 recovery. Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiff's request for anonymity, finding it inappropriate for adult litigants in civil litigation and noting that the plaintiff surrendered any entitlement to anonymity by initiating litigation based on allegations of his own exposure to risk.

This case involves a petition for review of the SEC's approval of IEX Options, a new options exchange designed to combat latency arbitrage through a 350-microsecond access delay ("speedbump") and an Options Risk Parameter tool. Citadel Securities, a major high-frequency trader and market maker, challenged the SEC's approval on multiple grounds.

1. Whether substantial evidence supports the SEC's finding that latency arbitrage exists in and harms the options market
2. Whether substantial evidence supports the SEC's finding that the Options Risk Parameter accurately targets latency arbitrage without substantially impeding ordinary trading
3. Whether quotations subject to the Options Risk Parameter qualify as "protected quotations" under the Options Plan
4. Whether the IEX Options proposal is "designed to permit unfair discrimination" in violation of the Exchange Act
5. Whether the IEX Options proposal imposes an undue burden on competition not necessary to further the Exchange Act's purposes

The Eleventh Circuit denied Citadel's petition and upheld the SEC's approval of IEX Options. The court found: (1) substantial evidence supports the SEC's findings that latency arbitrage exists in options markets and that the Options Risk Parameter accurately targets it, based on market participant comments, SEC expertise, and market structure analysis; (2) quotes subject to the Options Risk Parameter meet the legal definition of "protected quotations" under the Options Plan; (3) the Options Risk Parameter does not unfairly discriminate because it is a reasonable, commensurate risk protection that benefits the broader market by incentivizing market makers to provide more liquidity at better prices; and (4) the proposal does not impose an undue burden on competition—rather, it promotes competition among market makers and exchanges while furthering the Exchange Act's core purposes of protecting investors and ensuring efficient, fair execution. The court applied highly deferential arbitrary-and-capricious review, noting that the SEC's technical expertise and policy judgments warrant particular deference.

This is an insurance coverage dispute in which Florida East Coast Holdings Corporation seeks reimbursement for expenses incurred to remove and reinstall railroad crossing gates as a precautionary measure before Hurricane Irma in 2017, as well as lost revenues during the preventative period. The insurers denied coverage based on a deductible calculation, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers.

1. Which policy provisions provide coverage for Florida East Coast's preventative expenses and lost revenues—specifically whether the "Protection and Preservation of Property" provisions are the only applicable provisions, or whether the "Expenses to Reduce Loss," "Business Interruption/Loss of Income," and "Consequential Loss" provisions also apply.
2. How to calculate the applicable deductible under a "Named Windstorm" clause that specifies "5% of property values at locations damaged" or $750,000, whichever is greater, when no locations were actually damaged.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's decision. The court held that: (1) the "Protection and Preservation of Property" provisions in Sections B and C of the policy provide the relevant coverage for Florida East Coast's claimed expenses, while the "Expenses to Reduce Loss," "Business Interruption/Loss of Income," and "Consequential Loss" provisions do not apply because they require actual physical loss or damage to have occurred, which did not happen here; and (2) the applicable deductible is $750,000, not the $10.9+ million calculated by the district court, because the deductible provision requires calculation based on "property values at locations damaged," and since no locations were damaged, the 5% calculation yields $0, making the $750,000 minimum deductible applicable. The court reasoned that the plain language of the policy provisions and the principle of reading insurance policies as a whole supported this interpretation, and that Florida East Coast's claimed losses of $5,605,881 exceed the $750,000 deductible, entitling it to potential recovery.

This is a federal drug trafficking appeal in which Raul Flores-Hernandez, a 73-year-old Mexican national known as "El Tio," challenged his 21-year-10-month sentence for conspiring to distribute and import cocaine into the United States. Flores appealed on multiple grounds related to his sentencing calculation under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

1. Whether a district court may use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard (rather than beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard) to make factual findings at sentencing
2. Whether the evidence sufficiently supported the district court's findings that Flores exercised control over others and that his criminal activity involved at least five participants, thereby qualifying for a four-level enhancement under Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role)
3. Whether Flores was eligible for a zero-point-offender reduction under Sentencing Guideline § 4C1.1, which requires that a defendant both not receive an aggravating-role adjustment and not be engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's sentence on all grounds. First, the court held that district courts may properly use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard when making factual findings at sentencing, rejecting Flores' argument that a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies. Second, the court found that testimony from two cooperating witnesses (Mario Pinedo Alvarez Correa and Jack Sinuhe Almaguer-Ramirez) sufficiently established that Flores exercised control over approximately 20 people in his drug trafficking organization and that his criminal activity involved at least five participants, thereby supporting the four-level aggravating-role enhancement. Third, the court held that Flores was ineligible for the zero-point-offender reduction because the Guideline's tenth condition requires that a defendant satisfy both prongs—not receiving an aggravating-role adjustment AND not being engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise—connected by the conjunction "and." Since Flores received the aggravating-role adjustment, he failed to meet this condition regardless of whether he engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. The court's interpretation aligned with the Supreme Court's decision in Pulsifer v. United States and with all other federal circuits that had addressed this question.

This is an administrative law case in which ModernWest Longmont, LLC, a property developer, sought judicial review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) letters sent to the City of Longmont advising that ModernWest's proposed mixed-use housing developments would violate federal grant assurances. ModernWest requested that the court vacate and withdraw the FAA's letters so the City would reconsider its rejection of the proposal.

1. Whether ModernWest has standing to challenge FAA's letters, specifically whether ModernWest satisfied the three-part standing test: (a) injury in fact, (b) causation fairly traceable to FAA's actions, and (c) likelihood that judicial relief would redress the injury
2. Whether ModernWest complied with the D.C. Circuit's Rule 28(a)(7) requirement to argue standing and provide supporting evidence in its opening brief
3. Whether vacating FAA's letters would likely result in the City approving ModernWest's proposed developments, given the City's multiple independent reasons for denial

The court dismissed ModernWest's petition for review on two independent grounds. First, ModernWest lacked standing because it failed to demonstrate that a favorable court decision would redress its injury. The court found that even if FAA withdrew its letters, the City would remain legally bound by Grant Assurance 21 and would be free to deny the project based on other independent rationales, including: (1) CDOT's findings regarding state grant assurance violations; (2) the City's own determination that the development was incompatible with surrounding land uses; and (3) community opposition based on safety, noise, and liability concerns. ModernWest presented no evidence that the City would abandon these other rationales if the FAA letters were withdrawn, making redressability speculative rather than likely. Second, ModernWest violated Circuit Rule 28(a)(7) by failing to argue standing or cite supporting evidence in its opening brief, instead making only bare assertions of standing. The court found no good cause to excuse this procedural violation.

This is a foreign sovereign immunity case in which Global Voice Group SA, a Seychellois company, sought confirmation of an arbitral award and recognition of a foreign court judgment against the Republic of Guinea following a contractual dispute over telecommunications services. The district court dismissed both claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Guinea's sovereign immunity.

1. Whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's (FSIA) arbitration exception abrogates Guinea's sovereign immunity in an action to confirm an arbitral award, specifically whether an arbitration agreement must bind the foreign state as a party or can bind it as a nonparty
2. Whether the FSIA's arbitration exception applies to actions seeking recognition of foreign court judgments on arbitral awards
3. Whether a nation implicitly waives sovereign immunity by signing the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards

The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of the award-confirmation claim and remanded it to the district court. The court held that the district court failed to properly apply the test from TIG Insurance v. Republic of Argentina, which requires determining what source of law governs the enforcement of the arbitration agreement and whether, under that law, the agreement legally binds the sovereign to arbitrate—whether as a party or nonparty. The court affirmed the dismissal of the judgment-recognition claim, holding that the FSIA's arbitration exception does not extend to foreign court judgments (only to arbitral awards themselves) and that signing the New York Convention does not constitute an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity from judgment recognition actions.

This is a breach of contract case arising from a real estate transaction between long-time friends. Plaintiff Husbands sold his home to Defendants Hamilton and his wife for $130,000 (the mortgage balance) with an alleged agreement that Defendants would repay Husbands $200,000 or more from the sale proceeds when they resold the property in 2-3 years, but Defendants refused to make the payment after selling the property for $557,000.

1. Whether the parties formed a binding contract based on text messages and subsequent conduct, despite the absence of a written agreement memorializing the $200,000 repayment obligation
2. Whether the contract terms were sufficiently definite to be enforceable
3. Whether integration clauses in the Sales Agreement and Lease foreclosed the alleged contract
4. Whether Defendants' unexpected renovation expenses justified declining to enforce the contract as a matter of equity
5. Whether Husbands' alternative claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud were cognizable or duplicative of the breach of contract claim

The court entered judgment for Husbands on his breach of contract claim. The court found that the parties formed a binding contract through text messages exchanged on November 23, 2020, and subsequent conduct demonstrating their intent to be bound. The contract terms were sufficiently definite: Defendants agreed to purchase the property as an investment, pay off the mortgage, rent it back to Husbands, make repairs, resell it in 2-3 years, and repay Husbands $200,000 or more from the proceeds. The integration clauses in the later Sales Agreement and Lease did not foreclose this contract because those documents addressed different subject matters (the purchase and lease transactions) and did not purport to address the future sale proceeds obligation. The court rejected Defendants' equity argument regarding renovation expenses, finding that Defendants purchased the property "as is," bore the investment risk, and had ample opportunity to inspect the property beforehand. Husbands is entitled to $200,000 in damages plus prejudgment interest accruing from January 5, 2024 (the sale closing date). The court declined to reach Husbands' alternative claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud as duplicative of the successful breach of contract claim, and denied Husbands' request for attorney's fees under the American Rule.

This case involves a breach of contract dispute between Shore Community Energy LLC and MassAmerican Development LLC regarding four Membership Interest Purchase Agreements for solar energy companies. Shore Community seeks damages for MassAmerican's failure to make required payments under the agreements.

1. Whether indemnification provisions in the MIPAs constitute the exclusive remedy for breach of contract claims, thereby precluding damages.
2. Whether a six-month survival period for indemnity claims bars Plaintiff's damages claim filed seven months after the alleged breaches occurred.
3. Whether Plaintiff's request for damages can be recharacterized as a request for specific performance (an equitable remedy) to circumvent the indemnity exclusivity clause.
4. Whether Plaintiff has proven entitlement to the damages sought, including unpaid rent, development expenses, equipment deposits, and IRS safe harboring expenses.

The court DENIED Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment as to Damages. The court held that: (1) Section 7.2(g) of the MIPAs makes indemnification the exclusive monetary remedy for breach, and Section 7.1 imposes a six-month survival period for indemnity claims; (2) because the breaches occurred between December 12, 2024 and March 15, 2025, but Plaintiff did not file suit until October 10, 2025 (seven months later), the indemnity claim is time-barred; (3) Plaintiff's argument that indemnity is exclusive only for the first six months, after which other remedies become available, is inconsistent with the plain language of the MIPAs; (4) Plaintiff's attempt to recharacterize the damages request as specific performance fails because specific performance does not encompass orders to pay money, and the court has already granted specific performance by ordering return of the membership interests; and (5) even if the indemnity provisions were ignored, Plaintiff has not met its burden to prove damages, as it is not a party to the leases and would be unjustly enriched by recovering both the membership interests and the development costs.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving a dispute between co-founders of LawIQ, Inc. over the validity of a restricted stock agreement and whether a controlling shareholder breached fiduciary duties by terminating a minority shareholder to trigger a share reacquisition right. The court addresses a motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment.

1. Whether a fiduciary duty claim arising from the same facts as a contract obligation (the Restricted Stock Agreement) is barred as superfluous under Nemec v. Shrader
2. Whether summary judgment is appropriate when the defendant's motivations and intent are disputed factual matters
3. Whether the controlling shareholder breached fiduciary duties by terminating the minority shareholder without cause to avoid paying fair market value for his shares

The court denied the motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that: (1) summary judgment is not appropriate when ultimate facts involve motive, intention, or other subjective matters; (2) the fiduciary duty claim does not wholly overlap with the contract claim because it centers on Moldenhauer's conduct and motivations surrounding the exercise of the Reacquisition Right; (3) questions about Moldenhauer's motivations are disputed and factually complex and cannot be resolved on the sparse materials presented; and (4) it is not reasonably certain that there is no triable issue, making trial necessary to properly explore the facts and apply the law.

This case involves a creditor's derivative action against the board of directors of an insolvent software company (BERA) for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in mismanaging a failed sale process. The creditor, CIBC Bank USA, also brings claims for aiding and abetting and tortious interference with contract against certain defendants.

1. Whether a creditor of an insolvent corporation has standing to bring derivative fiduciary duty claims
2. Whether creditors are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 for demand futility in derivative actions
3. Whether demand on the board was excused as futile under the Zuckerberg standard
4. Whether the complaint states a claim for tortious interference with contract

The court granted the motions to dismiss Counts I through IV (the derivative fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting claims) under Rule 23.1 because CIBC failed to adequately plead that demand on the board would have been futile. The court rejected CIBC's argument that creditors should be held to a lower pleading standard, holding that Rule 23.1's plain text applies equally to all derivative plaintiffs. The court found that CIBC failed to plead with particularity that a majority of the board members either received material personal benefits from the alleged misconduct or faced a substantial likelihood of liability on non-exculpated claims. The court noted that the board's decision to pursue higher valuations rather than accept lower offers constituted a protected business judgment, and CIBC's allegations of bad faith were conclusory and lacked sufficient particularity. However, the court denied the motion to dismiss Count V (tortious interference) as to Barker, finding it reasonably conceivable that Barker acted outside his corporate authority by threatening to loot assets for personal gain, thereby interfering with BERA's obligations to CIBC. The court dismissed Count V as to Peak, finding no well-pleaded facts showing Peak engaged in conduct that was a significant factor in causing the breach.

This is a Delaware Chancery Court case in which Zync, Inc., an automotive technology startup, sued Porsche Investments Management and related entities for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The dispute arose after Porsche's designated board director allegedly used his veto rights to block the Company's access to third-party financing while Porsche itself failed to provide promised capital, ultimately causing the Company to shut down.

1. Whether a director designated by a major investor faces a conflict of interest (dual fiduciary problem) when the investor's interests diverge from the company's interests
2. Whether a director can breach fiduciary duties through conscious inaction and delay in approving transactions
3. Whether a party can be liable for aiding and abetting a director's breach of fiduciary duty through instructions and control
4. Whether intentional interference with prospective economic advantage requires independently tortious conduct or merely improper conduct
5. Whether a party breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by exercising contractual veto rights maliciously and without rational justification
6. Whether a contractual exculpation clause can shield a party from liability for intentional and bad faith acts

The court denied Porsche's and Knörle's motions to dismiss all four counts:

1. Count I (Breach of Fiduciary Duty): The court held that Knörle faced a dual fiduciary conflict as both a Company director and Porsche employee. The complaint adequately pleaded that Knörle acted disloyally by repeatedly deferring to Porsche's instructions to block the VC and PE financings, and by extracting confidential competitive information at Porsche's direction. The court rejected Porsche's argument that its financial interest in the Company precluded a conflict, reasoning that Porsche could rationally sacrifice its investment to gain competitive advantage over rivals seeking access to the Company's technology. The complaint also sufficiently alleged bad faith through Knörle's pattern of delay, obstruction, and participation in what appeared to be a "bait-and-switch" regarding bridge financing.
2. Count II (Aiding and Abetting): The court found that the complaint adequately pleaded all four elements of aiding and abetting liability. Porsche knowingly participated in Knörle's breaches by instructing him to block financing and extract confidential information. The court distinguished this case from third-party acquirer scenarios, noting that an affiliate of a culpable fiduciary is differently situated and can be liable for aiding and abetting through instructions and control.
3. Count III (Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage): The court held that the claim states a viable tort and clarified that "tortious interference" does not require independently tortious conduct but rather "improper" conduct as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court found that Porsche's use of wrongful means (causing Knörle to breach his fiduciary duty) to interfere with the VC and PE financings constituted improper interference, even though Porsche had contractual veto rights, because those rights were exercised through a breach of duty.
4. Count IV (Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing): The court held that the implied covenant applies to constrain Porsche's exercise of its discretionary veto rights under the Investor Agreement. While Porsche could legitimately use its veto to protect its interests or for rational contractual purposes, the complaint adequately alleged that Porsche exercised the veto maliciously and without any justification rationally grounded in the contractual relationship—specifically, to prevent competitors from accessing the Company's technology while the Company collapsed. This breached the implied covenant.
5. Exculpation Clause Defense: The court rejected Porsche's reliance on the Exculpation Provision in the Voting Agreement for three independent reasons: (1) the provision is ambiguous and susceptible to the Company's reasonable interpretation; (2) Delaware law prohibits exculpation for intentional and bad faith acts regardless of contract language; and (3) the 2024 Governance Agreement Amendment does not authorize provisions contrary to settled Delaware public policy prohibiting elimination of liability for intentional or bad faith conduct.

This case involves two consolidated appeals concerning whether federal prisoners sentenced before the First Step Act of 2018 can use the Act's nonretroactive sentencing amendments as grounds for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Daniel Rutherford and Johnnie Carter were sentenced to lengthy mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. §924(c) before Congress eliminated the 25-year stacking requirement for first-time offenders, but the amendment was not made retroactive to those already sentenced.

1. Whether the sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive change to §924(c) can constitute an "extraordinary and compelling reason" that warrants a sentence reduction under the compassionate release provision
2. Whether the terms "extraordinary and compelling" in §3582(c)(1)(A)(i) are sufficiently flexible to encompass consideration of nonretroactive sentencing amendments
3. Whether the Sentencing Commission's 2023 amended policy statement permitting consideration of "Unusually Long Sentences" created by nonretroactive legal changes is consistent with the statute
4. The proper scope of district court discretion when considering factors for compassionate release eligibility versus factors for determining the extent of a sentence reduction

The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision, holding that when Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive, the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an "extraordinary and compelling" reason warranting compassionate release. The Court reasoned that: (1) nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties are the norm rather than extraordinary; (2) Congress's deliberate decision not to extend reduced penalties to those already sentenced reflects its interest in finality and cannot be a compelling reason to override that choice; (3) compassionate release has historically been defined by a prisoner's personal circumstances (medical condition, age, family circumstances) rather than sentencing policy disagreements; (4) the terms "extraordinary and compelling" have limits and do not encompass any consideration a court deems relevant; (5) the gatekeeping requirement for eligibility is distinct from the §3553(a) factors used to determine the extent of reduction; and (6) to the extent the Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement permits consideration of nonretroactive changes in law, it conflicts with the statute and is invalid. The Court rejected arguments that Congress's single express limitation on rehabilitation implied authorization to consider all other factors, and cautioned against allowing judges to use compassionate release to circumvent mandatory minimum sentences based on policy disagreements.

This is a federal criminal procedure case addressing whether a federal prisoner can challenge the validity of his conviction through a compassionate release motion under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A), rather than through the more restrictive postconviction relief procedures under 28 U.S.C. §2255. Joe Fernandez, convicted of murder for hire based largely on witness testimony he claims was unreliable, sought sentence reduction by arguing his conviction was invalid.

1. Whether challenges to the validity of a conviction can be raised as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for compassionate release under §3582(c)(1)(A)
2. Whether allowing such challenges through §3582 would circumvent the procedural requirements of §2255, including its one-year statute of limitations, one-motion rule, and procedural default requirements
3. Whether the different forms of relief offered by §2255 (conviction vacatur) and §3582 (sentence reduction) affect the analysis
4. Whether actual innocence claims constitute an exception to any categorical bar on conviction-validity challenges in compassionate release motions

The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's reversal of the District Court's grant of compassionate release. The Court held that a prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through §2255, not §3582. The supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that justify compassionate release. The Court reasoned that: (1) §2255 is the specific federal habeas statute designed to govern collateral attacks on federal convictions and imposes tight procedural constraints; (2) allowing prisoners to challenge convictions through §3582 would circumvent §2255's exacting requirements, including its statute of limitations, one-motion rule, and procedural default rules; (3) the structural design of §3582 reflects its focus on granting mercy for personal circumstances (age, illness, rehabilitation) rather than righting legal wrongs; (4) the Bureau of Prisons' role in evaluating compassionate release motions suggests the statute is designed for assessing personal circumstances, not legal arguments about trial errors; (5) decades of Sentencing Commission policy statements have tied compassionate release to personal circumstances and never mentioned conviction invalidity; and (6) when a prisoner persuades a court that his conviction is invalid, the fitting remedy is to vacate it under §2255, not merely to reduce the sentence under §3582. The Court distinguished between prisoners seeking compassionate release based on personal circumstances (which do not suggest conviction invalidity) and those seeking release based on alleged problems with the criminal investigation or trial (which do suggest conviction invalidity). The nature of the arguments presented determines whether a motion challenges conviction validity. The Court rejected Fernandez's backup argument that actual innocence claims must be cognizable under §3582, holding that such claims lie "close to the core of habeas corpus" and do not provide a shortcut around postconviction statutes.

This is a capital murder case involving a Batson challenge to the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to exclude black prospective jurors from the jury. The case addresses whether the defendant waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for striking four black jurors during jury selection.

1. Whether the trial court properly conducted all three steps of the Batson inquiry to determine if peremptory strikes were based on race
2. Whether the defendant waived his Batson objection by failing to argue pretext at the trial court level
3. Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver determination was an unreasonable application of clearly established Batson precedents under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
4. Whether the trial court's assurance that the Batson objection was "in the record" preserved the defendant's right to argue pretext on appeal

The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson precedents and unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons. The Court found that: (1) the trial court erroneously omitted Batson's critical third step by failing to afford defense counsel an opportunity to argue that the prosecutor's stated reasons were pretextual; (2) Pitchford did not waive his Batson objection, particularly given the trial court's explicit assurance that the objection was preserved in the record; (3) at the point after the prosecutor offered race-neutral reasons, the Batson objection necessarily included a pretext argument, so distinguishing between a preserved "Batson objection" and a waived "pretext argument" was unreasonable; and (4) under AEDPA's deferential standard, deference does not mean abdication, and the record compelled the conclusion that the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver finding was unreasonable.

This case addresses the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption for workers engaged in interstate commerce. Specifically, the Court considers whether a franchisee distributor who operates entirely within one state (Colorado) but transports goods that originated from out-of-state bakeries qualifies for the statutory exemption from mandatory arbitration.

1. Whether a worker must cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do to qualify as "engaged in interstate commerce" under 9 U.S.C. §1 of the Federal Arbitration Act
2. Whether a worker performing an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can be considered engaged in interstate commerce
3. The proper interpretation of "engaged in interstate commerce" as used in the FAA's employment contracts exemption

The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision and held that a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can qualify for §1's exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do. The Court reasoned that the statutory language "engaged in interstate commerce" means to "take part in" or be "employed" or "involved" in the transportation of goods "between points in one state and points in another state." This necessarily includes intrastate activity that forms part of a continuous interstate journey. The Court relied on historical precedent, particularly The Daniel Ball (1871), which held that a steamer operating entirely within Michigan was engaged in interstate commerce because it transported goods destined for other states. The Court rejected Flowers' bright-line rule requiring workers to either cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do, finding no textual support for such a requirement. The Court noted that while other factors (such as whether a contract is with an independent business entity or whether title to goods changes hands) might be relevant to §1's scope, Flowers did not ask the Court to decide their legal significance and instead relied solely on the rejected bright-line rule.

This is a federal drug trafficking appeal in which Adam Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl. Johnson challenges the admission of his grand jury testimony and plea/cooperation agreements, his sentencing enhancement for leadership role, and the denial of credit for acceptance of responsibility.

1. Whether the district court erred in denying Johnson's motions in limine to exclude his grand jury testimony and statements made pursuant to plea and cooperation agreements, and whether an evidentiary hearing was required before ruling on these motions
2. Whether Johnson knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea and cooperation agreements despite signing them without his appointed counsel present
3. Whether the district court properly relied on statements from a deceased witness (Englehart) in applying a four-point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for Johnson's role as an organizer or leader
4. Whether Johnson should have received credit for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 based on his pretrial cooperation, despite proceeding to trial

The First Circuit affirmed Johnson's conviction and sentence on all grounds:

1. Motions in Limine: Johnson's argument that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing was unpreserved because he never requested one below. Under plain error review, there was no clear or obvious error because Johnson failed to present material facts in genuine dispute supported by evidence (such as sworn affidavits). Substantively, Johnson's own grand jury testimony established that he knowingly and voluntarily entered the agreements—he testified that he had sufficient time to review them with substitute counsel, felt comfortable proceeding, and understood the consequences of breach.
2. Sentencing Enhancement: The court properly applied the four-point leadership enhancement under § 3B1.1. Although Englehart (a deceased coconspirator) could not be cross-examined, her grand jury testimony contained sufficient indicia of reliability and was corroborated by trial testimony from other witnesses. The statements were included in the PSR with proper notice, and Johnson had opportunity to challenge them. The evidence showed Johnson recruited individuals, gave directions, coordinated drug purchases and sales, and exercised control over others in the conspiracy.
3. Acceptance of Responsibility: The court did not clearly err in denying acceptance-of-responsibility credit. Although Johnson's extensive cooperation was acknowledged, cooperation alone does not overcome the presumption against such credit when a defendant goes to trial and disputes factual guilt. The court properly noted that Johnson continued to contradict the jury's verdict in his PSR objections and lacked humility at allocution. The court appropriately gave Johnson some credit through a below-Guidelines variance sentence rather than a formal adjustment.

This is a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in which two relators alleged that Barton Associates, Inc. operated a fraudulent scheme to induce medical providers to submit false claims to Medicare and other government benefit programs. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to plead fraud with the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and the relators appealed.

1. Whether the relators adequately pleaded fraud with particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in an inducement-based False Claims Act claim
2. Whether the district court properly applied the "more flexible standard" for inducement-based FCA claims, which permits relators to allege particular details of a fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia that false claims were actually submitted, rather than requiring identification of specific false claims
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the relators' motion for reconsideration and, alternatively, their request for leave to amend the complaint

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on all grounds. The court held that although the district court correctly applied the more flexible standard for inducement-based FCA claims, the relators' complaint failed to satisfy Rule 9(b) because it lacked reliable indicia that false claims were actually submitted to government programs. Specifically, the complaint alleged that patients were "Medicare eligible" but failed to allege that any particular patients were actually enrolled in or covered by Medicare or other government programs, leaving a critical gap in the pleading. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to amend because the relators did not properly move to amend before judgment was entered and made only a passing request during the motion to dismiss hearing, which is insufficient under Rule 15(a). Finally, the court affirmed the denial of the motion for reconsideration because the relators merely reiterated their earlier arguments without establishing manifest error of law or presenting newly discovered evidence as required by Rule 59(e).

This is a putative class action brought by four Worcester County residents against the Massachusetts State Police Superintendent alleging that the MSP secretly recorded phone conversations with civilians without consent and withheld those recordings from prosecutors in criminal cases. The plaintiffs sought prospective relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

1. Whether the plaintiffs have standing to bring a § 1983 claim for prospective relief against the Superintendent in his official capacity
2. Whether the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity doctrine bars the claim under the Ex parte Young exception
3. Whether the plaintiffs adequately alleged a concrete and imminent injury in fact necessary to establish standing for prospective relief
4. Whether generalized grievances about an allegedly unlawful government program, without specific allegations of future personal harm, satisfy the standing requirement

The First Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring their § 1983 claim. The court reasoned that: (1) because only prospective relief is available under Ex parte Young and the Eleventh Amendment, plaintiffs must establish standing for prospective relief; (2) the plaintiffs' allegations constitute a generalized grievance about an allegedly unlawful program rather than a particularized injury affecting them personally; (3) the plaintiffs failed to allege that they face a "substantial risk" or "certainly impending" future prosecution affected by the record-and-withhold program—their allegations are merely conclusory and hypothetical; and (4) prior prosecutions and the widespread nature of the program cannot substitute for allegations of a sufficiently real and immediate threat of future harm. The court distinguished the case from situations where a plaintiff has previously suffered an injury and faces a substantial likelihood of recurrence.

This is a maritime shipping dispute in which an importer (SLT Imports) sued a cargo carrier (SAR Transport Systems) for fraud in the execution and breach of contract after the carrier allegedly released goods to a third party without the required endorsed bills of lading. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the fraud claim.

1. Whether SLT adequately pleaded a claim for fraud in the execution under the applicable legal standard
2. Whether the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act's (COGSA) one-year limitations period bars SLT's fraud claim
3. Whether the deviation doctrine exempts carriers from COGSA's limitations period when they commit misdelivery
4. Whether equitable estoppel applies to prevent SAR from relying on COGSA's statute of limitations

The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings, holding that SLT's fraud-in-the-execution claim fails on multiple grounds. First, SLT failed to adequately plead fraud in the execution because it did not allege that it lacked knowledge of the endorsement requirement; rather, it alleged that SAR breached its contractual obligation to release cargo only upon presentation of an endorsed bill of lading. The court found that SLT's claim was essentially a breach of contract claim disguised as fraud. Second, the claim is time-barred under COGSA's one-year limitations period. Each bill of lading constitutes a separate contract with its own limitations period, and SLT did not file suit until August 31, 2022—well beyond one year from the alleged fraudulent deliveries occurring between August 2015 and June 2016. Third, the deviation doctrine does not apply because misdelivery of cargo is not a quasi-deviation under COGSA; the deviation doctrine applies only to geographic deviations or variations that increase the risk of shipment, not to failures to comply with delivery conditions. Fourth, equitable estoppel does not apply because SAR's alleged secret intent to breach the contract did not prevent SLT from suing within the one-year period. The court reasoned that COGSA's limitations period is a procedural constraint on when suits may be brought, distinct from the allocation of risk, and therefore the deviation doctrine does not vitiate the time bar.

This is a criminal tax prosecution case in which two executives of a software company, Gregory Gentner and Richard Brasser, were convicted of five felony counts of willfully failing to pay over federal trust-fund taxes withheld from employee wages in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202. The defendants appealed their convictions and the district court's denial of their motion for a new trial.

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to review the indictment during deliberations
2. Whether the jury instructions were inconsistent with the IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program and failed to properly instruct the jury about the defendants' ability to pay trust-fund taxes when due
3. Whether the jury instructions on willfulness and the good faith defense were confusing, misleading, and prejudicial to the defendants
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendants' Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on insufficient evidence of willfulness and failure to weigh evidence of the defendants' cooperation with the IRS

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial. The court held that: (1) the trial court properly allowed the jury to review the indictment because the jury received an unequivocal instruction that the indictment was not evidence; (2) the jury instructions on willfulness were proper and consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent, which recognizes that intentional preference of other creditors over the United States establishes willfulness, and the defendants were only charged for tax quarters after they entered the Disclosure Program; (3) the jury instructions as a whole were clear and not confusing or misleading—the good faith defense was properly explained as applying to all charges, and the defendants were able to present a robust defense; and (4) the evidence of willfulness was overwhelming, as the defendants repeatedly failed to pay trust-fund taxes despite multiple IRS warnings, continued to pay themselves substantial salaries, funded an unrelated lawsuit, and received post-closure client payments without paying the IRS, demonstrating an intentional preference for other creditors and a pattern of non-compliance that clearly established willfulness.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which a defendant convicted of marijuana trafficking challenges the district court's denial of sentencing safety valve relief and the resulting 60-month sentence. The defendant argued he met all requirements for safety valve relief, which would have allowed the court to impose a sentence below the statutory five-year minimum.

1. Whether a high-speed vehicular chase to evade law enforcement constitutes "use of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2), which is a disqualifying factor for sentencing safety valve relief.
2. Whether the defendant met all five statutory requirements for safety valve relief.
3. Whether the resulting 60-month sentence was excessive.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of safety valve relief and the 60-month sentence. The court held that the defendant's high-speed car chase at speeds exceeding 135 mph, during which he struck another vehicle while fleeing law enforcement, constituted "use of violence" under § 3553(f)(2). The court reasoned that such reckless vehicular flight poses a very real threat of serious physical injury to other motorists and pursuing officers, and the actual collision demonstrated the application of physical force. Because the defendant failed to meet the safety valve requirement of not using violence in connection with the offense, he was ineligible for safety valve relief. Therefore, the statutory minimum sentence of 60 months was properly imposed and could not be deemed excessive.

This is a breach-of-contract case involving a commercial real estate loan where the borrower disputes the lender's right to retain excess building revenue in a special account following a tenant's bankruptcy filing during the COVID-19 pandemic. The dispute centers on the interpretation of contractual provisions governing the duration and application of funds held in a "Sweep Account."

1. Whether the Cash Management Agreement (CMA) unambiguously permits the loan servicer to hold excess cash flow (Excess Cash Flow) in a Sweep Account until a "Cash Sweep Cure" occurs, or whether it requires monthly disbursement of such funds to the borrower.
2. Whether the contract language in Section 3.4(i) and 3.4(j) of the CMA, read in conjunction with Section 6.3(b) of the Loan Agreement, is ambiguous regarding the parties' intent regarding the duration of funds held as additional security.
3. Whether a breach-of-contract claim can be dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when the contract language is ambiguous.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that the Loan Agreement and CMA are ambiguous because both parties offer reasonable interpretations of the contract terms. The court found that Aberdeen Developers' interpretation—requiring monthly disbursement of Excess Cash Flow under Section 3.4(j)—is reasonable because the opening language of Section 3.4 specifies disbursements occur "each Collection Period" (monthly), and the contract does not expressly clarify how long funds may be held in the Sweep Account. The court also found that Wells Fargo and LNR Partners' interpretation—permitting retention of funds until a Cash Sweep Cure occurs—is equally reasonable based on Section 6.3(b) of the Loan Agreement, which contemplates funds being "held" during the "continuance of a Cash Sweep Trigger Event." Because the contract is ambiguous, interpretation is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

This is an insurance coverage dispute in which Ronald and Ellen Saslow sought additional payments from their insurer, Bankers Standard Insurance, following a car accident, arguing they should be permitted to "stack" their coverage limits across multiple vehicles and policies to recover more than the stated limits.

1. Whether the Saslows could stack coverage limits for medical expenses and uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage across multiple vehicles and between their auto and umbrella policies
2. Whether the "other insurance" provision entitled the Saslows to additional recovery based on the involvement of a rental car and multiple tortfeasors
3. Whether Bankers Standard's delay in paying claims constituted vexatious and unreasonable conduct under Illinois Insurance Code Section 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/155, warranting attorney fees and penalties

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Bankers Standard. The court held that: (1) both the auto and umbrella policies contained unambiguous anti-stacking language that prohibited the Saslows from recovering multiple times for a single occurrence, regardless of the number of vehicles, premiums paid, or policy pages listing the limits; (2) the "other insurance" provision did not apply because the other vehicle involved in the accident was adequately insured, not underinsured; (3) the Saslows' argument regarding multiple tortfeasors was underdeveloped and waived; and (4) although Bankers Standard was two months late in paying, the delay did not constitute vexatious and unreasonable conduct because the company made good-faith attempts to pay and the record showed no intentional wrongdoing, thus no attorney fees or penalties were warranted under Illinois law.

This is a First Amendment retaliation case in which Kathleen Hayes, a Northwestern University administrator, sued Matthew Lyons (Chicago Public Schools' Chief Talent Officer) and the Board of Education after being terminated following Lyons's complaint to her supervisors about her critical social media posts regarding CPS. The district court denied Lyons's qualified immunity defense, and Lyons appealed.

1. Whether the Seventh Circuit has jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of qualified immunity when the appeal raises purely legal issues
2. Whether the Board of Education is a proper party to appeal a qualified immunity defense that is personal to Lyons
3. Whether Lyons is entitled to qualified immunity for sending an email to Hayes's supervisors complaining about her protected speech
4. Whether prior caselaw clearly established that Lyons's conduct violated Hayes's First Amendment rights

The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Lyons and dismissed the Board from the appeal. The court held that: (1) it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the defendants conceded the facts and raised purely legal issues; (2) the Board lacked standing to appeal because qualified immunity is a personal defense unavailable to governmental entities, and the Board's indemnification obligation and concern about inconsistent verdicts were insufficient to confer jurisdiction; and (3) Lyons was entitled to qualified immunity because no sufficiently analogous caselaw clearly established that his conduct—notifying Hayes's supervisors about her critical social media posts without threatening prosecution or directing her termination—violated her First Amendment rights. The court distinguished cases like Bantam Books and Backpage.com, which involved government threats of legal sanctions and coercion, from Lyons's conduct, which constituted persuasion rather than coercion.

This is a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Frederick Jackson challenged the constitutionality of his warrantless arrest and the police officers' use of non-lethal force against him during a multi-hour standoff at his home in Madison, Wisconsin. Jackson alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

1. Whether officers had probable cause to arrest Jackson for disorderly conduct and reckless endangerment based on reports of gunshots and observations at the scene
2. Whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless arrest inside Jackson's home
3. Whether the officers' use of non-lethal 40 millimeter foam bullets constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment
4. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions
5. Whether Jackson waived claims for failure to intervene and property damage

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. The court held:

1. Probable Cause: Officers had sufficient probable cause to arrest Jackson based on the neighbor's 911 report of gunshots, multiple officers hearing gunshot-like sounds, observations of a man in the driveway raising something above his head, and information that Jackson had a weapons history and suffered from alcoholism. Jackson's later acquittal and lack of shell casings were irrelevant to the probable cause analysis, which focuses on what officers knew at the time of arrest.
2. Exigent Circumstances: Although the court acknowledged that exigent circumstances did not clearly justify the warrantless arrest under existing precedent, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because no prior case clearly established that exigent circumstances dissipate during a multi-hour standoff involving a suspect believed to be armed and dangerous.
3. Excessive Force: The officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claims because Jackson failed to identify a closely analogous case clearly establishing that the use of non-lethal foam rounds was unconstitutional under the circumstances. While Phillips v. Community Insurance Corp. involved non-lethal force, the facts were too distinguishable because Jackson was closer to the officers, upright, acting belligerently, and believed to be armed with access to multiple firearms, unlike the intoxicated driver in Phillips who posed a substantially contained threat.
4. Waived Claims: Jackson waived his failure to intervene and property damage claims by raising only conclusory, undeveloped arguments that did not engage with the legal elements required for these claims.

The court emphasized that qualified immunity protects officers unless a plaintiff identifies precedent placing the constitutional question "beyond debate" and establishing that the officer's conduct was unlawful in the specific situation confronted. The majority reasoned that the novel factual circumstances of Jackson's case—a prolonged standoff with a suspect believed to be armed—were not clearly established as unconstitutional in prior case law.

Judge Jackson-Akiwumi concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to highlight the tension between qualified immunity and constitutional protections, arguing that the doctrine's requirement for nearly identical precedent effectively shields officers from liability for constitutional violations in novel fact patterns, even when the underlying constitutional right is well-established.

This is a legal malpractice case in which Fresh Mix, LLC seeks to recover damages from multiple law firms and attorneys who allegedly breached their duties by conspiring with Fresh Mix's majority owner, GFSI, to sabotage Fresh Mix's interests, including by orchestrating a fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy. After a settlement transferred ownership of Fresh Mix from GFSI to its former minority owners, Fresh Mix commenced this action, but the district court dismissed the claims as barred by Nevada's public policy against assignment of legal malpractice claims.

1. Whether Nevada's public policy prohibiting the assignment of legal malpractice claims bars Fresh Mix from pursuing such claims after a change in the company's ownership from GFSI to its former minority owners (Lagudi and Ponder).
2. Whether the transfer of majority ownership constitutes a "de facto assignment" of Fresh Mix's legal malpractice claims in violation of Nevada public policy.
3. How to balance Nevada's public policies against assignment of legal malpractice claims with fundamental principles of corporate law that treat corporations as separate legal entities distinct from their shareholders.
4. Whether the bankruptcy trustee's intervening control of the malpractice claims and the alleged breach of the duty of loyalty (rather than duty of care) should affect the de facto assignment analysis.

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Nevada Supreme Court: "Under what circumstances, if any, does the transfer of majority ownership of a corporate entity effectuate a de facto assignment of the entity's legal malpractice claims in violation of Nevada public policy?" The court declined to dismiss the case outright, recognizing that while Nevada has a strong public policy against direct assignment of legal malpractice claims, applying this policy to bar Fresh Mix's claims would raise substantial concerns about corporate law principles. The court noted that the Oceania Insurance decision (an unpublished Nevada Court of Appeals opinion) held that ownership transfer constitutes a de facto assignment, but the dissent in that case raised significant concerns about violating corporate separateness principles. The Ninth Circuit found that the circumstances here—where the malpractice allegedly arose from a breach of the duty of loyalty benefiting GFSI, making it impossible for Fresh Mix to bring claims while GFSI controlled it—present a compelling case for guidance from Nevada's highest court. The court stayed proceedings pending the Nevada Supreme Court's decision on the certified question.

This is an employment discrimination case in which a female car dealership employee sued for sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The jury awarded $831,028 in damages, but the district court reduced the award, and the plaintiff appealed the damages calculation.

1. Whether the district court had appellate jurisdiction to review the initial judgment after it was administratively terminated pending mediation.
2. How to allocate damages between Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act when a jury renders an unallocated verdict under both statutes.
3. Whether Title VII's $50,000 damages cap for employers with fewer than 101 employees should apply, and whether the defendant waived this cap by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions. The court held: (1) the district court had jurisdiction because the administrative termination of post-judgment motions did not "dispose of" them, and alternatively, the court could correct legal mistakes under Rule 60(b); (2) when a jury awards damages under both Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act without allocating between them, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the combined statutory maximums—$300,000 under Title VII plus $100,000 under the Act for punitive damages, with compensatory damages recoverable under the Act which has no cap; (3) Title VII's $50,000 employee-headcount cap is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in the answer, and the defendant waived this defense by failing to plead it, include it in the pretrial stipulation, or propose jury instructions on it. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to $481,028 in total damages ($81,028 in compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages).

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving a dispute over the validity of a restricted stock agreement and whether a controlling shareholder breached fiduciary duties by terminating a minority shareholder to trigger a share reacquisition right. The case arises from a disagreement between co-founders of LawIQ, Inc. regarding the enforceability of employment-related share repurchase provisions.

1. Whether a fiduciary duty claim is barred as superfluous when it arises from the same facts underlying a contract claim, specifically under the Nemec v. Shrader doctrine
2. Whether the restricted stock agreement and the company's exercise of its reacquisition right are valid
3. Whether Moldenhauer, as a controlling shareholder and director, breached his fiduciary duties by terminating MacGregor without cause to avoid paying fair market value for his shares
4. Whether summary judgment is appropriate when the defendant's motivations and intent are central disputed factual issues

The court denied the motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that: (1) fiduciary duty claims only require dismissal where they wholly overlap with concurrent breach of contract claims, and here the claims are unlikely to wholly overlap since MacGregor's counterclaim focuses on Moldenhauer's conduct and motivations surrounding the reacquisition right exercise; (2) questions regarding Moldenhauer's motivations are disputed, factually complex, and cannot be resolved on a sparse paper record; (3) when ultimate facts involve motive, intention, or other subjective matters, summary judgment is ordinarily inappropriate; and (4) it is not reasonably certain that there is no triable issue, warranting a full trial to properly explore the facts and apply the law.

This is a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying an application for cancellation of removal. Norberto Leonardo Argueta Castillo, a Guatemalan national who entered the United States illegally over twenty years ago, sought cancellation of removal based on the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship his removal would cause to his two minor U.S. citizen daughters.

1. Whether the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals properly applied the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) when evaluating hardship to the petitioner's U.S. citizen children.
2. Whether the agency considered all relevant hardship evidence and factors, including the daughters' medical conditions (anxiety/sleepwalking and vision problems), availability of medical care in Guatemala, family finances, and cumulative hardship effects.
3. The appropriate standard of review for hardship determinations under Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), and whether the agency's factual findings and legal conclusions were supported by substantial evidence or were clearly erroneous.
4. Whether the agency was required to explicitly address every factor listed in the BIA's Monreal decision and every circumstance the petitioner now identifies on appeal.

The First Circuit denied the petition for review and affirmed the agency's denial of cancellation of removal. The court held that:

1. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals did not commit legal error. The IJ explicitly stated she considered all testimony and documentary evidence and assessed hardship in the aggregate, and the BIA affirmed that the IJ had considered all relevant factors and applied the proper standard of proof.
2. The agency did not overlook critical evidence. The decisions expressly addressed the daughters' schooling, medical conditions, availability of medical care in Guatemala, country conditions, family finances, and cumulative hardship effects.
3. Under Wilkinson v. Garland, the court cannot review the underlying facts of the hardship determination but can only review the agency's application of the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" legal standard to the facts found. The court's review is deferential and the agency's factual findings—that the daughters did not have serious medical conditions and that adequate medical care would be reasonably available in Guatemala—are unreviewable.
4. The agency was not required to explicitly discuss every Monreal factor in every case, as Monreal uses permissive language. The agency need not provide commentary on each piece of evidence or dissect every contention in minute detail.
5. The aggregate hardship to the daughters did not go substantially beyond what ordinarily follows from a parent's removal. The daughters were doing well in school, K.A.'s anxiety was stable and tied to the uncertainty of removal proceedings, D.A.'s vision was stable with corrective lenses, and the family had significant financial resources ($75,000 in savings) to support relocation to Guatemala.

This is a federal sentencing appeal in which the defendant challenges the district court's application of a Federal Sentencing Guidelines enhancement based on the use or possession of a firearm in connection with another offense. The defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and sentenced to 84 months of imprisonment.

1. Whether the district court properly applied Guideline § 2K2.1(c)(1), which requires that a firearm be "cited in the offense of conviction" and used or possessed in connection with another offense where death resulted, triggering a homicide-based enhancement
2. Whether the district court made sufficient factual findings to support application of the cross-reference enhancement
3. Whether the district court adequately explained its sentencing decision and considered the defendant's arguments for a lower sentence
4. Whether the district court improperly relied on personal beliefs about whether the defendant would serve his state sentence

The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the district court failed to make the necessary factual findings to trigger the Guideline § 2K2.1(c)(1) cross-reference. Specifically, the court found that: (1) the revolver used to shoot the victim was not "cited in the offense of conviction" because it was not mentioned in the indictment and the jury had no evidence it traveled in interstate commerce; (2) while the shotguns were mentioned in the indictment, the district court never specified which firearm(s) triggered the cross-reference or explained why it concluded the shotguns facilitated the homicide; (3) the record suggested the district court actually relied on the revolver, not the shotguns, which would be legally impermissible; and (4) it was not "so obvious" from the record that the shotguns facilitated the homicide that the appellate court could make the finding itself. The court declined to fill in factual gaps and emphasized that appellate courts are courts of review, not first view. The court also noted additional procedural concerns regarding the adequacy of the sentencing explanation but vacated solely on the cross-reference issue.

This is an appeal of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in which the debtor, Christopher Cook, challenged the district court's dismissal of his appeal on equitable mootness grounds. Cook sought review of the bankruptcy court's denial of confirmation of his first proposed repayment plan.

1. Whether the district court properly applied the doctrine of equitable mootness to dismiss Cook's appeal without addressing the merits
2. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying confirmation of Cook's first proposed Chapter 13 plan on the grounds that it was not proposed in good faith and failed the liquidation test

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's application of equitable mootness and affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of Cook's first plan. The court held that equitable mootness is a pragmatic doctrine reserved for complex cases where relief would be impractical or inequitable, and should not be applied to simple, small-dollar Chapter 13 cases like Cook's. Applying the "Mac Panel factors," the court found that: (1) relief was practically available since Cook sought only a prospective adjustment to payments with no assets liquidated or property transferred; (2) this was a straightforward individual bankruptcy with limited assets and only four creditors totaling approximately $115,000 in claims, unlike the complex corporate reorganizations where equitable mootness had been upheld; and (3) the Mac Panel factors weighed against applying the doctrine. On the merits, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that Cook's first plan was not proposed in good faith, based on inaccuracies in his sworn documentation, shifting explanations for expenses, and inconsistencies between his written submissions and in-court testimony.

This is a toxic tort case arising from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in which plaintiff Floyd Ruffin, a cleanup worker, alleged that his exposure to crude oil caused his prostate cancer and sued BP. The central issue is whether expert testimony regarding causation was sufficiently relevant and reliable to be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard.

1. Whether expert testimony establishing causation in a toxic tort case requires the expert to identify a specific quantitative "dose" or minimum level of chemical exposure capable of causing the plaintiff's injury
2. Whether the expert's testimony adequately established general causation—that the chemical at issue is capable of causing the plaintiff's condition in the general population
3. Whether there was an impermissible analytical gap between the expert's data and opinions under Daubert
4. Whether summary judgment was appropriate when the plaintiff's causation expert testimony was excluded

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of the expert testimony and summary judgment for BP. While the court declined to adopt BP's proposed rule requiring experts to identify a specific quantitative dose of chemical exposure, it agreed that the expert's testimony was inadmissible due to fatal analytical flaws. Specifically, the court found that: (1) the expert testified that polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) generally cause prostate cancer, but his analysis actually focused only on benzo(a)pyrene, which neither the expert nor plaintiff claimed the plaintiff was exposed to; (2) the expert failed to establish a specific link between benzo(a)pyrene and prostate cancer, relying instead on studies of PAHs generally and animal studies; and (3) there was an impermissible analytical gap between the expert's data and his opinions. Without admissible general causation evidence, the plaintiff could not satisfy an essential element of his tort claim, making summary judgment appropriate.

This is a copyright ownership and statute of limitations case arising from George Bernard Worrell Jr.'s work as a keyboardist and arranger for the funk group Parliament-Funkadelic. The Estate of Worrell seeks a declaration of joint copyright ownership in sound recordings created between 1969 and 1981, and an accounting of royalties owed, after a 1976 agreement purporting to assign ownership rights to Thang, Inc. was deemed invalid by a New York state court.

1. Whether the statute of limitations on copyright ownership claims bars the Estate's claims, specifically when the defendants "plainly and expressly repudiated" Worrell's copyright co-ownership rights
2. Whether Worrell qualifies as a joint author and co-owner of the P-Funk sound recordings under the Copyright Act's definition of "joint work"
3. The proper standard for determining joint authorship in collaborative musical recordings, particularly regarding what level of creative contribution is required

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Statute of Limitations: A genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding when the defendants plainly and expressly repudiated Worrell's copyright ownership. Although the defendants' failure to pay royalties or provide credit would ordinarily trigger the statute of limitations, Worrell may have reasonably believed—based on the 1976 Agreement and the defendants' conduct consistent with it—that contractual rights, not copyright ownership, were at issue. Only in 2020, when the defendants denied the Agreement's validity, did plain and express repudiation arguably occur. However, this late accrual is limited to recordings made during the Agreement's term (January 1, 1976 to January 1, 1979), not all recordings from 1969-1981.
2. Copyright Co-ownership: The court rejected the strictest interpretation of the "independently copyrightable" standard from Childress v. Taylor, finding it unworkable for collaborative media like musical recordings. Instead, a joint author need only contribute "substantial original expression" to the work. The Estate presented sufficient evidence that Worrell made such contributions through his keyboard work, musical arrangements, and post-recording production work. Additionally, the evidence supports that Worrell and Clinton intended themselves to be co-authors based on Worrell's role as "founding member and Musical Director," his decision-making authority, and the parties' treatment of his contributions as substantial enough to assign away.
3. The court reasoned that the defendants' own admissions (Clinton's testimony about Worrell "radically charting the course of emerging keyboard technology" and providing P-Funk's "structural foundation") and expert evidence of Worrell's work as arranger and in post-recording production created genuine disputes of material fact precluding summary judgment on both the statute of limitations and co-ownership issues.

This is a bankruptcy case involving the intersection of Michigan's property tax foreclosure process and the federal Bankruptcy Code's preferential transfer provisions. Carrie Ann Reinhardt seeks to avoid (undo) the transfer of her property to the Bay County Treasurer as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) after the Treasurer obtained title through tax foreclosure.

1. Whether the transfer of title to the Treasurer occurred within the 90-day lookback period required by 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (i.e., whether the transfer occurred on March 31, 2022, when the foreclosure judgment took effect, or on February 18, 2022, when the judgment was entered)
2. Whether the transfer enabled the Treasurer to receive more than he would have received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (the "more than" test)
3. Whether property tax foreclosures can be avoided as preferential transfers under § 547(b), or whether they are per se non-preferential

The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower courts' decisions and held that Reinhardt established the preferential transfer requirements as a matter of law. The court ruled:

1. § 547(b)(4) Lookback Period: The transfer occurred on March 31, 2022, when title vested absolutely in the Treasurer under the foreclosure judgment, not on February 18 when the judgment was entered. The transfer was perfected on April 5 when the judgment was recorded, which was within 30 days of March 31. Therefore, the transfer occurred within the 90-day lookback period before the June 10, 2022 bankruptcy petition date.
2. § 547(b)(5) "More Than" Test: The Treasurer received more than he would have in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. In the hypothetical Chapter 7, the Treasurer would receive his $5,845 claim in full plus post-petition interest under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b), but would not receive the 5% sales commission that the GPTA provides. In the actual tax foreclosure, the Treasurer retained a 5% sales commission on the sale proceeds. This 5% commission—which would not exist in a Chapter 7 liquidation—constitutes "more than" the Treasurer would receive in bankruptcy, satisfying § 547(b)(5).
3. Property Tax Foreclosures and § 547(b): The court rejected a per se rule that would immunize property tax foreclosures from preferential transfer status. While acknowledging that transfers to fully secured creditors are usually not preferential, the court held that drastically oversecured creditors (like the Treasurer here) can receive preferential transfers. The court distinguished BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., which addressed fraudulent transfers under § 548, not preferential transfers under § 547. The court emphasized that § 547(b)(5)'s plain language requires only that the creditor receive "more than" in the actual transfer compared to a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, without regard to the creditor's priority class or percentage of recovery.

This is a tax dispute in which Flight Options, LLC, a fractional-share jet company, challenges an IRS assessment of approximately $39 million in uncollected excise taxes on fixed management and overhead fees charged to its clients. The case involves the interpretation of the federal excise tax on "transportation by air" under 26 U.S.C. § 4261.

1. Whether the 7.5% federal excise tax on "amounts paid for" domestic "transportation by air" applies to fixed monthly management and overhead fees charged by fractional-share jet operators, or only to usage fees for individual flights.
2. Whether Flight Options had adequate notice of its tax-collection obligations under the "precise and not speculative" standard established in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States for third-party tax collectors.
3. The proper interpretation of the statutory term "transportation" and the phrase "amounts paid for" in the context of a "ticket tax."
4. The applicability of pro-taxpayer canons of construction when interpreting tax statutes, particularly in the context of third-party withholding obligations.

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and held that the excise tax applies only to usage fees for individual flights, not to fixed overhead and management fees. The court's reasoning was based on multiple interpretive approaches:

1. Textual Analysis: The statute's label as a "ticket tax" and its focus on "amounts paid for transportation" (defined as moving persons from point A to point B) indicates a flight-by-flight tax structure, not a tax on fixed overhead costs. The term "transportation" refers to the act of moving persons, not the services necessary to operate a transportation business.
2. Statutory Context: The statute applies to specific "domestic segments" of transportation with defined beginning and ending points. Congress's 1970 amendment extending the tax to layovers and deadhead flights (both occurring during or in preparation for specific flights) reinforces the flight-by-flight interpretation. The statute's exclusions for foreign transportation and non-person transportation operate on the same axis as usage charges.
3. Regulatory Support: The regulations explicitly exclude from taxation charges "separable from the payment for transportation," including parking, de-icing, sanitation, dockage, and wharfage—all necessary features of flights. These exclusions confirm the tax does not cover all "reasonably necessary" costs of operating a transportation service.
4. Third-Party Collector Canon: Under Central Illinois, when the IRS enlists a third party to collect withholding taxes, the Tax Code or binding regulations must provide "precise and not speculative" notice of the withholding obligation. Flight Options lacked such notice because: (a) the statute never clarified how it would apply beyond the flight-by-flight context; (b) no guidance existed for allocating fixed charges between taxable domestic and nontaxable international transportation; (c) the IRS issued only conflicting technical advice memoranda (which do not bind other taxpayers); and (d) no revenue ruling ever addressed fractional jet programs or membership fees. The IRS's enforcement efforts added confusion rather than clarity, and the government's own position was inconsistent (e.g., never taxing the initial fractional-share purchase price).
5. Rejection of Government Arguments: The court rejected the government's reliance on: (a) the "reasonably necessary" standard, which Congress did not include in the statute and which lacks limiting principles; (b) the Shell Oil case regarding "waiting time," which refers to waiting times for particular flights, not general management services; (c) the "prepaid orders" analogy, which does not apply because fixed fees merely gave clients the option to purchase flight hours; and (d) IRS revenue rulings lacking coherent application standards and conflicting with the regulations' own exclusions.
6. Penalty Reversal: The court also reversed the failure-to-collect penalties, finding that Flight Options could not have known the IRS would attempt to collect taxes on fixed fees given the lack of clear statutory or regulatory guidance.

The court emphasized that third-party tax collectors face significant personal liability for both over-collection and under-collection, and therefore deserve clear instructions from statutes, binding regulations, and judicial authority. The government, not the taxpayer, bears the burden of precisely identifying which payments incur a tax. The court noted that Congress resolved the ambiguity in 2012 by exempting fractional-share jet owners from all excise taxes under § 4261, suggesting that the prior law was indeed unclear.

This is an employment discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA) in which Alma Sanchez alleged she was sexually harassed by a coworker at an El Milagro tortilla factory and that the employer failed to investigate her complaints promptly. The district court granted summary judgment for El Milagro, and Sanchez appealed.

1. Whether the alleged conduct—three incidents of inappropriate touching of Ms. Sanchez's buttocks by coworker Francisco Gutierrez over approximately one year—constituted sexual harassment severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment under Title VII and the IHRA.
2. Whether El Milagro had notice of the harassment and whether it took prompt and appropriate corrective action to prevent the harassment from recurring, thereby establishing employer negligence liability for coworker harassment.
3. The standard for assessing the severity and pervasiveness of physical sexual harassment, particularly the touching of intimate body parts.

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for El Milagro. The majority held that while a reasonable jury could find that the harassment Ms. Sanchez suffered amounted to a hostile working environment, a jury could not reasonably conclude that El Milagro was negligent in fulfilling its responsibilities in responding to the situation. The court's reasoning proceeded in two parts:

1. On the Hostile Work Environment Claim: The majority acknowledged that the touching of intimate body parts constitutes one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment and that a reasonable jury could view the three incidents—particularly the first involving genital contact—as egregious unwanted intimate bodily intrusions. However, the court found that the critical problem was the inadequacy of notice to the employer. When Ms. Sanchez reported the first two incidents to her supervisor Arturo Brito, her own deposition testimony indicated she characterized them as "accidents" due to close working quarters on the production line. This description did not provide Brito with "enough information to make a reasonable employer think there was some probability that she was being sexually harassed." Therefore, El Milagro lacked adequate notice of the first two incidents.
2. On Employer Liability: Regarding the third incident reported on August 30, 2020, El Milagro took prompt corrective action. HR investigated within days, interviewed both Ms. Sanchez and Gutierrez on September 2, and issued a "call of attention" letter to Gutierrez on September 16 directing him to change his behavior. The court found this constituted prompt and appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to prevent harassment from recurring. Ms. Sanchez did not identify witnesses to the first two incidents or the names of employees who made harassing comments, preventing further investigation. Additionally, Gutierrez has not sexually harassed Ms. Sanchez since the investigation concluded.

This is an employment discrimination appeal in which Kellie Wilson, a Black woman, challenged her former employer AIM Specialty Health for alleged racial discrimination in pay and promotion decisions under Title VII, Section 1981, and the Illinois Human Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of AIM, and Wilson appealed.

1. Whether Wilson established a prima facie case of disparate pay discrimination and whether AIM's stated reasons for pay decisions were pretextual
2. Whether Wilson established a prima facie case of failure to promote and whether AIM's stated reasons for promotion decisions were pretextual
3. Whether the district court applied the correct causation standard (sole cause versus but-for causation) in evaluating Wilson's discrimination claims
4. The appropriate framework for evaluating employment discrimination evidence under Title VII, Section 1981, and the IHRA

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AIM. The court held that although Wilson presented evidence that her supervisor Opasinski disliked her and that non-Black colleagues received higher salaries and faster promotions, this evidence was insufficient to establish pretext. The court emphasized that to survive summary judgment, Wilson needed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that AIM's stated justifications were false or dishonest, not merely faulty or mistaken. The court found that: (1) AIM's pay-setting process was neutral and objective, with Wilson's starting salary exceeding median market pay; (2) comparisons to other employees like Kimberly Louis showed only that AIM may have exercised mistaken judgment, not that it lied about its reasons; (3) Opasinski's mistreatment of Wilson and the timing of her promotion after filing an EEOC charge did not demonstrate that AIM fabricated reasons for its pay and promotion decisions; and (4) Wilson could not show that AIM's stated reasons for promoting other employees to Business Consultant were pretextual. The court also noted that although the district court misstated the causation standard in one section (using "solely due to" rather than "but for"), this error did not warrant reversal given the weakness of Wilson's underlying evidence.

This is a preemption case in which ConocoPhillips Alaska sought declaratory relief to prevent Alaska's Oil and Gas Conservation Commission from disclosing well data from oil and gas wells drilled in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, arguing that federal law preempts Alaska's disclosure requirements. The district court granted summary judgment for ConocoPhillips, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.

1. Whether the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976 expressly preempts Alaska's oil and gas well data disclosure statute
2. Whether Department of the Interior regulations expressly preempt Alaska's disclosure provisions
3. Whether Alaska's disclosure law is impliedly preempted as an obstacle to the purposes of the Production Act
4. The proper interpretation of the phrase "the conditions of" in the Production Act's cross-reference to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, holding that federal law does not preempt Alaska's disclosure requirements. The court determined that: (1) the Production Act does not expressly preempt Alaska law because it contains no clear preemption statement and the phrase "the conditions of 43 U.S.C. 1352(a)(1)(A)" incorporates only OCSLA's data-submission requirements, not its confidentiality provisions; (2) Department of the Interior regulations do not preempt state law because section 552.6(b) applies only to the federal government's handling of information and does not regulate the State's handling of independently obtained data; and (3) Alaska law is not impliedly preempted because the Production Act is silent on data confidentiality and evinces no congressional purpose that would be obstructed by Alaska's disclosure provisions. The court reasoned that while data confidentiality can encourage exploration, disclosure can also promote development by allowing companies to build on already-gathered information, and Congress did not make a deliberate choice to preclude state regulation of this matter.

This is a federal tax evasion appeal in which Ryan Ulibarri, a Colorado dentist, challenges his 41-month prison sentence for using abusive sham trusts to evade over $1.6 million in federal income taxes from 2016 through 2023. Ulibarri argues his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and applicable federal sentencing factors.

1. Whether the district court properly included uncharged 2023 tax loss conduct in the loss amount calculation under USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2) as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan
2. Whether the district court's method of calculating the 2023 tax loss using the guidelines' failure-to-file methodology was reasonable and not clearly erroneous
3. Whether the two-level sophisticated means enhancement under USSG § 2T1.1(b)(2) was properly applied given Ulibarri's use of multiple sham trusts and third parties to conceal income
4. Whether the 41-month sentence was substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including concerns about sentencing disparity and the weight given to various mitigating factors

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence in its entirety. The court held:

1. The 2023 tax loss was properly included because Ulibarri used the identical sham trust method without interruption from 2016 through 2023, constituting a single course of conduct under the guidelines, despite the different charging and calculation methods across years
2. The IRS agent's calculation of the 2023 tax loss using the 20% gross income method was reasonable and not clearly erroneous, as the guidelines do not require precision and permit reasonable estimates based on available facts; Ulibarri failed to provide alternative evidence
3. The sophisticated means enhancement was properly applied because Ulibarri's scheme involved multiple financial accounts, fictitious charitable entities, third-party participation, and false information to banks—conduct far more complex than simple tax return dishonesty—and the guidelines do not require that Ulibarri have personally devised the scheme
4. The 41-month sentence within the advisory guidelines range was substantively reasonable because the district court thoroughly considered all § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and seriousness of the offense, deterrence, and the defendant's persistent conduct despite repeated warnings; the court was not required to reweigh factors already presented or grant a downward variance based on community standing and lack of criminal history

This is a post-trial opinion in a breach of representation and indemnification case arising from Alexion Pharmaceuticals' acquisition of Syntimmune. The case concerns whether drug substance and drug product lots acquired in the merger were manufactured in compliance with current good manufacturing practice (cGMP) standards as represented in the merger agreement.

1. The interpretation of "in all material respects" and "applicable requirements" in Section 4.13(a) of the Merger Agreement regarding cGMP compliance
2. Whether a court-appointed expert's report on cGMP violations was reliable and admissible
3. Whether drug substance (DS) lots were subject to the full scope of ICH Q7 guidance or only Section 19 (for investigational drugs)
4. Whether drug product (DP) lots were exempt from 21 C.F.R. Part 211 requirements as Phase 1 investigational drugs
5. Whether the DS and DP lots breached cGMP requirements and caused material harm to Alexion
6. The appropriate measure of indemnification damages under the Merger Agreement

The court ruled in favor of Alexion Pharmaceuticals on the breach of representation claim and awarded approximately $11 million in indemnification. Key holdings include:

1. Contract Interpretation: "In all material respects" is a qualifier that excludes small, de minimis issues but applies to matters significant in the context of the parties' contract. The phrase is less onerous than a common law material breach standard.
2. Expert Testimony: The court-appointed expert Robert Sharpnack's report was reliable and admissible. His 53 years of cGMP compliance experience, including 18 years at the FDA inspecting active pharmaceutical ingredients, provided a sufficient foundation for his opinions despite lacking specific monoclonal antibody experience.
3. DS Lots Compliance: ICH Q7 guidance applies in its entirety to the DS lots, not just Section 19. The DS lots were specifically ordered to be manufactured under cGMP standards for Phase 1/2 clinical trials and were not "development" or "scale-up" batches exempt from full cGMP requirements. AGC breached cGMP requirements by: (a) failing to establish a formal change control system when switching filtration equipment; (b) failing to adjust filtration settings when introducing a larger STIC Jumbo Filter, causing leaching of polyallylamine; (c) failing to properly wash the filter per vendor instructions; and (d) failing to adequately qualify the Cygnus 2 HCP assay kit, which under-detected host cell protein contamination.
4. DP Lots Compliance: 21 C.F.R. Part 211 applies to the DP lots because they were manufactured for use in Phase 2 clinical trials. The Phase 1 exemption in 21 C.F.R. § 210.2(c) does not apply once a drug is manufactured for Phase 2 or 3 use. Patheon breached cGMP requirements by failing to evaluate the impact of switching manufacturing from Suite 1 to Suite 2 before making the change, and by failing to implement proper change control procedures despite documented differences in equipment and operating parameters between the two suites.
5. Materiality: The breaches were material because the usability of the drug substance and product was significant to Alexion's business plan. Alexion sought value from rapid development and winning the race to market, requiring compliant and usable drug materials. The cGMP violations rendered the lots completely unusable, forced termination of clinical trials, and caused a year-long delay in development—not "small, de minimis, or nitpicky issues."
6. Damages: Alexion is entitled to indemnification for costs incurred replacing the Acquired Lots, but not for half the purchase price as Alexion contended. The court applied the Merger Agreement's indemnification provisions to calculate approximately $11 million in recoverable damages.

This is a breach of contract and tortious interference case in Delaware Chancery Court involving the acquisition of a property rental management company. The plaintiffs allege that the seller, Shawn Kaleta, violated non-competition, non-solicitation, and non-interference covenants by transferring properties to his ex-wife and girlfriend, who then competed with the plaintiffs' property management services.

1. Whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims despite defendants' argument that only monetary damages are available
2. Whether the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants based on a forum selection clause in the Purchase Agreement
3. Whether the plaintiffs adequately pleaded breach of the non-competition, non-solicitation, and non-interference covenants in the Purchase Agreement
4. Whether the plaintiffs adequately pleaded breach of the Management Agreement regarding property transfers
5. Whether the plaintiffs adequately pleaded claims for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference by a party to the contract, anticipatory breach, and account stated

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held: (1) it has subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs pleaded equitable claims for injunctive relief to enforce restrictive covenants, and the remaining claims fall within the court's ancillary jurisdiction under the clean-up doctrine; (2) it has personal jurisdiction over Kaleta and the Hotel Defendants based on the forum selection clause in the Purchase Agreement, which applies to all Transaction Documents including the Management and Hotel Agreements; (3) the plaintiffs adequately pleaded breach of the non-competition covenant (Count I), non-solicitation covenant (Count II), non-interference covenant (Count III), and the goodwill provision in the Contribution Agreement (Count VI) based on allegations that Kaleta transferred properties to his ex-wife and girlfriend who then competed with plaintiffs' services; (4) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of the Management Agreement (Count IV) because the plain language of the agreement permits transfers and sales under the conditions Kaleta met; (5) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count V) because they did not identify a contractual gap or alleged facts supporting breach of an express term; (6) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for tortious interference (Count VII) because a party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with it; (7) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for anticipatory breach of the Management Agreement (Count XI) because exercising a contractual right is not a refusal to perform; and (8) the plaintiffs abandoned their account stated claim (Count XII). Counts I, II, III, VI, VIII, IX, and X survived the motion to dismiss; Counts IV, V, VII, XI, and XII were dismissed.

This is a stockholder class action challenging the acquisition of KnowBe4, Inc. by Vista Equity Partners. Plaintiffs alleged that certain stockholders (KKR, Elephant Partners, and CEO Sjouwerman) formed a control group that breached fiduciary duties, and that the company's directors breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the merger.

1. Whether KKR, Elephant Partners, and Sjouwerman constituted a "control group" under Delaware law and breached fiduciary duties as controllers
2. Whether the director defendants breached their fiduciary duties in approving the merger
3. Whether the stockholder vote was fully informed and uncoerced, and thus cleansed the transaction under the Corwin standard
4. Whether the proxy statement contained material disclosure deficiencies regarding: (a) special committee members' conflicts of interest; (b) Morgan Stanley's conflicts of interest; (c) KKR's rollover participation; (d) Kevin Mitnick's support agreement; and (e) alleged favoritism toward Vista

The court granted defendants' motions to dismiss all claims. Regarding Count I (control group claim): The court held that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that KKR, Elephant, and Sjouwerman formed a legally significant connection required for a control group. The court found insufficient historical ties among the alleged group members (separate investments over time, no long-standing coordinated strategy) and inadequate transaction-specific connections (concurrent rollover decisions and support agreements reflected only parallel self-interest, not actual agreement to work together). The adoption of MFW protections did not constitute a concession of control group status. Regarding Count II (director breach of fiduciary duty): Assuming entire fairness applied due to director conflicts, the court found that the stockholder vote cleansed the transaction under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC. Plaintiffs bore the burden of pleading material disclosure deficiencies, which they failed to do. The court rejected each alleged disclosure deficiency: (1) special committee members' investments in rollover stockholders were not material given the clean process and directors' incentives to maximize deal value; (2) Morgan Stanley's investments in KKR were not material because KKR was a minority rollover stockholder, not a counterparty, and was excluded from negotiations; (3) KKR's changing rollover estimates were not material because the proxy disclosed the fluid nature of rollover amounts; (4) Mitnick's characterization as an "Unaffiliated Stockholder" was accurate and complete, and the proxy disclosed his support agreement; and (5) alleged favoritism toward Vista was not adequately pleaded, and preliminary indications of interest from other bidders need not be disclosed. The proxy statement provided an accurate, full, and fair characterization of events. Therefore, business judgment review applied and plaintiffs failed to state a claim. Count III was dismissed as abandoned by plaintiffs.

This is a derivative shareholder lawsuit in which Marstrand Partners, L.P., on behalf of Ayala Pharmaceuticals, Inc., alleges that certain board members and venture capital funds breached their fiduciary duties by approving a convertible notes transaction that allegedly favored Israel Biotech Fund I, L.P. and Arkin Bio Ventures L.P. at the expense of other shareholders.

1. Whether the plaintiff satisfied the procedural requirements of Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 for derivative litigation by pleading demand futility with sufficient particularity
2. Whether directors Robert Spiegel and Murray Goldberg were incapable of impartially considering a demand to pursue the corporation's claims under the three-prong test established in Zuckerberg:
   1. Whether they received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct
   2. Whether they face a substantial likelihood of liability for the claims
   3. Whether they lack independence from interested parties
3. Whether the plaintiff adequately pleaded facts with particularity regarding the directors' roles as "Venture Advisors" to Israel Biotech and their financial interests in the transaction

The Court granted defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 23.1, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate demand futility. The court held that the plaintiff could not satisfy any of the three prongs of the Zuckerberg test as to directors Spiegel and Goldberg:

1. First Prong (Material Personal Benefit): The plaintiff's allegations that Spiegel and Goldberg received material benefits as Venture Advisors of Israel Biotech were insufficiently particularized. The plaintiff relied on a vague 2019 news quote about Venture Advisors having "skin in the game" but failed to specify the size or nature of their investments. Additionally, allegations that they received $70,000 director payments and sought to preserve their board positions were insufficient, as Delaware law recognizes that reasonable director compensation does not impugn independence, and the complaint contained no allegations that these payments were excessive or material to the directors.
2. Second Prong (Substantial Likelihood of Liability): The complaint contained no allegations particular to Spiegel and Goldberg regarding the notes transaction, did not state whether they voted on the transaction, and thus failed to establish what liability either director faced.
3. Third Prong (Lack of Independence): The plaintiff's theory that Spiegel and Goldberg lacked independence merely because Israel Biotech appointed them to the board and might appoint them to other boards was insufficient under Delaware law. The court noted that a director's independence is not compromised simply by being nominated to a board by an interested stockholder.

This is a trust administration dispute in which the plaintiff brings claims against the defendant trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and unjust enrichment arising from the defendant's administration of trust assets following the settlor's death in 2022. The defendant moved to dismiss the claims, arguing they are barred by a one-year statute of limitations under Delaware Code Section 3585.

1. Whether Delaware Code Section 3585 operates as a jurisdictional statute of repose or as a limitations provision applicable to trust claims
2. Whether accounting materials and settlement statements adequately disclosed the facts constituting the plaintiff's claims of self-dealing and imprudent administration to trigger Section 3585's one-year period
3. Whether the plaintiff's claims are barred by laches
4. Whether the breach of trust and unjust enrichment claims are adequately pleaded

The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court held that: (1) Section 3585's operation as a jurisdictional bar versus a limitations provision remains unsettled in Delaware, so the motion was evaluated under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(b)(1); (2) whether a report "adequately disclosed" the alleged fiduciary misconduct is a fact-intensive inquiry unsuitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss, and the mere existence of accounting records does not establish adequate disclosure at the pleadings stage; (3) the laches defense requires factual determinations regarding the plaintiff's knowledge, reasonableness of delay, and resulting prejudice, which are not apparent from the complaint; and (4) the breach of trust and unjust enrichment claims are adequately pleaded, as the plaintiff alleges the defendant acted inconsistently with the trust agreement and personally benefited from challenged transactions.

This case involves a challenge by the National Association of Immigration Judges to an Executive Office for Immigration Review policy requiring immigration judges to obtain supervisory approval for public speeches relating to their official duties. The central issue is whether the Fourth Circuit violated the principle of party presentation by deciding the case on grounds the parties did not raise.

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit violated the principle of party presentation by raising and deciding a novel issue—whether the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) continues to function as Congress intended—that neither party argued
2. Whether the CSRA's exclusive administrative review scheme through the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) applies to the immigration judges' constitutional claims challenging the speech policy
3. Whether changed circumstances regarding MSPB independence and removal protections affect the application of the CSRA's jurisdictional scheme

The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that the court violated the principle of party presentation. The Court emphasized that federal courts are passive instruments that must rely on parties to frame the issues for decision and decide only the questions presented. While both the District Court and Fourth Circuit correctly held that the CSRA covered respondent's claims, the Fourth Circuit improperly sua sponte raised and decided a broader question about whether the CSRA's scheme continues to function as Congress intended in light of current political circumstances—a question neither party had argued. Justice Thomas's concurrence further argued that the Fourth Circuit's analysis was flawed on the merits, as changed political circumstances cannot alter the meaning of a statute or override binding Supreme Court precedent interpreting it; statutes change only when Congress changes them.

This is an appeal of drug trafficking and racketeering convictions in which defendants Paul Girard and Kareem Harry challenged violations of their Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The trial began with all spectators relegated to an overflow room with an audiovisual feed, and federal marshals later prevented the defendants' mothers from entering the courtroom despite available seating.

1. Whether the District Court violated the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by requiring all spectators to view the trial from an overflow room on the first day without justification
2. Whether federal marshals violated the public trial right by excluding the defendants' mothers from the courtroom on subsequent days when seating was available
3. Whether the defendants adequately preserved these public trial claims for appeal
4. Whether any public trial errors were "plain error" affecting substantial rights and seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings
5. Whether the District Court violated the defendants' Fifth Amendment due process rights and Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process regarding witness testimony

The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court found two errors occurred: (1) the District Court erred by requiring all spectators to observe from the overflow room on the first day without explaining why alternatives were inadequate, and (2) it was error for federal marshals to exclude the defendants' mothers from the courtroom on later days when seating was available. However, the court declined to reverse the convictions under plain error review because the errors did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. The trial maintained adequate publicity through the audiovisual feed and in-person viewing, the errors did not undermine confidence in the judge's impartiality (the first-day closure was a good-faith COVID-19 precaution and the judge was unaware of the mothers' exclusion), and there was no suggestion of misbehavior. The court also rejected the defendants' arguments regarding witness testimony, finding no violation of due process or compulsory process rights.

This is an appeal concerning whether a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit brought by former employees seeking to enforce a prior judgment against Bristol Compressors International (BCI) by imposing liability on Garrison Investment Group, a party that was voluntarily dismissed from the original action. The employees obtained a judgment against BCI for violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), but were unable to collect due to BCI's insolvency.

1. Whether federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) to enforce a prior federal judgment against a party not found liable in the original action when the new suit alleges no independent violations of ERISA or the WARN Act.
2. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Peacock v. Thomas precludes federal courts from exercising ancillary jurisdiction over new actions seeking to impose liability for an existing federal judgment on parties not otherwise liable for that judgment.
3. Whether piercing the corporate veil constitutes an independent cause of action under ERISA or the WARN Act sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction.
4. Whether the WARN Act's exclusive remedy provision and Department of Labor regulations governing single-employer liability preclude alternative theories of liability such as veil piercing.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that:

1. No Federal Question Jurisdiction Under § 1331: The plaintiffs failed to establish federal question jurisdiction because they did not allege any new or independent violations of ERISA or the WARN Act. Instead, they sought only to collect the prior judgment against BCI from Garrison through veil-piercing theories. Under Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996), federal courts lack jurisdiction over actions seeking to impose liability for an existing federal judgment on parties not otherwise liable for that judgment when no new federal law violations are alleged.
2. ERISA Claims: Peacock explicitly holds that ERISA provides no provision for imposing liability for an extant ERISA judgment against a third party. Piercing the corporate veil is not itself an independent ERISA cause of action, and therefore cannot serve as the basis for federal jurisdiction.
3. WARN Act Claims: The WARN Act provides exclusive remedies for violations and does not authorize veil-piercing as an alternative theory of liability. The Department of Labor regulations establish specific factors for determining single-employer liability, making veil-piercing redundant and foreclosing its use as an independent basis for WARN Act liability. Sister circuits have similarly declined to authorize alternate theories of liability for underlying WARN Act violations.
4. No Ancillary Jurisdiction: Although federal courts may exercise ancillary jurisdiction to enforce their own judgments, Peacock specifically precludes ancillary jurisdiction over "new actions in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for a money judgment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment." Because the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Garrison from the original action (Messer I), only BCI was found liable. The subsequent suit against Garrison and other new parties cannot rely on ancillary jurisdiction because it involves new defendants and new theories of liability without an independent jurisdictional basis.
5. Procedural Consequence of Voluntary Dismissal: The court emphasized that the plaintiffs' decision to voluntarily dismiss Garrison without prejudice from the original action was strategically problematic. When Garrison predicted that BCI would be unable to pay the judgment and urged that Garrison's claims be dismissed with prejudice or litigated to conclusion, the district court granted the dismissal without prejudice. However, this left the plaintiffs without a viable means to enforce the judgment against Garrison in a subsequent action.

This is a federal sentencing appeal in which the defendant, Raquan Scott, challenges the district court's enhancement of his sentencing range for felon-in-possession of a firearm based on a prior conviction for using a firearm during the commission of a robbery under Virginia Code § 18.2-53.1. The central issue is whether this prior conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

1. Whether a conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-53.1 (use or attempted use of a firearm while committing robbery) satisfies the "elements clause" of the crime-of-violence definition in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), which requires that an offense "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another"
2. Whether the prior conviction alternatively qualifies as "robbery" under the enumerated offense clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2)
3. Whether any error in calculating the Guidelines range was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The majority held that: (1) Scott's conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-53.1 does not satisfy the elements clause because, under Virginia law, a person can be convicted of robbery through a non-violent threat to accuse the victim of sodomy, and § 18.2-53.1 does not require that the firearm be used against another person or to overcome the victim's resistance—thus the statute does not necessarily require proof of physical force as an element; (2) the government failed to adequately establish that the conviction qualifies as generic robbery under the enumerated offense clause, and the court noted that the Guidelines' reference to "use or unlawful possession of a firearm" may be more directly applicable; and (3) the government failed to demonstrate harmlessness because the district court would have needed to justify a significant upward variance from the lower 15-21 month Guidelines range, and the court was confused about the actual facts of Scott's prior offense (incorrectly believing Scott personally pointed a gun when it was actually a codefendant). The majority emphasized that the categorical approach requires focus on statutory elements rather than how crimes are typically committed in practice.

This is a criminal appeal case in which a defendant convicted of child pornography production and transportation challenges his supervised release conditions on appeal, despite having signed a plea agreement that waived his appellate rights with a limited exception for sentences exceeding the statutory maximum.

1. Whether an appeal waiver in a plea agreement bars a defendant's challenge to supervised release conditions that allegedly violate 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) reasonableness requirements.
2. Whether conditions of supervised release that violate § 3583(d) constitute a "sentence exceeding the statutory maximum punishment," which would fall within the exception to the appeal waiver.
3. The meaning of "statutory maximum punishment" in the context of appellate waivers—specifically whether it encompasses qualitative conditions of supervised release or only quantitative/temporal elements of sentences.

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court held that "statutory maximum punishment" refers only to the quantitative or temporal elements of a sentence, not the qualitative conditions attached to supervised release. Because § 3583(d) challenges target the reasonableness of conditions rather than the length of the sentence, they do not fall within the exception for sentences exceeding the statutory maximum. Therefore, Hackney's appeal waiver barred his challenge to the supervised release conditions, including the prohibition on contact with minors and the requirement to disclose financial information to his probation officer.

This is a Fourth Amendment appeal challenging the legality of a warrantless search of a backpack seized during an arrest. William Fillyaw was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant for arson, and law enforcement officers seized and searched his backpack, discovering a loaded handgun and drugs.

1. Whether officers lawfully seized and searched Fillyaw's backpack during his arrest in a public parking lot without a warrant
2. Whether the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement authorized the search
3. Whether minor deviations from written police inventory search procedures rendered the search unreasonable
4. Whether the use of a commercial license plate reader database to locate Fillyaw violated the Fourth Amendment

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Fillyaw's motion to suppress. The court held that: (1) it is reasonable for officers to take custody of personal property in an arrestee's possession during a public arrest, and once lawful custody is obtained, officers may conduct an inventory search in accordance with established procedures; (2) the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to leave property unattended at an arrest scene or pursue alternative options like storing it in a vehicle or giving it to a third party, particularly absent a request from the arrestee; (3) minor deviations from departmental inventory search procedures do not render a search unreasonable, and there was no evidence of bad faith; and (4) the court declined to address the license plate reader issue because Fillyaw forfeited it by failing to raise it before the district court.

This is a federal drug trafficking appeal in which Clifton Coleman challenges his 150-month sentence for conspiracy to distribute fentanyl-laced heroin. Coleman contests two sentencing enhancements applied by the district court: a four-level leadership enhancement and a two-level drug premises enhancement.

1. Whether the government violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to produce recordings of co-defendants' post-arrest statements, when FBI summaries (302 forms) of those statements were provided to the defendant.
2. Whether the district court properly applied the drug premises enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) when Coleman owned the property but did not occupy it as his primary residence, and whether the enhancement was consistent with recent Seventh Circuit precedent in Ford, Montgomery, and Craft.

The court affirmed the sentence and both enhancements. On the Brady claim, the court held that Coleman could not establish materiality because the FBI 302 summaries provided the key information he needed—that not all co-defendants identified him as the leader—and the district court ultimately relied on wiretapped evidence rather than the co-defendants' statements. On the drug premises enhancement, the court held that the combination of Coleman's ownership interest in the property, his knowledge that it would be used for drug distribution, his direction and control of the DTO's operations there, and the undisputed fact that the property served as a nerve center for drug activities satisfied both the "maintained" and "purpose" elements of the enhancement, distinguishing the case from Montgomery and Craft where there was insufficient evidence of the premises' primary purpose.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction in a class action lawsuit brought by University of California researchers whose federally funded research grants were terminated by three federal agencies (EPA, NSF, and NEH) pursuant to Executive Orders issued in early 2025. The plaintiffs challenged the terminations as violations of the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and other legal principles.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the grant terminations
2. Whether the Tucker Act bars district court jurisdiction over the Form Termination Class's APA claim challenging grant terminations as arbitrary and capricious
3. Whether the DEI Termination Class is likely to succeed on a First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim
4. Whether the preliminary injunction satisfies the Winter factors (likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest)
5. Whether the scope of the preliminary injunction requiring full reinstatement of grants is overbroad

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's preliminary injunction. The court held:

1. Standing: Plaintiffs established Article III standing by adequately alleging concrete injuries including loss of funding, reputational harm, project disruption, and costs of seeking alternative funding.
2. Form Termination Class: The court reversed the preliminary injunction for this class, holding that the Tucker Act bars district court jurisdiction over their APA claim. Following the Supreme Court's decision in National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association, claims based on research-related grants and seeking to enforce an obligation to pay money pursuant to those grants are contractual in nature and must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims, not district court. The identity of the party bringing the claim does not change this analysis.
3. DEI Termination Class: The court affirmed the preliminary injunction for this class, holding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim. The court found that the agencies terminated individual grants based solely on the recipients' perceived expression of DEI, DEIA, or environmental justice viewpoints, which constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination. The government may define subsidy programs but cannot discriminate against disfavored viewpoints within an existing program.
4. Winter Factors: The district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the equitable factors in favor of the DEI Termination Class. The loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable injury, and the likelihood of success on a First Amendment claim compels a finding that the balance of hardships tips in plaintiffs' favor.
5. Scope of Injunction: The district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring full reinstatement of the terminated grants, as plaintiffs demonstrated that alternative funding is not readily available and the uncertainty of seeking replacement funding risks irrevocable damage to research projects.

This is a criminal appeal in which Duane Lee Johnsen challenges his conviction for receiving and possessing child pornography. Johnsen appeals the district court's denial of his motions to suppress evidence, dismiss the indictment, and for judgment of acquittal.

1. Whether a search warrant was supported by probable cause based on hash value matches between files on the defendant's computer and known child pornography, without visual confirmation of the suspect files
2. Whether law enforcement's warrantless access to the defendant's publicly shared files on a peer-to-peer filesharing platform violated Fourth Amendment rights or the Wiretap Act
3. Whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when agents conducted forensic analysis of his devices without his attorney present
4. Whether the defendant was subjected to selective prosecution based on his prior convictions for offenses against children
5. Whether sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Johnsen's conviction on all counts. The court held that: (1) hash value matches between a suspect's files and known child pornography amply support probable cause even without visual confirmation of the suspect files, particularly when bolstered by other evidence such as suggestive filenames and the defendant's prior criminal history; (2) law enforcement's warrantless access to publicly shared files on a filesharing platform does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in files they offer for public download, and the Wiretap Act does not apply to stored files; (3) forensic analysis of devices is not a "critical stage" of prosecution requiring counsel's presence, as the defendant is not present during the analysis and cross-examination of forensic experts at trial provides adequate protection; (4) the defendant failed to establish selective prosecution because he presented no evidence of differential treatment or impermissible prosecutorial motive, and sex offenders do not comprise a suspect class; and (5) the defendant's bare assertion of insufficient evidence without specific arguments or record citations did not preserve the issue for appellate review.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a felon-in-possession of a firearm conviction. The defendant challenges his sentencing calculation, including the base offense level, a four-level enhancement, and conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court.

1. Whether attempted carjacking qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines to support an increased base offense level of 20.
2. Whether a four-level enhancement under Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies when a defendant possesses a firearm "in connection with" a concealed-carry felony offense.
3. Whether two conditions of supervised release (obtaining a GED and submitting to computer searches) were properly imposed when they were included only in the written judgment and not pronounced at sentencing.

The court affirmed the base offense level calculation and the four-level enhancement but vacated two conditions of supervised release and remanded for resentencing. Specifically:

1. The district court did not plainly err in calculating the base offense level of 20 because attempted carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines definition, which includes offenses with an element of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.
2. The district court properly applied the four-level enhancement because: (a) the concealed-carry violation is a distinct offense from felon-in-possession, as it requires the additional element of concealment; and (b) the firearm facilitated the concealed-carry offense because the firearm was an essential element of that offense.
3. The district court erroneously imposed the GED condition and the computer-search condition because they were not pronounced at the sentencing hearing but were added only in the written judgment, violating the defendant's right to be present when conditions are imposed. The court vacated these conditions and remanded for resentencing.

This is an ERISA case in which two retired employees challenge their former employer's calculation of pension benefits, alleging that the Southern Company Pension Plan used outdated and unreasonable actuarial assumptions (including mortality data from as far back as 1951) to reduce their joint-and-survivor annuity payments and impose excessive preretirement survivor annuity charges. The plaintiffs claim these practices violate ERISA's requirement that joint-and-survivor annuities be the "actuarial equivalent" of single-life annuities and ERISA's prohibition on forfeiture of vested benefits.

1. Whether ERISA's "actuarial equivalent" requirement mandates that plans use reasonable actuarial assumptions when converting single-life annuities to joint-and-survivor annuities, or whether plans may use any assumptions (no matter how outdated or unrealistic) as long as they are written into the plan document.
2. Whether excessive QPSA (qualified preretirement survivor annuity) charges based on unreasonable mortality assumptions violate ERISA's anti-forfeiture rule.
3. Whether the Plan's calculation methods violated ERISA's nonforfeiture protections for vested benefits.
4. Whether the Plan's fiduciaries breached their duties of loyalty, prudence, and disclosure under ERISA.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and held that:

1. Actuarial Equivalence Requires Reasonable Assumptions: ERISA's requirement that joint-and-survivor annuities be the "actuarial equivalent" of single-life annuities mandates the use of reasonable, realistic mortality and interest-rate assumptions at the time the benefit is calculated. The court rejected the defendants' "mathematical equivalency" interpretation that would allow plans to use any assumptions, including those from 1789. The court based this conclusion on: (a) the term "actuarial equivalent" being a term of art requiring reference to actuarial professional standards, which consistently require reasonable assumptions; (b) ERISA's definition of "present value" as reflecting "anticipated events"; (c) the Treasury Department's longstanding regulatory interpretation requiring "consistently applied reasonable actuarial factors"; (d) the plain meaning of "equivalent" and related terms; and (e) the canon against insignificance, which would render the "actuarial equivalent" requirement meaningless under defendants' interpretation.
2. Statutory Context Supports Reasonableness Requirement: Section 1055 contains interlocking protections for spouses designed to ensure economic security, and ERISA's overall purpose is to ensure workers receive the benefits they earn. Allowing unreasonable assumptions would undermine these protective purposes. The court also noted that congressional committee reports from 1974, 1984, and 1994 consistently referenced "reasonable actuarial assumptions" in connection with actuarial equivalence.
3. Rejection of Defendants' Counterarguments: The court rejected defendants' reliance on the Russello presumption (that Congress's omission of the word "reasonable" from Section 1055(d) was intentional), finding the presumption inapplicable because: (a) the cited provisions requiring "reasonable" assumptions were enacted years after the actuarial equivalence requirement; (b) the provisions address different concepts (funding vs. vesting); and (c) the presumption cuts both ways—Congress also omitted "under the plan" language from Section 1055(d), suggesting Congress did not want the meaning to depend solely on plan terms.
4. QPSA Charges and Forfeiture: Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that excessive QPSA charges violate ERISA's nonforfeiture rule. While Congress created a narrow exception in Section 1055(i) allowing plans to charge for increased costs of preretirement survivor benefits, the Treasury Secretary's interpretation (which the court treats as persuasive under Skidmore deference) caps these charges at a reasonable reflection of the plan's actual increased costs. Plaintiffs alleged their charges substantially exceeded this amount.
5. Survival of Motion to Dismiss: Because plaintiffs plausibly alleged violations of the actuarial equivalence requirement and the nonforfeiture rule, their claims survive the motion to dismiss. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of all four counts, including the breach of fiduciary duty claim, which depends on establishing an underlying ERISA violation.

This is a tortious interference case in which Declan Flight, Inc. and Right Rudder Aviation, LLC sued Textron, Inc. and Textron eAviation, Inc. for allegedly interfering with their contracts with Pipistrel, a Slovenian aircraft manufacturer that Textron acquired in 2022. The plaintiffs alleged that Textron and eAviation directed Pipistrel to breach contracts with the plaintiffs and interfered with a separate sales agreement between RRA and Mesa Airlines.

1. Whether non-signatory defendants can invoke forum-selection clauses contained in contracts to which they are not parties, specifically whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel under federal common law applies to allow such enforcement.
2. Whether the applicability of a forum-selection clause is governed by federal common law or by the substantive law governing the contract.
3. Whether Slovenian law, as the governing law of the contracts, permits non-signatories to invoke the forum-selection clauses.
4. Whether the district court properly applied the Atlantic Marine forum non conveniens test when no valid forum-selection clause applied to the claims.
5. Whether the district court properly established personal jurisdiction over the defendants for the Mesa Airlines contract claim.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of Counts I and II for forum non conveniens and reversed the finding of personal jurisdiction as to Count III, remanding for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. The applicability of a forum-selection clause—determining who can invoke it and to whom it applies—is distinct from and antecedent to the enforceability of the clause. Applicability is a matter of contract interpretation governed by substantive state law, while enforceability is governed by federal common law.
2. Under Erie doctrine, because contract interpretation is a substantive matter, the law governing the contract itself must be applied to interpret the forum-selection clause, not federal common law.
3. Applying Florida's choice-of-law rules, the Declan and RRA Contracts are governed by Slovenian law, which therefore governs interpretation of their forum-selection clauses.
4. Under Slovenian law, which implements EU Regulation 1215/2015, jurisdiction clauses are generally enforceable only between the parties to the contract. The European Court of Justice has held that non-signatories cannot rely on such clauses absent consent, and Slovenian case law reflects this restrictive approach.
5. Because Slovenian law does not permit non-signatories to invoke the forum-selection clauses, the clauses do not apply to the plaintiffs' claims against the non-signatory defendants, and therefore the Atlantic Marine modified forum non conveniens test does not apply. The district court should have applied the traditional forum non conveniens test instead.
6. As to Count III, the district court erred in finding personal jurisdiction based on Florida's long-arm statute breach-of-contract provision (since defendants were not parties to the Mesa Contract) and the forum-selection clause (without proper analysis). The court must establish personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits, and the case must be remanded for proper jurisdictional analysis.

This case involves an appeal of a National Labor Relations Board decision finding that Vermont Information Processing, Inc. (VIP) unlawfully terminated four software engineers for creating and disseminating a salary-sharing spreadsheet. The court reviews both VIP's petition for review and the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement of its remedial order.

1. Whether VIP unlawfully discharged Christopher Bendel for engaging in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by creating and sharing a salary-sharing spreadsheet
2. Whether the NLRB impermissibly broadened its theory of liability regarding the terminations of Gordon Dragoon, Kaleb Noble, and Kestrel Swift by relying on "workplace conditions" discussions not charged in the General Counsel's complaint
3. Whether the Board's reinstatement remedy for Bendel is appropriate despite his securing other employment
4. Whether VIP properly preserved its challenge to the "make-whole" financial remedy under the Thryv standard, which compensates employees for all direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms regardless of interim earnings

1. Christopher Bendel: The court affirmed the NLRB's finding that VIP unlawfully discharged Bendel for engaging in protected salary-sharing activity. Substantial evidence supported the Board's determination based on the timing of termination (within 70 minutes of discovery), lack of prior termination plans, and VIP's shifting explanations. The court rejected VIP's arguments that it fired Bendel for disrupting the restructuring, misusing company resources, or disseminating inaccurate information.
2. Dragoon, Noble, and Swift: The court vacated the Board's findings as to these three employees because the Board impermissibly expanded the theory of liability beyond the General Counsel's complaint. While the ALJ's inclusion of "instant messaging chats about the spreadsheet and Bendel's termination" was permissible as closely connected to the charged conduct, the Board's further expansion to include discussions of "workplace conditions" violated due process by providing inadequate notice to VIP and preventing it from presenting a full defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
3. Reinstatement Remedy: The court upheld the Board's reinstatement order for Bendel, finding no undue hardship. VIP's reliance on a Second Circuit case involving theft was distinguishable because the Board rejected VIP's claims of disloyalty as pretextual. The reinstatement remedy effectuates NLRA policies even if Bendel declines to return.
4. Make-Whole Financial Remedy: The court declined to address VIP's challenge to the Thryv-based make-whole remedy on the merits, holding that VIP failed to preserve the issue. VIP raised only a case-specific "windfall" argument before the Board, not a facial challenge to the Thryv remedy's statutory authority. The court also rejected VIP's unpreserved Seventh Amendment argument based on the recent SEC v. Jarkesy decision, finding VIP could have raised it before the Board after Jarkesy was decided.

This case involves a constitutional challenge to state legislation (SB 159) that authorized conditional use permits for electrical substations supporting renewable energy projects. Sussex County and the Town of Fenwick Island appealed a Court of Chancery decision upholding the statute after County Council had denied a permit application for such a substation.

1. Whether SB 159 violates the separation of powers doctrine by allowing the General Assembly to override a subordinate government's quasi-judicial land use decision
2. Whether SB 159 violates Article II, Section 25 of the Delaware Constitution, which authorizes the General Assembly to delegate zoning authority to municipalities and counties
3. Whether SB 159 violates Article II, Section 16 of the Delaware Constitution's requirement that bills embrace only one subject clearly expressed in the title
4. Whether SB 159 violates due process rights of the public
5. Whether the Town of Fenwick Island has standing to challenge the legislation

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision upholding SB 159 on all grounds. The court held: (1) the separation of powers doctrine applies only between the three branches of government, not vertically within the legislative branch, so the General Assembly may override subordinate governmental decisions; (2) Article II, Section 25 does not prevent the General Assembly from reclaiming delegated zoning authority, as the delegation is not immutable; (3) the bill's title adequately describes its subject matter as relating to public utilities and electrical substations, and the zoning provisions are germane to that public utility purpose; (4) there is no "common law" due process claim restricting legislative action by the General Assembly, and due process requirements apply only to quasi-judicial acts by subordinate governments; and (5) the standing issue was unnecessary to reach because Sussex County's standing was not challenged and both plaintiffs raised identical claims.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case addressing whether the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Ulrich Thiem, a Porsche executive, in a lawsuit brought by Zync, Inc., a defunct automotive technology startup. The Company alleges that Thiem aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty and tortiously interfered with two financing transactions by blocking them through his control over the Porsche Director's voting rights.

1. Whether Delaware's Long-Arm Statute permits jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on a "Delaware-directed omission"—specifically, the failure of a corporate filing with the Delaware Secretary of State that would have occurred if the defendant had not blocked two financing transactions.
2. Whether the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction applies when the defendant exercised control over another party's fiduciary duties through an aiding-and-abetting relationship.
3. Whether signing agreements containing Delaware choice-of-law provisions or exercising the right to appoint a director to a Delaware corporation constitutes a Delaware-directed act sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
4. Whether an omission can support jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute when it is a collateral effect of alleged tortious conduct rather than part of the cause of action itself.

The court granted Thiem's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that:

1. The Company failed to identify any Delaware-directed act by Thiem that could support jurisdiction. Signing agreements with Delaware choice-of-law provisions, exercising Porsche's director appointment right, and other conduct did not constitute Delaware-directed acts because they were not performed in Delaware and did not have the requisite nexus to the state.
2. The Company's novel theory of "Delaware-directed omission" fails because the Long-Arm Statute requires an omission that causes tortious injury, not merely an omission compared to an alternative timeline. The omitted filing with the Delaware Secretary of State was a collateral effect of the alleged breach of duty, not part of the cause of action itself, and bore no causal connection to the Company's injury.
3. While an omission can support jurisdiction when it is part of the cause of action (such as fraud by omission or tortious failure to warn), the relevant omission here—Knörle's failure to vote in favor of the financings—did not occur in Delaware. The omitted Secretary of State filing would have been a consequence of the financing transactions, not the tortious conduct itself.
4. Although the court acknowledged an "odd asymmetry" where it is easier to assert jurisdiction over transactions that occurred rather than those prevented from occurring, the Long-Arm Statute and conspiracy jurisdiction doctrine do not provide a method to overcome this limitation in the present case.

This is a stockholder derivative and class action case arising from the 2023 merger of World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (WWE) with Endeavor Group Holdings, Inc. Plaintiffs allege that controlling stockholder Vincent K. McMahon steered the sale to his longtime friend Ari Emanuel in exchange for a post-merger executive role and assistance with federal investigations into alleged sexual misconduct.

1. Whether defendants spoliated electronically stored information (ESI) by failing to preserve Signal messaging app communications after receiving litigation hold notices
2. Whether defendants had a duty to preserve Signal chats under Court of Chancery Rule 37(e)
3. Whether defendants took reasonable steps to preserve ESI or instead affirmatively destroyed it
4. Whether plaintiffs suffered prejudice from the loss of the Signal communications
5. Whether defendants acted recklessly or intentionally in destroying the evidence
6. What sanctions are appropriate to remedy the spoliation

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, finding that spoliation occurred and that defendants acted recklessly. The court made the following key rulings:

1. Timing: The court ruled it was appropriate to decide the spoliation motion before trial because it rests on undisputed facts and the remedies sought will affect how the parties prepare for trial.
2. Duty to Preserve: The Signal Users had a duty to preserve Signal chats beginning June 21, 2022, when the Misconduct Hold was issued, and certainly by August 31, 2022, when they should have anticipated litigation related to a potential sale of the Company.
3. Loss of ESI: The Signal chats are irretrievably lost and cannot be recovered from other sources.
4. Failure to Take Reasonable Steps: Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to preserve ESI. Instead of disabling auto-deletion settings after receiving litigation holds, they manually changed auto-deletion settings for individual Signal chats to delete messages within hours or less, resulting in destruction of existing messages and future message deletion. Khan also selectively deleted text messages.
5. Prejudice: Plaintiffs demonstrated prejudice because the Signal Users communicated about relevant topics including Vince's alleged misconduct, his return to the Company, the sale process, and the merger. The timing of the auto-deletion setting changes corresponded with key events. The court rejected defendants' arguments that the lost messages were irrelevant, noting that the selective destruction suggests the most sensitive and probative exchanges are gone.
6. Recklessness: Defendants acted recklessly by failing to check Signal auto-delete settings after receiving litigation holds, manually changing settings to implement short-fuse destruction periods, and selectively deleting messages. Knowledge of the duty to preserve coupled with the loss of communications and lack of explanation is dispositive of recklessness.
7. Sanctions Imposed: The court imposed the following sanctions:
   1. Presumed the following facts to be true (which only Vince and Khan must rebut):
      • Emanuel's promise of a continued role at the post-merger company influenced Vince's decision-making regarding the merger
      • Emanuel's offer of indemnification and legal support related to federal investigations influenced Vince's decision-making
      • Vince decided to pursue a transaction with Endeavor in 2022, before the Company initiated its strategic review
      • Khan communicated with Emanuel between August and December 2022 to facilitate a transaction
      • Vince and Khan worked with Raine to steer the process toward Endeavor and away from other bidders
   2. Elevated the standard of proof for overcoming the presumed facts from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence, recognizing that plaintiffs lack access to the spoliated evidence and cannot use it in their case-in-chief or to impeach testimony
   3. The court declined to impose more severe sanctions such as default judgment or dismissal, finding the presumptions and heightened burden sufficient

The court emphasized that defendants remain free to present their case at trial and attempt to overcome the presumptions with credible evidence meeting the clear and convincing standard.

This is a dispute over whether a Delaware court should enjoin arbitration proceedings under the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The plaintiff, who initially consented to arbitration to obtain dismissal of a claim in a related New York lawsuit, subsequently sought to block the arbitration after the arbitrator ruled to apply the Commercial Rules rather than the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) Rules.

1. Whether the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated questions of substantive arbitrability (such as which arbitral rules apply and the arbitrator's jurisdiction) to the arbitrator rather than retaining them for court resolution.
2. Whether the plaintiff's subsequent attempt to withdraw consent to arbitration was valid, given his unequivocal August 1 letter consenting to arbitration under AAA administration.
3. Whether the plaintiff has standing to challenge the arbitration and whether the arbitration is ripe for proceeding given that Atlas's ownership remains disputed in the parallel New York litigation.
4. Whether the court should grant a preliminary injunction halting the arbitration pending resolution of the New York Action.

The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction as moot. The court held that the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated substantive arbitrability questions to the arbitrator through the plaintiff's August 1 letter, in which he unequivocally consented to arbitration "under the administration of the AAA" without conditioning his consent on application of specific rules. Both the Commercial Rules and ICDR Rules empower the arbitrator to decide jurisdictional disputes and determine which rules apply, so the AAA's decision to apply the Commercial Rules does not vitiate the delegation. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's reservation of "jurisdictional objections" in his consent letter meant he agreed to present standing and ripeness defenses to the arbitrator rather than the court. The court declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, characterizing this as an abstention doctrine rather than a true lack of jurisdiction, and noted that the arbitrator is fully capable of addressing any defects in the arbitration proceedings.

This is an errata sheet for a United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit opinion in a criminal case between the United States and defendant Francisco Xavier Ortiz-Colón, correcting grammatical and spelling errors in the original May 6, 2026 opinion.

The document does not address substantive legal issues, as it is solely an errata sheet containing corrections to the original opinion.

The court issued four corrections to the original opinion:

1. Page 13, line 18: Replace "which" with "whom"
2. Page 36, line 15: Replace "gleam" with "glean"
3. Page 42, line 5: Replace "statues" with "statutes"
4. Page 42, line 16: Replace "who" with "which"

This is an immigration appeal case in which William Hernando Usma Acosta petitions for review of a decision by the Acting United States Attorney General regarding immigration eligibility and discretionary denial.

The case addresses the scope of judicial review over an Immigration Judge's (IJ) discretionary decisions regarding eligibility waivers and denials in immigration proceedings.

The court clarified that factual circumstances underlying a discretionary denial by an Immigration Judge are within the IJ's discretion and are not subject to appellate review. The court issued an errata sheet to remove language suggesting the court could review the broader decision to waive eligibility, thereby narrowing the scope of reviewable issues to those matters properly within the court's jurisdiction.

This is an errata sheet for a United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit opinion in a criminal case involving defendants Sunna Sepetu and Nafis Quaye appealing their convictions against the United States.

The document provided is an errata sheet only and does not contain the substantive opinion; therefore, the specific key legal issues are not detailed in this excerpt.

The court issued a minor correction to its May 15, 2026 opinion, amending page 28, line 2 to replace the word "that" with "the." This is a typographical correction and does not reflect a change in the court's substantive ruling.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a state court's denial of a Brady claim (failure to disclose exculpatory evidence). Juan Crespo-Morales was convicted in 1996 of four counts of first-degree murder in Puerto Rico and sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that prosecutors suppressed witness affidavits that would have undermined the prosecution's theory of motive.

1. Whether a federal district court can properly evaluate a state court's Brady claim adjudication under § 2254 standards without access to the trial testimony of a key prosecution witness
2. Whether the district court complied with applicable habeas rules and the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases when it denied the petition without obtaining a transcript or narrative summary of the witness's testimony
3. Whether the suppression of the women's affidavits was material and prejudicial to the defendant's defense

The First Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case. The court held that the district court erred by denying Crespo's § 2254 petition without reviewing a transcript or narrative summary of Regino Burgos-Torres's trial testimony. The court reasoned that under § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2), a district court must evaluate whether a state court's adjudication was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of facts, which is impossible without knowing the content of key trial testimony. The court rejected the Commonwealth's arguments that the 2015 evidentiary hearing record was sufficient and that the transcript was unavailable due to Hurricane Maria damage. The court noted that at least five other circuits require district courts to review important portions of the state court record before resolving § 2254 petitions. The case was remanded with instructions to obtain Burgos-Torres's testimony and re-examine the Brady claim in light of that evidence.

This is an immigration appeal case in which Franklin Maudiel Vasquez-Chavez petitions for judicial review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision affirming the denial of his asylum and withholding of removal applications. Vasquez fled El Salvador after suffering years of abuse from his father, but the immigration authorities determined his claims did not qualify for protection under asylum law.

1. Whether Vasquez established persecution on account of a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion) as required for asylum eligibility
2. Whether the harm Vasquez suffered had the requisite causal nexus to a protected ground or instead stemmed from a personal family dispute
3. Whether Vasquez provided sufficient corroborating evidence regarding the government's inability or unwillingness to protect him from his father
4. Whether credible testimony alone is sufficient to establish persecution without corroboration

The First Circuit denied Vasquez's petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination that Vasquez failed to establish persecution because: (1) although the harm he suffered was severe enough to constitute persecution-level harm, he did not demonstrate the required nexus between that harm and any protected ground—the evidence showed the abuse stemmed from a personal family dispute rather than a protected ground; (2) Vasquez failed to provide reasonably available corroborating evidence regarding the government's unwillingness or inability to protect him, and an immigration judge may require such corroboration even when testimony is found credible; and (3) Vasquez waived the issue of government protection by failing to challenge the IJ's ruling on that point before the BIA. The court reasoned that showing only severe harm is insufficient for persecution; a causal connection to a protected ground is also required, and personal disputes generally do not satisfy this requirement.

This is an immigration law case involving a habeas corpus petition filed by Mahmoud Khalil, a lawful permanent resident, challenging his detention and removal proceedings. The case centers on whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims arising from detention before a final removal order is entered.

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) strips federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions challenging detention when no final order of removal has been issued
2. Whether the panel majority correctly applied the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez and the Third Circuit's precedent in Chehazeh v. Attorney General
3. Whether Khalil's detention-specific claims (alleging First and Fifth Amendment violations) constitute "now-or-never claims" that fall outside the jurisdictional bar
4. Whether denying jurisdiction violates the Suspension Clause of the Constitution
5. Whether the petition-for-review process provides an adequate substitute for habeas review of detention claims

The petition for rehearing en banc was denied. However, three circuit judges (Krause, Restrepo, and Freeman) dissented from the denial, arguing that the panel majority erred in finding jurisdiction was stripped. The dissenters contended that: (1) § 1252(b)(9) applies only when a final removal order exists, which was not the case here; (2) Khalil's detention-specific and First Amendment claims constitute "now-or-never claims" that cannot be meaningfully reviewed in a later petition-for-review proceeding; (3) the panel majority mischaracterized Khalil's detention claim as merely repackaging removal challenges; and (4) denying jurisdiction violates the Suspension Clause because the petition-for-review process cannot provide adequate substitute habeas review for claims that will be moot by the time a final removal order is entered. The dissenters argued the panel majority strained precedent and conflated distinct claims to reach its jurisdictional conclusion.

This is a federal sentencing appeal in which the defendant challenges the district court's enhancement of his felon-in-possession sentence based on a prior conviction for using a firearm during a robbery under Virginia Code § 18.2-53.1. The defendant argues that this prior conviction does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

1. Whether a prior conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-53.1 (use or attempted use of a firearm while committing robbery) qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' elements clause, which requires that an offense "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another."
2. Whether the prior conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines' enumerated offense clause (which includes "robbery" as a predicate offense).
3. Whether any error in calculating the defendant's sentencing guidelines range was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The majority held that:

1. Elements Clause: The district court erred in concluding that Virginia Code § 18.2-53.1 satisfies the elements clause. Under the categorical approach, courts must focus on the elements required for conviction rather than how those elements are typically satisfied in practice. Because Virginia robbery can be committed through a threat to accuse someone of sodomy (which does not involve physical force), and § 18.2-53.1 does not require that the firearm be used against another person or to overcome the victim's resistance, the statute does not necessarily require proof of physical force against another person as an element. Therefore, the elements clause is not satisfied.
2. Enumerated Offense Clause: The government failed to carry its burden on this alternative ground. The court noted that Parham held Virginia robbery does not categorically match the Guidelines' enumerated offense of "robbery," and the government did not adequately address this precedent or the Guidelines' language covering "the use or unlawful possession of a firearm," which may be more directly applicable than the generic "robbery" category.
3. Harmlessness: The government failed to demonstrate that the sentencing error was harmless. Although the district court stated it would impose the same sentence regardless, the court's cursory explanation and apparent confusion about the defendant's actual criminal history (incorrectly stating the defendant personally pointed a gun at others when it was actually a codefendant) raised concerns about whether the court would have imposed the same above-Guidelines sentence had it correctly calculated the range as 15-21 months rather than 30-37 months.

This is a federal sentencing appeal in which the defendant challenges whether his prior Delaware drug-distribution convictions qualify as predicate offenses for a career-offender enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant argues that the Delaware statutes under which he was convicted impermissibly include attempted drug distribution, which would disqualify them as "controlled substance offenses."

1. Whether prior Delaware drug-distribution convictions under Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4752(a) and § 4754(1) qualify as "controlled substance offenses" for purposes of the career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1
2. Whether the Delaware statutes' definition of "delivery" to include "attempted transfers" renders them overbroad to include inchoate attempted delivery offenses
3. The distinction between an "attempted transfer" (which constitutes a completed delivery) and an "attempted delivery" (which would be prosecuted under Delaware's separate attempt statute)

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence, holding that Starkey's prior Delaware drug-distribution convictions properly qualified as predicate offenses for the career-offender enhancement. The court reasoned that although Delaware's definition of "delivery" includes "attempted transfers," this does not render the statute overbroad because an "attempted transfer" becomes a completed delivery under the statute's plain language, distinct from an "attempted delivery" which would be prosecuted under Delaware's separate attempt statute. The court rejected Starkey's reliance on Bordley v. State, finding that case actually supported the government's position by demonstrating that attempted transfers are prosecuted as completed deliveries. The court also noted its consistent interpretation of similar statutes in other jurisdictions (federal, North Carolina, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) reaching the same conclusion.

This is an appeal in consolidated cases involving coastal land loss claims brought by Plaquemines Parish and Cameron Parish against major oil and gas companies. The Fifth Circuit is addressing the case on remand from the Supreme Court regarding the applicability of the federal officer removal statute.

Whether the defendants' actions "relate to" the federal officer removal statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which permits removal of state court cases to federal court when a federal officer's actions are involved.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, which vacated the court's prior judgment and concluded that Chevron USA plausibly alleged its case satisfied the "relating to" requirement of the federal officer removal statute. The court remanded the cases to the respective district courts for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, 146 S. Ct. 1052 (2026).

This is an appeal in consolidated cases involving Plaquemines Parish and Cameron Parish suing major oil companies (BP, Chevron, Shell, Exxon Mobil, and others) for coastal damage. The case was remanded by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals following a Supreme Court decision regarding federal officer removal jurisdiction.

1. Whether the defendants' case satisfies the "relating to" requirement under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)
2. Whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the removal of the case from state to federal court

The Fifth Circuit vacated its prior judgment and remanded the cases to the respective district courts for further proceedings. The Supreme Court had concluded that Chevron plausibly alleged its case satisfied the "relating to" requirement of the federal officer removal statute. The court instructed the district courts to proceed consistently with the Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, 146 S. Ct. 1052 (2026).

This case involves crime victims' families challenging the Department of Justice's non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with Boeing following two fatal airplane crashes. The families sought mandamus relief in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals after the district court denied their motion to set aside the NPA and approved the government's motion to dismiss the criminal prosecution.

1. Whether the Department of Justice violated the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) by failing to properly confer with and notify crash victims' families regarding the 2021 Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Boeing
2. Whether the Department violated the CVRA by allegedly misleading the families about the timing of the 2025 NPA and the government's ability to refile charges if Boeing breached the agreement
3. Whether the families' challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot after Boeing breached the agreement
4. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review a district court's decision to dismiss a criminal prosecution under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the families' petitions for writ of mandamus. The court held that: (1) the families' challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot because Boeing's breach of the agreement relieved the government of its obligations under it; (2) the Department did not violate the CVRA by failing to confer with the families or by misleading them about the NPA's timing or the government's ability to refile charges, as the prosecution held a meaningful video conference with the families in May 2025 where it clearly explained the NPA terms and the requirement to move to dismiss; (3) the court lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review the district court's Rule 48 dismissal decision, as the CVRA's mandamus provision only permits review of whether victims' enumerated rights were denied, not the merits of prosecutorial decisions; and (4) the families' argument that applying the "wrong legal standard" violates the fairness requirement of the CVRA was rejected because reading such a broad appeal right into the CVRA would be inconsistent with the principle that nonparties lack a judicially cognizable interest in prosecution decisions.

This case involves families of victims from two Boeing 737 MAX crashes challenging the Department of Justice's non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with Boeing under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA). The families sought mandamus relief after the district court approved the NPA and granted the government's motion to dismiss the conspiracy to defraud charges against Boeing.

1. Whether the Department of Justice violated crime victims' rights under the CVRA by failing to properly confer with the families before negotiating and entering into the NPA with Boeing
2. Whether the Department misled the families regarding the timing of the NPA and the government's ability to refile charges if Boeing breached the agreement
3. Whether the families' challenge to the 2021 Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) was moot after Boeing breached it
4. Whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review a district court's decision to dismiss criminal charges under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48

The Fifth Circuit denied the families' petitions for mandamus relief. The court held that: (1) the challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot because Boeing's breach terminated the agreement and relieved the government of its obligations; (2) the Department did not violate the CVRA by failing to confer with the families, as it held a meaningful video conference in May 2025 where it compared views with the families as required; (3) the Department did not mislead the families about the NPA's timing or the government's ability to refile charges, as the NPA expressly permitted prosecution for conduct not time-barred as of the agreement's signing date; and (4) the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review the district court's Rule 48 dismissal decision, as the CVRA mandamus procedure only permits review of whether a district court denied victims' enumerated rights, not the merits of the underlying prosecution decision.

This is an appeal concerning the timeliness of removal of a class action lawsuit from state to federal court. The defendant GateHouse Media sought to remove the case a second time after the district court had remanded it to state court following denial of class certification, raising the question of whether the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) can be equitably tolled.

1. Whether the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) can be equitably tolled when a district court improperly remands a case to state court.
2. Whether a motion for class certification filed in state court after remand can reset the removal clock for purposes of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
3. Whether a district court's denial of class certification divests federal courts of CAFA jurisdiction.
4. Whether the district court's improper remand order created ambiguity that would justify equitable tolling of the removal deadline.

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and instructed it to remand the case to state court. The court held that: (1) the Supreme Court's recent decision in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel established that § 1446(b)(1)'s 30-day removal deadline cannot be equitably tolled, foreclosing GateHouse's argument; (2) the removal clock begins when the initial complaint is filed and cannot be reset by later developments such as class certification motions or denials; (3) CAFA jurisdiction is determined at the time of filing and is not divested by denial of class certification, meaning the district court's original remand was improper; and (4) despite the district court's error, the removal clock is "unforgiving" and mandatory, with no judicial authority to create equitable exceptions beyond those explicitly provided by Congress in the removal statute. The court noted that while GateHouse's predicament resulted from the district court's mistake, GateHouse had opportunities to challenge the remand order timely but failed to do so.

This is an appeal by Detroit police officers from a district court's partial denial of their motion for summary judgment in a civil rights case brought by two individuals whose murder convictions were vacated after nearly twenty years of imprisonment. The plaintiffs alleged that the officers violated their constitutional rights through Brady violations, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence.

1. Whether the court has interlocutory jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity under the collateral order doctrine and pendent appellate jurisdiction
2. Whether the Heck doctrine bars the plaintiffs' claims because their convictions were vacated
3. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Brady claims for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence regarding witness testimony and a jailhouse informant's fabricated statement
4. Whether collateral estoppel bars malicious prosecution claims based on prior state court probable cause determinations
5. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on federal and state malicious prosecution claims
6. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on a fabrication of evidence claim, and whether probable cause defeats such a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment

The court AFFIRMED in part and DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically:

1. The court DISMISSED the Heck doctrine challenge for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction, finding that Heck claims are neither reviewable under the collateral order doctrine nor pendent appellate jurisdiction because they do not rise or fall with qualified immunity.
2. The court AFFIRMED the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the Brady claims, finding that: (a) the officers waived their argument that Brady was not clearly established by explicitly conceding this point before the district court; (b) the court lacked jurisdiction to review admissibility of hearsay evidence; (c) the officers forfeited arguments about bad faith by failing to raise them before the district court; and (d) arguments first raised in the reply brief were forfeited, and even if considered, would fail because the officers did not concede the most favorable facts to the plaintiffs.
3. The court AFFIRMED the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claims, holding that: (a) collateral estoppel does not bar the claims because the plaintiffs' convictions were properly vacated under Michigan law, which provides that vacated convictions have no preclusive effect; (b) the state court's WICA decision did not actually litigate whether the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty for purposes of the malicious prosecution claim; and (c) arguments first raised in the reply brief were forfeited.
4. The court AFFIRMED the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the fabrication of evidence claim, holding that: (a) collateral estoppel does not apply because the prior probable cause determinations have no preclusive effect following vacation of the convictions; and (b) the court lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence issue on interlocutory appeal, as district court determinations of triable issues of fact cannot be appealed on an interlocutory basis.

This is a Title VII employment discrimination case in which an African American applicant for deputy sheriff challenged his removal from the Will County Sheriff's Merit Commission's certification process, alleging racial discrimination. The applicant was removed based on a negative employment reference from his former employer.

1. Whether the Will County Sheriff's Merit Commission qualifies as an "employer" under Title VII (which requires 15 or more employees), and whether employees of related government agencies may be aggregated to meet this threshold
2. Whether the applicant established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
3. Whether the Merit Commission's stated reason for removal—the negative employment reference—was pretextual for racial discrimination
4. Whether various circumstantial evidence (delayed disclosure, notation discrepancies, a commissioner's stray remark, statistical data, and a "cat's paw" theory) could support an inference of discrimination

The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The court declined to address the threshold Title VII coverage issue because the applicant's discrimination claim lacked evidentiary support on the merits. The court found that: (1) the applicant failed to establish he was qualified for the position, as evidenced by the substantial negative employment reference indicating he was not dependable, did not work well with others, would not be rehired, and was off on a questionable unreported work injury; (2) the negative employment reference was an unquestionably legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for removal; (3) no evidence suggested the stated reason was pretextual; and (4) none of the applicant's alternative arguments—including the delayed disclosure, notation discrepancies, a stray remark made nearly a decade later, claims of abnormal procedure, statistical evidence lacking specificity, or a "cat's paw" theory unsupported by evidence of discriminatory animus—could overcome the absence of evidence linking his race to the Merit Commission's decision.

This is an appeal of a district court's decision confirming an arbitration award in an employment discrimination case. The appellant challenges both the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction and the arbitrator's admission of evidence, seeking to have the arbitration award set aside.

1. Whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award when the plaintiff and one defendant were both citizens of Illinois, potentially destroying diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332
2. Whether the arbitrator engaged in misconduct under 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(3) by admitting undisclosed evidence and hearsay testimony that violated the arbitration agreement's procedural rules
3. Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure apply in arbitration proceedings

The court affirmed the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award. On jurisdiction, the court held that federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 applied because the underlying suit arose under federal employment discrimination law, and this jurisdictional basis continues when a court decides whether to confirm an arbitration award, citing Kinsella v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC and the Supreme Court's decision in Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties. On the merits, the court rejected all of the appellant's procedural arguments, reasoning that: (1) the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure do not apply in arbitration; (2) arbitrators may adopt streamlined procedural rules; (3) §10(a)(3) only permits vacatur when arbitrators refuse to hear evidence, not when they hear excess or unreliable evidence; (4) the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice from the admission of the disputed evidence; and (5) the arbitrator did not engage in misconduct or misbehavior warranting vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act.

This is a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case involving a plaintiff who filed two negligence suits against the United States—one timely and one untimely. The district court dismissed the timely suit based on claim preclusion from the final judgment in the untimely suit, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that California state law governs the preclusive effect of FTCA judgments.

1. Whether state or federal law governs the claim preclusive effect of a Federal Tort Claims Act judgment
2. Whether a judgment dismissing a suit as time-barred under the statute of limitations has claim preclusive effect under California law
3. Whether California's public policy exception to claim preclusion applies when a party never had an opportunity to litigate the merits

The court reversed the district court's summary judgment and held that: (1) under the FTCA's directive to apply "the whole law of the State where the act or omission occurred," California's claim preclusion law governs the preclusive effect of FTCA judgments, following the precedent in Filice v. United States, 271 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1959); (2) under California law, a judgment dismissing a suit based on the statute of limitations is not "on the merits" and therefore lacks claim preclusive effect; and (3) alternatively, even if the judgment had preclusive effect, California's public policy exception applies because Hedrington never had an opportunity to litigate the merits of his claims, and applying preclusion would result in manifest injustice and undermine the integrity of the judicial system. The court remanded for further proceedings on the merits.

This is a Fourth Amendment civil rights case in which a woman who suffered a broken arm during a police encounter sued four officers for unlawful seizure and excessive force. The plaintiff alleged the officers lacked legal authority to detain her after she regained consciousness following a suspected drug overdose, and that they used excessive force when she attempted to leave the scene.

1. Whether the officers lawfully seized the plaintiff under the Fourth Amendment emergency-aid doctrine or had probable cause to believe she committed a crime (drug possession)
2. Whether Officer Phillips used excessive force when he physically restrained the plaintiff as she attempted to leave
3. Whether the other officers had a duty to intervene to stop Officer Phillips's alleged excessive force
4. The proper legal standard for emergency-aid seizures following a recent Supreme Court decision in Case v. Montana

The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of all four officers based on qualified immunity. The court held:

1. Lawful Seizure: The officers had an arguable basis to seize the plaintiff under the emergency-aid doctrine because a reasonable officer could conclude she needed emergency assistance following a suspected GHB overdose. The court applied the new standard from Case v. Montana, which requires only an "objectively reasonable basis" for believing intervention is needed to prevent serious harm, rather than the higher "probable cause" standard. Alternatively, the officers had probable cause to believe the plaintiff possessed GHB, a controlled substance, which independently justified the seizure.
2. Excessive Force: Officer Phillips did not use excessive force. The force employed—grabbing the plaintiff's arm and pulling it behind her back—was a standard handcuffing technique constituting de minimis force that was reasonably proportionate to the need to maintain the seizure. The officer had only seconds to respond to the plaintiff's sudden pivot toward him and attempt to leave in a confined space, and a reasonable officer could perceive this as a forceful attempt to terminate the encounter.
3. Duty to Intervene: Officers Cash, Collier, and Pena had no duty to intervene because Officer Phillips did not use excessive force, and therefore there was no constitutional violation to prevent.

This is an insurance coverage dispute in which Northfield Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify North Brook Industries in an underlying sex trafficking lawsuit brought by J.G. The appeal concerns whether the district court's partial dismissal of Northfield's declaratory judgment action is immediately appealable.

1. Whether the district court's order dismissing Northfield's request for a declaration regarding its duty to defend constitutes an injunction that is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
2. Whether the order is a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
3. Whether an insurer can simultaneously defend an insured while seeking a declaratory judgment that it owes no duty to defend
4. Whether Northfield's declaratory judgment complaint adequately alleged a real and substantial controversy between the parties

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the district court's order does not have the practical effect of an injunction because it: (1) was not a clear and understandable directive requiring Northfield's performance; (2) was not enforceable through contempt proceedings; and (3) did not award North Brook substantive relief. The order merely announced the meaning of contested policy provisions without requiring affirmative action. The court distinguished this case from James River Insurance Co. v. Ultratec Special Effects Inc., where summary judgment was granted on a counterclaim for declaratory relief. The court noted that Northfield could pursue immediate appeal by moving for final judgment under Rule 54(b) or amending its complaint under Rule 15(a)(2). In a concurring opinion, Judge Tjoflat criticized the fundamental misuse of the declaratory judgment action, noting that Northfield failed to allege an actual disagreement with North Brook requiring immediate resolution, and highlighted the practical problems created by allowing an insurer to defend an insured while simultaneously seeking a declaration that it owes no duty to defend.

This case involves a challenge by the Narragansett Indian Tribe to the Federal Highway Administration's adoption of mitigation measures for a bridge reconstruction project in Providence, Rhode Island that affects archaeologically and culturally significant tribal lands. The Tribe alleges the agency failed to adequately consult with it and improperly excluded a tribal official as a required signatory to the programmatic agreement implementing the mitigation strategies.

1. Whether the Narragansett Tribe has Article III standing to challenge the Second Programmatic Agreement despite a prior dismissal for lack of standing
2. Whether the National Historic Preservation Act's implementing regulations require a tribal historic preservation officer to be a required signatory to a programmatic agreement when the affected historic properties are located off tribal lands
3. Whether the Federal Highway Administration adequately consulted with the Tribe in developing the Second Programmatic Agreement as required by Section 106 of the Preservation Act
4. Whether the agency's change in mitigation strategies and the Tribe's signatory status between the First and Second Programmatic Agreements constituted an arbitrary and capricious change of policy

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Federal Highway Administration. The court held:

1. Standing: The Narragansett Tribe has Article III standing because it suffered a procedural injury (failure to adequately consult) that is traceable to the Highway Administration's actions and redressable by judicial relief. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply because the prior dismissal did not constitute a final determination on the Tribe's procedural injury theory of standing.
2. Required Signatory Status: The Tribe was not a required signatory to the Second Programmatic Agreement. The regulation requiring "appropriate SHPOs/THPOs" (State/Tribal Historic Preservation Officers) to sign uses a virgule (forward slash) that denotes alternatives, not a conjunction. A tribal historic preservation officer is required as a signatory only when the undertaking or mitigation measures affect tribal lands or involve tribal acquisition or control of land. Here, the Providence Viaduct reconstruction and mitigation strategies affected off-tribal lands, so only the State Historic Preservation Officer's signature was required. The Tribe was appropriately designated as an "invited signatory," which does not require its approval for the agreement to take effect.
3. Adequate Consultation: The Highway Administration adequately consulted with the Tribe as required by Section 106. The agency provided the Tribe with multiple opportunities to comment on drafts of the agreement through five letters requesting comments and three telephonic conferences, including a formal Nation-to-Nation consultation. The agency incorporated the Tribe's feedback by removing proposed educational initiatives the Tribe found insulting, adding preservation covenants for properties of cultural significance, and upgrading the Tribe's status from concurring party to invited signatory. Section 106 requires consultation and consideration of tribal views, not particular outcomes, and the agency satisfied this obligation.
4. Arbitrary and Capricious Challenge: The agency's change in mitigation strategies and signatory status was not arbitrary and capricious. The Highway Administration explicitly acknowledged the changes between the First and Second Programmatic Agreements and provided reasoned explanations: the First Agreement's land transfers became impossible due to Rhode Island's insistence on a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, and public safety and transportation needs required moving forward with construction. The agency reasonably explained that the Tribe was no longer a required signatory because no land was being deeded to it and it had no duties to perform under the Second Agreement. No serious reliance interests were impacted because the Tribe never actually acquired any property under the First Agreement.

This is a defamation and privacy case arising from the National Academy of Sciences' rescission of Luis Jaime Castillo Butters's membership following sexual harassment allegations. Castillo sued the NAS and its president Marcia McNutt for defamation, defamation by implication, and false light invasion of privacy based on statements made regarding his ouster.

1. Whether Castillo adequately pleaded a false statement for purposes of a defamation or false light claim, specifically whether disagreement with the underlying conduct (Code of Conduct violation) constitutes a false statement about the conduct itself
2. Whether the defendants' statements were capable of defamatory meaning
3. Whether Castillo stated a plausible claim for defamation by implication based on statements in a third-party ScienceInsider article
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Castillo's request for leave to amend his defamation-by-implication claim

The court affirmed the dismissal of the defamation-by-implication claim but reversed the dismissal of the defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims. The majority held that Castillo adequately pleaded false statements by alleging he did not violate the NAS Code of Conduct, even though he did not dispute that the Code of Conduct violation was the stated reason for his expulsion. The court explained that falsity operates on two levels: whether the defendant made a false statement about the reason for termination, and whether the underlying conduct actually occurred. Castillo's denial that he violated the Code of Conduct satisfies the second level of falsity. The court further held that the defendants' statements were capable of defamatory meaning because Section 4 of the Code of Conduct proscribes serious conduct including sexual harassment, making it reasonably capable of defamatory meaning. However, the court affirmed dismissal of the defamation-by-implication claim, finding that Castillo failed to allege facts affirmatively suggesting the defendants intended or endorsed a defamatory inference. McNutt's quoted statement about NAS members being role models was too general and contained no "problematic juxtaposition" or other contextual evidence of intent to defame. The court rejected the argument that the full context of the ScienceInsider article should be considered, reasoning that the article was written by a third party for which the defendants were not responsible. The court also upheld the district court's denial of leave to amend, finding no abuse of discretion where Castillo had three opportunities to perfect his claim and failed to explain why his claimed additional facts were not included earlier.

This case involves a capital defendant's challenge to his death sentence under Atkins v. Virginia, which prohibits executing individuals with intellectual disability. The central issue is how courts should evaluate multiple IQ test scores when determining whether a defendant meets the intellectual disability threshold of an IQ of 70 or below.

1. Whether courts must apply a specific methodology when evaluating multiple IQ scores in Atkins intellectual disability claims
2. How to interpret IQ test scores in light of standard error of measurement and confidence intervals
3. Whether a "holistic approach" considering multiple scores and adaptive functioning evidence is constitutionally permissible
4. The proper allocation of burden of proof and standard of review for factual findings regarding intellectual disability
5. Whether Atkins v. Virginia itself should be overruled (raised in dissent)

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, declining to provide guidance on how courts should evaluate multiple IQ scores. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence (joined by Justice Jackson) explains that the case was inappropriately presented because: (1) the specific methodologies for combining scores were not meaningfully litigated below; (2) there is no demonstrated split among lower courts; and (3) the District Court's holistic approach—considering all scores with their confidence intervals alongside expert testimony and adaptive functioning evidence—is consistent with prior precedent (Hall v. Florida and Moore v. Texas) and medical community standards. Justice Sotomayor concludes the District Court's factual finding that Smith is intellectually disabled was neither clearly erroneous nor properly before the Court for review. Justice Thomas dissents, arguing Atkins should be overruled as inconsistent with the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Alito dissents, arguing the Court should have provided guidance on permissible methods for evaluating multiple scores, such as composite scores, median scores, or expert judgment regarding central tendency.

This case involves a dispute over when pension plan actuaries must select actuarial assumptions for calculating withdrawal liability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Four employers challenged the IAM National Pension Fund's use of a discount rate adopted after the measurement date, arguing that ERISA requires assumptions to be selected on or before the measurement date.

1. Whether ERISA's requirement that withdrawal liability be calculated based on unfunded vested benefits "as of" the measurement date establishes a deadline for selecting actuarial assumptions
2. Whether Section 1393 of ERISA, which governs actuarial assumptions, contains any deadline for assumption selection
3. Whether statutory context and policy concerns support reading an implied deadline into ERISA's withdrawal liability provisions

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the D.C. Circuit's decision, holding that ERISA does not require actuarial assumptions to be selected on or before the measurement date. The Court reasoned that: (1) the "as of" language in Section 1391 applies only to hard factual data about the plan, not to actuarial assumptions, which are predictive tools rather than observable facts; (2) Section 1393 contains no deadline for assumption selection, and the Court does not read limitations into statutes that do not appear in their text; (3) Congress's inclusion of a deadline in a different statutory section but omission in Section 1393 suggests intentional choice; (4) allowing assumptions to be selected after the measurement date enables actuaries to comply with the statutory requirement that assumptions reflect their "best estimate" based on current data; (5) the statutory antiretroactivity limits in Section 1394 do not apply to actuarial assumptions, indicating Congress did not intend such limits; and (6) policy concerns about potential manipulation cannot override the statutory text, as ERISA provides safeguards through reasonableness requirements and arbitration rights.

This case involves a dispute over whether cruise lines that used docks in Havana between 2016 and 2019 are liable under the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Title III) to Havana Docks Corporation, which held a time-limited property interest in those docks that was confiscated by the Cuban Government in 1960. The central issue is whether Title III liability requires trafficking in the plaintiff's original property interest or whether it extends to trafficking in the underlying physical property in which the plaintiff had an interest.

1. Whether "property which was confiscated" under Title III refers only to the plaintiff's property interest (the time-limited usufructuary concession) or can also refer to the physical property (the docks themselves) in which the plaintiff had an interest
2. Whether the Cuban Government confiscated the docks or only the concession
3. Whether the cruise lines' use of the docks after the concession expired in 2004 constitutes trafficking in confiscated property
4. Whether a counterfactual analysis is required to determine if the defendant's conduct would have interfered with the plaintiff's property interest absent the confiscation

The Supreme Court held that the cruise lines' use of the docks is sufficient to establish that they used "property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government" and that Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines trafficked in Havana Docks' property interest (the concession). The Court reasoned that: (1) under the plain text of Title III, "property which was confiscated" can refer to the physical property in which the plaintiff had an interest, not just the interest itself; (2) the docks are "property which was confiscated" because the Cuban Government seized control of them in 1960 when armed agents physically occupied the facilities and expelled Havana Docks' agents; (3) the cruise lines "used" the confiscated docks without authorization when they transported nearly a million passengers between 2016 and 2019; and (4) Havana Docks is a United States national who owns a claim to the confiscated docks, as evidenced by its Commission-certified claim. The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's counterfactual approach as difficult to understand and apply, and inconsistent with Title III's text. The Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This is an employment discrimination case in which a former municipal employee sued for political discrimination in violation of the First Amendment after allegedly being subjected to adverse employment actions because of his membership in the New Progressive Party. The district court granted summary judgment for the individual defendants and dismissed the entire case sua sponte, which the appellate court reversed.

1. Whether the plaintiff waived his First Amendment political discrimination claim by failing to fully develop his legal arguments in opposition to summary judgment
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence that the individual defendants knew of the plaintiff's political affiliation and participated in the adverse employment actions
3. Whether the district court properly dismissed claims against defendants who did not move for summary judgment (the Municipality and individual defendants in their official capacities)
4. The standards for granting summary judgment sua sponte and the notice requirements that must be satisfied

The First Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The court held that: (1) although the plaintiff's opposition brief lacked detailed legal argument, the district court had an independent duty to consider the motion on its merits, and waiver was not an appropriate basis for summary judgment; (2) the plaintiff's deposition testimony, which was incorporated into the defendants' statement of facts and uncontradicted in the record, established that the individual defendants knew of his NPP affiliation and participated in the harassment and adverse employment actions; (3) the district court erred in dismissing the entire case sua sponte without providing notice to the plaintiff regarding claims against the Municipality and individual defendants in their official capacities, resulting in procedural prejudice; and (4) the case should be remanded for further proceedings on all remaining claims.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's fraud and conspiracy claims against a hospital. The central issue is which Maryland statute of limitations applies to the plaintiff's claims arising from alleged fraudulent misrepresentation regarding a surgeon's employment status at the time of a 2015 gallbladder surgery.

1. Whether Maryland's five-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims (Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-109) or the general three-year statute of limitations for civil claims (Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101) applies to fraud and conspiracy claims arising in a healthcare context
2. Whether fraud and conspiracy claims stemming from alleged medical malpractice constitute "traditional malpractice claims" subject to the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act
3. Whether the time bar was apparent on the face of the complaint to support dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's dismissal order. The court held that Maryland's general three-year statute of limitations under section 5-101 applies to the plaintiff's fraud and conspiracy claims, not the five-year medical malpractice statute of limitations under section 5-109. The court reasoned that although the claims arise in a healthcare context, they are not "traditional malpractice claims" involving a breach of professional duty to exercise professional expertise or skill. Instead, they are civil claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy, which fall outside the scope of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. The court declined to determine whether the claims were timely under section 5-101, leaving that analysis for the district court on remand, noting that the discovery rule applies to determine when the cause of action accrued.

This is an immigration law case concerning whether an immigration judge violated a noncitizen's statutory right to counsel by denying her request for a continuance to find new representation just weeks before her final asylum hearing. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision affirming the denial of the continuance and Rodriguez-Solis's subsequent removal order.

1. Whether the Immigration and Nationality Act's guarantee of "the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of" a noncitizen's choosing (8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)) requires immigration judges to provide a "reasonable and realistic period of time" for noncitizens to obtain new counsel when their attorney withdraws
2. Whether the immigration judge abused its discretion in denying Rodriguez-Solis's request for a continuance when her attorney withdrew only weeks before her final merits hearing
3. Whether the denial of a continuance violated Rodriguez-Solis's Fifth Amendment due process rights
4. Whether prejudice must be shown to obtain relief for violations of the statutory right to counsel
5. The proper standard of review for claims involving statutory rights to counsel (de novo versus abuse of discretion)

The Fourth Circuit granted Rodriguez-Solis's petition for review and vacated the removal order. The majority held that the immigration judge violated Rodriguez-Solis's statutory right to counsel by denying her continuance request. The court reasoned that:

1. The Board of Immigration Appeals erred in concluding Rodriguez-Solis had "sufficient time to retain counsel" because it failed to account for the September 18 deadline for submitting supplemental documents and the time a new attorney would need to review and update prior filings, address the immigration judge's concerns about the proposed social group, and prepare witnesses for testimony
2. The relevant time period was not simply the month before the October 18 hearing, but rather the period between when Rodriguez-Solis learned she needed a new attorney and the September 18 submission deadline, which was substantially shorter
3. Under the circumstances—including that this was Rodriguez-Solis's first request for more time after over a decade of representation, there was no indication she was using the request as a dilatory tactic, and she could not find willing counsel—the immigration judge failed to provide "a reasonable and realistic period of time" as required by Board precedent in Matter of C-B-
4. The court did not reach Rodriguez-Solis's alternative due process argument
5. The court vacated and remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals to consider in the first instance whether the statutory violation prejudiced Rodriguez-Solis, rather than deciding the prejudice question itself, consistent with administrative law principles that agencies should address issues in the first instance

This is a civil rights case brought by two brothers, Kenneth McPherson and Eric Simmons, who were convicted in 1995 of conspiracy to murder and later exonerated after more than twenty years in prison. They sued detectives Robert Patton and Frank Barlow under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the detectives fabricated evidence through coercive interrogation and suppressed exculpatory evidence.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the trial testimony of witness Marcus King under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) (prior testimony exception to hearsay)
2. Whether McPherson and Simmons established a triable issue of fact regarding the detectives' fabrication of evidence through coerced testimony
3. Whether the detectives violated due process by suppressing exculpatory witness statements under Brady v. Maryland

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated in part and affirmed in part the district court's summary judgment. On the evidentiary issue, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding King's trial testimony. Although King was deceased and unavailable, his prior trial testimony was admissible under Rule 804(b)(1) because the prosecutor at the original trial (Holback) had a substantially similar motive to question King as the detectives' counsel would have in the civil case. The court found that Holback, after King recanted, attempted to rehabilitate his recorded statement and defend the integrity of the detectives' investigation through extensive questioning about the interrogation circumstances. On the fabrication claim, the court reversed summary judgment and found a triable issue of fact. The court held that King's testimony—that the detectives coerced him into falsely inculpating the brothers—combined with circumstantial evidence (including the detectives' admission that they fed King non-public facts during the unrecorded interrogation, the drastic shift in King's story, and serious doubts about the reliability of the key witness Bailey's account) was sufficient to survive summary judgment. The court emphasized that while the brothers' case may not be a "slam dunk," it created a genuine factual dispute for a jury. On the suppression claim, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the suppressed witness notes about Martin and Jackson identifying a single shooter were not material to the conspiracy conviction because: (1) the jury convicted the brothers as co-conspirators, not as the actual shooters; (2) the evidence did not exclude the possibility of multiple shooters; and (3) there was no reasonable probability the evidence would have changed the verdict. The court also noted that McPherson and Simmons inadequately raised the bad faith element by addressing it only in a footnote.

This is an interlocutory appeal in a putative class action alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The case concerns whether USHealth Advisors, LLC, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement between plaintiff Sessoms and a lead generation company (NextGen), can enforce the arbitration clause against Sessoms' TCPA claim.

1. Whether a district court or arbitrator must decide whether a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement is entitled to enforce that agreement
2. Whether USHealth qualifies as a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement between Sessoms and NextGen under Delaware law, specifically whether the benefit to USHealth was "material to the purpose" of the contract (the third element of the MBIA test)

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of arbitration. The court held that: (1) consistent with its precedent in Rogers v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC, a district court—not an arbitrator—must decide whether a non-signatory can enforce an arbitration agreement; and (2) the district court erred in concluding that USHealth is not a third-party beneficiary under Delaware law. The court found that USHealth satisfied all three MBIA elements for third-party beneficiary status, particularly the third element, because NextGen's commercial arrangement with marketing partners like USHealth to provide consent-based leads was material to the purpose of the agreement. The court reasoned that because NextGen itself does not provide insurance quotes, the benefit of third-party marketing partners was essential to NextGen's business model and therefore material to the contract's purpose. The case was remanded for entry of an order compelling arbitration.

This is an antitrust case in which a real estate developer challenged a Texas city's alleged anticompetitive conduct in blocking access to water utility services needed for property development. The developer sued the City of Mansfield under the Sherman Act and state law after years of unsuccessful negotiations to obtain water service from a utility district that required the city's permission.

1. Whether the City of Mansfield is entitled to state-action immunity under the Sherman Act for its anticompetitive conduct regarding water utility services
2. Whether the Texas Water Code clearly articulates and affirmatively expresses a state policy authorizing Mansfield (as opposed to the utility district holding the certificate of convenience and necessity) to act anticompetitively in the water services market
3. Whether the developer's Sherman Act claims survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of state-action immunity to Mansfield and remanded the case. The court held that while the Texas Water Code clearly expresses a state policy to displace competition in water utilities through monopolies, it grants that authority exclusively to utilities holding a certificate of convenience and necessity (JCSUD in this case), not to municipalities like Mansfield. The court reasoned that state-action immunity requires the defendant municipality to demonstrate that state law authorizes it—not another entity—to engage in the challenged anticompetitive conduct. Since Mansfield failed to show that Texas law delegated to it the authority to monopolize water services in the Cipriani Property area (which falls within JCSUD's exclusive service territory), Mansfield cannot claim state-action immunity. The court remanded for the district court to reconsider the developer's Sherman Act and state law claims on the merits.

This is an arbitration enforcement case in which an automobile manufacturer, FCA US, LLC, sought to compel a consumer to arbitrate product defect claims based on an arbitration agreement contained in a lease contract between the consumer and a dealership, to which FCA was not a party. The court affirmed the district court's denial of FCA's motion to compel arbitration.

1. Whether a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement can enforce a delegation clause (a clause delegating arbitrability questions to an arbitrator) against a signatory to the agreement
2. Whether the plain language of the arbitration agreement between the consumer and dealership extends to claims against the manufacturer
3. Whether the manufacturer can use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration under California law
4. The proper interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. in the context of third-party enforcement of delegation clauses

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of FCA's motion to compel arbitration on three independent grounds:

1. Delegation Clause Not Enforceable by Non-Signatory: Following its precedent in Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., the court held that FCA, as a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement, cannot enforce the delegation clause because the agreement's plain language expressly limits its application to disputes between the consumer and the dealership. The agreement lacks "clear and unmistakable evidence" that the consumer agreed to arbitrate arbitrability questions with third parties like FCA. The court rejected FCA's argument that Henry Schein requires courts to defer all arbitrability questions to arbitrators when a delegation clause exists, noting that Henry Schein assumed the parties seeking to enforce the delegation clause were effectively parties to the arbitration agreement.
2. Plain Language Does Not Cover FCA Claims: The arbitration agreement's plain language limits coverage to disputes "between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns," where "you" means the consumer and "us" means the dealership. FCA does not qualify as an employee, agent, successor, or assign of the dealership, so the agreement does not require the consumer to arbitrate claims against FCA.
3. Equitable Estoppel Does Not Apply Under California Law: Applying California law as established in Ford Motor Warranty Cases, the court held that FCA cannot use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration. Under California law, equitable estoppel only applies when a plaintiff's claims are "intimately founded in and intertwined with" a contractual provision in the agreement containing the arbitration clause. The consumer's claims arise under California statutes and FCA's manufacturer warranty, not from the lease agreement itself, so they are not sufficiently intertwined with the lease contract to permit FCA to invoke equitable estoppel.

This is an appeal concerning the interpretation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, specifically whether a municipal denial of a single cell tower permit application violates the federal ban on local "regulation" that "prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting" the provision of cellular services. T-Mobile applied to build a cell tower in Roswell, Georgia in 2010, was denied, and sued claiming the denial effectively prohibited wireless service provision.

1. Whether the effective prohibition provision of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i) applies to individual permit denials or only to local zoning regulations and rules
2. Whether the "significant gap test" developed by other circuits—requiring a provider to show a significant gap in service coverage and that the proposed tower is the least intrusive means of closing that gap—is a valid interpretation of the statute
3. The proper meaning of "regulation" as used in the Telecommunications Act and whether it encompasses individual zoning decisions or only control by rule

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case. The court held that the effective prohibition provision applies only to state and local "regulation of" cell tower siting (meaning control by rule or restriction), not to individual permit denials. The court rejected the "significant gap test" as inconsistent with the statutory text. The court reasoned that "regulation" in its ordinary meaning refers to control by rule or restriction, not individual discretionary decisions. The statutory context confirms this interpretation: Congress used "regulation" when imposing substantive limits on local authority and used "decision" when imposing procedural requirements on permit applications. Providers may challenge zoning rules themselves—whether written or unwritten—by demonstrating that a pattern of denials reflects an unwritten rule effectively prohibiting service, but they cannot challenge a single permit denial as an effective prohibition. The court acknowledged that while courts have assumed for thirty years that individual denials fall within the effective prohibition clause, none adequately explained this interpretation based on statutory text, and the significant gap test represents impermissible judicial common-law rulemaking.

This is an appeal of a Fourth Amendment excessive force case in which Nicholas Bolton sued Coweta County Sheriff's deputies after being shot in the eye during a vehicle pursuit and subsequent arrest. Bolton challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the deputies and sheriff on federal constitutional claims and state law assault and battery claims.

1. Whether Deputy Collins was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting Bolton while Bolton's vehicle was pinned between police cars and he continued pressing the accelerator
2. Whether Deputy Spinks was entitled to qualified immunity for using force to remove Bolton from the vehicle and restrain him during arrest
3. Whether Deputy House was entitled to qualified immunity for failing to intervene in Deputy Collins's use of force
4. Whether Sheriff Wood was entitled to sovereign immunity on supervisory liability claims
5. Whether the deputies were entitled to official immunity under Georgia law on state assault and battery claims

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for all defendants. The court held that: (1) Deputy Collins's shooting was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because Bolton's continued acceleration of his vehicle posed an immediate threat to officers standing nearby, even though the vehicle was pinned; (2) Deputy Spinks's use of force was de minimis and reasonable for effectuating an arrest; (3) Deputy House had no duty to intervene because there was no constitutional violation to prevent; (4) Sheriff Wood, as a Georgia sheriff performing law enforcement duties, is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity; and (5) the deputies are entitled to official immunity under Georgia law because Bolton presented no evidence they acted with actual malice or intent to cause harm.

This case involves a motion for an injunction pending appeal to prevent Rhode Island Hospital from complying with a Department of Justice subpoena seeking sensitive medical records of children who received gender-affirming care. The First Circuit Court of Appeals addresses conflicting orders from federal courts in different circuits regarding production of these records.

1. Whether the Child Advocate demonstrated irreparable harm sufficient to warrant an injunction pending appeal
2. Whether the DOJ's subpoena was issued for a congressionally-authorized purpose or an improper purpose
3. Whether compelled disclosure of children's medical records violates Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights
4. Whether the Child Advocate has standing to seek relief against a non-party hospital in federal court
5. Whether the First Circuit has jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with an order from the Northern District of Texas
6. Whether the request constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the Texas court's order

The First Circuit denied the Child Advocate's motion for an injunction pending appeal. The court held that the Child Advocate failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, which is a necessary threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive relief. The court noted that the Texas court's order provided for in camera safekeeping of records pending appeal resolution, and the Child Advocate cited no authority that providing anonymized records to a court constitutes irreparable harm. The concurring opinion raised additional concerns about standing, jurisdiction, and whether the request amounted to an improper collateral attack on the Texas court's order, as well as serious questions about the merits of the underlying district court decision regarding the government's authority to enforce the subpoena and the scope of Fourteenth Amendment informational privacy rights.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges his enhanced sentence as a "career offender" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment for bank robbery, with the sentence enhanced based on a prior Massachusetts carjacking conviction being classified as a "crime of violence."

1. Whether a prior conviction for Massachusetts carjacking constitutes a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), which requires that the offense have as an element "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another"
2. The proper weight and deference to give to a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision (Commonwealth v. Anderson) that addressed carjacking in a different statutory context (Massachusetts ACCA)
3. Whether the categorical approach requires that all alternative means of committing carjacking (assault, confine, maim, or put in fear) necessarily involve violent force, or whether such elements can be read in context with other statutory elements

The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the defendant's sentence, holding that Massachusetts carjacking is not categorically a "crime of violence" under the federal sentencing guidelines. The court reasoned that under the categorical approach, all means of committing the offense must necessarily require violent force. The court found that Massachusetts carjacking's "assault" element can be satisfied by a mere offensive touching under state law, which does not constitute the "violent force" (force capable of causing physical pain or injury) required by the guidelines' definition. The court rejected the government's reliance on Commonwealth v. Anderson, concluding that under Supreme Court precedent (Johnson v. United States) and First Circuit precedent (United States v. Starks), federal courts must independently determine whether federal sentencing enhancements apply and are not bound by state court interpretations of similar state statutes. The court also determined that even when read in context with carjacking's other elements (intent to steal and purpose of stealing), the assault element still permits conduct that does not necessarily involve violent force. Therefore, the Massachusetts carjacking statute is "overbroad" compared to the guidelines' crime of violence definition, and the career offender enhancement was erroneously applied.

This is an appeal of a supervised release revocation and sentencing decision. Roberto Ortiz-Rodríguez challenges the revocation of his supervised release term and the resulting fourteen-month incarceration sentence, arguing he was denied proper notice of the violations on which the sentence was based.

1. Whether Ortiz received adequate written notice of the supervised release violations under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, specifically whether notice of the underlying conduct (positive drug tests) was sufficient or whether notice of the specific condition violated (prohibition on new crimes) was required.
2. Whether the District Court erred by "sua sponte recharacterizing" technical violations of drug use and treatment noncompliance as a Grade B felony drug possession violation, when the probation officer's motions only alleged Grade C violations.
3. Whether Ortiz's waiver of Rule 32.1 rights was knowing and voluntary given the lack of notice regarding the Grade B violation.
4. Whether the District Court conducted an adequate colloquy to ensure Ortiz knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Rule 32.1 rights.

The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's revocation and sentence. The court held:

1. Ortiz failed to preserve his notice argument because his objection at sentencing regarding the distinction between Grade B and Grade C violations was insufficient to alert the district court to a lack-of-notice issue, and plain error review therefore applied.
2. Although the court found error in the notice provided—the probation officer's motions identified only two conditions as violated (drug use and treatment noncompliance) but the District Court found a violation of the condition prohibiting new crimes based on constructive possession inferred from drug use—Ortiz failed to meet his burden under plain error review to show the error affected his substantial rights.
3. Ortiz could not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that, but for the notice error, his sentence would have been different, as he failed to argue that he did not actually use illicit substances, failed to develop legal arguments challenging the constructive possession theory, and failed to explain what specific evidence or arguments he would have presented.
4. The court rejected Ortiz's argument that his waiver of Rule 32.1 rights was invalid, noting that the District Court made an independent finding of violations based on the record rather than relying on Ortiz's waiver, and Ortiz failed to show prejudice.
5. The court rejected Ortiz's challenge to the adequacy of the colloquy, finding that Ortiz was advised of his rights by the Magistrate Judge and submitted an official waiver form, and he failed to develop an argument that a district judge's colloquy was required.

This is an appeal in a class action case brought by Cynthia Michelle Sessoms against USHealth Advisors, LLC. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an amended order correcting the entity name in its previously filed opinion.

The opinion does not address substantive legal issues, as this is merely an administrative amendment order correcting the defendant's legal entity name throughout the court's opinion.

The court amended its May 21, 2026 opinion by changing all references to "USHealth Advisors, Inc." to "USHealth Advisors, LLC" to reflect the correct legal name of the defendant-appellant. This is a technical correction to ensure accuracy in the court's records and published opinion.

This is a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Peter Villa Cordova, convicted of drug possession and evading arrest by motor vehicle, appeals his felon-in-possession conviction, arguing the statute violates his Second Amendment rights as applied to him.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)'s lifetime firearm ban for all felons is consistent with the Second Amendment under the historical test established in New York State Pistol & Rifle Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi
2. Whether the government can disarm individuals based on a "dangerousness" standard rooted in historical tradition
3. Whether courts should consider only the specific predicate offense or a defendant's entire criminal history when evaluating dangerousness
4. Whether vehicle evasion constitutes conduct probative of dangerousness sufficient to justify disarmament

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Cordova's conviction. The per curiam majority held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Cordova because there is a historical tradition of disarming individuals convicted of violent offenses, and vehicular evasion of arrest poses a credible threat to public safety, making Cordova dangerous. Judge Ho concurred in the judgment but expressed concerns about the statute's lifetime disarmament provision and noted the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether permanent disarmament of those never imprisoned is constitutional. Judge Oldham concurred in the judgment but issued a lengthy opinion criticizing the circuit's precedent in United States v. Diaz as "historically bankrupt" and proposing instead a "dangerousness standard" rooted in English and colonial history that would allow disarmament only of those who pose a credible threat to public safety. Under Oldham's analysis, Cordova's vehicle evasion conviction demonstrates dangerousness and justifies his disarmament, but he argued the court should abandon Diaz's flawed reasoning and adopt a more rigorous historical analysis based on whether an individual is actually dangerous.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a Michigan state conviction for arson and insurance fraud. The petitioner argues that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the trial court allowed him to represent himself at trial.

1. Whether the petitioner validly waived his constitutional right to counsel by choosing to represent himself
2. Whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent, given the trial court's warnings about the dangers of self-representation
3. Whether the waiver was voluntary, particularly in light of disagreements with his appointed counsel
4. The proper standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) for evaluating state court decisions on habeas review

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the Michigan appellate court reasonably concluded that the petitioner validly waived his right to counsel. The court found:

1. The waiver was knowing and intelligent because the trial court adequately warned the petitioner about the dangers of self-representation, including a possible life sentence and the complexity of procedural rules, and the petitioner explicitly confirmed twice that he wanted to represent himself despite these warnings.
2. The petitioner's subsequent silence and request for new counsel did not render his waiver equivocal, as he had made clear, unequivocal statements of intent to represent himself and then proceeded to exercise his right by participating in jury selection and trial.
3. The trial court's warnings, though brief (217 words), were sufficient under Supreme Court precedent, which does not require "magic words" or formal warnings with specific word counts.
4. The petitioner's argument that he must have received a "penetrating and comprehensive examination" was based on broad, abstract language from a plurality opinion that does not constitute clearly established federal law under AEDPA.
5. The waiver was voluntary because the petitioner made an informed choice "with eyes open," understanding the risks and consequences of self-representation, and his counsel was adequately prepared for trial despite strategic disagreements.
6. Under AEDPA's highly deferential standard, the state court's decision was reasonable and entitled to strong deference, and the petitioner failed to show that every fairminded jurist would agree the state courts unreasonably applied clearly established law.

This is an appeal of a supervised release condition imposed as part of a criminal sentence for robbery and firearm offenses. The defendant challenges the validity of a condition requiring him to notify third parties of any "risk" he poses as determined by a probation officer.

1. Whether the defendant waived his right to challenge the supervised release condition by failing to object to it before sentencing and only objecting when directly asked by the district court
2. Whether the defendant's new legal arguments on appeal (vagueness, First Amendment, and non-delegation) are waived when his only objection at sentencing was that the condition was unwarranted based on lack of consistent threat of violence
3. Whether Special Condition 13 is unconstitutionally vague for failing to define key terms such as "risk" and the identities of persons who must be notified

The court held that the defendant did not waive his challenge to Special Condition 13. The court found that when the district judge directly asked defense counsel about the condition, counsel's statement that it was unwarranted constituted an adequate objection. Following the Supreme Court's guidance in Yee v. City of Escondido, the court ruled that once a claim is properly preserved, a party may advance new legal arguments on appeal supporting that claim, provided they raise pure questions of law rather than new factual arguments. The court applied de novo review and found Special Condition 13 unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define "risk" and does not specify which persons must be notified. The court vacated Special Condition 13 and remanded the case to the district court to define the condition's terms with greater specificity, consistent with prior Seventh Circuit precedents vacating nearly identical conditions.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges the district court's denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) following a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that reduced the impact of criminal history status points. The defendant argues that the Sentencing Commission's binding policy statement violates the nondelegation doctrine and separation of powers, and that the district court erred in calculating his amended guideline range.

1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by making the Sentencing Commission's policy statements binding on courts in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings
2. Whether Congress violated the separation of powers by delegating authority to the Commission to impose binding limitations on judicial sentencing discretion
3. Whether departures from the original sentencing should be included when calculating the amended guideline range under USSG § 1B1.10(b)(1)
4. Whether the defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction and, if so, whether the district court adequately considered mitigation evidence

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the sentence reduction motion. The court held that: (1) Congress did not violate the nondelegation doctrine because the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States already upheld the delegation of authority to the Commission, and recent Supreme Court decisions in Loper Light and Jarkesy did not address nondelegation challenges to the Commission; (2) Congress did not violate separation of powers because Congress has constitutional authority to control the scope of judicial sentencing discretion; (3) applying the Kisor standard, USSG § 1B1.10's text unambiguously does not include departures when calculating the amended guideline range, as departures are defined as sentences imposed outside the applicable guideline range, not modifications to the range itself; and (4) because the defendant's 180-month sentence was below his amended guideline range of 210–262 months, he was ineligible for a reduction under § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), making it unnecessary to address his challenge to the district court's alternative holding.

This is a criminal appeal in which Isaac Tekola challenges his 105-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute multiple controlled substances, specifically contesting the district court's imposition of a sentencing enhancement for maintaining a premises for drug distribution purposes.

1. Whether the district court properly applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement when a defendant uses his primary residence for substantial drug trafficking activities
2. Whether drug trafficking must be the sole purpose of a premises or merely a "primary or principal use" to qualify for the enhancement
3. Whether the district court was required to explicitly compare the frequency of "drug use" versus "residential use" of the property
4. Whether the court's prior decision in United States v. Shetler forecloses application of the enhancement when drug trafficking is a significant purpose of a home

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's application of the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The court held that:

1. Drug trafficking need not be the sole purpose of a premises but must be one of the defendant's "primary or principal uses" rather than "incidental or collateral uses"
2. A defendant's apartment can qualify for the enhancement even when it serves as his primary residence, provided substantial drug trafficking activity occurs there
3. The district court was not required to explicitly compare residential use versus drug use frequency; overwhelming evidence that the apartment served as the central hub of the drug-trafficking business was sufficient
4. Shetler's interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) does not control the § 2D1.1(b)(12) analysis because the enhancement is narrower in scope and not subject to vagueness concerns applicable to criminal statutes
5. The evidence—including nearly $13,000 in cash, drug paraphernalia, large quantities of drugs, hundreds of customer messages, and Tekola's admission that his safe was primarily used for drugs and proceeds—amply supported the enhancement

This case involves a homeowner's lawsuit against a homeowners association, its declarant, and related parties regarding alleged mismanagement, poor community maintenance, and governance failures in a residential community in Delaware. The plaintiff seeks various remedies including cessation of dues collection, forensic audits, and transition of the association to community control.

1. Whether default judgment should be entered against defendants who failed to timely respond to the complaint
2. Whether the court has personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants Albert Salame, III and Kamil Salame, who are alleged to be personal representatives of a deceased individual's estate
3. Whether the amended complaint states viable claims against the defendants despite alleged deficiencies in pleading
4. The legal status and capacity of a homeowners association that was voided by the Delaware Secretary of State for non-payment of franchise taxes

The court recommended denying both the motion for default judgment and the motion to dismiss. Regarding default judgment: (1) The homeowners association cannot be subject to default judgment because it was civically "dead" when the lawsuit was filed and lacks capacity to be sued; (2) The declarant cannot be subject to default judgment because it has not yet been served; (3) Sean Marcus cannot be subject to default judgment because he answered the complaint, albeit late; and (4) Albert Salame, III and Kamil Salame cannot be subject to default judgment because they filed responsive motions to dismiss, which constitute proper responses under the court rules. Regarding the motion to dismiss: (1) The court has personal jurisdiction over Albert Salame, III and Kamil Salame as personal representatives of the deceased Albert Salame's estate, because the deceased had sufficient minimum contacts with Delaware through his ownership and management of the declarant and control of the homeowners association, and it was reasonably foreseeable he might be required to defend himself in Delaware courts; (2) The amended complaint states conceivable claims against the estate of the deceased, satisfying the pleading standard, and the defendants failed to argue that no reasonably conceivable set of circumstances could support claims against the deceased individual.

This is a Delaware limited liability company dispute in which one member (USAB) seeks advancement of litigation expenses it is incurring in prosecuting direct and derivative claims against the other members. USAB argues that the operating agreement's indemnification language requiring the company to "indemnify, defend, and save harmless" members unambiguously obligates the company to advance fees for offensive litigation.

1. Whether the term "defend" in the operating agreement's indemnification clause unambiguously means "advance" (i.e., pay litigation expenses on an ongoing basis).
2. Whether "defend," even if it means "advance," unambiguously includes offensive litigation expenses initiated by the party seeking advancement, as opposed to defensive litigation.
3. Whether the phrase "to the fullest extent permitted by law" in the indemnification provision creates or clarifies a right to advancement of offensive litigation expenses.

The court denied USAB's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the operating agreement's language is ambiguous and therefore cannot support judgment as a matter of law. The court reasoned that: (1) "defend" does not unambiguously mean "advance" because, unlike similar language in the Fillip II case, there is no clarifying language in the operating agreement that demonstrates the parties intended ongoing payment of litigation expenses; (2) even if "defend" means "advance," it does not unambiguously include offensive litigation expenses, as the ordinary meaning of "defend" does not include "attack," no reported Delaware decision has construed "defend" to require advancement for affirmative litigation, and interpreting it this way would produce an arguably absurd result by requiring the company to fund offensive litigation by numerous parties only loosely connected to the company; and (3) the "to the fullest extent permitted by law" phrase is a rights-protecting provision (similar to a severability clause) that does not create rights or resolve ambiguities. The court concluded that because the interpretation is ambiguous and a factual record regarding the drafting and negotiation of the provision would be helpful, the matter cannot be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

This case involves a dispute between two siblings who are co-managers of a Delaware limited liability company (LLC). One sibling filed suit seeking judicial dissolution of the LLC based on alleged deadlock, but the LLC moved to dismiss based on an "Antisuit Provision" in its operating agreement requiring majority member approval before commencing any litigation involving the company.

1. Whether an "Antisuit Provision" in an LLC agreement that requires majority member approval before commencing litigation "involving the Company" bars a member from pursuing a direct claim for judicial dissolution under the LLC Act.
2. The proper interpretation of the Antisuit Provision: whether it applies to all claims involving the company (the "Every-Claim Reading"), only to derivative claims (the "Company-Claim Reading"), or only to actions taken by managers on behalf of the company (the "Manager-Authority Reading").
3. Whether a claim for judicial dissolution is a direct claim belonging to a member or a derivative claim belonging to the company.
4. Whether the member has stated a claim for dissolution where prior arbitration and judgment findings established that the other manager has sole authority and no deadlock exists.

The court granted the motion to dismiss. The court held that: (1) Under principles of issue preclusion, a prior arbitration award and New York judgment interpreting the Antisuit Provision adopted the "Company-Claim Reading," which applies only to derivative claims and company claims, not to direct claims by members; (2) A member's right to seek judicial dissolution under the LLC Act is a direct claim that belongs to the member individually, not a derivative claim belonging to the company, and therefore the Antisuit Provision does not bar it; (3) However, the member failed to state a claim for dissolution because prior binding determinations in the arbitration award and judgment established that the other manager has sole managerial authority and no deadlock exists, making it not reasonably conceivable that dissolution would be warranted under the statutory standard.

This is a criminal appeal in which Jabar Evans challenges his convictions for drug trafficking and firearm offenses following a search of his hotel room pursuant to a warrant. Evans raises three trial court errors on appeal, arguing that the search of the ceiling exceeded the warrant's scope, that improper lay opinion testimony was admitted, and that he was entitled to a spoliation instruction regarding missing body camera footage.

1. Whether the search of the hotel room ceiling and seizure of contraband found therein violated the Fourth Amendment;
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by admitting Detective Costigan's testimony as lay opinion testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 701, particularly regarding general drug trafficking practices;
3. Whether the District Court erred in denying Evans' request for a spoliation instruction regarding the absence of body camera footage of the hotel room search.

The Third Circuit affirmed Evans' convictions on all grounds. First, the court held that the search of the ceiling was reasonable and within the scope of the warrant because the detective reasonably inferred that Evans had accessed the ceiling space (evidenced by ceiling tile debris on the bed), and a lawful search warrant extends to all areas where the target of the search has access or control. Second, while the court found that some of Detective Costigan's testimony regarding general drug trafficking practices and modus operandi—not tied to his personal observations—should not have been admitted under Rule 701(c), any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including approximately 13,000 glassine bags of drugs, drug manufacturing equipment, and cash found in the room. Evans' own defense conceded the evidence indicated drug trafficking but argued it was not his. Third, the court held that Evans was not entitled to a spoliation instruction because he failed to establish that the police intentionally suppressed the body camera footage; instead, he conceded there was a plausible non-nefarious explanation for its absence, and he did not demonstrate that the missing footage had apparent exculpatory value.

This is a civil rights appeal involving a plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance under which he was previously convicted. The case was remanded by the Supreme Court to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's ruling on the applicability of the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine.

Whether the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine, which generally bars civil suits that would implicitly invalidate prior criminal convictions, applies to suits seeking purely prospective relief rather than damages.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Supreme Court's reversal of its prior judgment. The Supreme Court held that Heck v. Humphrey does not bar Olivier's suit because he seeks only prospective relief (not damages that would call into question the validity of his prior conviction). The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in a trade secret misappropriation case. PCC Airfoils sought to enjoin a former 26-year employee, Justin Daugherty, from disclosing trade secrets and working for a competitor after allegedly printing confidential documents on his last days of employment.

1. Whether a district court must require "clear and convincing evidence" for each of the four preliminary injunction factors to grant injunctive relief
2. Whether the preliminary injunction factors are individual prerequisites that must each meet a heightened standard of proof or whether they should be evaluated together on a sliding-scale basis
3. Whether federal or state procedural rules apply to preliminary injunction standards in federal court
4. Whether the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to trade secret misappropriation cases under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case. The court held that the district court erred by requiring PCC to establish each of the four preliminary injunction factors by "clear and convincing evidence." The court clarified that preliminary injunction factors should be evaluated using a sliding-scale inquiry where all four factors are weighed together, and a strong showing on one factor may outweigh a weaker showing on another. The court reasoned that: (1) the four factors are not individual prerequisites but equitable considerations to be balanced; (2) federal procedural rules, not state rules, apply in federal court; (3) no statute, rule, or constitutional provision requires clear and convincing evidence for preliminary injunctions in trade secret cases; (4) requiring a heightened standard of proof for each factor before discovery is complete is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent; and (5) preliminary injunction determinations are not binding on the merits at trial, so plaintiffs do not receive two opportunities to litigate the same issues.

This case involves a petition for rehearing en banc in a civil rights action where Nathan Roberts, a white business owner, challenged Progressive Preferred Insurance Company's race-based grant program that limited eligibility to businesses owned and operated by Black entrepreneurs. Roberts claimed discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 after declining to complete the grant application upon discovering the racial eligibility requirement.

1. Whether Roberts had Article III standing to challenge the race-based grant program without submitting a completed application
2. Whether Roberts's failure to submit the application constituted a "self-inflicted" injury breaking the chain of causation between the defendants' discriminatory conduct and his alleged harm
3. Whether the "futile gesture" doctrine applies to standing analysis in discrimination cases
4. Whether Roberts could assert an "unequal footing" theory of injury despite not explicitly naming it in his complaint
5. The proper scope and application of the court's precedent in Aiken v. Hackett regarding standing requirements in affirmative action cases

The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc. However, the dissenting opinions (by Judges Thapar and Hermandorfer) argued that the panel majority erred in dismissing Roberts's claims for lack of standing. The dissenters contended that: (1) Roberts did not cause his own injury—Progressive's racial barrier did; (2) Supreme Court precedent in International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Runyon v. McCrary establishes that plaintiffs need not engage in "futile gestures" by applying for benefits they are barred from receiving based on race; (3) the panel wrongly rejected Roberts's "unequal footing" theory of injury; and (4) Aiken v. Hackett should not be read to impose a heightened standing requirement requiring plaintiffs to prove they "would have" received the benefit under a race-neutral policy. The dissenters argued that the denial of equal treatment resulting from a race-based barrier constitutes an injury in fact sufficient for standing, and that requiring Roberts to complete a futile application would reward corporate gamesmanship and deter meritorious civil rights suits.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant, Mitchel Crow, was convicted of sexually abusing a minor and challenges the admission of the government's expert rebuttal testimony on the grounds that the government failed to provide adequate pretrial notice. The case addresses whether the government must disclose rebuttal expert testimony when the defendant's own expert presents new opinions at trial that were not previously disclosed.

1. Whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 requires the government to disclose rebuttal expert testimony when the defendant's expert witness presents new opinions at trial that were not included in the expert's pretrial report.
2. Whether the government's duty to disclose rebuttal testimony is triggered by opinions that the defendant himself had not timely disclosed.
3. The applicability of the 2022 amendments to Rule 16 to pending cases commenced before the amendment's effective date of December 1, 2022.

The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the government did not violate Rule 16's disclosure requirements. The court reasoned that:

1. Under the 2022 amended Rule 16, the government's duty to disclose rebuttal testimony is triggered only when the defendant has timely disclosed the expert testimony that the rebuttal will counter.
2. The defendant's expert, Dr. Kushida, did not timely disclose his opinion about malingering in his pretrial report; he only testified about malingering at trial in response to cross-examination.
3. Because the defendant had not disclosed Dr. Kushida's malingering opinion before trial, the government had no corresponding duty to disclose before trial how its expert, Dr. Bornemann, would respond to that opinion.
4. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that Dr. Bornemann's rebuttal opinions addressed only matters in Dr. Kushida's report and that the government had "opened the door" to malingering testimony.
5. The defendant waived any alternative argument based on unfairness by failing to raise it in the opening brief.

This is an appeal concerning whether an insurance company's second voluntary dismissal of a declaratory judgment action operates as a dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B), thereby barring the company from refiling the same claim. Great Lakes Insurance filed three separate suits against the Crabtrees regarding coverage for boat fire damage, voluntarily dismissing the first two actions.

1. Whether Rule 41(a)(1)(B)'s two-dismissal rule applies when the first dismissal was by agreement between the parties rather than unilateral action by the plaintiff
2. Whether an "adjudication on the merits" under Rule 41(a)(1)(B) constitutes a dismissal with prejudice
3. Whether the with-prejudice bar applies when a plaintiff files in one court but the case is transferred to another court

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Crabtrees. The court held that Rule 41(a)(1)(B) means precisely what it says: when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a second action based on the same claim, that dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits, which is equivalent to a dismissal with prejudice. The court rejected Great Lakes' argument that the rule should not apply when the first dismissal was by agreement, finding that the plain language of the rule contains no such exception. The court further held that once a claim is dismissed with prejudice, it cannot be refiled in the same court, regardless of whether the third suit was originally filed in a different court and then transferred. The court relied on Supreme Court precedent in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. and Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. to support its interpretation that an "adjudication on the merits" means a dismissal with prejudice.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges his convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) based on videos found on his iPhone during a drug trafficking investigation. The defendant raises five separate arguments claiming reversible error, all of which the court rejects.

1. Whether the state search warrant for the iPhone was supported by probable cause and satisfied the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement
2. Whether law enforcement exceeded the scope of the state warrant when they investigated the child sexual abuse material discovered during the drug search
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to ask a specific voir dire question about bias against interracial relationships
4. Whether evidence of the defendant's mistaken belief about the victim's age should have been admitted
5. Whether the jury instructions on the "purpose" element of § 2251(a) were proper
6. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction

The First Circuit affirmed the conviction on all grounds. The court held: (1) the state warrant was supported by probable cause and was sufficiently particular because it was limited to evidence related to drug trafficking and ownership of the phone, and courts need not restrict cell phone searches to specific functions when probable cause supports a broader search; (2) officers did not exceed the warrant's scope because the videos were directly relevant to the drug investigation as they depicted the bedroom where drugs were found and contained statements about drug activity; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in voir dire because it asked three questions addressing racial bias that fairly covered the substance of the defendant's concerns, and trial judges have broad discretion in determining the form and scope of voir dire questions; (4) mistake of age is not a defense to § 2251(a) because the statute's text does not require knowledge of the victim's age, and Congress intentionally omitted such a requirement unlike in related statutes; (5) the jury instruction requiring proof of "at least a significant purpose" was proper, and the defendant waived his argument by explicitly approving the instruction at trial; and (6) there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to convict based on the defendant's directives to the victim, the camera work focusing on specific body parts, the multiple videos recorded over time, and the overall circumstances indicating the defendant acted as a "director" of the videos with the purpose of filming sexual conduct.

This is an appeal in an action to confirm, recognize, and enforce a foreign arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act. SCMS seeks to enforce a Chilean arbitral award against Webuild S.p.A., alleging that Webuild is the successor in interest to Astaldi, the original judgment debtor, and attempts to invoke quasi in rem jurisdiction over Webuild's Delaware-based subsidiary property.

1. Whether Shaffer v. Heitner's thirty-sixth footnote permits a court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction based solely on the presence of a defendant's property in the forum state when enforcing an already-adjudicated debt, without requiring minimum contacts between the forum, the defendant, and the underlying controversy.
2. Whether the logic of Shaffer's thirty-sixth footnote, which addresses enforcement of sister-state judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, extends to the confirmation and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention.
3. Whether the District Court must determine whether Webuild is Astaldi's successor in interest before dismissing the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court's dismissal. The court held that: (1) Shaffer's thirty-sixth footnote expressly authorizes the exercise of traditional quasi in rem jurisdiction in post-judgment actions to collect on already-adjudicated liabilities without requiring minimum contacts; (2) this exception applies equally to the confirmation and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention, as the logic and spirit of Shaffer and Hilton v. Guyot extend to foreign arbitral awards; (3) the mere presence of an arbitral-award debtor's property within the forum state is sufficient to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction for enforcement purposes; and (4) the District Court erred by dismissing the action without first determining whether Webuild is Astaldi's successor in interest, as federal courts have an obligation to determine disputed jurisdictional facts. The court reasoned that allowing arbitral debtors to avoid payment by locating assets where courts lack personal jurisdiction would violate principles of fair play and substantial justice, and that foreign arbitral awards deserve the same enforcement protections as domestic judgments and sister-state judgments.

This is a federal criminal appeal addressing whether attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) constitutes a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The defendant was convicted of armed bank robbery, attempted armed bank robbery, and brandishing firearms in connection with two bank robberies in North Carolina.

1. Whether attempted armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)
2. Whether the statutory language of § 2113(d) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force as an element
3. Whether the statute's reference to "any person" is overbroad and could include self-inflicted harm
4. Whether attempted armed bank robbery requires a specific mens rea (mental state) of purposefulness or knowledge

The court affirmed the conviction, holding that attempted armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) is categorically a crime of violence. The court reasoned that § 2113(d)'s plain language requires that a defendant "assault[] any person, or put[] in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device" during the commission or attempted commission of bank robbery. Because assault and putting someone's life in jeopardy both require use of a dangerous weapon, the statute categorically requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, satisfying the elements test for crimes of violence. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that: (1) "any person" could include the defendant himself (reasoning that assault by definition requires force against another person); and (2) the offense lacks sufficient mens rea (holding that the statute requires intentional, not merely reckless, use of force, which satisfies the mens rea requirement for crimes of violence).

This is a tax law case in which a taxpayer appeals the Tax Court's denial of her request for equitable relief under Internal Revenue Code Section 6015(f)(1) after the IRS erroneously refunded underpayment interest that she had previously paid on her underpaid taxes.

1. Whether underpayment interest owed by a taxpayer following an erroneous IRS refund constitutes a "liability" for "unpaid tax" eligible for discretionary equitable relief under 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f)(1)
2. Whether the rebate/nonrebate distinction in refund classification determines eligibility for Section 6015(f)(1) relief
3. Whether a taxpayer's previous payment of underpayment interest "extinguishes" the liability such that an erroneous refund cannot "revive" it as unpaid tax

The Fourth Circuit vacated the Tax Court's judgment and remanded the case. The court held that erroneous refunds of underpayment interest do give rise to a "liability" for "unpaid tax" eligible for equitable relief under Section 6015(f)(1). The court reasoned that: (1) 26 U.S.C. § 6601(e)(1) provides that references to "tax" in the Internal Revenue Code shall be deemed to include underpayment interest imposed under § 6601(a); (2) the rebate/nonrebate distinction has no basis in Section 6015(f)(1)'s text and has not been adopted by courts in this context; (3) whether a taxpayer has "liability" for "unpaid tax" depends on whether obligations under the tax code are currently satisfied, not on past IRS collection procedures; and (4) plain statutory text cannot be overcome by policy arguments about Congressional intent.

This is an appeal concerning whether a debt collection law firm can enforce an arbitration agreement contained in a promissory note between a debtor and creditor, despite not being a party to the agreement. The Fourth Circuit addresses whether the law firm qualifies as a party to the arbitration agreement based on the definition of "servicing" the note.

1. Whether a non-signatory law firm can enforce an arbitration agreement to which its client is a party
2. Whether the law firm qualifies as a party to the arbitration agreement by "servicing" the note under the agreement's definition of "you"
3. The proper interpretation of "servicing this Note" under Maryland contract law
4. The distinction between a lawyer's role as an agent of the client and the lawyer's independent legal status

The court affirmed the district court's denial of the law firm's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that: (1) the law firm is not a party to the arbitration agreement and therefore cannot enforce it; (2) "servicing this Note" means collecting payments and maintaining a payment schedule for a loan, not providing legal representation; (3) the law firm did not service the loan—it only provided litigation services; and (4) while lawyers play an important role in debt collection, they remain distinct from their clients and cannot claim the benefits of agreements written to protect the client absent broader language or special circumstances. The court reasoned that arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion, and the agreement was drafted to protect creditors and loan servicers, not lawyers.

This is a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case in which Brittany Morris sued the United States for negligence and negligent undertaking after a federal probation officer failed to promptly arrest Morris's ex-boyfriend, who subsequently attacked and severely injured her. The district court dismissed the case based on the FTCA's misrepresentation exception, and Morris appealed.

1. Whether Morris's negligent undertaking claim falls within the FTCA's misrepresentation exception, which bars claims "arising out of" misrepresentation
2. Whether Morris's claim falls within the FTCA's discretionary function exception, which shields government actions based on discretionary decisions involving policy considerations
3. How to distinguish between negligent undertaking claims (which may be actionable) and misrepresentation claims (which are barred) when both involve reliance on government conduct
4. Whether a probation officer's failure to expeditiously execute a warrant after deciding to seek one involves policy considerations protected by the discretionary function exception

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case. The court held that:

1. Misrepresentation Exception Does Not Apply: The gravamen of Morris's claim is Officer Matt's negligent failure to perform an operational task—securing a warrant expeditiously—rather than the communication of misinformation. Although Morris's complaint mentions reliance on Officer Matt's promises, reliance alone does not transform a negligent undertaking claim into a barred misrepresentation claim. The court distinguished this case from cases where injury arose solely from reliance on false information, finding instead that Officer Matt had a duty to supervise the probationer and pursue the warrant with due care, a duty distinct from communicating information accurately.
2. Discretionary Function Exception Does Not Apply: Although probation officers generally make policy-laden decisions about which interventions to pursue, Officer Matt's alleged negligence here involved the failure to implement a decision she had already made—to seek a warrant immediately due to the danger Malveaux posed. The tortious conduct (failing to act after deciding to act) was not itself susceptible to policy analysis because the policy decision had already been made. The court emphasized that mere association with regulatory concerns is insufficient; the tortious conduct itself must be fraught with policy considerations. Since Officer Matt's inaction was not coincident with the policy considerations underlying the warrant decision, the discretionary function exception does not shield the government from liability.

This is an appeal of a district court dismissal in a passport denial case. Hector Cortez, who claims to have been born in Laredo, Texas, challenged the Department of State's repeated denials of his passport applications, asserting claims under federal statute, administrative law, and constitutional provisions.

1. Whether Cortez's claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) is time-barred by the five-year statute of limitations
2. Whether equitable tolling applies to extend the § 1503(a) limitations period
3. Whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides an alternative basis for judicial review of the passport denial
4. Whether the Mandamus Act provides a remedy for compelling issuance of a passport
5. Whether Cortez has stated valid claims under the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments and Article IV's Full Faith and Credit Clause

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that: (1) Cortez's § 1503(a) claim is time-barred because the five-year limitations period began with the 2013 denial, which constituted a final administrative denial on the ground that he failed to prove U.S. nationality, and subsequent applications do not reset the clock; (2) equitable tolling is unavailable because the Department of State provided clear notice of the reasons for denial and the legal standards; (3) the APA claim is jurisdictionally barred because § 1503(a) provides an adequate alternative remedy; (4) the Mandamus Act claim fails because Cortez lacks a clear right to relief, an adequate remedy exists under § 1503(a), and passport decisions are discretionary; and (5) the constitutional claims fail because Congress's provision of a § 1503(a) remedy precludes implied constitutional causes of action, the right to international travel can be regulated within due process bounds, and Cortez has not alleged deprivation of a liberty or property interest distinct from his citizenship claim.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of transporting a minor across state lines with intent to engage in sexual activity, aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country, and coercion and enticement of a minor. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions on two counts.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) requires the government to prove that the defendant's "dominant purpose" for transporting a minor was engaging in sexual activity, or whether proof of "intent" that the minor engage in sexual activity is sufficient.
2. Whether the government must prove a defendant's non-Indian status through documentary evidence or whether unchallenged testimonial evidence from family members is sufficient to establish this element under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (the General Crimes Act).

The court affirmed the convictions on both counts. First, the court held that § 2423(a) requires only proof of "intent" that a minor engage in sexual activity, not that such activity be the defendant's "dominant purpose." Congress removed "purpose" language from the statute in 1948, and this change in statutory language is presumed to reflect a change in meaning. The government presented sufficient evidence that Thompson harbored the intent to sexually abuse his daughter when he transported her to Texas, based on his pattern of abusing children when alone with them and his use of hidden cameras. Second, the court held that unchallenged testimonial evidence from Thompson's wife and daughter that he was not an Indian was sufficient to prove his non-Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected Thompson's argument that documentary evidence or corroborated testimony about genealogical research was required, noting that testimony alone can satisfy the government's burden of proof on criminal elements, even when documentary evidence might be stronger.

This is an environmental citizen suit in which Mobile Baykeeper, a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting water resources, challenges Alabama Power's coal ash impoundment closure plan at the James M. Barry Electric Generating Plant as violating EPA's Coal Ash Rule. The case involves the threshold jurisdictional questions of whether the plaintiff has standing to sue and whether the claims are ripe for judicial review.

1. Whether Mobile Baykeeper has Article III standing to challenge Alabama Power's closure plan, specifically whether it has adequately pleaded injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability
2. Whether Mobile Baykeeper's claims are ripe for judicial review under the two-prong ripeness test (fitness of the issues for judicial decision and hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration)
3. Whether past environmental contamination from the coal ash impoundment precludes standing to challenge a future noncompliant closure plan
4. Whether contingent future administrative actions and permitting requirements defeat redressability

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal and held that Mobile Baykeeper has standing and its claims are ripe for review. On standing, the court found that: (1) Mobile Baykeeper adequately pleaded injury-in-fact through members' declarations that they have reduced their recreational use of the Mobile River due to concerns about toxic coal ash leaching; (2) causation was satisfied because the allegedly noncompliant closure plan perpetuates the leaching that injures the members, and past contamination does not vitiate current standing to challenge a failure to comply with remediation requirements; and (3) redressability was established because a compliant closure plan meeting EPA's performance standards would reduce the toxic leaching and thus provide at least partial relief, with complete or immediate relief not being required. On ripeness, the court found the issues fit for judicial decision because the core question—whether federal law permits capping coal ash in place while it remains in contact with groundwater—is a purely legal question that courts can answer, and the hardship prong favored Mobile Baykeeper because its members are suffering injury now while Alabama Power has no legitimate interest in violating federal law. The court rejected Alabama Power's arguments based on speculation about future administrative outcomes, noting that requiring certainty about future administrative actions would render citizen-suit provisions meaningless.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction in a Medicaid case involving a three-year-old boy with a rare metabolic disease who requires private nursing care. The case addresses whether Georgia's Medicaid program must provide more than 21 hours per week of nursing services to meet federal statutory requirements under the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) program.

1. Whether a state Medicaid program can deny medically necessary care by applying an otherwise reasonable policy, or whether the state must meet the statutory standard of providing care "sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to correct or ameliorate" a patient's condition regardless of policy
2. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that 21 hours per week of nursing care was insufficient to meet the child's medical needs
3. Whether administrative exhaustion of state remedies is required before bringing a Section 1983 action to enforce Medicaid Act provisions
4. Whether a bond should be required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) for the preliminary injunction

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction requiring Georgia to provide more than 21 hours of weekly nursing care. The court held that: (1) a state cannot justify denying medically necessary care by relying on an otherwise reasonable policy—the statutory standard requiring sufficient care to correct or ameliorate the patient's condition must be met in all individual cases; (2) the district court did not clearly err in finding that 21 hours was insufficient, as the record supported this finding through evidence of the child's dangerous glucose drops after moving to Georgia and expert testimony about his medical needs; (3) administrative exhaustion is not required for Section 1983 Medicaid claims; and (4) the district court properly exercised its discretion in declining to require a bond, as requiring a substantial bond would make enforcement of the EPSDT mandate cost-prohibitive for a Medicaid-eligible child. The court reasoned that while states have broad discretion to adopt reasonable policies, they cannot use those policies to circumvent the federal statutory requirement to provide adequate care to each individual beneficiary.

This is an appeal by the Department of Veterans Affairs and its Secretary challenging two District Court orders—a preliminary injunction and an enforcement order—that reinstated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the VA and federal employee unions. The unions challenged the VA's termination of the CBA as violating the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment.

1. Whether the President's exclusion of the VA from federal labor-management relations protections rendered the CBA "inoperable" and thus whether the District Court erred in ordering its reinstatement
2. Whether the CBA's termination constituted First Amendment retaliation against the unions for their advocacy
3. Whether the CBA's termination was arbitrary and capricious under the APA
4. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction to enforce the preliminary injunction by ordering specific performance of the CBA's terms and grievance procedures
5. Whether the District Court properly determined that the VA's re-termination of the CBA was unlawful
6. Whether the defendants were entitled to a stay of the District Court orders pending appeal under the four-factor test from Nken v. Holder

The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted the defendants' motion for a stay in part and denied it in part:

1. Preliminary Injunction Stay Denied: The court denied the defendants' request to stay the preliminary injunction requiring reinstatement of the CBA. The defendants failed to make a "strong showing" of likelihood of success on the merits because: (a) they forfeited their "inoperability" argument by not raising it in the District Court; (b) they failed to adequately challenge the District Court's finding that the termination was retaliatory, as they did not grapple with multiple bases for that finding beyond the White House fact sheet; and (c) they did not develop a legal argument that the District Court erred as a matter of law even if its factual findings were correct.
2. Compliance Portion of Enforcement Order Stay Granted: The court granted a stay of the enforcement order's directive requiring the defendants to "comply with" the CBA in "both form and substance" and to process pending grievances and arbitrations. The court found that this portion of the enforcement order modified the preliminary injunction by expanding it to require specific performance of individual CBA terms and grievance procedures, making it subject to interlocutory appeal. The defendants made a strong showing of likelihood of success on their argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order such specific performance, as the FSLMRS and sovereign immunity doctrines (Tucker Act and Little Tucker Act) limit federal courts' authority to enforce federal employee CBAs in this manner.
3. Re-termination Unlawfulness Determination Stay Denied: The court denied the defendants' request to stay the portion of the enforcement order declaring the re-termination of the CBA unlawful. The defendants failed to establish that this portion of the order modified the preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), as they did not develop a separate argument explaining how the District Court's handling of the re-termination constituted a modification rather than merely a disagreement about compliance with the clarified injunction. Without establishing appellate jurisdiction, the defendants could not make the requisite strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits.
4. Administrative Stay Motion Denied as Moot: The court denied the defendants' accompanying motion for an administrative stay as moot in light of the partial grant of the stay pending appeal.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Ángel Pérez-Otero, the former mayor of Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, challenges his convictions for conspiracy to commit federal-program bribery, federal-program bribery, and extortion under color of official right. Pérez was convicted of accepting bribes and kickbacks from a construction company owner in exchange for steering municipal contracts to that company.

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support convictions, particularly regarding whether payments constituted bribes or campaign contributions under McCormick v. United States
2. Whether the payments constituted a quid pro quo arrangement as required for bribery convictions
3. Whether the indictment was defective for failing to allege an explicit quid pro quo regarding campaign contributions
4. Whether there was a prejudicial variance between the indictment and trial evidence
5. Whether the district court improperly commented on evidence regarding the characterization of payments
6. Whether the district court erred in failing to provide an entrapment instruction
7. Whether jury impartiality was compromised by pretrial publicity and inadequate voir dire
8. Whether the sentences were procedurally and substantively reasonable under the Sentencing Guidelines

The First Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences. The court held: (1) Sufficient evidence supported the convictions because a rational jury could find that Santamaría's payments were not campaign contributions, based on evidence showing the payments were made secretly in cash envelopes rather than through normal campaign contribution channels, were not reported in campaign finance reports, and continued after the alleged campaign debt was paid off. (2) The evidence established a quid pro quo because Santamaría testified he made payments "in order to get contracts and benefits," the payments were made in secret, Pérez began discussing municipal contracts shortly after payments began, and Pérez promised Santamaría specific contracts in exchange for payments. (3) The indictment was not defective because it alleged bribes generally, not specifically campaign contributions, and McCormick's "explicit promise" requirement applies only to campaign contributions, which were not charged. (4) No prejudicial variance occurred because Pérez had adequate notice of the campaign contribution theory through his pre-trial motion and opening arguments, and the jury instructions made clear the jury determined the characterization of payments. (5) While the district court's statement about payments may have commented on evidence, Pérez failed to show prejudice because the evidence supporting a quid pro quo was substantial and uncontradicted. (6) No entrapment instruction was required because Pérez neither requested one nor relied on an entrapment defense at trial, and he failed to establish improper government inducement. (7) Jury impartiality was not compromised because the district court properly conducted voir dire, excused jurors with bias, and the trial setting was not inherently prejudicial despite pretrial publicity. (8) Sentences were reasonable because the district court properly applied sentencing enhancements under the Guidelines (two-level enhancement for multiple bribes and six-level enhancement for loss amount), and Pérez's disparity argument failed because he provided no appropriate comparators—the cited cases involved defendants who pleaded guilty rather than going to trial.

This is a criminal appeal in which two defendants, Nafis Quaye and Sunna Sepetu, challenge their convictions for money laundering conspiracy. The defendants operated fraudulent business accounts that received over $3 million in wire transfers from a romance scam victim, which they then laundered through cash withdrawals and personal expenditures.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knowingly agreed to launder fraud proceeds, despite the lack of direct evidence linking them to the romance scam
2. Whether the district court properly instructed the jury on willful blindness as an alternative to actual knowledge
3. Whether the district court erred by declining to provide the defendants' proposed good faith instruction
4. Whether the government improperly argued for Sepetu's guilt by association with Quaye during opening and closing arguments
5. Whether the district court properly calculated Sepetu's sentencing guidelines range based on the victim's financial hardship

The First Circuit affirmed both convictions and Sepetu's sentence. The court held that: (1) circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support convictions, including the unusual pattern of establishing business accounts under others' names, receiving large transfers, and making swift wire transfers without legitimate business records; the repeated large transfers from the victim's account earmarked for "investment"; the absence of invoices documenting legitimate business transactions; significant personal expenditures inconsistent with reported business profits; conflicting accounts given by defendants; and defendants' failure to investigate red flags raised by banks and law enforcement; (2) the willful blindness instruction was proper because evidence showed defendants engaged in a conscious course of deliberate ignorance by ignoring warning signs; (3) the district court properly declined to give the proposed good faith instruction because the jury instructions adequately conveyed that good faith was a defense by requiring proof of specific criminal intent; (4) the government's collective references to "the defendants" did not constitute improper guilt by association because Sepetu's own conduct provided sufficient basis for conviction, and cautionary jury instructions cured any potential error; and (5) any error in calculating sentencing guidelines was harmless because the district court explicitly stated it would impose the same sentence regardless of the guidelines calculation.

This is an appeal of a supervised release revocation sentence in which the defendant was convicted of firearm possession offenses in 2014 and subsequently arrested in 2023 for possessing a rifle and other weapons. The defendant challenges his revocation sentence, arguing that the district court relied on evidence outside the revocation record to find he knowingly possessed a machine gun, a critical fact that drove his sentence.

1. Whether the district court committed a procedural error by relying on extra-record evidence (trial testimony from dismissed criminal charges) to support its finding that the defendant knowingly possessed a machine gun in violation of his supervised release terms
2. Whether the government was required to prove the defendant's knowledge (mens rea) that the rifle was a machine gun, or whether possession alone suffices under the Sentencing Guidelines
3. Whether the defendant's due process rights and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2) were violated when the court relied on evidence not presented during the revocation proceeding
4. Whether the government waived its argument that no mens rea requirement exists by failing to raise it before the district court

The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that a procedural error occurred because the district court relied on extra-record evidence—specifically, detailed trial testimony about the rifle's switch and lever mechanisms—that the government failed to introduce into the revocation record. The court reasoned that:

1. Although district courts have broad discretion to consider information at sentencing, this discretion is bounded by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 and due process requirements
2. The government had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly possessed a machine gun, and it failed to introduce sufficient evidence in the revocation record to support this finding
3. The government waived its argument that no mens rea requirement exists under the Sentencing Guidelines by failing to raise it before the district court, and the court declined to consider this novel legal argument for the first time on appeal
4. The defendant was deprived of his right to be sentenced on accurate and reliable information and his opportunity to rebut evidence, as he built his defense strategy around the limited evidence the government submitted and had no notice that the court would rely on additional trial testimony
5. The government's failure to introduce available evidence into the revocation record, combined with the district court's reliance on extra-record evidence, violated the defendant's due process rights and the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)

This case involves a First Amendment challenge to Maryland's Senate Bill 1, which restricts renewable energy suppliers from using certain marketing terms (such as "green" or "100% renewable") unless their electricity is at least 51% backed by renewable energy credits (RECs) sourced from within the PJM region, and requires specific disclosures about RECs. The appellants sought a preliminary injunction against the statute's enforcement.

1. Whether Maryland's speech restriction on "green power" marketing claims violates the First Amendment under the appropriate level of scrutiny
2. Whether the regulated speech is inherently or actually misleading and thus unprotected
3. Whether the restriction directly advances Maryland's asserted substantial government interest in consumer protection
4. Whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve that interest
5. Whether Maryland's compelled disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment under the Zauderer standard
6. Whether the appellants satisfied all four preliminary injunction factors under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded with instructions. The court held:

1. Speech Restriction (Section 7-707(c)): The court found that appellants are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment challenge to the speech restriction. Although the court applied intermediate scrutiny (the appropriate standard for commercial speech), it found the restriction fails even under this less stringent standard because: (a) the regulated speech is not inherently or actually misleading; (b) while Maryland has a substantial interest in consumer protection, the restriction does not materially advance this interest; and (c) the restriction is not adequately tailored to address consumer confusion. The court noted that the restriction allows confusing marketing to persist (suppliers can still call energy "green" if backed by in-region RECs while prohibiting the same claims for out-of-region RECs), and the geographic distinction drawn by the statute does not logically correlate with the State's consumer protection goal. The court concluded that all four preliminary injunction factors favor the appellants and reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction as to this provision.
2. Compelled Disclosure Requirements: The court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions at this stage. After the district court's preliminary injunction ruling, the Maryland Public Service Commission issued new mandatory disclosure language that materially differs from the statutory model language the district court had reviewed. The court found that reviewing the now-superseded model language would be moot and that the district court should conduct the initial review of the new disclosure language on remand. The court provided guidance that on remand, the district court should evaluate the disclosure under the Zauderer standard, considering whether the disclosure contains purely factual and uncontroversial information and whether it is reasonably related to preventing consumer deception, while also assessing whether the disclosure is unduly burdensome or threatens to drown out the suppliers' own protected speech.

This is a mandamus petition by Express Scripts, a pharmacy benefit manager, challenging a district court's denial of its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a public nuisance action brought by 120 West Virginia local governments alleging that Express Scripts contributed to an opioid oversupply. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition, holding that Express Scripts is entitled to a jury trial because the remedy sought—an "abatement fund" for addiction treatment, rehabilitation, and education—constitutes legal damages rather than equitable relief.

1. Whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to jury trial in a public nuisance action seeking an "abatement fund" that includes compensation for downstream harms such as addiction treatment and community rehabilitation.
2. The proper historical test for determining whether a remedy is legal or equitable for Seventh Amendment purposes, specifically whether the remedy sought would have been available in courts of equity in 1791.
3. The distinction between equitable abatement (eliminating the nuisance-constituting condition itself) and legal damages (compensating for downstream consequences of a public nuisance).
4. Whether a forward-looking monetary remedy can constitute legal damages rather than equitable relief.

The Fourth Circuit granted the writ of mandamus in part, holding that Express Scripts is entitled to a jury trial. The court's reasoning proceeded as follows: The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial in "Suits at common law" as understood in 1791, measured against the historical distinction between law courts (which provided jury trials and awarded damages) and equity courts (which operated without juries and provided injunctive relief). The court applied a two-pronged test focusing primarily on the remedy sought rather than the nature of the claim. Regarding the remedy analysis, the court conducted extensive historical research demonstrating that in 1791, courts of equity could only abate public nuisances by eliminating the nuisance-constituting condition itself—they could not compensate for downstream harms. Compensation for downstream consequences was exclusively the province of law courts. The court examined founding-era cases (Attorney General v. Parmeter, Attorney General v. Richards, Attorney General v. Johnson, and Spencer v. London & Birmingham Railway Co.) and treatises by Story, Eden, and Pomeroy, all confirming that equity's jurisdiction was limited to preventing future injury, not compensating for past harm. The court found that the abatement fund Plaintiffs seek goes beyond historical equitable abatement because it includes funding for addiction treatment, rehabilitation, and education—which compensate for the downstream consequences of the alleged opioid oversupply rather than merely eliminating the oversupply itself. Although West Virginia's modern public nuisance law may characterize such relief as "equitable," the Seventh Amendment analysis requires examining what remedy would have been available in 1791, not how contemporary state law labels it. The court rejected Plaintiffs' arguments that: (1) the remedy is not damages because it is forward-looking (compensatory damages routinely include prospective components); and (2) the remedy is merely "cleaning up the mess" like pollution remediation (the analogy fails because pollution cleanup removes the pollutant itself, whereas here the fund compensates for downstream effects like addiction, not the oversupply). The court found the historical-analog inquiry (whether public nuisance claims would have been heard at law or equity) inconclusive because public nuisance was a "chameleon" that could be brought in either court depending on the remedy sought. Therefore, the remedy inquiry was dispositive. The court declined to grant mandamus on the separate issue of the "statewide" trial order, finding that Express Scripts could challenge any overly broad remedy on direct appeal.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a disaster relief fraud and wire fraud indictment against Sade Kuyoro. The defendant sought dismissal after the Government failed to timely disclose two pieces of evidence during trial: civil recoupment letters and an email regarding a FEMA inspector.

1. Whether the Government's late disclosure of civil recoupment letters and an email about a FEMA inspector constituted a Brady v. Maryland violation (suppression of exculpatory evidence)
2. Whether the late disclosures violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (discovery obligations)
3. Whether the district court properly exercised its supervisory powers in dismissing the indictment as a sanction for discovery violations
4. Whether the defendant suffered prejudice from the late disclosures and whether dismissal was the appropriate remedy

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded with instructions to reinstate the indictment. The court held that: (1) no Brady violation occurred because the recoupment letters were disclosed during trial with adequate time for use, and the inspector information was not suppressed since the defendant could have obtained it through reasonable diligence; (2) even assuming a Rule 16 violation, the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply the required Garrett factors and imposing dismissal rather than the least severe sanction (such as a continuance); and (3) the defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the late disclosures, which is required to invoke the court's supervisory powers. The court noted the Government acted without malicious intent and that the violations could have been remedied through less severe sanctions.

This is a Hague Convention case involving an international child custody dispute between Sarah Moreau and Andrew Christopher White over two children. Moreau filed a petition in federal court seeking the return of the children from Texas to Canada, arguing that White wrongfully retained them in violation of her Canadian custody rights.

1. Whether the children's habitual residence was Canada or Texas, and whether White wrongfully retained them in Texas in violation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
2. Whether Moreau consented to Texas courts' final adjudication of the custody dispute, which would constitute an affirmative defense to the return remedy
3. Whether Moreau should be judicially estopped from asserting that Canada has jurisdiction over the custody dispute based on her prior representations to Texas courts
4. Whether the district court properly enjoined Canadian and Texas courts from proceeding with custody litigation

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order requiring the return of the children to Canada but vacated the preliminary injunction restricting state and foreign court proceedings.

1. Habitual Residence: The court affirmed that the children were habitually resident in Canada. Although Moreau initially represented the move as temporary, the children had lived in Canada for over five years, attended school there, maintained relationships and medical providers there, and had spent more of their young lives in Canada than in Texas. Under the totality of the circumstances test established in Monasky v. Taglieri, the children were "at home" in Canada, making it their habitual residence despite Moreau's initial characterization of the move as temporary.
2. Wrongful Retention: The court affirmed that White wrongfully retained the children in Texas. White retained the children on August 5, 2024, when he informed Moreau they would start school in Texas. This retention violated Moreau's Canadian custody rights, as the Canadian court had recognized and partially superseded a Texas custody order, granting Moreau the right to determine the children's residence without geographic limitation.
3. Consent Defense: The court rejected White's argument that Moreau consented to Texas courts' final adjudication of the custody dispute. Although Moreau initially represented the move as temporary and submitted to Texas jurisdiction, she repeatedly attempted to dismiss the Texas custody dispute and transfer it to Canada after moving there. The court distinguished the precedent case of Larbie, finding that Moreau's efforts to dismiss the Texas proceedings constituted a revocation of any prior consent to Texas's final adjudication. The court emphasized that requiring Moreau to contest jurisdiction "ad nauseum" after Texas courts repeatedly rejected her jurisdictional arguments would be impractical and redundant.
4. Judicial Estoppel: The court declined to apply judicial estoppel as an affirmative defense to the Hague Convention's mandatory return remedy. The court reasoned that the Hague Convention specifies only narrow enumerated defenses, and applying common law doctrines like judicial estoppel would undermine the Convention's core purpose of returning wrongfully retained children to their habitual residence. The court noted that no circuit has recognized judicial estoppel as an affirmative defense to the Convention's mandated return remedy and that the Supreme Court has cautioned against exporting American legal principles to treaty interpretation.
5. Preliminary Injunction: The court vacated the district court's preliminary injunction that enjoined Canadian and Texas courts from proceeding with custody litigation. The court held that the district court improperly enjoined a foreign sovereign tribunal (Canada) in violation of international comity principles. The principles restricting federal courts from enjoining state courts under the Anti-Injunction Act apply with even greater force to foreign courts. Because the Texas injunction was corollary to the now-vacated Canadian injunction, the Texas injunction was also vacated. However, the court noted that the Hague Convention itself implies Canada's exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters once the children are returned.

This is a Hague Convention case involving an international child custody dispute between Sarah Moreau and Andrew White over their two children. Moreau filed a petition in federal court seeking the return of the children from Texas to Canada, arguing that White wrongfully retained them in violation of her Canadian custody rights.

1. Whether the children's habitual residence was Canada or Texas, and whether White wrongfully retained them in Texas in violation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
2. Whether Moreau consented to Texas court jurisdiction over the custody dispute, which would constitute an affirmative defense to the return remedy
3. Whether Moreau should be judicially estopped from asserting that custody should be adjudicated in Canada based on her prior representations to Texas courts
4. Whether the district court properly enjoined Texas and Canadian courts from proceeding with custody litigation

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order requiring the return of the children to Canada but vacated the preliminary injunction restricting state and foreign court proceedings. The court held:

1. Habitual Residence: The children were habitually resident in Canada at the time of retention. Although Moreau's initial move to Canada was temporary, the children became settled there over five years, attending school, maintaining relationships, and establishing a home. The court applied a totality-of-circumstances test and found no clear error in the district court's determination.
2. Wrongful Retention: White wrongfully retained the children in Texas on August 5, 2024, when he informed Moreau the children would start school in Texas. This violated Moreau's Canadian custody rights, which included the right to determine the children's residence without geographic restriction, as recognized by the Canadian court.
3. Consent Defense: The court rejected White's argument that Moreau consented to Texas court jurisdiction. Although Moreau made representations that her move was temporary, her repeated efforts to dismiss the Texas custody dispute and transfer it to Canada constituted a revocation of any prior consent. The court distinguished the case from precedent and found Moreau's subjective intent did not reflect submission to Texas's final adjudication.
4. Judicial Estoppel: The court declined to apply judicial estoppel as an extra-treaty defense to the Hague Convention's mandatory return remedy. The court reasoned that the Convention specifies narrow affirmative defenses, and applying common law defenses would undermine the Convention's purposes. The Supreme Court has cautioned against automatically applying American legal principles when interpreting treaties.
5. Preliminary Injunction: The court vacated the district court's orders directing the Canadian courts to adjudicate the custody dispute and the related injunction against Texas litigation. The court held that enjoining a foreign sovereign tribunal violates principles of international comity and that such restrictions should be issued sparingly. The court noted that while the Convention implies Canada's exclusive jurisdiction post-return, the district court lacked authority to command a foreign court to act.

This is an appeal of the dismissal of multiple tort and statutory claims brought by Nikko D'Ambrosio against Meta Platforms, a woman he briefly dated (Abbigail Rajala), her parents, and administrators of a Facebook group where women discuss their dating experiences. D'Ambrosio alleged that posts made about him in the group constituted defamation, invasion of privacy, doxing, and violations of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act.

1. Whether D'Ambrosio stated a claim under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA) by alleging that defendants used his likeness for commercial purposes
2. Whether D'Ambrosio stated a claim under Illinois' Civil Liability for Doxing Act by alleging intentional publication of personally identifiable information with intent to harm or knowledge of risk of death, bodily injury, or stalking
3. Whether D'Ambrosio stated a defamation claim under Illinois law, including application of the innocent construction rule
4. Whether D'Ambrosio stated claims for false light invasion of privacy and civil conspiracy
5. Whether D'Ambrosio stated claims for negligence and products liability against Meta
6. Whether sanctions should be imposed for frivolous appeal and attorney misconduct

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. On the IRPA claim, the court held that D'Ambrosio failed to allege that any defendant used his likeness for a "commercial purpose" as required by the statute. Merely displaying advertisements adjacent to a person's image does not constitute a commercial purpose under IRPA, and D'Ambrosio failed to connect any defendant's conduct to the sale, advertisement, or promotion of products, merchandise, goods, or services. On the Doxing Act claim, the court held that D'Ambrosio failed to adequately allege the required state of mind—knowledge or reckless disregard that he would suffer death, bodily injury, or stalking. The court found no allegations supporting an inference that defendants knew of or recklessly disregarded such risks, and D'Ambrosio never alleged he was actually stalked or subjected to bodily injury. On the defamation claim, the court applied Illinois' innocent construction rule and held that the comment linking D'Ambrosio to a news article about a different person (Anthony LaMonica) was reasonably susceptible to an innocent construction referring to someone else entirely. The court also held that D'Ambrosio failed to plead special damages required for defamation per quod and that he forfeited arguments about the authenticity of a text message by raising them only at oral argument. On the false light and civil conspiracy claims, the court held that because the defamation claim failed under the innocent construction rule, the false light claim also failed, and the civil conspiracy claim necessarily failed as it depended on an underlying tort. On the negligence and products liability claims against Meta, the court affirmed dismissal based on D'Ambrosio's waiver of these claims by failing to meaningfully respond to Meta's arguments in the district court. The court also ordered D'Ambrosio and his attorneys to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for frivolously appealing the dismissal of claims against the Rajalas, for attorney Walner's submission of a brief containing fictitious quotations and misstatements of law regarding the Doxing Act, and for attorney Trent's unfounded assertion at oral argument that D'Ambrosio did not send the text message attributed to him.

This is an immigration asylum case in which Baljit Singh, a Sikh and member of the Mann political party from Punjab, India, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA's decision, holding that Singh failed to establish past persecution and could reasonably relocate within India to avoid future persecution.

1. Whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination that Singh's past incidents (a vague threat, two physical assaults causing minor injuries, and a one-night police detention over an eleven-month period) rose to the level of persecution under immigration law.
2. Whether the BIA properly applied legal factors from related Mann party cases (the "S. Singh factors") in evaluating Singh's persecution claim.
3. Whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that Singh could reasonably relocate within India to avoid future persecution, given country conditions evidence regarding the feasibility of relocation for Sikhs and low-level Mann party members.
4. The proper standard of review for agency conclusions regarding persecution and internal relocation following the Supreme Court's decision in Urias-Orellana v. Bondi.

The Ninth Circuit denied Singh's petition for review. The court held that:

1. Past Persecution: Substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that Singh's cumulative harms did not rise to the level of persecution. The court found that the vague threat, two brief beatings causing only minor injuries (swelling, no serious injuries or permanent damage), and one-night detention—occurring over eleven months with tenuous connections between incidents—did not compel a finding of persecution. Although a reasonable factfinder could have found the incidents sufficient to establish persecution, a factfinder would not be compelled to do so under the highly deferential substantial evidence standard.
2. Application of S. Singh Factors: The BIA was not required to apply the five factors from related Mann party cases as a binding test or "special rule" for all Mann party Sikhs from Punjab. The court noted that asylum review is fact-dependent and not subject to set formulas, and the Supreme Court has rejected such special rules. Additionally, Singh's case was materially distinguishable from the precedent cases because he did not receive death threats, was not a minor, did not have family members harmed, and relocated temporarily after only one assault.
3. Internal Relocation: Substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that Singh could reasonably relocate within India to avoid future persecution. The court relied on a Law Library of Congress report indicating no legal obstacles for Sikhs to relocate and that internal relocation is feasible for low-level Mann party members who are not "hard-core militants." Since Singh failed to establish past persecution, he bore the burden of showing internal relocation was unreasonable, which he failed to meet.
4. Standard of Review: Following the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, the substantial evidence standard applies to the entirety of the BIA's conclusions—both underlying factual findings and application of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This is a highly deferential standard under which the BIA's findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

This is a putative class action consumer fraud case in which the plaintiff alleges that KLN Enterprises falsely represented its Wiley Wallaby licorice product as free of artificial flavors when the product actually contains DL malic acid, an artificial flavor derived from petroleum substrates. The plaintiff purchased the product at a Target store in California after reviewing the product's labels.

1. Whether the plaintiff's complaint satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud allegations, specifically whether the plaintiff pleaded with sufficient particularity that the malic acid used in the product was artificial.
2. Whether the plaintiff plausibly alleged a claim of consumer fraud under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) by showing that a reasonable consumer would likely be deceived by the product's labeling claims of being "free of artificial flavors."
3. Whether the product's ingredient list disclosure on the back label adequately informed reasonable consumers about which ingredients were artificial.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that: (1) the plaintiff's allegations satisfied Rule 9(b) because they identified the "who" (KLN), "what" (false representation of being free of artificial flavors), "when" (May 2023), "where" (Target in Encinitas, California), and "how" (label statements), and provided specific details about laboratory testing by a named facility with identified methodology, giving the defendant adequate notice and the court assurance the theory had a factual basis; and (2) the plaintiff plausibly alleged consumer fraud under the reasonable consumer standard because a reasonable consumer would likely be deceived by a product claiming to be free of artificial flavors when it allegedly contains artificial DL malic acid, particularly where the ingredient list does not disclose which ingredients are artificial and a reasonable consumer lacks the scientific expertise to determine this independently.

This is an appeal by Phoenix Charitable Trust, a nonparty to the underlying proceedings, challenging three district court orders related to the collection of assets from entities controlled by Daniel Carpenter to satisfy a judgment in favor of Universitas Education, LLC. The Tenth Circuit dismisses the appeal based on Phoenix's lack of standing to raise its challenges.

1. Whether Phoenix, as a nonparty, has Article III constitutional standing to appeal the three district court orders (the fees order, the sale-of-assets order, and the injunction order)
2. Whether Phoenix has prudential standing to challenge the injunction order on behalf of another party (Carpenter)
3. Whether Phoenix suffered an injury-in-fact from the fees order and sale-of-assets order, as required for Article III standing

The court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing. Regarding the fees order, Phoenix clearly lacks Article III standing because the order only requires Carpenter to pay fees and costs, and Phoenix failed to show how it could be injured by an order directed at Carpenter. Regarding the sale-of-assets order, Phoenix failed to meet its burden of demonstrating an injury by providing unauthenticated and speculative evidence of membership interest in SDM-OK's insurance portfolio; the documents contradicted the record and left too many unanswered questions. Regarding the injunction order, even assuming Phoenix had Article III standing as a nonparty affected by the injunction, it lacks prudential standing because it seeks to challenge the injunction based on alleged violations of Carpenter's rights rather than its own rights, which the court found insufficient under the doctrine of prudential standing.

This case involves a personal injury lawsuit arising from a truck accident in Illinois. The plaintiff sued a transportation broker (C.H. Robinson) for negligently hiring an unsafe motor carrier, claiming the broker should have known the carrier had safety deficiencies based on its federal safety rating.

1. Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), which preempts state laws related to prices, routes, and services in the trucking industry, also preempts state negligent-hiring claims against transportation brokers.
2. Whether negligent-hiring claims against brokers fall within the FAAAA's "safety exception," which preserves state authority to regulate safety "with respect to motor vehicles."
3. Whether the phrase "with respect to motor vehicles" in the safety exception is broad enough to encompass claims against brokers who select motor carriers.

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower courts and held that negligent-hiring claims against brokers are not preempted by the FAAAA because they fall within the statute's safety exception. The Court reasoned that: (1) common-law duties and standards of care are part of a state's safety regulatory authority; (2) negligent-hiring claims impose a duty of reasonable care in selecting contractors for work involving physical harm; (3) the phrase "with respect to motor vehicles" means "concerns" the vehicles used in transportation; (4) requiring a broker to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier "concerns" the trucks that will transport goods; and therefore (5) such claims are saved from preemption by the safety exception. The Court rejected counterarguments that this interpretation would swallow the entire preemption provision, create surplusage, or create an anomaly with other statutory provisions, concluding that the text of the safety exception controls.

This case addresses whether a federal court that has previously stayed claims under §3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) retains jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award under §9 and §10 of the FAA, even when those motions do not independently present a basis for federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court holds that such a court does retain jurisdiction.

1. Whether a federal court's original jurisdiction over claims that are stayed pending arbitration extends to subsequent motions to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under §9 and §10 of the FAA
2. Whether the "look-through" approach to jurisdiction established in Vaden v. Discover Bank applies to §9 and §10 motions, or whether Badgerow v. Walters limits that approach to freestanding FAA applications
3. Whether §9 and §10 motions filed in pre-existing federal suits should be treated as "new federal actions" requiring an independent jurisdictional basis
4. The proper interpretation of the FAA's jurisdictional requirements and the supervisory role of federal courts in arbitration proceedings

The Court affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment, holding that a federal court that has previously stayed claims under §3 of the FAA retains jurisdiction to confirm or vacate resulting arbitral awards under §9 and §10. The Court reasoned that:

1. Unlike freestanding FAA motions addressed in Vaden and Badgerow, assessing jurisdiction over §9 or §10 motions in a case originally filed in federal court does not require "looking through" to an underlying controversy outside the court. Instead, the court may assess jurisdiction by looking at the suit already before it.
2. The District Court had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 over Jules's federal claims, and nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction while the parties arbitrated. When the parties returned with §9 and §10 motions, the court retained the same jurisdiction to decide those motions.
3. This case differs from Badgerow because there is an obvious third place to look for jurisdiction: the original claims themselves, which were sufficient to establish the District Court's jurisdiction.
4. Federal courts have the power to incorporate private settlements (including arbitral awards) into court orders when resolving claims that are the subject of those settlements, as recognized in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.
5. The FAA's structure supports this result. Section 3 requires a stay rather than dismissal, which comports with the supervisory role the FAA envisions for courts, including facilitating recovery on arbitral awards. A court that grants a §3 stay should be able to superintend the arbitration to the end, including through confirmation or vacatur.
6. Jules's counterarguments lacked merit: Badgerow did not convert the FAA into a comprehensive jurisdictional scheme requiring independent jurisdictional bases for all §9 and §10 motions; §9 and §10 motions should not be treated as entirely "new federal actions" merely because they require service and notice; §8's maritime arbitration provisions do not shed light on jurisdiction in other FAA disputes; and Jules's policy concerns about manufactured federal jurisdiction are conjectural and outweighed by countervailing efficiency and supervisory concerns.

This is an errata sheet for a First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in a criminal case involving the United States as appellee against defendant Lilian Giang, issued on April 22, 2026.

The document does not contain substantive legal analysis, as it is solely an errata sheet correcting a typographical error in the original opinion.

The Court amended its April 22, 2026 opinion by correcting page 9, line 4, to replace the word "restructuring" with "[structuring]". No substantive ruling or reasoning is provided in this errata sheet.

This case involves the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska's request for repatriation of the remains of two tribal members, Samuel Gilbert and Edward Hensley, who died at the Carlisle Indian Industrial School in the 1890s and were buried at Carlisle Cemetery on a U.S. Army base. The Tribe invoked the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) to seek return of the remains for proper tribal burial.

1. Whether human remains buried in a federal cemetery constitute "holdings or collections" subject to NAGPRA's repatriation requirements under 25 U.S.C. § 3003 and § 3005
2. Whether NAGPRA's repatriation obligation applies only to previously excavated remains or extends to remains still interred in cemeteries
3. Whether the Army obtained a "right of possession" over the remains that would exempt them from repatriation
4. Whether requiring repatriation of buried remains would contradict NAGPRA's purpose of protecting Native American burial sites

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's dismissal, holding that buried Native American remains in federal cemeteries can constitute "holdings or collections" subject to NAGPRA's repatriation requirements. The court reasoned that: (1) the ordinary meaning of "holdings or collections" encompasses human remains purposefully accumulated by a federal agency, regardless of whether they are excavated or still buried; (2) the statutory text contains no location-specific limitation excluding interred remains; (3) the Department of the Interior's regulatory definition of "holdings or collections" as "an accumulation of one or more objects, items, or human remains for any temporary or permanent purpose" supports this interpretation; (4) the Tribe's allegations that the Army intentionally gathered and held the remains in the cemetery satisfy the definition; and (5) the Army lacks a "right of possession" because it never obtained consent from the families or tribe for the burials. The court distinguished the case from Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe (involving consensually buried remains) and emphasized that NAGPRA's purpose of honoring Native American burial traditions supports repatriation of remains buried without consent. The court noted that its interpretation does not require agencies to excavate consensually buried remains or to inventory remains they unknowingly possess, but only requires repatriation of purposefully held remains without requisite consent.

This case involves a petition for review of a National Labor Relations Board decision regarding alleged unfair labor practices by Starbucks during unionization campaigns at two upstate New York locations. The dispute centers on whether Starbucks unlawfully terminated a union organizer and engaged in surveillance of union activities.

1. Whether Starbucks violated the National Labor Relations Act by terminating James Schenk, a union organizer and shift supervisor at the Latham store, based on alleged infractions including profanity in workplace communications, incomplete task completion, and opening company mail.
2. Whether the district manager's increased presence at the Stuyvesant store during the union campaign created an unlawful impression of surveillance in violation of the NLRA.
3. Whether the Board adequately considered contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn when making its factual findings.

The Fifth Circuit granted Starbucks' petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the Board failed to adequately consider contradictory evidence regarding Schenk's termination, including: (1) evidence that no other employee had used similarly extreme profanity; (2) whether earlier disciplinary actions involving profanity should be considered as part of an escalating pattern; (3) the fact that no other shift supervisors had failed to complete closing tasks while on final warning; and (4) evidence that employees generally did not open mail and Schenk's stated belief that Starbucks would not share the letter's contents with employees. The court reasoned that the Board, as the primary decisionmaker in such matters, must "grapple with countervailing portions of the record" and cannot ignore relevant evidence when explaining its reasoning. Judge Oldham concurred in granting the petition but would have reversed outright rather than remanding, arguing the Board's decision was unreasonable given the severity of Schenk's profanity-laden abuse directed at coworkers and supervisors.

This is an appeal of a wrongful death case brought under the Montreal Convention, an international treaty governing airline liability. Melissa Arzu, as administrator of her nephew Kevin Greenidge's estate, sued American Airlines after the 14-year-old died from cardiac arrest during an international flight, alleging the airline failed to provide adequate medical response and equipment.

1. Whether the flight crew's allegedly ineffective medical response constituted an "accident" under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, which imposes strict liability for injuries caused by unexpected or unusual external events
2. Whether the alleged malfunction of the aircraft's Automatic External Defibrillator (AED) constituted an Article 17 accident
3. Whether the Montreal Convention preempts Arzu's state-law breach of contract claim
4. Whether sufficient evidence of causation exists to support liability if an accident is found

The court partially reversed and partially affirmed the district court's summary judgment. Specifically:

1. Crew Response Theory - AFFIRMED: The court affirmed summary judgment dismissing Arzu's claim based on the crew's allegedly ineffective medical response. The court held that an imperfect medical response alone cannot constitute an Article 17 accident absent unusual circumstances and willing inaction by the crew. The crew's actions—removing Kevin from his seat, securing medical professionals, assisting with CPR, fetching an AED, and alerting the pilots to divert—were not unexpected or unusual under the circumstances.
2. AED Malfunction Theory - REVERSED: The court reversed summary judgment on Arzu's claim based on alleged AED malfunction. The court reasoned that FAA regulations requiring functional AEDs on aircraft are relevant to whether an event is unexpected or unusual. Because four witnesses, including two medical professionals, testified that the AED never delivered a shock despite its internal data recording one, a genuine factual dispute exists about whether the AED malfunctioned. This dispute must proceed to trial, as the AED data alone cannot conclusively contradict the witness testimony.
3. Causation - SUFFICIENT: The court found sufficient evidence of causation to proceed to trial. The plaintiff's medical expert opined that prompt CPR and proper AED usage would have significantly increased Kevin's survival chances, and that the delayed response and ineffective AED usage contributed to his death. This creates a genuine dispute on whether the AED malfunction was a link in the causal chain.
4. Breach of Contract Claim - AFFIRMED: The court affirmed dismissal of the breach of contract claim, holding that the Montreal Convention expressly preempts domestic-law contract claims. The allegedly breached terms were materially identical to Article 28 of the Convention, which governs advance payments, and therefore any such claim must be brought exclusively under the Convention's conditions and liability limits.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Terrence London, II challenges his convictions on three counts arising from a June 6, 2022 incident involving the possession of a firearm and controlled substances. London was acquitted of charges related to a separate November 18, 2021 incident but convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.

1. Whether the government presented sufficient evidence to support London's convictions on Counts IV, V, and VI, specifically regarding his knowing possession of the firearm and drugs found in the vehicle
2. Whether the district court properly admitted evidence of London's prior 2018 firearm possession conviction under the "opening the door" doctrine and Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
3. Whether London's Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel was violated when his attorney Sunny Koshy represented both London and Kayla Fulton, a lab analyst who tested evidence in London's case
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying London's motion to conduct a post-verdict interview with Juror 5, who appeared to initially reject the guilty verdict during jury polling

The Sixth Circuit affirmed London's convictions on all grounds. The court held:

1. Sufficiency of Evidence: The government presented substantial and competent evidence supporting London's convictions. Regarding the firearm (Count IV), London had both actual possession (the gun was on the driver's seat he had just vacated) and constructive possession (he was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, possessed keys to it, and had personal items in the trunk). Regarding the drugs (Count V), the same evidence of dominion and control over the vehicle, combined with $9,000 in cash and two cell phones found on his person, supported constructive possession with intent to distribute. Regarding the firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking (Count VI), the gun's strategic location on the driver's seat, its loaded condition, the large quantities of drugs and cash nearby, and expert testimony about drug dealers carrying guns for protection established the required nexus.
2. Prior Conviction Admission: The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that London's defense counsel "opened the door" to the admission of his 2018 conviction. When defense counsel cross-examined Officer Green about the sole basis for his belief that London was armed, counsel implicitly opened the door to other bases for that belief, including London's previous history with firearms. The conviction was properly admitted as a limited yes/no answer with a 404(b) instruction preventing the jury from considering it as direct evidence of guilt.
3. Conflict of Interest: No actual conflict of interest existed because Koshy was unaware of the conflict between his representation of London and his later representation of Fulton until April 2024, eight months after London's trial concluded. Since Koshy did not know about the dual representation, he could not have been forced to choose between clients, and therefore no actual conflict materialized. The district court was not required to hold a hearing because it did not know or reasonably should have known about the conflict until Koshy disclosed it.
4. Juror Interview: The district court properly denied London's motion to interview Juror 5 post-verdict. London's allegations concerned internal influences (juror bias and behavior during deliberations) rather than external influences, which are the only grounds for post-verdict juror interviews under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). The juror's note, initial rejection of the verdict, and emotional demeanor all relate to internal deliberation processes and do not provide grounds for investigation. The district court, as the best position to determine appropriate remedies for jury misconduct, did not abuse its discretion in denying the interview.

This is a civil rights case arising from a fatal police shooting during a traffic stop. Mitchell's estate and children sued Officer Bryan Arnold for excessive force under federal law and for battery, wrongful death, and gross negligence under Kentucky law, claiming Arnold was not justified in using deadly force when Mitchell's vehicle struck him.

1. Whether Officer Arnold was entitled to qualified immunity under federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
2. Whether Arnold was entitled to qualified official immunity under Kentucky law, specifically whether his use of deadly force constituted a discretionary act performed in good faith
3. Whether alleged inconsistencies in Arnold's testimony regarding what he observed created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding bad faith
4. Whether evidence of Arnold's general racial animus from ex-wives and family members established that he acted with subjective ill will motivated by racial bias in this particular incident

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and held that Arnold is entitled to Kentucky qualified official immunity. The court ruled:

1. Arnold's use of deadly force was a discretionary act, not a ministerial act, because self-defense situations are quintessentially discretionary despite standard operating procedures governing shooting at moving vehicles
2. Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of subjective bad faith. Alleged inconsistencies in Arnold's testimony did not demonstrate he acted without permissible intentions
3. Video evidence corroborated Arnold's account that Mitchell's vehicle moved before he fired and that both Arnold and Officer King were in serious danger, supporting Arnold's subjective belief that deadly force was necessary
4. Evidence of Arnold's general racial animus from family members lacked probative value because it had no temporal nexus to the incident, was not directly probative of his motivations at the moment of the shooting, and did not show a pattern of violence against racial minorities in his police work. General racial bias does not alone create a genuine factual dispute about whether Arnold acted with willful or malicious intent in this specific encounter

This is an employment discrimination and labor law case in which Daniel Paris sued his former employer, MacAllister Machinery Company, and the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 324, alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA). The district court dismissed Paris's LMRA and ELCRA claims and granted summary judgment on his FMLA claims, which the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

1. Whether Paris established a "serious health condition" under the FMLA sufficient to entitle him to leave
2. Whether Paris's inquiry about FMLA paperwork constituted "protected activity" under the FMLA
3. Whether MacAllister's termination of Paris was pretextual retaliation for engaging in protected FMLA activity
4. Whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation in a hybrid LMRA section 301 claim
5. Whether the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Paris's state law ELCRA claims

The court affirmed the district court's decisions on all counts. First, the court held that Paris failed to establish a "serious health condition" because he never received inpatient care or continuing treatment from a healthcare provider, despite alleging anxiety and mental distress. Second, while the court reversed the district court's finding that Paris's inquiry about FMLA paperwork was not protected activity—holding that requesting FMLA paperwork is a protected initial step in exercising FMLA rights—the court affirmed summary judgment on the retaliation claim because Paris could not show that MacAllister's termination was pretextual. MacAllister articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination based on Paris's long history of performance, attendance, and conduct issues, as well as his violation of a "last chance" agreement. Third, the court affirmed dismissal of Paris's LMRA claims against the Union because Paris failed to plausibly allege that the Union breached its duty of fair representation, particularly by failing to adequately allege that he requested the Union to grieve his demotion and that the Union failed to do so. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the ELCRA claims.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Alexandre Ansari sued Detective Moises Jimenez for violating his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Ansari had been convicted of first-degree murder but was later exonerated when the prosecutor's office determined he was innocent, leading to vacation of his convictions.

1. Whether Ansari's § 1983 claim is barred by the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine, which generally prevents civil rights suits that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction
2. Whether Detective Jimenez is entitled to qualified immunity on Ansari's Brady claim
3. Whether the district court erred in denying Jimenez's motion for a new trial based on evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and closing argument

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Ansari, awarding him $10 million in damages. The court held: (1) Heck does not bar Ansari's claim because his convictions and sentence were properly vacated by the state court, eliminating any outstanding criminal judgment; (2) Jimenez is not entitled to qualified immunity because police officers' Brady duties were clearly established as of 1990, and Jimenez forfeited his argument that no case clearly established the duty regarding the specific type of evidence withheld; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence under Rule 403, limiting the Tusar memo to one paragraph under the rule of completeness, providing adequate jury instructions clarifying the Brady claim, or denying a new trial based on closing argument.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in a capital murder case where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's grant of relief to death row inmate Mark Alan Bradford. Bradford challenged his 1988 first-degree murder conviction for killing Lynea Kokes based on Brady and Strickland claims, but the appellate court upheld the California Supreme Court's summary denial of these claims under the deferential AEDPA standard of review.

1. Whether the district court properly applied AEDPA's deferential standard of review when evaluating the California Supreme Court's summary denial of Bradford's Brady claim (alleging suppression of blood-alcohol testing results) and Strickland claim (alleging ineffective assistance of counsel).
2. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Light Enterprises v. Raimondo requires abandonment of AEDPA's deferential standard of review in favor of de novo review of state court decisions.
3. What factual allegations in Bradford's state habeas petition the California Supreme Court was required to accept as true under California law standards for prima facie case pleading.
4. Whether Bradford adequately pleaded that blood-alcohol-content testing was actually performed on his blood sample and that results were suppressed.
5. Whether Bradford's counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of Bradford's intoxication and mental impairments at the time of the murder.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief and remanded for denial of Bradford's petition as to his guilt-phase claims. The court held:

1. AEDPA Standards Remain Applicable: The court rejected Bradford's argument that Loper Bright requires de novo review of state court decisions, holding that Loper Bright addressed judicial review of executive agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act, not collateral review of state court judgments under AEDPA. AEDPA's plain language mandates deferential review using the "unreasonable application" standard, which does not violate the Constitution because: (a) the U.S. Supreme Court retains direct review authority over state court decisions; and (b) state courts are presumptively competent to adjudicate federal constitutional claims. Congress has constitutional authority to regulate the scope of habeas relief.
2. Proper Standard for Summary Denials: Under Pinholster, when reviewing a state court's summary denial of a habeas petition, a federal court must determine what arguments or theories could have supported the state court's decision and ask whether fairminded jurists could disagree. The court must consider how the California Supreme Court may reasonably have construed the adequacy of allegations under California law, which requires petitioners to plead facts "fully and with particularity" and support them with documentary evidence.
3. Factual Adequacy of Pleading: The California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that Bradford failed to adequately support his allegation—made on "information and belief"—that blood-alcohol-content testing was actually performed on his blood sample. Although the sample was drawn in a tube consistent with blood-alcohol testing procedures, the prosecutor stated at a pretrial hearing that use of that tube was a mistake, as the sample should have been placed in a different tube for DNA testing. The only testing confirmed in the record was serological testing for blood type. Bradford provided no non-speculative evidence that blood-alcohol testing was actually conducted.
4. Brady Claim Fails: Because the California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that Bradford failed to establish that blood-alcohol-content testing results actually existed, the sole factual predicate for his Brady claim was vitiated. Therefore, the state court could reasonably have concluded the Brady claim failed on the merits.
5. Ineffective Assistance Claims—Dependent on Non-Existent Testing: To the extent Claim 8(B) rested on counsel's failure to request blood-testing results that allegedly existed, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded this claim failed because Bradford did not adequately plead the existence of such results.
6. Ineffective Assistance Claims—Independent Aspects: Even assuming arguendo that Bradford's counsel was deficient in failing to investigate and present additional evidence of intoxication and mental impairments, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that Bradford failed to establish prejudice. The court noted that Bradford presented evidence at trial of his drinking and intoxication, and the jury heard detailed testimony about his coherent behavior and his detailed, deliberative confession to police. The jury rejected the intoxication defense and convicted him of first-degree murder with a special circumstance finding. Under AEDPA's deferential standard, Bradford failed to show that fairminded jurists would disagree that additional evidence of intoxication would have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
7. Scope of Relief: The court reversed the district court's judgment setting aside Bradford's first-degree murder conviction and special circumstance finding, and remanded for the district court to deny the habeas petition in its entirety as to the conviction and special circumstances, while allowing the district court to resolve any remaining unresolved penalty-phase claims.

This is a First Amendment case in which a University of Washington teaching professor challenged the university's investigation, reprimand, and threat of further discipline after he included a parody land acknowledgment statement in his course syllabus that mocked the university's official indigenous land acknowledgment. The case involves claims of First Amendment retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, and facial constitutional challenges to the university's nondiscrimination policy.

1. Whether Professor Reges's parody land acknowledgment statement in his syllabus constitutes protected speech or government speech under the First Amendment, and whether the Garcetti doctrine applies to academic speech in the university setting
2. Whether the University of Washington's adverse employment actions (investigation, reprimand, and threat of discipline) against Reges violated his First Amendment rights under the Pickering balancing test
3. Whether student discomfort, unrest, and emotional distress caused by controversial academic speech can justify restricting or punishing a professor's speech in the university context
4. Whether the University's Executive Order 31 (Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action policy) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as applied to speech, particularly its prohibition on "any conduct that is deemed unacceptable or inappropriate, regardless of whether the conduct rises to the level of unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation"

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the University of Washington and directed entry of summary judgment for Professor Reges on his First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims. The court held:

1. Protected Speech: Reges's parody land acknowledgment constitutes protected academic speech, not government speech. The court applied the Demers exception to Garcetti, holding that Garcetti does not apply to speech related to scholarship or teaching. Reges's statement addressed what was taught at the school and fell within the academic speech exception. The fact that the statement appeared in a required syllabus did not convert it to government speech, as the university acknowledged that syllabi are "the purview of the faculty" and faculty have "great flexibility" in determining their contents.
2. Matter of Public Concern: Reges's speech addressed a matter of public concern. Land acknowledgments are the subject of significant public debate, and Reges's parody statement contributed to this ongoing discussion about the appropriateness and wisdom of land acknowledgment policies.
3. Pickering Balancing: Under the Pickering balancing test, Reges's First Amendment interests outweigh the University's interests. The court emphasized that in the university context, student discomfort, unrest, and emotional reactions to controversial academic speech cannot justify restricting or punishing a professor's speech. The court reasoned that:
   • Student unrest is an inevitable byproduct of the First Amendment's protections for academic freedom in higher education and cannot constitute the type of disruption permitting speech restrictions
   • Allowing student anxiety or outrage to justify censoring professors would undermine the university's special role in fostering the free exchange of ideas
   • The University's claimed tangible disruptions (Native students dropping out or taking leaves of absence, recruitment difficulties, and student transfers to another section) were inadequately substantiated. The one Native student who took a leave of absence cited multiple other reasons, and the second student who allegedly dropped out appeared not to exist
   • The University's own permitting of Reges to express the same views in other forums (office door, email signature, media interviews, and subsequent syllabi) undermined its claim that the Winter 2022 syllabus statement was uniquely disruptive
4. Viewpoint Discrimination: Summary judgment for Reges was also warranted on his viewpoint discrimination claim, as the record clearly showed the University took action against Reges because of the views he expressed in his mock land acknowledgment.
5. EO-31 Policy Challenge: The court held that the district court erred in dismissing Reges's overbreadth and vagueness challenge to Executive Order 31 under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court's limiting construction of the policy was improper because it conflicted with the policy's plain text, which targets "any conduct that is deemed unacceptable or inappropriate, regardless of whether the conduct rises to the level of unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation." The court remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether the policy is unconstitutional, considering how it has been enforced and applied in practice.

This case involves a petition by Angela Okafor Carlisle to remove Rone Everett as personal representative of the estate of Sharif Kihill Green, challenging the validity of Green's marriage to Everett on grounds of fraud. The court granted Everett's motion to dismiss for lack of standing.

1. Whether Carlisle has standing under Delaware Code Title 13, Section 1506 to challenge the validity of Green's marriage to Everett
2. Whether the marriage between Green and Everett was valid despite Green being hospitalized in New Jersey on the date the marriage certificate stated the ceremony occurred in Philadelphia
3. Whether a challenge to a marriage after the death of a spouse must proceed exclusively under the statutory annulment provisions of the Act
4. The application of the two-step analytical framework established in LaFon v. Felmlee to determine marriage validity and standing to challenge marriages

The court granted Everett's motion to dismiss, holding that Carlisle lacks standing to challenge the marriage. The court applied the two-step framework from LaFon v. Felmlee: First, the court determined that Green and Everett's marriage was valid because the parties complied with Pennsylvania's marriage laws, obtained proper documentation (including a doctor's note for a Zoom sick call), participated in a valid marriage ceremony, and acted in good faith with the intent to marry—evidenced by their decades-long relationship and child together. The court gave deference to Pennsylvania's marital decrees and found no statutory defect in the marriage formalities. Second, because a valid marriage existed, any challenge must proceed under Delaware's annulment statute (13 Del. C. § 1506), which strictly limits who may seek annulment. Parents of a decedent are not among the authorized classes of persons who may petition for annulment, and Carlisle herself admitted she cannot seek relief as she is neither a party to the marriage nor the legal representative of the decedent. Therefore, Carlisle lacks standing to challenge the marriage.

This is an immigration or administrative law case involving petitioners Victor Geovany Lopez Martinez and M.G.L.G. challenging a decision by the Acting Attorney General. The case was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this errata sheet, which only contains a minor typographical correction to the original opinion.

This document is an errata sheet amending the Court's opinion issued on April 23, 2026. The amendment corrects a typographical error on page 16, line 10, replacing "Un " with "Un". The substantive ruling and reasoning are contained in the original opinion, not in this errata correction.

This is an appeal of a free exercise rights claim brought by a college student who was denied tuition assistance under Virginia's Tuition Assistance Grant Program after changing her major to a religious vocation program. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Locke v. Davey controls and has not been overruled by subsequent Supreme Court precedent.

1. Whether Virginia's Tuition Assistance Grant Program, which excludes students pursuing religious training or theological education majors (classified as CIP Code 39 programs), violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
2. Whether the Supreme Court's decisions in Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, and Carson v. Makin effectively abrogated or overruled Locke v. Davey.
3. Whether lower courts may treat Supreme Court precedent as implicitly overruled when subsequent decisions have narrowed or disfavored it.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that Locke v. Davey directly controls this case and has not been overruled or abandoned by Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, or Carson. The court reasoned that while those subsequent cases distinguished Locke and narrowed its application, they did not explicitly reject or overrule it. The key distinction is that Locke involved a restriction on the use of funds for a specific category of instruction (religious vocational degrees), whereas Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, and Carson involved categorical exclusions based on religious status or character. The court emphasized that lower courts must follow controlling Supreme Court precedent unless the Supreme Court explicitly overrules it, and absent such explicit direction, courts cannot treat precedent as implicitly abrogated. Judge Richardson's concurrence agreed that Locke controls but argued that Locke was wrongly decided and should be formally overruled by the Supreme Court, noting that the Court has eroded Locke's foundation through subsequent decisions.

This is a premises-liability slip-and-fall case in which Jonathan Lewis sued Circle K Stores Inc. for injuries sustained when he slipped on a wet parking lot surface that had been treated with a powdered concrete cleaner. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Circle K, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding breach of duty and causation that should be decided by a jury.

1. Whether a wet concrete surface treated with a powdered chemical cleaner constitutes an "open and obvious" hazard as a matter of law, thereby relieving the merchant of its duty to warn invitees.
2. Whether the scope of a merchant's duty of reasonable care extends to vulnerable populations (elderly, disabled, chronically ill) when the merchant opens its premises to the general public.
3. Whether expert testimony is required to establish causation in a slip-and-fall case, or whether a jury may rely on common experience and circumstantial evidence (such as immediate onset of symptoms following the incident).
4. Whether spoliation sanctions were appropriate for Circle K's repainting of the parking lot stripes before Lewis's expert could inspect them.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, finding that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding both breach and causation. On the "open and obvious" hazard issue, the court held that mere observable wetness on concrete is insufficient to render it an obvious danger as a matter of law. The court reasoned that the real hazard was the unacknowledged presence of a chemical cleaning agent, which is difficult to distinguish from ordinary water without clear context clues such as signage, cones, or safety vests. The court noted that Circle K failed to employ such commonplace warnings despite company policy appearing to require a yellow reflective vest. Whether a reasonable person could have perceived the chemical hazard remains a question for the jury. Regarding the scope of duty, the court held that merchants owe a heightened degree of care to vulnerable populations (elderly, disabled, chronically ill) when they open their premises to the general public and offer essential commodities. Circle K cannot limit its duty of reasonable care only to young, able-bodied customers. On causation, the court held that expert testimony is not mandatory in slip-and-fall cases. South Carolina law permits juries to rely on common knowledge and experience to establish causation when the scientific complexity does not exceed average juror knowledge. The immediate onset of symptoms following a physical injury is classic circumstantial evidence that juries may consider. While both parties may submit expert testimony to supplement or rebut lay testimony, such evidence is not required. The court vacated the district court's Daubert and spoliation determinations and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to carefully evaluate spoliation under the applicable Fourth Circuit standards.

This is an employment discrimination case in which a teacher with Usher syndrome (a progressive vision and hearing loss disease) sought paid sick leave to attend mandatory guide dog training, which her school district denied. The teacher sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), claiming the denial constituted disability discrimination and a failure to accommodate her disability.

1. Whether the school district's denial of paid sick leave constituted disparate treatment discrimination under the ADA by treating the disabled teacher less favorably than similarly situated non-disabled employees
2. Whether the school district failed to provide a reasonable accommodation under the ADA by denying paid leave when unpaid leave was offered as an alternative
3. Whether the FMLA required the school district to provide paid sick leave for guide dog training when the district's sick-leave policy limited such leave to "personal illness"

The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the school district on all three claims. Regarding the ADA disparate treatment claim, the court held that the teacher failed to present evidence that similarly situated non-disabled employees received paid leave for absences that did not qualify under the sick-leave policy. The teacher's own experience demonstrated that the district applied its rules neutrally—she received paid sick leave for a five-day training (under ten days) but was required to use unpaid leave for the three-week training (over ten days), consistent with how the district treated all employees. Regarding the ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, the court held that unpaid leave constituted a reasonable accommodation because: (1) it allowed the teacher to attend the training and obtain the guide dog; (2) the teacher presented no evidence that paid leave was necessary to perform her teaching duties; and (3) financial hardships arising outside the work environment are not relevant to the reasonableness analysis. The court emphasized that employers have discretion to choose between alternative reasonable accommodations and may select the less expensive option. Regarding the FMLA claim, the court assumed FMLA applied but held that the teacher could not obtain paid leave because the guide dog training did not fall within the definition of "personal illness" under the district's sick-leave policy, Ohio law, or the collective bargaining agreement. The court noted that the FMLA does not require employers to provide paid leave in situations where they would not normally do so under their own policies.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of providing material support to ISIS and receiving military-type training from the terrorist organization. The government cross-appealed, challenging the district court's sentence as substantively unreasonable.

1. Whether the district court properly applied the terrorism sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, specifically whether "government" in the terrorism statute includes only governments formally recognized by the President.
2. Whether the defendant's sentence of 101 months was substantively unreasonable when the advisory Guidelines range was 360-600 months, representing a 72% variance below the minimum.
3. Whether the district court properly weighed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the seriousness of the offense, sentencing disparities, and public safety concerns.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the application of the terrorism enhancement but vacated and remanded the sentence as substantively unreasonable. On the enhancement issue, the court held that "government" carries its ordinary meaning and is not limited to formally recognized governments. The court rejected the defendant's constitutional argument that only the President's formal recognition determines whether an entity qualifies as a government for sentencing purposes. On the sentencing issue, the court found the sentence substantively unreasonable because: (1) the district court minimized the seriousness of the defendant's conduct by characterizing him as a mere "soldier" rather than acknowledging ISIS's brutal atrocities and the defendant's enthusiastic support for them; (2) the district court improperly elevated national sentencing statistics over the Guidelines themselves, relying on a median sentence from only nine defendants without adequate information about their conduct; and (3) the district court failed to adequately consider public safety concerns, including the defendant's military training, his release at a relatively young age, his lack of remorse, his failure to renounce terrorism, and empirical evidence that returned jihadists pose ongoing threats.

This case involves a petition for review of the EPA's 2024 amendments to its risk management rule regulating decabromodiphenyl ether (decaBDE), a highly toxic flame retardant chemical. Environmental and consumer advocacy groups challenged the EPA's decision not to regulate decaBDE exposure in recycling, waste disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge.

1. Whether the EPA's decision not to regulate decaBDE in recyclable articles was supported by substantial evidence under TSCA § 6(h)
2. Whether the EPA properly considered "low levels" of exposure as a basis for not regulating under TSCA § 6(h)
3. Whether the EPA's cost and policy-based rationales for not regulating recyclables were supported by substantial evidence
4. Whether the EPA could defer to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to avoid regulating decaBDE disposal under TSCA
5. Whether the EPA adequately addressed evidence regarding decaBDE discharges in wastewater
6. Whether the EPA properly justified not regulating decaBDE in sewage sludge
7. Whether the EPA could regulate decaBDE in stages under TSCA § 6(h), as permitted under the Clean Air Act

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the 2024 Rule to the EPA without vacatur. The court held that:

1. Recyclable Articles: The EPA's decision not to regulate decaBDE in recyclable articles was not supported by substantial evidence. The court ruled that under TSCA § 6(h), the EPA cannot justify a decision not to regulate based on "low levels" of exposure, as Congress has already determined that PBT chemicals like decaBDE warrant regulation. The EPA's cost rationales were unsupported because the studies cited did not specifically address decaBDE testing costs, and the EPA failed to consider less drastic alternatives such as restrictions on high-concentration waste streams. The EPA also improperly gave undue weight to its general recycling policy goals over its statutory mandate to reduce decaBDE exposure to the extent practicable.
2. Waste Disposal: The EPA cannot evade its TSCA responsibilities by merely invoking compliance with RCRA's waste disposal regime. The EPA failed to adequately examine RCRA's limitations and the significant gaps in coverage (such as non-hazardous waste incinerators and certain landfills), and it did not address contrary evidence regarding the costs of separating decaBDE-contaminated materials.
3. Wastewater: The EPA's decision not to regulate decaBDE discharges in wastewater was not supported by substantial evidence because the EPA relied on self-reporting data showing "zero releases" while ignoring contradictory evidence from the State of Washington documenting substantial decaBDE discharges. The EPA also failed to consider the practicability of restricting discharges from facilities other than recyclers and disregarded evidence of available wastewater treatment technologies.
4. Sewage Sludge: The EPA's decision not to regulate decaBDE in sewage sludge was not supported by substantial evidence because the EPA based its decision on "low levels" of exposure, which falls outside its statutory authority under TSCA § 6(h).
5. Staged Regulation: The court rejected the EPA's reliance on Bluewater Network v. EPA to justify staged rulemaking. Unlike the Clean Air Act, TSCA § 6(h) does not permit tiered rulemaking and instead requires completing regulation on an expedited timeline without any commitment to future revisions.

This case involves a petition for review of the EPA's 2024 amendments to its risk management rule regulating decabromodiphenyl ether (decaBDE), a highly toxic flame retardant chemical. The petitioners challenged the EPA's decision not to regulate decaBDE exposure in recyclable articles, waste disposal, wastewater discharges, and sewage sludge under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).

1. Whether the EPA's decision not to regulate decaBDE in recyclable articles was supported by substantial evidence under TSCA § 6(h)
2. Whether the EPA properly considered the scope of its statutory authority when relying on "low levels" of decaBDE exposure as justification for non-regulation
3. Whether the EPA's cost and policy-based rationales for not regulating recyclables were adequately supported
4. Whether the EPA could defer to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to avoid regulating decaBDE disposal under TSCA
5. Whether the EPA adequately addressed evidence regarding decaBDE discharges in wastewater
6. Whether the EPA properly justified its decision not to regulate decaBDE in sewage sludge
7. Whether the EPA could employ tiered rulemaking under TSCA § 6(h), as permitted under the Clean Air Act in Bluewater Network v. EPA

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the 2024 Rule to the EPA without vacatur for renewed rulemaking. The court held that the EPA's decisions not to further regulate decaBDE in recyclable articles, disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically:

1. Recyclable Articles: The EPA cannot justify non-regulation based on "low levels" of decaBDE exposure because TSCA § 6(h) does not require risk evaluation for PBT chemicals already deemed hazardous by Congress. The EPA's cost and recycling policy rationales were also unsupported by substantial evidence, as the EPA failed to consider less drastic alternatives such as restrictions on high-concentration waste streams and ignored evidence of more affordable testing methods like XRF testing.
2. Waste Disposal: The EPA cannot evade its TSCA responsibilities by merely invoking compliance with RCRA. The EPA failed to adequately examine RCRA's regulatory gaps regarding decaBDE (such as non-hazardous waste incinerators and certain landfills) and did not address contrary evidence regarding the costs of separating contaminated materials or established disposal reduction technologies used in other countries.
3. Wastewater: The EPA's decision was not supported by substantial evidence because it relied on self-reported "zero releases" data while ignoring contradictory evidence from the State of Washington documenting substantial decaBDE discharges. The EPA also failed to consider the practicability of restricting discharges from non-recycler facilities and disregarded evidence of available wastewater treatment technologies.
4. Sewage Sludge: The EPA improperly based its decision on "low levels" of decaBDE, which falls outside its statutory authority under TSCA § 6(h). The statute permits consideration of exposure levels only when selecting among regulatory tools, not when deciding whether to regulate at all.
5. Tiered Rulemaking: The court rejected the EPA's reliance on Bluewater Network v. EPA to justify staged regulation. Unlike the Clean Air Act, TSCA § 6(h) requires expedited action and does not contemplate tiered rulemaking. Additionally, the EPA made no commitment to further regulation in the future.

This case involves a petition for review of the Environmental Protection Agency's 2024 rule regulating decabromodiphenyl ether (decaBDE), a highly toxic flame retardant chemical. The petitioners challenged EPA's decision not to regulate decaBDE exposure in recycling, disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).

1. Whether EPA's decision not to regulate decaBDE in recyclable articles was supported by substantial evidence under TSCA § 6(h)
2. Whether EPA properly considered the costs and practicability of regulating decaBDE in recycling, and whether it adequately addressed alternative regulatory approaches
3. Whether EPA can rely on "low levels" of decaBDE exposure to justify not regulating under TSCA § 6(h)
4. Whether EPA can defer to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to avoid its TSCA obligations to regulate decaBDE disposal
5. Whether EPA adequately addressed evidence of decaBDE discharges in wastewater and available treatment technologies
6. Whether EPA properly justified not regulating decaBDE in sewage sludge
7. Whether EPA's tiered rulemaking approach is permissible under TSCA § 6(h), as opposed to the Clean Air Act framework in Bluewater Network v. EPA

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the 2024 Rule to EPA without vacatur for renewed rulemaking. The court held that EPA's decisions not to further regulate decaBDE in recyclable articles, disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically:

1. Recyclable Articles: EPA cannot justify not regulating based on "low levels" of decaBDE exposure because TSCA § 6(h) does not require a risk evaluation—Congress already deemed these chemicals sufficiently hazardous. EPA's cost rationale was unsupported because the studies cited did not isolate costs for decaBDE testing, and EPA failed to consider less drastic alternatives such as restrictions on high-concentration waste streams. EPA's policy preference to promote recycling cannot override the statutory mandate to reduce decaBDE exposure to the extent practicable.
2. Waste Disposal: EPA cannot evade its TSCA responsibilities by invoking compliance with RCRA. EPA failed to address significant gaps between TSCA and RCRA coverage, including emissions from non-hazardous waste incinerators and certain landfills not regulated by RCRA. EPA also ignored contrary evidence regarding the costs of separating decaBDE-contaminated materials and established international practices for regulating such disposal.
3. Wastewater: EPA's determination that there were "zero releases of decaBDE to water" was based on limited self-reporting and ignored contradictory evidence from the State of Washington documenting substantial decaBDE discharges. EPA failed to address the practicability of restricting decaBDE discharges from facilities other than recyclers and disregarded evidence of available wastewater treatment technologies.
4. Sewage Sludge: EPA improperly relied on "low levels" of decaBDE to justify not regulating, which falls outside EPA's statutory authority under TSCA § 6(h). The court rejected EPA's post hoc rationalization that regulating would require wastewater treatment plants to test for and remove decaBDE.
5. Tiered Rulemaking: The court rejected EPA's reliance on Bluewater Network v. EPA to justify staged regulation. Unlike the Clean Air Act, TSCA § 6(h) places regulation on an expedited timeline and does not contemplate tiered rulemaking. Additionally, EPA made no commitment to further regulate in the future.

This is an appeal from a Court of Chancery decision involving AIM Ventura Capital Fund, LLC and AIM Ventura Co-Invest I, LLC challenging a judgment in a case against Gabb Wireless, Inc. and Stephen and Jana Dalby. The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed multiple lower court orders and rulings issued between August 2025 and November 2025.

The opinion does not detail the specific legal issues in the text provided, as it is an order affirming the lower court's judgment. However, the case involves intervention rights, specific performance claims, and entitlement to attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery based on four prior orders: the Memorandum Opinion (August 29, 2025), the Implementing Order (September 9, 2025), the Order granting the Dalbys' Petition for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses (November 6, 2025), and the Order and Final Judgment (November 19, 2025). The Court denied as moot the appellees' Motion to Dismiss the appeal regarding the specific-performance ruling and denied without prejudice the appellees' Motion for Appellate Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses, allowing that claim to be pursued in the Court of Chancery.

This case involves a dispute between Blodgett, a key employee and minority member of Fairstead Capital Management (an affordable housing investment fund), and Fairstead's founders over the cancellation of Blodgett's equity interests following his termination for cause. The court addresses whether Blodgett breached the LLC agreements governing Fairstead's entities and whether Fairstead properly forfeited his equity interests.

1. Whether factual findings from an arbitration award regarding Blodgett's breach of his employment agreement have preclusive effect in subsequent litigation over breach of LLC agreements
2. Whether Blodgett breached the Confidentiality Provision and Good Faith Provision of the LLC agreements by sharing confidential information and developing competing business plans
3. Whether the LLC agreements authorized Fairstead to cancel all of Blodgett's equity interests, or only interests in pending deals as permitted under the Employment Agreement
4. Whether conduct by Blodgett as an employee should be analyzed under the Employment Agreement rather than the LLC agreements
5. The proper scope of Delaware courts' jurisdiction over employment-related disputes when employment provisions are embedded in entity governance documents

The court granted summary judgment in Blodgett's favor on all counts. The court held:

1. Issue Preclusion: The arbitrator's factual findings regarding Blodgett's conduct are binding and preclusive in the subsequent LLC agreement litigation, even though the legal implications may differ between the two contexts.
2. Breach of LLC Agreements (Counts I and III): Blodgett did not breach the Confidentiality Provision or Good Faith Provision because he acted exclusively in his capacity as an employee, not as a member. The court emphasized the critical distinction between conduct by employees in their employment capacity (governed by the Employment Agreement) and conduct by investors in their capacity as members (governed by the LLC agreement). Since Blodgett took no action as a member, the LLC agreement restrictions did not apply. Additionally, any remedy would be duplicative of what the arbitrator already awarded.
3. Equity Forfeiture (Counts II and IV): The LLC agreement's Section 3.6(b) contains no affirmative language authorizing Fairstead to cancel Blodgett's equity interests. Instead, it establishes a general rule of non-forfeiture with a narrow exception that merely creates a "window" allowing the Employment Agreement's limited forfeiture right to operate. The arbitrator determined that the Employment Agreement permits forfeiture only of interests in pending deals, not all of Blodgett's interests. The LLC agreement does not grant an independent forfeiture right beyond this limited scope.
4. Capacity Distinction Rationale: The court emphasized that Delaware courts must carefully distinguish between employee conduct and member conduct to maintain the integrity of Delaware law and avoid using entity governance documents to override employment law in other jurisdictions. This distinction is particularly important given Delaware's reliance on other states deferring to Delaware law on internal affairs of Delaware entities.

This is a breach of contract case in which Postbit, Inc. seeks to enforce a term sheet requiring Look Dynamics, Inc. to negotiate in good faith toward a merger and execute an exclusive technology license agreement. After Look Dynamics abandoned negotiations and failed to retain counsel following the court's withdrawal of its prior counsel, the court entered default judgment on liability and held a remedies hearing to determine appropriate damages.

1. Whether a term sheet requiring good faith negotiation toward a merger constitutes an enforceable contract and whether specific performance is an appropriate remedy for breach;
2. Whether Postbit is entitled to expectation damages based on lost profits from the failed merger;
3. Whether Postbit is entitled to reliance damages for payments made in reliance on Look Dynamics' commitment to execute an exclusive license agreement;
4. Whether Postbit is entitled to attorneys' fees, costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest.

The court granted Postbit's request for attorneys' fees ($394,225), costs ($4,821.31), reliance damages ($360,605.12), and pre- and post-judgment interest compounded quarterly. The court denied Postbit's request for expectation damages, reasoning that while such damages are theoretically available for breach of a good faith negotiation agreement, Postbit failed to present sufficient evidence to establish expectation damages with reasonable certainty and the court was concerned about the inherently speculative nature of awarding such damages for a Type II agreement (one requiring good faith negotiation). The court had previously dismissed Postbit's request for specific performance, finding that Type II agreements do not lend themselves to specific enforcement under Delaware law.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Garrito Fort challenges his guilty plea conviction for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), following a shooting incident in November 2021 that resulted in one death and one serious injury.

1. Whether the district court properly precluded Fort from presenting a justification defense (duress, necessity, and self-defense) to the felon-in-possession charge under the framework established in United States v. Leahy
2. Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Fort under the Second Amendment, particularly in light of District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen
3. Whether Fort's above-Guidelines sentence of 60 months' imprisonment was substantively unreasonable

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on all grounds. Regarding the justification defense, the court held that Fort failed to satisfy the threshold requirements under Leahy. Specifically, Fort could not demonstrate that he faced an unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury at the moment he first possessed the firearm inside his home. The court rejected Fort's argument that the Leahy criteria were too narrow under the Second Amendment, finding that even under a broader Second Amendment analysis, the facts did not support a justification defense. The court emphasized that Fort deliberately armed himself and went outside to confront Coletti about a minor car mirror incident, and that he admitted bringing the pistol for "intimidation" and "scare tactics." Regarding the as-applied Second Amendment challenge, the court declined to resolve whether as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are cognizable but held that regardless, the facts did not support justification under applicable law or Fort's own Second Amendment theory. The court noted that Fort's challenge essentially conceded that some applications of § 922(g)(1) do not violate the Second Amendment and accord with historical tradition. Regarding sentencing, the court found no abuse of discretion in the 60-month sentence, which was double the advisory Guidelines range of 24-30 months. The court upheld the district court's rationale that an upward variance was warranted because Fort's unlawful firearm possession caused death and serious injury—the worst type of harm § 922(g) is designed to prevent. The court rejected Fort's arguments as mere disagreement with the district court's factual findings and weighing of sentencing factors.

This is a class action appeal involving alleged violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) by Amazon Web Services and Pindrop Security. Illinois residents claimed that defendants collected their voiceprints without consent when they called John Hancock, a financial services company that routed calls through Amazon's systems and used Pindrop's authentication technology.

1. Whether Pindrop qualifies for BIPA's financial-institution exemption despite being a technology company
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' discovery extension motions
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying newly added plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal
4. Whether BIPA's extraterritoriality doctrine bars application of the statute when Amazon's relevant activities occurred outside Illinois
5. Whether the District Court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for the Section 15(d) claim that plaintiffs repleaded after initial dismissal

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions on all issues. The court held that: (1) Pindrop qualifies as a "financial institution" under BIPA because it provides authentication services for financial transactions, which falls within the Federal Reserve Board's definition of financial activities; (2) the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery extensions, as plaintiffs failed to demonstrate diligence and disregarded the court's specific instructions; (3) the District Court properly denied the voluntary dismissal motion because plaintiffs' eleventh-hour attempt to remove newly added plaintiffs appeared to be forum shopping after four years of litigation and substantial discovery; (4) BIPA does not apply extraterritorially, and plaintiffs failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact that Amazon's activities occurred primarily and substantially in Illinois, as Amazon's servers were in Virginia, Pindrop was in Georgia, and John Hancock was in Massachusetts; and (5) the District Court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for the Section 15(d) claim because plaintiffs repleaded it in their amended complaint despite claiming they only intended to add new plaintiffs.

This is a criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of money laundering, conspiracy, and transportation of stolen goods related to his business of purchasing fraudulently obtained electronics and shipping them overseas. The defendant challenges the trial court's evidentiary rulings, while the government cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to enter a forfeiture judgment.

1. Whether wireless carrier spreadsheets were properly admitted as business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), including whether they were created for litigation purposes and whether they contained inadmissible fraud determinations
2. Whether admission of the spreadsheets violated the Confrontation Clause
3. Whether invoices and emails from the defendant's business were properly admitted as business records
4. Whether summary exhibits were properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 or whether they impermissibly selected certain data points to support the government's theory
5. Whether the district court was required to enter a forfeiture judgment despite concerns about double payment with restitution

Convictions Affirmed: The court affirmed all of the defendant's convictions. Regarding the evidentiary challenges:

1. Wireless Carrier Spreadsheets: The court held that the spreadsheets were properly admitted as business records because the underlying data were created in the ordinary course of business and maintained in the carriers' databases. The fact that the data were extracted and formatted into spreadsheets for litigation did not render them inadmissible, as "the business record is the datum itself, not the format in which it is printed." The fraud determinations were also admissible as business records made by employees with authority and personal knowledge. The Confrontation Clause was not implicated because the data were non-testimonial business records created for the administration of the carriers' affairs, not for proving facts at trial.
2. Invoices from Defendant's Business: Invoices certified by the defendant under Rule 902(11) were properly admitted. Invoices not certified but seized during a search (exhibits 220-255) were assumed to be erroneously admitted, but the error was harmless because the underlying data were similar to admissible invoices and did not directly support any conviction.
3. Advertising Emails: The court assumed the emails were erroneously admitted as business records but found the error harmless because the defendant's own testimony and text messages firmly established that he knowingly paid for third-party unlocking services.
4. Summary Exhibits: The court assumed certain summary exhibits (900, 905-908) may have been improperly admitted under Rule 1006 because they selectively presented data points from underlying documents. However, the error was harmless because: (a) all underlying documents were already in evidence; (b) the exhibits could have been shown as illustrative aids under Rule 611(a); and (c) overwhelming evidence of guilt existed, including testimony from coconspirators, victims, investigators, and wireless company representatives.
5. Cumulative Error: The court rejected the defendant's cumulative error argument, finding that even if multiple harmless errors existed, they did not fatally infect the trial or violate fundamental fairness.

Forfeiture Judgment Reversed and Remanded: The court reversed the district court's refusal to enter a forfeiture judgment. The court held that forfeiture is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) when a defendant is convicted of an offense for which forfeiture is authorized. The district court erred in declining to enter forfeiture based on concerns about "double payment" with restitution. The court emphasized that forfeiture is mandatory even when restitution is imposed, and the defendant's lack of assets does not prevent entry of a forfeiture order. The defendant's Eighth Amendment excessive fines argument was rejected because he failed to engage with the relevant factors for determining gross disproportionality.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a sentence reduction motion filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) by Tyrone Davis, who was convicted of possessing ammunition as a convicted felon and sought a reduction based on a retroactive amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that lowered his applicable guideline range.

1. Whether a district court must provide detailed explanations and justify an "above-Guidelines sentence" when denying a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction motion, or whether the Legree presumption of judicial consideration applies.
2. Whether a § 3582(c)(2) motion constitutes a plenary resentencing proceeding triggering full sentencing explanatory requirements under Gall v. United States.
3. Whether the Legree presumption applies when a retroactive Guidelines amendment results in a reduced range that falls below the defendant's original sentence.
4. Whether the district court adequately considered the defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence and disciplinary violations.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Davis's sentence reduction motion. The court held that:

1. A § 3582(c)(2) motion does not constitute a plenary resentencing proceeding but rather a limited adjustment to a final sentence, and therefore does not trigger the full explanatory requirements of Gall.
2. The Legree presumption of judicial consideration applies to § 3582(c)(2) motions, and courts need not provide detailed explanations unless a defendant presents exceptional mitigating evidence that the court appears to have overlooked.
3. Davis did not rebut the Legree presumption because he presented only modest rehabilitation evidence (GED courses, prison employment, mental health treatment) over a two-year period, which is far less substantial than the "mountain" of evidence required to trigger heightened explanation requirements.
4. Davis's post-sentencing disciplinary violations—including threatening prison officials with bodily harm while in four-point restraints and possessing a cell phone—undermined his rehabilitation claims and supported the district court's conclusion that a sentence reduction was unwarranted.
5. The district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, particularly the nature and seriousness of the offense (carrying a loaded firearm as a convicted felon), the need to protect public safety, and the requirement for adequate deterrence, all of which weighed against reduction.
6. The fact that the same judge who sentenced Davis two years earlier reviewed the reduction motion strengthened the inference that the judge remained familiar with Davis's circumstances and considered the totality of the record.

This is a civil rights case in which American Acceptance Corporation (AAC), a lienholder in two motorcycles, challenged the Lexington County Sheriff's Department's retention of the motorcycles as evidence in a murder investigation, claiming a violation of procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause governs the process owed to a third-party lienholder when law enforcement seizes and retains property as evidence in a criminal investigation
2. Whether law enforcement violated procedural due process by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to AAC regarding the retention of the motorcycles during the pendency of a criminal investigation
3. Whether the retention of property as evidence in an active criminal investigation requires additional procedural protections beyond Fourth Amendment compliance

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of AAC's procedural due process claim. The court held that: (1) the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, defines the process due for seizures of property in criminal cases; (2) because the motorcycles were lawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment and retained as evidence in an active criminal investigation, no further process was required; (3) requiring additional due process protections would impede law enforcement's ability to investigate crimes and would permit third-party lienholders to delay criminal investigations; and (4) AAC's reliance on City of West Covina v. Perkins and Krimstock v. Kelly was misplaced because those cases involved different circumstances—Perkins addressed post-investigation property return procedures, and Krimstock's reasoning did not apply where law enforcement had probable cause and a legitimate interest in marshaling evidence for a pending murder investigation.

This is a First Amendment pre-enforcement challenge brought by two former candidates for Kentucky judicial office who argue that the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission violated their free speech rights by threatening to sanction them for campaign speech during a 2022 election. The candidates sought declaratory and injunctive relief against three ethical rules governing judicial candidate conduct.

1. Whether the candidates have standing to bring a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge when the Commission sent warning letters but has not yet initiated formal enforcement proceedings
2. Whether the case is moot based on the Commission's subsequent disavowal of enforcement intentions
3. Whether the Nominee Rule (prohibiting candidates from identifying themselves as nominees of political parties) violates the First Amendment as applied to the candidates' speech
4. Whether the Endorsement Rule (prohibiting candidates from seeking, accepting, or using endorsements from political organizations) violates the First Amendment as applied to the candidates' speech
5. Whether the Commitment Rule (prohibiting pledges or promises about how candidates will rule on cases) violates the First Amendment as applied to the candidates' pro-life campaign messaging
6. The proper order of operations for resolving as-applied challenges and the sovereign immunity implications of various remedies

The court held that the candidates have standing and the case is not moot because the Commission retains jurisdiction over the pending complaints and has not made an absolute disavowal of enforcement. The court ruled that the candidates' First Amendment rights were violated as follows:

1. Nominee Rule and Endorsement Rule (As-Applied): The court affirmed that the Commission cannot enforce these rules against the candidates' speech identifying themselves as "conservative," "Republican," or "the conservative Republican," or against their use of a generic elephant symbol, as such speech merely conveys political affiliation and ideology rather than formal party nomination or endorsement. The court reversed the district court's denial of as-applied relief regarding the Endorsement Rule.
2. Endorsement Rule (Facial Challenge): The court declined to reach the facial challenge because the as-applied remedy fully redressed the candidates' injury, following the principle of constitutional avoidance.
3. Commitment Rule (As-Applied): The court affirmed that the Commission cannot enforce this rule against the candidates' pro-life campaign messaging and endorsements from pro-life groups, as taking a position on issues of the day without explicit pledges about how they will rule does not constitute prohibited commitments.
4. Disavowal of Endorsements: The court held that candidates need not disavow endorsements they receive, so there is no threat of enforcement on that basis.

This is an appeal concerning whether parents of children with disabilities must exhaust the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) administrative hearing process before filing a federal lawsuit against a school district for alleged systemic failures to provide special education services. The parents claimed their children were denied appropriate special education services due to district-wide staffing and funding shortages.

1. Whether the IDEA's mandatory exhaustion requirement—requiring parents to complete administrative due process hearings before suing in federal court—applies when parents allege systemic violations caused by district-wide staffing and funding shortages
2. Whether a "systemic violations" exception or "futility" exception to the exhaustion requirement exists under the IDEA
3. Whether the individual-centric nature of the IDEA and its focus on individualized education programs is compatible with class action lawsuits challenging systemic failures
4. Whether parents can bypass administrative remedies by reframing claims as involving systemic rather than individual violations

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement applies and that no "systemic violations" exception exists for claims based on alleged district-wide staffing or funding shortages. The court reasoned that: (1) the IDEA's text explicitly requires parents to be "aggrieved by the findings and decision" of an administrative hearing before bringing federal court action, and allegations of systemic violations cannot displace this precondition; (2) the administrative process serves important purposes by bringing together stakeholders familiar with each child's individualized needs and creating a developed record for potential federal court review; (3) the IDEA's individual-centric structure—centered on individualized education programs tailored to each child's unique needs—is fundamentally incompatible with class action litigation and systemic relief; (4) no circuit court has successfully applied a systemic violations exception to excuse exhaustion based merely on allegations of underfunding or understaffing; and (5) allowing such an exception would effectively swallow the exhaustion requirement, as nearly any claim could be reframed as systemic. The court noted that while a narrow futility exception might exist in limited circumstances (such as when a school district refuses to provide any hearing process), it does not apply to these allegations, as due process hearings would not be futile—they could result in relief, attorney's fees, and spillover benefits for other students.

This is a procedural due process case in which a towing company challenges its removal from a county's towing rotation list. Tire Town Auto LLC sued Wood County, Wisconsin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the county violated its Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by removing it from the list without proper procedures.

1. Whether Tire Town had a constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on Wood County's towing rotation list
2. Whether such a property interest could be derived from the county's Minimum Standards policy, state law, contract rights, or mutually explicit understandings
3. Whether the county's discretion to remove businesses "at any time for any appropriate reason" created a limited property interest comparable to public employment protections

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Tire Town failed to plausibly allege a constitutionally protected property interest. The court reasoned that: (1) no Wisconsin statute, regulation, or ordinance guarantees a spot on a towing rotation list; (2) the Minimum Standards policy expressly disclaimed being a contract and involved no bargained-for exchange; (3) the policy's language allowing removal "at any time for any appropriate reason" imposed no meaningful limit on county discretion, unlike "good cause" standards in public employment cases; (4) a property interest requires a mutual understanding of entitlement, not merely unilateral expectations; and (5) the policy did not have the "force of law" necessary to create a protected property interest. Without an underlying property interest, Tire Town's due process claim could not proceed.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant, Andres Sanchez, challenges his conviction on six counts of preparing and presenting false and fraudulent tax returns. Sanchez argues that the presence of a racially biased juror during jury deliberations violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.

1. Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard when assessing prejudice from a racially biased juror who was excused before the verdict was accepted
2. Whether the Remmer presumption of prejudice or the Sarkisian standard applies in cases involving racially biased jurors
3. Whether Dyer v. Calderon's structural error standard applies when a biased juror is excused before verdict
4. Whether the Government adequately rebutted the presumption of prejudice through the special voir dire and jury instructions

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Sanchez's motion for a new trial and remanded for a new trial. The court held that: (1) the Remmer presumption of prejudice standard, not the Sarkisian standard, applies when a racially biased juror is discovered but excused before the trial court accepts a verdict; (2) Dyer's structural error standard does not apply in such circumstances; and (3) the Government failed to meet its heavy burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice. The court reasoned that Juror 5's participation in nearly all jury deliberations, combined with his racially biased statements about Mexicans (the defendant's ethnicity), created a strong presumption of prejudice that the Government could not overcome through the district court's special voir dire. The court found significant deficiencies in the inquiry, including that some jurors heard biased comments but initially denied it, that not all jurors were adequately questioned, and that jurors' self-assessments of impartiality are not dispositive. The court emphasized that racial bias warrants heightened scrutiny under Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado and that the Government's burden is particularly heavy in such cases.

This case involves a former high-level employee of a Delaware corporation seeking advancement of unpaid legal fees and expenses incurred in defending litigation filed against him by the corporation. The underlying litigation was dismissed while this advancement action was pending, and the corporation argues the advancement claim is moot and that the employee was not entitled to advancement because he did not hold a covered officer position under the bylaws.

1. Whether the dismissal of the underlying action rendered the advancement claim moot
2. Whether the former employee qualifies as an "officer" under the corporation's bylaws and is therefore entitled to mandatory advancement of legal fees and expenses
3. Whether the employee was still "defending" the underlying action after the corporation offered to dismiss it without prejudice
4. The proper interpretation of "officer" status under the bylaws and whether de facto officer status satisfies the requirement

The court denied both parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. First, the court held that dismissal of the underlying action did not moot the advancement claim because: (1) the employee was still actively defending the action when he opposed the dismissal motion, and (2) he incurred additional unpaid fees between the settlement offer and the formal dismissal date. The court found no equitable basis to preclude the advancement claim, as the demand was timely served while the underlying action was ongoing. Second, the court determined that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the employee qualifies as an "officer" under the bylaws. The court found insufficient evidence regarding whether the corporation's board formally appointed the employee to an officer position, whether the CEO had authority to make such appointments, or whether the bylaws encompass de facto officers. The court noted that neither party provided adequate proof of the corporation's actual practices regarding officer appointments or its adherence to corporate formalities, making summary judgment inappropriate on this factual question.

This is a procedural motion in a commercial dispute between Centene Corporation and Centurion Equity, Inc. regarding indemnification obligations arising from the sale of a correctional healthcare business (MHM Services, Inc.). The court addresses Centurion's motion for leave to file supplemental briefing on a pending motion for partial judgment on the pleadings.

1. Whether Centurion should be permitted to file supplemental briefing presenting arguments allegedly not previously raised
2. Whether Delaware's public policy favoring resolution of cases on their merits justifies allowing supplemental briefing
3. Whether Centene would suffer prejudice if supplemental briefing were permitted
4. Underlying substantive issues: (a) whether Centene is entitled to indemnification under the Stock Purchase Agreement (SPA) for post-closing medical malpractice insurance fees and costs arising from pre-closing conduct; (b) the proper interpretation of SPA Section 8.2 regarding captive reinsurance arrangements; (c) whether indemnifiable losses must be offset by pre-paid premiums under SPA Section 8.5; and (d) the meaning and effect of SPA Section 5.6 regarding termination of reinsurance obligations

The court DENIED Centurion's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Briefing. The court reasoned that: (1) Centurion's three categories of arguments—concerning commercial realities of captive reinsurance, the offset provision in Section 8.5, and the interpretation of Section 5.6—had all been extensively addressed in prior briefing and during ninety minutes of oral argument, so Centurion was not presenting new arguments but rather seeking to clarify or relitigate already-addressed positions; (2) Delaware's strong public policy favoring resolution of cases on their merits is not intended to function as a "reset button or safety net," and Centurion's request appeared to be a do-over now that it had secured new counsel; and (3) Centene would be prejudiced by supplemental briefing because Centurion had already had multiple opportunities to present its arguments through its complaint, answers, and oral argument, and requiring Centene to incur further costs to address previously-advanced arguments would be prejudicial and would unnecessarily elongate proceedings.

This is a contract dispute arising from the sale of a Mexican funeral company, in which the buyer breached a financial guarantee by filing unauthorized litigation in Mexico against the seller's affiliated funds. The court addresses the seller's entitlement to damages for defense costs incurred in the Mexican lawsuit and enforcement costs in the Delaware action.

1. Whether attorneys' fees and costs incurred defending an unauthorized lawsuit in a foreclosed forum constitute recoverable expectation damages under Delaware law, notwithstanding the American Rule against fee-shifting
2. Whether the buyer's failure to mitigate damages by promptly seeking an anti-suit injunction bars recovery
3. Whether enforcement expenses incurred in prosecuting the Delaware action are recoverable as damages
4. The appropriate methodology for allocating fees when billing entries relate to multiple proceedings
5. Whether laches and waiver defenses bar the seller's damages claim

The court granted the seller's motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. The seller is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred defending the unauthorized Mexican Civil Action as expectation damages, because such fees represent losses naturally flowing from the breach of the forum selection clause and covenant not to sue, and are therefore distinguishable from enforcement expenses barred by the American Rule. The court rejected the buyer's defenses regarding failure to mitigate, lack of causation, laches, and waiver. However, the seller cannot recover enforcement fees incurred prosecuting the Delaware Action, as these constitute enforcement expenses not covered by any exception to the American Rule and the Guarantee lacks a fee-shifting provision. The court awarded full recovery for invoices dedicated solely to the Mexican Civil Action ($3,113,924.34), but stayed the quantum of damages for "mixed" billing entries pending targeted discovery to evaluate the seller's 75% allocation methodology. The seller is entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest at the legal rate, compounded quarterly, from the dates invoices were paid.

This is a putative class action appeal involving whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to sue outdoor retailers Bass Pro Shops and Cabela's for using Session Replay Code on their websites to capture user interactions without consent. The plaintiffs alleged violations of federal wiretapping and computer fraud statutes, as well as state and common law privacy causes of action.

1. Whether plaintiffs alleging intangible injuries from the surreptitious capture of their website interactions have Article III standing
2. Whether the captured information constitutes a concrete injury with a "close relationship" to harms traditionally recognized at common law
3. Whether the alleged injuries are analogous to the common law torts of (a) public disclosure of private facts or (b) intrusion upon seclusion
4. Whether dismissals for lack of standing should be with or without prejudice

The Third Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal as to two plaintiffs (Heather Cornell and Peter Montecalvo) and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the dismissal of the remaining six plaintiffs' claims but modified the dismissals to be without prejudice rather than with prejudice. The court's reasoning: Cornell and Montecalvo entered sensitive payment and billing information (complete credit card/debit card numbers) during online purchases, which the Session Replay Code captured. This alleged injury is analogous to the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion because complete credit card numbers are highly sensitive information that individuals reasonably expect to keep private from unauthorized examination. The six other plaintiffs who only browsed without making purchases did not enter personal or sensitive information, so their alleged injuries were not analogous to either comparator tort. The court rejected the argument that the information was publicly disclosed, finding it remained "functionally internal" when shared only with the code providers. Additionally, the court held that dismissals for lack of standing should be without prejudice because standing defects do not deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction in the same way as other jurisdictional defects.

This is a capital habeas corpus case in which Edward Lee Busby, a death row inmate, seeks a stay of execution and relief from a federal district court's denial of his Atkins v. Virginia claim for intellectual disability. The case involves disputes over IQ test scores, adaptive functioning deficits, and the proper standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

1. Whether Busby's Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration constitutes a successive habeas petition subject to heightened procedural requirements
2. Whether the district court's prior denial of funding for an expert on intellectual disability violated Busby's right to develop his Atkins claim
3. Whether Busby is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution under the Eighth Amendment, considering multiple IQ test scores, the Flynn Effect, and evidence of adaptive functioning deficits
4. Whether the state trial court's factual findings regarding intellectual disability were reasonable under AEDPA's deferential standard of review
5. Whether a temporary stay of execution is warranted pending the Supreme Court's decision in Hamm v. Smith regarding how courts should evaluate cumulative IQ scores in Atkins claims

The Fifth Circuit panel issued a fractured decision with no majority opinion. The court temporarily stayed Busby's execution scheduled for May 14, 2026, but for different reasons:

1. Judge Higginson (Temporary Stay): Granted a temporary stay pending the Supreme Court's decision in Hamm v. Smith, reasoning that because Hamm will clarify the constitutional rule for evaluating intellectual disability in capital cases—particularly regarding multiple IQ scores and adaptive behavior deficits—the court should await that guidance before executing Busby, whose circumstances closely parallel the Hamm case.
2. Judge Graves (Grant Habeas Relief): Would grant habeas relief and a permanent stay, arguing that both the defense expert (Dr. Martinez) and the state's expert (Dr. McGarrahan) concluded Busby is intellectually disabled. Judge Graves emphasized that the state itself submitted proposed findings that Busby is intellectually disabled, and that the trial court improperly substituted its own "recollections" from a 2005 trial (where intellectual disability was not at issue) for the medical experts' consensus. Judge Graves contended that the trial court violated Moore v. Texas by diminishing the force of the medical community's consensus and that multiple IQ scores, when properly analyzed with the Standard Error of Measurement (SEM), fall within or near the intellectual disability range.
3. Judge Richman (Deny Stay and Habeas Relief): Would deny the stay and habeas relief, holding that under AEDPA's deferential standard of review, the state trial court's factual determinations were not unreasonable. Judge Richman found that: (a) the state court properly declined to adjust IQ scores for the Flynn Effect, which is controversial and not required by law; (b) the state court reasonably rejected Dr. Martinez's "practice effect" adjustment as arbitrary and unsupported; (c) the state court's credibility determinations regarding adaptive functioning evidence were reasonable, particularly given the evidence was "internally inconsistent" and came from sources after Busby's conviction and death sentence; and (d) reasonable minds could disagree on the evidence, which is insufficient under AEDPA to overturn the state court's determination.

The temporary stay was granted based on Judge Higginson's position, creating a majority for that relief. However, the panel remained divided on the merits of Busby's Atkins claim, with Judge Graves arguing for habeas relief based on the medical experts' consensus that Busby is intellectually disabled, and Judge Richman arguing that AEDPA deference to the state court's factual findings precludes federal habeas relief.

This is a consolidated appeal of multiple habeas corpus petitions filed by noncitizens without lawful status who were detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory detention scheme. The petitioners challenged their detention, arguing they should have been detained under § 1226, which permits detention or release on bond, and that detention without a bond hearing violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights.

1. Whether noncitizens present in the interior of the United States who entered without inspection are subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory detention scheme or § 1226's permissive detention scheme
2. Whether the phrase "seeking admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires an affirmative act by the noncitizen to seek lawful entry, or whether merely being an "applicant for admission" automatically means the noncitizen is "seeking admission"
3. Whether detention without an individualized bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause for noncitizens detained under § 1226(a)

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district courts' grants of habeas relief on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Statutory Interpretation: The court held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens like the petitioners. The court reasoned that "seeking admission" requires an affirmative act or attempt toward lawful entry, not merely being present in the country. The ordinary dictionary definitions of "seek" and "seeking" require active conduct. The court found that Congress deliberately used the phrase "seeking admission" rather than simply "applicant for admission," and this distinction must have independent meaning under the canon against surplusage. The court also noted that Congress was aware of the millions of undocumented immigrants in the country when it enacted IIRIRA but included no detention capacity safeguards for § 1225(b)(2)(A) as it did for § 1226(c), suggesting Congress did not intend mandatory detention for interior noncitizens. Additionally, the government's 29-year practice of applying § 1226(a) to such noncitizens supported this interpretation. The court rejected the government's arguments that every "applicant for admission" is necessarily "seeking admission," finding these arguments inconsistent with the statute's text and structure. Due Process: The court held that noncitizens who have "passed through our gates" and reside in the interior of the United States are entitled to Fifth Amendment Due Process protections. The court found that detention during removal proceedings must serve two regulatory goals: ensuring appearance at proceedings and preventing danger to the community. The court distinguished Demore v. Kim (which addressed § 1226(c) mandatory detention) and DHS v. Thuraissigiam (which addressed border noncitizens), holding that noncitizens in the interior who have resided in the country for years are entitled to individualized bond hearings under § 1226(a). The court rejected the government's argument that the district courts' due process holdings were merely derivative of their statutory interpretation, finding that petitioners raised independent due process claims based on deprivation of liberty without due process.

This is a civil rights case brought by the estate of John Griswold, a pretrial detainee who died in jail custody several hours after being medically cleared and placed in a cell. The estate sued jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to Griswold's serious medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights.

1. Whether the jail officials violated Griswold's clearly established constitutional rights by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment;
2. Whether the officials are entitled to qualified immunity based on the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test, which requires showing that a medical condition was so serious that even a layperson would recognize the need for medical attention;
3. What standard applies to determine whether a medical need is "obvious" to a layperson—whether it must be visually detectable from observation or whether it includes knowledge of the actual medical condition.

The Court of Appeals REVERSED the district court's denial of qualified immunity to the jail officials. The court held that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity because Griswold failed to satisfy the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test. Although Griswold was medically cleared before incarceration, vomited once in his cell, and remained in his vomit for approximately 13 hours, these facts did not constitute an "obvious" need for medical care that would alert a reasonable layperson. The court distinguished this case from precedent (Blackmore and Burwell) where plaintiffs exhibited multiple clear signs of distress, severe pain, complaints, or unconsciousness. Griswold displayed no outward signs of distress beyond the single vomiting incident and made periodic minor movements throughout his detention, which would suggest to jail officials that he was not in immediate need of medical attention. Therefore, the right to medical care was not clearly established at the time of the 2018 incident, and the officials are entitled to qualified immunity.

This is a federal criminal appeal concerning the authority of a district court to order the temporary hospitalization of a defendant found incompetent to stand trial and unrestorable to competency for purposes of evaluating his dangerousness to others under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246 and 4247. The defendant, John Coad, was indicted on charges of mailing threatening communications to a former prosecutor and was found incompetent and unable to be restored to competency.

1. Whether a district court has authority to order a defendant's temporary hospitalization for a dangerousness evaluation under § 4246(a) after his competency-restoration hospitalization under § 4241(d) has ended, or whether the defendant must remain continuously hospitalized for both purposes.
2. Whether the statutory language "is hospitalized" in § 4246(a) requires an unbroken hospitalization for both competency and dangerousness proceedings.
3. Whether the phrase "has been committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d)" requires continuous custody or merely prior commitment.
4. Whether a district court may order a formal "examination and report" under § 4246(b) or whether only the hospital director in the district where the hospital is located may order such an examination.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's authority to order Coad's temporary hospitalization for a precertification dangerousness evaluation under § 4246(a), but reversed the portion of the order directing a formal "examination and report" under § 4246(b) as premature and beyond the court's authority. The court reasoned that: (1) Once a defendant is found incompetent and unrestorable, he reaches "the end of the time period specified" in § 4241(d) and becomes "subject to" § 4246, giving the district court authority to order temporary hospitalization for dangerousness evaluation; (2) The phrase "is hospitalized" does not require continuous hospitalization for both competency and dangerousness purposes—a defendant may be temporarily rehospitalized for dangerousness evaluation after his competency-related hospitalization ends; (3) The phrase "has been committed" means "ever was" during the ongoing proceeding, not requiring continuous present custody; (4) However, a § 4246(b) examination and report can only be ordered by the court in the district where the hospital is located, not by the committing court, and only after the hospital director files a § 4246(a) certificate of dangerousness. The court remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

This is a criminal appeal in which defendant Cameron Watkins challenges his conviction, with the central dispute concerning whether a law enforcement officer's observation through a one-inch gap in motel room curtains violated Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches.

1. Whether an officer's close observation through a small gap in closed curtains constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
2. Whether the "plain view" doctrine applies when an officer must position himself close to a window and peer through gaps in curtains to observe the interior of a room
3. Whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy behind closed curtains and doors, even when small gaps exist
4. Whether Fourth Amendment analysis should apply bright-line rules or a totality-of-the-circumstances reasonableness standard

The court denied both the petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc. The majority upheld the panel's original decision, finding no Fourth Amendment violation. Judge Hartz's concurrence noted that most state peeping tom statutes would not apply to law enforcement conduct and questioned the factual premise that the officer's face was pressed directly against the window. Judge Moritz, joined by Judge Federico, dissented from the denial of en banc rehearing, arguing that the panel erred by applying the plain view doctrine too broadly and failing to recognize that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy behind closed curtains, regardless of small gaps. Judge Moritz contended that the court should apply a totality-of-the-circumstances reasonableness standard rather than focusing on bright-line rules.

This is an appeal of a discrimination claim brought by Joshua Young, a White male former employee of the Colorado Department of Corrections, who alleged that a mandatory racial sensitivity training program created a hostile work environment based on race. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.

1. Whether a racial sensitivity training program and its aftermath created a hostile work environment actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
2. Whether the plaintiff plausibly alleged facts showing the workplace was "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" sufficient to alter the conditions of employment
3. Whether the plaintiff plausibly alleged a constructive discharge claim based on the alleged hostile work environment
4. Whether the district court properly dismissed the case with prejudice rather than without prejudice

The court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice. The court held that: (1) the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a hostile work environment because he did not allege facts showing the workplace was permeated with discriminatory behavior—the single training session, glossary definitions, recommended videos, and alleged aftermath did not meet the "extremely high" threshold required for such claims; (2) the plaintiff's five new allegations about ongoing training commitments, forced endorsement of ideology, supervisory reliance on training for discipline, security compromises, and failure to investigate were either speculative or insufficient to establish an abusive environment; (3) the constructive discharge claim necessarily failed because no hostile work environment was established; and (4) dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because the plaintiff, after four versions of the complaint across two actions, failed to explain how further amendments could cure the deficiencies identified by the district court.

This is an appeal of a dismissal for lack of Article III standing in a case where two Georgia voters challenged the state's alleged failure to maintain accurate voter rolls in compliance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). The plaintiffs claimed their confidence in the electoral process was undermined by discovering allegedly ineligible voters remaining on the state's voter registration list.

1. Whether the plaintiffs possessed a particularized injury-in-fact sufficient to establish Article III standing
2. Whether undermined confidence in the electoral process constitutes a concrete and particularized injury rather than a generalized grievance
3. Whether personal discovery of alleged government impropriety through independent research grants standing to sue
4. Whether the plaintiffs' claims fall within the scope of generalized grievances that are common to all members of the public

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of standing. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a particularized injury because their undermined confidence in Georgia's elections equally affects all Georgia voters and does not affect them in a personal and individual way. The court reasoned that any voter could claim equally undermined confidence based on the Secretary's alleged failure to maintain voter rolls, and the fact that the plaintiffs personally discovered the alleged discrepancies through their own research does not transform their generalized grievance into a particularized injury. The court applied precedent from Wood v. Raffensperger, holding that an interest in ensuring that only lawful ballots are counted is a generalized grievance common to all members of the public, not a particularized injury sufficient for standing.

This is a shareholder derivative action challenging Liberty Media Corporation's September 2024 spin-off of SiriusXM Holdings Inc. Minority shareholders claim the spin-off improperly benefited Liberty by eliminating a tracking stock discount worth billions of dollars, while a special committee and board approved the transaction.

1. Whether an interlocutory appeal should be certified under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42, which requires a "substantial issue" of material importance and a balancing of substantial benefits against the costs of appeal.
2. Whether a director's vote in favor of a challenged transaction satisfies the "action element" required under the Cornerstone standard for pleading a breach of fiduciary duty claim against non-independent directors.
3. Whether conflicting trial court decisions on the Cornerstone action element warrant immediate appellate review.

The court denied the Non-Committee Defendants' application for interlocutory appeal certification. Although the court found a "substantial issue" existed (the split in trial court authority regarding Cornerstone's action element), the multi-factor analysis weighed against certification. The court held that: (1) a director's vote in favor of a transaction unquestionably advances that transaction and satisfies Cornerstone's action element at the pleading stage, consistent with Delaware's board-centric model and prior precedent in Foundation Building Materials and BGC I; (2) while some divergence exists among trial decisions (Klein, Atallah, and BGC II), this does not outweigh the costs of interlocutory appeal; and (3) because claims against the Liberty Defendants will proceed regardless, all defendants will remain involved in discovery, making an interlocutory appeal inefficient and prejudicial to plaintiffs. The court emphasized that interlocutory appeals must be exceptional, not routine, and the disruption and delay caused by appeal outweigh the benefit of resolving the split in authority.

This is a Delaware Chancery Court case involving early-stage friends-and-family investors in Footprint International Holdco, Inc., a biodegradable food packaging company, who challenge a cram-down financing transaction (the "Class F Financing") as resulting from breaches of fiduciary duty by the company's directors and a controlling stockholder. The court addresses Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss various fiduciary duty claims.

1. Whether Cleveland Avenue, LLC exercised transaction-specific control over the company sufficient to owe fiduciary duties as a controlling stockholder
2. Whether the directors breached their fiduciary duties in approving the Class F Financing, including claims that they: (a) installed a conflicted committee member; (b) failed to consider alternative financing proposals (Shuler, Apollo, and Ariel); (c) approved unfair terms benefiting the Funds, ZenCap, and the Koch family; and (d) failed to disclose material information
3. What standard of review applies to the directors' decision-making (business judgment rule versus entire fairness)
4. Whether the complaint adequately pleads facts supporting a reasonable inference that the directors lacked sufficient independent and disinterested members to invoke business judgment rule protection

1. Count IX (Cleveland as Controlling Stockholder) - DISMISSED: The court held that the plaintiffs failed to plead facts supporting a reasonable inference that Cleveland exercised transaction-specific control over the Class F Financing. Although Cleveland held 26.4% of voting power (a historically significant amount), this was mitigated by: (a) the existence of other large stockholder blocks (Olympus, Movendo, ZenCap); (b) the Governance Agreement's requirement that Cleveland vote for a slate of directors it did not solely control; (c) Cleveland's designation of only one director (Thompson as Chair); (d) absence of allegations that Cleveland had compromising influence over other directors; (e) weak allegations regarding Cleveland's industry ties and lending relationships; and (f) conclusory allegations about Cleveland's influence over the Koch family. The court reasoned that while a 26.4% block would ordinarily support an inference of control in a widely held company, the specific capital structure and governance constraints here made such an inference unreasonable at the pleading stage.
2. Counts V-VIII (Directors' Breach of Fiduciary Duty) - PARTIALLY GRANTED, PARTIALLY DENIED: The court held that the complaint states claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the directors. The court found that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded facts supporting a reasonable inference that: (a) the Class F Financing was an interested transaction because multiple directors had conflicts (the Funds' designees benefited from the transaction, and ZenCap received special treatment); (b) the Committee was compromised because Daly, a ZenCap designee, was installed despite his conflict; (c) the Committee lacked real power to reject proposals; (d) the directors failed to adequately consider alternative financing proposals; (e) the transaction terms were inferably unfair, including the Funds' favorable conversion rights, special treatment for ZenCap and the Koch family, and depressed valuation; and (f) material information was not disclosed to stockholders. The court reasoned that these allegations, when credited at the pleading stage, support an inference that the board lacked sufficient independent and disinterested directors acting with due care and good faith, thereby shifting the burden to the defendants to prove entire fairness rather than allowing them to rely on the business judgment rule presumption.

This is a breach of fiduciary duty case in which OptimisCorp sued three former stockholders and directors (Atkins, Smith, and Waite) for wrongfully withholding a $5.2+ million arbitration award that the defendants obtained as derivative plaintiffs on behalf of the company. The defendants sought to distribute the award to stockholders they deemed "innocent" rather than return it to the company, and the court found them liable for breaching their fiduciary duties as agents of the company.

1. Whether defendants owed fiduciary duties to the company as derivative plaintiffs and agents
2. Whether defendants breached those duties by withholding and attempting to distribute the derivative award
3. What damages, if any, resulted from the breach, including: (a) lost business value from clinic closures; (b) costs of expensive short-term debt financing; and (c) attorneys' fees and costs
4. Whether the defendants' conduct warranted fee-shifting under the bad faith exception to the American Rule

The court awarded OptimisCorp only $1.00 in nominal damages, finding that while the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by withholding the award, the company failed to prove any actual damages caused by the breach. The court rejected the company's claims for $7.6-10 million in lost business value from closed clinics, finding that the closures were caused by COVID-19, pre-existing financial problems, and staff competition from rival firms—not the missing award. The court also rejected $2.3 million in debt damages, finding that the company's expensive short-term borrowing was necessitated by pre-existing financial distress and a "debt death spiral" rather than the award withholding. The court declined to shift attorneys' fees, finding that while the breach was wrong, the defendants did not act with the subjective bad faith required under Delaware law, as they genuinely believed they were acting in stockholders' interests. The company was awarded costs under Court of Chancery Rule 54(d).

This is a contract dispute arising from the sale of a Mexican funeral company, in which the buyer breached a guarantee agreement by filing litigation in Mexico against the seller in violation of a Delaware forum selection clause and covenants not to sue. The court addresses the seller's entitlement to damages for defense costs incurred in the unauthorized Mexican litigation and enforcement costs in the Delaware action.

1. Whether attorneys' fees and costs incurred defending unauthorized litigation in Mexico constitute recoverable expectation damages despite the American Rule limiting fee recovery
2. Whether the defendant's delay in seeking an anti-suit injunction bars recovery under a failure-to-mitigate defense
3. Whether attorneys' fees incurred prosecuting the enforcement action in Delaware are recoverable as damages
4. The appropriate methodology for allocating fees when billing entries relate to multiple proceedings
5. Whether laches and waiver defenses bar the plaintiff's damages claim

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. The court held that: (1) The plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred defending the Mexican Civil Action as expectation damages, not as enforcement expenses, because the breach of the forum selection clause and covenant not to sue directly caused the plaintiff to defend in the unauthorized forum. The American Rule does not bar such recovery because these are damages for breach, not enforcement expenses. (2) The defendant's failure-to-mitigate defense fails because waiting for formal service before seeking an anti-suit injunction was reasonable conduct, and the court rejected a hindsight-driven analysis of the plaintiff's mitigation efforts. (3) The defendant's arguments that the fees do not flow causally from the breach (because similar claims were litigated in Massachusetts), that laches bars recovery, and that the plaintiff waived its rights all fail as a matter of law. (4) The plaintiff is NOT entitled to recover attorneys' fees incurred prosecuting the Delaware enforcement action because these constitute enforcement expenses barred by the American Rule, which applies absent a contractual fee-shifting provision. The court distinguished this case from Namdar, which involved a contract with an explicit fee-shifting clause. (5) For invoices dedicated solely to the Mexican Civil Action, the plaintiff is awarded the full billed amounts. For "mixed" billing entries relating to multiple proceedings, the plaintiff's blanket 75% discount lacks sufficient evidentiary support, and the quantum of these damages is stayed pending targeted discovery regarding the allocation methodology. (6) The plaintiff is entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest at the legal rate (5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate), compounded quarterly, from the date each invoice was paid until payment of damages.

A former Head of Legal for a Delaware corporation seeks advancement of unpaid legal fees and expenses incurred in defending litigation filed against him by the corporation. The corporation argues the advancement claim is moot because the underlying action was dismissed and that the plaintiff was not an officer entitled to advancement under the corporation's bylaws.

1. Whether the dismissal of the underlying action renders the advancement claim moot
2. Whether the plaintiff qualifies as an "officer" under the corporation's bylaws and is therefore entitled to mandatory advancement rights
3. The proper interpretation of "defending" a proceeding under the advancement provision of the bylaws
4. Whether Delaware public policy favoring advancement rights applies to preclude mootness arguments

The court denied both parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. First, the court held that dismissal of the underlying action does not moot the advancement claim because the plaintiff continued "defending" the action until its formal dismissal on March 24, and incurred additional unpaid fees between the settlement offer and dismissal. The court interpreted "defending" broadly to include all actions taken to contest or oppose allegations through the proceeding's conclusion. Second, the court found a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the plaintiff was an "officer" under the bylaws entitled to advancement. While the plaintiff was hired as "Head of Legal," the record did not clearly establish whether this position constituted an officer appointment under the bylaws' formal procedures, nor whether the bylaws encompass de facto officers. The court reasoned that neither party presented sufficient evidence regarding the corporation's appointment procedures and adherence to corporate formalities to permit summary judgment on this issue.

This is a procedural motion in a contractual dispute between Centene Corporation and Centurion Equity, Inc. arising from the sale of a correctional healthcare business (MHM Services, Inc.). The case involves disagreement over indemnification obligations for medical malpractice insurance costs under the Stock Purchase Agreement.

1. Whether Centurion should be granted leave to file supplemental briefing on arguments regarding the interpretation of Stock Purchase Agreement (SPA) Sections 8.2, 8.5, and 5.6
2. Whether the arguments Centurion seeks to raise in supplemental briefing are truly new or have been previously addressed in briefing and oral argument
3. Whether Delaware's public policy favoring resolution of cases on their merits permits supplemental briefing as a "reset button" after counsel substitution
4. Whether Centene would suffer prejudice from allowing supplemental briefing

The Court DENIED Centurion's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Briefing. The Court found that: (1) Centurion's three proposed categories of arguments concerning commercial realities of captive reinsurance, SPA Section 8.5 offset provisions, and Section 5.6 interpretation had already been extensively addressed in prior briefing and during ninety minutes of oral argument; (2) Delaware's strong public policy favoring resolution on the merits is not intended to function as a "reset button or safety net," and Centurion's request appeared to be seeking a do-over following counsel substitution; and (3) Centene would be prejudiced by requiring it to incur additional costs and expenses to address arguments already advanced, particularly since Centurion had already filed multiple pleadings and had a full opportunity to present arguments at oral argument.

This is a Delaware Chancery Court case involving early-stage friends-and-family investors in Footprint International Holdco, Inc., a biodegradable food packaging company, who challenge a cram-down financing (Class F Financing) as resulting from breaches of fiduciary duty by the company's directors and a controlling stockholder. The court addresses Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss various fiduciary duty claims.

1. Whether Cleveland Avenue, LLC exercised transaction-specific control over the company sufficient to owe fiduciary duties as a controlling stockholder
2. Whether the directors breached their fiduciary duties in approving the Class F Financing, including claims that they: (a) installed a conflicted committee member; (b) failed to consider alternative financing proposals (Shuler, Apollo, and Ariel); (c) approved unfair terms benefiting the Funds, ZenCap, and the Koch family; and (d) failed to disclose material information to stockholders
3. The appropriate standard of review for evaluating director decision-making (business judgment rule versus entire fairness)
4. Whether the complaint adequately pleads facts supporting a reasonable inference that interested or non-independent directors dominated the board's decision

1. Count IX (Cleveland as Controlling Stockholder) - DISMISSED: The court held that Cleveland did not exercise transaction-specific control over the Class F Financing. Although Cleveland held 26.4% of voting power and designated the Board Chair, this was insufficient to establish control when: (a) other large stockholders (Olympus, Movendo, ZenCap) held substantial blocks and possessed director designation rights; (b) the Governance Agreement bound Cleveland to vote for a slate of directors appointed by multiple investors; and (c) no allegations supported Cleveland's influence over other directors or use of creditor status to channel the transaction. The court noted that while 26.4% is historically significant and would support control in a widely-held company, the Company's capital structure and governance protections mitigated this factor.
2. Counts V-VIII (Director Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims) - GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART: The court held that these claims state causes of action on which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs adequately pleaded facts supporting a reasonable inference that the Class F Financing was an interested transaction subject to entire fairness review because: (a) Interested Directors: The Funds (Cleveland, Olympus, Movendo) received material, non-ratable benefits not shared equally with Class A stockholders, including: favorable conversion ratios for their Class A-1 stock, enhanced liquidation preferences, and board control. These benefits were not equally shared by all stockholders. (b) Lack of Independence: The Committee members could not be deemed independent: (i) Richard Daly was a ZenCap designee and ZenCap received significant benefits (share redemption and improved conversion terms); (ii) Brian Krzanich, as the Class A Director, had a duty to protect Class A stockholders whose interests were directly adverse to the transaction; and (iii) the Committee lacked power to reject proposals, as the Board retained final authority. (c) Procedural Defects: The plaintiffs adequately pleaded that the process was unfair: (i) the Committee included a conflicted member (Daly); (ii) alternative proposals (Shuler at $670 million valuation, Apollo at $1 billion valuation, Ariel at $390 million pre-money valuation) were rejected without meaningful consideration; (iii) stockholders were given only three weeks to decide and had to commit funds before accessing the data room; and (iv) material information was not disclosed, including the Funds' favorable conversions, charter amendments benefitting Cleveland, and the depressed $500 million valuation compared to the $1 billion valuation used in bridge loans. (d) Substantive Unfairness: The plaintiffs adequately pleaded facts suggesting unfair dealing and price: the Class A stockholders would receive only 4% of their original investment in a $1.2 billion liquidity event, while the Funds received substantial benefits. The Company's stated need for financing and desire to avoid insolvency did not preclude the inference that the true motivation was to enable the Funds to seize control and eliminate Class A protections. The court emphasized that at the pleading stage, it must credit well-pleaded allegations and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. The confluence of multiple factors—interested directors, lack of independence, procedural defects, rejection of superior alternatives, and substantive unfairness—supported the inference that entire fairness applied rather than the business judgment rule.

This is a breach of fiduciary duty case in which OptimisCorp sued three former stockholders and directors (Atkins, Smith, and Waite) for withholding a $5.2+ million derivative arbitration award that belonged to the company. The defendants, acting as derivative plaintiffs, had won the award against the company's former outside counsel but sought to distribute it to stockholders they deemed "innocent" rather than return it to the company.

1. Whether defendants breached their fiduciary duties as agents of the company by withholding and attempting to distribute a derivative arbitration award without authority
2. Whether the company is entitled to compensatory damages for losses allegedly caused by the nine-month delay in receiving the award
3. Whether the company is entitled to attorneys' fees under exceptions to Delaware's American Rule
4. The proper measure of damages when a breach of fiduciary duty is proven but causation to specific losses is not adequately demonstrated

The court awarded OptimisCorp only $1.00 in nominal damages, despite finding that defendants breached their fiduciary duties. On summary judgment, the court had already determined that defendants, as agents of the company, breached their duties of care and loyalty by withholding the award without authority. However, at trial on damages, the court found that OptimisCorp failed to prove a sufficient causal connection between the breach and the damages it sought. The company sought over $12 million in damages, including $7.6-10 million in lost business value from seven closed clinics and $2.3 million in debt costs from expensive short-term loans. The court rejected both categories of damages. For the clinic closures, the court found that the clinics' financial performance during the relevant period did not support a staffing shortage theory, and that COVID-19 was a more significant cause of the closures. For the debt damages, the court found that OptimisCorp's financial distress and expensive borrowing predated the breach and resulted from a "debt death spiral" unrelated to the missing award. The court also denied attorneys' fees, finding that while defendants' conduct was wrong, it did not rise to the level of egregious or bad faith conduct necessary to shift fees under Delaware law. The court awarded costs to OptimisCorp as the prevailing party.

This is a stockholder derivative action challenging Liberty Media Corporation's September 2024 spin-off of SiriusXM Holdings Inc. Minority stockholders claim the transaction improperly benefited Liberty by eliminating a tracking stock discount, and they appeal the trial court's dismissal of claims against certain defendants.

1. Whether an interlocutory appeal should be certified under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42, which requires a "substantial issue" of material importance and a balancing of substantial benefits against costs of appeal
2. Whether a director's vote in favor of a transaction satisfies the "action element" required under In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. to state a claim against non-independent directors with conflicts of interest
3. Whether conflicting trial court decisions on the Cornerstone action element constitute a substantial issue warranting appellate review

The court denied the Non-Committee Defendants' application for interlocutory appeal certification. Although the court found a "substantial issue" existed due to conflicting trial court decisions regarding Cornerstone's action element, the court concluded that a single Rule 42 factor was insufficient to warrant certification. The court reasoned that interlocutory appeals must be exceptional, not routine, and the downsides of disrupting litigation, causing delay, and exhausting resources outweighed the benefit of resolving the split in authority. The court further noted that because claims against the Liberty Defendants will proceed regardless, all defendants will likely remain involved in discovery, making an interlocutory appeal inefficient and potentially prejudicial to plaintiffs.

This is a criminal appeal in a sex trafficking case where Ricardo Middleton was convicted of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1), and obstruction of a sex trafficking prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d). Middleton was sentenced to 30 years in prison and appeals on multiple grounds.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony from Dr. James Hopper regarding the neurobiological effects of trauma on memory, and whether such testimony improperly invaded the jury's role in assessing witness credibility.
2. Whether sufficient evidence supported Middleton's conviction for attempted obstruction of a sex trafficking prosecution based on recorded jail calls.
3. Whether Middleton's 30-year sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable, particularly based on sentencing disparities with co-defendants and the impact of the Adam Walsh Act.
4. Whether Middleton received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to cross-examine a key witness (Christianna Dedrick).

The First Circuit affirmed all convictions and the sentence, and dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice. On the expert testimony issue: The court held that Dr. Hopper's testimony regarding how trauma affects memory and brain function was properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The testimony was beyond the ken (knowledge) of ordinary laypersons and did not improperly invade the jury's credibility determination role because: (1) Dr. Hopper never opined on Rush's credibility; (2) the district court carefully limited his testimony to scientific information about trauma's neurobiological effects; and (3) the court gave clear jury instructions that jurors remained free to accept or reject the expert testimony and had sole authority to determine witness credibility. On the sufficiency of evidence for obstruction: The court found sufficient evidence supported the attempted obstruction conviction. Middleton's repeated jail calls to Dedrick requesting she relay messages to co-defendant Jones to deny being present at a key location, combined with Dedrick's testimony clarifying that Middleton was referring to Jones, constituted both the specific intent to obstruct and a substantial step toward commission of the offense. On sentencing: The court rejected Middleton's procedural unreasonableness claim as inadequately briefed and waived. On substantive unreasonableness, the court held the 30-year sentence was reasonable because: (1) it fell within the guideline range; (2) Middleton and his co-defendants were not "identically situated" given material differences (Middleton went to trial while others pleaded guilty, he had a prior record, received a leadership enhancement, and was convicted of obstruction); and (3) Congress's decision to impose mandatory minimums and increase guideline base offense levels under the Adam Walsh Act did not render the sentence unreasonable. On ineffective assistance of counsel: The court dismissed this claim without prejudice, holding that fact-specific ineffective assistance claims cannot be raised on direct appeal and must instead be pursued in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

This is a trademark infringement and unfair competition case under the Lanham Act in which Trojan Battery Company sued Golf Carts of Cypress, LLC and Trojan EV, LLC for using the "TROJAN-EV" mark on golf carts, allegedly infringing Trojan Battery's registered "TROJAN®" marks for batteries. After a bench trial, the district court found the defendants liable, awarded disgorgement of profits, and issued a permanent injunction.

1. Whether defendants' use of the "TROJAN-EV" mark creates a likelihood of confusion with Trojan Battery's "TROJAN®" marks, establishing trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Texas common law
2. Whether disgorgement of defendants' profits is an appropriate equitable remedy under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and how to calculate such disgorgement using the burden-shifting framework
3. Whether the scope of the permanent injunction is appropriate or overbroad

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's liability judgment and disgorgement award but vacated and remanded the permanent injunction for modification. On liability, the court found no clear error in the district court's finding of likelihood of confusion based on eight factors: (1) the TROJAN® marks are very strong in the golf industry; (2) the marks are highly similar, with "TROJAN" being the dominant element; (3) golf-cart batteries and golf carts are highly related complementary products; (4) both parties sell through the same retail outlets to similar purchasers; (5) both use identical advertising media; (6) defendants intended to trade on Trojan Battery's goodwill, as evidenced by the owner's lack of credibility regarding his knowledge of TROJAN® batteries; (7) although the court found clear error regarding actual confusion evidence (only five instances over 2.5 years of concurrent sales with millions in annual sales), this factor was not dispositive; and (8) purchasers exercise moderate care. The court emphasized that no single factor is dispositive and that five of seven remaining factors supported likelihood of confusion. On disgorgement, the court affirmed the award, finding it equitable under the Lanham Act based on willful infringement, potential diverted sales, inadequacy of other remedies, and the public interest in deterring future infringement. The court upheld the district court's application of the burden-shifting framework, where the plaintiff proves defendant's sales and the defendant must prove costs and deductions. On the permanent injunction, the court held it was overbroad because it prohibited defendants from using "TROJAN" on any goods or services, including those unrelated to golf carts and golf-cart batteries in outside markets where confusion is unlikely. The court noted that the likelihood of confusion arose specifically from the parties' use of "TROJAN" to market related products in the golf industry to the same customers through the same channels. The court remanded for the district court to narrow the injunction to apply only to products within the golf carts and golf-cart batteries markets.

This is an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) employment case in which an Army contractor employee with autism and mental health disabilities challenged his termination after being denied a request to work remotely. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the employee's failure-to-accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation claims.

1. Whether in-person attendance is an essential function of the employee's job as an IT systems administrator for an Army contractor, such that full-time telework is not a required reasonable accommodation under the ADA
2. Whether the employee was a "qualified individual" under the ADA capable of performing the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation
3. Whether the employer provided a reasonable accommodation by allowing the employee to work from home two to three days per week
4. Whether the employee established a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework
5. Whether the employee established a prima facie case of retaliation for requesting an accommodation, including whether temporal proximity between the accommodation request and termination established causation

The court affirmed the dismissal of all three claims. The court held that: (1) in-person attendance is an essential function of the employee's job because the Army determined full-time telework was not in its interests, current employees do not receive telework accommodations, and supervision is more difficult remotely; (2) temporary COVID-era telework policies do not permanently change a job's essential functions; (3) the employee was not qualified for the job because he needed to work from home full-time to perform his duties, making it impossible to maintain the essential in-person function; (4) GStek satisfied its accommodation obligation by allowing two to three days of remote work per week, and the ADA does not require employers to provide an employee's preferred accommodation; (5) the discrimination claim fails because the employee is not qualified for the job; and (6) the retaliation claim fails because three months elapsed between the accommodation request and termination (insufficient temporal proximity for causation) and because the employee's inability to perform essential job functions defeats any causal connection.

This is a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case in which Energy and Policy Institute (EPI), a watchdog organization, sought documents from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) concerning industry groups and an insurance policy. TVA withheld or redacted documents under various FOIA exemptions, and EPI challenged these withholdings in litigation, also seeking attorneys' fees for documents released during the lawsuit.

1. Whether TVA properly withheld documents under FOIA Exemption Four (protecting confidential commercial information from third parties)
2. Whether TVA properly withheld documents under FOIA Exemption Five (protecting attorney-client privileged communications)
3. Whether TVA properly withheld documents under FOIA Exemption Six (protecting personal privacy information)
4. Whether EPI is eligible for attorneys' fees under the OPEN Government Act's "substantially prevailed" standard when documents are released during litigation without a court order

The court AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part:

1. Exemption Four: The court upheld TVA's withholding of legal advice from McGuireWoods (the law firm managing industry groups CLG and PGen), client lists, and membership information as properly commercial and confidential. However, the court reversed withholdings of logistical information (scheduling emails, communication platform discussions, naming decisions) that lacked sufficient commercial harm justification. The court also reversed the redaction of the AEGIS insurance representative's name, finding it was not commercial information. Additionally, the court required TVA to clarify and release the names of current PGen members that were publicly available.
2. Exemption Five: The court found no error in the district court's handling of attorney-client privilege claims, as the disputed redactions were properly covered by Exemption Four withholdings.
3. Exemption Six: The court held that individual names and email addresses are protected by Exemption Six, but reversed withholdings of company names and email domain names (without the individual portion), finding the public interest in knowing who influences TVA was insufficient to overcome privacy interests and that company names alone would satisfy EPI's stated purpose.
4. Attorneys' Fees: The court reversed the district court's denial of fee eligibility, holding that TVA's release of 166 documents during litigation constituted a "voluntary" change in position by the agency under the OPEN Government Act, even though prompted by a third party's (McGuireWoods') withdrawal of confidentiality objections. The court remanded for the district court to determine whether the lawsuit caused the release and whether EPI's claim was "not insubstantial" before deciding the equitable question of whether to award fees.

This is an Article III standing case in which the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a nonprofit public service employer, challenged the Department of Education's COVID-19 pandemic-related suspensions of student loan payments and interest, as well as a twelve-month on-ramp to repayment program, arguing these actions violated the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Mackinac's failure to establish Article III standing.

1. Whether Mackinac established Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's student loan payment suspensions and on-ramp to repayment program
2. Whether Mackinac suffered a direct economic injury as a public service employer under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program
3. Whether Mackinac established competitor standing by demonstrating that the government's actions increased competition between public service employers and private sector employers in the labor market

The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Mackinac failed to establish Article III standing. Regarding direct economic injury, the court found that Mackinac's complaint contained only legal conclusions and speculation rather than specific, concrete facts demonstrating an actual economic injury. Mackinac did not allege that any employees stopped making payments, that it lost the ability to recruit or retain talent, or that it suffered any monetary loss. The suspensions and on-ramp did not alter the PSLF program's requirements for loan forgiveness. Regarding competitor standing, the court held that Mackinac failed to establish a sufficient link between the challenged government actions and increased competition in the labor market. The court found that Mackinac's theory rested on a speculative chain of possibilities—that the pause would cause borrowers to seek private sector employment, thereby reducing Mackinac's competitiveness—and that Mackinac failed to identify its specific competitors or demonstrate how they received benefits from the suspensions and on-ramp. The court concluded that Mackinac's allegations were too speculative and conclusory to satisfy the pleading requirements for establishing standing at the motion to dismiss stage.

This is a civil rights case arising from the suicide of Paul Bliven, a pretrial detainee in Ontonagon County Jail. The estate's representative sued county corrections officers and the county itself, alleging deliberate indifference to the risk of suicide and seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan state law.

1. Whether corrections officers violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a pretrial detainee by acting with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of suicide, and whether qualified immunity protects them from liability
2. Whether the subjective element of deliberate indifference was satisfied when the detainee explicitly denied suicidal feelings and had no prior suicide attempts
3. Whether Ontonagon County can be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services for a constitutional violation based on county policies or customs
4. The appropriate standard for establishing an officer's knowledge of suicide risk in the context of qualified immunity

The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. The court held that:

1. Individual Officers - Qualified Immunity: No reasonable jury could find that any of the five officers subjectively believed there was a "strong likelihood" that Bliven would commit suicide. The court applied the demanding pre-Brawner deliberate-indifference standard because the suicide occurred in May 2021, before the September 2021 Brawner decision that lowered the standard for pretrial detainees. Bliven's explicit denials of suicidal feelings, lack of prior suicide attempts, and absence of specific suicide-related evidence constituted strong circumstantial evidence that officers lacked the required knowledge. Generic risk factors (mental health treatment, possible intoxication, delusional statements) were insufficient without specific evidence of immediate suicide risk. The court rejected arguments that officers should have perceived the risk, holding that they must have actually perceived it.
2. Sheriff Rantala: Qualified immunity protected Rantala from claims based on generic jail policies (security camera monitoring and electric fan cords in cells) because no clearly established law required 24-hour camera monitoring or prohibited such items in cells.
3. Monell Claim Against County: The county could not be held liable because: (a) the monitoring policy was reasonable and the county had hourly check-in requirements; (b) officers' negligent failure to follow the detox cell placement policy did not establish county deliberate indifference; and (c) the alleged ratification theory failed because post-suicide investigative failures could not have caused the suicide itself, and no prior incidents were identified to show systemic deficiencies.

This is an immigration case in which a Honduran national challenges an in absentia removal order, arguing that she did not receive proper notice of her removal hearing because the Department of Homeland Security failed to provide notice of her obligation to update her address with the immigration court in her native Spanish language.

1. Whether the Due Process Clause requires the Department of Homeland Security to provide notice of an alien's obligation to update her address with the immigration court in the alien's native language rather than English.
2. Whether an English-language-only written notice of an alien's obligation to update her address satisfies due process requirements.
3. Whether an alien can challenge an in absentia removal order based on alleged lack of notice when the alien failed to update her address after being notified of that obligation.

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review and affirmed the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision. The court held that the Department of Homeland Security is not constitutionally required to translate notice of an alien's obligation to update her address into the alien's native language. The court reasoned that: (1) English-language notices are "reasonably calculated to reach and to inform" aliens of their obligations, satisfying due process; (2) Congress did not include a native-language requirement for notices regarding address updates, unlike it did for other statutory provisions; (3) an English-language written notice, when provided to a non-English-speaking adult alien who is released from custody with ample time to act, typically satisfies due process because it puts the alien on notice that further inquiry is needed; and (4) the heightened standard for knowing and voluntary waivers of appellate rights does not apply to routine notice of procedural obligations. Because Urquia-Yanez was properly advised of her obligation to update her address and failed to do so after moving, the notice of hearing mailed to her last known address constituted sufficient notice under the statute.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of kidnapping resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). The defendant challenged his conviction on multiple grounds, including the sufficiency of evidence, jury coercion, and the validity of his Miranda waiver.

1. Whether the "holding" element of the federal kidnapping statute requires physical force or can be satisfied through non-physical means such as deception in an inveiglement case
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the kidnapping conviction
3. Whether the district court improperly coerced the jury's verdict through an Allen charge and questioning of a holdout juror
4. Whether the defendant validly waived his Miranda rights and whether his confession was voluntary

The court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial due to improper jury coercion, while affirming other aspects of the district court's rulings. Specifically:

1. Holding Element: The court held for the first time in the Ninth Circuit that the "holding" element of the federal kidnapping statute does not require physical force and can be satisfied through non-physical means such as deception. The court found sufficient evidence that the defendant "held" the victim through deception by promising to move in with her after the trip.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence: The court affirmed that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find all essential elements of kidnapping resulting in death beyond a reasonable doubt, including the taking through inveiglement, the holding through deception, the interstate commerce element, and causation of death.
3. Jury Coercion: The court found impermissible jury coercion based on: (1) the district court giving an Allen charge while knowing the numerical breakdown of jurors' votes from jury notes that were not disclosed to the parties; (2) the district court's coercive comments when questioning a holdout juror, including telling the juror to "surrender that opinion" and that the evidence the juror relied upon was "irrelevant"; and (3) the jury deliberating for only thirty-seven minutes after the Allen charge before returning a unanimous guilty verdict. The court noted that all three factors—the form of the instruction, the brief deliberation time, and other indicia of coerciveness—supported finding jury coercion under the totality of circumstances.
4. Miranda Waiver and Confession: The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession was voluntary. The court found that despite the defendant's mental health diagnoses, he understood his rights, had prior criminal justice experience, signed a written waiver, and the detectives' comments about helping him and that "honesty goes a long way" did not overbear his will.

This is an appeal in a habeas corpus or post-conviction case involving petitioner Michael Ray Hogan against Nevada state officials. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order addressing a motion to stay the mandate pending potential Supreme Court review.

The key issue is whether the appellate mandate should be stayed to allow the respondents time to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.

The court granted the motion to stay the mandate for 90 days pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d). The stay permits respondents to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. If a petition is filed, the stay continues until the Supreme Court rules on it. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari, the mandate remains stayed pending the Supreme Court's disposition. If the Supreme Court denies certiorari, the mandate will issue immediately. The parties must notify the court of the Supreme Court's decision.

This is an appeal of a district court's judgment denying long-term disability (LTD) benefits to an employee of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland who suffered from long-haul COVID-19 symptoms. The plaintiff challenged the plan administrator's denial of her benefits claim on grounds of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

1. Whether the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review under New York contract law (rather than ERISA standards) properly applies to review the plan administrator's denial of benefits for a non-ERISA governmental plan.
2. Whether the district court properly denied the plaintiff's requests for open discovery and limited discovery outside the administrative record.
3. Whether the plan administrator's denial of LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious based on the administrative record.
4. Whether the plan administrator adequately considered the plaintiff's treating physicians' opinions when making its benefits determination.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that:

1. The arbitrary-and-capricious standard under New York contract law properly applies because ERISA does not govern the Federal Reserve's plan (a governmental plan), and the plan contains a New York choice-of-law provision. Under this standard, a plan administrator's decision may be set aside only if made in bad faith, arbitrary, or fraudulent.
2. The district court properly denied both open and limited discovery because judicial review must be limited to the administrative record that was available to the plan administrator when it made its decision. The plaintiff failed to establish sufficient grounds for limited discovery, as she did not adequately allege a conflict of interest or procedural defect.
3. The plan administrator's denial was not arbitrary and capricious. Matrix provided a reasoned explanation based on evidence, including: (a) the plaintiff's ability to work for months after her December 2021 COVID-19 infection; (b) medical evidence showing improvement in her symptoms around the time she took leave on April 13, 2022; (c) thorough review of medical evidence from twelve treating physicians; and (d) reliance on multiple independent medical reviewers' opinions that contradicted the plaintiff's treating physicians' opinions. The administrator was not required to accord special deference to treating physicians' opinions or to respond to each rebuttal letter.

This is a federal drug trafficking and conspiracy case in which Darrick Bell was convicted of three drug-related offenses for operating a large-scale drug distribution enterprise at a Detroit motel. Bell appeals his convictions and below-guidelines sentence of 336 months.

1. Whether hundreds of text messages from cell phones found at the motel were properly admitted as coconspirator statements and properly authenticated under the Federal Rules of Evidence
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Bell's three drug convictions (conspiracy to distribute drugs, possession with intent to distribute, and maintaining drug-distribution premises)
3. Whether newly discovered evidence regarding a witness's alleged false statements warranted a new trial
4. Whether the district court properly calculated sentencing enhancements for dangerous weapon possession, leadership role, drug quantity, threat of violence, and criminal history

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Bell's convictions and sentence. The court held that: (1) the text messages were properly admitted as coconspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and were adequately authenticated, as Bell failed to specifically identify problematic messages and the government provided substantial circumstantial evidence linking them to the conspiracy; (2) the evidence was more than sufficient to support all three convictions, including the drug quantity findings, as multiple victims testified to purchasing drugs directly from Bell and the jury could rationally attribute the large quantities discussed in testimony to Bell as the enterprise's leader; (3) the alleged false testimony claim failed because the witness never actually testified about the matters she allegedly lied about, and Bell presented no evidence the government knowingly solicited or permitted false testimony; and (4) all sentencing enhancements were properly calculated and supported by clear evidence, including the dangerous weapon enhancement (coconspirators possessed firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy), leadership enhancement (Bell controlled at least 10 women and multiple drug dealers), drug quantity enhancement (evidence showed far more than the required minimum), violence enhancement (Bell used violence to protect operations and collect debts), and criminal history points (the court need not resolve the dispute as it would not affect the sentencing range).

This is an appeal of a pretrial detainee's civil rights lawsuit against Milwaukee County for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his two-and-a-half-year detention in the County Jail. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, and the detainee appealed.

1. Whether the County can shield itself from liability for inadequate medical care provided by its private contractor (Wellpath) by claiming lack of notice of constitutional violations
2. Whether the detainee received objectively unreasonable mental-health care despite having documented serious conditions (traumatic brain injury and PTSD)
3. Whether the Jail's COVID-19-related lockdown policies were unconstitutionally excessive
4. Whether the Jail's unsanitary conditions (fecal matter, mold, disabled toilets, etc.) constituted a constitutional violation either individually or in combination
5. Whether these conditions were attributable to the County under Monell liability standards

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County on all claims. The court held:

1. Notice/Contractor Liability: The County cannot insulate itself from § 1983 liability by contracting out medical services to a private company. When a municipality delegates final decision-making authority to a contractor, the contractor's policies become the municipality's policies. However, the County's notice argument was rejected as a threshold matter.
2. Medical-Care Claim: Although the detainee's mental-health conditions (traumatic brain injury and PTSD) were serious enough to require some level of constitutional protection, he failed to present sufficient clinical evidence to establish that the care provided was objectively unreasonable. The record lacked details about the scope and severity of his conditions, his prior treatment, and Wellpath's evaluation of his symptoms. Without such evidence, no reasonable jury could conclude the treatment was constitutionally inadequate. The court sympathized with the detainee's burden as a pro se litigant but found he failed to meet his summary judgment burden.
3. Excessive-Lockdown Claim: The Jail had a legitimate governmental interest in reducing COVID-19 transmission during the pandemic. The lockdowns were reasonably related to this objective and not excessive in relation to it. While the detainee proposed alternative measures, courts should not second-guess jail administrators' pandemic-related decisions. Lockdowns after mid-2021 that were not clearly COVID-related were too isolated and sporadic to constitute a widespread practice under Monell.
4. Unsanitary-Conditions Claim: Individual unhygienic conditions, while unpleasant, were not serious enough to constitute constitutional violations. The conditions did not manifest a single identifiable deprivation or traceable widespread practice. Jail staff typically responded to complaints within a week, and most complaints did not recur. The practice of shutting off toilets in cell blocks, while unsanitary, had a legitimate justification (emergency response to inmates flooding cells during the pandemic) and did not constitute excessive punishment on this record.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a California death penalty conviction for murder. Shaun Burney was convicted in 1994 of murdering Joseph Kondrath during a robbery and kidnapping, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed his claims of judicial bias and misconduct during trial.

1. Whether the trial judge's comments during voir dire and trial demonstrated judicial bias against Burney and in favor of the death penalty, violating the Due Process Clause
2. Whether the trial judge's conduct, including allegedly racist, sexist, and inappropriate comments, constituted judicial misconduct that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair
3. Whether Burney's confession was involuntary and whether he validly waived his Miranda rights
4. Whether the admission of codefendants' redacted statements violated Burney's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Burney's habeas petition on all grounds. On the certified judicial bias and misconduct claims, the court exercised discretion to proceed directly to the merits under de novo review rather than addressing procedural default issues. The court held that:

1. The trial judge's comments did not demonstrate personal interest or direct involvement in the proceedings, nor did they show an intolerable risk of bias or create an appearance of impropriety. When examined in context, the judge's remarks about the crime's seriousness and the death penalty accurately explained the law and emphasized the jury's duty to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. The trial judge's various comments—though sometimes inappropriate, including an inexcusable "they all look alike" remark and a "lynched" reference—did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The comments were not sufficiently grave, antagonistic, or adverse to Burney to violate constitutional due process limits, particularly when considered against thousands of pages of trial transcript.
3. Burney's confession was voluntary under the totality of circumstances. The detectives used no threats, violence, promises, or deception. Although Burney was 18 with some mental deficits, he was not coerced, responded coherently throughout the interview, and even resisted some detective suggestions.
4. Burney's Miranda waiver was valid and knowing. Although Burney claimed he did not believe he could invoke his rights, the trial court's credibility finding that he understood his rights is supported by the record and must be deferred to under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
5. Any Bruton error from admitting redacted codefendant statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Burney's own confession independently established all elements of his crimes, and the codefendants' statements provided no unique, material evidence necessary to convict him.
6. The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability for the confession, Miranda, and Bruton claims because the district court's denials were not debatable among jurists of reason.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the estate of Shaun Fuhr challenged a Seattle police officer's use of deadly force when the officer shot and killed Fuhr, who was fleeing police while holding his infant daughter. The case involves the application of qualified immunity doctrine to an excessive force claim.

1. Whether Officer Noah Zech violated Shaun Fuhr's Fourth Amendment rights by using deadly force when shooting Fuhr as he fled with his infant daughter
2. Whether any Fourth Amendment right violated by Zech was "clearly established" at the time of the shooting, such that qualified immunity would not apply
3. The appropriate level of generality for defining a "clearly established" constitutional right in the context of excessive force claims
4. Whether the totality of circumstances—including Fuhr's firing a gun, fleeing from police, ignoring commands to stop, and holding a child—distinguished this case from precedent establishing a constitutional violation

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Officer Zech. The majority held that although it did not decide whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, Fuhr's conduct did not violate clearly established law. The court found that no prior case clearly established a constitutional right in circumstances involving a noncompliant, fleeing, potentially armed suspect holding a child or hostage. The court emphasized that Fuhr's continued possession of the baby after firing a gun, fleeing from law enforcement, and ignoring repeated commands to stop distinguished this case from clearly established precedent. The majority reasoned that from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, it was reasonable for Zech to believe Fuhr posed an immediate threat to his daughter based on his threatening behavior, firing of his gun, lack of compliance with warnings, and prolonged flight endangering the child. The court distinguished cases like Harris v. Roderick and George v. Morris, finding those precedents inapplicable to these facts. Judge Fletcher dissented, arguing that the undisputed video evidence showed Fuhr posed no immediate threat to either the officers or his daughter—he was walking slowly with both hands visible holding his daughter tightly, had not been given adequate time to comply with the stop command, and was never warned that deadly force would be used. The dissent contended that clearly established law from Harris and other precedent prohibited deadly force absent an immediate threat.

This is a mandamus petition in a securities fraud class action where Crain Walnut Shelling, LP sought to overturn the district court's decision denying it appointment as lead plaintiff under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The Ninth Circuit addressed the standard of proof required to rebut a presumptive lead plaintiff's adequacy and typicality.

1. What is the correct standard of proof for rebutting the PSLRA's presumption of adequacy and typicality afforded to the loss leader (the plaintiff with the largest financial interest)?
2. Whether the district court clearly erred in applying a "genuine and serious doubt" standard instead of the preponderance of the evidence standard.
3. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that the competing plaintiff (Universal) rebutted Crain Walnut's presumption of adequacy based on filing inaccuracies and problematic deposition testimony.
4. Whether mandamus relief was appropriate under the Bauman factors.

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for writ of mandamus. The court held that:

1. Standard of Proof: Preponderance of the evidence is the correct standard for rebutting the PSLRA's presumption of adequacy and typicality. The district court erred in applying a lowered "genuine and serious doubt" standard, which deviated from the default standard of proof in civil litigation established by Supreme Court precedent. The court rejected the district court's reliance on Cavanaugh and Mersho, finding those cases did not establish a lower standard of proof but rather addressed what types of evidence could support a rebuttal.
2. Clear Error Analysis: Although the district court initially applied the incorrect "genuine and serious doubt" standard, it alternatively reasoned that Crain Walnut's presumption of adequacy had been rebutted even under the correct preponderance of the evidence standard. Under highly deferential clear error review, the court found no clear error in the district court's determination that Universal sufficiently rebutted Crain Walnut's adequacy based on: (a) filing inaccuracies regarding ownership structure that compromised credibility and demonstrated lack of ability to work with the court; and (b) Crain Walnut's unequivocal testimony that it would refuse to produce personal financial records if required, suggesting unwillingness to comply with court orders.
3. Mandamus Standard: The absence of clear error was dispositive and defeated the mandamus petition. Although the first, second, and fifth Bauman factors favored Crain Walnut (no adequate alternative remedy and an issue of first impression), the absence of clear error as a matter of law is a necessary condition for granting mandamus and strikes a mortal blow to the petition.

This is an appeal in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding where a creditor sued a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee for allegedly breaching her fiduciary duties by failing to preserve and safeguard estate assets, including allowing real properties to deteriorate and failing to collect rental income. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the scope of immunity available to bankruptcy trustees in personal capacity suits.

1. Whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to review the district court's remand order to the bankruptcy court
2. Whether a bankruptcy trustee is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from claims that she failed to preserve and safeguard estate assets
3. Whether a bankruptcy trustee is entitled to derived immunity based on the facts alleged in the complaint
4. The proper legal standard for determining when bankruptcy trustees receive absolute immunity versus when they may be held liable for negligent conduct

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision upholding the trustee's immunity and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court. The court held that: (1) it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) because the plaintiff's counsel represented that the plaintiff would not amend the complaint, making the district court's order effectively final; (2) bankruptcy trustees may be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity only for functions involving the exercise of discretionary judgment that are essential to the authoritative adjudication of private rights to the bankruptcy estate; (3) the trustee was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because the allegations related to property management functions (gathering estate property, investigating finances, and operating the business), not adjudicatory functions that determine how assets are divided among creditors; (4) the trustee was not entitled to derived immunity on the current record because there were no bankruptcy court orders authorizing the trustee's inaction; and (5) bankruptcy trustees may be held liable for negligent conduct, not just intentional wrongdoing, though they have various defenses available including the business judgment rule and derived immunity when court approval is obtained.

This is a stockholders' derivative action in which Ruby Wagner challenged the facial validity of three consent rights in BRP Group, Inc.'s stockholders agreement entered into at the time of the company's 2019 IPO. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed whether Wagner's claims were barred by the doctrine of laches in light of the recent Moelis decision.

1. Whether facial challenges to stockholders agreement provisions that are successful render those provisions void (not subject to equitable defenses) or voidable (subject to equitable defenses including laches)
2. Whether Wagner's facial invalidity claims were barred by laches under the framework established in Moelis & Company v. West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund
3. Whether Wagner could pursue alternative as-applied challenges that would not be barred by laches
4. Whether attorneys' fees should be awarded for a mooted claim when the defendant's responsive action produced a corporate benefit

The Court reversed the Court of Chancery's judgment. Following the Moelis precedent, the Court held that facial challenges to stockholders agreement provisions are subject to equitable defenses, including laches. Wagner's facial challenges were barred by laches because she filed suit more than three years after the stockholders agreement was entered into in October 2019. The Court rejected Wagner's argument that she had viable as-applied challenges, finding that her complaint alleged no actual exercise of the consent rights and that any as-applied claim would rely on the same unlawful act as the facial challenge, thus also barred by laches. However, the Court remanded for reconsideration of attorneys' fees, finding that Wagner had a meritorious claim when filed, the defendants took responsive action producing a corporate benefit (the consent agreement and bylaw amendment), and there was a causal relationship between the suit and the benefit. The Court instructed that any fee award should be modest and based on the actual benefit achieved, not on the invalidation of the stockholders agreement provisions.

This is a shareholder class action appeal involving claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment arising from an allegedly misleading proxy statement issued by defendants in connection with a corporate transaction.

1. Whether the Court of Chancery properly dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim
2. Whether the unjust enrichment claim is barred by the doctrine of laches
3. When an unjust enrichment claim accrues and whether tolling applies

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment. The court held that the unjust enrichment claim is barred by laches because it accrued when the allegedly misleading proxy statement was disseminated to stockholders and was not brought within the three-year limitations period under Delaware Code Title 10, Section 8106. The court found that tolling did not apply based on the reasoning in the Court of Chancery's opinion. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim for the reasons stated in the lower court's memorandum opinion.

This is an intestate succession case involving the distribution of a deceased person's real property between her surviving spouse (who received a life estate) and her three surviving children (who received remainder interests). The plaintiffs seek to terminate or modify the defendant's life estate due to his failure to pay the mortgage on the property.

1. Whether a life tenant's failure to pay mortgage obligations on property constitutes waste that justifies termination or modification of the life estate
2. The extent of a life tenant's obligations to maintain and pay carrying costs on mortgaged property, including mortgage principal and interest payments
3. Whether equitable relief in the form of termination or modification of a life estate is an appropriate remedy for waste committed by a life tenant
4. Whether the defendant's stated reasons for nonpayment (uncertainty about the executor's identity) justified his failure to pay the mortgage

The court granted the plaintiffs' petition with modifications. The defendant, as life tenant, is obligated to pay both principal and interest on the mortgage as part of his duty to maintain the property and avoid committing waste. By failing to pay the mortgage (except for one payment) since the decedent's death, the defendant has committed waste and forfeited his life estate. However, the court exercised equity by giving the defendant 30 days (until June 7, 2026) to bring the mortgage current. If the defendant successfully brings the mortgage current and provides proof by June 8, 2026, his life estate will remain unchanged and he must continue paying the mortgage going forward. If he fails to do so, his life estate will be terminated and the property will pass entirely to the plaintiffs as remaindermen. The court found credible the defendant's testimony that he has the financial means to make the payments and does not want to lose the property to foreclosure.

This is a probate matter in which the petitioner seeks to admit a photocopy of the decedent's will to probate after the original will was lost. The decedent executed the will in Washington in 2000, and it was discovered in her abandoned home in 2023 by the petitioner's daughter, who scanned it and mailed the original to the petitioner, which was subsequently lost.

1. Whether the photocopy of the will meets the statutory requirements for valid execution under Delaware Code Title 12 Section 202
2. Whether the decedent revoked the will prior to her death
3. Whether the photocopy accurately reflects the terms and testamentary intent of the original will

The Magistrate in Chancery recommended that the court admit the photocopy of the will to probate. The court found that: (1) the will was validly executed, as evidenced by the signatures of the decedent and two witnesses, and was accompanied by a self-proving affidavit; (2) the decedent did not revoke the will, as the presumption of validity applies when the will was not in the testator's possession when lost and the testator did not order its destruction, placing the burden on objecting parties to rebut the presumption; and (3) the photocopy accurately reflects the original will's provisions, as supported by testimony from the petitioner's daughter regarding a video she recorded while scanning the will in 2023, and testimony from other beneficiaries that the will's terms aligned with the decedent's expressed wishes.

This is an action to quiet title to three yachts owned by ATP Marin, Inc., a Delaware corporation controlled by a Turkish entity. ATP seeks to rescind the transfer of the yachts to Sentinel Global Partners USA, Inc., arguing the transfer was invalid under Delaware corporate law because it lacked required stockholder approval.

1. Whether Plaintiff's challenge to the transfer was timely under the applicable statute of limitations, or whether it was time-barred
2. Whether the transfer of the yachts constituted a sale of substantially all of ATP's assets requiring majority stockholder approval under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 271
3. Whether equitable rescission is an appropriate remedy for the invalid transfer

Judgment entered for Plaintiff. The court held that: (1) Plaintiff's challenge was timely because the statute of limitations was equitably tolled—the trustees controlling ATP's majority shareholder were not on inquiry notice of the transfer until July 2020, as the transfer left no meaningful commercial footprint and ATP's prior fiduciaries concealed all corporate records; (2) the transfer violated Section 271 because the yachts were ATP's only assets at the time of transfer, requiring approval from the majority stockholder (Koza Holding), which was never obtained or even informed of the transaction; and (3) equitable rescission is appropriate because the yachts remain in Turkey under the trustees' physical control and restoration to the status quo ante is feasible. The Bills of Sale are rescinded, title reverts to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff must return the consideration received.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Jose Padilla-Galarza challenges his convictions for masterminding a 2010 robbery of a Puerto Rico police compound in which 125 firearms were stolen and two police officers were taken hostage. Padilla was convicted after a bench trial on multiple counts including Hobbs Act conspiracy and robbery, firearm offenses, and being a felon in possession of firearms, and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.

1. Whether two counts of the superseding indictment were time-barred under the statute of limitations
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Padilla's eleventh-hour motions for continuances filed two days before trial
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Padilla's requests for additional funds to pay for investigatory and expert witness services
4. Whether the district court improperly excluded prior inconsistent statements and polygraph evidence
5. Whether the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence given alleged credibility problems with government witnesses

The First Circuit affirmed all convictions. On the statute of limitations issue, the court held that the superseding indictment neither broadened nor substantially amended the original charges, as the new counts involved identical conduct to the original indictment and actually reduced the applicable penalties. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance motions, noting that twelve years had elapsed between the robbery and trial, Padilla failed to demonstrate necessity for the specific continuances requested, and the government agreed to exclude cell phone location evidence while Padilla was familiar with the newly-disclosed witness. Regarding the funds requests, the court found no abuse of discretion because Padilla's motions lacked the specificity required to demonstrate necessity, and he failed to accept the court's invitation to provide additional detail. On evidentiary issues, the court found that Padilla did introduce prior inconsistent statements through other means, was properly precluded from leading questions on direct examination, and suffered no prejudice from the polygraph exclusion since the trial judge stated it would not rely on such evidence and Padilla had other impeachment evidence available. Finally, the court rejected Padilla's credibility challenges because he failed to request specific findings of fact, and substantial evidence supported the convictions including cooperating witnesses and cell phone records.

This is a criminal appeal in which Francisco Xavier Ortiz-Colón challenges his convictions for producing, possessing, and receiving child pornography, and for coercing and enticing minors. The defendant was convicted on nineteen counts and sentenced to 360 months imprisonment, and he appeals various trial and sentencing decisions.

1. Whether the district court committed plain error in conducting jury voir dire by failing to ask more specific questions about the disturbing nature of the offenses
2. Whether the district court erred in excusing jurors during trial, including whether ex parte communications with a juror violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
3. Whether three government witnesses provided impermissible "overview testimony" that went beyond their personal knowledge and expertise
4. Whether the district court properly handled three juror notes submitted during trial
5. Whether the defendant's separate convictions for possession and receipt of child pornography, and for production and coercion/enticement of minors, violate the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause
6. Whether the defendant's 360-month sentence is substantively unreasonable

The court affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings. Specifically:

1. Jury Selection: The court found no plain error in the voir dire process, as the trial court asked appropriate questions to identify bias and gave defense counsel ample opportunity for follow-up questioning.
2. Excused Jurors: The court found no plain error in excusing two jurors during trial. The ex parte communication with one juror was harmless because it occurred before deliberations began and did not influence the jury's verdict.
3. Overview Testimony: The court rejected claims that three government witnesses provided impermissible overview testimony. The witnesses testified based on personal knowledge and expertise, and their testimony was consistent with other evidence presented at trial.
4. Juror Notes: The court found no plain error in the district court's handling of juror notes. Where defense counsel affirmatively agreed to the court's proposed responses, the defendant waived the issue. For the third note, although the court's decision to read the note aloud was not ideal, curative instructions adequately protected the defendant's rights.
5. Double Jeopardy - Possession and Receipt: The court agreed with the defendant that his separate convictions for possession and receipt of child pornography violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because possession is a lesser included offense of receipt. The court found that the government failed to establish that the convictions were based on separate evidence and remanded for the district court to vacate one of these convictions.
6. Double Jeopardy - Production and Coercion: The court rejected the defendant's claim that his convictions for production of child pornography and coercion/enticement of a minor violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because each offense requires proof of an element the other does not under the Blockburger test.
7. Sentencing: The court found the 360-month downwardly variant sentence substantively reasonable, as the district court provided thorough reasoning considering both offense and offender characteristics, and the sentence falls within the universe of reasonable sentences.

This case challenges the constitutionality of Ohio liquor laws that prohibit out-of-state wine retailers from shipping directly to Ohio consumers and limit Ohio residents to transporting no more than six bottles of wine from out-of-state sources into the state during any 30-day period. The plaintiffs argue these restrictions violate the dormant Commerce Clause.

1. Whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Direct Ship Restriction and Transportation Restriction under the dormant Commerce Clause
2. Whether the restrictions can be justified as legitimate public health and safety measures under the test established in Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas
3. Whether the restrictions are essential features of Ohio's three-tier alcohol regulatory system
4. Whether the predominant effect of the restrictions is protectionism rather than protection of public health and safety

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and held that both restrictions are unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. The court found that plaintiffs have standing to challenge both restrictions because their injuries are redressable through either "leveling up" (extending benefits to out-of-state interests) or "leveling down" (removing benefits from in-state interests). The court rejected the district court's "essential feature" framework, finding that neither restriction is essential to Ohio's three-tier system, particularly because Ohio already allows extensive direct-to-consumer wine shipping by out-of-state wineries. Applying the Tennessee Wine test, the court concluded that the state's proffered health and safety justifications—physical presence requirements for inspections, price controls and taxation to promote temperance, and prevention of underage drinking—were speculative, unsupported by concrete evidence, and undermined by Ohio's own exceptions allowing out-of-state wine shipments. The court found that the predominant effect of both restrictions is protectionism favoring in-state retailers rather than protection of public health and safety. The case was remanded for the district court to determine appropriate remedies.

This is an appeal of a supervised release revocation case in which the defendant was sentenced to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment after the district court predetermined the sentence at an earlier violation hearing. The defendant challenges the reasonableness of this sentence on appeal.

1. Whether a district court violates procedural reasonableness requirements by predetermining a post-revocation term of imprisonment at an earlier violation hearing rather than following the proper sentencing sequence at the time of the actual revocation hearing.
2. Whether a sentence-in-advance method results in non-individualized terms of imprisonment that fail to comply with statutory requirements for individualized assessment.
3. Whether a post-revocation term of imprisonment is substantively unreasonable when the district court relies solely on a previous promise rather than properly weighing the relevant sentencing factors.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Barton's two-year statutory maximum sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court found two procedural deficiencies: (1) the district court inverted the proper sentencing sequence by predetermining the sentence at the first violation hearing rather than imposing it after considering the relevant factors at the second hearing, and (2) the sentence-in-advance method resulted in a non-individualized term of imprisonment that did not reflect consideration of the specific circumstances of the later violation. The court also found the sentence substantively unreasonable because the district court afforded virtually no weight to the relevant sentencing factors, instead relying solely on its promise to impose the statutory maximum. The court distinguished this case from prior precedent (Glass and Epps) where district courts had imposed promised sentences but clearly indicated those sentences were based on the new violation conduct and relevant sentencing factors. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, while clarifying that district courts may consider breach of trust from future violations as one factor in sentencing, but may not rely solely on a previous promise to impose a predetermined sentence.

This is an appeal of a special education case under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) involving a first-grade student with behavioral and emotional disabilities. The dispute centers on whether the school district properly followed the IDEA's least restrictive environment (LRE) requirement when proposing to place the student at a private therapeutic day school rather than keeping him in the district's self-contained emotional and behavioral disorders (EBD) classroom.

1. The appropriate standard of review for appellate courts when evaluating IDEA compliance decisions by district courts, particularly when additional evidence is presented at the district court level beyond the administrative record
2. The proper weight to be given to administrative hearing officer findings when a district court receives significant new evidence
3. Whether the district court improperly conducted a "trial de novo" by relying heavily on new evidence
4. Whether the proposed placement at a private therapeutic day school violated the IDEA's requirement that students with disabilities be educated in the least restrictive environment appropriate to their needs
5. The level of deference owed to professional educators' IEP decisions and what constitutes adequate explanation for those decisions

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the school district violated the IDEA's least restrictive environment requirement. The court established that when a district court receives significant new evidence at the judicial review stage, the administrative hearing officer's decision is entitled to less deference under a "sliding scale" approach—the more material new evidence presented, the less deference is owed. Here, the district court properly considered substantial new evidence, including post-hearing developments showing the student's significant progress in the EBD classroom, positive relationships formed, and expert testimony regarding the benefits of a one-on-one aide. The court found no clear error in the district court's conclusion that the student could receive a satisfactory education in the less restrictive EBD classroom with additional reasonable measures, such as a one-on-one aide, rather than being placed in the more restrictive private therapeutic day school. The court rejected the school district's arguments that the district court failed to accord proper deference to the hearing officer's decision and improperly conducted a trial de novo. The court emphasized that while deference is owed to professional educators' expertise, such deference requires cogent and responsive explanations for their decisions, which the school district failed to provide regarding why the student did not need a one-on-one aide despite other students at the school receiving such support.

This is a false advertising case under the Lanham Act in which Vericool World LLC, a cooler manufacturer, sued Igloo Products Corporation for falsely claiming to be the first to market a biodegradable cooler. The court affirmed summary judgment for Igloo, holding that the Lanham Act does not provide a cause of action for misrepresentations about which product was first to market.

1. Whether Vericool World, as an assignee of Vericool Inc., has Article III standing to sue for injuries suffered by its predecessor company.
2. Whether the Lanham Act's prohibition on misrepresenting "the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin" of goods encompasses false claims about which product was the first to market.
3. Whether such claims concern observable characteristics of the tangible product itself or instead concern the origin of an idea or design concept embodied in the product.
4. Whether Vericool waived an alternative argument that Igloo's statements caused confusion about whether the Ohana cooler was genuinely biodegradable.

The court affirmed summary judgment for Igloo on the following grounds: (1) Vericool World has Article III standing as an assignee of Vericool Inc.'s claims and injuries. (2) The Lanham Act does not create a cause of action for false claims about which product was first to market because such claims concern the origin of an idea or design concept rather than observable characteristics of the tangible product itself. Following precedent from Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. and Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., the court held that the Lanham Act's unfair competition provision protects only against misrepresentations about observable qualities of goods themselves, not about the intellectual origins or design concepts embodied in products. The court reasoned that allowing such claims would improperly extend trademark protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent and copyright law. (3) Vericool waived its alternative argument that Igloo's statements caused consumer confusion about whether the Ohana was biodegradable because this theory was not presented to the district court and contradicted Vericool's own prior arguments and evidence. Judge Bumatay dissented, arguing that the plain text of the Lanham Act encompasses misrepresentations about all material characteristics, including intangible ones like whether a product was first to market, and that the majority's "observable characteristics only" test was not supported by precedent and would create administrative difficulties.

This consolidated appeal addresses whether unadmitted aliens found in the interior of the United States are eligible for bond hearings while undergoing immigration proceedings. The petitioners, Mexican nationals detained without bond following traffic stops, challenged their detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that discretionary detention provisions under § 1226 applied to them rather than mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

1. Whether § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory detention provision applies to all unadmitted aliens present in the United States or only to those actively "seeking admission" at the border
2. The proper interpretation of the phrases "applicant for admission" and "seeking admission" under the INA
3. Whether the distinction between arriving aliens (governed by § 1225) and aliens in the interior (governed by § 1226) remains valid after IIRIRA's 1996 amendments
4. Whether an alien's failure to self-deport after removal proceedings commence constitutes "seeking admission"

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief, holding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to the petitioners. The court ruled that mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to aliens actively "seeking admission" (lawful entry after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer), not merely to those present in the United States without admission. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress technically defined "applicant for admission" as a passive status (mere presence without admission), while "seeking admission" requires an affirmative step; (2) the statute's text lists these as two separate conditions that must both be met; (3) the statutory structure distinguishes between § 1225 (governing arriving aliens at the border) and § 1226 (governing aliens in the interior); (4) nearly 130 years of immigration law history consistently applied detention provisions to arriving aliens; (5) IIRIRA modified but did not eliminate the entry doctrine; and (6) five presidential administrations over 29 years interpreted § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply only to aliens seeking admission, not those already present in the country. Therefore, the petitioners fell under § 1226's discretionary detention provisions and were entitled to bond hearings before an immigration judge.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving charges of aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact with a minor in Indian country. The defendant was charged under both the General Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1152, applicable to non-Indians) and the Major Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1153, applicable to Indians), and was convicted under the § 1152 charges.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the victim was an Indian and the defendant was a non-Indian, as required for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1152
2. Whether the indictment was multiplicitous by charging the defendant under both § 1152 and § 1153 for the same conduct, and whether the district court erred in not requiring the prosecution to elect between the charges before trial

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant's convictions. On the sufficiency of evidence issue, the court held that: (1) a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was an Indian based on the totality of evidence, including her receipt of tribal health care benefits, the Cherokee Nation's involvement in her guardianship proceedings, her testimony that she is Indian, and her enrollment in the Cherokee Nation; and (2) a rational jury could find that the defendant lacked Indian blood based on testimony from his sisters about family history, his erroneous enrollment in the Delaware Tribe after the abuse, his text message stating he "wasn't tribal" at the time of the abuse, and FBI investigation findings. On the multiplicity issue, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing both charges to be presented to the jury because adequate safeguards were in place: the jury was instructed it could not convict on both charges, and a special verdict form required the jury to choose between acquittal, conviction as an Indian, or conviction as a non-Indian. The court noted that the principal danger of multiplicitous charges—multiple sentences for a single offense—was prevented by the jury instructions and verdict form.

This is a criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of unlawful reentry of a removed alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The defendant, who had been deported in 2013 and illegally reentered the United States, sought to present a duress defense based on allegations that he was coerced into remaining in the country through years of abuse and threats by a woman who had trafficked him.

1. Whether the defendant presented sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the duress defense to the unlawful reentry charge
2. Whether the defendant established the three required elements of duress: (1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear the threat would be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm or a prompt bona fide effort to surrender once the duress lost its coercive force
3. Whether the defendant's opportunities to escape or contact law enforcement during the ten-year period he remained in the United States were sufficient to defeat the duress defense
4. Whether the defendant's delay in attempting to surrender to authorities after escaping on April 30, 2023 was reasonable under duress law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the duress jury instruction. The court held that the defendant failed to establish sufficient evidence on the third element of duress—that he lacked a reasonable opportunity to escape or that he made a prompt bona fide effort to surrender. Specifically, the court found:

1. During the ten-year period from 2013 to 2023, the defendant had numerous reasonable opportunities to escape, including when running errands, visiting family members, and having financial resources and access to phones to contact law enforcement
2. The defendant's opportunities for escape exceeded those found insufficient in prior cases, such as when a defendant was left alone for thirty minutes
3. Even if the defendant had no reasonable opportunity to escape before April 30, 2023, he failed to make a timely effort to surrender after escaping, waiting more than three weeks before disclosing his immigration status to authorities on May 22, 2023
4. The defendant did not adequately explain why he could not contact law enforcement during the three-week period following his escape, particularly since the danger from his abuser had dissipated once he moved to his sister's house
5. The court rejected the argument that continued threats after his escape prevented him from contacting authorities, noting he did not claim or show that the abuser prevented him from reaching out to police during the three-week span

This is an appeal of a Fifth Amendment takings claim brought by New Mexico landowners who own non-navigable streambeds. The landowners argue that a New Mexico Supreme Court decision (Adobe Whitewater) declaring a public right to walk and wade in private streambeds constituted an unconstitutional taking of their property without just compensation.

1. Whether the landowners have Article III standing to bring their claims despite the New Mexico Supreme Court (rather than the named defendants) being responsible for the loss of their property rights
2. Whether the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity bars the landowners' claims against state officials
3. Whether the landowners' claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
4. Whether the landowners stated a claim for a Fifth Amendment judicial taking
5. Whether a judicial decision that clarifies (rather than changes) property law can constitute an unconstitutional taking

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal but on different grounds. The court held that: (1) the landowners have standing because they face a credible threat of enforcement by state officials, which is a cognizable injury traceable to and redressable by the defendants; (2) sovereign immunity does not bar their claims because they seek prospective injunctive relief falling within the Ex parte Young exception; (3) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply; and (4) the landowners failed to state a claim for a judicial taking. On the merits, the court assumed without deciding that the Fifth Amendment protects against judicial takings, but found that the landowners failed to demonstrate that their claimed right to exclude the public from private streambeds was an established property right prior to the Adobe Whitewater decision. The court reasoned that the New Mexico Supreme Court merely clarified the scope of the public's existing easement to use public waters rather than taking an established right, and the landowners' allegations from fishing proclamations and a 2015 law were insufficient to show the right was established under traditional property law principles, historical practices, or Supreme Court precedent.

This is a civil rights case brought by an Oklahoma state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment violations for inadequate nutrition and unsanitary toilet and shower facilities at a correctional facility. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims, and the prisoner appealed.

1. Whether the district court properly excluded evidence submitted in opposition to summary judgment
2. Whether the prisoner established an Eighth Amendment violation based on inadequate nutrition following an inmate population surge
3. Whether the prisoner established an Eighth Amendment violation based on inadequate and unsanitary toilet and shower facilities
4. Whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on both claims
5. Whether the district court properly awarded costs to the defendants

The court affirmed summary judgment on the nutrition claim but reversed on the facilities claim. On the nutrition claim, the court found insufficient evidence that the food rationing was severe enough to deprive the prisoner of minimal necessities or create substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants lacked knowledge of any substantial risk of harm. On the facilities claim, the court found genuine issues of material fact regarding both the objective component (exposure to human waste due to overflowing toilets, inadequate lighting, and insufficient toilet-to-inmate ratios) and the subjective component (defendants' knowledge of and deliberate indifference to the unsanitary conditions). The court rejected the district court's reliance on work orders as evidence of timely repairs, finding that inmates could not directly submit work orders and some issues went unreported. The court also vacated and remanded the cost award because the prevailing party had yet to be established following the reversal on the facilities claim.

This is an appeal concerning tribal sovereign immunity in a dispute between the Comanche Nation and officials of the Fort Sill Apache Tribe over the operation of the Warm Springs Casino near Lawton, Oklahoma. The Comanche Nation sued to enjoin the casino's operation and seek damages, claiming violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of an order denying tribal sovereign immunity under the collateral-order doctrine
2. Whether IGRA abrogates tribal sovereign immunity for suits brought by Indian tribes challenging gaming operations on Indian lands conducted in violation of tribal-state compacts
3. Whether the Ex Parte Young doctrine displaces tribal immunity for RICO claims seeking injunctive relief against alleged ongoing violations of federal law
4. Whether tribal officials sued in their individual capacities for RICO violations can invoke tribal sovereign immunity when the tribe is not the real party in interest

The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held:

1. The court has jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the district court's order explicitly denied tribal immunity on the RICO claim and implicitly denied it on the IGRA claim, qualifying as a collateral order under established precedent.
2. IGRA abrogates tribal sovereign immunity for the Nation's official-capacity IGRA claim. Under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), the abrogation applies to suits "initiated by a[n] . . . Indian tribe" to enjoin class III gaming on Indian lands conducted in violation of a tribal-state compact. The plain language of the statute does not limit abrogation only to tribes that are parties to the compact, and the Nation's allegations satisfy all four elements of the abrogation clause: (1) the suit is initiated by an Indian tribe; (2) it seeks to enjoin class III gaming; (3) the gaming occurs on Indian lands (the Tsalote Allotment); and (4) it violates the Fort Sill Apache Tribe-Oklahoma gaming compact's location provision.
3. The Ex Parte Young doctrine does not displace tribal immunity for the RICO claim. Although Ex Parte Young applies to tribal immunity as well as state immunity, it requires that the plaintiff sue officials "charged with carrying out the [challenged conduct]." The Nation failed to allege that the Officials have a particular duty to operate the casino's continuing operations. Allegations that some Officials voted to approve the casino in the past or have general compliance duties are insufficient to establish the necessary connection to ongoing violations.
4. The Officials cannot invoke tribal sovereign immunity for the individual-capacity RICO claims because the tribe is not the real party in interest. When a plaintiff seeks to impose individual liability on officials for their personal wrongdoing in furthering an unlawful enterprise, the individual officials—not the tribe—are the real parties in interest and would be bound by an adverse judgment. Therefore, the officials may only raise personal immunity defenses like qualified immunity, not tribal immunity. However, the court declined to address qualified immunity because it was never raised before the district court and does not form part of the collateral order, and the court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over this issue.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which a Denver police officer appeals a jury verdict finding him liable for using excessive force against a peaceful protester during the George Floyd protests. The officer shot the plaintiff with a pepperball while she was peacefully crossing the street toward the state capitol.

1. Whether Officer Christian was entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to bifurcate (separate) the trial of the plaintiff's claim against Officer Christian from the claims of multiple protesters against the City and County of Denver
3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of punitive damages against Officer Christian

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict against Officer Christian on all grounds. First, the court held that the plaintiff established a Fourth Amendment violation because Officer Christian used objectively unreasonable force against a peaceful, non-threatening protester who was committing no crime more serious than a misdemeanor and posed no threat to anyone. The court found this violation was clearly established by prior Tenth Circuit precedent (Fogarty and Buck from 2008), which put a reasonable officer on notice that shooting peaceful protesters with less-lethal munitions was unconstitutional. Second, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying bifurcation, noting that the jury's verdict demonstrated it did not simply lump Officer Christian's actions with Denver's liability, as evidenced by finding him liable for Fourth Amendment violations but not First Amendment violations. Third, the court upheld the punitive damages award, finding sufficient evidence that Officer Christian acted with evil motive, intent, or reckless indifference to the plaintiff's federally protected rights, including evidence that he intentionally shot her without warning or justification and that he had engaged in similar conduct against other non-threatening protesters during the protests.

This is a civil rights case arising from the death of Terral Ellis II, a 26-year-old pretrial detainee who died in custody at the Ottawa County Jail in Oklahoma from septic shock due to acute bronchopneumonia. The Estate sued the Sheriff of Ottawa County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of Ellis's Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care, and a jury awarded $33 million in compensatory damages.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Ottawa violated Ellis's constitutional right to adequate medical care through deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
2. Whether Ottawa maintained a policy or custom of inadequate training of jail staff regarding medical emergencies
3. Whether the jury instructions correctly stated the law on deliberate indifference and municipal liability under Monell
4. Whether evidence regarding state and national jail standards should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403
5. Whether the Estate's counsel engaged in misconduct warranting a new trial
6. Whether the damages award was excessive and warranted remittitur

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in full. The court held:

1. Sufficiency of Evidence on Deliberate Indifference: Substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that Ottawa knew of a substantial risk of harm to Ellis and failed to take reasonable measures to abate that risk. The evidence showed Ellis repeatedly reported serious symptoms (back pain, leg numbness, seizures, difficulty breathing), jail staff mocked and dismissed his complaints, and Nurse Horn failed to properly assess or treat him despite clear signs of deterioration.
2. Inadequate Training Policy: The evidence supported a finding that Ottawa maintained a policy or custom of inadequate training. Despite testimony that staff received some training, the jury heard that officers had not reviewed the policy book, received minimal training on medical emergencies, and were instructed not to call ambulances without the nurse's permission—contrary to written policy.
3. Jury Instructions: Instructions 17 and 19 correctly stated the law. Instruction 17 properly defined deliberate indifference and required proof of a constitutional violation. Instruction 19 made clear that an underlying constitutional violation was a predicate to municipal liability. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Ottawa's requested instruction on abusive language, as the general instructions already adequately covered that the jury could not find liability based solely on words.
4. Jail Standards Evidence: The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence about Oklahoma and national jail standards under Rule 403. The evidence was relevant to show what measures were necessary to ensure inmate safety and what Ottawa knew or should have known. Limiting instructions adequately mitigated any risk of prejudice.
5. Attorney Misconduct: The Estate's counsel's display of emotion during trial and remarks about deterrence during closing argument did not warrant a new trial. While the court assumed such conduct constituted misconduct, the four-factor test for determining whether misconduct justifies a new trial weighed against granting relief.
6. Damages: The $33 million compensatory damages award was not excessive. The court considered the severity of the violation, the deliberate indifference shown, and the tragic circumstances of Ellis's death.

This is a civil rights case arising from the Denver police response to George Floyd protests in May-June 2020. Twelve plaintiffs sued the City and County of Denver under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that police officers violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive and indiscriminate force against peaceful protesters. After a three-week trial, a jury found Denver liable for constitutional violations and awarded compensatory damages to each plaintiff.

1. Whether officers violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights by using force against peaceful protesters
2. Whether officers violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights through excessive use of force
3. Whether Denver was liable under municipal liability theories, specifically: (a) official policies or customs causing constitutional violations; (b) failure to train officers adequately; and (c) ratification of unconstitutional conduct by final policymakers
4. Whether the jury instructions on First Amendment violations, municipal liability theories, and deliberate indifference were proper
5. Whether testimony from Denver's former independent monitor was admissible
6. Whether sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict on the failure-to-train theory
7. Whether the compensatory damages awards were excessive

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict in its entirety. The court rejected all of Denver's arguments on appeal:

1. First Amendment Instruction: Any error in the jury instruction on First Amendment violations was harmless because the phrases "substantial or motivating" and "substantially motivating" are substantially similar, and the instruction's definition of "substantial or motivating factor" as "a significant factor" aligned with the correct legal standard.
2. Deliberate Indifference Element: The court did not need to decide whether deliberate indifference was required for all municipal liability theories because the jury instruction on the failure-to-train theory explicitly included deliberate indifference as an element, and the damages award could be sustained on that basis alone.
3. Failure-to-Train Instruction: The jury instruction properly combined failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise theories, both of which require proof of deliberate indifference. The plain reading of the instruction and the jury's verdict form made clear that the jury was required to find deliberate indifference.
4. Independent Monitor's Testimony: The testimony of Nicholas Mitchell, Denver's former independent monitor, was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 as lay witness testimony because it was rationally based on his personal investigation and perception, even though he was not present during the protests. The testimony did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 407 (subsequent remedial measures) because it was investigative in nature, not a remedial measure itself. The testimony was not inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because it was probative and not unfairly prejudicial.
5. Sufficiency of Evidence: There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Denver was liable for failure to train. Plaintiffs presented evidence of: (a) a pattern of similar constitutional violations following inadequate training (referencing the 2012 Occupy Denver protests and Denver's subsequent discontinuation of crowd control training); (b) expert testimony that officers were "woefully" inadequately trained; and (c) evidence that Denver policymakers knew officers would confront civil rights protests, the situation presented difficult choices requiring training, and failure to train would likely result in constitutional violations.
6. Compensatory Damages: The jury's compensatory damages awards ($3 million for Packard, $750,000 for Wedgeworth, and $1 million each for the other ten plaintiffs) were not excessive and did not shock the judicial conscience. Plaintiffs' testimony about their physical injuries (tear gas inhalation, being shot with less-lethal projectiles) and emotional distress was relevant and sufficient to support the awards, particularly given the jury's opportunity to observe plaintiffs' demeanor and credibility.

This is a federal tax case in which Liberty Global, Inc. (LGI) challenged the Internal Revenue Service's disallowance of a $2.4 billion dividend deduction claimed under Internal Revenue Code Section 245A. LGI executed a complex four-step transaction called "Project Soy" designed to exploit a perceived loophole in the international tax provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act to shelter billions of dollars in foreign income from taxation.

1. Whether the codified economic substance doctrine under 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) is relevant and applicable to Project Soy, a series of transactions that mechanically complied with the literal terms of the tax code but lacked economic substance.
2. Whether transactions that comply with the literal terms of the tax code can be disregarded under the economic substance doctrine if they are mere tax-avoidance schemes with no economic purpose.
3. Whether certain steps of Project Soy, such as corporate reorganizations under Section 351 and entity classification elections, are categorically exempt from the economic substance doctrine.
4. Whether the appropriate unit of analysis for applying the economic substance doctrine is the individual steps of Project Soy or the integrated series of transactions as a whole.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the economic substance doctrine codified in Section 7701(o) is relevant to Project Soy and that LGI is not entitled to the claimed Section 245A deduction. The court ruled as follows:

1. The economic substance doctrine applies to transactions that mechanically comply with the literal terms of the tax code if they are mere tax-avoidance schemes lacking economic substance or business purpose. The court rejected LGI's argument that mechanical compliance with the tax code shields transactions from the doctrine.
2. The statute contains no categorical exemptions for basic business transactions such as Section 351 corporate reorganizations or entity classification elections. The appropriate unit of analysis is the entire integrated series of transactions, not individual steps.
3. Project Soy constituted a highly structured tax-avoidance scheme rather than a basic business transaction. The four-day sequence of transactions was tightly integrated and executed specifically to exploit an unintended "last day of year rule/mismatch" in the TCJA's international tax provisions.
4. Under the two-prong test of Section 7701(o)(1), the first three steps of Project Soy failed both requirements: (A) they did not change LGI's economic position in any meaningful way apart from tax effects, and (B) they served no substantial non-tax purpose. LGI had admitted these facts in the district court.
5. The doctrine was relevant because Project Soy exploited a legislative mismatch through transactions serving no economic purpose other than tax savings, thereby violating congressional intent. Congress intended that only earnings exempt from GILTI would be eligible for the Section 245A deduction, but Project Soy unlinked the deduction from the anti-base erosion safeguards Congress intended.
6. The court rejected the argument that including "basic business transactions" within Project Soy rendered the economic substance doctrine inapplicable, as this would allow sophisticated taxpayers to inoculate complex tax-avoidance schemes from scrutiny by incorporating routine transactions.

Justice Eid dissented, arguing that Section 7701(o) contains a meaningful threshold relevancy determination separate from the statutory two-prong test, and that the economic substance doctrine is only relevant when the favorable tax treatment provided by another Code provision turns on "objective economic realities of a transaction" or the taxpayer's economic motive. The dissent contended that LGI's choice of when to sell the CFC does not implicate economic reality or taxpayer motive as contemplated by the Code, and therefore the doctrine was not relevant to Project Soy.

This case involves a facial challenge by builders' associations to President Biden's executive order requiring federal construction contractors on projects valued at $35 million or more to enter into project labor agreements with unions. The associations challenged the order, implementing regulations, and guidance memorandum on multiple statutory and constitutional grounds.

1. Whether the procurement mandate violates the Competition in Contracting Act by restricting "full and open competition"
2. Whether President Biden exceeded his authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
3. Whether the mandate violates the First Amendment freedom of association
4. Whether the mandate violates the Administrative Procedure Act, Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, and National Labor Relations Act
5. Whether the associations would suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, but on different grounds. The court held that the associations are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Specifically: (1) the mandate does not facially violate the Competition Act because the executive order includes exceptions that incorporate the Act's requirements by reference, and facial challenges require showing no set of circumstances exists under which the mandate would be valid; (2) President Biden had authority under the Federal Property Act to issue the order because the statute grants the President broad discretion to prescribe policies he considers necessary to carry out federal contracting, and the order's presumptive requirement for project labor agreements with exceptions for economy, efficiency, and competition concerns satisfies statutory requirements; (3) the mandate does not violate the First Amendment because the associations failed to establish that compelled interaction with unions significantly impedes their members' expressive activities, and the government has broader proprietary interests as a contractor than it does regulating citizens generally; and (4) the associations failed to establish violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, and National Labor Relations Act. The court also corrected the district court's error in evaluating irreparable harm by noting that First Amendment claims constitute per se irreparable injury and that the court should have analyzed each claim separately.

This is an appeal concerning whether the Florida Prepaid College Board enjoys sovereign immunity from a lawsuit brought by plan purchasers seeking to enjoin changes to their college savings plan contracts. The plaintiffs purchased tuition savings plans and challenged the Board's refusal to transfer amounts equivalent to a tuition differential fee to their daughters' out-of-state colleges, claiming violations of the Contracts and Takings Clauses.

1. Whether the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity protection bars a suit against state officials under the Ex parte Young doctrine
2. Whether a request for injunctive relief against state officials constitutes an impermissible request for specific performance of a state contract
3. Whether the distinction between prospective relief and retrospective damages applies when the underlying relief amounts to contract-specific performance

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint but vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice rather than with prejudice. The court held that sovereign immunity bars the suit because the requested relief amounts to specific performance of a contract to which the State was a party. Although the plaintiffs framed their request as prospective injunctive relief, the court determined that the actual effect of the requested relief would require the state to perform its contractual obligations. The court rejected the plaintiffs' creative pleading and distinguished the case from Maron v. Chief Financial Officer of Florida, where the property interest was not based on a contract. The court also rejected reliance on Lipscomb v. Columbus Municipal Separate School District as conflicting with Supreme Court precedent and the court's own binding precedent in Tamiami Partners.

This case involves a challenge to Florida's construction of an immigration detention facility in the Everglades without an environmental impact assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Environmental advocacy groups and the Miccosukee Tribe sought to enjoin the facility's operation, arguing that federal officials failed to comply with NEPA's procedural requirements.

1. Whether the construction of the detention facility constitutes a "final agency action" reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
2. Whether the facility construction qualifies as a "major federal action" under NEPA, requiring an environmental impact statement
3. Whether the district court's injunction violates the statutory bar on enjoining immigration enforcement operations under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)
4. The proper standard of review for preliminary injunctions and the deference owed to district court factual findings

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. The majority held that: (1) plaintiffs failed to establish a final agency action because Florida, not federal officials, constructed the facility using state funds and employees, and an agency's mere request or decision not to conduct an environmental review is insufficient; (2) plaintiffs failed to prove a major federal action under NEPA because the facility was constructed with minimal federal involvement and the federal government could not control the project's outcome—Florida retained final authority over construction decisions; (3) even if plaintiffs had succeeded on the merits, the injunction violated the statutory prohibition on enjoining immigration enforcement by preventing the Secretary from detaining aliens at a designated facility; and (4) the 2023 amendments to NEPA clarified that non-federal actions require both substantial federal funding and control to trigger NEPA's requirements, and this facility satisfied neither condition. The majority reasoned that while states may assist in federal immigration enforcement through section 287(g) agreements, such cooperation does not transform a state-constructed project into federal action subject to NEPA. A dissenting opinion argued the majority improperly substituted its own factual findings for the district court's well-supported conclusions and that the federal government's request for the facility's construction, combined with its exclusive control over immigration detention and commitment to fund operations, constituted sufficient federal involvement to trigger NEPA's requirements.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits the possession of machineguns, on Second Amendment grounds. The defendant was indicted for knowingly possessing a machinegun conversion device, pleaded guilty, and appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.

1. Whether the Second Amendment protects the possession of machineguns under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1)
2. Whether machineguns are "in common use" for lawful purposes and thus protected by the Second Amendment
3. Whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to adult citizens with no felony convictions
4. Whether a guilty plea bars a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal

The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns. The court reasoned that under District of Columbia v. Heller, the Second Amendment does not protect weapons that are not "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes." The court found that machineguns are not in common use for lawful purposes and are "dangerous and unusual weapons" consistent with the historical tradition of prohibiting such weapons. The court noted that handheld machineguns were quickly adopted by criminals after World War I, prompting at least 32 states to enact anti-machinegun laws between 1925 and 1934. The court also emphasized that Congress enacted the National Firearms Act in 1934 and section 922(o) in 1986, and that more than 35 jurisdictions currently strictly regulate or ban machinegun possession. The court rejected the defendant's quasi-facial challenge based on his status as a non-felon citizen, finding that section 922(o) is constitutional as applied to him.

This is a civil forfeiture case in which the United States seized over 700,000 barrels of crude oil from two tankers in the Mediterranean Sea, alleging the oil belonged to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and was subject to forfeiture because NIOC materially supported the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. A Turkish commodities trading company that claimed ownership appealed the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss.

1. Whether the government adequately alleged that NIOC owned the seized property, and whether ownership must be assessed at the time of the offense or at the time of seizure
2. Whether NIOC's material-support offense "affects foreign commerce" as required by the material-support statute, and the proper scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause
3. Whether NIOC's material-support offense was "calculated to influence" the conduct of the U.S. government as required for a federal crime of terrorism

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss on all three grounds. First, the court held that under the relation-back rule, title to forfeited property vests in the United States upon commission of the forfeiture-inducing offense, so ownership need only be shown at the time of the offense, not at seizure. The Amended Complaint adequately alleged NIOC owned the property when it transferred the oil in November 2020. Second, the court held that the Foreign Commerce Clause incorporates the same framework as the Interstate Commerce Clause and permits regulation of transactions occurring entirely abroad if they substantially affect commerce with the United States. The court found that NIOC's alleged millions of dollars in sanctioned oil transactions supporting the IRGC would substantially affect U.S. energy markets. Third, the court held that "calculated" means the defendant acted with the purpose of influencing government conduct and can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and knowledge. The court found it reasonable to infer that NIOC knew and intended its substantial support for the IRGC would further the IRGC's primary aim of using terrorism to affect the U.S. government, given that NIOC and the IRGC are closely intertwined government entities.

This case involves a dispute over confirmation of an arbitration award in a swimming pool construction contract. The defendants sought to transfer the case to the Court of Common Pleas, arguing the contract constitutes a "consumer credit contract" subject to that court's exclusive jurisdiction, while the plaintiff sought judgment on the pleadings to confirm the arbitration award.

1. Whether the Pool Contract qualifies as a "contract to provide consumer credit" under Delaware Code Title 10, Section 5702(d), which would vest jurisdiction in the Court of Common Pleas rather than the Court of Chancery.
2. Whether the inclusion of a "holder rule" notice in the Pool Contract transforms it into a consumer credit contract as defined by federal regulations (16 C.F.R. § 433.1).
3. Whether the arbitration award must be confirmed under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and whether defendants waived their right to challenge the award by failing to seek vacatur within the three-month statutory period.

The court denied defendants' motion to transfer and granted plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that: (1) the Pool Contract is a cash construction contract, not a consumer credit contract, despite containing a "holder rule" notice; (2) the mere inclusion of a "holder rule" notice does not transform a construction contract into a consumer credit contract; (3) the Arbitration Agreement relates only to the swimming pool construction, not to any third-party financing arrangement; (4) the FAA governs confirmation of the arbitration award; and (5) defendants waived their right to challenge the award by failing to seek vacatur within three months of the award's issuance on April 14, 2025, as required by 9 U.S.C. § 12. Accordingly, the court must grant confirmation of the $134,044 arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 9.

This is a breach of contract action arising from a merger in which the defendant corporation conditioned payment of merger consideration on stockholders executing a release agreement. The plaintiff stockholder refused to comply with this condition and sued after the merger closed, seeking the merger consideration plus prejudgment interest.

1. Whether the defendant corporation breached the certificate of incorporation by conditioning payment of merger consideration on execution of a release agreement (Joinder Agreement)
2. Whether a stockholder who demanded appraisal but later withdrew that demand is entitled to receive merger consideration without executing the release agreement
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages exceeding the per-share merger consideration provided in the merger agreement
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest and, if so, at what rate and whether it should be compounded
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception to the American Rule

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the breach of contract claim. The court concluded that: (1) the defendant breached the certificate of incorporation by conditioning payment of merger consideration on execution of the release agreement, as this condition lacked consideration and violated Section 262(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law; (2) the plaintiff's damages are limited to his pro-rata share of the merger consideration as calculated under the merger agreement terms, not a higher amount based on avoiding deductions for management bonuses and transaction expenses; (3) the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right, not discretion; (4) the court exercises its discretion to award simple (non-compounded) interest at 6.75%, the legal rate in effect when payment became due on July 29, 2017, rather than the plaintiff's requested 8.625% compounded monthly, due to the plaintiff's significant delays in pursuing the claim; and (5) the plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees is denied because the defendant did not act in bad faith. The plaintiff was awarded total damages of $498,558.02 plus prejudgment interest at 6.75% from July 29, 2017 through the date of judgment.

This case involves a dispute between Masimo Corporation and its founder and former CEO Joe Kiani over the enforceability of an employment agreement containing a forum selection clause. Masimo sued in Delaware to invalidate provisions of the agreement, claiming they resulted from breaches of fiduciary duty, while Kiani moved to dismiss based on a California forum selection clause in the employment agreement.

1. Whether a forum selection clause in an employment agreement can compel litigation of fiduciary duty claims in California rather than Delaware
2. Whether the Bylaws Provision requiring Delaware as the exclusive forum for internal affairs claims supersedes the Forum Selection Clause
3. Whether the Independent-Source Principle (which traditionally prohibited contractual forum selection clauses from capturing fiduciary duty claims) survives under newly enacted DGCL § 122(18)
4. Whether the Employment Agreement qualifies as a "stockholder agreement" under § 122(18)
5. Whether the Forum Selection Clause's plain language covers the Company's breach of fiduciary duty and waste claims

The court granted Kiani's motion to dismiss and held that the Forum Selection Clause is valid and enforceable, requiring the Company's claims to be litigated in California Superior Court. The court reasoned that: (1) the Bylaws Provision explicitly allows the Company to consent to alternative forums, which it did through the Employment Agreement; (2) DGCL § 122(18), enacted in 2024, legislatively overrides the Independent-Source Principle for stockholder agreements by authorizing corporations to contract with stockholders for adjudication in alternative forums; (3) the Employment Agreement qualifies as a stockholder agreement under § 122(18) because Kiani contracted at least partly in his capacity as the Company's controller and prospective stockholder, and the agreement functions as a governance agreement allocating control rights; (4) the phrase "arising out of or relating to" in the Forum Selection Clause is broad under both California and Delaware law and encompasses the Company's fiduciary duty and waste claims, which all depend on and relate to the Employment Agreement; and (5) the Company cannot circumvent the forum selection clause through arguments about the enforceability of other contract terms.

This is a Fourth Amendment case concerning whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle and its driver. The Supreme Court reviews whether Officer Vanterpool's stop of R.W. violated the Fourth Amendment when the officer ordered R.W. to put his hands up without first establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

1. Whether Officer Vanterpool had reasonable suspicion to justify a brief investigatory stop of R.W.'s vehicle under the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether the District of Columbia Court of Appeals properly applied the "totality of the circumstances" test when evaluating reasonable suspicion
3. Whether the lower court erred by excluding certain facts (the radio dispatch call and the flight of R.W.'s companions) from its reasonable suspicion analysis

The Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision and held that Officer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspicion to stop R.W. The Court reasoned that under the totality of the circumstances, the officer was justified in stopping the vehicle based on: (1) a late-night dispatch call about a suspicious vehicle at the location; (2) two individuals fleeing from the car upon the officer's arrival; (3) the late hour (approximately 2:00 a.m.); and (4) R.W.'s unusual behavior of backing out of the parking space while leaving a rear door open. The Court criticized the lower court for improperly "excising" the dispatch call and the companions' flight from its analysis, emphasizing that the totality-of-the-circumstances test requires courts to consider the "whole picture" rather than evaluate facts in isolation. The Court noted that reasonable suspicion need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct and permits officers to make commonsense inferences about human behavior. Justice Jackson dissented, arguing that the lower court properly applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test through a factor-by-factor analysis and that Supreme Court intervention was unwarranted for this factbound determination.

This is a criminal appeal in which Mark Brown challenges the conditions of his supervised release imposed after his guilty plea to fourteen counts of making false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims and one count of theft of government funds. Brown appeals the district court's imposition of special electronic-monitoring conditions as part of his three-year supervised release term.

1. Whether the electronic-monitoring condition requiring installation of software to monitor all internet activity on Brown's devices without reasonable suspicion, and permitting unannounced examinations of his computer devices, is overbroad and not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
2. Whether the monitoring condition applied to devices used in the course of employment constitutes an impermissible occupational restriction under U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5.
3. Whether the district court made an adequate individualized assessment before imposing the special conditions of supervised release.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that: (1) the electronic-monitoring condition is reasonable and not overbroad because it is directly related to the nature of Brown's offense (using internet-enabled devices to commit fraud), his criminal history, his prior violation of probation for a similar offense, and his documented pattern of deception; (2) the condition does not impose a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary, as monitoring must be effective to detect fraud and the search condition is limited to instances of reasonable suspicion; (3) the monitoring condition is not an occupational restriction because it does not prohibit Brown from engaging in a specified occupation, does not functionally bar him from computer-dependent jobs, and does not compel employer notification; and (4) district courts have broad discretion to impose special conditions of supervised release when reasonably related to sentencing factors under U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b).

This is a criminal appeal in which Akayed Ullah challenges his conviction for a December 11, 2017 terrorist attack in which he detonated a homemade pipe bomb in a subway tunnel between Times Square and the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan. Ullah was convicted on six counts related to the attack and appeals his convictions on three counts and his sentence.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Ullah provided "material support or resources" to ISIS under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, specifically whether acting as an independent "lone wolf" terrorist inspired by ISIS propaganda constitutes providing "personnel" or "service" to a designated foreign terrorist organization.
2. Whether "placing" a destructive device under 18 U.S.C. § 1992(a)(2) includes carrying a bomb affixed to one's person on a mass transportation vehicle, and whether the government constructively amended the indictment regarding Count Five.
3. Whether the completed offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2332f(a)(1) constitutes a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to support a conviction for using a destructive device during and in furtherance of a crime of violence, and whether any legal error in the verdict affected Ullah's substantial rights.

1. Count One (Material Support to ISIS) - REVERSED: The court reversed Ullah's conviction on Count One, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove he provided "material support or resources" to ISIS under either a "personnel" or "service" theory. The court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 2339B to require that material support be "coordinated with or under the direction of" a designated foreign terrorist organization. The court reasoned that merely being inspired by ISIS's publicly broadcast propaganda videos and independently committing a terrorist attack does not constitute working "under [ISIS's] direction or control" as required by the statute. The court emphasized that Congress expressly excluded "individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives" from the statute's reach, and that the Supreme Court's decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project confirmed this interpretation. The court also noted that Congress simultaneously amended FISA to cover "lone wolf" terrorists while amending § 2339B to exclude independent actors, demonstrating Congress's intent not to criminalize independent conduct under § 2339B.
2. Count Five (Terrorist Attack Against Mass Transportation) - AFFIRMED: The court affirmed Ullah's conviction on Count Five, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1992(a)(2) by placing a destructive device on a mass transportation vehicle. The court rejected Ullah's argument that "carrying" a bomb on one's person is distinct from "placing" it, reasoning that the ordinary meaning of "place" includes positioning oneself and an affixed device in a location. The court also rejected Ullah's constructive amendment argument, finding that the indictment clearly alleged the conduct charged and the jury instructions and verdict were consistent with the government's theory of liability under § 1992(a)(2).
3. Count Six (Using Destructive Device During Crime of Violence) - AFFIRMED: The court affirmed Ullah's conviction on Count Six, holding that the completed offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2332f(a)(1)(A)—unlawfully delivering, placing, discharging, or detonating an explosive with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury—constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) because it requires the government to prove at minimum the attempted use of physical force. The court determined that § 2332f(a) is a divisible statute and applied the modified categorical approach. Although the court acknowledged that the indictment, jury instructions, and verdict did not clearly establish whether Ullah was convicted under § 2332f(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), or (a)(2), it held that any legal error under Yates v. United States did not affect Ullah's substantial rights because the uncontroverted evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the completed offense under § 2332f(a)(1)(A), which is a valid predicate crime of violence.
4. Sentence - AFFIRMED (except as to Count One): The court affirmed Ullah's sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty years, except to the extent that the sentence on Count One was vacated due to the reversal of that conviction.

This is an immigration case in which Benjamin Sandoval Diaz, a Mexican national who unlawfully entered the United States in 1997, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. Diaz was found ineligible for cancellation because he admitted to committing felony drug offenses involving cocaine, which bars him from establishing the required "good moral character."

1. Whether the BIA erred in declining to apply the procedural safeguards established in Matter of K-, a 1957 BIA precedent requiring that noncitizens be given an adequate definition of crimes, including all essential elements explained in understandable terms, before admissions can be used against them in immigration proceedings.
2. Whether Diaz's testimony before the Immigration Judge (IJ) sufficiently established that he admitted to the essential elements of felony drug offenses under North Carolina law, specifically regarding cocaine possession, sale, and delivery.
3. Whether the "good moral character" requirement for cancellation of removal bars Diaz from relief based on his admissions to controlled substance violations.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Diaz's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision. The majority held that:

1. Matter of K- Inapplicable: The court found that Matter of K- was materially distinguishable from Diaz's case based on four key differences: (1) Diaz bore the burden of proof to establish his eligibility for relief, whereas in Matter of K- the government bore the burden of proving removability; (2) Diaz was represented by counsel throughout his proceedings, whereas the noncitizen in Matter of K- was not; (3) Diaz testified voluntarily under oath before the IJ, whereas the noncitizen in Matter of K- gave an out-of-court unsworn statement to a police officer; and (4) Diaz's counsel was present and entitled to object to questions, providing procedural safeguards absent in Matter of K-. The court reasoned that these distinctions meant Diaz could not show he was "unwittingly entrapped" or denied "fair play" as contemplated by Matter of K-.
2. Admissions to Drug Offenses Valid: The court upheld the IJ's and BIA's findings that Diaz's testimony constituted valid admissions to the essential elements of felony drug offenses under North Carolina law. Diaz explicitly admitted under oath to obtaining, possessing, and selling 3.5 grams of cocaine to Milton, and he acknowledged prior cocaine use. The court rejected Diaz's argument that he did not admit to the identity of the substance, noting that he repeatedly acknowledged the substance was cocaine and that he personally knew what cocaine was from his own prior use.
3. Good Moral Character Bar: The court affirmed that Diaz's admissions to controlled substance violations necessarily preclude him from demonstrating good moral character as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3), which bars from good moral character status any person who admits committing acts constituting the essential elements of a violation of state law relating to controlled substances.

This is a civil rights case in which a former federal inmate brought a Bivens action against Bureau of Prisons officials alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical treatment and Fourth Amendment violations for excessive force during his incarceration at USP Lee. The plaintiff sought $15 million in compensatory and punitive damages.

1. Whether a Bivens remedy is available for inadequate medical treatment claims that are materially different from the seminal case of Carlson v. Green (1980)
2. Whether a Bivens remedy is available for excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment following the Supreme Court's reversal of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Fields v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
3. Whether the separation of powers doctrine and the existence of alternative remedies preclude recognition of new Bivens causes of action in the prison context

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims, holding that no Bivens remedy is available. The court reasoned as follows:

1. Inadequate Medical Treatment Claims: Although Carlson authorized Bivens claims for inadequate medical care, Spivey's claims present a materially different context. Spivey's allegations involved temporary dental issues, investigated rectal bleeding, and denial of psychology class enrollment—none approaching the severity of Carlson, where an inmate died due to deliberate indifference. Additionally, Spivey's claims implicate broader systemic issues regarding prison staffing and institutional medical policies rather than discrete acts of malfeasance. Congress's enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 15 years after Carlson, combined with its failure to create a damages remedy for federal inmates, constitutes a special factor counseling against extending Bivens. The availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons' Administrative Remedy Program further supports this conclusion.
2. Excessive Force Claims: The Supreme Court's recent decision in Goldey v. Fields (2025) reversed the Fourth Circuit's prior decision in Fields and held that Eighth Amendment excessive force violations constitute a new context where special factors preclude Bivens relief. The same reasoning applies to Spivey's excessive force claims, rendering them unavailable under Bivens.
3. General Principle: The court emphasized that while Congress has authorized damages actions for state inmates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it has deliberately chosen not to create similar remedies for federal inmates. This legislative silence, combined with separation of powers concerns, forecloses judicial creation of new Bivens causes of action. The court noted that creating a cause of action is a legislative endeavor, not a judicial one.

This is an appeal of a supervised release revocation and sentencing. Preston Mills, Jr. was convicted of drug trafficking and firearm offenses in 2008, and after his release and subsequent supervised release violations involving assault charges, his supervised release was revoked and he was sentenced to 24 months in prison.

1. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Mills violated the mandatory condition not to commit a new crime by committing strangulation and assault and battery of a family member based on an incident with his ex-girlfriend.
2. Whether Mills' 24-month revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately consider his non-frivolous mitigation argument regarding the additional 19 months he spent on supervised release while the revocation petition was pending.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the revocation of Mills' supervised release but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. On the first issue, the court found no clear error in the district court's credibility determination favoring the victim's testimony over Mills' account. The court emphasized the high deference given to credibility determinations and noted that corroborating evidence—including text messages where Mills apologized without denying the assault, testimony from the victim's daughter, and photographic evidence of injuries—supported the finding by a preponderance of the evidence. On the second issue, the court held that the revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to expressly address Mills' potentially meritorious argument that he should receive credit for the additional 19 months of supervised release he served while the petition was pending. The court concluded that without record evidence showing the district court considered this non-frivolous mitigation argument, the sentence was plainly unreasonable and required remand for resentencing.

This is a criminal appeal in which Luis Alfredo Lezama-Ramirez, a previously removed alien convicted of unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), challenges discrepancies between supervised-release conditions orally pronounced at sentencing and those listed in the district court's written judgment. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether conditions disclosed in a presentence report (PSR) but not read aloud at sentencing were properly imposed.

1. Whether a district court must read aloud all supervised-release conditions at sentencing when those conditions were disclosed in the PSR that the defendant and counsel reviewed
2. Whether a defendant forfeits the right to challenge conditions by failing to object when conditions were not orally pronounced but were included in the PSR
3. Whether discrepancies between oral pronouncements and written conditions constitute reversible error, and if so, whether the written judgment imposes more burdensome requirements than the oral pronouncement
4. The proper standard of review for conditions disclosed in the PSR but not re-disclosed orally versus conditions that varied between oral and written pronouncements

The court AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part. Regarding Standard Conditions 2-9, 11-13, and Special Condition 1 (disclosed in PSR but not read aloud): The court affirmed these conditions, holding that a district court need not read conditions aloud when they are disclosed in the PSR. Under plain error review, the court found no error because: (1) the probation officer certified the PSR was disclosed to defendant and counsel; (2) the district court confirmed no objections to the PSR and adopted it; (3) defense counsel demonstrated intimate familiarity with the PSR; and (4) the defendant himself indicated he would comply with all requirements. The court drew reasonable inferences from the record that the defendant understood the conditions imposed at sentencing were those disclosed in the PSR. Regarding Special Condition 2 (variance between oral and written): The court vacated and remanded this condition because the written judgment added a 72-hour reporting requirement not mentioned in the oral pronouncement, thereby imposing an additional burden beyond what was orally pronounced. Regarding Standard Condition 10 (variance between oral and written): The court affirmed this condition, characterizing the difference between "prohibited from possessing" (oral) and "must not own, possess, or have access to" (written) as an ambiguity rather than a conflict, with the written version defining the scope of the oral pronouncement.

This is a Fourth Amendment excessive force case brought by Amanda Carter against Deputy Chad Dupuy and Sheriff Jason Ard, arising from an incident at a high school where Dupuy used minimal physical force to remove Carter from the school office after she refused to leave without her daughter during a child abuse investigation.

1. Whether Deputy Dupuy's use of force—grasping Carter's arm, pulling her a few inches through a doorway, and briefly pushing her—constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether Dupuy and Sheriff Ard are entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim
3. Whether Carter's state law claims for negligence, assault, and battery, and the respondeat superior claim against Sheriff Ard, survive summary judgment

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and granted qualified immunity to Dupuy and Sheriff Ard. The court held that the force used was de minimis and therefore did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. The court reasoned that: (1) Dupuy used force for only four seconds and ceased immediately once Carter was outside; (2) Dupuy had legitimate reasons to remove Carter, including knowledge of the child abuse investigation and Carter's refusal to comply with his instructions; and (3) under the Graham v. Connor factors and totality of circumstances, such minimal force was not "clearly excessive and unreasonable." The court also reversed the denial of summary judgment on Carter's state law claims, finding they similarly failed because Dupuy did not use excessive force.

This is an appeal of a district court's interlocutory order denying a stay of discovery and deferring a qualified immunity ruling in an excessive force case. The plaintiff's guardian sued a police officer and hospital defendants after the officer tackled the plaintiff, causing permanent incapacity, following the plaintiff's public urination outside a hospital.

1. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review an interlocutory discovery order under the collateral order doctrine when qualified immunity is at issue
2. Whether a district court properly deferred ruling on a qualified immunity motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) by ordering further discovery without finding a genuine dispute of material fact
3. Whether the district court adequately considered all available evidence, including video evidence, when determining whether discovery was necessary to resolve the qualified immunity issue
4. Whether the appellate court should reach the merits of the qualified immunity claim or remand to the district court

The Sixth Circuit held that it has jurisdiction to review the district court's order because an inappropriate Rule 56(d) deferral effectively denies qualified immunity. The court vacated the district court's order, finding that the district court erred by deferring the summary judgment ruling without adequately analyzing whether a genuine dispute of material fact existed. Specifically, the district court failed to address video evidence showing the relevant events and did not properly determine whether discovery was actually necessary to resolve the qualified immunity issue. The court emphasized that officers are entitled to a qualified immunity decision at the earliest stage because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not liability, and defendants should avoid the disruptiveness of discovery. The court remanded the case to the district court to properly analyze the qualified immunity motion in light of all available evidence, rather than deciding the merits itself.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in which a minor student alleges that a school security officer used excessive force during a cafeteria altercation by taking her to the ground and placing his knee on her neck within 44 seconds. The defendant officer appeals the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

1. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment when material factual disputes exist regarding the excessive force claim
2. Whether video evidence from surveillance cameras conclusively establishes the facts necessary to determine if the officer violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law
3. Whether the officer used excessive force by applying substantial force after the student stopped resisting, or whether the student was still resisting when force was applied

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that because material factual disputes exist regarding whether the student was resisting at the time the officer placed his knee on her neck, and whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances, the case cannot be resolved on appeal at the summary judgment stage. Although video evidence can sometimes conclusively establish facts, the surveillance footage in this case was pixelated and did not capture all relevant action, making it impossible to definitively determine when the student stopped struggling or the duration and force of the knee placement. The court reasoned that only a trial can resolve these factual disputes and determine whether the officer violated clearly established law, which is the proper scope of appellate review in qualified immunity cases.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction in a voting rights case challenging Indiana's Senate Bill 10, which eliminated student IDs from state-run universities as acceptable proof of identification for voting. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the law during the state's primary election, and the district court granted the injunction, prompting the State to seek an emergency stay pending appeal.

1. Whether Senate Bill 10's exclusion of student IDs from acceptable voter identification documents imposes an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote
2. Whether the law intentionally discriminates against young voters in violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
3. Whether a federal court should enjoin election rules on the eve of an election (the "Purcell principle")
4. Whether the State is entitled to a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted the State's emergency motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction pending appeal. The court held that the Purcell principle—which discourages lower federal courts from altering election rules on the eve of an election—applies here. The court found that the district court's injunction, issued seven days after voting had already begun and unilaterally changing voter eligibility rules, constituted a clear violation of Purcell. The court emphasized that federalism concerns and the risk of disruption to Indiana's primary election were dispositive, particularly given that the injunction altered who could cast a ballot mid-election. The court noted that while injunctions can sometimes issue during ongoing elections, mid-stream relief on voter eligibility matters violates the Purcell principle.

This is a wage-and-hour class action appeal brought by former Jack in the Box employees challenging three employer policies: overdeductions from the Workers' Benefit Fund (WBF), failure to pay for interrupted meal periods, and deductions for non-slip shoes. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court's judgment, addressing issues of willfulness, class certification, and statutory interpretation under Oregon law.

1. Whether JITB willfully overdeducted WBF contributions from employee wages, entitling employees to penalty wages
2. Whether employees can recover wages for shortened meal breaks under Oregon's meal break regulation
3. Whether shoe deductions were "for the employee's benefit" as required by Oregon statute
4. Whether the district court properly denied class certification for unpaid break claims
5. Whether written authorization is a defense to minimum wage and overtime violations
6. Whether prejudgment interest can be reduced based on plaintiff delays
7. Whether the cross-appeal was timely filed

1. WBF Overdeductions: The court reversed the district court's summary judgment finding of willfulness and remanded for trial. The court held that while JITB overdeducted, a reasonable jury could find JITB did not know about the error, as the overdeductions were minuscule (0.4 cents per hour) and JITB relied on payroll software. The court also held that the district court erred in its constitutional analysis of penalty wages by failing to consider that penalty wages are punitive, not compensatory, and by ignoring the ratio between the penalty ($5.3 million) and actual damages ($13,468).
2. Late Final Pay 1 Theory: The court affirmed the district court's reconsideration allowing plaintiffs to present a damages theory for WBF overdeductions without minimum wage or overtime violations, finding no abuse of discretion and that one judge could modify another judge's interlocutory rulings.
3. Unpaid Meal Breaks: The court reversed the district court's denial of class certification and granted JMOL on individual claims. The court held that under Oregon law (as interpreted in Maza v. Waterford Operations and Athena v. Pelican Brewing), employers must pay for full 30-minute meal periods even when shortened, regardless of whether the employee voluntarily returned or was ordered back. This obligation applied before the June 2010 regulatory amendment. The court rejected the district court's reasoning that the reason for each shortened break mattered and that Maza applied only prospectively.
4. Shoe Deductions: The court reversed the district court's summary judgment that shoe deductions were "for the employee's benefit." A reasonable jury could find that the ultimate reason for requiring Shoes for Crews was for JITB's benefit (to collect $2 rebates per shoe and indemnities), not the employees' benefit, particularly since a competitor charged $2 less. The court remanded for the district court to reconsider class certification and for a jury trial on whether the shoes benefited employees.
5. Written Authorization Defense: The court held that written authorization is not a defense to minimum wage and overtime violations under Oregon Revised Statute § 653.055, even though it is a defense to wrongful deduction claims under § 652.610(3)(b). The statutes do not cross-reference each other on this issue.
6. Class Notice: The court affirmed the district court's decision not to exclude 856 class members whose mailed notices were undeliverable, finding the district court provided the best notice practicable and that JITB failed to identify alternative methods to reach class members.
7. Prejudgment Interest: The court affirmed that prejudgment interest cannot be reduced for plaintiff delays. Oregon law mandates prejudgment interest on all moneys after they become due, and the statute creates no discretion to reduce it. The court adopted the reasoning of New York and Ohio over Florida and Delaware, holding that prejudgment interest is compensatory, not punitive, and should run from when damages become ascertainable.
8. Jurisdiction/Timeliness: The court held the cross-appeal was timely. When a district court grants a Rule 50(b) motion and enters an amended judgment, the 30-day appeal deadline runs from the amended judgment, not from the order granting the motion.

This is a wage-and-hour class action appeal brought by former Jack in the Box employees challenging three employer policies: overdeductions from the Workers' Benefit Fund (WBF), failure to pay for interrupted meal periods, and deductions for non-slip shoes. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings on willfulness, meal break pay, and shoe deduction claims.

1. Whether JITB willfully overdeducted WBF contributions, entitling employees to penalty wages
2. Whether plaintiffs waived a "Late Final Pay 1" damages theory for WBF overdeductions
3. Whether penalty wage awards violate constitutional due process limits
4. Whether class members who did not receive mailed notices should be excluded
5. Whether prejudgment interest can be reduced for plaintiff delays
6. Whether an unpaid meal break class should be certified under Oregon law
7. Whether shoe deductions were "for the employee's benefit" under Oregon statute

1. WBF Willfulness: The court reversed summary judgment finding willfulness was established, holding that a reasonable jury could find JITB did not knowingly overdeduct given the minuscule amounts involved and reliance on payroll software. The case is remanded for trial on willfulness.
2. Late Final Pay 1 Theory: The court affirmed the district court's reconsideration allowing plaintiffs to present this damages theory, finding no abuse of discretion and that one judge may modify another judge's interlocutory orders.
3. Constitutional Limits on Penalty Wages: The court held the district court erred by failing to consider that Oregon penalty wages are punitive rather than compensatory, and by refusing to consider the ratio between penalty wages ($5.3 million) and actual damages ($13,468), which was nearly 400:1. On remand, the district court must reassess constitutional proportionality.
4. Class Notice: The court affirmed the district court's decision not to exclude 856 class members whose mailed notices were undeliverable, finding the notice provided was the best practicable under the circumstances.
5. Prejudgment Interest: The court affirmed that Oregon law does not permit reducing prejudgment interest for plaintiff delays, as the statute mandates interest on all money after it becomes due, and reducing it would prevent full compensation for loss of use of money.
6. Unpaid Meal Breaks: The court reversed the denial of class certification, holding that under Oregon law (as interpreted in Maza v. Waterford Operations and Athena v. Pelican Brewing), employers must pay for full 30-minute meal periods even when shortened, regardless of the reason. This requirement applied before June 2010, and the district court erred in requiring individualized inquiries about why breaks were shortened.
7. Shoe Deductions: The court reversed summary judgment for JITB on the "for employee's benefit" defense, holding that a reasonable jury could find the ultimate reason for shoe deductions was to benefit JITB (through rebates and indemnities) rather than employees. The court remanded for jury determination and for reconsideration of class certification.