Opinions

This is an appeal in a case involving plaintiffs who are firearms instructors, gunsmiths, and shooting range operators challenging actions taken by the Maine Attorney General. The case concerns constitutional or statutory issues related to firearms regulation and licensing.

The opinion does not provide substantive details about the key legal issues, as this document is an errata sheet that only contains technical corrections to a previously issued opinion.

This document is an errata sheet issued on April 3, 2026, which amends the Court's opinion by making two minor technical corrections: (1) adding a period after the word "firearm" on page 7, line 21, and (2) replacing "(citation modified)" with "(quotation modified)" on page 14, line 14. The errata sheet does not address the substantive ruling on the merits of the case.

This is a civil rights case in which Jeffery Payne sued Sergeant Joshua Moser for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment after Moser directed detectives to use tactical vehicle maneuvers (ramming) to stop Payne's car during a failed controlled drug buy operation, and subsequently shot Payne through his car window. The district court granted summary judgment to Moser, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

1. Whether Sergeant Moser used excessive force when he directed detectives to conduct a tactical vehicle intercept (TVI) and precision immobilization technique (PIT)—including ramming Payne's vehicle—to stop him from leaving a shopping complex parking lot without first identifying themselves as police or giving Payne an opportunity to pull over.
2. Whether Sergeant Moser used excessive force when he shot Payne through the back window of his car based on a perceived reaching motion toward the center console, when Payne claims he never made such a movement and was unarmed.
3. Whether genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment in an excessive force case under the Graham v. Connor factors (severity of crime, immediate threat to safety, and active resistance/evasion).
4. Whether Sergeant Moser is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. TVI/PIT Maneuvers: Viewing facts in the light most favorable to Payne, the use of force to stop his vehicle was not objectively reasonable as a matter of law. The court emphasized that Payne was driving slowly out of a shopping complex in unmarked police vehicles without police lights or sirens activated, posed no immediate threat to officers or the public, and had no opportunity to pull over. The court distinguished cases upholding such maneuvers, which typically involved high-speed pursuits endangering the public. The second Graham factor (immediate threat) weighed heavily in Payne's favor and was deemed the most important factor.
2. The Shooting: Genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether Payne made a furtive or threatening movement toward the center console. Payne testified he kept his left hand on the steering wheel and his left arm at his side, while Sergeant Moser claimed he saw Payne reach toward the center console. The court noted that simply being armed does not justify deadly force without a furtive or threatening movement, and without video evidence to corroborate either account, summary judgment was inappropriate. The court declined to make credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage.
3. Qualified Immunity: The district court must consider on remand whether Sergeant Moser is entitled to qualified immunity, as the lower court did not reach this issue.

This is an appeal of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in which the debtor, Christopher Cook, challenged a district court's dismissal of his appeal on equitable mootness grounds. Cook sought review of the bankruptcy court's denial of confirmation of his first proposed repayment plan.

1. Whether the doctrine of equitable mootness was properly applied to dismiss Cook's appeal without addressing the merits
2. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying confirmation of Cook's first proposed plan on the grounds that it was not proposed in good faith and failed the liquidation test

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's application of equitable mootness and affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of Cook's first plan on the merits. The court held that equitable mootness is a pragmatic doctrine reserved for complex cases where relief would be impractical or inequitable, and is not appropriately applied to simple, small-dollar Chapter 13 cases like Cook's. Applying the "Mac Panel factors," the court found that relief was practically available because Cook sought only a prospective adjustment to his monthly payments with no assets liquidated or property transferred. On the merits, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that Cook's first plan was not proposed in good faith, based on inaccuracies in his sworn documentation, inconsistent testimony, and shifting explanations for expenses.

This case involves a dispute between Rieth-Riley Construction Company and Local 324 of the International Union of Operating Engineers over collective bargaining following the union's 2018 withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining agreement. After years of litigation and an ongoing strike, the NLRB found that Rieth-Riley committed unfair labor practices by unilaterally raising wages, withdrawing recognition from the union, refusing to bargain, and failing to provide requested information.

1. Whether Rieth-Riley's unilateral wage increases in 2021 and 2022 violated the NLRA, or whether the union waived its right to bargain over them
2. Whether Rieth-Riley withdrew recognition from the union through its pattern of conduct
3. Whether Rieth-Riley properly invoked the "technical refusal to bargain" doctrine to obtain judicial review of the Board's dismissal of decertification petitions
4. Whether the Board's bargaining order was properly issued

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Rieth-Riley's petition for review and enforced the NLRB's order. The court held:

1. Wage Increases: Substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Rieth-Riley failed to provide "clear and unequivocal notice" of the 2021 and 2022 wage increases to the union. General testimony about potential wage adjustments during a 2020 hearing was insufficient notice, and the union did not waive its bargaining rights.
2. Withdrawal of Recognition: The company's pattern of conduct—including unilateral wage increases over multiple years, an explicit June 2022 refusal to bargain, and failure to provide requested information—demonstrated an intent to completely sever its relationship with the union, constituting a withdrawal of recognition.
3. Technical Refusal to Bargain: Rieth-Riley could not properly invoke the technical-refusal-to-bargain doctrine to challenge the dismissal of decertification petitions. This doctrine applies only when a Board decision creates, clarifies, or eliminates a bargaining obligation. The dismissal of the petitions merely maintained the status quo and did not change Rieth-Riley's preexisting duty to bargain with the union. Therefore, Rieth-Riley's refusal to bargain was not a valid technical refusal but rather a straightforward violation of the NLRA.
4. Bargaining Order: The court lacked jurisdiction to consider Rieth-Riley's challenge to the Board's bargaining order because the company failed to raise this objection before the Board in a petition for reconsideration or rehearing.

This is a criminal appeal in which a defendant convicted of sex trafficking challenges the district court's denial of his request for court-appointed counsel during trial after he had previously waived his right to counsel and chosen to represent himself. The defendant had cycled through five court-appointed attorneys and twice validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel after full Faretta hearings.

1. Whether a district court abuses its discretion by denying a defendant's midtrial request for counsel after the defendant has validly waived his right to counsel and chosen self-representation
2. Whether a judge must conduct an inquiry into the defendant's motives for changing his mind and assess the probable duration of delay before denying such a request
3. Whether a district court may limit the number of court-appointed attorneys provided when a defendant repeatedly refuses to cooperate with his counsel

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Perry's midtrial request for counsel. The court held that once a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel after a full Faretta hearing, the district court may hold him to that decision if he later changes his mind, particularly after trial has begun. The court found no requirement for a "Faretta-lite" inquiry examining the defendant's motives or assessing delay. Additionally, the court held that a district judge has discretion to deny requests for new counsel when a defendant has repeatedly refused to cooperate with multiple court-appointed attorneys. The judge's summary denial was reasonable and fair given Perry's history of non-cooperation with five attorneys, persistent pro se filings, baseless claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and violations of protective orders.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Marwan Mahajni sued two deputies for violating his constitutional rights during jury deliberations in a criminal case. Deputy Vu Do told jurors they must reach a unanimous verdict and could not be hung, while Deputy Scott Woida was present but did not intervene or report the incident to the court.

1. Whether the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Deputy Woida constitutes a final, appealable decision under the collateral order doctrine
2. Whether Deputy Woida is entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged failure to intervene and failure to report Deputy Do's improper statements to the jury
3. Whether a clearly established right existed at the time of the alleged conduct regarding a bailiff's duty to prevent or report improper jury communications

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The majority held that the district court did not make a final, definitive ruling on Deputy Woida's qualified immunity claim. Instead, the district court postponed the decision, explicitly stating it was denying qualified immunity "without prejudice" and inviting Deputy Woida to raise the issue again at summary judgment. The court found that because neither party had adequately addressed Deputy Woida's specific conduct (failure to intervene and failure to report), the district court lacked sufficient legal argument to decide the qualified immunity question on the merits. The majority reasoned that a postponement of qualified immunity decisions is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine, which only permits immediate appeals of definitive rulings on immunity. Judge Kirsch dissented, arguing that the district court made adequate factual and legal findings to constitute a final decision on a pure question of law, and that Deputy Woida was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law prohibited a bailiff from failing to intervene to stop a colleague's improper jury communication.

This is an appeal in a Title IX case where a male student, identified as "John Doe," was found responsible for sexual assault by a university hearing panel and subsequently suspended. The plaintiff sued the University of Southern Indiana alleging sex discrimination, due process violations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and this appeal addresses whether he may proceed under a pseudonym while keeping his real name confidential.

1. Whether an adult plaintiff in a Title IX lawsuit may proceed under a pseudonym rather than disclosing his real name in federal court proceedings
2. Whether the plaintiff satisfied the "substantial risk of harm" standard required to use a pseudonym, specifically regarding claims of physical danger and mental health risks
3. Whether the court should broaden the standard for pseudonym use to protect a party's mental health in addition to physical safety
4. Whether the merits of the underlying Title IX claims should factor into the decision to allow pseudonym use

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiff's request to proceed under a pseudonym. The court applied the established "substantial risk of harm" standard from prior Title IX cases (Indiana University and Loyola Chicago), requiring either physical harm or retaliation beyond embarrassment. The court found the plaintiff failed to meet this standard because: (1) social media threats from 2021 were stale with no subsequent harm despite the plaintiff's known identity to some posters; (2) the plaintiff had left the Midwest with no intention to return; and (3) there was no credible evidence of intent to follow through on threats years later. The court declined to broaden the standard to include mental health risks, acknowledging that while the plaintiff's suicidal ideation was serious, the line between embarrassment, stress, and mental illness is not sharp enough to warrant expansion of the pseudonym exception. The court also rejected both parties' arguments that the merits of the case should influence the pseudonym decision, reasoning that such a test would be incongruous with the principle that pseudonym decisions are collateral orders separate from the merits. However, the court offered the plaintiff the option to dismiss the appeals by May 13, 2026, to avoid public disclosure of his name, or proceed with the appeals knowing his real name would be used in the public decision.

This is an appeal of a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Bank of America in a case brought by Mohammad Farshad Abdollah Nia, an Iranian citizen, after the Bank closed his account pursuant to its Consumer Residency Monitoring policy. Nia brought claims under federal civil rights statutes and California law, alleging discrimination based on his citizenship status.

1. Whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act's (IEEPA) liability shield provision, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3), applies only to actions specifically compelled by sanctions regulations or to actions taken "pursuant to and in reliance on" such regulations more broadly.
2. Whether Bank of America's Consumer Residency Monitoring policy, which requires citizens of comprehensively sanctioned countries to periodically submit proof of residency, falls within the scope of IEEPA's liability shield.
3. Whether the Bank acted in good faith when it closed Nia's account after mistakenly classifying a Form I-797C as permanent rather than temporary proof of residency.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Bank of America. The court held that:

1. IEEPA's liability shield applies to actions taken "pursuant to and in reliance on" sanctions regulations, not merely to actions compelled by those regulations. The plain language of the statute—including the terms "pursuant," "reliance," "instruction," and "direction"—does not require compulsion.
2. Bank of America's Consumer Residency Monitoring policy falls comfortably within the liability shield's scope because it is built around the demands of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and is explicitly permitted by Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) guidance, which allows financial institutions to account for citizenship in comprehensively sanctioned countries as a risk factor in their sanctions compliance programs.
3. Nia failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Bank's good faith. The Bank's mistaken classification of the Form I-797C was not shown to be made in bad faith; the Bank's citizenship-based application of its policy adheres to OFAC guidance; and third-party complaints and CFPB complaints do not create a genuine dispute about good faith, particularly given that the Bank has served 67,000 Iranian citizen accountholders since 2016 without widespread issues.

This is a criminal appeal involving a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer convicted of attempted online enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant engaged in text communications and planned an in-person meeting with an undercover law enforcement decoy posing as a 13-year-old girl.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for attempted enticement of a minor, specifically whether the statute requires proof that the defendant attempted to "transform or overcome the will of a minor"
2. Whether the defendant's repeated statements that he did not believe the minor's age undermined the conviction
3. Whether the government's failure to preserve the final published decoy advertisement violated Brady v. Maryland and California v. Trombetta
4. Whether the district court properly imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on alleged perjury

The court affirmed the conviction and vacated the sentence for resentencing. Regarding the conviction: (1) The court held that Section 2422(b) does not require proof that the defendant attempted to transform or overcome a minor's will; the statute only requires that the defendant knowingly attempted to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the minor to engage in sexual activity, regardless of the minor's willingness. (2) A rational jury could find all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the defendant's conduct constituted a substantial step toward completing the offense. The jury was entitled to reject the defendant's testimony that he did not believe the minor's age. (3) The court found no viable Brady claim regarding either the missing "Warning in Moses Post" or the "Yours or Mine Post," as the defendant could not demonstrate materiality and exculpatory value. Regarding sentencing: The court agreed with the government that the district court committed reversible error by imposing an obstruction of justice enhancement without making explicit findings that the defendant's testimony was false, material, and willfully intended to obstruct justice, as required by Supreme Court precedent.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Jordan Thompson, a police officer, was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon after entering his estranged wife's military housing with a gun and threatening to shoot another service member. Thompson appeals both the denial of his motion for a new trial and his sentence.

1. Whether the appellate court retains jurisdiction over the case after Thompson's release from federal custody during the appeal
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Thompson's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence suggesting the witnesses colluded to lie
3. Whether the district court plainly erred by considering Thompson's status as a police officer as a basis for imposing a higher sentence

1. Jurisdiction: The court retained jurisdiction despite Thompson's release from custody because his conviction carries collateral consequences and his unexpired term of supervised release could be affected by the appeal.
2. New Trial Motion: The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial. Thompson failed to satisfy the second prong of the Cordova standard because he lacked reasonable diligence in investigating the evidence before trial. Specifically, Thompson was aware of the witness (McPhaul) before trial and had the investigative resources to contact her, yet failed to do so despite her relevance to his credibility-based defense strategy.
3. Sentencing Error: The court found plain error in the district court's reliance on Thompson's status as a police officer to justify an increased sentence. The court held that a defendant's occupation as a law enforcement officer, standing alone, is not a justifiable reason to increase a sentence. The district court's explicit statements that Thompson's police officer status was "the basis for why I'm doing what I'm doing" and listing it as an aggravating factor constituted clear error that affected Thompson's substantial rights and the integrity of judicial proceedings. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

This is an administrative law case reviewing a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) debarment order against Jessica Palacio, a former clinical trial coordinator who was convicted of making a false statement to the FDA during an investigation into irregularities in clinical trial data.

1. Whether the FDA's permanent debarment of Palacio was required by law under 21 U.S.C. § 335a(a)(2), which mandates debarment for individuals convicted of felonies relating to drug development or approval
2. Whether the phrase "relating to the development or approval, including the process for development or approval, of any drug product" encompasses false statements made during post-trial FDA investigations
3. Whether temporal limitations apply to the statute—specifically, whether conduct must occur during an active clinical trial to qualify for mandatory debarment
4. Whether the debarment order was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act

The court denied Palacio's petition for review and upheld the FDA's debarment order. The court held that: (1) the ordinary meaning of "relating to" is broad and capacious, encompassing all things logically connected with drug development or approval; (2) Palacio's false statement to the FDA during an investigation into clinical trial integrity directly relates to the drug approval process because it impeded investigation into that process; (3) the statute contains no temporal or causal limitations, so the fact that the false statement was made nearly two years after the trial ended does not remove it from the statute's scope; (4) the statute covers conduct relating to "the process for development or approval," not just specific drug development; and (5) the debarment was not arbitrary and capricious because Palacio's conduct satisfied the plain language of the mandatory debarment statute.

This is an administrative law case in which Spirit Airlines challenges a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) audit determination requiring the airline to remit security fees collected from customers who did not travel. The case involves interpretation of the fee collection and remittance requirements under federal aviation security law.

1. Whether the TSA has statutory authority to collect security fees from customers who do not actually travel as passengers
2. Whether expired travel credits constitute valid "refunds" under the security fee statute and TSA guidance
3. Whether the TSA's interpretation of the refund requirement provides fair notice to airlines under due process principles
4. The proper interpretation of 49 U.S.C. § 44940, specifically the distinction between "fees imposed" and "amounts collected" and the scope of the Administration's discretionary refund authority

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Spirit Airlines' petition for review and upheld the TSA's liability determination of $2,838,849.11. The court held that: (1) although the security fee statute contemplates active passengers, section 44940(e) requires airlines to remit all "amounts collected" to the TSA regardless of whether travel occurs; (2) expired travel credits do not constitute refunds under the TSA's 2002 guidance, which requires airlines to either refund fees to customers or remit them to the TSA when customers do not travel; (3) Spirit had fair notice through both the plain statutory text and the TSA's publicly posted 2002 guidance that it could not retain security fees from expired credits; and (4) the TSA's discretionary refund authority under section 44940(g) supports the agency's interpretation that airlines are merely temporary custodians of collected fees.

This case addresses whether advancement of litigation expenses for former ERISA fund fiduciaries defending state-law claims is barred by ERISA section 1110, which voids provisions that relieve fiduciaries from responsibility or liability. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the lower court's determination that such advancement was prohibited by federal law.

1. Whether ERISA section 1110 bars advancement of defense costs for state-law fiduciary duty claims brought in state court against former ERISA fiduciaries
2. Whether advancement provisions that require an undertaking to repay advanced funds if the fiduciary is ultimately found not entitled to indemnification violate ERISA's prohibition on relieving fiduciaries from responsibility or liability
3. The distinction between advancement and indemnification rights and their separate legal effects under ERISA
4. Whether the Third Circuit's decision in Secretary of Labor v. Koresko categorically bars all advancement from ERISA plan assets

The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery's holding that ERISA section 1110 bars advancement. The court held that the requested advancement does not violate section 1110 because: (1) advancement and indemnification are distinct legal rights, with advancement being narrower in scope and serving only to provide interim relief from litigation expenses; (2) the advancement here is expressly conditioned on a written undertaking to repay if the fiduciary is ultimately found not entitled to indemnification, meaning the Fund retains its right to recover from the fiduciaries for any ERISA breaches; (3) the advancement is sought for expenses incurred defending state-law claims in state court, not ERISA claims, and therefore does not relieve ERISA fiduciary responsibility or liability; and (4) Koresko is distinguishable because it involved advancement without an undertaking requirement and did not address state-law claims. The court balanced Delaware's strong policy favoring advancement rights against the federal interest in protecting ERISA plan assets, concluding that advancement conditioned on an undertaking does not impermissibly relieve fiduciary responsibility under section 1110.

This is a stockholder class action case arising from a squeeze-out merger of Orbit/Fr, Inc. in which the lead plaintiff, AB Value Partners, L.P., seeks an incentive award for its substantial contributions to the litigation that resulted in a $17.85 million settlement, significantly exceeding the original proposed settlement amount.

1. Whether the lead plaintiff is entitled to an incentive award based on the time, effort, expertise, and resources expended in the litigation
2. Whether the lead plaintiff generated significant benefits for the class through its litigation efforts
3. The appropriate amount of an incentive award by comparison to prior precedent cases
4. Whether an incentive award creates conflicts of interest or perverse incentives that could undermine the litigation process

The court granted AB Value's request for an incentive award in the amount of $730,000. The court found that AB Value satisfied all relevant factors: (1) AB Value expended substantial time, effort, and resources, including posting $395,000 in security, fronting counsel fees, and having its Chief Operating Officer devote over 2,400 hours to the case; (2) AB Value contributed meaningfully to obtaining a 235% premium over the deal price ($17.85 million versus $7.6 million deal value), which is more than double the nearest precedent in similar cases; (3) the implied hourly rate of $302 per hour is consistent with recent precedent cases such as Santander ($307/hour) and El Paso ($300/hour); and (4) there was no risk that the incentive award created problematic conflicts or perverse incentives in this case. The court emphasized that incentive awards serve important public policy functions by compensating lead plaintiffs for the risks and burdens of litigation and incentivizing effective private enforcement of stockholder rights.

This is a consolidated derivative litigation case in which Tesla stockholders challenged fiduciary breaches by company executives and directors. The central issue is whether the court should enforce a newly adopted Texas forum selection bylaw or the prior Delaware forum selection bylaw that was in effect when the lawsuits were filed.

1. Whether a forum selection bylaw adopted after derivative lawsuits are filed should be enforced instead of the prior bylaw in effect at the time of filing
2. Whether enforcing the Texas Forum Bylaw violates Delaware General Corporation Law Section 266(e), which preserves the choice of law for matters arising prior to conversion
3. Whether enforcing the Texas Forum Bylaw violates Delaware General Corporation Law Section 115, which restricts bylaws prohibiting internal corporate claims in Delaware courts
4. Whether the Texas Forum Bylaw is unreasonable or unjust as applied, particularly given claims that stockholders were misled about the Redomestication and concerns about less favorable Texas law

The court granted defendants' motions to dismiss and enforced the Texas Forum Bylaw. The court held that: (1) venue need not be determined solely based on facts existing at the time complaints were filed; courts may look to later points in time such as when defendants appear; (2) the Texas Forum Bylaw does not violate Section 266(e) because stockholders never had a vested right to litigate in a particular forum, and Delaware corporate law rejects the "vested rights" doctrine; (3) Section 115 does not apply because it governs Delaware corporations, and Tesla was no longer a Delaware corporation when it adopted the Texas Forum Bylaw; and (4) plaintiffs failed to meet their heavy burden of showing the bylaw is unreasonable or unjust as applied—challenges to the underlying Redomestication cannot undermine a valid forum selection clause, and the court will not second-guess stockholders' choice of forum by comparing Texas and Delaware law. The court emphasized that the Texas Forum Bylaw was publicly announced before litigation commenced and became effective just days after filing, before defendants appeared or meaningful litigation occurred, making this an especially strong case for enforcement.

This is a breach of contract action brought by a stockholder against a corporation that acquired his company through merger. The stockholder sought payment of merger consideration that the corporation had conditioned upon execution of a release agreement, which the stockholder refused to sign.

1. Whether the corporation breached its certificate of incorporation by conditioning payment of merger consideration on the stockholder's execution of a release agreement
2. Whether a stockholder who demands appraisal but withdraws that demand is entitled to merger consideration without executing additional documents
3. Whether the stockholder is entitled to damages exceeding the per-share merger consideration provided in the merger agreement
4. Whether the stockholder is entitled to prejudgment interest and at what rate
5. Whether the stockholder is entitled to attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception

The court ruled in favor of the stockholder (Chertok) on his breach of contract claim. The court concluded that: (1) the corporation breached the certificate of incorporation by conditioning payment of merger consideration on execution of a release agreement lacking independent consideration; (2) under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 262, a stockholder who timely withdraws an appraisal demand is entitled to merger consideration without additional conditions; (3) the stockholder's damages are limited to his pro rata share of the merger consideration as calculated under the merger agreement terms, not a higher amount; (4) the stockholder is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right, awarded at the legal rate of 6.75% (the rate in effect when payment became due) without compounding, in the court's discretion; and (5) the stockholder's request for attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception is denied because he failed to demonstrate the corporation acted in bad faith. The court awarded total damages of $498,558.02 plus simple prejudgment interest from July 29, 2017, through the date of judgment.

This is a discovery dispute in a Delaware Court of Chancery case where the court resolves exceptions to a Special Discovery Magistrate's report regarding the scope of document production and deposition examination concerning ownership of AMFI Corp. stock.

1. Whether defendants must produce documents reflecting direct and indirect ownership of and purchases and sales of their equity securities
2. Whether the scope of deposition examination should include inquiry into direct or indirect ownership of Class A or Class B shares of AMFI stock
3. Whether discovery should extend to stock ledgers of non-parties and defendants' knowledge of non-parties' stock ownership

The court sustained defendants' exceptions in part, clarifying that plaintiff is not permitted discovery into stock ledgers of non-parties or defendants' knowledge of non-parties' ownership of defendant stock, except as it relates to Class B stock. The court overruled plaintiff's exceptions except to the extent plaintiff requested verification of interrogatories, which was sustained. The court's ruling was based on consistency with its prior January 28, 2026 ruling and the need to limit overbroad discovery.

This is a stockholder class action challenging a September 2024 spin-off transaction by Liberty Media Corporation that eliminated a tracking stock trading at a significant discount to net asset value. The plaintiffs allege that the special committee and other directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to negotiate adequate compensation for minority stockholders in exchange for the elimination of this multi-billion dollar benefit that accrued solely to Liberty.

1. Whether plaintiffs adequately pleaded non-exculpated claims against the Non-Committee Defendants under the Cornerstone standard, specifically whether voting in favor of a conflicted-controller transaction satisfies the "action element" of a loyalty breach claim at the pleading stage.
2. Whether plaintiffs adequately pleaded a "controlled mindset" theory of disloyalty against the Committee Defendants, and what level of process defects are necessary to infer bad faith by otherwise independent and disinterested directors.
3. Whether certain claims challenging the debt-shifting provisions constitute derivative claims that were extinguished under Lewis v. Anderson when the merger closed.

The court denied the Non-Committee Defendants' motion to dismiss Count III and granted the Committee Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II.

Reasoning:

Non-Committee Defendants: The court held that voting in favor of a transaction is sufficient to satisfy the "action element" of Cornerstone's non-exculpated claim requirement at the pleading stage. Following Foundation Building Materials and BGC I, the court reasoned that a vote in favor of a conflicted-controller transaction constitutes an "action to advance" the controller's interest. The court rejected the defendants' argument that more than a vote is required, noting that at the pleading stage, stockholders often lack full insight into directors' conduct beyond the vote. Requiring more would discourage meritorious suits against fiduciaries who approved transactions benefiting controllers from whom they lacked independence. Since plaintiffs adequately alleged that each Non-Committee Defendant lacked independence from Liberty and voted for the Transactions, they stated a non-exculpated claim.

Committee Defendants: The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs failed to allege the "extreme set of process flaws" necessary to infer a controlled mindset and bad faith. While the court acknowledged that controlled-mindset theories can support a reasonable inference of disloyal conduct when combined with extreme process defects (citing Viacom, CBS, and Berteau), plaintiffs' allegations fell short. The court found that: (1) the committee's agreement to Liberty's all-stock structure did not demonstrate dictation, as the committee negotiated over the reference price; (2) the committee's decision not to pursue a majority-of-the-minority vote was reasonably explained by concerns about jeopardizing the deal given the company's small public float; (3) providing preliminary feedback within a week did not support an inference of bad faith; and (4) while Maffei's exclusion of director Amble from the committee raised some concern, it did not demonstrate that the Committee Defendants themselves acted disloyally. The allegations did not rise to the level of extreme facts present in cases like Viacom, where the controller hand-picked committee members, dominated decision-making, and the committee failed to secure any minority protections.

Lewis Argument: The court denied the Non-Committee Defendants' motion to dismiss aspects of Count III under Lewis without prejudice, based on plaintiffs' representation that they were not asserting an independent derivative claim based on the debt-shifting provisions but rather challenging the fairness of the entire Transactions.

This is a discovery dispute in a commercial litigation case where non-party ProPublica challenged redactions made by the parties in deposition transcripts filed with the court. The parties sought continued confidential treatment of the redacted information under Court of Chancery Rule 5.1.

1. Whether the public's presumptive right of access to judicial records under the First Amendment and common law outweighs parties' requests for confidential treatment of sensitive information
2. Whether redacted information meets the definition of "Confidential Information" under Court of Chancery Rule 5.1, which requires that information be: (A) maintained confidentially; (B) not otherwise publicly available; (C) likely to cause particularized harm if disclosed; and (D) where the harm from disclosure outweighs the public interest
3. Whether the materiality of redacted information to the court's decision affects the balance between public access and confidentiality protection

The court granted both parties' motions for continued confidential treatment. The court reasoned that: (1) the redacted information—including third-party interests in BitGo, BitGo's competitive strategy, non-public financial information, Galaxy's HR information, regulatory information, and internal budget figures—was not relied upon by the court in its decision denying leave to move for summary judgment, making it immaterial to public understanding of the dispute; (2) the redacted information constitutes sensitive business and personal information that is non-public and could cause particularized harm to competitive standing and business relationships if disclosed; and (3) the public record already contains sufficient information to understand the parties' claims and the court's ruling, so the redactions do not impair public access to meaningful information about the case.

This is a stockholder lawsuit arising from alleged misconduct at Jenzabar, Inc., an education technology company. The plaintiffs, minority stockholders, sued the company's founders and directors for allegedly advancing legal fees and paying a judgment on behalf of founder Robert Maginn following a prior court decision, and for an alleged scheme between 2010-2015 to dilute minority shareholders through improper bonuses and compensation while concentrating ownership among insiders.

1. Whether the plaintiffs' claims are direct or derivative in nature, and whether they can proceed as direct claims under recognized exceptions
2. Whether the indemnification-related claims are ripe for adjudication or premature given that the underlying indemnification determination is still pending
3. Whether the plaintiffs' claims are time-barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations, and whether any tolling doctrines apply to extend the limitations period

The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on all three threshold grounds. First, the court held that the plaintiffs' claims are exclusively derivative, not direct, because they allege harm to the corporation (improper extraction of assets and equity) rather than direct harm to individual shareholders. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the claims fit within recognized exceptions for Revlon transactions or wrongful impairment of voting power. Second, the court found that the indemnification-related claims are unripe because Jenzabar has only advanced (not indemnified) Maginn's legal fees, and the ultimate indemnification determination is still being litigated in a separate proceeding. Third, the court determined that the remaining claims are time-barred. The alleged misconduct occurred between 2010-2015, making the claims subject to a three-year statute of limitations that expired between 2013-2018. The plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of their claims by July 2014 when a prior court opinion regarding similar compensation issues was publicly filed, and none of the three tolling doctrines (inherently unknowable injuries, fraudulent concealment, or equitable tolling) applied. Since the lawsuit was filed in April 2024, over six years after the limitations period expired, the claims were time-barred. The court dismissed most counts with prejudice and certain indemnification-related claims without prejudice.

This is an appeal of a diversity jurisdiction case arising under Puerto Rico law involving a wrongful death claim stemming from an elderly woman's death at an assisted living facility. The central issue is whether an insurance policy's "professional services" exclusion bars coverage for the facility's alleged negligence, with the District Court's application of an intervening Puerto Rico Supreme Court decision being the key point of contention on appeal.

1. Whether the appellant forfeited her argument that an intervening Puerto Rico Supreme Court decision (Rivera-Matos) should not apply retroactively to the insurance coverage dispute
2. Whether acts or omissions by the assisted living facility and its nurse—specifically failing to keep accurate records and miscommunicating a patient's religious beliefs to a treating physician—constitute "professional services" excluded from coverage under the insurance policy
3. Whether the "intricate part doctrine" adopted in Rivera-Matos applies to determine whether certain acts are professional services for purposes of an insurance exclusion
4. Whether a clarifying decision by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court should be subject to a presumption against retroactive application

The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment in favor of Universal Insurance Company. The court held that: (1) the appellant forfeited her retroactivity argument by failing to raise it in the proceedings below, instead making a different argument based on contract interpretation principles; (2) even if the argument had not been forfeited, it would not constitute plain error because Rivera-Matos appears to merely clarify rather than overturn prior precedent, and it is unclear whether Puerto Rico law presumes against retroactive application of clarifying decisions; (3) the District Court properly applied Rivera-Matos's "intricate part doctrine" in concluding that the facility's failure to keep accurate records and miscommunication to the treating physician were integral to the rendering of professional services and thus fell within the insurance policy's professional services exclusion; and (4) therefore, Universal had no obligation to provide coverage for the claims against the facility.

This is a criminal appeal in which Christopher Pence challenges his conviction for using a facility of interstate commerce in connection with murder-for-hire. Pence appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to FBI agents before receiving Miranda warnings, arguing he was in custody at the time of interrogation.

1. Whether Pence was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda rights when he was interrogated by FBI agents in an FBI vehicle outside his home following a search warrant execution
2. Whether the totality of circumstances—including the armed search warrant execution, the location of interrogation in an FBI vehicle, the duration of questioning (over two hours), and confrontation with evidence of guilt—constituted a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings
3. Whether a reasonable person in Pence's position would have understood himself to be free to leave or at the mercy of law enforcement

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Pence's motion to suppress. The court held that although Pence was interrogated without Miranda warnings, he was not in "custody" for Miranda purposes. Applying the objective "reasonable person" test and considering the totality of circumstances, the court found that: (1) Pence voluntarily agreed to speak with agents and chose to do so in an FBI vehicle; (2) he was never handcuffed, threatened, or had weapons pointed at him; (3) agents explicitly told him he was not under arrest and had no obligation to speak; (4) he was not physically restrained; and (5) he never asked to leave or stop the questioning. While the court acknowledged that some factors supported Pence's position—including the dramatic armed search warrant execution, the two-hour interrogation duration, and confrontation with evidence—it concluded these did not outweigh the voluntary nature of his participation and the agents' explicit assurances that he was free to refuse to speak. The court distinguished this case from a true custodial setting and affirmed that a reasonable person in Pence's circumstances would not have believed he was at the mercy of the agents or that his freedom was curtailed to a degree comparable to formal arrest.

This is an appeal of a district court's preliminary injunction that barred the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) from accessing sensitive personal information held by the Social Security Administration. Three membership organizations representing millions of Americans sued to prevent DOGE personnel from accessing their members' personally identifiable information without lawful authorization.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing based on the concrete injury of unauthorized access to sensitive personal information, analogized to the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion
2. Whether plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction
3. The proper legal standard for assessing likelihood of success on the merits in cases involving multiple independent issues (the "multiplicative problem")
4. The precedential effect of Supreme Court interim stay orders on lower court decisions in similar cases

The Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The majority held that: (1) plaintiffs established Article III standing by demonstrating a concrete injury analogous to intrusion upon seclusion, as the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive personal information to DOGE personnel constitutes an intentional intrusion into private affairs; (2) plaintiffs failed to satisfy Winter's second factor (irreparable harm) because monetary damages and reparative injunctions could remedy any lingering harm; and (3) the court rejected the "multiplicative problem" framework from a prior circuit decision, holding that district courts need not assign numerical probabilities to each issue and multiply them together, but rather should apply traditional equitable principles. The majority reasoned that while cases with multiple barriers to success are inherently harder to win, this does not require a mechanical algorithmic approach. The court also addressed the Supreme Court's stay of the preliminary injunction, with multiple opinions discussing its precedential effect on the appeal.

This is an interlocutory appeal in which 31 former employees of Geneva Enterprises, LLC and AV Automotive, LLC challenge a district court order denying their motion to lift a stay of litigation and compel arbitration, specifically seeking an order requiring the employer to pay arbitration initiation fees. The Fourth Circuit addresses whether it has appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's March 2025 order under the Federal Arbitration Act.

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit possesses appellate jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act to review the district court's March 2025 order
2. Whether the March 2025 order constitutes an order "directing arbitration to proceed" or "granting a stay of action" under § 16(b), which would preclude interlocutory appeal
3. Whether the former employees' motion was properly captioned as a motion to compel arbitration when it actually sought additional relief (payment of arbitration fees) not provided for by the FAA
4. Whether the court should address the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in the absence of appellate jurisdiction

The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that: (1) the district court's March 2025 order was an order "directing arbitration to proceed" and "granting a stay of action" pending arbitration, both of which fall within the prohibition of 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1)-(2) against interlocutory appeals; (2) although the former employees captioned their motion as a "Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration," the motion's actual text sought relief beyond arbitration (specifically, payment of arbitration fees), which is not provided for by the FAA and therefore forfeited their right to interlocutory review under § 16(a); (3) the March 2025 order was merely an extension of the June 2024 order that had already directed the parties to arbitrate; and (4) because the court lacked appellate jurisdiction, it could not address the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, as a court of appeals must first satisfy itself of its own jurisdiction before examining lower court jurisdiction.

This is a constitutional challenge to a 150-year-old federal statute that prohibits home distillation of spirits for personal consumption. The Hobby Distillers Association and individual members sued the Department of Justice and the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, arguing that the prohibition violates the Taxation and Necessary and Proper Clauses of the Constitution.

1. Whether the individual plaintiffs and the Hobby Distillers Association have Article III standing to challenge the home distilling prohibition
2. Whether 26 U.S.C. § 5178(a)(1)(B) and § 5601(a)(6), which prohibit home distillation of spirits, fall within Congress's enumerated taxing power under the Taxation Clause
3. Whether the home distilling prohibition is a "necessary and proper" means of executing Congress's taxing power under the Necessary and Proper Clause
4. Whether the prohibition violates federalism principles by improperly infringing on state police powers

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. The court held:

1. Standing: All plaintiffs have Article III standing. The individual plaintiffs demonstrated injury in fact by showing: (1) serious intent to distill alcohol at home, (2) conduct proscribed by statute, and (3) credible threat of prosecution based on the TTB's enforcement history and explicit refusal to issue permits. The Hobby Distillers Association has associational standing because its members have standing and the organization's claims do not require individual member participation.
2. Taxation Clause: The prohibition violates the Taxation Clause because it does not exercise Congress's taxing power. The court reasoned that the power to "lay and collect Taxes" means Congress can charge or demand money from taxpayers to raise revenue. Sections 5178 and 5601 do neither—they prohibit activity that would generate taxable spirits, thereby reducing rather than raising revenue. The provisions leave plaintiffs with only the choice not to distill or face criminal penalties, rather than the lawful choice to engage in the activity while paying a tax. The government's tax-evasion prevention rationale does not justify a blanket prohibition, as Congress cannot prohibit intrastate activity solely because it might produce products hard to tax.
3. Necessary and Proper Clause: The prohibition is not "plainly adapted" to executing Congress's taxing power. Under the McCulloch standard, a law must be plainly adapted to an enumerated power. The challenged provisions tax nothing and are distinct from regulations that facilitate tax collection. They criminalize conduct to prevent the taxing power from taking effect, thereby reducing rather than protecting revenue. Licensing and regulating at-home distilleries—as the government does for commercial distilleries—would accomplish the taxation purposes while allowing individuals to choose to distill and pay taxes. The court distinguished cases upholding regulations "restricted to the very articles which are the subject of taxation," noting that here no tax is imposed on the prohibited conduct.
4. Propriety and Federalism: The prohibition is not "proper" because it invades the reserved police and regulatory powers of the states without a plain connection to Congress's taxation power. The government's theory—that Congress may criminalize any at-home conduct because it might conceal taxable activity—would have no limiting principle and would grant Congress a general federal police power inconsistent with the Constitution's federalism structure. The taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of control over individual behavior as the Commerce Clause.
5. Remedy: The court affirmed the district court's injunction against enforcement of the statutes, as modified to include all plaintiffs with standing.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by the estate of Chase Lovell, who died by suicide while in custody at the Kalamazoo County Jail. The estate sued jail mental health supervisor Lindsey O'Neil and other defendants, alleging deliberate indifference to Lovell's known suicide risk in violation of the Due Process Clause.

1. Whether O'Neil violated the Constitution by acting with deliberate indifference to Lovell's suicide risk
2. Whether any clearly established law would have put O'Neil on notice that her conduct violated constitutional protections at the time she acted in 2020
3. Whether O'Neil's compromise placement decision—moving Lovell from a padded cell with a suicide-prevention gown to a medical cell with a regular jumpsuit but suicide-prevention blanket—constituted an unreasonable response to his suicide risk
4. Whether the collateral-order doctrine permits appellate review of the district court's denial of qualified immunity

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to O'Neil. The court held that no clearly established law would have put a reasonable official on notice that O'Neil's compromise placement decision violated the Constitution. Although Lovell faced an objective substantial risk of suicide and O'Neil recognized this possibility, the court found that O'Neil's response was not "beyond debate" unreasonable. O'Neil balanced competing concerns by removing Lovell from a padded cell that was causing him mental distress while maintaining suicide-prevention measures (suicide-prevention blanket, camera monitoring, and staff interactions). The court reasoned that O'Neil took protective precautions rather than ignoring the suicide risk, and a reasonable official could believe her response was not deliberately indifferent. The court distinguished prior cases like Comstock (where an officer removed all precautions) and Finley (where officials ignored mental health harm from segregation), finding that O'Neil's actions actually aligned with the principles those cases established. The court concluded that O'Neil's conduct fell within a gray area of the law that qualified immunity is designed to protect.

This is an employment discrimination case brought by Susan Qashu, a visually impaired AAAS fellow at the State Department, who alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act based on failure to accommodate her disability, discrimination, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State Department, and the appellate court affirmed.

1. Whether the State Department failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Qashu's visual impairment in violation of the Rehabilitation Act
2. Whether the State Department discriminated against Qashu based on her disability by rescinding her fellowship renewal offer and failing to assign her to lead an ocean-acidification portfolio
3. Whether the State Department retaliated against Qashu for requesting accommodations and filing an administrative discrimination complaint

The court affirmed summary judgment for the State Department on all three claims. The court held that:

1. Failure to Accommodate: The State Department did not deny reasonable accommodations. Qashu herself praised the Disability and Reasonable Accommodation Division for accommodating her "completely" and "beautifully" in September 2016. For later requests, the State Department provided reasonable accommodations (a quieter office, readers when available, and IT support for software issues), even if not perfectly or as quickly as preferred. The law requires reasonable, not perfect, accommodations.
2. Discrimination: The State Department articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for both adverse actions: (a) rescinding the renewal offer because Qashu failed to accept the modified renewal terms despite extended deadlines, indicating lack of interest; and (b) not assigning the ocean-acidification portfolio because Qashu did not recommend herself when the position was discussed. No reasonable jury could find these reasons were pretextual.
3. Retaliation: Qashu's retaliation claims failed because the State Department's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse actions (lack of interest in renewal and failure to self-recommend for the portfolio) were not pretextual and were unrelated to her accommodation requests or administrative complaint.

This is an appeal concerning the allocation of attorney's fees awarded to True the Vote, Inc. in its lawsuit against the IRS. The dispute centers on whether Bopp Law Firm has an equitable charging lien on the fee award and, if so, what portion of the approximately $789,000 in fees it is entitled to receive.

1. Whether Bopp Law Firm has a valid equitable charging lien on the attorney's fees awarded to its client under Indiana law
2. The proper framework for establishing an equitable charging lien under Indiana law, specifically whether the test is conjunctive (requiring both prongs) or disjunctive (requiring either prong)
3. If Bopp has a lien, whether it has priority over the Former Attorneys' lien
4. If Bopp has priority, whether it is entitled to the full amount it claims based on its billing records and fee agreement, or only the portion reflected in the EAJA calculation

The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's denial of Bopp's charging lien motion and remanded for reconsideration. The court held that under Indiana law, as established in Koons v. Beach, an attorney may establish an equitable charging lien by satisfying either of two alternative prongs: (1) showing the attorney's efforts secured the fund for the client, or (2) showing the client agreed to pay the attorney from that fund. The district court erred by requiring Bopp to satisfy both prongs. The court noted that on remand, the district court must determine whether Bopp established a lien under the first prong, whether the Former Attorneys' lien has priority, and if Bopp's lien has priority, what amount Bopp is entitled to receive.

This case involves a challenge to a receiver's decision to permit a former faithless fiduciary, Thomas Braziel, to participate as a bidder in a sale process for assets of a defunct corporation. Peter Lydon Sheeran seeks to exclude Braziel from the bidding, arguing that Braziel's informational advantage will impair the sale process and reduce the value obtained for creditors and equity holders.

1. What standard of review applies to a court-appointed private receiver's business decisions regarding asset sales?
2. Whether a receiver should exclude a bidder with superior information about the assets being sold?
3. Whether permitting Braziel to participate in the sale process will impair competition and reduce the highest achievable price?
4. Whether Sheeran has standing to challenge the sale process?

The court denied Sheeran's objection and declined to issue an injunction. The court held that: (1) Sheeran has standing to challenge the sale process from the standpoint of whether it generates the best value; (2) a court-appointed private receiver's business-oriented decisions regarding asset sales are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard (requiring only that the decision be rational), which is more deferential than de novo review but less deferential than the business judgment rule; (3) while Braziel's informational advantage creates real risks of deterring other bidders and reducing competition, excluding him also presents risks by potentially reducing the final bid price; (4) the Receiver, being disinterested and independent, must exercise judgment in designing a sale process that weighs these competing factors; and (5) neither including nor excluding Braziel constitutes an abuse of discretion, so the court defers to the Receiver's judgment on this matter.

This case involves a Delaware corporation's attempt to establish jurisdiction over a California minority stockholder in a declaratory judgment action regarding the stockholder's right to inspect corporate records. The court addresses whether the corporation's forum selection bylaw provides a basis for personal jurisdiction when the corporation, rather than the stockholder, initiates the lawsuit.

1. Whether a forum selection bylaw that designates Delaware as the exclusive forum for stockholder claims constitutes express consent to personal jurisdiction when a corporation sues a stockholder in Delaware
2. Whether a minority stockholder implicitly consents to personal jurisdiction in Delaware by holding stock in a corporation with a forum selection bylaw
3. Whether the scope of the forum selection bylaw extends to declaratory judgment actions brought by the corporation against stockholders, or only to actions brought by stockholders against the corporation

The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that: (1) the forum selection bylaw applies only to actions brought by stockholders against the corporation, not to actions brought by the corporation against stockholders, and therefore does not constitute express consent to jurisdiction; (2) a minority stockholder who did not participate in adopting the bylaw and holds only 11.11% of stock does not implicitly consent to personal jurisdiction merely by holding shares; and (3) because the lawsuit falls outside the scope of the forum provision, Salamon could not have consented to jurisdiction, either expressly or implicitly. The court reasoned that allowing a corporation to subject a nonresident stockholder to jurisdiction simply by filing a declaratory judgment action would improperly expand the bylaw beyond its plain text. The court noted that if Salamon wishes to pursue his inspection rights, he may file a Section 220 action in Delaware, thereby affirmatively invoking the court's jurisdiction.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery decision resolving a request for attorneys' fees and costs following the court's January 23, 2026 ruling that granted a motion to disqualify an expert witness and impose sanctions for violations of a confidentiality order. The case involves disputes between the Accelerant Parties and the Sullivan Parties regarding unauthorized disclosure of confidential material and improper expert witness designation.

1. Whether fees incurred in drafting the opening motion should be compensable when the conflict of interest grounds for disqualification were first raised in the reply brief
2. Whether the $1,059 blended hourly rate charged by the Accelerant Parties' counsel is reasonable, or whether it should be reduced to $345 per hour as proposed by the Sullivan Parties
3. Whether the fee award should be enforceable immediately or stayed pending final judgment in the case

The court granted the Accelerant Parties' full fee request of $39,831 ($39,406 in attorneys' fees and $425 in costs). The court rejected the Sullivan Parties' arguments on all three points: (1) the fees for drafting the opening motion were compensable because the motion was necessary to address the Sullivan Parties' violation of the confidentiality order in disseminating sensitive material to the expert; (2) the $1,059 blended hourly rate was reasonable given the specialized expertise required in patent law, trade secret law, and professional responsibility, the experience level of the attorneys involved, and prevailing market rates as established by the 2023 AIPLA economic survey; and (3) while the fee award is entered now, its enforcement is stayed pending entry of final judgment to preserve the rights of all parties without disrupting ongoing litigation.

This is a criminal appeal in which defendant Dwayne Barrett challenges his convictions for Hobbs Act robbery, firearm offenses, and murder. The case returns to the Second Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court following the Supreme Court's clarification regarding the proper application of federal firearms and murder statutes.

1. Whether a defendant can be convicted and sentenced under both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (firearms crime) and § 924(j) (murder committed during a § 924(c) crime) for a single act that violates both provisions
2. Whether the aggregate 50-year sentence imposed was substantively reasonable
3. Whether the case should be reassigned to a different judge on remand

The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case. The court held that: (1) following the Supreme Court's decision in Barrett v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 482 (2026), a defendant cannot be convicted under both § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j) for one act violating both provisions; (2) the district court must vacate one of the two convictions (Counts Six or Seven) and resentence Barrett accordingly, giving due weight to the government's position on which count to vacate; (3) the court declined to withdraw its prior conclusion that the 50-year aggregate sentence was substantively reasonable, but did not foreclose Barrett from arguing for a different sentence on remand; and (4) Barrett's request for reassignment to a different judge was denied because Judge Sullivan did not participate in the prior rehearing en banc decision.

This is a civil rights appeal by a pro se plaintiff challenging the dismissal of his amended complaint alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations by Broome County, the City of Binghamton, and various law enforcement officials arising from interactions related to his firearm ownership and seizures of his weapons and property.

1. Whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint as factually frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
2. Whether the complaint adequately alleged personal involvement of individual defendants in constitutional violations
3. Whether the complaint stated a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search and seizure against Officer Mushalla
4. Whether the complaint adequately alleged municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services for policy, custom, or practice violations
5. Whether claims against Detective Sostowski should be dismissed based on res judicata principles given overlapping litigation

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part and vacated in part. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against most defendants (Sheriff Harder, Deputy Hamilton, Mayor Kraham, Police Chief Zikuski, and an unknown State Police trooper) for failure to allege personal involvement in constitutional violations, and affirmed dismissal of municipal liability claims against Broome County and the City of Binghamton for failure to allege a policy, custom, or practice causing the violations. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Mushalla, finding that Campbell's allegations—that Mushalla entered his home without consent, seized his firearms and other items without explanation or documentation—were sufficient to state a claim for unreasonable search and seizure, even though some aspects might be unlikely. The court did not disturb the dismissal of claims against Detective Sostowski regarding the January 14, 2023 search, reasoning that Campbell had already pursued overlapping claims against Sostowski in a related action (Binghamton I) that was dismissed without leave to amend, and therefore Campbell could not relitigate those same claims in the present action.

This is a criminal appeal in which the United States challenges a district court's dismissal of an aggravated illegal reentry charge. The defendant, Manuel Zumba Mejia, sought to collaterally attack his prior deportation order, arguing that the immigration judge's misadvice about his eligibility for voluntary departure rendered his removal proceedings fundamentally unfair.

1. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Palomar-Santiago (2021) abrogates the Second Circuit's prior precedent in United States v. Sosa (2004) regarding exceptions to the mandatory requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)
2. Whether a defendant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies can be excused when an immigration judge fails to advise the defendant of eligibility for discretionary relief or affirmatively misleads the defendant
3. Whether all three requirements of § 1326(d)—exhaustion of administrative remedies, deprivation of judicial review opportunity, and fundamental unfairness—must be satisfied conjunctively for a collateral challenge to a removal order

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's order and held that Palomar-Santiago abrogates Sosa and its progeny. The court ruled that: (1) all three requirements of § 1326(d) are mandatory and must be satisfied conjunctively; (2) courts may not excuse a defendant's failure to satisfy any of these requirements, regardless of procedural errors or fundamental unfairness in the underlying removal proceeding; (3) Mejia failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals and expressly waived his right to appeal; and (4) even assuming the immigration judge's statement about voluntary departure was erroneous and rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair, this error does not excuse Mejia's independent failure to satisfy the exhaustion and judicial review requirements. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Palomar-Santiago—that administrative review exists precisely so noncitizens can challenge immigration judges' decisions, and that an immigration judge's error does not excuse failure to comply with mandatory exhaustion requirements—is controlling and irreconcilable with Sosa's exception-based approach.

This is a criminal appeal in which Christopher Pence challenges his conviction for using a facility of interstate commerce in connection with murder-for-hire. Pence appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to FBI agents before receiving Miranda warnings, arguing he was in custody at the time of interrogation.

1. Whether Pence was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda rights when he was interrogated by FBI agents in an FBI vehicle outside his home following a search warrant execution
2. Whether the totality of circumstances—including the armed search, duration of interrogation (over two hours), location in an FBI vehicle, confrontation with evidence of guilt, and other factors—constituted a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings
3. Whether the reasonable person standard for assessing custody should be modified or whether human-behavior experts should be consulted in applying the standard

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Pence's motion to suppress. The court held that, under the totality of circumstances, a reasonable person in Pence's position would not have believed he was in custody. The court emphasized that: (1) Pence voluntarily agreed to speak with agents and chose to do so in an FBI vehicle outside his home; (2) he was never handcuffed, threatened, or had weapons pointed at him; (3) agents explicitly told him he was not under arrest and had no obligation to speak; (4) he never asked to leave or stop the questioning; and (5) while the agents confronted him with evidence of guilt and the initial search was dramatic, these factors alone were insufficient to establish custody when considered with all other circumstances. The court acknowledged this was a close call but found that the government met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Pence was not in custody. The court rejected Pence's alternative arguments to modify the Miranda custody standard.

This is a civil rights case in which a 13-year-old student sued school officials and police after being charged with possession of child pornography for possessing and sharing an explicit photo of a classmate. The student alleged violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the school investigation and police interrogation.

1. Whether a school official's warrantless search of a student's cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment under the New Jersey v. T.L.O. standard, and whether Riley v. California's restrictions on cell phone searches apply in the school setting
2. Whether the student's confession to school officials was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
3. Whether school officials and police officers conspired to deprive the student of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
4. Whether the school board and city could be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services for the alleged constitutional violations

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for all defendants on all claims. The court held that: (1) the assistant principal's search of the student's phone was justified at its inception and reasonable in scope under T.L.O., and Riley v. California does not displace T.L.O. in the school setting; (2) the student's confession was voluntary under the totality of circumstances, as the questioning occurred during school hours in a familiar setting by a school official without threats or coercion; (3) no civil conspiracy existed because the record showed only parallel investigations by school and police, not a coordinated unlawful plan; and (4) absent any underlying constitutional violation, Monell liability could not attach. The court reasoned that T.L.O.'s flexible reasonableness standard appropriately balances students' reduced privacy expectations at school against schools' legitimate need to maintain order and discipline, and that Riley's rationale regarding police searches incident to arrest does not necessarily apply to school disciplinary searches.

This is an appeal in a criminal case where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a petition for en banc rehearing regarding the proper treatment of discrepancies between oral sentencing pronouncements and written judgments in criminal cases.

1. Whether the oral pronouncement of a sentence or the written judgment of conviction controls when they conflict
2. The proper foundation and scope of a defendant's right to be present at sentencing under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process Clause
3. Whether conditions of supervised release appearing only in the written judgment but not orally pronounced are validly imposed
4. The appropriate remedy for violations of a defendant's right to be present at sentencing
5. The finality and judicial economy implications of the current "Rogers-Singletary doctrine"

The en banc rehearing petition was denied by a vote of 12-2. However, the judges issued statements expressing serious concerns about the Fourth Circuit's current precedent. Judge Richardson's statement (joined by eight judges) argued that the court has erroneously held that the oral pronouncement controls over the written judgment, when in fact the written judgment should be recognized as the operative sentence. The statement contends that the written judgment is the final, binding sentence under principles of law, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and historical practice. The judges proposed that the court should recognize the centrality of the written judgment and limit remedies for Rule 43 violations to procedural fixes (such as conforming the written judgment to the oral pronouncement or conducting a new sentencing hearing) rather than vacating entire sentences for minor discrepancies. Judge Wynn's separate statement expressed difficulty reconciling the judges' articulation of compelling reasons for en banc review while simultaneously voting to deny it.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a death sentence imposed for two murders in Arizona. The case involves an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was procedurally defaulted in state court and raises questions about what evidence can be considered when evaluating whether to excuse the procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan.

1. What evidence from the state court record may be considered when evaluating whether to excuse a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Martinez v. Ryan
2. Whether sentencing counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington for failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence
3. Whether any deficient performance prejudiced the defendant under the standards articulated in Thornell v. Jones and Lee v. Thornell
4. Whether the procedural default can be excused by demonstrating both "cause" and "prejudice" under Martinez

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that: (1) when evaluating whether to excuse procedural default under Martinez, federal courts may consider evidence submitted to state court in accordance with state procedural rules regardless of timing or purpose, including evidence from Ramirez's Atkins proceeding; (2) Ramirez demonstrated "cause" to excuse the procedural default because Arizona law required IAC claims to be raised in collateral proceedings and his postconviction counsel was ineffective; (3) however, Ramirez failed to demonstrate "prejudice" because although sentencing counsel's performance was deficient in failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence, the deficiency did not sufficiently prejudice his defense under recent Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent; and (4) the new mitigating evidence regarding intellectual disability and brain dysfunction would not have changed the outcome because it merely offered a different explanation for diminished capacity already known to the sentencing judge, and Arizona courts accord such evidence diminished weight when not causally connected to the crime. The court found the aggravating circumstances (multiple homicides, cruelty, and prior violent felony convictions) were sufficiently weighty to outweigh the additional mitigation evidence that should have been presented.

This is an environmental law case brought by eighteen minor plaintiffs challenging the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) use of cost-benefit analyses that "discount" the value of future costs and benefits when regulating greenhouse gas emissions. The plaintiffs alleged that this discounting practice discriminates against children and violates their constitutional rights by favoring present-day consumption over future consumption.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the EPA's discounting policies, specifically whether they have established: (a) an injury-in-fact, (b) causation fairly traceable to the government's conduct, and (c) redressability through the requested relief
2. Whether the plaintiffs' discrimination theory constitutes a cognizable equal protection injury under the Fifth Amendment
3. Whether plaintiffs' alleged environmental harms are fairly traceable to the government's discounting policies or instead depend on speculative chains of causation
4. Whether declaratory relief is an appropriate remedy given circuit precedent in Juliana v. United States
5. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs further leave to amend their complaint

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case for lack of Article III standing on all grounds. The court held that: (1) plaintiffs' discrimination theory failed to establish an injury-in-fact because the discounting policies are facially neutral and do not intentionally discriminate against children—they favor present-day consumption by all present persons (children and adults alike), not specifically against minors; (2) plaintiffs' alleged environmental harms are not fairly traceable to the discounting policies because the causal chain requires too much speculation, including assumptions about future EPA rulemaking, future application of discount rates, and future reliance on cost-benefit analyses; (3) circuit precedent in Juliana v. United States forecloses plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief because such relief is unlikely to redress their alleged injuries without further court action; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying further leave to amend because amendment would be futile given the fundamental structural deficiencies in plaintiffs' standing theories. The court emphasized that plaintiffs' theory depends on a highly attenuated chain of hypothetical future events that cannot support Article III jurisdiction.

This is a copyright infringement case in which DISH Network sued the defendants for unlawfully capturing and retransmitting Arabic-language television programming to which DISH held exclusive distribution rights in the United States. The defendants operated streaming services that allowed customers to view this programming through set-top boxes without DISH's permission or payment.

1. Whether DISH owns valid copyrights in the registered audiovisual works under UAE copyright law, specifically whether the works constitute "Joint Works" or "Collective Works"
2. Whether MBC properly transferred copyright ownership to DISH under United States copyright law
3. Whether the defendants' use of encoders and content delivery networks (CDNs) to transmit the protected programming constituted direct copyright infringement
4. The admissibility of expert testimony, monitoring reports, screenshots, PayPal records, and WHOIS records as evidence of infringement
5. Whether the defendants' transmissions occurred in the United States, establishing domestic copyright infringement

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of DISH. The court held that: (1) the registered works are "Collective Works" under UAE law, with MBC as the initial copyright owner, because the contributors' work was inseparable and not distinguishable; (2) MBC validly transferred exclusive rights to DISH, and the defendants lacked standing to challenge this transfer under Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act; (3) the defendants' use of encoders to "push" copyrighted works onto their system for customer viewing constituted direct copyright infringement, as it violated DISH's exclusive right to publicly perform the works; (4) the district court properly admitted expert testimony from Pascal Metral based on his twelve years of antipiracy experience, along with monitoring reports, screenshots, PayPal records, and WHOIS records, all of which were relevant and admissible under applicable evidentiary rules; and (5) the evidence established that transmissions occurred in the United States, satisfying the requirement for domestic copyright infringement. The court affirmed the permanent injunction and $600,000 in statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.

This is an appeal from a Court of Chancery decision in a dispute between PJT Holdings, LLC and defendants Daniel Costanzo, Benjamin Costanzo, and Brian Fitzpatrick. The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the lower court's judgment on cross-motions for summary judgment and post-trial proceedings.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this order, as the court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision based on the lower court's prior rulings and opinions without restating the substantive legal questions at issue.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The court adopted the reasoning and conclusions of the lower court as expressed in: (1) the Oral Rulings on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment dated December 7, 2023; (2) the Order Resolving the Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment dated January 17, 2024; (3) the Post-Trial Opinion dated May 15, 2025; and (4) the Final Order and Judgment dated August 6, 2025.

This is a criminal appeal in which defendant Dwayne Barrett challenges his conviction for Hobbs Act robbery, firearm use, and murder. The case returns to the Second Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court following the Supreme Court's decision clarifying that a defendant cannot be convicted under both 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 924(j) for a single act.

1. Whether a defendant can be convicted and sentenced on both a § 924(c) firearms offense and a § 924(j) murder charge arising from the same criminal act
2. Whether the aggregate 50-year sentence imposed was substantively reasonable
3. Whether the case should be reassigned to a different judge on remand

The Second Circuit withdrew part of its prior opinion and remanded the case for resentencing. The court held that: (1) consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Barrett v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 482 (2026), Barrett cannot be convicted under both § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j) for the same act, and the district court must vacate one of the two convictions (Counts Six or Seven) on remand; (2) the court declined to withdraw its prior conclusion that the 50-year aggregate sentence was substantively reasonable, but permitted Barrett to argue on remand that a 50-year sentence is unwarranted given the circumstances; and (3) Barrett's request for reassignment to a different judge was denied because Judge Sullivan did not participate in the prior rehearing en banc decision.

This is a civil rights appeal brought by a pro se plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by various law enforcement officials and municipal entities in Broome County and the City of Binghamton, New York, arising from interactions related to his ownership and possession of firearms.

1. Whether the district court properly dismissed the amended complaint as factually frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
2. Whether the amended complaint adequately alleged personal involvement of individual defendants in constitutional violations
3. Whether the amended complaint stated a claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services
4. Whether the plaintiff stated a valid Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search and seizure against Officer Mushalla
5. Whether claims against Detective Sostowski should be dismissed based on res judicata principles given overlapping litigation

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part and vacated in part. The court affirmed the dismissal of most claims as frivolous or failing to state a claim, including claims against Defendants Harder, Hamilton, Kraham, Zikuski, the unknown state trooper, and Finley, finding insufficient allegations of personal involvement or constitutional violations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of municipal liability claims against Broome County and the City of Binghamton for failure to allege a municipal policy, custom, or practice causing constitutional violations. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Mushalla for the January 13, 2023 search and seizure of firearms and other items, finding the allegations sufficient to state a claim where Campbell had informed the officer that no intruder had entered his home, potentially rescinding any implied consent to enter. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Detective Sostowski related to the January 13-14 searches, holding that Campbell was barred from pursuing these claims in the present action because they arose from the same circumstances and were dismissed in a related case (Binghamton I) without leave to amend.

This is a criminal appeal in which the United States challenges a district court's dismissal of an aggravated illegal reentry charge. The defendant sought to collaterally attack his prior deportation order, arguing that procedural defects in the removal proceeding rendered it invalid.

1. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Palomar-Santiago (2021) abrogates the Second Circuit's prior precedent in United States v. Sosa (2004) regarding exceptions to the mandatory requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)
2. Whether a defendant may collaterally challenge a removal order when he failed to exhaust administrative remedies and expressly waived his right to appeal, even if the immigration judge made an erroneous statement about his eligibility for discretionary relief
3. Whether § 1326(d)'s three requirements—exhaustion of administrative remedies, deprivation of judicial review opportunity, and fundamental unfairness—are truly mandatory with no exceptions

The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal order. The court held that Palomar-Santiago unambiguously abrogates Sosa and its progeny. The Supreme Court's decision established that all three requirements of § 1326(d) are mandatory and that courts may not excuse a defendant's failure to satisfy any of them. The court reasoned that when Congress uses mandatory language in an administrative exhaustion provision, courts cannot excuse non-compliance. Here, Mejia failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals and expressly waived his right to appeal. Even assuming the immigration judge's erroneous statement about voluntary departure rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair under § 1326(d)(3), that error does not excuse his independent failures to satisfy §§ 1326(d)(1) and (2). Therefore, Mejia is barred from collaterally challenging his removal order and remains subject to prosecution for aggravated illegal reentry.

This case involves a First Amendment free exercise challenge to West Virginia's compulsory vaccination law for school children. Parents sought a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement for their daughter enrolled in a public virtual school, which West Virginia law does not permit, unlike 45 other states.

1. Whether West Virginia's compulsory vaccination law violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by denying religious exemptions
2. Whether the law is "generally applicable" under the framework established in Employment Division v. Smith
3. Whether medical exemptions create a mechanism for individualized exemptions that undermines the law's general applicability
4. Whether the law treats comparable secular activities (homeschooling, learning pods, microschools) more favorably than religious exercise
5. Whether the law substantially interferes with parental rights to direct religious upbringing under Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mahmoud v. Taylor
6. Whether the law can survive rational basis review or requires strict scrutiny

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's preliminary injunction and held that West Virginia's compulsory vaccination law is constitutional. The majority (Judges Wilkinson and Agee) concluded that: (1) the law is neutral and generally applicable because medical exemptions do not constitute a mechanism for individualized exemptions—they involve only limited professional judgment about medical contraindications; (2) the law does not treat comparable religious and secular activities differently because medical exemptions advance the state's health interests while religious exemptions would undermine them; (3) the law is distinguishable from Yoder and Mahmoud because it is a public health measure, not ideological indoctrination, and does not substantially interfere with religious development; and (4) even under rational basis review, the law is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of protecting public health, and West Virginia need not address all public health risks simultaneously or uniformly. The majority emphasized the long historical precedent supporting compulsory vaccination laws dating to Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) and the state's police power to protect public health. Judge Niemeyer's dissent argued that the law should be subject to strict scrutiny under Mahmoud because it substantially interferes with parental rights to direct religious upbringing, and that the law fails strict scrutiny because virtual students are similarly situated to homeschooled students who are exempt from vaccination requirements.

This case involves a dispute between Rieth-Riley Construction Company and Local 324 of the International Union of Operating Engineers regarding the union's withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining and subsequent unfair labor practices allegations. The National Labor Relations Board found that Rieth-Riley violated the National Labor Relations Act through various unfair labor practices and issued an affirmative bargaining order.

1. Whether the Union timely withdrew from the multiemployer bargaining unit under the Retail Associates standard
2. Whether Rieth-Riley committed unfair labor practices by: (a) insisting on multiemployer bargaining; (b) implementing unilateral wage increases in 2018 and 2020 without bargaining; (c) clawing back benefit-fund contributions from employees; and (d) locking out bargaining-unit employees
3. Whether the 2019 strike was an unfair-labor-practice strike or an economic strike
4. Whether the Board properly issued an affirmative bargaining order prohibiting decertification attempts

The Sixth Circuit denied Rieth-Riley's petition for review and enforced the Board's order. The court held:

1. The Union timely withdrew from multiemployer bargaining by providing notice before negotiations commenced, satisfying the Retail Associates standard. The contract-modification deadline was irrelevant because withdrawal before bargaining begins requires no additional conditions.
2. Rieth-Riley violated the NLRA by: insisting on multiemployer bargaining after the Road Agreement expired; implementing wage increases in 2018 and 2020 without bargaining with the Union; clawing back benefit contributions without proving economic exigency (the company created its own crisis and had foreseeable knowledge of its bargaining obligations); and locking out employees to pressure the Union into multiemployer bargaining.
3. The 2019 strike was an unfair-labor-practice strike, not merely an economic strike. Substantial evidence supported this finding through testimony about employees' lingering financial concerns from the 2018 lockout, the timing of the unfair-labor-practice complaint, and picket signs referencing unfair labor practices. The Board could rely on union official testimony without employee testimony and reasonably relaxed evidentiary rules.
4. The court lacked jurisdiction to review the affirmative bargaining order because Rieth-Riley failed to raise this objection before the Board through a petition for reconsideration or rehearing, and identified no extraordinary circumstances excusing this failure.

This is an appeal of a breach of contract case involving an IRA custodian's resignation and transfer of funds. Plaintiffs Daniel Hewitt and Lynne Thompson sued Capital One for allegedly breaching its duty of good faith and fair dealing by transferring their IRA assets to Inspira Financial Trust, which placed the funds in a low-yield sweeps account earning only 0.02% annually.

1. Whether Capital One breached its contractual obligations by exercising its contractual right to resign as custodian and choosing Inspira as the successor custodian in its sole discretion
2. Whether the principle of good faith and fair dealing in contract law required Capital One to select a successor custodian offering higher rates of return
3. Whether Capital One's conduct violated its duties to plaintiffs when it transferred their funds to an investment vehicle that earned less than management fees charged

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint against Capital One. The court held that Capital One did not breach any contractual promise to the plaintiffs. Although the court assumed arguendo that the good faith and fair dealing principle applied, it found no violation because: (1) Capital One explicitly gave plaintiffs the right to choose a different successor custodian and investment vehicles; (2) Capital One provided adequate notice and time for plaintiffs to make alternative arrangements; (3) the sweeps account was a reasonable, industry-standard default that minimized risk; (4) plaintiffs could have easily discovered the low interest rate and moved their funds to other providers such as Fidelity, Vanguard, or Schwab; and (5) Capital One did not exploit a contractual loophole or act deceptively. The court reasoned that because plaintiffs had complete discretion to choose their successor custodian and investment vehicles, Capital One could not have deprived them of good faith or fair dealing.

This is an immigration appeal case in which Armando Santana-Gonzalez, a Mexican national, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' dismissal of his appeal from an Immigration Judge's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection. The Ninth Circuit denied his petition for review.

1. Whether Santana established eligibility for asylum based on persecution by the Defensores of Guerrero vigilante group, his father's experience with extortion, or discrimination based on sexual orientation
2. Whether Santana established eligibility for withholding of removal
3. Whether Santana established a likelihood of torture by or with the acquiescence of Mexican government authorities
4. Whether Santana exhausted his procedural due process claims before the BIA by merely labeling the Immigration Judge's decision as "wrongfully made" in his notice of appeal
5. Whether Santana forfeited his substantive challenges by failing to meaningfully argue them in his opening brief before the appellate court

The Ninth Circuit denied Santana's petition for review on multiple grounds. First, the court held that Santana forfeited all exhausted bases to challenge the agency's decision by failing to make any meaningful argument on the merits in his opening brief and failing to file a reply brief. Second, the court held that Santana failed to exhaust his procedural due process arguments before the BIA, as merely describing the Immigration Judge's decision as "wrongfully made" did not adequately alert the BIA to specific due process violations. The court reasoned that such a vague assertion could not have placed the BIA on notice of the specific procedural due process arguments Santana later raised. Third, the court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's determinations that: (1) Santana failed to establish a nexus between any protected ground and the harms he suffered; (2) the discrimination and threats he experienced did not rise to the level of persecution; (3) internal relocation within Mexico would have been reasonable; and (4) Santana failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of torture by Mexican authorities. The concurring opinion criticized the Ninth Circuit's practice of automatically granting stays of removal and deferring judicial review of stay motions for extended periods, which the concurrence argued violates Supreme Court precedent in Nken v. Holder and creates perverse incentives for filing meritless immigration appeals.

This is an appeal of a district court's grant of summary judgment for the government in a case challenging the Food and Nutrition Service's permanent disqualification of Brothers Market LLC No. 2 from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) based on findings of SNAP benefits trafficking. The store owner and the store appealed the disqualification decision.

1. Whether the flagged SNAP transaction patterns at the Market constitute sufficient evidence of SNAP trafficking to support permanent disqualification
2. Whether the plaintiffs raised a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the suspicious transaction patterns identified by the Agency
3. The appropriate standard for summary judgment in SNAP trafficking cases and what evidence a store must present to defeat summary judgment
4. Whether expert testimony is required to interpret SNAP transaction data in trafficking investigations

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government. The court held that the Agency presented compelling circumstantial evidence of SNAP trafficking through four distinct suspicious transaction patterns: (1) 649 unusually large transactions (averaging $14.10 compared to the area average of $9.88); (2) 190 benefits-depleting transactions that fully or nearly depleted households' monthly SNAP benefits in a single day; (3) 127 rapid transactions conducted within minutes by the same household; and (4) repeated transactions at the same dollar values ($99-$100), which occurred 52 times at the Market compared to only 3-8 times at comparable nearby stores. The court found that plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact because their evidence—consisting primarily of Brown's affidavit, customer and employee affidavits, financial statements, and only 75 receipts corresponding to a small fraction of the flagged transactions—was insufficient to rebut the hundreds of undisputed suspicious transactions. The court rejected the argument that expert testimony was required to interpret the transaction data, noting that courts may draw reasonable inferences from transaction data in SNAP trafficking cases. The court emphasized that while stores need not address every flagged transaction, they must present evidence supporting a legitimate explanation for each transaction pattern, which plaintiffs failed to do.

This is an environmental law case in which a pro se petitioner challenged the EPA Administrator's denial of his administrative petition requesting that the EPA object to the renewal of an air quality operating permit issued to a refinery in Los Angeles. Eng argued that the permit lacked necessary conditions to address risks of catastrophic chemical releases, specifically of hydrogen fluoride and modified hydrofluoric acid.

1. Whether the EPA Administrator was required to object to the refinery's Title V operating permit based on alleged deficiencies in the facility's Risk Management Plan (RMP), Emergency Response Plan (ERP), and Emergency Response Manual (ERM)
2. Whether additional RMP-related permit conditions were "necessary to assure compliance" with the Clean Air Act's RMP program requirements under Section 112(r)(7) and Part 68 regulations
3. Whether the Title V permitting process is the appropriate venue for addressing risk management concerns that are governed by a separate regulatory regime administered by the EPA
4. Whether state law requirements invoked by the petitioner qualify as "applicable requirements" under the CAA for Title V permit purposes
5. Whether the petitioner satisfied the procedural requirement to raise objections during the public comment period

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review and upheld the EPA Administrator's decision to deny Eng's administrative petition. The court held that:

1. The court could not rest its decision solely on the procedural ground that Eng failed to raise issues during the public comment period, since the Administrator did not dispose of all claims on that basis
2. Eng failed to demonstrate that additional RMP-related conditions were legally or factually necessary to assure compliance with the RMP program, because a robust separate regulatory enforcement structure already exists within the RMP program itself, administered by the EPA as the implementing agency
3. The Title V permitting agency (SCAQMD) lacks delegated authority to implement the RMP program and should not use the Title V process as a "backdoor" to assume that authority or second-guess the EPA's regulatory measures
4. The EPA regulation 40 C.F.R. § 68.215 limits the Title V permitting agency's role to verifying document submission, initiating enforcement for submission failures, and conducting audits—not imposing substantive regulatory authority over the RMP program
5. Eng failed to provide the required "legal reasoning, evidence, and references" to support his claims
6. To the extent Eng's objections rested on state law requirements rather than federal CAA requirements, those state-law requirements do not qualify as "applicable requirements" under Title V, and the EPA cannot object to a Title V permit on such grounds
7. The Administrator's reasoning for declining to impose additional conditions through the Title V process was reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction seeking to block a congressionally mandated land exchange under the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. The case involves the transfer of approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat (an Apache ceremonial site), containing nearly two billion metric tons of copper, from the U.S. Forest Service to Resolution Copper Mining LLC in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land.

1. Article III standing and justiciability of plaintiffs' claims challenging the land exchange
2. Whether the Forest Service's appraisal of the exchanged lands complied with the Land Exchange Act's requirement for appraisals "in accordance with nationally recognized appraisal standards"
3. Whether the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) complies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), including analyses of water impacts, mitigation measures, agency comments, expert evidence, alternatives, and page length requirements
4. Whether the government satisfied its consultation obligations under the Land Exchange Act and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) Section 106
5. Whether the land exchange violates plaintiffs' religious liberty rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The majority held that plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims:

1. Appraisal Claims: The court upheld the Forest Service's appraisal methodology, finding no error in treating Resolution Copper's unpatented mining claims as encumbrances that reduce the value of the Mining Claim Zone parcel. The court reasoned that under the general mining laws, Resolution already owns the exclusive right to mine the minerals, so including their value in the appraisal would force Resolution to pay twice for rights it already possesses.
2. NEPA Claims: Applying the highly deferential standard from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, the court found the FEIS adequate. The court rejected arguments regarding cumulative water impacts, treatment of other agencies' comments, mitigation measures, extra-record evidence, alternative mining techniques, and page length requirements, finding the agency's discretionary choices fell within a broad zone of reasonableness.
3. Consultation Claims: The court held that both the Land Exchange Act and NHPA Section 106 are procedural statutes that do not mandate particular substantive outcomes. The government's two-decade consultation process, including pre-2021 efforts, was not arbitrary and capricious, even though it ultimately rejected the tribes' preferred outcome.
4. Religious Liberty Claims: The court held that plaintiffs' RFRA and Free Exercise Clause claims were foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States, which applied the Supreme Court's framework from Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. The court rejected arguments that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor abrogated Apache Stronghold, finding Mahmoud inapplicable because it involved education and coercion rather than government disposition of property.

This case involves a consolidated appeal challenging a congressionally mandated land exchange under the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, whereby the U.S. Forest Service must transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land (including Oak Flat, an Apache ceremonial site) containing nearly two billion metric tons of copper to Resolution Copper Mining LLC in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. Three groups of plaintiffs sought to enjoin the land exchange based on claims under the Land Exchange Act, NEPA, NHPA, RFRA, and the Free Exercise Clause.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing and prudential standing to bring their claims
2. Whether the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) is reviewable as final agency action
3. Whether the appraisal of the exchanged lands complies with the Land Exchange Act's requirement that appraisals be conducted in accordance with nationally recognized appraisal standards
4. Whether the FEIS complies with NEPA's procedural requirements regarding cumulative water impacts, agency comments, mitigation measures, expert evidence, alternatives analysis, and page limits
5. Whether the government satisfied its consultation obligations under the Land Exchange Act and Section 106 of the NHPA
6. Whether the land exchange violates plaintiffs' religious liberty rights under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The majority held that:

1. Standing: Plaintiffs established Article III standing based on imminent injury to traditional cultural places and redressability through favorable judicial decisions. AMRC also established prudential standing for its appraisal claims under the flexible zone-of-interests test.
2. Final Agency Action: The FEIS is reviewable as final agency action because its publication triggers the 60-day statutory deadline for land conveyance.
3. Appraisal Claims: AMRC is unlikely to succeed on its appraisal challenge. The appraisal properly treated Resolution Copper's unpatented mining claims as encumbrances on the property, not as ownership of the mineral estate. Under the "finders keepers" regime of the Mining Law of 1872, Resolution already owns the exclusive right to extract minerals in the Mining Claim Zone, so including those minerals' value in the appraisal would force Resolution to pay twice for rights it already possesses.
4. NEPA Claims: Applying the highly deferential standard from Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County (2025), plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on any NEPA claims. The government properly analyzed cumulative water impacts, adequately addressed agency comments, considered mitigation measures, properly handled extra-record evidence, reasonably rejected alternative mining techniques as infeasible, and any violation of page limit requirements constitutes harmless error.
5. Consultation Claims: The government satisfied its consultation obligations under both the Land Exchange Act and Section 106 of the NHPA. These are procedural statutes that do not mandate particular substantive outcomes, and the government engaged in thorough, good-faith consultation over two decades.
6. Religious Liberty Claims: The Lopez Plaintiffs' RFRA and Free Exercise Clause claims are foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States (2024), which held that disposition of government property is not subject to strict scrutiny under Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. The Supreme Court's decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025) does not abrogate Apache Stronghold because it involved education and coercion contexts, not property disposition.

This case involves a consolidated appeal challenging a congressionally mandated land exchange under the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, which requires the U.S. Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land (including Oak Flat, a sacred Apache site) containing nearly two billion metric tons of copper to Resolution Copper Mining LLC in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. Three groups of plaintiffs sought to enjoin the land exchange based on claims under the Land Exchange Act, NEPA, NHPA, RFRA, and the Free Exercise Clause.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing and prudential standing to challenge the land exchange
2. Whether the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) complies with NEPA's procedural requirements
3. Whether the government's appraisal of the exchanged lands complied with the Land Exchange Act's requirement that appraisals be conducted "in accordance with nationally recognized appraisal standards"
4. Whether the government satisfied its consultation obligations under the Land Exchange Act and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
5. Whether the land exchange violates plaintiffs' religious liberty rights under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims. The majority held:

1. Standing: Plaintiffs established Article III standing because the FEIS showed that physical and visual impacts on traditional cultural places would be immediate, permanent, and large in scale, constituting imminent injury. Plaintiffs also demonstrated redressability because a favorable decision would likely prompt the government to reconsider the exchange. AMRC had prudential standing to challenge the appraisal under the flexible zone-of-interests test.
2. Appraisal Claims: AMRC's challenge to the appraisal was unlikely to succeed. The Forest Service properly valued the Mining Claim Zone (MCZ) parcel at approximately $2 million because Resolution Copper's unpatented mining claims gave it exclusive rights to extract minerals, meaning those minerals were not part of the federal government's estate to be valued. The appraisal correctly applied the "highest and best use" standard by valuing the land for surface use supporting mining operations rather than mining itself, since the minerals were already subject to Resolution's claims under the general mining laws.
3. NEPA Claims: Under the Supreme Court's deferential standard in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, plaintiffs' six NEPA challenges all failed. The government adequately analyzed cumulative water impacts, properly considered comments from other agencies, analyzed mitigation measures across hundreds of pages, addressed concerns raised by expert declarations, reasonably rejected alternative mining techniques as infeasible, and any violation of page limit requirements was harmless error.
4. Consultation Claims: Both the Land Exchange Act and NHPA consultation requirements are procedural statutes that do not mandate any particular substantive outcome. The government engaged in thorough consultation with the Tribe over two decades and adequately responded to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation's recommendations. The government's consultation process was not arbitrary and capricious merely because it reached a conclusion contrary to the Tribe's preferences.
5. Religious Liberty Claims: The Lopez Plaintiffs' RFRA and Free Exercise Clause claims were foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States, which held that under Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, a disposition of government property is not subject to strict scrutiny when it does not coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or discriminate against religious adherents. The Supreme Court's decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor did not abrogate Apache Stronghold because Mahmoud involved education and coercion, not property disposition.

This is an immigration law case involving a refugee's appeal of a district court's dismissal of her lawsuit challenging the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) denial of her application for lawful permanent resident status. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether the case became moot after USCIS reopened the application and issued a new decision while the litigation was pending.

1. Whether USCIS acted without legal authority (ultra vires) when it sua sponte reopened plaintiff's application for lawful permanent resident status
2. Whether the case became moot when USCIS provided the relief plaintiff sought in her complaint by reopening her application and issuing a new decision
3. Whether the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to mootness applied to preserve the case
4. Whether plaintiff's requests for attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) preserved the case from mootness

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on mootness grounds. The court held that: (1) USCIS did not act ultra vires when it reopened plaintiff's application, as it complied with regulatory requirements by providing notice and more than 30 days to respond to a Request for Evidence; (2) the case became moot when USCIS granted the specific relief plaintiff requested in her complaint—setting aside the July 2020 denial and issuing a new decision—by reopening the application and issuing a May 2024 decision; (3) plaintiff's requests for attorney's fees and a broad catch-all for "any other relief" did not preserve the moot cause of action; and (4) the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception did not apply because plaintiff could have meaningfully challenged the May 2024 decision in a separate action or by amending her complaint, meaning the action did not evade review. The court reasoned that once USCIS issued its May 2024 decision, the district court could no longer grant relief regarding the July 2020 denial, which was the only agency action challenged in the complaint.

This case involves a dispute over loan documents and security interests in real estate properties owned by NICbyte and its subsidiaries. The defendant StarTop Investments sought to enforce loans allegedly secured by deeds of trust and pledge agreements, while plaintiffs claimed the loan documents were procured through fraud, forgery, and unauthorized action by a rogue manager, and were obtained in violation of a joint venture agreement.

1. Whether the loan documents were void or voidable based on fraud and forgery
2. Whether the manager (Soberal) had actual authority to enter into the loan documents and grant security interests
3. Whether the manager had apparent authority to bind the plaintiffs
4. Whether the defendant could rely on a provision in the joint venture agreement protecting third parties from inquiring into the manager's authority
5. Whether sanctions including an adverse inference were appropriate due to the defendant's spoliation of evidence
6. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief preventing enforcement of the loan documents

The court ruled in favor of plaintiffs on all major issues. The court found that:

1. The defendant intentionally destroyed thousands of documents including emails, text messages, and Slack communications, warranting sanctions including an adverse inference
2. The manager (Soberal) lacked actual authority to enter into the loans, as the joint venture agreement explicitly prohibited such transactions without consent from the other member (NICbyte)
3. The manager lacked apparent authority because: (a) the circumstances presented numerous red flags suggesting fraud (urgent requests, unusually high interest rates, unrecorded security interests, forged documents); (b) the defendant's principals were aware of these red flags; and (c) the defendant itself engaged in fraudulent conduct by falsifying loan documents to investors
4. The defendant could not rely on the joint venture agreement's protection for third parties, as that provision does not apply when the third party has actual knowledge that the manager lacks authority
5. An adverse inference was appropriate that the manager did not have authority and that the defendant knew this, based on the intentional destruction of evidence and the numerous indicia of fraud in the record
6. The loan documents were invalid and unenforceable, and the defendant had no right, title, or interest in the underlying properties
7. Plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from asserting any rights or interests derived from the fraudulent loans
8. The defendant must pay $423,781 in attorney's fees and expenses related to the spoliation motion

This is an appeal of a special education case under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) involving the appropriate classroom placement for a student with severe multiple disabilities and intensive management needs. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the interpretation of state class size regulations.

1. Whether multiple class size regulations under New York's § 200.6(h)(4) represent distinct stacking requirements or alternative placement options from which the Department of Education may choose
2. Whether a 12:1:4 classroom placement violated the student's right to a free appropriate public education
3. Whether the State Review Officer (SRO) properly determined that the 12:1:4 placement would best serve the student's individual needs

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The New York Court of Appeals answered the certified question by holding that § 200.6(h)(4) provides alternative placement options rather than stacking requirements. Therefore, the Committee on Special Education properly exercised its discretion in selecting the 12:1:4 classroom placement for the student, who qualified for either a 12:1:4 or 6:1:1 classroom. The SRO reasonably concluded that the 12:1:4 placement was appropriate based on the student's need for increased adult support from multiple professionals and his lack of progress and poor attendance in the previous 6:1:1 placement. The court deferred to the SRO's decision as it involved educational expertise and was adequately reasoned.

This is a criminal appeal in which Mustafa Goklu was convicted of money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business based on bitcoin-for-cash exchanges with an undercover DEA agent. Goklu challenges his conviction on three grounds and also raises sentencing issues.

1. Whether the district court violated Goklu's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury by empaneling a juror (Juror 30) who expressed positive views toward law enforcement and negative views toward financial crimes.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Goklu of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, specifically whether exchanging bitcoin for cash constitutes "money transmitting" under 18 U.S.C. § 1960.
3. Whether the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 by instructing the jury after Goklu's closing argument that exchanging bitcoin for U.S. currency can qualify as a transfer.
4. Whether Goklu's sentencing was improper because the court included the value of transactions that occurred before the undercover agent disclosed the bitcoin came from drug dealing.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Goklu's conviction and dismissed his sentencing challenges as moot. The court rejected all three conviction challenges: (1) The district court did not abuse its discretion in empaneling Juror 30, who stated he would "try his best" to be impartial despite his initial doubts, and the trial judge's credibility assessment is entitled to deference absent clear abuse of discretion. (2) The evidence was sufficient to support the money transmitting conviction because Goklu's business of exchanging bitcoin for cash falls within the statutory and regulatory definitions of money transmission services—bitcoin qualifies as "funds," and the physical transfer of cash is a valid "means" of transmitting funds to another location, consistent with FinCEN's guidance treating virtual currency exchangers as money transmitters. (3) The district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the supplemental jury instruction after Goklu's closing argument because the instruction was legally correct and responsive to a new argument Goklu raised for the first time in closing. Regarding sentencing, the court dismissed Goklu's challenges as moot because he had completed his prison sentence and raised no challenge to his term or conditions of supervised release.

This is a copyright infringement case in which ASTM International, a non-profit standards development organization, appealed the denial of a preliminary injunction against UpCodes, Inc., a for-profit online platform that publishes copyrighted ASTM technical standards that have been incorporated into building codes. The court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction, finding that UpCodes is likely to succeed on its fair use defense.

1. Whether UpCodes' copying of ASTM's copyrighted technical standards constitutes copyright infringement or qualifies as fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107
2. Whether UpCodes' use is "transformative" despite reproducing the standards without alteration, focusing on the purpose and character of the use rather than expressive similarity
3. Whether the commercial nature of UpCodes' use (as a for-profit entity offering free access to standards) weighs against fair use
4. Whether copying the entirety of standards incorporated by reference into law is reasonable in relation to UpCodes' purpose of disseminating the law
5. Whether UpCodes' copying causes cognizable market harm to ASTM's business and how to balance such harm against public benefits of free access to law

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of the preliminary injunction, holding that UpCodes is likely to succeed on its fair use defense. The court's reasoning on the four fair use factors is as follows:

1. Purpose and Character of Use (Factor 1): UpCodes' use is transformative because it serves a fundamentally different purpose than ASTM's. While ASTM publishes standards to advance industry best practices and safety, UpCodes publishes only the versions of standards that have been incorporated into law to help the public access and comply with binding legal requirements. This distinction renders the use transformative even though UpCodes does not alter the standards. The court rejected ASTM's argument that lack of alteration precludes transformativeness, holding that a work can be transformative in function or purpose without altering the original. UpCodes also has a compelling independent justification for copying—it cannot achieve its purpose of disseminating the law without copying the law itself. While UpCodes is a for-profit entity, it derives no direct monetary profit from the standards themselves (offering them free to all users) and derives only tangential commercial benefits. The commercial elements do not outweigh the transformative nature of the use. This factor favors fair use.
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work (Factor 2): Technical standards constitute primarily factual works that fall at the factual end of the fact-fiction spectrum, which counsels in favor of fair use. The fact that the standards were incorporated by reference into law moves them even further to the periphery of copyright's core protection. This factor strongly supports fair use.
3. Amount and Substantiality of Portion Used (Factor 3): Although UpCodes reproduced the entirety of the standards, this is reasonable in relation to its transformative purpose. The International Building Code incorporates the standards in their entirety without specifying which provisions are incorporated, so accessing the entire standard is necessary to understand and comply with legal requirements. Additionally, copying non-mandatory portions (such as explanatory notes and appendices) is justified because such material aids in understanding and interpreting legal duties and has legal effect. The third factor favors fair use.
4. Effect on the Market for the Copyrighted Work (Factor 4): This factor is equivocal. While UpCodes' free copies are effective substitutes for ASTM's paid standards and will likely affect the market for the Works, the potential harm to the broader market for technical standards appears limited. Many standards incorporated into law are outdated, and demand for outdated standards appears dim compared to demand for current standards. ASTM provides no clear evidence of actual subscription cancellations or the percentage of its revenue derived from incorporated standards. Additionally, the substantial public benefits of free access to law—benefiting regulated entities, building residents, government enforcers, press members, and the public—must be weighed against potential economic harm. While unfettered copying could theoretically threaten ASTM's ability to develop standards, the record lacks sufficient information to assess the likelihood of significant market harm. On balance, the fourth factor does not significantly tip the balance either way.

This is a Black Lung Benefits Act case in which a coal miner, Harold Baisden, sought benefits for pneumoconiosis (black lung disease). The central issue was whether the responsible coal operator, Wolf Run Mining Company, successfully rebutted the statutory presumption that Baisden's total disability was caused by coal dust exposure.

1. Whether the ALJ properly applied the Preamble to the 2000 Black Lung Benefits regulations, which establishes that smoking and coal dust exposure present additive risks to lung health
2. Whether the presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(b)—which presumes total disability is caused by pneumoconiosis for miners with 15+ years of coal employment—properly shifted the burden to the employer to rebut the presumption
3. Whether the ALJ adequately considered and properly discredited the expert opinions of the employer's medical experts, Dr. Jarboe and Dr. Ranavaya, who attributed Baisden's lung impairment solely to smoking
4. Whether the ALJ's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for review and affirmed the ALJ's award of benefits. The court held that: (1) the ALJ properly considered the Preamble, which establishes that smoking and coal dust are additive causes of lung disease; (2) the statutory presumption, not the Preamble, properly shifted the burden to the employer to rebut the presumption by excluding coal dust as a cause; (3) the ALJ adequately explained her rationale for discrediting Dr. Jarboe's and Dr. Ranavaya's opinions because neither expert adequately explained why coal dust was not also a contributing cause of Baisden's lung impairment, and both failed to address the additive effects of smoking and coal dust exposure; and (4) the ALJ's finding that the employer failed to rebut the presumption was supported by substantial evidence. The court emphasized that in a presumption case, the employer bears the burden of affirmatively excluding coal dust as a cause, and the experts' failure to do so was fatal to the employer's rebuttal argument.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a motion to transfer venue in an antitrust case. Google sought to transfer a Sherman Act lawsuit filed by Branch Metrics from the Eastern District of Texas to the Northern District of California, and the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the transfer motion.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in applying the eight-factor Volkswagen test under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to determine whether transfer was warranted for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice
2. Whether the court-congestion factor (factor 5) was properly weighted and whether it was improperly given dispositive weight over other factors favoring transfer
3. Whether the Clayton Act's liberal venue provisions alter the standard § 1404(a) analysis and provide heightened deference to a plaintiff's forum selection in antitrust cases

The Fifth Circuit granted Google's petition for a writ of mandamus and ordered the district court to transfer the case to the Northern District of California. The court held that the district court misapplied the law in two respects: (1) it incorrectly analyzed the court-congestion factor by relying on median time-to-disposition statistics that are unreliable for complex litigation and do not account for the case's complexity; and (2) it improperly gave dispositive weight to the court-congestion factor to override all other factors that weighed in favor of transfer or were neutral, violating the principle that no single factor is dispositive. The court also rejected Branch's argument that the Clayton Act amplifies deference to a plaintiff's forum choice, holding that § 1404(a) applies to antitrust suits and that the liberal venue provisions of the Clayton Act only allow broader forum selection but do not alter the § 1404(a) transfer analysis.

This is an immigration appeal case in which a Guatemalan national who illegally entered the United States seeks asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection based on alleged persecution by the Mara 18 gang and his Mayan ethnicity. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge's denial of all relief.

1. Whether the petitioner established membership in a particular social group eligible for asylum or withholding of removal protection
2. Whether the petitioner exhausted administrative remedies by presenting his claims to the Board before raising them on appeal
3. Whether the petitioner forfeited arguments about particular social groups by failing to contest their rejection in his petition for review
4. Whether the petitioner experienced persecution based on group membership rather than individual recruitment
5. Whether the petitioner preserved a due-process claim regarding interpretation and language access
6. Whether the petitioner preserved a Convention Against Torture claim on appeal

The court denied the petition for review. The court held that: (1) the petitioner forfeited his arguments about the four particular social groups he identified before the agency by failing to contest their rejection in his petition for review; (2) the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies for three new social groups raised for the first time on appeal, as the exhaustion requirement demands precision and the new groups' additional modifiers made them sufficiently different from those presented to the Board; (3) without establishing membership in a particular social group, the petitioner's asylum and withholding claims necessarily fail; (4) the immigration judge properly assessed credibility and evidence discrepancies while considering contextual factors; (5) the petitioner waived his Convention Against Torture claim by failing to challenge it on appeal; and (6) the petitioner failed to exhaust his due-process claim by not raising it before the Board.

This case involves a challenge to Tennessee's pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) laws by McKee Foods Corporation, a self-funded ERISA health plan sponsor. McKee sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that Tennessee's laws regulating PBM practices—specifically provisions restricting interference with pharmacy choice and limiting financial incentives—are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).

1. Whether McKee has standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge against the Tennessee Commissioner of Commerce and Insurance
2. Whether McKee has a private right of action under ERISA to challenge state laws as preempted
3. Whether McKee qualifies as a fiduciary under ERISA with authority to bring suit
4. Whether Tennessee's any-willing-provider (AWP) provisions have an impermissible "connection with" ERISA plans
5. Whether Tennessee's incentive provisions restricting financial incentives have an impermissible connection with ERISA plans
6. Whether ERISA's saving clause or deemer clause preserves the Tennessee laws despite preemption

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that ERISA preempts Tennessee's PBM laws. The court held:

1. Standing and Jurisdiction: McKee has standing to bring this pre-enforcement challenge because it demonstrated an injury in fact (its conduct is proscribed by the laws and subject to enforcement), a credible threat of prosecution (based on administrative complaints and the Commissioner's stated intent to enforce against ERISA plans), and the case is ripe for review.
2. Private Right of Action: McKee, as both a plan sponsor and fiduciary, has a private right of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) to seek equitable relief, including injunctions against state officials, when federal law preempts state regulation.
3. Fiduciary Status: McKee qualifies as a fiduciary under ERISA because it exercises discretionary authority and control over plan management and administration, including designing the plan, establishing eligibility requirements, setting benefits, and forming the pharmacy network.
4. AWP Provisions Preempted: Tennessee's any-willing-provider provisions (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 56-7-2359, 3120(b)(1), and 3121(a)-(b)) have an impermissible connection with ERISA because they: (1) require plans to structure benefits in a particular way by mandating pharmacy inclusion; (2) govern a central matter of plan administration (the scope and design of pharmacy networks); and (3) interfere with nationally uniform plan administration by requiring state-specific tailoring. The court rejected the comparison to the cost-regulation law upheld in Rutledge v. PCMA, finding that these provisions go beyond cost regulation to mandate specific benefit structures.
5. Incentive Provisions Preempted: Tennessee's incentive provisions (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 56-7-3120(a), (b)(2), and 3121(c)) are preempted because they restrict cost-sharing arrangements and require uniform copays across all network pharmacies, effectively dictating plan design rather than merely increasing costs or altering incentives.
6. Saving and Deemer Clauses: Although the Commissioner argued ERISA's saving clause preserves the laws as insurance regulations, the court held that even if the saving clause applied, the deemer clause prevents self-funded ERISA plans from being treated as insurance companies. Therefore, the saving clause does not apply, and the laws remain preempted.

This is a First Amendment challenge to California Assembly Bill 290 (AB 290), which regulates how dialysis providers and nonprofit charities can interact with patients receiving health insurance premium assistance. The case involves constitutional challenges to five key provisions of the statute by dialysis providers, the American Kidney Fund (a nonprofit charity), patient advocacy groups, and individual patients.

1. Whether the Reimbursement Cap—which caps reimbursement rates for providers who donate to charities offering premium assistance—violates the First Amendment right to association
2. Whether the Patient Disclosure Requirement—requiring charities to disclose patient names to insurers—violates associational rights
3. Whether the Financial Assistance Restriction—prohibiting charities from conditioning assistance on certain patient eligibility factors—violates the First Amendment right to association
4. Whether the Coverage Disclosure Requirement—mandating disclosure of all available health coverage options—violates the First Amendment
5. Whether the Safe Harbor Provision is justiciable
6. Whether unconstitutional provisions are severable from the remaining statute

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision. The court held:

1. Reimbursement Cap: Unconstitutional. The provision burdens the First Amendment right to association between providers and the charity. Although California has a sufficiently important interest in preventing distortion to insurance risk pools, the cap is not narrowly tailored because the state could achieve the same result through less restrictive means, such as directly regulating reimbursement rates for all ESRD patients rather than only those whose providers donate to charities.
2. Patient Disclosure Requirement: Unconstitutional. The requirement triggers exacting scrutiny as a compelled disclosure burdening associational rights. California's only asserted interest is carrying out the unconstitutional Reimbursement Cap, so no sufficiently important governmental interest supports the requirement.
3. Financial Assistance Restriction: Unconstitutional. The provision burdens AKF's right to choose which patients to support and associate with. While California has a substantial interest in protecting vulnerable populations from abusive practices, the blanket prohibition on conditioning assistance is not narrowly tailored to address only abusive conduct.
4. Coverage Disclosure Requirement: Constitutional. The requirement compels only factual and uncontroversial information about available health coverage options and is reasonably related to preventing consumer deception, satisfying the Zauderer standard for compelled commercial speech.
5. Severability: The unconstitutional provisions cannot be severed from the Coverage Disclosure Requirement. Under California law's volitional separability test, the legislature would not have enacted the Coverage Disclosure Requirement as a standalone provision, particularly given that the Anti-Steering provision (struck down by the district court) was essential to the statute's purpose, and the disclosure requirement without anti-steering protections might actually encourage the steering the law sought to prevent.
6. Safe Harbor Provision: Moot. The provision allowed entities to request an updated federal advisory opinion before July 1, 2020. Because that date has passed and no action was taken, the court cannot provide any effectual relief.

This is a First Amendment challenge to California Assembly Bill 290 (AB 290), which regulates how dialysis providers and nonprofit charities can interact with patients receiving health insurance premium assistance. The case involves constitutional challenges to five key provisions of the statute by dialysis providers, a nonprofit charity, and patient advocacy groups.

1. Whether the Reimbursement Cap—which caps reimbursement rates for providers who donate to charities offering premium assistance—violates the First Amendment right to association
2. Whether the Patient Disclosure Requirement—requiring charities to disclose patient names to insurers—violates associational rights
3. Whether the Financial Assistance Restriction—prohibiting charities from conditioning assistance on certain patient eligibility factors—violates expressive association rights
4. Whether the Coverage Disclosure Requirement—requiring charities to inform patients of all available health coverage options—violates the First Amendment
5. Whether the unconstitutional provisions are severable from the remaining constitutional provision
6. Whether challenges to the Safe Harbor Provision are moot

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that: (1) the Reimbursement Cap violates the First Amendment because it burdens the right to association and is not narrowly tailored to California's sufficiently important interest in preventing insurance risk pool distortion; (2) the Patient Disclosure Requirement violates the First Amendment because California's only asserted interest is carrying out the unconstitutional Reimbursement Cap; (3) the Financial Assistance Restriction violates the First Amendment right to expressive association because it is not narrowly tailored to prevent abusive practices; (4) the Coverage Disclosure Requirement does not violate the First Amendment as it compels only factual, uncontroversial information reasonably related to preventing consumer deception; (5) the unconstitutional provisions cannot be severed from the Coverage Disclosure Requirement under California law's volitional separability test, as the legislature likely would not have enacted the disclosure requirement alone without the other provisions; and (6) challenges to the Safe Harbor Provision are moot because the deadline for action has passed.

This is a First Amendment challenge to California Assembly Bill 290 (AB 290), which regulates dialysis providers' charitable donations to nonprofits that assist patients with health insurance premiums. The case involves constitutional challenges to five key provisions of the statute by dialysis providers, the American Kidney Fund (a charitable organization), and patient advocacy groups.

1. Whether the Reimbursement Cap—which caps reimbursement rates for providers who donate to charities offering premium assistance—violates the First Amendment right to association
2. Whether the Patient Disclosure Requirement—requiring charities to disclose patient names to insurers—violates associational rights
3. Whether the Financial Assistance Restriction—prohibiting charities from conditioning assistance on certain patient eligibility factors—violates the right to expressive association
4. Whether the Coverage Disclosure Requirement—mandating disclosure of all available health coverage options—violates the First Amendment
5. Whether the Safe Harbor Provision allowing entities to seek updated advisory opinions is justiciable
6. Whether unconstitutional provisions are severable from the remaining statute

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision. The court held:

1. Reimbursement Cap: Unconstitutional. The cap burdens Providers' First Amendment right to donate to an expressive association (AKF), triggering exacting scrutiny. While California has a sufficiently important interest in preventing distortion to insurance risk pools, the cap is not narrowly tailored because the state could achieve the same result through less restrictive means (e.g., directly capping reimbursement rates for all ESRD patients rather than only those whose providers donate to charities).
2. Patient Disclosure Requirement: Unconstitutional. Compelled disclosure requirements trigger exacting scrutiny regardless of whether the association is controversial. California's only asserted interest was carrying out the unconstitutional Reimbursement Cap, which cannot serve as a valid governmental interest.
3. Financial Assistance Restriction: Unconstitutional. The provision burdens AKF's right to choose which patients to support, interfering with its expressive association. Although California has a substantial interest in protecting vulnerable populations from abusive practices, the blanket prohibition on conditioning assistance is not narrowly tailored to address only the specific abusive practices California identified.
4. Coverage Disclosure Requirement: Constitutional. The requirement to inform patients of all available health coverage options compels only factual and uncontroversial information reasonably related to preventing consumer deception, fitting within the Zauderer framework for permissible compelled commercial speech.
5. Severability: The unconstitutional provisions cannot be severed from the Coverage Disclosure Requirement. Under California law's volitional separability test, the legislature would not have enacted the Coverage Disclosure Requirement alone, as it would likely encourage patients to switch from public to private insurance—contrary to AB 290's stated purpose—especially without the Anti-Steering provision (which was struck down and not appealed).
6. Safe Harbor Provision: Moot. The provision required action by July 1, 2020, a date that has passed. Because no action was taken before the statutory deadline, the court cannot provide any effectual relief.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a class-action product defect lawsuit. The case involves whether an automobile manufacturer (FCA) who was not a signatory to a lease agreement containing an arbitration clause can enforce that clause against a lessee (Olson) to compel arbitration of claims alleging defects in a vehicle's headrest.

1. Whether a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement can enforce a delegation clause (a clause delegating questions about the scope of the arbitration agreement to an arbitrator) when the agreement expressly limits its terms to the original parties.
2. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. overruled the Ninth Circuit's precedent in Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., which holds that non-parties generally cannot enforce arbitration agreements.
3. Whether FCA can compel arbitration under the plain language of the lease agreement between Olson and the dealership.
4. Whether FCA can use equitable estoppel under California law to compel Olson to arbitrate claims that arise from statutory rights and manufacturer warranties rather than from the lease contract itself.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of FCA's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that:

1. FCA cannot enforce the delegation clause because the arbitration agreement expressly limits its application to disputes between Olson and the dealership. The agreement lacks "clear and unmistakable evidence" that Olson agreed to arbitrate arbitrability with third parties like FCA.
2. Henry Schein does not overrule Kramer because Henry Schein involved a party that was effectively a signatory to the arbitration agreement, whereas FCA is not. Henry Schein did not address whether delegation clauses can be enforced by third parties with no valid arbitration agreement with the party seeking to compel arbitration.
3. The plain language of the lease agreement does not require Olson to arbitrate claims with FCA because the agreement explicitly limits coverage to disputes between Olson and the dealership (or its employees, agents, successors, or assigns), and FCA claims none of these statuses.
4. Under California law as clarified in Ford Motor Warranty Cases, FCA cannot use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration because Olson's claims are not "intimately founded in and intertwined with" the lease contract. Rather, Olson's claims arise from statutory rights under California consumer protection laws and from FCA's own manufacturer warranty, not from the lease agreement itself.

This is a criminal appeal of a misdemeanor conviction arising from a jet ski accident at Lake Mead in which a passenger drowned. Bryce Tyrone Verhonich was convicted of negligent operation of a vessel, failure to wear a personal flotation device, and failure to attach an engine cut-off switch lanyard in violation of National Park Service regulations.

1. Whether evidence of failure to wear a life jacket and failure to attach a safety lanyard are relevant to proving negligent operation of a vessel under 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(b)(8), or whether "operating a vessel" concerns only the piloting of the jet ski itself
2. Whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction for negligent operation
3. Whether two surveillance videos were improperly admitted as propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
4. Whether the sentencing was reasonable and whether the magistrate judge erred in relying on personal anecdotal experience

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. On the issue of first impression regarding statutory interpretation, the court held that failure to wear a life jacket and failure to attach a safety lanyard may be considered in determining whether a vessel was operated negligently, as "operate" encompasses external factors affecting the maintenance and use of the vessel. The court found sufficient evidence supported the conviction because Verhonich admitted making a careless turning maneuver that caused both occupants to fall into the water, while operating without proper safety equipment in rough conditions. The court held the surveillance videos were properly admitted—one was inextricably intertwined with the flotation device charge, and the other's admission did not affect substantial rights given overwhelming evidence of the safety lanyard violation. Finally, the court upheld the sentencing, finding the magistrate judge reasonably distinguished state vehicular manslaughter cases and properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors in imposing six months custody and two years probation.

This case involves a challenge by two advocacy groups to a federal agency's approval of an underground coal mine expansion on Indian lands. The groups sought judicial review under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, alleging the agency failed to protect water resources and enforce statutory obligations.

1. Whether the advocacy groups provided adequate notice of their intent to sue under 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2), including identification of specific statutory provisions and sufficient information about alleged agency failures
2. Whether the alleged agency duties to investigate violations, issue penalties, and suspend permits are nondiscretionary obligations under § 1270
3. Whether the advocacy groups participated in the agency's permit-review process as required to obtain judicial review under 30 U.S.C. § 1276

The court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition for judicial review on multiple grounds:

1. Section 1270 Notice Requirement: The advocacy groups failed to provide adequate notice because their notice focused on violations of the (rescinded) Stream Protection Rule and did not identify the specific statutory provisions (§§ 1211, 1268, and 1271) or provide sufficient information about the agency's alleged failures to investigate, issue penalties, or suspend the permit.
2. Discretionary Functions: Even if notice had been adequate, § 1270 only applies to nondiscretionary duties. The court found that the duties to investigate (§ 1271), issue penalties (§ 1268), and suspend permits (§ 1211) all involve agency discretion because they depend on the agency's assessment of whether violations occurred and how to respond, making them unsuitable for relief under § 1270.
3. Section 1276 Participation Requirement: The advocacy groups did not participate in the permit-review process as required by § 1276. They failed to object to or comment on the permit application itself; their only comments addressed the environmental assessment, which occurred before the permit application was even filed. Without participation in the permit-review process, they had no right to notice of the agency's decision and could not pursue judicial review under § 1276.

This is a Title VII employment discrimination retaliation case in which Juan Dominguez appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Weiser Security Services. Dominguez alleged that Weiser terminated him in retaliation for reporting his supervisor's alleged sex discrimination to the company's HR department.

1. Whether Dominguez established the causation element of a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework
2. Whether the decisionmaker (Strickland) knew about Dominguez's protected activity (his report of sex discrimination to HR on June 10)
3. Whether Dominguez could establish liability under the "cat's paw" theory, which allows imputation of a biased subordinate's retaliatory motive to an unbiased final decisionmaker
4. Whether pretext evidence could establish causation absent proof that the decisionmaker knew of the protected activity

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Weiser. The court held that Dominguez failed to establish the causation element necessary for a prima facie retaliation claim. Specifically:

1. Direct Retaliation Theory Failed: Dominguez could not prove that Strickland, the ultimate decisionmaker on the termination, knew about his June 10 report of sex discrimination to HR. Neither Lee-Sutherlin (the HR investigator) nor Dominguez told Strickland about the sex discrimination comments, and Strickland testified he was unaware of them. The court rejected speculation that Strickland could have inferred knowledge merely because Dominguez was interviewed as part of an unrelated race discrimination investigation.
2. Cat's Paw Theory Failed: Dominguez could not prove that Yates, his supervisor, knew about his protected activity. The court found that Yates's pre-investigation suspicions about complaints could not support an inference that he knew Dominguez specifically reported sex discrimination on June 10. The angry phone call from Yates about training issues did not establish knowledge of the sex discrimination report, and Yates's fabrication of the Saturday training attendance requirement, while evidence of pretext, could not prove retaliatory animus without evidence that Yates knew about the protected activity.
3. Pretext Insufficient Without Knowledge: The court held that pretext evidence alone cannot establish causation. Even if Strickland's stated reasons for termination were pretextual, retaliation for the protected activity could not have been the "but-for" reason if Strickland did not know about the protected activity in the first place.
4. Burden of Proof: The court emphasized that Dominguez bore the burden of producing sufficient evidence to support reasonable inferences, and that "bare speculation" about what supervisors knew was insufficient to overcome summary judgment. The court rejected invitations to allow juries to fill evidentiary gaps with speculation.

This is an appeal by the State of Georgia seeking review of a district court's denial of its motion for a "limited remand" to state court to obtain a superseding indictment against two federal task force officers charged with crimes related to a suspect's death during a raid. The State argued that removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 divested state court jurisdiction, preventing it from obtaining a superseding indictment under Georgia law.

1. Whether the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the State's motion for limited remand under the collateral order doctrine
2. Whether the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) for interlocutory orders with the practical effect of injunctions
3. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(5) prevents a state court from conducting grand jury proceedings for a superseding indictment after removal of a criminal prosecution to federal court

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that: (1) the collateral order doctrine does not apply because the district court's order did not conclusively determine whether the State could obtain a superseding indictment—federal law does not prohibit the State from seeking a superseding indictment before a state grand jury with or without remand; (2) § 1292(a)(1) does not provide jurisdiction because the district court's order does not have the practical effect of enjoining the State from seeking a superseding indictment, as the State admitted it could pursue alternatives such as seeking a new indictment in state court; and (3) interpreting § 1455(b)(5) using the rule of the last antecedent, only the removed "prosecution" must cease in state court, not the state court's ability to conduct grand jury proceedings for a superseding indictment.

This is an appeal concerning eligibility for Black Lung Benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. The case involves the interpretation of a Department of Labor regulation defining what constitutes a "year" of coal mine employment for purposes of establishing the 15-year employment requirement that triggers a presumption of total disability from pneumoconiosis.

1. Whether a "year" of coal mine employment under 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32) requires: (a) proof that a miner worked 125 days within a full 365/366-day calendar year employment period (the Director's interpretation), or (b) proof only that a miner worked 125 days in coal mines during any 365/366-day period (Hayes's interpretation)
2. The proper interpretation of the plain language of the regulation and its subsections (i) and (ii)
3. Whether deference to the agency's interpretation under Kisor v. Wilkie is appropriate
4. Whether the regulation's preamble in the Federal Register supports either interpretation

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted Hayes's petition for review, vacated the Benefits Review Board's decision, and remanded the case. The court adopted Hayes's interpretation of the regulation, holding that the plain text of 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32)(i) unambiguously provides that if a coal miner worked in coal mine employment for at least 125 working days during a 365/366-day period, that constitutes one "year" of coal mine employment for all purposes under the Act. The court reasoned that: (1) the plain language of subsection (i) does not require the 125 working days to occur within a full calendar year of employment; (2) subsection (ii)'s presumption that miners who worked a full calendar year worked 125 days would be rendered meaningless under the Director's interpretation; (3) the regulation is unambiguous and does not warrant deference to the agency; and (4) the regulation's preamble contains language supporting Hayes's position. The court rejected arguments that the regulation was discretionary or that avoidance doctrines should apply.

This is a racial discrimination case under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in which Kenny Faulk, a Black man, sued Dimerco Express USA Corp. after the company rescinded his conditional job offer for a sales position once the company president discovered Faulk's race. The jury awarded Faulk $390,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages, and Dimerco appealed challenging the verdict and damages awards.

1. Whether counsel's misconduct and evidentiary errors warrant a new trial
2. Whether the compensatory damages award for lost wages and emotional distress was excessive and should be remitted
3. Whether the punitive damages award of $3 million was unconstitutionally excessive under the Due Process Clause
4. Whether the district court properly awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects. The court held that: (1) plaintiff's counsel's misconduct, including improper arguments about "passing a torch" to the jury, did not require a new trial because the district court immediately corrected the statements and instructed the jury, and courts presume juries follow instructions; (2) the district court did not reversibly err in excluding Faulk's 2019 arrest record under Rule 403 because his emotional distress testimony was limited to distress from learning of the discrimination, and the arrest record had minimal probative value compared to its prejudicial effect; (3) exclusion of the 2014 arrest record was harmless because the jury heard testimony about the aggravated assault charge; (4) the compensatory damages award of $300,000 for emotional distress was supported by Faulk's credible testimony about his feelings of anger, frustration, and humiliation, consistent with precedent allowing emotional distress damages based on plaintiff testimony alone; (5) the punitive damages award of $3 million with a 7.69:1 ratio to compensatory damages was not unconstitutionally excessive because Dimerco's conduct was exceedingly reprehensible—involving intentional racial discrimination despite explicit warnings of illegality, repeated discriminatory actions by company leadership, and intentional harm to Faulk; and (6) the attorney's fees award was proper as a prevailing plaintiff under section 1988.

This is an appeal of a district court decision confirming an international arbitration award under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico sought to vacate a $47 million arbitration award in favor of Canadian investor Lion Mexico Consolidated, claiming the arbitrators exceeded their authority in interpreting NAFTA Article 1105(1) to protect foreign investors in addition to their investments.

1. Whether the arbitral tribunal exceeded its powers under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act by interpreting NAFTA Article 1105(1) to protect foreign investors with respect to their qualifying investments, rather than only protecting investments themselves.
2. Whether the tribunal acted in manifest disregard of the law by failing to follow Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in its interpretation of Article 1105(1).
3. Whether a Mexican businessman (Héctor Cárdenas Curiel), who was found by the arbitrators to have orchestrated fraud in Mexican courts, had the right to intervene in the district court proceedings to challenge the arbitration award.

The court affirmed the district court's decision in full. On the merits of Mexico's vacatur petition: (1) The tribunal did not exceed its powers because it engaged in legitimate treaty interpretation by examining the text of Article 1105(1), relying on binding Free Trade Commission Interpretation Notes, and citing relevant arbitration precedent. The tribunal's conclusion that Article 1105(1) protects investors regarding their qualifying investments fell "comfortably within the realm of interpretation" and was not an impermissible imposition of the arbitrators' own policy preferences. (2) The tribunal did not act in manifest disregard of the law because it properly applied Article 31 of the Vienna Convention by considering the treaty's text in context and in light of its object and purpose, and by faithfully considering the binding Free Trade Commission Interpretation Note. Mexico's narrow textual reading would have undermined NAFTA's purpose of encouraging cross-border investment. On Cárdenas's intervention: The district court properly denied both intervention as of right and permissive intervention because Mexico could adequately represent Cárdenas's interests (both sought vacatur of the award), Cárdenas's motion was untimely, and allowing intervention would have caused undue delay by requiring briefing of arguments unrelated to the existing petitions.

This case involves a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's denial of small-refinery exemptions from the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program. The petitioners, oil refineries that met the statutory definition of "small refinery" based on their 2024 throughput, sought exemptions from their 2024 RFS obligations but were denied by the EPA, which required them to meet the small-refinery definition for two consecutive years (2023 and 2024) rather than just one year.

1. Whether the EPA's interpretation of its own 2014 Eligibility Regulation—requiring applicants to meet the "small refinery" definition for both the year for which an exemption is sought and the preceding year—is consistent with the plain language of that regulation.
2. Whether the EPA's two-year requirement violates the Clean Air Act's statutory definition of "small refinery," which is based on throughput for "a calendar year" (singular).
3. Whether petitioners' statutory challenge to the 2025 denial decisions is timely under the Clean Air Act's 60-day filing requirement, or whether it constitutes an untimely attack on the 2014 regulation.

The court vacated the EPA's denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. The majority held that the EPA's interpretation of its own 2014 Eligibility Regulation violated the plain text of that regulation. When petitioners applied in 2025 for exemptions from their 2024 RFS obligations, the "most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and "the year for which an exemption is sought" were both 2024. Since petitioners met the small-refinery definition in 2024, they were eligible for exemptions under the regulation's plain language. The court rejected the EPA's argument that the regulation required two consecutive years of qualifying throughput, finding that such an interpretation contradicted the regulation's unambiguous text. The court declined to address the statutory challenge to the Clean Air Act itself, finding it unnecessary to do so. In a concurring opinion, Judge Rao argued that the EPA's denials also violated the Clean Air Act because the statute explicitly defines small-refinery status based on one year of throughput, not two, and that petitioners' statutory challenge to the 2025 denial decisions was timely under the 60-day filing requirement.

This is a case concerning whether the Delaware Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction to confirm a decision made by KPMG as an arbitration award under Delaware statute. The plaintiffs sought confirmation of KPMG's expert determination regarding post-closing purchase price adjustments in an asset purchase agreement, alternatively pleading breach of contract claims.

1. Whether KPMG's decision constitutes an arbitration award subject to confirmation under 10 Del. C. § 5713, or an expert determination outside the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction
2. Whether the dispute resolution provision in Section 2.02(d) of the Asset Purchase Agreement establishes an arbitration or expert determination mechanism
3. Whether labels used in contracts are dispositive in distinguishing between arbitration and expert determination
4. Whether the Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction to hear breach of contract claims as an alternative to confirming an arbitration award

The Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court held that KPMG's decision was an expert determination, not an arbitration award, and therefore Section 5713 does not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery. The Court reasoned that: (1) the APA explicitly labeled KPMG as acting "as an expert (and not an arbitrator)"; (2) the provision operated as a "run-of-the-mill accountant true-up mechanism" by limiting KPMG's authority to only the disputed items specified in the Objection Notice regarding net asset value calculations; (3) while labels are not dispositive, the actual operation of the mechanism—limited scope of authority, designation of an independent accountant, and absence of reference to arbitral rules—all indicated an expert determination; (4) the Engagement Letter's reference to an "award" subject to the FAA was not controlling given the explicit "expert not arbitrator" language and the limited mandate; and (5) the plaintiffs' alternative breach of contract claims seek legal relief on legal claims, which do not trigger the Court's equitable jurisdiction. The plaintiffs were permitted to transfer the matter to Superior Court within sixty days.

This is an immigration appeal case involving petitioners Niranjan Khanal and Gita Khanal against the Acting Attorney General regarding a denied immigration matter. The case was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The opinion does not provide sufficient detail in this errata sheet to identify the specific legal issues addressed in the underlying case.

This document is an errata sheet amending the Court's opinion issued on February 18, 2026. The amendment deletes a footnote statement regarding the government's supplemental brief and its failure to address a particular question. The substantive ruling and reasoning of the Court are not detailed in this errata sheet.

This is an appeal involving employees of the University of Puerto Rico who challenged actions taken by the University's President and a labor union. The case was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this errata sheet, which is a procedural document correcting a typographical error in the original opinion rather than summarizing the substantive legal questions addressed.

This document is an errata sheet that amends the Court's opinion issued on March 25, 2026, by removing a period following "n.7" on page 9, line 19. It does not contain the actual ruling or reasoning of the Court, but rather corrects a minor formatting error in the published opinion.

This is an errata sheet for a First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion issued on March 27, 2026, in a case involving plaintiffs Lucia Urizar-Mota, Sergio Reyes, and others against the United States. The errata sheet documents corrections to typographical and formatting errors in the original opinion.

The document does not address substantive legal issues, as it is merely an errata sheet correcting clerical errors in the court's opinion rather than the opinion itself.

The court issued corrections to six typographical and formatting errors throughout the opinion, including:

1. Correcting citation formatting for "SF-95" on page 6
2. Correcting case citation formatting for "Ouellette v. Beaupre" on page 13
3. Correcting case citation formatting for "Wojciechowicz v. United States" on page 14
4. Correcting formatting of "see, e.g." on page 18
5. Correcting case number formatting "No. CV13-1726 PHX" on page 19
6. Correcting word choice from "homeowner" to "homemaker" on page 25
7. Correcting pronoun usage from "who" to "which" on page 48

This is a bankruptcy appeal involving a Chapter 11 debtor, Ho Wan Kwok, who claimed not to own a mega-yacht (the Lady May) worth tens of millions of dollars, which was instead registered to HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, a limited liability company owned by his daughter. The appellants (HK and the daughter) challenged the bankruptcy trustee's authority to assert an alter ego claim and argued that HK was not actually Kwok's alter ego.

1. Whether the bankruptcy trustee had standing under the Bankruptcy Code (specifically sections 541 and 544) to assert a reverse veil-piercing claim on behalf of the debtor's creditors
2. Whether Delaware law permits reverse veil-piercing claims by outside creditors (as opposed to only by owners of a business organization)
3. Whether the trustee's reverse veil-piercing claim constitutes a "general" claim (benefiting all creditors) rather than a "personal" claim (benefiting only specific creditors)
4. Whether HK was the alter ego of debtor Kwok based on traditional veil-piercing factors and the eight-factor test under Delaware law
5. Whether summary judgment was appropriate given the undisputed facts in the record

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that:

1. Jurisdiction: The court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the trustee agreed at oral argument to dismiss his remaining claims with prejudice, making the district court's summary judgment decision a final appealable order.
2. Standing: The trustee had standing to assert the reverse veil-piercing claim under section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 544 permits a trustee to assert the rights of a hypothetical creditor. Delaware law recognizes outsider reverse veil-piercing claims brought by creditors, and the trustee, by stepping into creditors' shoes under section 544, could invoke those same rights. The court rejected appellants' argument that reverse veil-piercing applies only to owners, finding that Delaware law applies the doctrine equitably based on all relevant factors, not formalistic rules.
3. General vs. Personal Claims: Reverse veil-piercing claims are "general" claims that increase the basket of assets available to satisfy all liabilities owed by the debtor, benefiting all creditors equally. Therefore, the trustee could properly assert such claims under section 544, which allows trustees to pursue general causes of action that would benefit any hypothetical creditor.
4. Alter Ego Status: HK was unquestionably Kwok's alter ego based on undisputed facts. The traditional veil-piercing factors all pointed to HK being a shell company: it had no revenue, employees, directors, officers, bank accounts, tax returns, or business purpose beyond owning the Lady May and Lady May II; it failed to observe corporate formalities; and it served as a façade for Kwok. Additionally, Kwok (not his daughter Guo) primarily used the yacht, Kwok used HK's address for his own bankruptcy petition, and Kwok initially proposed a plan to liquidate the Lady May. The eight Manichaean factors also supported the alter ego finding, including that Guo had no legitimate expectations in HK's assets, Kwok exercised dominion and control over HK, and allowing the reverse pierce would prevent injustice and help creditors recover funds owed to them. Appellants' narrow interpretations of the facts and unsupported explanations could not overcome the mountain of evidence presented by the trustee.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a disability discrimination case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, a New York citizen, sued the American Chemical Society (ACS), a federally chartered corporation, under New York State law based on alleged diversity jurisdiction, but the district court dismissed the case because ACS, as a federally chartered entity, is not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes.

1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)'s principal-place-of-business provision can confer state citizenship on a federally chartered corporation that is not incorporated by any state
2. Whether the word "and" in § 1332(c)(1) operates conjunctively (joining the state-of-incorporation and principal-place-of-business provisions together) or disjunctively (allowing them to operate independently)
3. Whether Congress intended § 1332(c)(1) to expand diversity jurisdiction to federally chartered corporations or only to narrow it for state-chartered corporations
4. Whether the judicially created "localization exception" provides an alternative basis for diversity jurisdiction over ACS

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that § 1332(c)(1)'s principal-place-of-business provision does not apply to federally chartered corporations. The court reasoned that the word "and" in § 1332(c)(1) operates as a correlative conjunction, meaning a corporation is deemed a citizen "not only" of every state by which it has been incorporated "but also" of the state where it has its principal place of business. Because this language presupposes that a corporation has been incorporated by at least one state, the principal-place-of-business provision cannot confer state citizenship on a federally chartered corporation with no state of incorporation. The court's analysis considered the statutory text, context, broader statutory framework, and legislative history, all of which demonstrated that Congress's sole purpose in enacting § 1332(c)(1) was to narrow—not expand—diversity jurisdiction by subjecting state-chartered corporations to dual citizenship. The court noted that Congress knows how to expressly extend state citizenship to specific federally chartered corporations when it chooses to do so, as evidenced by targeted legislation for entities like national banks and Amtrak. The court also rejected the dissent's argument that § 1332(c)(1) codifies the judicially created localization exception, finding no congressional intent to do so and noting that the plaintiff had expressly waived reliance on localization in the district court.

This is an appeal in an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) case involving the appropriate classroom placement for a student with severe multiple disabilities and intensive management needs. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the interpretation of state class size regulations and, upon receiving the answer, affirmed the district court's judgment.

1. Whether multiple class size regulations under New York's § 200.6(h)(4) represent distinct stacking requirements or alternative placement options from which the Department of Education may choose
2. Whether placement of a student with severe multiple disabilities and highly intensive management needs in a 12:1:4 classroom (rather than a 6:1:1 classroom) violates the student's right to a free appropriate public education
3. Whether the State Review Officer properly determined that a 12:1:4 placement would best serve the student's individual needs

The court affirmed the district court's judgment. The New York Court of Appeals answered the certified question by holding that § 200.6(h)(4) provides alternative placement options rather than stacking requirements. Accordingly, the Committee on Special Education properly exercised its expertise in selecting the 12:1:4 placement as the appropriate alternative for the student. The court found that the State Review Officer reasonably concluded the 12:1:4 placement was appropriate based on the student's need for increased adult support from multiple professionals and his lack of progress and poor attendance in the previous 6:1:1 placement. The court deferred to the educational expertise of the decision-makers and declined to disturb their findings.

This is a criminal appeal in which Mustafa Goklu was convicted of money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business based on bitcoin-for-cash exchanges conducted with an undercover DEA agent. Goklu challenges his conviction on three grounds and also raises sentencing challenges.

1. Whether the district court violated Goklu's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury by empaneling Juror 30, who expressed positive views toward law enforcement and negative views toward financial crimes but stated he would "try his best" to be impartial.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Goklu of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business under 18 U.S.C. § 1960, specifically whether exchanging bitcoin for cash constitutes "money transmitting" as defined by statute and regulations.
3. Whether the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 by instructing the jury after Goklu's closing argument that "exchanging Bitcoin for U.S. currency can qualify as a transfer."
4. Whether Goklu's sentencing was improper because the district court included all transactions with the undercover agent in calculating the value of laundered funds, rather than only those after the agent disclosed the bitcoin came from drug dealing.

1. Impartial Jury: The court affirmed the district court's decision to empanel Juror 30. Although the juror initially expressed doubts about impartiality, he committed to trying his best to be fair, and the trial judge's credibility assessment—that the juror was sincere—is entitled to deference absent clear abuse of discretion. The court distinguished United States v. Nelson, where the juror had voiced explicit dissatisfaction with prior proceedings and never asserted probable impartiality.
2. Money Transmitting Business: The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Goklu of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Bitcoin qualifies as "funds" under the relevant statutes and regulations. Goklu's exchanges of bitcoin for cash constitute "money transmitting" because: (1) he accepted funds (bitcoin) from customers and transmitted currency (cash) representing their value; (2) the transactions involved movement of funds to another location (from cryptocurrency wallet to cash); (3) physical transfer of cash is an expressly contemplated "means" of transmitting funds under the statutes; and (4) Goklu also conducted transactions where he accepted cash and electronically transmitted bitcoin. The court's conclusion aligns with FinCEN's guidance treating virtual currency exchangers as money transmitters subject to registration requirements.
3. Rule 30 Violation: The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's supplemental jury instruction given after Goklu's closing argument. Because the instruction was legally correct—exchanging bitcoin for U.S. currency does qualify as a transfer—the district court had broad discretion to give it as a curative measure in response to Goklu's novel argument that conviction required proof of transfer to a third party.
4. Sentencing Challenges: The court dismissed Goklu's sentencing challenges as moot. Although Goklu completed his 16-month prison sentence and is serving supervised release, he raised no challenge to his term or conditions of supervised release. Without a live controversy regarding supervised release, the sentencing challenges lack the requisite concrete injury for appellate review.

This is a federal appellate case addressing whether the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) preempts New Jersey's gambling laws as applied to KalshiEX LLC, a company operating a CFTC-licensed designated contract market (DCM) that offers sports-related event contracts. The central dispute is whether these sports event contracts constitute "swaps" under federal jurisdiction or gambling products subject to state regulation.

1. Whether Kalshi's sports-related event contracts fall within the statutory definition of "swaps" under the Commodity Exchange Act
2. Whether the CEA's grant of exclusive CFTC jurisdiction over swaps traded on DCMs constitutes field preemption of state gambling laws
3. Whether state gambling laws create an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives, constituting conflict preemption
4. Whether the Act's savings clauses preserve state regulatory authority over event contracts
5. Whether the presumption against preemption applies in an area traditionally regulated by states

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction, holding that Kalshi demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on its preemption claims. The majority concluded that: (1) Kalshi's sports-related event contracts qualify as "swaps" under the CEA because they depend on event outcomes associated with potential financial, economic, or commercial consequences; (2) the CEA's grant of exclusive CFTC jurisdiction over swaps traded on DCMs constitutes field preemption of state gambling laws, as the federal government has comprehensively occupied the field of futures trading on designated contract markets; (3) conflict preemption also applies because allowing New Jersey to enforce its gambling laws would create an obstacle to the Act's purpose of establishing uniform federal regulation of futures markets; and (4) the Act's savings clauses do not preserve state authority to regulate swaps on DCMs, as they only preserve jurisdiction for common-law actions and apply only "except as hereinabove provided" by the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. The court rejected arguments that the presumption against preemption applies, noting that federal regulation of derivatives markets dates back over a century and that the proper field for preemption analysis is DCM trading (a form of futures trading) rather than gambling generally. The court also found that Kalshi satisfied the remaining preliminary injunction factors, including irreparable harm and public interest considerations.

This is an appeal of a supervised release condition imposed on Joseph D. Castellano, who was convicted of transporting child sexual abuse material. The case addresses whether the district court properly imposed a special condition prohibiting Castellano from accessing or possessing legal pornography following a prior appellate decision that had struck down a similar condition for lack of individualized evidence.

1. Whether a special condition prohibiting access to legal pornography is "reasonably related" to the goals of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), requiring individualized evidence specific to the defendant rather than categorical reasoning about all offenders convicted of similar crimes
2. Whether the mandate rule from the prior appeal (Castellano I) barred the district court from imposing a legal pornography ban on remand
3. Whether the government was improperly permitted to bring a "belated challenge" to supervised release conditions using factual or legal premises previously available to it

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of the special condition prohibiting legal pornography. The court held that:

1. The government provided sufficient individualized evidence through testimony from Castellano's certified sex offender treatment provider, who had worked with him for six years and testified that his pornography use was a barrier to treatment, created a "chain reaction" leading to escalating behavior, and had worsened over time with increased compulsive sexual behaviors
2. The treatment provider's testimony focused on Castellano's specific circumstances rather than categorical reasoning about all child sexual abuse material offenders, and the district court explicitly clarified it was making an individualized assessment for Castellano alone
3. The mandate rule from Castellano I did not bar reimposition of the condition because that decision applied only to the record before the court at that time and did not permanently foreclose such conditions; moreover, significant new evidence had emerged post-Castellano I, including Castellano's voluntary consent to a similar condition, additional violations, and evidence of worsening behavior
4. The government was not improperly bringing a belated challenge, and even if it were, the McLeod rule limiting belated challenges applies only to defendants, not the government

This is a federal drug trafficking appeal in which Joseph McNoriell was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. McNoriell appeals his conviction and 110-month sentence on multiple grounds, including claims regarding his right to self-representation, the validity of the indictment, and the admissibility of various evidence.

1. Whether excluding a pro se defendant from sidebar conferences violated his Sixth Amendment rights to self-representation and representation at critical stages
2. Whether the indictment was duplicitous by alleging two separate conspiracies (heroin and cocaine) in a single count
3. Whether testimony from a cooperating witness regarding danger posed by the defendant constituted improper character evidence
4. Whether text messages between co-conspirators were properly admitted as co-conspirator hearsay statements
5. Whether a DEA agent improperly testified as a lay witness by interpreting recorded phone conversations
6. Whether a two-level leadership enhancement was properly applied at sentencing

The court affirmed McNoriell's conviction and sentence on all grounds. Key holdings include:

1. Sidebar Exclusion: No violation of self-representation rights occurred because McNoriell knowingly and voluntarily agreed to have standby counsel represent him at sidebar conferences, and he failed to object to this arrangement during trial. His acquiescence to standby counsel's participation did not impede his control over the case.
2. Duplicitous Indictment: The indictment was not duplicitous. A single conspiracy count may allege distribution of multiple drugs without being duplicitous, as conspiracy itself is the crime. Even if duplicitous, McNoriell could not show prejudice because the jury unanimously found him guilty of 500 grams or more of cocaine, and juries are presumed to follow jury instructions.
3. Character Evidence: The cooperating witness's testimony about danger was not improper character evidence but rather an explanation for why he purchased heroin from McNoriell despite his cooperation agreement. Additionally, overwhelming independent evidence of guilt made any error harmless.
4. Co-Conspirator Statements: Text messages between co-conspirators Bogan and Caldwell were properly admitted under the co-conspirator hearsay exception (Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)) because the government established the conspiracy existed, McNoriell was a member, and the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
5. Agent's Testimony: The DEA agent's interpretation of recorded phone calls was proper lay witness testimony because he was present during the conversations, directed the informant's responses, and had personal knowledge of the facts discussed. He did not merely interpret plain English but provided context from his investigative perspective.
6. Leadership Enhancement: The two-level leadership enhancement was properly applied because McNoriell's actions exceeded those of a middleman. He organized the drug deal by coordinating with co-conspirators, setting transaction locations, maintaining consistent contact with couriers, and actively participating in the delivery.

This is a petition for review of an immigration case in which a petitioner seeks judicial review of a Department of Homeland Security official's email declining to reopen a removal order that was executed in 2018. The petitioner had illegally entered the United States, was removed based on a drug conviction, later re-entered the country, and requested that her removal order be reopened after her conviction was amended to a lesser charge.

1. Whether an email from a Deportation Officer declining to reopen an executed removal order constitutes a "final order of removal" subject to judicial review under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)
2. Whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an executed removal order that has not been reinstated
3. The distinction between an executed removal order and a field office's refusal to revisit that order

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the email declining to reopen the removal order does not constitute a reviewable "final order of removal" under §1252(a). The 2018 removal order, though judicially reviewable at the time, has already been executed and cannot be re-executed. The court reasoned that once an order has been carried out, it cannot serve as the basis for appellate review. The court noted that the Department of Homeland Security has restarted the removal process by issuing a Notice to Appear, and the petitioner will have the opportunity to seek judicial review if a new removal order is issued from that ongoing process.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal under 28 U.S.C. §2254 challenging a state civil commitment order designating William Walls as a sexually violent person. Walls contends that his commitment was based on constitutionally impermissible use of statements made while he was in prison, but the appeal is dismissed on procedural grounds.

1. Whether statements made by Walls during a prison sex offender treatment program can be used in a civil commitment proceeding under the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause
2. Whether Walls's second federal habeas petition constitutes an unauthorized successive petition under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b), which prohibits repetition of claims previously rejected
3. Whether Walls exhausted his state remedies and properly preserved federal constitutional arguments in state court proceedings
4. Whether the extraordinary delay in state court proceedings (12 years pretrial, 7 years on appeal) affects the court's jurisdiction or analysis

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Walls's petition. The court held that Walls's current challenge is an unauthorized successive petition attacking the 2015 commitment order, which is barred by 28 U.S.C. §2244(b). The court reasoned that Walls failed to raise federal constitutional arguments during the 2018 annual review proceeding, and therefore any challenge to the 2015 decision on its own appears moot since he is no longer in custody under that specific order. The court declined to address the merits of Walls's Self-Incrimination Clause argument. However, the court expressed serious concern about the 19-year delay from Walls's scheduled release in 2003 until the appellate decision in 2022, and noted that such delays may warrant bypassing state remedies under 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) in future cases involving similar circumstances.

This is a False Claims Act (FCA) appeal concerning when postjudgment interest begins to accrue on attorneys' fees awarded to a qui tam relator. Gwen Thrower sued her former employer Academy Mortgage Corporation under the FCA for false certifications in a federal housing program, settled the case for $38.5 million, and then sought $8.6 million in attorneys' fees, which the district court awarded sixteen months after approving the settlement.

1. Whether postjudgment interest on attorneys' fees accrues from the date the settlement was approved (when the relator became statutorily entitled to fees under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2)) or from the date the specific amount of fees was awarded
2. What constitutes a "money judgment" under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) for purposes of triggering postjudgment interest
3. Whether the "entitlement" test adopted by other circuits (where interest runs from when a party becomes unconditionally entitled to fees) should apply instead of requiring a definite and certain amount

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that postjudgment interest accrues from the date the specific amount of attorneys' fees was awarded (May 2024 Order), not from the settlement approval date (January 2023 Order). The court held that for a judgment to qualify as a "money judgment" under § 1961, it must contain two elements: (1) identification of the parties, and (2) a definite and certain designation of the amount owed. The January 2023 Order approving the settlement lacked the second element because it expressly excluded attorneys' fees from dismissal and left the amount to be determined later. Only the May 2024 Order, which specified $8,585,530.20 in attorneys' fees and $89,437.77 in expenses, constituted a "money judgment" triggering postjudgment interest. The court rejected the "entitlement" approach adopted by other circuits, finding it unsupported by § 1961's plain text and noting that any delay in payment can be compensated through adjustments to the fee award itself.

This is a False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam case in which the court addresses whether a district court properly awarded an upward multiplier enhancement to attorneys' fees beyond the lodestar calculation. Gwen Thrower sued her former employer, Academy Mortgage Corporation, alleging false certifications under the Federal Housing Administration's Direct Endorsement Program, ultimately settling for $38.5 million.

1. Whether a district court abused its discretion in awarding an upward fee multiplier (1.75x) above the lodestar calculation under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2)
2. Whether the "exceptional result" of surviving motions to dismiss from both the defendant and the federal government justifies a fee enhancement
3. Whether the plaintiff's counsel's investigative work constitutes a non-subsumed factor warranting enhancement
4. Whether the district court provided adequate reasoning and explanation for selecting a specific multiplier amount

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's award of the 1.75 multiplier and remanded the case. The majority held that:

1. This was not a "rare and exceptional" case justifying enhancement above the lodestar, as the factors cited by the district court (exceptional result and investigative work) were adequately subsumed within the lodestar calculation itself
2. The district court's finding that counsel's requested rates were "on the high end" of the market undermined any claim that the lodestar undervalued counsel's true market value
3. The complexity of battling two parties simultaneously and the investigative efforts were fully reflected in the approximately 7,000 billable hours awarded and the hourly rates set above the San Francisco mean
4. Even assuming an enhancement were appropriate, the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide a reasoned, specific explanation for why a 1.75 multiplier (rather than 50%, 25%, or 10%) was necessary to adequately compensate counsel
5. The district court must show how the enhancement amount is linked to the specific factors demonstrating the lodestar's inadequacy, following the methodology established in Perdue v. Kenny A.

Judge M. Smith concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that the district court abused its discretion in failing to explain the 1.75 multiplier specifically, but disagreeing that the district court abused its discretion in awarding an enhancement at all. Judge Smith would have found this a "rare and exceptional" case warranting enhancement based on the unprecedented result of prevailing against both the defendant and the government's motion to dismiss, and the superior performance demonstrated through extensive investigative work.

This is a consolidated appeal of two spouses, Michael and Kimberley Tew, who were convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and related offenses for operating a fraudulent invoice scheme that defrauded National Air Cargo of over $5 million. The defendants appeal their convictions and sentences, raising Fourth Amendment and trial severance issues.

1. Whether a search warrant served on Apple Inc. to obtain data from Kimberley's cloud-based account was sufficiently particularized under the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the defective Apple warrant
3. Whether the district court erred in denying Michael's motion to sever the trial based on antagonistic defenses between the spouses
4. Whether the district court erred in denying Kimberley's motion to sever the trial

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences in both cases. On the Fourth Amendment issue, the court held that: (1) the Apple search warrant was insufficiently particularized in violation of the Fourth Amendment because it relied on overly broad conspiracy and fraud statutes without adequate limitations, and authorized seizure of years of communications, photos, and location data; however, (2) the good faith exception applied because the warrant was authorized by a neutral magistrate judge, made some effort to comply with particularity requirements, and law enforcement lacked specific guidance on cloud-based account warrants at the time. On the severance issues, the court held that: (1) Kimberley waived her severance argument by failing to properly present it to the district court and failing to argue plain error on appeal; (2) Michael's severance motion was untimely under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 because the basis for the motion was reasonably available before trial, given the defendants' prior inculpatory statements and Kimberley's earlier severance arguments; and (3) even if the motions had been timely, both would fail on the merits because the defendants' defenses were merely antagonistic "finger-pointing" rather than mutually exclusive, and judicial economy outweighed any prejudice.

This is an appeal of a civil rights lawsuit brought by Barry Morphew against Colorado state prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and municipalities following his arrest for first-degree murder in the disappearance of his wife, Suzanne Morphew, and the subsequent dismissal of charges against him. Morphew alleged that defendants fabricated evidence, conspired to violate his rights, and maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause.

1. Whether Morphew plausibly alleged the absence of probable cause for his arrest and prosecution, which is essential to his claims for malicious prosecution, Fourth Amendment fabrication of evidence, Franks violations, conspiracy, failure to intervene, and Monell municipal liability.
2. Whether Morphew adequately pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim based on proximate causation between the fabricated evidence and his deprivation of liberty.
3. Whether Morphew stated a claim for reckless investigation under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process guarantee.
4. Whether the district court properly considered the arrest affidavit attached to the complaint when reviewing the motion to dismiss.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that: (1) Morphew failed to plausibly allege the absence of probable cause for his arrest and prosecution, which was fatal to his malicious prosecution, Fourth Amendment fabrication of evidence, Franks, conspiracy, failure to intervene, and Monell claims. Even accounting for alleged omissions of exculpatory evidence and fabricated evidence, the arrest affidavit contained substantial undisputed inculpatory facts establishing probable cause, including Morphew's motive (wife's affair), means (tranquilizer gun), opportunity (last person to see wife alive), and suspicious behavior (unusual work schedule on Mother's Day, discarding items in trash, asset liquidation). (2) Morphew's Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim failed because he did not plausibly allege a causal connection between the fabricated evidence and his prosecution—he did not claim defendants would have declined to prosecute without the fabricated evidence. (3) Morphew's reckless investigation claim failed because it targeted pre-arrest conduct, and the court expressed serious doubt about whether such a cause of action exists under Tenth Circuit precedent. The court rejected Morphew's arguments that the district court improperly decided credibility, placed too heavy a burden on him, or failed to give him favorable inferences, finding the district court properly applied Rule 12(b)(6) standards.

This is a Delaware Chancery Court case involving investor plaintiffs (Diem entities) who invested in Maisonette Inc., an e-commerce startup, through a convertible note and preferred stock offerings between 2021 and 2024. The plaintiffs allege they were fraudulently induced to invest based on misrepresented financial statements and false representations regarding pending litigation against company directors.

1. Whether a general release in the Series C Stock Purchase Agreement waived fraud claims arising from the convertible note
2. Whether the complaint adequately pleads fraud based on misstatements in financial documents and the absence of litigation representation
3. Whether the complaint states claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy to commit fraud, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, securities law violations, equitable fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment
4. Whether NEA 15 (an investor with board representation) can be held liable as a co-conspirator and aider-abettor

The court largely denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. Key holdings include:

1. Waiver: The release in the Series C SPA does not unambiguously waive unknown fraud claims because it does not explicitly state that it covers claims "whether known or unknown."
2. Fraud (Count I): Denied in part. The complaint adequately alleges fraud based on: (a) misstatements in financial documents showing lower revenue and profitability than later restated figures; (b) false representation that no litigation was pending against directors when one director was defendant in a dozen federal securities lawsuits; and (c) scienter is adequately pleaded based on board knowledge that financial reporting was "not entirely accurate." The complaint fails to allege fraud regarding the Key Employee representation regarding Mendoza's employment status.
3. Breach of Contract (Counts III-IV): Denied. The false litigation representation constitutes breach of the purchase agreements' representations and warranties.
4. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count V): Denied. Directors breached their fiduciary duty of disclosure by approving false litigation representations when seeking stockholder approval, and this claim is not wholly duplicative of the contract claim.
5. Civil Conspiracy (Count II): Denied. The complaint adequately alleges that NEA 15 conspired with company fiduciaries to defraud plaintiffs by inducing them to invest to "bail out" NEA 15's existing investments, based on allegations that NEA 15 negotiated terms, approved documents, and Florence (NEA 15's designee) oversaw fundraising.
6. Aiding and Abetting (Count VI): Denied. NEA 15 knowingly participated in the fiduciary breach through Florence's conduct, which may be attributed to NEA 15 as its agent.
7. Securities Law Violation (Count VII): Denied to the extent Count I survives, as the elements track common law fraud.
8. Equitable Fraud (Count VIII): Granted in part, denied in part. The claim survives only as to the Series D SPA where a fiduciary relationship existed; it is dismissed as to the Note and Series C SPA where no special relationship existed. The claim against NEA 15 is dismissed.
9. Conversion (Count IX): Granted. Conversion is not an appropriate theory because the conversion of the note into equity was automatic and contractual rights are not "property" subject to conversion tort.
10. Unjust Enrichment (Count X): Denied. The claim survives as an alternative theory of recovery despite the contractual relationship, as it may provide different remedies and the allegations go beyond purely contractual matters.

This is a bankruptcy appeal involving a Chapter 11 debtor (Ho Wan Kwok) and a third-party limited liability company (HK International Funds Investments) that allegedly owned a multi-million dollar yacht. The court addresses whether the Chapter 11 trustee has standing to assert an alter ego claim against HK and whether HK is properly characterized as the debtor's alter ego.

1. Whether the Chapter 11 trustee has standing under the Bankruptcy Code (specifically sections 541 and 544) to assert a reverse veil-piercing claim on behalf of the bankruptcy estate's creditors
2. Whether HK constitutes an alter ego of the debtor such that its assets should be included in the bankruptcy estate
3. Whether genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on the alter ego claim
4. The proper application of Delaware law regarding reverse veil-piercing doctrine

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that: (1) it had jurisdiction over the appeal because the trustee agreed to dismiss remaining claims with prejudice at oral argument, making the district court's summary judgment decision final and appealable; (2) the trustee has standing under Bankruptcy Code section 544 to assert reverse veil-piercing claims as a general claim that benefits all creditors, distinguishing such general claims from personal claims that only specific creditors could bring; (3) HK is Kwok's alter ego based on undisputed facts showing HK was a shell company with no independent business purpose, no employees, no bank accounts, no tax returns, and served only to hold the yacht while Kwok controlled and benefited from it; and (4) the traditional veil-piercing factors (insolvency, undercapitalization, failure to observe corporate formalities, use as a façade) and the eight-factor Manichaean test all supported the alter ego finding. The court rejected appellants' narrow interpretations of the facts and held that appellants could not overcome the trustee's mountain of evidence through conclusory assertions and speculation.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a disability discrimination case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, a New York citizen, sued the American Chemical Society (ACS), a federally chartered corporation, under New York State law based on alleged diversity jurisdiction. The central issue is whether a federally chartered corporation can be deemed a citizen of a state under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction.

1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)'s principal-place-of-business provision applies to federally chartered corporations that are not incorporated by any state
2. How to interpret the conjunction "and" in § 1332(c)(1) — whether it operates conjunctively (requiring state incorporation as a prerequisite) or disjunctively (allowing principal place of business alone to establish state citizenship)
3. Whether the statute's purpose of narrowing diversity jurisdiction for state-chartered corporations extends to federally chartered corporations
4. The proper application of statutory construction principles, including textual analysis, statutory context, and legislative history
5. Whether the judicially recognized "localization exception" provides an alternative basis for diversity jurisdiction over federally chartered corporations

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) does not apply to federally chartered corporations. The court reasoned that:

1. Textual Analysis: The word "and" in § 1332(c)(1) operates as a correlative conjunction (like "not only...but also"), not disjunctively. The statute's reference to "every State by which [a corporation] has been incorporated" presupposes that incorporation by at least one state has occurred. Therefore, the principal-place-of-business provision can only identify an additional state of citizenship beyond the state(s) of incorporation, not serve as an independent basis for state citizenship.
2. Statutory Context: The structure and punctuation of § 1332(c)(1) support a conjunctive reading. The lack of punctuation separating the two provisions (unlike the separately enumerated insurance provisions in the same statute) indicates Congress did not intend them to operate independently. Additionally, the statute's purpose was to narrow, not expand, diversity jurisdiction for state-chartered corporations.
3. Broader Statutory Context: The Supreme Court's 1916 decision in Bankers' Trust established that federally chartered corporations are not citizens of any state for diversity purposes. Congress was aware of this rule when it enacted § 1332(c)(1) in 1958. Moreover, Congress has enacted targeted legislation specifically designating certain federally chartered corporations as state citizens (e.g., national banks, federal savings associations, Amtrak), demonstrating that Congress knows how to extend diversity jurisdiction to federally chartered corporations when it chooses to do so. The absence of such legislation for ACS suggests Congress did not intend § 1332(c)(1) to apply generally to federally chartered corporations.
4. Legislative History: The Committee Reports for § 1332(c)(1) consistently used the correlative conjunctions "not only...but also" and "both...and," strongly indicating an intent for the two provisions to operate conjunctively. The legislative concern was exclusively with state-chartered corporations' abuse of diversity jurisdiction, not with federally chartered corporations. The reports make clear that the statute was designed to limit, not expand, diversity jurisdiction.
5. Constitutional Considerations: Because only Congress has the constitutional power to expand federal jurisdiction, courts must proceed cautiously in assuming such intent and will not readily assume Congress intended to expand jurisdiction sub silentio.
6. Localization Exception: The court declined to address the plaintiff's waived argument regarding the judicially recognized "localization exception," holding that a party's express waiver of an argument precludes appellate review absent extraordinary circumstances not present here.

This is a federal criminal forfeiture case in which David Calderin-Pascual appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition challenging the forfeiture of a boat that was subject to a preliminary forfeiture order based on his brother Osvaldo's drug conspiracy conviction. David claimed an ownership interest in the boat and sought a hearing to establish his superior claim to the property.

1. Whether David's petition adequately alleged the "time and circumstances" of his acquisition of the boat as required by 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3) to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
2. Whether the district court properly considered untranslated Spanish-language documents attached to the petition
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition without addressing David's alternative request for leave to amend
4. The proper standard of review and consideration of pro se petitioner status in forfeiture proceedings

The First Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that: (1) David's initial petition and the untranslated Spanish-language documents did not adequately allege when he acquired the boat, as required by statute; (2) the court could not consider the Spanish-language attachments without English translations pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 864; (3) the district court erred by not addressing David's alternative request for leave to amend his petition, and the reasons for denying amendment were not apparent from the record; and (4) on remand, the district court must consider David's pro se status and the statutory requirement that forfeiture provisions be "liberally construed" when deciding whether to allow amendment or reconsider its decision.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction that blocked enforcement of Maine's 72-hour waiting period law for firearm purchases. The law was enacted following the October 2023 Lewiston mass shooting and was challenged by firearms dealers and purchasers as violating Second Amendment rights.

1. Whether Maine's 72-hour waiting period on firearm deliveries violates the Second Amendment under the two-step test established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen
2. Whether the Act regulates conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment (step one of Bruen) or instead regulates ancillary conduct outside the plain text
3. Whether the Act is presumptively lawful as a condition or qualification on commercial firearm sales, or whether it requires historical justification under step two of Bruen
4. Whether the Act constitutes an abusive burden on Second Amendment rights

The First Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and held that Maine's waiting period law is likely constitutional. The court concluded that: (1) the Act regulates the acquisition of firearms, which occurs before a person keeps or bears arms, and therefore does not directly restrict conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment; (2) the Act imposes conditions and qualifications on commercial firearm sales that are presumptively lawful under Heller without requiring historical analogue justification at step two of Bruen; (3) the Act is analogous to "shall-issue" licensing regimes that briefly delay but do not deny firearm acquisition, distinguishing it from the discretionary "may-issue" regime struck down in Bruen; (4) the Act does not constitute an abusive burden on Second Amendment rights because it shares the legitimate goal of preventing firearms from reaching irresponsible persons, contains exceptions for certain purchasers, and imposes only a modest delay comparable to federal background check periods; and (5) plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on their facial constitutional challenge.

Christopher Miller appeals his sentence for bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and unlawful monetary transactions, challenging the District Court's application of a four-level leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Miller argues that his wife and neighbor should not have been classified as "participants" in his fraudulent scheme, which would disqualify the enhancement for "otherwise extensive" criminal activity.

1. Whether the phrase "otherwise extensive" in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) is genuinely ambiguous and thus permits deference to Sentencing Commission commentary
2. Whether the commentary's definition of "participant" and guidance on determining "otherwise extensive" criminal activity is reasonable and entitled to controlling weight under the Kisor/Nasir framework
3. Whether Kelly Moran and Robert Reynolds were properly classified as "participants" under the Helbling three-step test
4. Whether the District Court clearly erred in finding that the three participants plus thirteen non-participants constituted the functional equivalent of five participants

The Third Circuit affirmed Miller's sentence. The court held that: (1) "otherwise extensive" is genuinely ambiguous under the plain text of the Guideline; (2) the Sentencing Commission's commentary is reasonable and entitled to controlling weight because it falls within permissible interpretation, implicates the Commission's substantive expertise, and represents the Commission's official position since 1987; (3) the Helbling three-step test for determining "otherwise extensive" criminal activity remains appropriate; and (4) the District Court did not clearly err in classifying Moran and Reynolds as participants. Reynolds pleaded guilty to wire fraud for his role and was integral to the scheme, while Moran called a lender to verify information, personally received benefits, and fled with Miller after he received a target letter. Although the District Court erred by not conducting the Nasir analysis before deferring to commentary, this error was harmless because the District Court would have reached the same conclusion had it properly applied the Nasir framework.

This is an antitrust case in which four college football players challenge the NCAA's "JUCO Rule" and "Five-Year Rule" as violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The players sought a preliminary injunction to allow them to play during the 2025-26 season after being deemed ineligible due to time spent at junior colleges, and the district court granted the injunction, which the NCAA appealed.

1. Whether the appeal is moot given that the 2025-26 college football season has concluded
2. Whether the NCAA's eligibility rules constitute "commercial" conduct subject to Sherman Act scrutiny
3. Whether the district court properly applied the correct standard of antitrust analysis (rule of reason versus quick-look analysis)
4. Whether the players established a properly defined relevant market for antitrust analysis
5. Whether the players demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Sherman Act Section 1 claim

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the preliminary injunction. The court held: (1) the appeal is not moot under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception because college football seasons are too short to litigate fully and similar challenges are likely to recur annually; (2) the challenged eligibility rules are commercial in nature and subject to Sherman Act scrutiny because they limit athletes' participation in a labor market where they can now earn compensation through revenue-sharing and NIL deals; (3) the district court erred by applying quick-look analysis rather than full rule of reason analysis, which improperly reduced the players' burden of proof; and (4) most critically, the district court failed to require the players to meet their burden of establishing a properly defined relevant market with factual findings and economic analysis, instead merely adopting the players' proposed market definition without meaningful analysis. The court concluded that without a properly defined market, the players cannot establish anticompetitive effects, and therefore failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits necessary for a mandatory preliminary injunction.

This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a former city councilmember who was prosecuted for voting on matters in which he had a financial interest as a roofing subcontractor, but was ultimately acquitted. The plaintiff alleged that city officials retaliated against him for his political speech by making false statements to the Ohio Ethics Commission that led to his prosecution.

1. Whether the plaintiff can rebut the presumption of probable cause arising from a grand jury indictment by showing that the indictment was tainted by false statements and omitted material information submitted to the Ohio Ethics Commission.
2. Whether the plaintiff can establish a retaliatory prosecution claim under the First Amendment despite the existence of probable cause.
3. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach excuses the plaintiff from proving an absence of probable cause in a retaliatory prosecution claim against the city.
4. Whether the plaintiff satisfied the affirmative defense under Ohio Revised Code § 2921.42(C) to the charge of having an unlawful interest in a public contract.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The court held that: (1) the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of probable cause because he did not satisfy the affirmative defense under Ohio law, as he voted on multiple ordinances related to the police station project despite having a financial interest; (2) the plaintiff's retaliatory prosecution claims against the individual defendants fail because he cannot establish an absence of probable cause; (3) Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach is legally and factually distinguishable and does not apply to retaliatory prosecution claims, which require proof of an absence of probable cause; and (4) the plaintiff presented no evidence undermining the presumption of prosecutorial regularity, and therefore his claim against the City also fails.

This is an appeal by John C. Farris challenging his criminal sentence, but the court's opinion addresses the misconduct of Farris's court-appointed attorney, Steven N. Howe, who used artificial intelligence to draft appellate briefs without properly verifying the cited legal authorities, resulting in false quotations and misrepresentations of law to the court.

1. Whether an attorney's use of artificial intelligence to draft appellate briefs without adequate verification of citations and legal authorities violates professional ethical obligations
2. The scope of attorneys' duties of competence and candor when utilizing AI tools in legal practice
3. Whether reliance on non-attorney staff to supervise AI-generated work product satisfies an attorney's professional responsibilities
4. The appropriate consequences for an attorney's submission of false quotations and misleading legal arguments to an appellate court

The court found that Howe committed inexcusable transgressions by using AI to draft briefs containing three fabricated quotations that do not appear in cited sources and misrepresenting the holdings of two prior cases. The court held that attorneys have an ethical obligation to verify all citations and propositions submitted to courts, regardless of the tools used, and that reliance on AI does not diminish duties of competence and candor. The court imposed the following sanctions: (1) Howe shall not be compensated under the Criminal Justice Act for his appellate work; (2) the opinion shall be forwarded to the Chief Judge for consideration of disciplinary proceedings; (3) copies shall be served on relevant district court officials and the Kentucky Bar Association; and (4) Howe is removed from representing Farris, with replacement counsel to be appointed and new briefs to be filed. The court emphasized that while new technologies offer promise, attorneys must understand their limitations, implement safeguards, and maintain traditional verification practices to fulfill their professional obligations.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor and related offenses. The defendant challenges both the district court's rejection of his plea agreement and his resulting 252-month prison sentence.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in rejecting a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement that recommended a 180-month sentence
2. Whether the district court properly applied a five-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b) for a pattern of sexual conduct involving a minor, and whether the Supreme Court's decision in Wooden v. United States governs the definition of "separate occasions" under that guideline
3. Whether the district court properly considered intra-district sentencing disparities and national sentencing disparities in rejecting the plea agreement

The court affirmed both the rejection of the plea agreement and the 252-month sentence. Regarding the plea rejection, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion because it provided sound, case-specific reasons for rejection, including: (1) the defendant's knowledge of the victim's age and his deliberate concealment of their communications; (2) the need to protect the public from a defendant who posed significant danger to other minors; and (3) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, as similarly situated offenders received an average of 275 months and a median of 240 months. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the district court improperly considered intra-district disparities and failed to defer to the government's plea-bargaining choices, noting that district courts have an independent obligation to review sentences and are not mere rubber stamps for agreed-upon sentences. Regarding the sentencing enhancement, the court affirmed the application of the § 4B1.5(b) enhancement without deciding whether Wooden v. United States governs the definition of "occasions." The court found that even under Wooden's test, the enhancement was properly applied because: (1) the offenses were separated by two days (timing factor); (2) they occurred in different locations—South Carolina and Tennessee, five hours apart (proximity factor); and (3) while both involved sexual exploitation of a child, they served different purposes and were committed in different ways—one involving solicitation of child pornography and the other involving interstate travel to commit rape (character and relationship factor).

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of ERISA claims brought by a construction company and its employees against union fringe benefit funds, alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The plaintiffs sought to compel the funds to accept contributions following the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, claiming the funds had a statutory obligation under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to maintain the status quo of the agreement's terms.

1. Whether plaintiffs' ERISA claims are preempted by the Garmon doctrine, which requires federal courts to defer to the National Labor Relations Board's exclusive jurisdiction over matters "arguably subject" to Sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA
2. Whether the independent federal remedy exception to Garmon preemption applies, which permits federal courts to decide labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits under independent federal statutes
3. Whether the district court properly denied plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctive relief
4. Whether the district court properly denied plaintiff Rieth-Riley's motion for leave to file an amended complaint

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal and denial of all motions. The court held that: (1) Plaintiffs' ERISA claims are "arguably subject" to the NLRA because they allege that the defendants' conduct violated the NLRA's status quo obligations, making the Garmon doctrine applicable regardless of whether the NLRB has jurisdiction to hear ERISA claims; (2) The independent federal remedy exception does not apply because the labor law question—whether defendants had an NLRA-based obligation to accept contributions—is not merely collateral but rather central to plaintiffs' ERISA claims, as the claims can only succeed if defendants violated the NLRA; (3) Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, so the denial of preliminary injunctive relief was proper; and (4) The proposed amended complaint would still be preempted by Garmon, making amendment futile. The court emphasized that plaintiffs improperly attempted to "cast statutory claims under the NLRA as violations of ERISA," which circumvents the NLRB's primary jurisdiction.

This is an appeal involving a police officer's termination and whether a 2022 amendment to Arizona's Peace Officers Bill of Rights (POBOR) applies retroactively to an at-will employment agreement signed in 2021. The Ninth Circuit certified three unsettled questions of Arizona law to the Arizona Supreme Court rather than deciding the case itself.

1. Whether Arizona's presumption against retroactivity prohibits application of the 2022 POBOR amendment to at-will employment agreements signed before the amendment's enactment
2. If the presumption against retroactivity does not apply, whether the 2022 amendment voids pre-existing at-will employment contracts by limiting permissible agreements to those that only "supplement or enhance" rather than "deviate from" POBOR provisions
3. Whether voiding a pre-existing at-will employment contract would impair a vested contractual right in violation of the Arizona State Constitution's Contract Clause

The Ninth Circuit certified the three questions to the Arizona Supreme Court rather than issuing a final ruling. The court determined that no controlling Arizona Supreme Court or intermediate appellate decision answered these questions, making them determinative of the case and best suited for resolution by Arizona's highest court. The district court had dismissed Blunt's claims based on its conclusion that the presumption against retroactivity applied, but the Ninth Circuit found this issue sufficiently unsettled to warrant certification. The case is stayed pending the Arizona Supreme Court's acceptance and decision on the certified questions.

This is an appeal in a civil case involving plaintiff Jerry Lee King against defendants R. Villegas, P. Cruz, and J. Curry. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has issued an order regarding the procedural status of the case.

The key procedural issue is whether the case should be reheard en banc (by the full court) rather than decided by a three-judge panel.

The court ordered that the case be reheard en banc pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(c) and Ninth Circuit Rule 40-3. The three-judge panel opinion was vacated. This decision was made upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, indicating that the full court determined the case warranted en banc review, likely due to the significance of the legal issues or a conflict with prior precedent.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which the defendant was convicted of possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The defendant challenges both the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction and the constitutionality of the statute's "in furtherance of" language as unconstitutionally vague.

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed firearms "in furtherance of" a drug-trafficking crime, as opposed to merely "in relation to" such a crime
2. Whether the "in furtherance of" language in § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant, particularly regarding the distinction between "in relation to" and "in furtherance of"
3. The proper interpretation and application of the Basham factors used to determine whether firearm possession furthers a drug-trafficking offense

The court affirmed the defendant's conviction. On the sufficiency of evidence issue, the court found more than adequate evidence under the Basham factors that the defendant possessed the firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. Relevant factors included: the firearms' accessibility from the driver's seat, evidence the defendant was in the middle of a drug transaction, text messages showing he sought firearms after being victimized in a drug robbery, expert testimony that drug traffickers use firearms for protection and deterrence, and the proximity of the firearms to the drugs. The court rejected the vagueness challenge, reasoning that the defendant only needed to understand what "in furtherance of" means to determine whether his conduct violated the statute. The court explained that "in furtherance of" is a stricter standard than "in relation to," and possession that is in furtherance of a crime is always also in relation to it. Therefore, the distinction between the two standards does not create constitutional vagueness, and the defendant's conduct clearly fell within the "in furtherance of" requirement.

This is an appeal in a habeas corpus case where Marcus Bernard Williams, a state prisoner, challenged his conviction or sentence in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, and the State of Alabama appealed the district court's decision in favor of Williams to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this judgment document, as it only contains the court's order affirming the opinion issued on the date of the judgment without including the substantive opinion itself.

The Eleventh Circuit entered the opinion issued on April 3, 2026, as its judgment in the case. The opinion itself, which would contain the court's detailed ruling and reasoning, is referenced but not included in this judgment document.

This is an appeal challenging the State Department's administration of the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program for fiscal year 2021, where visa processing was paused due to COVID-19 and a presidential proclamation suspending diversity visa entries. Appellants, who were selected in the diversity visa lottery but did not receive visas before the fiscal year ended on September 30, 2021, sought declaratory relief, nominal damages, and injunctive relief.

1. Whether No-Visa Appellants' equitable claims seeking preservation of visa eligibility beyond fiscal year 2021 are moot
2. Whether Appellants have standing to pursue non-Goodluck claims for declaratory relief, nominal damages, and injunctive relief based on alleged bad faith, unlawful conduct, and violation of substantive due process
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Appellants' motion for supplemental briefing
4. Whether unadjudicated DS-260 applications create justiciable issues or impediments for future visa applications

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that: (1) No-Visa Appellants' equitable claims are moot because the prior Goodluck decision conclusively established that diversity visa eligibility terminates at the end of the fiscal year, and courts cannot order the State Department to process applications beyond that deadline; (2) Appellants lack standing to pursue their remaining claims because past injuries alone are insufficient for standing, nominal damages are unavailable under sovereign immunity principles and the Administrative Procedure Act, and Goodluck is dispositive of injunctive relief requests; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying supplemental briefing, as the Goodluck decision rendered further briefing unnecessary; and (4) while unadjudicated DS-260s from FY2021 technically expired on September 30, 2021, they should not impede Appellants from applying for diversity visas or other visa types in subsequent years.

This is an appeal of a district court order permanently staying and enjoining employment discrimination and retaliation claims brought by two former Puerto Rico Police Department officers against their employer. The court affirmed the stay and injunction, finding that the plaintiffs' claims were discharged under Puerto Rico's PROMESA reorganization plan because they constituted "administrative expenses" that were not timely filed before the applicable bar date.

1. Whether employment discrimination and retaliation claims arising from conduct occurring after Puerto Rico filed for reorganization under PROMESA should be discharged under the confirmed Plan of Adjustment when no proof of claim was timely filed before the pre-petition bar date or administrative claims bar date.
2. Whether claims for employment-related retaliation constitute "administrative expenses" under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b), as incorporated into PROMESA, thereby making them subject to discharge if not timely filed.
3. Whether judicial estoppel should bar the Puerto Rico Police Department from asserting the discharge defense after litigating the case for over two years without raising the PROMESA discharge argument until after summary judgment was denied and trial was imminent.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's permanent stay and injunction, but on different grounds. The court held:

1. Administrative Expense Classification: The plaintiffs' employment discrimination and retaliation claims constitute "administrative expenses" under § 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code as incorporated into PROMESA. The court adopted the expansive definition of administrative expenses established in Reading Co. v. Brown, which includes tort claims and employment-related claims arising from a debtor's ongoing operations during reorganization, even when based on intentional unlawful conduct. The court reasoned that such claims are "costs ordinarily incident to operation of" the debtor entity and should be prioritized to encourage third parties to continue doing business with the reorganizing entity. Because the plaintiffs failed to timely file proof of their administrative expense claims before the administrative claims bar date, those claims were discharged under the Plan.
2. Judicial Estoppel Rejection: The court rejected the plaintiffs' judicial estoppel argument, finding that the Puerto Rico Police Department did not take directly inconsistent positions. The Department consistently reserved its PROMESA defenses in its filings (motion to dismiss, answer, and summary judgment motion) by stating it acted "without waiving any right, objection or defense arising from Title III of PROMESA." The court found no affirmative assertion by the Department that the Plan did not apply, and therefore no "mutually exclusive" or "directly inconsistent" positions required for judicial estoppel. The court also noted the plaintiffs failed to cite authority supporting the proposition that silence or failure to raise an argument early constitutes a waiver or disclaimer of that argument.
3. Discharge Effect: Under PROMESA's incorporation of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), the discharge "operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action" to collect on discharged claims, regardless of waiver.

This is a criminal appeal in which Kevin Lee Ross challenges his conviction for possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Ross argues that the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by allowing the government to display and describe child sexual abuse material (CSAM) at trial despite his stipulation that the files met the legal definition of child pornography.

1. Whether the government may introduce actual evidence of CSAM files when a defendant has stipulated that the files constitute child pornography under the legal definition.
2. Whether displaying graphic images of child sexual abuse material violates Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by having probative value substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
3. Whether an investigative agent's detailed descriptions of CSAM files violate Rule 403 when the defendant has stipulated to the legal nature of the material.
4. Whether a defendant's stipulation to the contents of devices relieves the government of its burden to prove the mens rea (knowledge) element of the possession charge.

The First Circuit affirmed Ross's conviction, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to publish the CSAM exhibits or in permitting Agent Kelly to describe them. The court reasoned as follows:

1. Probative Value Despite Stipulation: Although Ross stipulated that the nine files constituted child pornography, the stipulation did not strip the evidence of probative value because it did not address the essential element of "knowing possession." The government was not relieved of its burden to prove that Ross knowingly possessed the devices containing CSAM.
2. Knowledge Element: Because Ross's defense was that he had no knowledge of the CSAM on the devices and that his brother may have framed him, the actual display of the images was probative of whether someone in possession of the devices would have known they contained readily accessible child pornography. The court found that displaying a representative sample of nine files (six photos and three video clips totaling less than fifteen seconds) demonstrated that Ross could not have possessed and used the devices without recognizing their graphic content.
3. Narrative and Possession: The exhibits, combined with search data showing Ross's personal interests (gardening, Harley-Davidson motorcycles), created a coherent narrative demonstrating that Ross was the sole possessor of all three devices, which was probative of the possession element.
4. Rule 403 Balance: The court applied broad deference to the district judge's Rule 403 analysis, noting that while the evidence was admittedly prejudicial, it was not "unfairly prejudicial" because it served valid, non-cumulative purposes beyond inflaming the jury's passions. The government's conservative approach—displaying only nine files from the 1,380 total files recovered—further supported the conclusion that probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
5. Agent Kelly's Testimony: The agent's descriptions of the files were similarly probative in establishing that the same types of CSAM appeared across all three devices and in corroborating that Ross was the devices' owner. The court held that the district court was not required to "scrub the trial clean of all evidence that may have an emotional impact" where the evidence is part of the government's narrative.
6. Government's Prosecutorial Discretion: Relying on Old Chief v. United States, the court emphasized that a defendant cannot "stipulate or admit [their] way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the government chooses to present it," and the government retains the right to make a full presentation of the crime charged even when a defendant offers a stipulation.

This is an appeal of a First Amendment compelled speech challenge to Maine's Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program. A law firm and its client challenged a state rule requiring attorneys to deposit certain client funds in pooled interest-bearing accounts, with the resulting interest directed to legal services organizations, arguing the program violates their free speech rights.

1. Whether Maine's IOLTA program unconstitutionally compels speech by requiring attorneys to place client funds in pooled accounts and directing the resulting interest to organizations providing legal services to low-income individuals
2. Whether the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the IOLTA program required them to deposit the specific client funds at issue
3. Whether there was a sufficient connection between the plaintiffs and the speech of the recipient organizations to support a subsidy-based compelled-speech claim
4. Whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue the Maine Justice Foundation

The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Maine's IOLTA program required them to deposit the client's retainer funds into an IOLTA account. Under Maine's rules, IOLTA accounts are required only for funds "small in amount or held for a short period of time such that they cannot earn interest or dividends for the client in excess of the costs incurred to secure such income." The court found the complaint lacked factual allegations supporting an inference that the client's retainer would not have generated net interest if deposited in a regular account. The plaintiffs' allegations that they "sincerely believed" they were required to use an IOLTA account and their general concerns about enforcement penalties were insufficient to overcome this deficiency. The court also found the claim against Maine Justice Foundation moot because the fatal defect in the complaint applied regardless of which defendant was sued. The court applied precedent from Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, which required a connection between dissenters and recipient organizations for a compelled-speech claim to proceed.

This is a criminal appeal in which the United States challenges a district court's suppression of evidence obtained from a search of the defendant's home and statements made during a police interrogation. The defendant was charged with drug trafficking and firearm possession offenses.

1. Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant supported by an affidavit that the district court deemed "bare bones" and lacking in detail
2. Whether the defendant's Miranda rights waiver was valid, specifically whether his signature on a form was a knowing and voluntary waiver when the officer did not read the waiver section and the defendant appeared to believe he was merely acknowledging receipt of his rights
3. Whether the defendant implicitly waived his Miranda rights based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. The court held:

1. Search Evidence: The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. The affidavit was not "bare bones" because it contained sufficient detail including timeframes of controlled drug buys, the defendant's address, the type of drug, the controlled buy process, details of conversations, and vehicle information. The affidavit went beyond conclusory statements and was supported by corroborating surveillance of three controlled buys, making the officers' reliance on the warrant objectively reasonable. Therefore, the evidence from the search is admissible.
2. Express Waiver: The defendant's express waiver (his signature) was not voluntary because it was obtained through deception. The officer told the defendant to sign a form representing that the officer had read his rights, but the form also contained a waiver section that the officer never read to the defendant. The defendant appeared to believe he was merely acknowledging receipt of his rights, not waiving them. This deception negated the voluntariness of the express waiver.
3. Implied Waiver: The district court failed to analyze whether the defendant implicitly waived his Miranda rights. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether an implied waiver occurred based on all relevant circumstances of the interview, including the defendant's silence, understanding of his rights, and course of conduct indicating waiver.

This is a contract dispute between Porch.com and Gallagher Reinsurance (formerly Willis Re) concerning alleged breaches of a reinsurance-intermediary-authorization agreement. Porch sued Gallagher for failing to fulfill its obligations as a reinsurance broker after a reinsurance deal with Vesttoo collapsed due to fraudulent collateral letters, resulting in substantial losses to Porch's subsidiary insurance company.

1. Whether Gallagher breached Section 5 of the RIAA by failing to retain documents showing that the assuming reinsurer agreed to assume the risk, specifically documents from China Construction Bank (CCB) regarding a letter of credit.
2. Whether Gallagher breached Section 11 of the RIAA by failing to comply with applicable economic or trade sanctions laws, which Porch argued included Texas insurance laws.
3. Whether Gallagher breached Section 13 of the RIAA by failing to provide administrative services customarily performed by reinsurance brokers, particularly regarding verification and administration of the collateral letter and reserve funding.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Porch's claims under Sections 5 and 11, but reversed and remanded the dismissal of Porch's Section 13 claim. Regarding Section 5: The court held that "retain" means to hold in possession, not to procure documents, and therefore Gallagher had no obligation to obtain documents from CCB. Additionally, CCB is a financial institution, not a reinsurer, so Section 5's requirement to retain documents from a "reinsurer" did not apply. Regarding Section 11: The court held that "economic or trade sanctions laws" refers specifically to sanctions regimes (U.S., E.U., U.K., and similar), not general economic regulations like Texas insurance laws. Reading "economic" in isolation would improperly expand the parties' bargained-for obligations. Regarding Section 13: The court reversed the dismissal, finding that Porch plausibly alleged post-placement breaches, including Gallagher's failure to recognize the difference between a collateral letter and a letter of credit, failure to notify HOA of this distinction, misrepresentation of the collateral, and assurances that the $25 million withdrawal was safe. The court determined that Section 13 is ambiguous regarding whether verifying and administering collateral falls within customarily performed administrative services, making this a fact question inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

This is an immigration law case involving a dispute over an Affidavit of Support signed by a U.S. citizen spouse to sponsor her Canadian husband's application for permanent residency. After their divorce in Michigan, the husband sued in federal court claiming the wife failed to provide the financial support promised in the affidavit, but the district court dismissed the case based on claim preclusion from the divorce judgment.

1. Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
2. Whether Michigan state claim preclusion law applies to federal Affidavits of Support claims
3. Whether federal preemption prevents application of state claim preclusion rules to Affidavit enforcement actions
4. Whether the plaintiff could have raised the Affidavit enforcement claim during the divorce proceedings, thus triggering claim preclusion

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. The court held that: (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar jurisdiction because the plaintiff is not complaining of injuries caused by the state court judgment; (2) Michigan's claim preclusion law properly applies to Affidavit of Support claims under the Full Faith and Credit Act; (3) federal preemption does not apply because the preclusion rules originate in federal law (28 U.S.C. § 1738), not state law, and federal statutes do not preempt other federal statutes; and (4) all three elements of Michigan's broad res judicata rule are satisfied—the prior divorce action was decided on the merits, both actions involve the same parties, and the Affidavit enforcement claim could have been raised during the divorce proceedings since immigrants can enforce Affidavits in "any appropriate court," including state family courts. The court reasoned that both the Affidavit enforcement claim and the spousal support determination in the divorce proceeding arise from the same transaction because they both turn on the immigrant's income and are related in time, space, origin, and motivation.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in which Barbara Jean Mercer challenges her state court conviction for second-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and third-degree arson. Mercer argues that the trial court violated her constitutional rights by failing to provide a jury instruction on defense-of-others, that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments.

1. Whether the state trial court violated Mercer's due process rights by refusing to give a defense-of-others jury instruction regarding the killing of victim Thomas
2. Whether Mercer's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by initially mentioning a duress defense that was unavailable under Michigan law
3. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by making incorrect statements about the hearsay rule during closing arguments
4. The proper standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) for mixed questions of law and fact involving jury instructions

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief on the jury-instruction claim and affirmed the denial of relief on all other grounds. Reasoning:

1. Jury Instruction Claim: The court held that the question of whether to provide a jury instruction based on a particular set of facts is a mixed question of law and fact that must be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), not § 2254(d)(2). The district court erred by treating it as a purely factual determination. Under § 2254(d)(1), Mercer must show that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court found that the Supreme Court has never clearly established a constitutional right to a defense-of-others instruction, and the Sixth Circuit's precedent in Keahey v. Marquis eliminated § 2254(d)(1) as a viable legal theory for such claims. The state appellate court properly considered the evidence presented and reasonably concluded that Mercer had not presented sufficient evidence to warrant the instruction.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim: Mercer failed to satisfy the "doubly deferential gauntlet" required for ineffective assistance claims on habeas review. Although her counsel mistakenly mentioned the duress defense, which was unavailable under Michigan law, Mercer could not show a reasonable probability of acquittal without this error. The counsel presented a legitimate alternative defense throughout the trial—that Mercer and Janish intended only to scare the victims and that Mercer lacked the requisite mental state for murder. The shared error by the prosecutor and judge did not cause counsel to lose unique credibility, and the court's curative instruction remedied any prejudice.
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim: Although the prosecutor made incorrect statements about the hearsay rule, the state court's conclusion that the misconduct did not infect the trial with unfairness was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The prosecutor's statements were isolated and part of a broader argument about witness credibility. The trial judge issued curative instructions explaining that the hearsay rule was complicated and that the jury should determine the weight of the defendants' statements. Additionally, the jury's verdict—acquitting Mercer of first-degree murder—suggested the jury did not believe the prosecutor's misstatement, as the jury credited the defendants' out-of-court statements that they did not plan to kill in advance.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory 15-year minimum sentence for felons in possession of firearms who have three prior "violent felony" convictions. Mario Delaine appeals the district court's determination that three of his prior state convictions qualified as violent felonies under ACCA.

1. Whether a Florida aggravated assault conviction with a deadly weapon qualifies as a violent felony, specifically whether the state-of-mind requirement can be satisfied when earlier Florida case law arguably permitted reckless threats, even though later judicial decisions clarified the requirement as intentional threats.
2. Whether a Florida felony battery conviction qualifies as a violent felony when the statute requires intentional use of force causing great bodily harm, but does not explicitly require intent to cause the injury itself.
3. Whether an Ohio domestic violence conviction qualifies as a violent felony, particularly whether the "attempt to cause" language in the statute and the broad definition of "physical harm" satisfy ACCA's elements clause.
4. Whether sentencing courts must look to state law as it existed at the time of a defendant's prior conviction or may rely on later state court decisions clarifying the offense's elements.
5. Whether the state-of-mind requirement in ACCA's elements clause requires intent regarding the resulting harm or only intent regarding the use of force itself.

The court affirmed the district court's application of ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. The court held:

1. Florida Aggravated Assault: The conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The court rejected Delaine's argument that earlier Florida case law permitted reckless threats, holding that sentencing courts should rely on later judicial interpretations that clarify an unamended statute's meaning, as judicial decisions reveal what the law always meant rather than changing it. The statutory text and consistent Florida appellate precedent required intentional threats, satisfying both the conduct and state-of-mind components of ACCA's elements clause.
2. Florida Felony Battery: The conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The court held that ACCA's state-of-mind requirement concerns the use of force, not the resulting injury. Because the statute requires intentional touching or striking that causes great bodily harm, it satisfies the elements clause. The defendant need not intend or know that the force will cause injury—only that the force is intentionally applied. The court noted this conclusion holds under either interpretation of the controlling Borden precedent.
3. Ohio Domestic Violence: The conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The court rejected two arguments: (1) that the "attempt to cause" language creates a gap where attempted domestic violence might not involve actual use of force, holding that attempted domestic violence necessarily involves attempted use of force; and (2) that Ohio's broad definition of "physical harm" might include trivial injuries, holding that prior precedent (Gatson v. United States) established that force causing any injury satisfies ACCA's requirement for "violent force."
4. Temporal Application of State Law: The court held that when interpreting whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony, sentencing courts should apply later state court decisions that clarify an unamended statute's meaning. The court distinguished between statutory amendments (which apply prospectively under traditional retroactivity principles) and judicial interpretations (which apply retroactively because they reveal what the law always meant). This approach prevents the same offense from constantly shifting between violent and non-violent categories based on subsequent judicial decisions.

This is a federal jurisdictional appeal involving a property-line dispute between neighbors in Illinois state court. The case raises questions about the scope of federal court jurisdiction when a federal agency removes an ancillary subpoena proceeding under the federal officer removal statute while the underlying property dispute remains in state court.

1. Whether the Seventh Circuit has appellate jurisdiction to review a partial remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) when a federal officer removal statute (§ 1442) was invoked alongside other removal grounds
2. Whether the Department of Agriculture's selective removal of only the subpoena proceeding authorized the defendants to remove the entire property dispute to federal court
3. Whether the property-line dispute presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on the federal government's historical role in defining the property lines
4. Whether the district court properly quashed subpoenas served on federal employees that violated federal agency regulations

The court affirmed the district court's rulings on all issues. First, the Seventh Circuit has appellate jurisdiction to review the entire remand order because the defendants invoked federal officer jurisdiction in their removal notice, triggering the § 1447(d) exception to the general non-reviewability of remand orders. Second, the Department of Agriculture properly removed only the subpoena proceeding under § 1442(d), and this limited removal did not authorize the defendants to remove the broader property dispute—the defendants needed an independent jurisdictional basis for the property dispute, which they lacked. Third, the property dispute does not present a federal question merely because the federal government originally conveyed the property; something more, such as a challenge to the federal conveyance itself, would be required. Fourth, the district court properly quashed the subpoenas because federal courts lack jurisdiction to enforce subpoenas that violate valid federal agency regulations, and the defendants conceded the state court lacked jurisdiction to enforce them. Although the district court used summary judgment rather than the proper Rule 12 motion procedure, this was harmless error because the correct result was reached.

This is an appeal of a district court's management of a consent decree in a class action lawsuit brought by Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) prisoners alleging inadequate medical and dental care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The case involves disputes over the enforceability of an implementation plan designed to remedy systemic deficiencies in prison healthcare.

1. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review certain interlocutory orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), specifically regarding the denial of a motion to strike a stipulation and the extension of the consent decree's term
2. Whether the district court was required to make specific findings under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), before approving and enforcing the implementation plan
3. Whether modification of the consent decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) was appropriate given changed circumstances in how the implementation plan was developed
4. Whether the implementation plan should be completely excised from the consent decree or modified to require PLRA findings before enforcement

The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction IDOC's appeals of (1) the denial of the motion to strike the stipulation and (2) the extension of the consent decree, finding these orders did not substantially alter the parties' pre-existing legal relationship. However, the court affirmed the district court's denial of IDOC's motion to completely excise the implementation plan from the consent decree. The court upheld the district court's modification of the consent decree, which amended Section IV.C to provide that the implementation plan becomes enforceable only upon the court making the factual findings required by the PLRA's "narrowly drawn" and "least intrusive means" requirements. The court reasoned that while IDOC demonstrated a significant change in circumstances (the monitor, rather than IDOC, essentially drafted the plan), complete removal was excessive. The modification struck an appropriate balance by preserving the implementation plan while ensuring PLRA compliance before any enforcement action. The court noted that IDOC's real concern—that the plan not be enforceable without PLRA findings—was satisfied by the district court's amendment.

This is an appeal of a consent decree in a class action lawsuit brought by Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) prisoners alleging inadequate medical and dental care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The case involves disputes over the enforceability of an implementation plan designed to remedy systemic deficiencies in prison healthcare.

1. Whether the district court had appellate jurisdiction to review certain interlocutory orders regarding modification of the consent decree under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
2. Whether the district court was required to make specific findings under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), before approving the implementation plan
3. Whether modification of the consent decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) was appropriate, and if so, what form that modification should take
4. Whether the implementation plan could be enforced without prior PLRA findings regarding narrowness, necessity, and least-intrusive-means requirements

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction IDOC's appeals of (1) the district court's denial of the motion to strike a stipulation from the consent decree and (2) the order extending the consent decree, finding these orders did not substantially alter the parties' pre-existing legal relationship. However, the court affirmed the district court's denial of IDOC's motion to completely excise the implementation plan from the consent decree. The court held that while IDOC demonstrated a significant change in circumstances warranting modification (the monitor, rather than IDOC, essentially drafted the final plan), complete removal was not suitably tailored to that change. The court affirmed the district court's amendment to Section IV.C of the consent decree, which makes the implementation plan enforceable only upon the district court's making the requisite PLRA findings that any prospective relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation, and is the least intrusive means necessary. This modification strikes an appropriate balance by preserving IDOC's flexibility to implement reforms while allowing plaintiffs to demonstrate that particular reforms are necessary and meet PLRA requirements.

This is a Second Amendment and constitutional law case in which Kenneth Karwacki, convicted by court martial of delivering peyote, challenged Wisconsin's denial of his concealed-carry permit application based on a state statute that treats military misdemeanor convictions equivalent to state felonies when the conduct would constitute a felony under state law.

1. Whether Wisconsin's treatment of a federal military misdemeanor conviction as equivalent to a state felony for firearms disability purposes violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution.
2. Whether Wisconsin's firearm disability statute violates the Second Amendment on its face.
3. Whether Wisconsin's firearm disability statute violates the Second Amendment as applied to Karwacki's specific conviction for drug distribution.

The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Wisconsin. The court held that: (1) the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to federal court martial proceedings, and even if it did, Wisconsin has not deprived the military conviction of its effect—the clause does not prevent states from determining collateral civil consequences of out-of-state or military convictions; (2) the facial Second Amendment challenge fails based on precedent rejecting similar challenges to federal firearms disability statutes; and (3) the as-applied challenge fails because the well-established relationship between drug distribution and firearm-related violence permits governments to disarm individuals who present credible threats to public safety, and no federal court of appeals has accepted an as-applied Second Amendment challenge from a convicted drug distributor.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Edlando Watson challenges his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), raising both Fourth Amendment and Second Amendment constitutional challenges to his prosecution.

1. Whether Watson's DNA evidence should be suppressed based on alleged Fourth Amendment violations in obtaining the initial DNA sample
2. Whether the federal felon in possession of a firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), violates the Second Amendment as applied to Watson
3. Whether felons are included within "the people" protected by the Second Amendment
4. Whether disarming dangerous felons is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation under the Bruen framework

The court affirmed Watson's conviction on both grounds. On the Fourth Amendment issue, the court held that the federal DNA warrant was lawful under the independent-source doctrine because the affidavit supporting it contained substantial untainted evidence linking Watson to the firearms, including eyewitness accounts, witness statements, and recorded jail calls, making the warrant genuinely independent of any alleged Fourth Amendment violation in obtaining the initial state sample. On the Second Amendment issue, the court held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Watson. The court reasoned that: (1) felons are part of "the people" protected by the Second Amendment, as they are members of the national political community; (2) the government must show the statute is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation; (3) two enduring historical traditions support disarming dangerous felons—the historical practice of legislatures categorically disarming groups deemed dangerous, and the principle that the greater power to execute includes the lesser power to disarm; and (4) Watson's predicate felony conviction for drug dealing with intent to distribute is inherently dangerous, making his disarmament consistent with these historical traditions. The court expressly reserved judgment on whether non-dangerous felonies could support disarmament under § 922(g)(1).

This is a federal criminal appeal in which the United States challenges a district court's dismissal of an indictment charging Glen Prince with violating 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by convicted felons. The district court had declared the statute facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by persons convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year, is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment
2. Whether Supreme Court precedent in District of Columbia v. Heller, McDonald v. Chicago, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, and United States v. Rahimi permits or requires invalidation of the felon-in-possession statute
3. Whether as-applied challenges to §922(g)(1) remain available for individuals whose convictions do not suggest danger

The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case. The court held that §922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional. The court reasoned that: (1) Supreme Court precedent, particularly Heller and Rahimi, explicitly or implicitly affirms that longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by felons are constitutional; (2) Rahimi's risk-centric approach supports the validity of disarming individuals with felony convictions, as such convictions are plausible indicators of danger; (3) all other circuits that have addressed the question post-Bruen agree that §922(g)(1) has valid applications and cannot be declared unconstitutional on its face; and (4) Prince's own criminal history—prior convictions for armed robbery and aggravated battery, plus recent conduct involving armed robbery on public transit—demonstrates the statute's constitutional application to him. The court reserved the question of as-applied challenges for individuals whose convictions do not suggest danger.

This consolidated class action case involves shuttle truck drivers employed by motor carriers who transport automobile parts and containers between Ford's Chicago Assembly Plant and nearby storage lots entirely within Illinois. The plaintiffs sued for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and the Chicago Minimum Wage Law.

1. Whether the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption from FLSA overtime requirements applies to intrastate shuttle routes that are part of a continuous interstate journey of goods.
2. Whether temporary storage of out-of-state manufactured parts at storage lots near the Assembly Plant constitutes an interruption that breaks the continuity of an interstate shipment.
3. Whether the storage lots and Assembly Plant should be treated as a single destination ("Ford Assembly Campus") or as distinct locations for purposes of determining if transportation is interstate or intrastate commerce.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the shuttle drivers' intrastate routes are part of a continuous interstate journey and therefore fall under the MCA exemption from FLSA overtime requirements. The court reasoned that: (1) the storage lots are geographically distinct from the Assembly Plant and separated by miles of public roads; (2) the parties' stipulated facts identify the Assembly Plant at a specific address separate from the storage lots; (3) the temporary storage at the lots is analogous to routine warehousing stops in interstate commerce, which do not break the continuity of an interstate shipment; (4) Ford based its shipment volume on demand projections, maintained control of the parts, and bore responsibility for transportation costs—all factors indicating a fixed and persisting transportation intent beyond the storage point; and (5) the plaintiffs' "Ford Assembly Campus" argument lacks factual support and would create impractical legal standards. Therefore, the drivers are not entitled to FLSA overtime compensation.

This consolidated appeal involves two class action lawsuits brought by shuttle truck drivers employed by motor carriers who transport automobile parts to and from a Ford assembly plant in Chicago. The drivers challenged the defendants' failure to pay overtime wages, claiming violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and the Chicago Minimum Wage Law.

1. Whether the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption from FLSA overtime requirements applies to intrastate shuttle routes that are part of a continuous interstate journey.
2. Whether temporary storage of out-of-state manufactured auto parts at storage lots near the Assembly Plant constitutes an interruption that breaks the continuity of an interstate shipment.
3. Whether the storage lots and Assembly Plant should be considered a single destination ("Ford Assembly Campus") or distinct locations.

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the shuttle drivers' intrastate routes from storage lots to the Assembly Plant are part of a continuous interstate journey and therefore fall under the MCA exemption from FLSA overtime requirements. Applying the four-factor test from Collins v. Heritage Wine Cellars, the court found that: (1) Ford based its shipment volume on demand projections; (2) no processing or modification occurred at the storage lots; (3) Ford controlled the parts and directed their transportation; and (4) Ford bore responsibility for transportation costs. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the storage lots and Assembly Plant constitute one campus, finding that the stipulated facts clearly identify them as distinct locations separated by miles of public roads. The temporary storage at the lots was analogous to routine warehousing stops in interstate commerce and did not break the continuity of the interstate shipment.

This is an insurance coverage dispute arising from a car accident in which Thomas Polk was injured and his wife Katarzyna was killed. The case involves the interpretation of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage limits and anti-stacking provisions across three insurance policies to determine the maximum recovery available to Polk.

1. Whether UIM coverage limits can be stacked across multiple policies despite clear anti-stacking provisions in the policies
2. Whether anti-stacking provisions are ambiguous when they fail to distinguish between per-accident and per-insured limits, particularly when multiple insureds are injured in a single accident
3. Whether Progressive and Secura's UIM obligations can be offset by payments received from AMCO's settlement
4. Whether anti-stacking provisions violate the premium rule of construction, which prevents insurers from collecting premiums for coverage while using limiting clauses to reduce liability

The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the insurance companies. The court held that: (1) the anti-stacking provisions in the Progressive and Secura policies are clear and unambiguous, and Illinois law permits such provisions; (2) the statute's reference to a singular "insured" does not authorize stacking when multiple insureds are injured in a single accident; (3) both policies explicitly authorize offset by limiting liability to the highest UIM coverage available under any one policy ($1,000,000 under AMCO); (4) the premium rule of construction does not apply where parties manifested clear intent through unambiguous anti-stacking language; and (5) the maximum Polk could receive from Progressive and Secura combined was $250,000 each (25% of the $1,000,000 limit), and since Polk had already received $900,000 total ($100,000 from the tortfeasor and $800,000 from AMCO), the insurers' obligations were satisfied or minimal.

This is an immigration case in which Susie Eskilian, a native of Soviet Armenia ordered removed in 2011, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of her second motion to reopen removal proceedings. Eskilian sought to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing her attorney failed to present evidence of due diligence in the first motion to reopen, which was based on a subsequently vacated criminal conviction that had been the sole basis for her removability.

1. Whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard for assessing "due diligence" in the context of equitable tolling for a time- or number-barred motion to reopen
2. Whether Eskilian acted with reasonable due diligence in pursuing vacatur of her conviction and reopening of removal proceedings
3. Whether Eskilian was prejudiced by her counsel's failure to present facts and arguments regarding due diligence in the first motion to reopen
4. The appropriate standard for measuring diligence for individuals deemed "stateless" who face no imminent threat of removal

The Ninth Circuit granted Eskilian's petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that: (1) the BIA employed the wrong diligence standard by measuring Eskilian's diligence from the date California Penal Code § 1473.7 became effective in 2017, rather than from when she learned of her imminent removability in June 2018; (2) for individuals deemed "stateless," it is reasonable to expect them to take action to challenge removability only after learning they can be removed to a country; (3) Eskilian acted with reasonable due diligence because she obtained counsel in August 2018, had her conviction vacated in May 2019, and moved to reopen in July 2019—all promptly after learning in June 2018 that Armenia had begun accepting individuals born in Soviet Armenia; and (4) the BIA abused its discretion in finding no prejudice when Eskilian's counsel failed to present any facts, evidence, or argument of diligence in the first motion to reopen, which was the sole basis for the Immigration Judge's denial.

This is an appeal of a district court's partial grant of a § 2255 motion for ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant Ebube Otuonye was convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, distribution of controlled substances, and healthcare fraud. The district court vacated his convictions on the distribution counts but denied relief on the healthcare fraud counts, and Defendant appeals the denial as to the fraud counts.

1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Jury Instruction 16, which allegedly misstated the scienter (intent) requirement for criminal violations under 21 U.S.C. § 841 in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Ruan v. United States
2. Whether any error in Instruction 16 prejudiced Defendant's convictions on the healthcare fraud counts (Counts Three and Four) under 18 U.S.C. § 1347
3. Whether the healthcare fraud counts were legally or factually dependent on the distribution counts such that an error affecting the distribution counts would require reversal of the fraud convictions

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief on Counts Three and Four. The court held that Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to the fraud counts because: (1) Instruction 16 explicitly stated it was relevant only to Counts One and Two (the distribution charges), not Counts Three and Four; (2) the healthcare fraud counts are legally and factually distinct from the distribution counts and do not require proof of unlawful distribution of controlled substances; (3) the fraud counts focused on fraudulent billing for noncontrolled substance prescriptions under the pharmacy's 3:1 policy, not controlled substances; (4) the fraud counts have their own scienter requirement (knowledge that prescriptions were not medically necessary), which was properly instructed; and (5) the jury could have convicted on the fraud counts regardless of whether Defendant had the requisite intent for distributing controlled substances. Therefore, any error in Instruction 16 regarding scienter for distribution charges would not have affected the fraud convictions.

This is a federal appellate case involving a challenge by the National Association of Industrial Bankers to Colorado's state lending laws. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a petition for rehearing en banc after initially deciding the case in a panel decision dated November 10, 2025.

1. The meaning of the phrase "loans made in such State" under Section 525 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), specifically whether it refers to executed loans and encompasses loans where either the lender or borrower is located in the opt-out state
2. How Section 521 of DIDMCA's reference to "the State . . . where the bank is located" should inform the interpretation of "loans made in such State" in Section 525
3. The relevance of DIDMCA's enactment history to interpreting "loans made in such State"
4. The instructiveness of regulatory guidance to interpreting "loans made in such State"
5. Whether the phrase "loans made in such State" is ambiguous
6. Whether a presumption against preemption applies to this case

The court granted the petition for rehearing en banc, vacated the prior panel judgment, and stayed the mandate. The court ordered supplemental briefing on the six specified questions regarding the interpretation of DIDMCA's provisions governing state lending regulations. The en banc court will not reconsider the threshold question of whether the Banks have a valid cause of action under Ex parte Young.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which the defendant was convicted of possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the statute as applied to him.

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed firearms "in furtherance of" a drug-trafficking crime, as opposed to merely "in relation to" such a crime
2. Whether the "in furtherance of" language in § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant
3. The distinction between "in relation to" and "in furtherance of" under § 924(c) and how courts should apply the Basham factors to determine possession in furtherance of a drug offense

The court affirmed the defendant's conviction. On the sufficiency of evidence issue, the court found more than adequate evidence under the Basham factors that the defendant possessed the firearms in furtherance of his drug-trafficking crime. The evidence showed: (1) easy accessibility of the firearms from the driver's seat; (2) the defendant had recently been victimized in a drug robbery and sought to obtain guns for protection; (3) text messages indicated intent to acquire firearms; (4) the firearms had features useful for protection; and (5) the evidence was similar to or stronger than cases where courts found the in-furtherance-of element satisfied. On the vagueness challenge, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the statute fails to distinguish adequately between "in relation to" and "in furtherance of." The court reasoned that "in furtherance of" is a stricter standard than "in relation to," and the defendant need only understand what "in furtherance of" means to know whether his conduct violates the statute. The court found no vagueness problem with the statutory language or the established case law factors used to determine whether possession is in furtherance of a drug crime.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Frank Rende against the Court of Chancery, seeking relief from a judgment he claims is void due to jurisdictional defects and post-adjudication substitution of accounts in a trust removal and accounting case.

1. Whether the Delaware Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to the Court of Chancery
2. Whether a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy when the petitioner failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's final order
3. Whether the three-part test for mandamus relief is satisfied: (i) a clear right to performance of a duty, (ii) no other adequate remedy available, and (iii) arbitrary failure or refusal by the trial court to perform its duty
4. Whether a petition for mandamus may be used as a substitute for an appeal

The Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. The Court held that there is no basis for issuing a writ of mandamus because: (1) Rende's petition fails to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court; (2) Rende appears to be attempting to relitigate issues that were or could have been argued below or on appeal, and he failed to file a timely notice of appeal; (3) a writ of mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal; and (4) the proper time and place to submit documents challenging the Court of Chancery's decision was during the underlying litigation, not through a mandamus petition after a final order has been issued.

This is a Delaware Chancery Court case concerning whether a dissolved and cancelled limited liability company's (Reinz Wisconsin Gasket, LLC or "RWG") certificate of cancellation should be nullified due to allegedly improper dissolution. The petitioner, a plaintiff in an asbestos action against RWG, sought to nullify the cancellation, claiming RWG violated Delaware's Limited Liability Company Act by dissolving without setting aside assets to compensate claimants.

1. Whether RWG violated Sections 18-203 and 18-804 of Delaware's Limited Liability Company Act by filing a certificate of cancellation without properly winding up and setting aside assets for pending or foreseeable claims
2. Whether unexhausted insurance policies constitute assets of RWG that should have been set aside
3. Whether litigable claims (insurance coverage claims, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and aiding and abetting claims) constitute assets of RWG
4. The proper standard for determining whether contingent rights qualify as "assets" under Section 18-804
5. Whether the court should expand the receiver's authority to marshal assets and pursue claims on RWG's behalf

The court denied the petitioner's motion to nullify RWG's certificate of cancellation. The court held that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that RWG had assets it failed to set aside when it dissolved. Specifically:

1. Insurance Policies: The court concluded that RWG did not have any insurance policies constituting assets under Section 18-804. The petitioner failed to prove two alleged policies existed. For pre-Asset Sale policies issued to RWG's predecessor, the court found insufficient evidence that the successor company acquired rights to those policies through the 1981 asset purchase agreement. For post-Asset Sale policies, the court determined they offered no indemnification value because: (1) workers' compensation policies did not cover the pending asbestos claims; and (2) umbrella policies required exhaustion of underlying primary insurance limits before coverage attached, and there was no evidence those limits had been exhausted or could be exhausted given the underlying insurer's (Lumbermens) liquidation in 2013.
2. Litigable Claims: The court rejected the argument that litigable claims constituted valuable assets. The court held that under Krafft-Murphy precedent, contingent rights must be "capable of vesting" and "represent significant potential indemnification value" to constitute assets. The court found: (1) insurance coverage claims had no value because the underlying policies offered no coverage; (2) breach of fiduciary duty claims were largely exculpated by RWG's Operating Agreement and offered no value to RWG; and (3) aiding and abetting claims offered no quantifiable damages.
3. Legal Standard: The court established that contingent rights, such as insurance policies and litigable claims, constitute assets under Section 18-804 only if they are capable of vesting and represent significant potential indemnification value to the company. An LLC can dissolve in compliance with the LLC Act without setting aside provisions for claims if it had no assets.
4. Receiver's Authority: The court declined to expand the receiver's authority to marshal assets since the petitioner failed to prove RWG had any assets.

This is a fee-shifting case in which the court awards attorneys' fees to Sorrento Therapeutics and Scilex Pharmaceuticals against defendant Anthony Mack following a trial on claims for breach of employment and restrictive covenants agreements, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The court determines the reasonable amount of fees to be awarded after Mack challenges the plaintiffs' fee request.

1. Whether plaintiffs' documented attorneys' fees and expenses totaling $16,134,946.06 (seeking one-third or $5,378,315.35) are reasonable under Delaware law
2. Whether the court should deny or reduce the fee request based on: (a) insufficient documentation in initial affidavits; (b) block billing practices; (c) expenses for experts who did not testify at trial; (d) excessive number of attorneys involved; (e) hourly rates and staffing allocation; (f) fees exceeding damages recovered; and (g) defendant's claimed inability to pay
3. The proper standard for determining reasonable attorneys' fees under Delaware law and the factors to be considered

The court awards plaintiffs one-third of their reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of $5,378,315.35 to be paid by Mack. The court rejected all of Mack's objections:

1. The initial submission without invoices was permissible; supplemental documentation was properly considered
2. Block billing is not per se unreasonable and does not warrant denial of the fee request where all tasks are compensable
3. Expert fees for experts not called at trial are reasonable when incurred in good faith as part of case development
4. The number of attorneys involved and hours expended were reasonable given the case's complexity, three-year duration, and the court's observation of exemplary trial work
5. Hourly rates exceeding $1,000 per hour and partner-heavy staffing during trial were reasonable; the client's agreement to pay non-contingent fees at standard rates provides a "rough cut" of commercial reasonableness
6. The fact that fees exceed damages recovered is not dispositive, particularly where the fees are part of actual damages for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional misconduct
7. Mack's claimed inability to pay was rejected as unsupported and self-inflicted given his intentional, willful, and malicious conduct, including litigation misconduct involving document destruction

This is a Delaware Chancery Court case concerning whether a member of a limited liability company is entitled to advancement of legal expenses under the company's operating agreement. Fresh Express Vegetable, LLC seeks advancement from Latitude 36 Foods, LLC for expenses incurred in defending a separate lawsuit brought by the other member.

1. Whether the phrase "on behalf of the Company" in the operating agreement's advancement provision (Section 11.5) is conditioned by the limitations in the indemnification provision (Section 11.4), which requires actions be taken "in good faith on behalf of the Company" and "in a manner reasonably believed to be within the scope of authority conferred."
2. The proper interpretation of "on behalf of the Company" and whether member actions taken in a member capacity (as opposed to as the company's representative) qualify for advancement.
3. Whether the underlying lawsuit's allegations—which challenge decisions made by the plaintiff's board designees and decisions made by the plaintiff as a member—constitute actions taken "on behalf of" the company.

The court sustained the defendant's exceptions and ruled that the plaintiff is not entitled to advancement. The court held that "on behalf of the Company" means acting as the company's representative, acting for it or to bind it, with the necessary board supermajority vote and prior written approval as required by Section 4.1 of the operating agreement. The court reasoned that dictionary definitions and the plain language of the operating agreement, read as a whole, demonstrate that a member acts "on behalf of" the company only when authorized by the board to speak for or bind the company. Since the underlying lawsuit challenges only the plaintiff's decisions as a member and its board designees' decisions—not any action taken with board authorization to represent or bind the company—the plaintiff's conduct does not qualify for advancement under the operating agreement. The court found this interpretation sensible because it limits company-funded legal expenses to disputes arising from board-authorized actions, while excluding unauthorized acts, member infighting, and unrelated conduct.

This case involves challenges to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) sudden and dramatic changes to the Continuum of Care (CoC) program, which provides federal funding for homeless assistance. Multiple states, local governments, and nonprofit organizations sued HUD, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and federal law, and the district court granted preliminary injunctions preventing HUD from implementing the contested changes. HUD appealed the denial of its motion to dissolve those injunctions and requested an emergency stay pending appeal.

1. Whether HUD exceeded its statutory authority under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (MVA) by rescinding the 24-25 Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) and issuing a new November NOFO that departed from longstanding Housing First policies and statutory requirements
2. Whether HUD's actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act by being arbitrary and capricious, including departing from longstanding policy without explanation, failing to consider significant reliance interests, and adopting new conditions without notice and comment
3. Whether the enactment of the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act of 2026 (THUD) constituted a significant change in law or fact warranting dissolution of the preliminary injunctions
4. Whether the plaintiffs faced irreparable harm from funding gaps and service disruptions if the preliminary injunctions were dissolved
5. Whether HUD met the four-factor test under Nken v. Holder for obtaining an emergency stay pending appeal

The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied HUD's motion for a stay pending appeal. The court held that HUD failed to make a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal challenging the district court's denial of its motion to dissolve the preliminary injunctions. Reasoning:

1. Scope of Appeal: The court clarified that it could not review the underlying preliminary injunction orders themselves, as HUD did not appeal those orders within the required timeframe. HUD's appeal was limited to whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dissolve based on intervening changes in law or fact.
2. THUD's Impact on APA Claims: The court rejected HUD's argument that the 2026 appropriations law (THUD) undermined the plaintiffs' legal claims. The court found that:
   • HUD already possesses "a fiscal year 2025 NOFO" in the form of the 24-25 NOFO, which it can use to award funds under THUD's framework
   • THUD's plain text does not authorize HUD to issue a new 2025 NOFO after the MVA's three-month deadline; the word "new" is conspicuously absent from the statute
   • THUD appears aimed at avoiding funding gaps through continuity, not authorizing the December NOFO's disruptions
   • Even if THUD waived the three-month deadline, HUD still faced multiple other legal grounds for the preliminary injunctions, including violations of substantive MVA requirements regarding permanent housing prioritization and formula-based allocations, as well as APA violations for arbitrary and capricious action and failure to provide notice and comment
3. THUD's Impact on Irreparable Harm: The court found that THUD did not eliminate the threat of irreparable harm because:
   • CoC funding recipients must make long-term decisions today based on future funding projections
   • Even with THUD's automatic renewals in place, allowing HUD to implement the December NOFO would force housing programs to close or curtail services immediately in anticipation of funding cuts
   • The record showed that CoC recipients would face irreparable harm from having to respond to two separate funding competitions within two months (the December NOFO and the fiscal year 2026 NOFO)
4. Remaining Nken Factors: The court found that HUD failed to demonstrate irreparable harm to itself, as preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of unlawful agency action do not constitute irreparable harm. The court also found that the balance of equities and public interest strongly favored maintaining the preliminary injunctions, given the uncontested evidence of devastating harms to vulnerable populations including families, elderly persons, domestic violence survivors, and people experiencing homelessness if the injunctions were lifted.
5. Conclusion: Because HUD failed to make a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits—the most critical factor—the court denied the stay request without extensively analyzing the remaining Nken factors.

This case involves two consolidated lawsuits challenging the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) sudden and dramatic changes to the Continuum of Care (CoC) program, which provides federal funding for homeless assistance. Twenty-one states, the District of Columbia, and various local governments and nonprofits sued HUD after it rescinded a two-year funding notice and issued a new one with significantly reduced permanent housing funding and departure from the "Housing First" approach, threatening funding gaps for hundreds of housing projects serving vulnerable populations.

1. Whether HUD violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by rescinding the 24-25 Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) and issuing the November NOFO with substantially different terms, including a 30 percent cap on Tier 1 (permanent housing) funding renewals and elimination of the Housing First approach
2. Whether HUD's actions exceeded its statutory authority under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (MVA), which prioritizes permanent housing, renewal stability, and formula-based allocations
3. Whether HUD's actions were arbitrary and capricious, given the departure from longstanding policy without explanation and failure to consider reliance interests on a truncated timeline
4. Whether the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act of 2026 (THUD) constituted a changed circumstance warranting dissolution of the preliminary injunctions
5. Whether plaintiffs faced irreparable harm from funding gaps and service disruptions if the new NOFO were implemented

The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied HUD's motion for a stay pending appeal of the district court's denial of HUD's motion to dissolve preliminary injunctions. The court held that HUD failed to make a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal, which is the most critical factor under the Nken test for stays. Reasoning:

1. Scope of Appeal: The court clarified that it could not review the underlying preliminary injunction orders themselves, as HUD did not appeal them within the required time. HUD could only challenge the district court's denial of its motion to dissolve based on intervening changes in law or facts.
2. THUD's Impact on APA Claims: The court rejected HUD's argument that THUD authorized it to issue a new 2025 NOFO after the MVA's three-month deadline. The plain text of THUD does not amend the MVA or retroactively alter the deadline; it merely permits awards "under a fiscal year 2025 notice of funding opportunity." The 24-25 NOFO already qualifies as a 2025 NOFO. Moreover, even if THUD waived the deadline, HUD had not addressed the district court's other independent bases for finding the December NOFO likely violated the APA, including violations of substantive MVA requirements (prioritization of permanent housing and renewal stability, formula-based allocations), arbitrary and capricious action, and failure to provide notice and comment for new conditions.
3. THUD's Impact on Irreparable Harm: The court found that THUD's staggered renewal provisions did not eliminate the risk of irreparable harm. CoC funding recipients must make long-term decisions today based on future funding projections. If permitted to implement the December NOFO, they would be forced to close or prepare to close programs immediately due to anticipated funding cuts, even if the NOFO were ultimately ruled invalid. The record showed that organizations would cease operations, lay off personnel, and end services if forced to respond to two separate funding competitions within two months.
4. Remaining Nken Factors: The court found that HUD would not face irreparable harm from injunctions barring enforcement of an unlawful NOFO. Conversely, the record demonstrated substantial and immediate harm to plaintiffs and the public if the stay were granted, including closure of housing programs, loss of housing for vulnerable populations, and disruption of services for families, elderly persons, and domestic violence survivors. HUD failed to dispute these harms and could not show they were merely derivative of the merits claims.
5. Public Interest: The court concluded that the public interest strongly favored maintaining the preliminary injunctions, as ensuring lawful agency action, continuity of housing, and stability for vulnerable populations during winter months clearly served the public interest.

This is an appeal concerning whether attorneys' fees awarded to plaintiffs in a civil rights case challenging Puerto Rico's voting procedures are subject to discharge under Puerto Rico's debt restructuring plan confirmed pursuant to PROMESA (Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act). The court addresses whether the fee award, granted nearly two years after the plan's effective date, must be treated as a discharged claim under the bankruptcy-like Title III proceedings.

1. Whether defendants waived the discharge argument by raising it late in the proceedings
2. Whether the fee claim "arose" before or after the plan's effective date, and thus whether it is subject to discharge
3. Whether the fee claim qualifies as a nondischargeable "obligation arising under Federal police or regulatory laws" under 48 U.S.C. § 2164(h)
4. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to direct notice of the administrative expense bar date as a matter of due process

The First Circuit reversed the district court and held that the fee award is discharged under the Confirmed Plan. The court rejected all four of plaintiffs' arguments:

1. Waiver: Discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) is automatic and nonwaivable, operating independently of any action or inaction by the debtor, so the raise-or-waive rule does not apply.
2. Timing: The claim for fees arose when the underlying constitutional violation and § 1983 action occurred—well before the plan's effective date—not when the court later ruled on the fee motion. The timing of the court's decision does not circumvent the Title III proceedings, and allowing such a result would undermine bankruptcy's purpose of orderly resolution and successful reorganization.
3. Federal Police/Regulatory Laws Exception: Section 1983 and § 1988 are not "Federal police or regulatory laws" under § 2164(h); they are merely authorizing statutes that provide a cause of action and fee-shifting mechanism, not substantive obligations regarding public health and safety. The exception does not apply.
4. Notice: Under 11 U.S.C. § 944(c)(2), once a claimant has notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings, the burden shifts to the claimant to identify and comply with filing deadlines. Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the Title III proceedings from defendants' Answer and other filings, so they were not entitled to direct notice of the bar date as a matter of due process. The statutory notice requirement, not the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, governs the analysis.

This is a criminal appeal in which two brothers, Christopher and Joseph Ponzo, challenge their convictions and sentences for participating in a bribery scheme involving the Mass Save energy-conservation program. The defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy and honest-services wire fraud, lying to federal agents, and related offenses, and now appeal their 27-month prison sentences and forfeiture orders totaling $13.2 million and $3.6 million respectively.

1. Whether the district court properly calculated the tax loss for Joseph Ponzo's base offense level under the sentencing guidelines
2. Whether the district court properly applied sentencing enhancements for sophisticated means, aggravating role, and obstruction of justice
3. Whether the district court adequately explained the factual findings supporting the sentencing enhancements
4. Whether the district court erred in determining the amount of money the defendants made from the scheme when imposing above-guidelines sentences
5. Whether the forfeiture orders were proper under 18 U.S.C. § 981, including whether the proceeds were "derived from" the criminal conduct
6. Whether the forfeiture process complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2
7. Whether the forfeiture orders constitute an unconstitutionally excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment

The First Circuit affirmed all sentences and forfeiture orders. The court held:

1. Tax Loss Calculation: Joseph Ponzo failed to show plain error in the $115,528 tax loss calculation, as he provided no evidence to refute the IRS-calculated figure and the amount may have actually understated his true tax loss.
2. Sophisticated Means Enhancement: The enhancement properly applied because the defendants created Air Tight Solutions as a front company with fake employee email addresses and falsified records to conceal the bribery scheme and funnel payments, making the scheme "more effective and difficult to thwart." The defendants' argument that Air Tight was not a "shell company" failed because the shell-company example is merely illustrative, not dispositive.
3. Aggravating Role Enhancement: Christopher Ponzo's 2-level enhancement was proper because he exercised control over his co-conspirators, including directing Joseph to create fake emails and send money to cover bribes, and recruiting Joseph into the scheme in the first place.
4. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement: Both defendants' enhancements were proper because they were convicted of lying to federal agents under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which automatically triggers the enhancement under the sentencing guidelines, and their lies impeded the investigation.
5. Adequacy of Explanation: The defendants waived any claim that the judge failed to adequately explain the enhancements by not objecting at sentencing. Even if not waived, the judge's explanations were adequate because the parties vigorously contested the enhancements in their sentencing memoranda and at the sentencing hearing, and the judge explicitly agreed with the government's positions.
6. Amount of Proceeds: Both defendants waived or failed to show plain error regarding the judge's calculation of proceeds. The evidence established that Darlington and Marra, the CLEAResult employees being bribed, participated in recommending, selecting, and overseeing contractors; helped Air Tight become an approved contractor; assisted with pricing, billing, and payments; and manipulated contract specifications to inflate profits. Therefore, the defendants would not have received the funds "but for" the bribes, making all proceeds forfeitable regardless of who generated the initial customer referrals.
7. Forfeiture Process: Any procedural errors in the forfeiture process were harmless because the government clearly indicated its intent to seek forfeiture in the indictment and guilty-plea hearing, mentioned forfeiture in its sentencing memorandum, and the defendants did not timely object or request a hearing on traceability.
8. Excessive Fine Claim: The $13.2 million forfeiture was not an unconstitutionally excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment because: (1) the defendants fell squarely within the class of persons targeted by the honest-services statutes; (2) the statutory maximum fine of twice the gross gain ($72 million) far exceeded the forfeiture amount; and (3) the defendants' crimes caused substantial harm to the Mass Save program by damaging utilities' confidence in oversight companies, corroding CLEAResult's faith in its employees, and eroding public trust in the program.

This is a procedural due process case in which an incarcerated individual challenges the constitutionality of disciplinary procedures that resulted in his placement in solitary confinement (the Special Housing Unit or "SHU") for approximately nine months. The plaintiff alleges he was denied basic procedural protections at his disciplinary hearing, including the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence.

1. Whether a 270-day (or 180-day) term of disciplinary segregation in the SHU implicates a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, applying the "atypical and significant hardship" standard from Sandin v. Conner
2. Whether the duration of disciplinary confinement alone, absent evidence of unusually harsh conditions, can constitute an atypical and significant hardship
3. The appropriate durational threshold for when disciplinary segregation triggers constitutional due process protections

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment and held that Vidal's disciplinary segregation implicates a protected liberty interest based on duration alone. The court concluded that 180 days of disciplinary segregation under normal SHU conditions constitutes an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life and thus triggers due process protections. The court reasoned that: (1) defendants presented no evidence that such prolonged confinement was a common incident of prison life; (2) the court's precedent supports that 188 days of administrative confinement triggers Sandin protections absent countervailing evidence; (3) contemporary scientific research, judicial decisions, and state legislation increasingly recognize the severe psychological and physical effects of solitary confinement, lowering the durational threshold below the 305 days previously recognized in Colon v. Howard; and (4) the relevant duration could be measured as 180 days, 258 days, 270 days, or potentially longer depending on aggregation of sentences, but all measurements exceed the threshold. The court vacated and remanded for the district court to address remaining issues including qualified immunity and personal involvement.

This is an appeal of a mortgage servicer dispute where a debtor in Chapter 13 bankruptcy sued his mortgage servicers, alleging that communications sent to him during bankruptcy (monthly statements, payoff statements, and tax forms) constituted prohibited debt collection activity in violation of the automatic stay, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and state consumer protection laws.

1. Whether written communications sent by mortgage servicers to a debtor during Chapter 13 bankruptcy constitute "debt collection activity" under the FDCPA and bankruptcy law
2. The proper standard for determining when a communication is made "for the purpose of collecting a debt" under the FDCPA
3. The significance of bankruptcy disclaimers in communications sent to debtors in bankruptcy
4. Whether the automatic stay of collection activity was violated by sending informational documents
5. The applicability of supplemental jurisdiction over state law debt collection claims

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the mortgage servicers on all counts. The court held:

1. Monthly Statements: The monthly statements were not debt collection activity because they contained clear, unequivocal disclaimers stating that the communications were for informational purposes only and explicitly told the debtor not to make payments to the servicers. The court presumed the debtor read and understood these straightforward disclaimers.
2. Payoff Statements: The payoff statements were not debt collection activity for two reasons: (1) they contained disclaimers identical to those in the monthly statements, and (2) the debtor requested them, so they were merely ministerial responses to his inquiry rather than unsolicited collection efforts.
3. Tax Forms: The 1098 tax forms were not debt collection activity because they contained no demand for payment and provided no payment instructions.
4. FDCPA Claim: The debtor failed to establish the first element of an FDCPA claim—that he was the object of collection activity—because none of the communications were made for the purpose of collecting a debt. The court applied a "commonsense inquiry" test examining the nature of the parties' relationship, the objective purpose and context of the communication, and whether it included a demand for payment.
5. Automatic Stay Violation: Because the documents were purely informational in nature and not debt collection efforts, they did not violate the automatic stay imposed by Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
6. State Law Claims: The district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims because the federal claims were dismissed, and the court lacked diversity jurisdiction information.

This is an appeal in a contract and intellectual property dispute where Clear Touch Interactive sued Ockers Company for trademark infringement after the parties had previously settled a state-court breach of contract action. The central issue is whether Clear Touch's federal intellectual property claims are barred by the settlement agreement and dismissal of the prior state-court litigation.

1. Whether Clear Touch's federal trademark and intellectual property claims are barred by res judicata based on the parties' settlement agreement and the state court's dismissal of "all possible claims and counterclaims" in the prior litigation
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in reconsidering and reversing its initial summary judgment ruling on res judicata on the eve of trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
3. Whether the district court properly excluded a witness (Paul Diiorio) for untimely disclosure under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1)
4. Whether the district court properly allowed an attorney (Rita Bolt Barker) to testify as a fact witness despite her dual role as counsel
5. Whether the jury verdict for breach of contract and breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act was supported by sufficient evidence
6. Whether the late res judicata ruling and reversal of parties' positions warranted a new trial

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. The court held:

1. Res Judicata - Substantive Ruling: Clear Touch's intellectual property claims are barred by res judicata. Although the settlement agreement's release language did not cover the trademark claims, the separate dismissal provision required the parties to jointly dismiss "all possible claims and counterclaims that have or could have been brought" in the state-court litigation. Because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Lanham Act claims and South Carolina rules allow unrelated counterclaims, Clear Touch's trademark infringement claims could have been brought as counterclaims in the state-court action. The dismissal language is broader than the release in both scope and timeline, and the parties' intent—evidenced by Clear Touch's stated intention to bring intellectual property counterclaims and the handwritten modification adding the broad dismissal language—supports barring these claims.
2. Res Judicata - Procedural Ruling (Rule 54(b)): The district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering its initial summary judgment ruling on the eve of trial. Under Rule 54(b), which applies to nonfinal orders, district courts have broader flexibility to revise their decisions when substantially different evidence emerges, there is an intervening change in law, or there is clear error causing manifest injustice. The court properly relied on: (a) the Trask deposition showing Clear Touch knew about the TouchView mark before settlement, and (b) Barker's live testimony and contemporaneous email corroborating that Clear Touch contemplated bringing intellectual property counterclaims in state court. These materials were substantially different evidence justifying reconsideration. Additionally, the initial ruling was clear error because it conflated the settlement agreement's release and dismissal provisions, and allowing settled claims to proceed would cause manifest injustice to Ockers.
3. TouchView Interactive Summary Judgment: The district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing all claims against TouchView Interactive, Inc. as a corporate entity. Although reseller agreements named "TouchView Interactive" as a party, there was no evidence that the business was transferred to the corporate entity or that it had any assets, employees, or commercial activity. Ockers owned the TouchView brand and marks, not the corporate shell.
4. Witness Exclusion (Diiorio): The district court properly excluded Clear Touch's witness Paul Diiorio under Rule 37(c)(1) for untimely disclosure. Clear Touch disclosed Diiorio nearly three months after the discovery deadline, depriving Ockers of the opportunity to depose him and prepare for cross-examination. The late disclosure could not be cured in time for trial.
5. Witness Testimony (Barker): The district court properly allowed Ockers' counsel Rita Bolt Barker to testify as a fact witness despite her dual role. Barker withdrew from representation before trial and acted solely as a fact witness, which adequately resolved the conflict between her roles as advocate and witness under South Carolina professional conduct rules.
6. Judgment as a Matter of Law: The district court properly denied Clear Touch's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act claim. Ockers presented sufficient evidence that Clear Touch signed the settlement agreement with no intent to abide by it (evidenced by the cease-and-desist letter sent weeks later and refusal to sign the dismissal) and that Clear Touch falsely represented to customers that Pro AV remained an authorized reseller in Massachusetts. Ockers also presented sufficient evidence of damages through expert testimony and testimony from Houser regarding lost sales, reputational harm, and attorney's fees.
7. New Trial: The district court properly denied Clear Touch's motion for a new trial. Although the late res judicata ruling caused some prejudice to Clear Touch's trial preparation, Clear Touch waived arguments for additional preparation time or a new jury by not requesting such relief below. The district court's curative instruction to the jury adequately addressed the changed circumstances and the presumption that juries follow curative instructions applies here.

This is a First Amendment challenge to Kentucky judicial ethics rules brought by a sitting district court judge against the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission (JCC). Judge Dutton challenged the JCC's attempt to enforce three rules of judicial conduct against statements she made to a newspaper during her reelection campaign, claiming the enforcement violated her free speech rights.

1. Whether Judge Dutton had standing to bring a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge to the judicial ethics rules
2. Whether the JCC's enforcement of Rule 4.1(A)(11) (prohibiting false statements of material fact) against Dutton's campaign statements violated the First Amendment under strict scrutiny review
3. Whether the JCC's enforcement of Rule 1.2 (requiring upholding judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality) against Dutton's statements violated the First Amendment
4. Whether the JCC's enforcement of Rule 2.4(B) (prohibiting personal relationships from influencing judicial conduct) against Dutton's statements violated the First Amendment
5. Whether Dutton was entitled to a permanent injunction against enforcement of these rules

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision. The court held:

1. Judge Dutton had standing to bring her pre-enforcement challenge because she demonstrated injury in fact (intent to engage in protected campaign speech), the rules arguably proscribed her speech, and she established a credible threat of JCC enforcement based on the warning letter and proposed disciplinary order.
2. The JCC's enforcement of Rule 4.1(A)(11) against Dutton's statements violated the First Amendment because the statements were "readily capable of a true interpretation" and thus not materially false. Specifically: (a) her statement about the theft of money by an attorney was supported by evidence that the attorney had diverted client funds; (b) her statement that the attorney "practiced law" with her opponent was "readily capable of a true interpretation" given that they shared office space, staff, and covered cases for each other; and (c) her statement that no litigants were affected was opinion-based and not a false statement of fact, as there was no evidence her brief delay in recusal harmed the litigant.
3. The JCC's enforcement of Rules 1.2 and 2.4(B) also violated the First Amendment because the defendants' sole justification for enforcement was that Dutton's statements were materially false, but the record did not support this claim. The defendants provided no alternative, independent basis for applying these rules to her speech.
4. Dutton was entitled to permanent injunctive relief against the enforcement of all three rules as applied to her speech, as she demonstrated actual success on the merits, irreparable harm to her First Amendment rights, and no substantial harm to others from the injunction.
5. The court did not reach Dutton's facial challenges to the rules because she succeeded on her as-applied challenges.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a defendant's motions for early termination of supervised release. Guy Collins, who was sentenced to eight years of supervised release following his conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, sought early termination on three separate occasions, and the district court denied all three motions.

1. Whether a district court may employ a blanket "custom" or rule requiring defendants to complete at least fifty percent of their supervised-release term before considering motions for early termination, without conducting an individualized assessment of the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
2. Whether the district court properly considered the statutory factors required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) when denying Collins's motions for early termination.
3. Whether the district court's contradictory findings regarding the necessity of further supervision (stating in the first order that further supervision appeared unnecessary, but in the third order that it was necessary) constituted an abuse of discretion.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals VACATED the district court's decisions denying Collins's second and third motions for early termination and REMANDED for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. District courts cannot employ a blanket rule or "custom" requiring defendants to complete a certain proportion of their supervised-release term without conducting an individualized assessment of the relevant § 3553(a) factors. The Second Order abused discretion by relying solely on the "premature" nature of the motion based on the fifty-percent custom without explaining how this proportion pertained to any relevant statutory factor.
2. While the proportion of a supervised-release term completed may potentially be relevant to certain § 3553(a) factors (such as deterrence or protection of the public), a district court must explicitly draw the connection between the proportion and the specific statutory factor(s) for each individual defendant. The proportion standing alone is not a relevant consideration.
3. The Third Order abused discretion because it contradicted the district court's earlier finding in the First Order that further supervision did not appear necessary for deterrence or public protection. The district court never explained why it changed its position and failed to offer any other § 3553(a) factor to justify its decision.
4. The court emphasized that Congress imposed a one-year minimum time requirement for supervised release, and courts may not add additional time requirements without explicitly tying their decisions to the relevant statutory factors.

This is an enforcement proceeding by the Department of Labor against a home care agency and its owner for failing to pay overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The defendants challenged the validity of a 2013 Department regulation that prohibits third-party employers of home care workers from claiming certain statutory exemptions to FLSA overtime requirements.

1. Whether the 2013 Third-Party Regulation, which prohibits third-party employers from claiming the Companionship Services Exemption and Live-In Exemption under the FLSA, is a valid exercise of the Secretary of Labor's delegated authority under the Administrative Procedure Act and post-Loper Bright framework.
2. Whether the regulation's narrowed definition of "companionship services" is valid and whether the defendants have standing to challenge it.
3. The scope of the Secretary's authority to define and delimit terms in the FLSA exemptions, particularly whether this authority extends to regulating third-party employers.

The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that: (1) The 2013 Third-Party Regulation is a valid and reasonable exercise of the Secretary's expressly delegated authority under both the Companionship Services Exemption and the Live-In Exemption. The court found that Congress expressly delegated to the Secretary the authority to "define and delimit" key terms in the Companionship Services Exemption, and this delegation extends to the Live-In Exemption insofar as they overlap in regulating live-in companionship workers. The Department reasonably explained its change in course by reference to the dramatic transformation of the home care industry from institutional to home-based care since the 1974 amendments. (2) The defendants lack standing to challenge the Companionship Services Definition because their overtime obligations stem from the 2013 Third-Party Regulation (which prevents them from using the exemption), not from the definition itself. The court applied the three-step Loper Bright framework for express delegations: ensuring constitutionality of the delegation, fixing its boundaries, and ensuring reasoned decisionmaking within those boundaries.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Derek Aaron, through his legal guardian, sued police officers for excessive force during his arrest for violent crimes. The officers moved for qualified immunity, and the district court denied the motion in part, but the appellate court reversed.

1. Whether the officers violated Derek Aaron's Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during his arrest for home invasion and armed robbery.
2. Whether any constitutional right violated was "clearly established" at the time of the arrest, which is necessary to overcome qualified immunity.
3. Whether the officers' failure to inform Aaron of the specific charges at the outset of the encounter violated clearly established law.
4. Whether the use of knee strikes against Aaron after he was taken to the ground violated clearly established rights.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and held that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The court reasoned that:

1. Aaron failed to establish that the officers violated clearly established constitutional rights, which is the dispositive prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
2. The circumstances—including Aaron's large size (6'4", 280 pounds), the serious and violent nature of the crimes (robbery and home invasion), the recency of the crimes, Aaron's active physical resistance by repeatedly pulling his hands away and preventing handcuffing, and his continued resistance even after being taken to the ground—did not violate any clearly established law.
3. The cases Aaron cited were materially distinguishable because they involved suspects arrested for minor or non-violent offenses, suspects who were compliant or incapacitated, or suspects who were physically vulnerable, none of which matched Aaron's circumstances.
4. No clearly established law required officers to inform a suspect of the specific charges at the outset of an arrest for violent felonies where the suspect was given ample time to comply.
5. The knee strikes used by Officer Pawlowski were permissible because Aaron continued to resist handcuffing even after being taken to the ground and was not yet incapacitated, distinguishing cases where officers used force against already-incapacitated suspects.

This is an immigration case in which Mohamed Muthana, a U.S. citizen, sued the Secretary of Homeland Security claiming he never received notice of denial of his I-130 visa petition for his stepdaughter because the INS mistakenly sent notices to an address where he never lived. Muthana alleged violations of due process and the Administrative Procedure Act.

1. Whether the government satisfied due process requirements by sending notice to the address provided by the applicant in his I-130 petition
2. Whether the district court properly considered an unredacted version of Muthana's I-130 petition that he had submitted in redacted form to his complaint
3. Whether Muthana waived his claims by failing to meaningfully engage with the dispositive evidence in both the district court and on appeal

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings for the defendants. The court held that: (1) due process requires only that notice be sent to the last address provided by the applicant, and Muthana's unredacted I-130 petition conclusively established that he listed 4737 N. Kildare Avenue as his address; (2) the district court properly considered the unredacted I-130 petition under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine because Muthana had attached only a redacted version to his complaint, and a court may consider the complete version of a document when a plaintiff presents only a partial or truncated version; and (3) Muthana waived any challenge to the judgment by failing to meaningfully contest the dispositive evidence either in the district court (where his attorney did not appear at the hearing) or on appeal (where his brief did not address the unredacted petition).

This case involves three consolidated appeals addressing whether a 2024 Illinois amendment to the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) Section 20 applies retroactively to cases pending when it was enacted. The amendment limits damages recovery to one per person when the same biometric information is collected multiple times using the same method, responding to concerns about potentially astronomical liability following the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Cothron v. White Castle Systems, Inc.

1. Whether the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 constitutes a substantive or procedural change under Illinois law
2. Whether remedial amendments to statutes apply retroactively to pending cases under Illinois retroactivity doctrine
3. Whether the amendment alters substantive rights and duties or merely changes the available remedies
4. Whether applying the amendment retroactively raises constitutional concerns under the Illinois due process clause

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district courts and held that the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 applies retroactively to all cases pending when it was enacted. The court reasoned that: (1) under Illinois law, remedial changes are treated as procedural and apply retroactively; (2) the amendment is remedial because it is located in Section 20 (governing damages) rather than Section 15 (governing substantive conduct), and focuses on limiting recovery rather than changing liability standards; (3) the amendment does not alter when causes of action arise or change the rights and duties of parties, but merely cabins the damages available; (4) the Supreme Court of Illinois has consistently held for over a century that plaintiffs have no vested right to a particular remedy, and remedial changes can be applied retroactively; and (5) no constitutional concerns arise because damages under BIPA are discretionary and the amendment decreases rather than increases penalties. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the amendment is substantive because it reduces liability, noting that all remedial changes affect behavior but are still procedural under Illinois law.

This case consolidates three interlocutory appeals addressing whether a 2024 Illinois amendment to the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) Section 20 applies retroactively to cases pending when the amendment was enacted. The amendment limits damages recovery to one per person when the same biometric information is collected multiple times using the same method, responding to concerns about potentially astronomical liability following the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Cothron v. White Castle Systems, Inc.

1. Whether the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 constitutes a substantive or procedural change under Illinois law
2. Whether remedial amendments to statutes apply retroactively under Illinois's modified Landgraf retroactivity test
3. Whether the amendment alters substantive rights and duties or merely limits the remedy available to plaintiffs
4. Whether applying the amendment retroactively raises constitutional concerns under Illinois due process protections

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district courts' decisions and held that the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 applies retroactively to pending cases. The court reasoned that under Illinois law, the amendment constitutes a remedial (procedural) change rather than a substantive one because: (1) it was located in Section 20 (governing damages) rather than Section 15 (governing substantive liability standards); (2) it focuses on limiting recovery available to plaintiffs rather than altering the rights, duties, or obligations of parties; (3) Illinois courts have consistently treated remedial changes as procedural and applied them retroactively; and (4) the amendment does not create new liability but merely caps damages at one recovery per person per collection method. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the amendment substantively changed the number of "violations" by clarifying that Cothron addressed claim accrual for statute of limitations purposes, not the meaning of "violation" in Section 20's damages provision. The court also found no constitutional impediment to retroactive application, as plaintiffs have no vested right to a particular remedy and the amendment decreases rather than increases penalties.

This case involves three consolidated appeals addressing whether a 2024 Illinois amendment to the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) Section 20 applies retroactively to cases pending when it was enacted. The amendment limits damages recovery to one per person when the same biometric information is collected multiple times using the same method, responding to concerns about potentially astronomical liability following the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Cothron v. White Castle Systems, Inc.

1. Whether the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 constitutes a substantive or procedural change under Illinois law
2. Whether remedial amendments to statutes apply retroactively to pending cases under Illinois retroactivity doctrine
3. Whether applying the amendment retroactively raises constitutional concerns regarding vested rights
4. The proper interpretation of "violation" under BIPA Section 20 and its relationship to claim accrual under Section 15

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district courts and held that the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 applies retroactively to cases pending when it was enacted. The court reasoned that: (1) under Illinois law, amendments are presumed to apply prospectively unless they expressly state otherwise or are substantive in nature; (2) the amendment is remedial, not substantive, because it modifies only the damages available to plaintiffs, not the substantive standards of liability or the rights and duties of parties; (3) Illinois courts have consistently treated remedial changes as procedural and applied them retroactively; (4) the amendment's location in Section 20 (governing remedies) rather than Section 15 (governing conduct) confirms its remedial nature; (5) the amendment does not create new substantive liability but rather cabins the discretionary damages available; and (6) no constitutional concerns arise because plaintiffs have no vested right to a particular remedy, and the amendment decreases rather than increases penalties. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the amendment substantively altered the number of violations by clarifying that "violation" is a term of art in Section 20 concerning remedies, not a recharacterization of conduct governed by Section 15.

This is an immigration law case in which Alfonso Verduzco Ruiz petitioned for review of the Department of Homeland Security's reinstatement of a prior removal order. The case addresses whether the retroactive application of IIRIRA's reinstatement provision violates due process and whether Verduzco Ruiz was denied his right to counsel in reinstatement proceedings.

1. Whether it is impermissibly retroactive to apply the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) reinstatement provision to an alien who was the beneficiary of an approved visa petition before IIRIRA's effective date but had not applied for adjustment of status.
2. Whether an alien has a due process right to counsel in reinstatement proceedings and, if so, whether the alien must show prejudice to obtain relief for denial of that right.
3. Whether Verduzco Ruiz demonstrated sufficient prejudice from his attorney's absence at the reinstatement proceedings.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Verduzco Ruiz's petition for review. The court held that: (1) applying IIRIRA's reinstatement provision to Verduzco Ruiz was not impermissibly retroactive because he had no vested right to immigration relief before IIRIRA's effective date—a vested right only arises when an alien affirmatively applies for adjustment of status or consular processing, not merely upon filing or approval of a visa petition; (2) an alien must show prejudice to obtain relief for a due process violation based on denial of counsel in reinstatement proceedings, following the logic established in Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions, which held that prejudice can be readily assessed in summary proceedings where aliens have opportunities to consult with counsel before removal orders are executed; and (3) Verduzco Ruiz failed to establish prejudice because his proposed arguments—that counsel could have presented an incorrect legal argument about IIRIRA's applicability or could have convinced DHS to exercise discretion to place him in full removal proceedings—were too speculative and based on faulty premises.

This is a First Amendment case in which journalists, legal observers, protesters, and two press organizations sued the Department of Homeland Security and its Secretary for injuries sustained during protests against immigration raids. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First Amendment rights to be free from retaliation and to have public access to protests.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief for First Amendment violations
2. Whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claims, specifically whether their protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the government's use of force against them
3. Whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their right-of-access claims
4. Whether plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction
5. Whether the balance of equities and public interest favor granting a preliminary injunction
6. Whether the scope of the preliminary injunction is appropriately tailored and not overbroad

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction but vacated and remanded because the injunction was overbroad. The court held that: (1) plaintiffs have standing based on continuing, present adverse effects including chilling of First Amendment rights; (2) plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claims, supported by extensive circumstantial evidence that officers targeted journalists and legal observers standing far from protesters, even when crowds were dispersing; (3) plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm from loss of First Amendment freedoms; and (4) the balance of equities and public interest favor the injunction. However, the court found the injunction overbroad because it expressly applied to non-parties beyond those necessary for relief, exempted journalists and legal observers from all dispersal orders, and imposed a broad audible warnings requirement unrelated to the specific First Amendment harms alleged. The court remanded for the district court to fashion a narrower injunction, noting that provisions directly addressing the specific harm—such as prohibiting targeting of sensitive body areas—were appropriately tailored.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a wage-related class action brought by former employees of a travel-nursing agency. The central issue is whether the doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel can be used to invalidate arbitration agreements and prevent arbitration proceedings.

1. Whether the application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements is compatible with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
2. Whether an equitable preclusion doctrine can serve as a valid ground for invalidating arbitration agreements under Section 2 of the FAA
3. Whether applying collateral estoppel from some arbitral awards while ignoring others violates the principle of consent underlying the FAA
4. Whether using arbitral awards to effectively transform individualized arbitration into a class action without parties' consent violates the FAA

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and held that the FAA does not permit the application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to invalidate arbitration agreements. The court reasoned that: (1) non-mutual offensive issue preclusion is not a "generally applicable contract defense" recognized under Section 2 of the FAA; (2) applying such preclusion violates the principle of consent essential to arbitration, as it would preclude arbitrations to which parties had agreed; (3) the district court's approach effectively transformed individualized arbitration into a binding bellwether class action without parties' consent, which contravenes Supreme Court precedent prohibiting class arbitration without agreement; and (4) nowhere in the FAA's text and structure did Congress contemplate that preclusion doctrine could frustrate agreed-upon arbitrations. The court emphasized that this novel application of preclusion doctrine constituted the type of "judicial hostility to arbitration" that the FAA was enacted to prevent.

This is an appeal of an interlocutory order denying a preliminary injunction in a trade secret and nonsolicitation dispute. BankUnited sought to enjoin former senior leaders who moved to a competitor from soliciting BankUnited's employees and customers, but the Court of Chancery denied the motion, finding the nonsolicitation provisions overbroad and unenforceable.

1. Whether BankUnited timely filed its application for certification of an interlocutory appeal, given that counsel miscalculated the filing deadline by using Court of Chancery rules instead of Supreme Court rules.
2. Whether the interlocutory appeal satisfies the criteria for certification under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42(b), including whether the decision involves a substantial issue, conflicts with other decisions on a question of law, and serves considerations of justice.
3. Whether the nonsolicitation provisions in BankUnited's code of conduct and restricted stock agreements are enforceable or overbroad.

The Delaware Supreme Court refused the interlocutory appeal on two independent grounds. First, the application for certification was untimely, filed more than ten days after the Court of Chancery's decision, and BankUnited failed to establish good cause to excuse the late filing. Counsel's miscalculation of filing deadlines does not constitute good cause. Second, even if timely, the application would fail on the merits because: (1) BankUnited did not identify a question of law on which the decision conflicts with other cases—the dispute is merely about preliminary factual determinations regarding overbreadth; and (2) interlocutory review would not serve considerations of justice, as the issue can be more appropriately addressed after final resolution of the case, with damages available as a remedy. The Court concluded that exceptional circumstances do not exist and that the costs and inefficiency of interlocutory review outweigh any benefits.

This is an advancement rights dispute in which former officers of Care One LLC seek reimbursement for legal fees and expenses incurred in defending a RICO action. The case involves competing interpretations of whether a 2010 amendment to the company's operating agreement eliminated previously vested advancement rights for officers other than the majority owner.

1. Whether the 2006 LLC Agreement granted Petitioners (Elizabeth Straus and Androsky Lugo) vested advancement rights as former officers
2. Whether the 2010 Amendment effectively eliminated those previously vested rights
3. Whether the equitable defenses of unclean hands and equitable estoppel bar Lugo's advancement claim based on his alleged inequitable conduct in drafting the 2010 Amendment without adequately informing the company's CEO (Daniel Straus) that vested rights could not be eliminated without individual waivers
4. Whether summary judgment was appropriate to resolve the equitable defenses

The Court sustained Care One's exceptions and reversed the Senior Magistrate's grant of summary judgment on the equitable defenses. The Court held that:

1. Daniel Straus's affidavit, which was improperly disregarded by the Senior Magistrate, contains specific factual assertions supported by personal knowledge and corroborated by other evidence in the record
2. Daniel's Affidavit raises genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Lugo, as Care One's general counsel, acted inequitably by failing to advise Daniel that vested advancement rights could only be eliminated through individual waivers, and by assuring Daniel that the 2010 Amendment would accomplish his directive to eliminate all officer advancement rights
3. Summary judgment is inappropriate when the resolution depends on credibility determinations or weighing conflicting evidence, particularly in fact-intensive equitable defenses
4. Delaware public policy favors advancement, but equitable defenses based on an attorney's inequitable conduct in amending advancement rights contrary to client instructions may preclude summary judgment resolution

This is a First Amendment challenge to Colorado's law banning "conversion therapy" with minors. Kaley Chiles, a licensed mental health counselor who provides talk therapy, challenges the constitutionality of the state law as applied to her speech-based therapeutic practice.

1. Whether Colorado's conversion therapy ban, as applied to talk therapy, regulates speech or professional conduct
2. Whether the law constitutes viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment
3. Whether professional speech receives diminished First Amendment protection
4. Whether the law falls within recognized exceptions to strict scrutiny (such as regulations of conduct that incidentally burden speech)
5. Whether the state can regulate "substandard care" through content-based restrictions on professional speech

The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision and held that Colorado's law, as applied to Chiles's talk therapy, violates the First Amendment. The Court ruled that:

1. The law regulates speech based on viewpoint, not merely professional conduct. Chiles's speech does not become "conduct" simply because the state labels it that way or describes it as a "treatment" or "therapeutic modality."
2. Viewpoint discrimination represents an egregious form of content regulation triggering strict scrutiny, which Colorado cannot satisfy. The law permits Chiles to express acceptance and support for clients exploring their identity but forbids her from expressing views that attempt to change a client's sexual orientation or gender identity.
3. Professional speech receives the same First Amendment protection as speech by others. The fact that Chiles holds a state license does not diminish her constitutional protections.
4. The law does not fall within recognized exceptions to strict scrutiny. It does not regulate conduct with only incidental effects on speech (as in Cohen v. California and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project), nor does it require disclosure of factual, noncontroversial information as in commercial speech cases.
5. Colorado failed to establish that the law falls within a long tradition of permissible content regulation. The Court rejected Colorado's arguments based on medical licensing laws (which traditionally address qualifications, not viewpoint), informed-consent laws (which regulate speech incident to separate physical conduct), and malpractice laws (which require proof of injury and allow client consent).
6. The First Amendment protects the inalienable right of individuals to decide how to speak and prevents the government from prescribing orthodoxies of views, even in the medical and healthcare professions.

This is an appeal by parents challenging decisions of the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education and its Board regarding education policy or services for their children. The case involves multiple plaintiffs acting on behalf of themselves and their children against state education officials and board members.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in the provided text, which consists only of the case caption and an errata sheet correcting clerical errors in the opinion.

No ruling information is available in the provided text. The document only contains an errata sheet that corrects three clerical errors from the original opinion issued on March 20, 2026: (1) correcting the name of a board member from "DR. ERICKA FISHER" to "DR. CHRISTINA GRANT" on the cover page; (2) removing the "DR." title from "AMY KERSHAW"; and (3) changing "Acting Secretary" to "Secretary" in the title of Pedro Martinez.

This is a procedural due process case in which an incarcerated individual challenges the constitutionality of disciplinary procedures used in a prison disciplinary hearing that resulted in his placement in solitary confinement (the Special Housing Unit or "SHU") for approximately nine months. The plaintiff alleges he was denied basic procedural protections, including the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense.

1. Whether a 270-day (or 180-day) sentence to disciplinary segregation in the SHU implicates a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, applying the "atypical and significant hardship" standard from Sandin v. Conner.
2. Whether the duration of disciplinary segregation alone, without considering conditions of confinement, can constitute an atypical and significant hardship.
3. The appropriate durational threshold for disciplinary segregation to trigger due process protections when confinement occurs under "normal" SHU conditions.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case. The court held that Vidal's disciplinary segregation constitutes an atypical and significant hardship based on duration alone and thus implicates a protected liberty interest triggering due process protections. The court concluded that 180 days of disciplinary segregation under normal SHU conditions satisfies the Sandin standard, regardless of how the duration is measured (whether 270 days imposed, 180 days served, or 258 total days in SHU). The court reasoned that: (1) defendants offered no evidence that such lengthy disciplinary segregation was common in New York prisons in 2015; (2) prior precedent established that 188 days of administrative segregation triggers Sandin absent countervailing evidence; (3) contemporary scientific research and recent state legislation limiting disciplinary segregation to 15 consecutive days demonstrate that the durational threshold for a liberty interest is well below the 305 days previously addressed in Colon v. Howard; and (4) the court need not establish a fixed minimum duration but concluded that 180 days plainly satisfies the standard. The court declined to address the district court's failure to consider qualified immunity and personal involvement arguments, leaving those issues for remand.

This is an immigration appeal case in which Samuel Cardenas, a Dominican national without lawful status, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision denying his applications for cancellation of removal based on abuse by his stepfather. The case involves statutory interpretation of the eligibility requirements for special rule cancellation of removal for abused individuals.

1. Whether the phrase "is or was a lawful permanent resident" in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) requires the abuser to have held legal permanent resident (LPR) status at the time of the abuse, or whether it includes abusers who obtained LPR status after the abuse but before the application for relief was adjudicated.
2. Whether Cardenas established that his mother would suffer "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" required for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

The court granted the petition in part and denied it in part. First, the court held that the plain language of "is or was" unambiguously includes abusers who obtained LPR status after the abuse occurred, rejecting the BIA's interpretation that the abuser must have held LPR status at the time of abuse. Because Cardenas's stepfather was an LPR or citizen when Cardenas applied for relief, Cardenas satisfies the statutory requirement and the case was remanded for consideration of his special rule cancellation application. Second, the court upheld the BIA's denial of cancellation of removal, finding that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Cardenas's mother would not suffer "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" beyond ordinary hardship, given that she has remarried, is employed full-time, receives support from family members, and no longer fears her abuser.

This is an appeal of a prisoner's civil rights claims challenging his removal from a prison medication-assisted treatment program for opioid addiction. Jonathan DiFraia, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, was removed from the Suboxone program after being accused of diverting his medication, and he subsequently sued prison officials under the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state tort law.

1. Whether removal from a medication-assisted treatment program for suspected drug diversion violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, specifically whether it constitutes "deliberate indifference" to serious medical needs
2. Whether the removal violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminating against DiFraia based on his disability (opioid addiction)
3. Whether a state-law medical negligence claim should be dismissed based on Pennsylvania's certificate of merit requirement

The court AFFIRMED the dismissal of both federal claims but VACATED and REMANDED the state negligence claim. Regarding the Eighth Amendment claim, the court held that DiFraia failed to allege deliberate indifference because: (1) the Eighth Amendment requires subjective recklessness, not mere negligence or disagreement over medical judgment; (2) DiFraia received some treatment (a tapered dose over seven days rather than abrupt cessation); (3) opioid addiction can be treated through multiple methods, and the court cannot second-guess medical judgment calls; (4) there was no plausible allegation that the diversion finding was pretextual; and (5) the doctor's decision to taper the dose suggested genuine medical judgment rather than intent to harm. Regarding the ADA claim, the court held that DiFraia failed to establish causation because he was removed from the program "despite" his addiction, not "by reason of" it. The program exists to treat addicts, and DiFraia was removed for alleged diversion, not for having the disability itself. The court distinguished Furgess v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, finding that unlike that case where disabled prisoners faced worse conditions than non-disabled prisoners, here both addicted and non-addicted prisoners caught diverting medication would face the same discipline. Regarding the negligence claim, the court vacated the dismissal because the Supreme Court recently abrogated the Third Circuit precedent (Liggon-Redding) that had applied Pennsylvania's certificate of merit requirement to state-law claims in federal court. The case was remanded for the district court to address the negligence claim's merits.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges her supervised release conditions on the grounds that the written judgment imposed conditions materially different from those orally pronounced at sentencing. The Fourth Circuit addresses whether a discrepancy between oral pronouncement and written judgment regarding warrantless search conditions constitutes reversible error requiring resentencing.

1. Whether a material discrepancy exists between the district court's oral pronouncement of warrantless search conditions and the written judgment's formulation of those conditions
2. Whether a defendant must object at sentencing to preserve a claim that a written judgment contains conditions not orally announced
3. Whether a plea agreement provision requiring the defendant to abide by conditions "regardless of whether" they are orally pronounced can cure a Rogers-Singletary error
4. Whether a defendant has standing to appeal a Rogers-Singletary error
5. Whether a Rogers-Singletary error can be harmless

The court vacated and remanded for resentencing. The majority held that a material discrepancy exists because the district court orally limited warrantless searches without reasonable suspicion to "safety issues" only, while the written judgment permitted such searches whenever a probation officer was engaged in "the lawful discharge of the officer's supervision functions"—a substantially broader standard. The court rejected the government's arguments that: (1) the defendant was tardy in raising the issue by not objecting at sentencing (Rogers precedent does not require such objection); (2) the written judgment merely clarified an ambiguous oral pronouncement (the oral pronouncement was not ambiguous, and the written judgment added new restrictions rather than clarifying); (3) the plea agreement provision requiring compliance "regardless of whether" conditions were orally pronounced cured the error (courts, not parties, impose sentences, and a condition not orally announced was not validly "included in the judgment"); and (4) any error was harmless (the Fourth Circuit has never held a Rogers-Singletary error harmless and routinely vacates without harmless error analysis). The court also held that a defendant has standing to appeal a Rogers-Singletary claim because such conditions restrict liberty and create a practical effect requiring compliance, similar to challenging an allegedly unlawful statute.

This case involves three consolidated appeals challenging West Virginia's S.B. 325, a state law that prohibits drug manufacturers participating in the federal 340B drug pricing program from restricting delivery of discounted drugs to contract pharmacies or requiring submission of utilization data as a condition of sale. Pharmaceutical manufacturers sued to enjoin enforcement of the statute, claiming it is preempted by federal law.

1. Whether West Virginia's S.B. 325 is preempted by the federal 340B program under the Supremacy Clause
2. Whether S.B. 325 directly regulates a federal domain by targeting only manufacturers participating in a federal spending-power program
3. Whether S.B. 325 interferes with HHS's exclusive enforcement authority over the 340B program
4. Whether S.B. 325 frustrates manufacturers' ability to conduct audits required by the 340B program
5. Whether the manufacturers are entitled to a preliminary injunction based on likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, holding that S.B. 325 is likely preempted by federal law. The majority reasoned that: (1) S.B. 325 directly targets participants in a federal spending-power program by imposing obligations solely on manufacturers that have opted into the 340B program; (2) Congress struck a careful bargain with drug manufacturers—offering access to the massive Medicaid market in exchange for discounted prices—and West Virginia cannot unilaterally add conditions to this bargain without offering additional compensation; (3) S.B. 325 intrudes on HHS's exclusive enforcement authority by requiring state attorneys general and courts to determine whether a "bona fide offer" has been made under 340B, which is central to federal enforcement; (4) S.B. 325 prevents manufacturers from requiring utilization data as a condition of delivery, thereby frustrating the audit mechanism necessary for HHS-administered dispute resolution; and (5) the presumption against preemption does not apply because S.B. 325 targets a federal domain rather than a traditional area of state regulation. The court emphasized that while states may regulate pharmacy practices generally, they cannot single out federal program participants for unfavorable treatment or reshape the terms of a federal spending-power bargain. The remaining Winter factors for preliminary injunction relief were also satisfied, as manufacturers face irreparable financial harm from penalties and compliance costs, and the balance of equities favors an injunction. Judge Benjamin dissented, arguing that the presumption against preemption applies because pharmacy regulation is a traditional state function, that 340B's silence on delivery indicates no congressional intent to preempt state law, and that the majority improperly introduced a heightened preemption standard for spending-power legislation contrary to established Supreme Court precedent.

This case involves crime victims' families challenging a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) between the Department of Justice and Boeing following two fatal airplane crashes. The families sought mandamus relief after the district court approved the NPA and granted the government's motion to dismiss the criminal conspiracy charge against Boeing.

1. Whether the Department of Justice violated the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) by failing to confer with crash victims' families and provide timely notice regarding a 2021 Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA)
2. Whether the Department violated the CVRA by allegedly misleading families about the timing of the 2025 NPA and the government's ability to refile charges if Boeing breached the agreement
3. Whether the families had a right to confer with the prosecution before the NPA was finalized
4. Whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the substantive merits of the district court's Rule 48 dismissal motion on public interest grounds

The Fifth Circuit denied the petitions for writ of mandamus. The court held that: (1) the families' challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot because Boeing's breach of the agreement terminated it; (2) the Department did not violate the CVRA by failing to confer with the families, as the May 2025 video call satisfied the requirement to "compare views" and communicate meaningfully; (3) the Department did not mislead families about the NPA's timing, as it clearly explained that entering an NPA would require filing a motion to dismiss; (4) the Department's statement that it could refile charges "notwithstanding the passage of time" was accurate because the statute of limitations had been tolled by the filing of an information in 2021; and (5) the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review the district court's Rule 48 dismissal decision, as the CVRA's mandamus provision applies only to protecting enumerated victim rights, not to challenging the merits of prosecutorial decisions.

This case involves crime victims' families challenging the Department of Justice's non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with Boeing following two fatal airplane crashes. The families sought mandamus relief in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals after the district court approved the NPA and granted the government's motion to dismiss the criminal conspiracy charges against Boeing.

1. Whether the Department of Justice violated the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) by failing to properly confer with and inform the crash victims' families about the 2021 Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Boeing
2. Whether the Department violated the CVRA by allegedly misleading the families about the timing of the 2025 NPA and the government's ability to refile charges if Boeing breached the agreement
3. Whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction under the CVRA to review the substantive merits of the district court's Rule 48 dismissal motion on public interest grounds
4. Whether the 2021 DPA challenge was moot after Boeing breached the agreement

The Fifth Circuit denied the families' petitions for mandamus relief on the following grounds: (1) The challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot because Boeing's breach of the agreement relieved the government of its obligations under the DPA, making any third-party challenge to its terms no longer viable. (2) The Department did not violate the CVRA regarding the 2025 NPA because it provided the families with a reasonable opportunity to confer during a May 2025 video call, clearly explained the NPA process and its consequences, and did not mislead them about timing or the government's ability to refile charges—the NPA expressly permitted prosecution for conduct not time-barred as of the agreement's signing date. (3) The court lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to perform substantive review of the district court's Rule 48 dismissal decision, as the CVRA's mandamus provision applies only to protecting enumerated crime victims' rights, not to challenging the merits of prosecutorial decisions. The court rejected the families' argument that applying the "wrong legal standard" constituted a failure to treat them with fairness under the CVRA, holding that such an interpretation would improperly grant nonparties a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of another.

This is a bankruptcy appeal involving a preference claim brought by a debtor's assignee against a company officer who had loaned money to the debtor. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether the appellant waived its right to appeal a jury verdict by failing to file required post-trial motions.

1. Whether Briar Capital waived appellate review of the jury verdict's sufficiency of evidence by failing to file Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(a) and 50(b) motions
2. Whether a party can appeal a jury verdict for plain error absent Rule 50 motions in the Fifth Circuit
3. Whether any evidence supported the jury's finding that Remmert would have received more in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and held that Briar Capital waived appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence by failing to file Rule 50(a) and 50(b) motions. The court rejected Briar Capital's argument that plain error review could apply absent these motions, citing Supreme Court precedent and Fifth Circuit precedent establishing that appellate courts are "powerless to review the sufficiency of the evidence" without such motions. The court further noted that even under a plain error standard, sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict, as testimony regarding asset undervaluation and other financial uncertainties provided some evidence supporting the verdict, which is all that is required.

This is a property law case involving a dispute over the scope of easement rights granted to a natural gas pipeline company over landowners' properties in Indiana. The landowners sought to limit the company's easement to the area surrounding the existing pipeline, while the company asserted it retained rights to install additional pipelines anywhere on the properties.

1. Whether the 1959 easement agreements granted Trunkline a "floating" (unspecified location) or "fixed" (specific location) easement
2. Whether unexercised, future floating easement rights can become fixed under Indiana law
3. Whether the court should certify the floating easement question to the Indiana Supreme Court
4. Whether Trunkline's past conduct and communications fixed the easement to a 66-foot corridor around the existing pipeline

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Trunkline. The court declined to certify the question to the Indiana Supreme Court, finding it could resolve the issue with certainty based on existing Indiana law. The court held that under Indiana law, only exercised floating easements may become fixed to a specific location. Because Trunkline had not yet exercised its rights to install additional non-parallel pipelines or relocate the existing 100 Line, those future rights remain unfixed and Trunkline retains the ability to exercise them anywhere on the properties. The court rejected the landowners' arguments based on past practice and acquiescence, finding these doctrines apply only to already-exercised easement rights. The court also emphasized Indiana's strong policy favoring freedom of contract and the parties' express bargain for future easement rights.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal concerning whether a death row inmate can obtain a transportation order under the All Writs Act to undergo brain scans in support of his untimely petition for federal habeas relief. The inmate filed his § 2254 petition two years after the statutory deadline and seeks equitable tolling based on attorney abandonment and mental health limitations.

1. Whether the court has appellate jurisdiction over a transportation order issued under the All Writs Act
2. Whether a district court may order a prisoner's transportation for medical testing under the All Writs Act when the prisoner seeks to develop evidence for an equitable tolling claim
3. Whether the requested brain scan evidence has sufficient nexus to the prisoner's equitable tolling argument or to a particular claim for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
4. The proper application of Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U.S. 811 (2022), which restricts the use of the All Writs Act to develop new evidence in habeas proceedings

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's transportation order. The court held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, as transportation orders are immediately appealable. However, the court found that Gibson failed to establish the required nexus between the requested brain scans and either: (1) a particular claim for relief under § 2254, or (2) his specific equitable tolling argument based on attorney abandonment. The court reasoned that under Shoop v. Twyford, the All Writs Act cannot be used to allow a prisoner to develop evidence unless that evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief and satisfies the stringent requirements of § 2254(e)(2). Gibson merely asserted that the brain scans would show his mental impairments left him unable to manage his affairs, but failed to explain with sufficient particularity how the etiology (cause) of his brain abnormalities would support equitable tolling or any habeas claim. The court emphasized its decision was narrow and did not preclude the district court from holding the scheduled evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling using other evidence Gibson had developed.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a consumer lending case. Two Illinois residents borrowed $600 each from an online lender at interest rates exceeding 497%, which violated Illinois usury laws, and sued for violations of consumer protection statutes. The defendants sought to enforce an arbitration clause requiring disputes to be resolved under tribal law that did not exist at the time the loans were made.

1. Whether the parties mutually assented to an arbitration agreement and delegation provision that specified non-existent tribal law as the governing law for resolving disputes
2. Whether arbitration agreements can be enforced when they require application of a body of law that did not exist at the time of contracting
3. Whether the prospective waiver doctrine prevents enforcement of arbitration agreements that require waiver of state-law substantive rights
4. The proper choice of law (tribal versus Illinois law) for determining contract formation requirements

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the parties lacked mutual assent to the arbitration and delegation provisions because the governing law provision specified the Otoe-Missouria Tribal Contract Code, which did not exist when the plaintiffs signed their loan agreements. The court reasoned that while parties may accept the risk of changes to existing law, they cannot mutually assent to be bound by law that is completely nonexistent at the time of contracting. The court distinguished this case from ordinary choice-of-law provisions by noting that the Tribe—which owned the defendant lenders—retained unilateral ability to draft the tribal law after the fact, creating additional concerns about the parties' true meeting of the minds. The court also noted that the Tribal Contract Code, adopted in May 2024, omitted unconscionability as a defense, which no state law does. Although the district court relied on the prospective waiver doctrine, the appellate court found it unnecessary to reach that issue given the formation defect, but noted that recent Supreme Court precedent suggests the prospective waiver doctrine may apply to state-law rights.

This is a trademark infringement case involving a Schedule A lawsuit where a plaintiff sued hundreds of foreign online vendors for allegedly infringing her registered trademark. The defendants failed to appear initially and received a default judgment, but later moved to vacate, arguing the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them.

1. Whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants operating e-commerce stores on platforms like Walmart.com and eBay.com
2. Whether the defendants' operation of online stores accessible in the United States, combined with the ability to ship to the United States, is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
3. Whether actual sales to Illinois residents occurred, as opposed to merely offering products for sale
4. The appropriate standard of review for denying a motion to vacate a default judgment based on lack of jurisdiction

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the default judgment and remanded the case for dismissal. The court found that the district court clearly erred in concluding that actual sales to Illinois residents had occurred. The evidence only showed that the defendants' products were offered for sale and could be shipped to Illinois, as demonstrated by screenshots of checkout pages, but not completed purchases. The court reasoned that merely operating an accessible website capable of accepting orders from a forum state, even a highly interactive one, is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction without evidence of actual purposeful conduct directed at that state. Without the sales to Illinois residents, the remaining contacts were insufficient to meet the three-part test for specific personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a motion to vacate a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Francis R. Casildo challenged his designation as a career offender, arguing that his prior Nevada conviction for sale of controlled substances did not qualify as a "controlled substance offense" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

1. Whether Casildo's procedural default in failing to raise the career offender challenge on direct appeal could be excused based on ineffective assistance of counsel by his appellate counsel.
2. Whether Casildo suffered prejudice from the alleged error in applying the career offender enhancement.
3. Whether Casildo's conviction under Nevada Revised Statute § 453.321(1)(a) qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) for purposes of career offender sentencing enhancement.
4. Whether the actus reus clause of § 453.321(1)(a) is divisible or indivisible under the categorical approach to predicate offense analysis.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for resentencing. The court held that: (1) Casildo's procedural default was excused because his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the career offender enhancement when a meritorious indivisibility argument was sufficiently foreshadowed in existing case law; (2) Casildo demonstrated prejudice because the record indicated more than a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different without the career offender enhancement, and the sentencing judge explicitly stated the sentence would have been "very, very different" without the prior convictions; and (3) on the merits, Nevada Revised Statute § 453.321(1)(a) is not a qualifying controlled substance offense because the statute is overbroad (listing substances not in the federal Controlled Substances Act) and its actus reus clause is indivisible, meaning a jury need not unanimously agree on which prohibited act was committed. Therefore, Casildo was improperly sentenced as a career offender and must be resentenced.

This is a judicial misconduct complaint filed by a pro se litigant against a district judge regarding a prefiling order imposed on the complainant after he was found to be a vexatious litigant. The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council reviewed the complaint under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.

1. Whether allegations that a judge "lied" and "falsified facts" in imposing a prefiling order constitute cognizable judicial misconduct under 28 U.S.C. § 351(a)
2. Whether the complaint is directly related to the merits of the judge's decision and therefore subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii)
3. Whether the complaint lacks sufficient evidence to raise an inference of misconduct under 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii)
4. Whether the complaint constitutes a repetitive filing of materially identical allegations

The complaint was dismissed on multiple grounds. First, the allegations were dismissed as directly related to the merits of the judge's decisions, which are not cognizable in judicial misconduct proceedings. Second, the complaint was dismissed as unfounded because the complainant provided no objectively verifiable evidence to support the allegations of lying or falsifying facts. Third, the complaint was dismissed because the complainant had previously filed materially identical complaints against the same judge in three prior proceedings. The court emphasized that judicial misconduct proceedings are not a substitute for appellate review and cannot be used to seek reversal of a judge's decision or obtain a new trial.

This is a civil rights case in which the United States sued Florida under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that Florida discriminated against medically complex children by failing to provide care in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, thereby unnecessarily institutionalizing some children and placing others at serious risk of institutionalization. The case involves over a decade of litigation regarding Florida's provision of private duty nursing, care coordination, and nursing facility services to low-income children with disabilities.

1. Whether the United States has authority to sue Florida for injunctive relief on behalf of children who did not file individual administrative complaints under the ADA
2. Whether the risk of institutionalization (not actual institutionalization) constitutes actionable discrimination under the ADA and Olmstead v. L.C.
3. Whether Florida violated the three Olmstead criteria: (1) appropriateness of community placement; (2) non-opposition by affected individuals; and (3) reasonable accommodation by the state
4. Whether a system-wide injunction was an appropriate remedy for widespread Olmstead violations
5. The proper scope and provisions of the permanent injunction

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's liability findings and affirmed in part and reversed in part the permanent injunction. The court held:

1. Authority to Sue: The United States has authority to sue Florida for injunctive relief under Title II of the ADA and can obtain relief benefiting a broad group of children, not limited to those who filed administrative complaints. When the United States sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce federal law, it represents the public interest and can obtain broad injunctive relief.
2. Risk of Institutionalization: The court rejected Florida's argument that only actual institutionalization constitutes actionable discrimination. The court held that the risk of institutionalization can constitute discrimination under the ADA where there is substantial risk of imminent harm. Six sister circuits have allowed similar claims, and the court found that children receiving inadequate private duty nursing services face a substantial and imminent risk of institutionalization.
3. Appropriateness: The court affirmed that community placement is appropriate if individuals "could live in the community with sufficient services for which they would be eligible." The appropriateness analysis focuses on medical determinations by treatment professionals based on the child's medical conditions, not on practical barriers like current housing situations that are within the state's control to remedy. The district court properly found that all 139 institutionalized children could be treated in community settings if appropriate accommodations were made.
4. Non-Opposition: The court held that non-opposition is satisfied where service recipients would choose community-based services if they were actually available and accessible, not whether they would accept discharge today with inadequate services. The court found clear error in deeming unopposed those parents who would still oppose transfer even if Florida provided adequate services for personal reasons unrelated to state action. However, the court found no clear error in the district court's overall finding that the great majority of families (approximately 97% of all affected families) were not opposed to community-based care.
5. Reasonable Accommodation: The court affirmed that Florida failed to demonstrate that the proposed accommodations would fundamentally alter its services. The accommodations called for expanding access to existing state services and using existing state programs and administrative tools. Once the United States established appropriate accommodations, the burden shifted to Florida to show the accommodations were unreasonable, which Florida failed to do.
6. System-Wide Injunction: The court held that the widespread nature of the violations (affecting approximately 1,800 children receiving inadequate private duty nursing and 140 institutionalized children) warranted a system-wide injunction rather than relief limited to individual children.
7. Injunction Provisions: The court affirmed most of the district court's permanent injunction requiring Florida to ensure 90% of authorized private duty nursing hours are provided, improve care coordination, develop transition plans, and collect data. However, the court reversed in part several provisions that were stayed pending appeal, including requirements for care coordinator training curriculum, certain monitoring provisions, and specific reporting mechanisms.

This case involves petitions for review of nonfinal orders from the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC) in which the Commission denied the Secretary of Labor's motions to settle or dismiss contested mine safety citations. The Secretary challenged the Commission's authority to require her to provide explanations when removing "significant and substantial" (S&S) designations or vacating citations as part of settlement agreements.

1. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review nonfinal Commission orders under the collateral-order doctrine
2. Whether the Commission's orders are "effectively unreviewable" if review is delayed until final judgment
3. Whether the Secretary's prosecutorial discretion and separation of powers concerns justify immediate appellate review
4. Whether section 110(k) of the Mine Act constrains the Secretary's discretion to modify or settle contested penalties without explanation

The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review the Commission's nonfinal orders and dismissed the Secretary's petitions. The court held that the orders do not satisfy the collateral-order doctrine's requirements for immediate appealability. Specifically, the court found that: (1) delaying review until final judgment would not imperil a substantial public interest; (2) the Secretary's interest in unilaterally modifying citations via settlement is not comparable to sovereign immunity or other interests traditionally warranting immediate review; (3) the Secretary retains substantial prosecutorial discretion, including the ability to unconditionally dismiss pending contests; and (4) alternative remedies, such as mandamus or asserting the settlement denial issue as a respondent in subsequent appeals, remain available. The court distinguished the Secretary's reliance on OSH Act precedent, noting that the Mine Act's statutory scheme differs significantly and that the Supreme Court has narrowed the collateral-order doctrine since those earlier decisions.

This is an appeal of nonfinal orders from the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC) in which the Secretary of Labor sought immediate appellate review of the Commission's denial of her motions to settle or dismiss contested mine safety citations. The case involves disputes over the Secretary's authority to modify, vacate, or remove "significant and substantial" (S&S) designations from citations as part of settlement agreements.

1. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review nonfinal FMSHRC orders under the collateral-order doctrine
2. Whether the Secretary's interest in unilaterally modifying or vacating citations constitutes a substantial public interest or separation-of-powers concern warranting immediate appellate review
3. Whether section 110(k) of the Mine Act constrains the Secretary's discretion to settle contested penalties and requires the Commission's approval for such modifications

The Court of Appeals dismissed the Secretary's petitions for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that the FMSHRC's orders are nonfinal and do not satisfy the collateral-order doctrine's requirements for immediate appealability. Specifically, the court reasoned that: (1) the orders do not conclusively determine a disputed question completely separate from the merits; (2) delaying review will not imperil a substantial public interest or value of high order; (3) the Secretary's interest in avoiding litigation burdens does not rise to the level of sovereign immunity or comparable interests that justify immediate review; (4) the Secretary retains substantial prosecutorial discretion, including the ability to unconditionally dismiss pending contests; and (5) alternative remedies exist, such as mandamus or review as a respondent if the operator appeals a final decision. The court distinguished the Secretary's reliance on OSH Act precedent, noting that the Mine Act contains a provision requiring Commission approval of settlements that the OSH Act lacks, and that modern Supreme Court precedent has narrowed the collateral-order doctrine significantly since those 1980s-era decisions.

This is an administrative law case in which the World Shipping Council challenges a Federal Maritime Commission rule defining "unreasonable refusal to deal or negotiate" with respect to vessel space accommodations by ocean common carriers. The Council argues the rule exceeds the Commission's statutory authority and is arbitrary and capricious.

1. Whether the Commission has statutory authority to consider price (specifically, rates "so far above current market rates") in evaluating whether an ocean carrier unreasonably refused to deal or negotiate, given that the Commission lacks general ratemaking authority.
2. Whether requiring ocean carriers to submit a "documented export policy" exceeds the Commission's authority under 46 U.S.C. § 40104(a)(1) and whether this requirement is arbitrary and capricious.
3. Whether the Commission arbitrarily and capriciously removed reference to "business decisions" from the list of factors to be considered in evaluating reasonableness.

The court denied the Council's petition on all three grounds. First, the court held that the Commission has authority to consider whether quoted rates are unreasonably high as one factor in evaluating good-faith negotiations, distinguishing this from rate regulation. The court drew an analogy to National Labor Relations Act cases where the NLRB considers wage proposals in assessing good-faith bargaining despite lacking wage-setting authority. The court emphasized that price consideration must be part of a totality-of-circumstances analysis and that an unjustifiably extreme rate could constitute an unreasonable refusal to deal. Second, the court upheld the documented export policy requirement as authorized by § 40104(a)(1), finding that "pricing strategies" and similar information constitute "facts related to the business of the common carrier" and that the term "report" is broad enough to encompass such information. The court reasoned that requiring carriers to document their policies helps determine whether specific conduct aligns with stated practices. Third, the court found no meaningful departure regarding business decisions, noting that the Commission's preamble clarified that relevant business decisions would still be considered and that the Commission cannot arbitrarily ignore relevant factors.

This is a derivative and stockholder action brought by Shiva Stein against Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and its board members regarding corporate governance matters. The Delaware Supreme Court is reviewing the Court of Chancery's approval of a settlement and fee award in the case.

The key legal issues include: (1) the propriety of the Third Settlement reached in the derivative and stockholder action; and (2) the appropriateness of the fee award to plaintiff Stein and objector Griffith.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The court adopted the reasoning set forth in the Court of Chancery's February 27, 2024 Memorandum Opinion approving the Third Settlement and its August 11, 2025 Letter Opinion awarding fees to Plaintiff Stein and Objector Griffith, finding the lower court's decisions to be sound and properly reasoned.

This is a double-derivative action brought by an investor in a feeder fund on behalf of a master fund against the fund's directors and investment manager. The plaintiff challenges the directors' approval of an asset sale that concentrated the master fund's diversified portfolio into a single illiquid security in a company with significant red flags, and the subsequent failure to pursue a stated dissolution plan or renegotiate management fees.

1. Whether a limited partner in a feeder fund that owns only 48% of a master fund has standing to assert double-derivative claims on behalf of the master fund
2. Whether the complaint adequately pleads demand futility at both the feeder fund and master fund board levels under Rule 23.1
3. The proper test for establishing double-derivative standing in the limited partnership context
4. Whether the Outside Directors face a substantial risk of liability on the merits claims

The court denied the defendants' Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss. The court held that: (1) Double-derivative standing does not require majority ownership at either the first-tier or second-tier level; instead, standing is established through either the Double-Futility Test (requiring demand futility at both levels) or the Demand-Plus-Control Test (requiring demand futility at the first level and control at the second level). (2) The Double-Futility Test applies here because the feeder fund does not control the master fund—the general partner (Investment Manager) controls both entities. (3) The complaint adequately pleads demand futility at both levels because the Outside Directors face a substantial risk of liability on the merits claims for approving the asset sale, failing to pursue the dissolution plan, and failing to renegotiate fees. (4) The court rejected defendants' arguments that the plaintiff failed to conduct adequate pre-suit investigation, noting that Section 220 does not apply to limited partnerships and the LP Act provides limited informational rights. The court found the allegations serious and non-frivolous, establishing that the Outside Directors confront substantial liability risks that make demand futile.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving a motion to dismiss fraud and breach of contract claims arising from a merger between SupplyShift and Sphera Solutions. Shareholder Representative Services (SRS) brought the action on behalf of SupplyShift shareholders, alleging that Sphera made false pre-closing representations about cross-selling efforts, marketing support, and integration plans that induced SupplyShift to enter into the merger agreement with an earnout structure.

1. Whether SRS adequately pleaded a fraud claim under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 9(b), including whether Sphera's statements constituted actionable misrepresentations or mere puffery
2. Whether SRS satisfied the heightened pleading requirement for scienter (intent) in promissory fraud claims by alleging that Sphera had no intention of performing its promises when made
3. Whether the Merger Agreement's integration clause, lacking explicit anti-reliance language, bars SRS's fraud claim based on justifiable reliance on extracontractual representations
4. Whether SRS adequately pleaded a duty to disclose theory based on Sphera's pre-closing budget that contradicted its representations
5. Whether Section 8.2(g) of the Merger Agreement's indemnification provision permits fee-shifting for costs and attorneys' fees in seller-initiated litigation

1. Fraud Claim - DENIED (Motion to Dismiss Denied): The court found that SRS adequately pleaded a fraud claim meeting Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement. While some of Sphera's statements (such as promising to cross-sell to all 7,000 customers) constituted mere puffery, Sphera's specific promise to substantially increase marketing budget and dedicate resources to cross-selling exceeded puffery's safe harbor because SRS pleaded that Sphera had already finalized a budget contradicting this promise at the time the representation was made. The court found sufficient pleading of scienter by alleging that Sphera finalized its budget prior to making representations and that post-closing conduct supported an inference that Sphera had no intention of performing. The court also rejected Sphera's argument that the integration clause barred reliance, holding that under Delaware precedent (particularly Trifecta Multimedia), an integration clause without explicit anti-reliance language does not bar fraud claims. Additionally, SRS adequately pleaded an alternative theory of fraud by omission based on Sphera's duty to disclose its pre-closing budget when making partial or ambiguous statements about cross-selling efforts.
2. Fee-Shifting Claim - GRANTED (Motion to Dismiss Granted): The court held that Section 8.2(g)'s indemnification provision does not unambiguously permit fee-shifting for first-party litigation initiated by selling stockholders. Applying the multi-factor test from Schneider National Carriers v. Kuntz, the court found that: (1) the indemnification provision applies only to breaches giving rise to third-party claims (requiring damages owed to "unaffiliated third persons"), unlike the Kuntz provision which expressly covered breaches that could only arise from first-party claims; (2) the provision does not distinguish between first-party and third-party losses in the way Kuntz's provision did; (3) the language limiting indemnification to costs incurred "in connection with investigating, defending against or settling" claims does not apply to prosecuting claims, which is what SRS is doing; and (4) the absence of a fee-shifting clause elsewhere in the agreement, combined with the presence of "whether or not due to a Third Party Claim" language in other indemnification provisions, indicates the parties did not intend fee-shifting for inter-party litigation. The court emphasized the strong presumption under the American Rule that indemnification provisions do not shift first-party litigation fees absent clear and unequivocal contractual language.

This is a breach of contract case arising from a pharmaceutical acquisition where the purchase price included milestone payments tied to the clinical development of cancer drugs. The plaintiff, representing former shareholders of Potenza Therapeutics, claims that the defendant Astellas Pharma failed to pay contractually-required milestone payments when Phase II clinical trials were initiated, while Astellas contends that no Phase II trials were ever formally commenced.

1. Whether the initiation of "Bayesian Optimal Phase 2 (BOP2) design Expansion Cohorts" constituted the commencement of a Phase II Clinical Trial under the Warrant Purchase Agreement (WPA), thereby triggering milestone payment obligations
2. Whether the plaintiff's claims are time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims
3. Whether equitable tolling applies to extend the statute of limitations period
4. Whether the defendant breached its contractual duty to act in good faith and use commercially reasonable efforts to achieve the milestones
5. The proper interpretation of the WPA's definition of "Phase II Clinical Trial," specifically whether trials studying multiple diseases or conditions can qualify

The court GRANTED Astellas's motion for summary judgment in part and DENIED it in part, and DENIED the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment entirely.

Reasoning:

1. Phase II Clinical Trial Definition: The court interpreted the WPA's definition of "Phase II Clinical Trial" as requiring a study focused on "the disease or condition" (singular), not multiple diseases. Because all the trials at issue involved patients with multiple diseases or conditions, they did not meet the contractual definition of Phase II Clinical Trials. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the use of BOP2 statistical design could trigger Phase II status, finding the WPA's bespoke definition unambiguous and not subject to interpretation based on general industry practices or expert testimony.
2. Statute of Limitations: The court found that even under the plaintiff's most favorable timeline (assuming BOP2 Expansion Cohorts triggered Phase II status), the claims accrued between March and November 2019, well before the September 20, 2020 cutoff for the three-year limitations period. Thus, the claims would be time-barred unless equitable tolling applied.
3. Equitable Tolling: The court found a triable issue of fact regarding equitable tolling. Although the plaintiff had means of obtaining knowledge of the BOP2 Expansion Cohorts during the collaboration period, the defendant's January 2020 representation that no milestones had been achieved and that a "global Phase 1 study is ongoing" created a factual question about whether the plaintiff reasonably relied on the defendant's conduct. The court determined this fact-intensive issue must proceed to trial.
4. Milestone Payments: The court granted summary judgment to Astellas on the milestone payment claims because no Phase II Clinical Trials meeting the WPA's definition were initiated prior to termination of the studies.
5. Bad Faith Claim: The court denied summary judgment on the Section 3.4(d) bad faith claim, finding it plausible that the plaintiff could show the trials were designed to avoid triggering Phase II milestones. However, the plaintiff must still prove equitable tolling to establish timeliness of this claim.

This is a post-closing dispute arising from a $103 million acquisition of an e-discovery company, in which the buyer (Driven) seeks to enforce an independent accountant's determination regarding working capital adjustments and to compel release of escrowed funds. The buyer attempted to establish jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery by characterizing the accountant's determination as an arbitral award and by seeking specific performance.

1. Whether the Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute
2. Whether the independent accountant acted as an arbitrator (invoking the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act) or as an expert (limiting jurisdiction)
3. Whether specific performance to compel release of escrowed funds constitutes an adequate equitable remedy when a legal remedy exists
4. Whether a declaratory judgment from a court of law regarding the final closing payment would provide an adequate remedy at law

The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without prejudice, with leave to transfer to Superior Court. The court held that: (1) the independent accountant acted as an accounting expert rather than an arbitrator because she had limited authority to resolve only three specific disputed accounting items, not broad legal authority to decide all issues necessary to resolve the controversy; therefore, the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act does not apply and statutory jurisdiction is unavailable; (2) the remaining claims are quintessential legal claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment, remediable by money damages; (3) an adequate remedy at law exists because the escrow agreement permits the escrow agent to disburse funds upon receipt of a "Court Order" from any court of competent jurisdiction, meaning a declaratory judgment from Superior Court calculating the final closing payment would legally bind the escrow agent to release funds, making specific performance superfluous; and (4) a post-closing true-up dispute cannot be transformed into an equitable matter simply by requesting an injunction to release escrowed funds when the agreement honors final judicial orders.

This is a First Amendment challenge to Colorado's law banning "conversion therapy" with minors. Kaley Chiles, a licensed mental health counselor who provides talk therapy, challenges the law as applied to her practice, arguing that it violates her free speech rights by prohibiting her from helping clients who seek to change their sexual orientation or gender identity.

1. Whether Colorado's conversion therapy ban, as applied to talk therapy, regulates speech or professional conduct
2. Whether the law constitutes viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment
3. Whether the law qualifies for any exception to strict scrutiny review, such as regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech
4. Whether states have a traditional authority to regulate professional speech regarding medical treatments without triggering heightened First Amendment scrutiny

The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision and held that Colorado's law, as applied to Ms. Chiles's talk therapy, violates the First Amendment. The Court ruled that the law regulates speech based on viewpoint and therefore requires strict scrutiny, which Colorado cannot satisfy. The majority reasoned that: (1) Ms. Chiles engages in pure speech, not conduct; (2) Colorado's law discriminates based on viewpoint by permitting affirmation of sexual orientation and gender identity while prohibiting efforts to change them; (3) the law does not fit within recognized exceptions to strict scrutiny, including the "speech incident to conduct" doctrine, because the state's law trains directly on the content of speech rather than regulating conduct that incidentally burdens speech; and (4) Colorado failed to demonstrate a long historical tradition supporting content-based regulation of professional speech on this topic. Justice Jackson's dissent argued that the law should receive less scrutiny because it regulates professional medical conduct that incidentally involves speech, consistent with the Court's precedent in NIFLA regarding professional speech in medical contexts.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges his sentencing for conspiracy to traffic firearms. The defendant argues that the district court improperly applied a six-level sentencing enhancement based on uncorroborated hearsay statements from his co-conspirator regarding uncharged firearm transactions.

1. Whether a district court may rely on out-of-court statements from a co-conspirator to enhance a defendant's sentencing guidelines calculation for uncharged conduct
2. Whether the co-conspirator's statements possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard required for consideration of uncharged conduct at sentencing
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in crediting certain aspects of the co-conspirator's statements while rejecting others

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the co-conspirator's 2021 statements were reliable. The court identified several indicia of trustworthiness supporting the reliability determination: (1) fifteen firearms purchased by the co-conspirator were recovered by law enforcement in Massachusetts, corroborating the trafficking scheme; (2) the co-conspirator's statements were detailed and specific, describing the mechanics of the transactions; and (3) the pattern of transactions in 2023 that were proven by objective evidence was substantially similar to how the co-conspirator described the 2020-2021 transactions. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the lack of documentary evidence, the co-conspirator's subsequent criminal conduct, or discrepancies in certain details undermined the overall reliability of the core narrative. The court reasoned that a district court may selectively credit portions of a witness's account while rejecting others, and that the defendant's uncharged conduct was proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

This is an appeal in a terrorism damages case brought by U.S. citizens injured in terrorist attacks in Israel against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The case involves jurisdictional issues and the constitutionality of the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA).

1. Whether the PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
2. Whether the court should recall its earlier mandate that vacated the district court's judgment due to lack of personal jurisdiction
3. Whether a district court judgment entered without personal jurisdiction can be revived when Congress later enacts a statute establishing jurisdiction
4. Whether the defendants are entitled to a new trial based on allegedly improper expert testimony admitted at the original trial

The court GRANTED the plaintiffs' motion to recall the November 28, 2016 mandate and AFFIRMED the district court's October 1, 2015 judgment for $655.5 million. The court held that: (1) the Supreme Court's decision in Fuld v. PLO established that the Fifth Amendment permits more flexible jurisdictional standards for federal courts than the Fourteenth Amendment, and the PSJVTA satisfies those standards; (2) the PSJVTA constitutes a supervening change in law justifying recall of the mandate, particularly given the political branches' considered judgment regarding national security and foreign policy; (3) post-judgment developments, including congressional enactment of the PSJVTA, can cure earlier jurisdictional deficiencies, and Congress's determination should be respected; and (4) the defendants failed to demonstrate manifest error in the district court's admission of expert testimony regarding the structure of terrorist organizations and the PLO/PA's relationship to them, and any errors were harmless.

This is a habeas corpus appeal challenging a 2004 West Virginia sexual abuse conviction. The petitioner claims that a juror's statements during deliberations—that he knew the defendant's family and feared for their safety if the defendant were acquitted—constituted external influence that violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

1. Whether the petitioner preserved his legal arguments on appeal when he framed his objections primarily in terms of factual determinations
2. Whether the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent by characterizing the juror's statements as internal rather than external influences on jury deliberations
3. Whether juror statements derived from the juror's own knowledge and personal concerns constitute "external influence" under the Sixth Amendment
4. Whether the statements should be analyzed separately or as a unified comment

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that: (1) the petitioner adequately preserved his legal arguments for appeal despite framing them as factual issues; (2) the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent because, as of 2006, Supreme Court law had not extended to cover juror statements originating from the juror's own mental processes rather than from third-party communications or tampering; (3) whether analyzed separately or together, the juror's comments did not constitute the type of external influence—such as bribery, bailiff communications, or law enforcement contact—that the Supreme Court had clearly established as violating the Sixth Amendment; and (4) the statements were analogous to a juror reciting information from memory rather than receiving external communications, and therefore were reasonably found to be internal to the deliberation process.

This is an appeal concerning diversity jurisdiction in a wrongful termination case. The plaintiff sued two defendants in Virginia state court, but the case was removed to federal court based on alleged complete diversity of citizenship and fraudulent joinder of a non-diverse defendant.

1. Whether the district court properly exercised diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) when one defendant was a Virginia citizen, the same state as the plaintiff
2. Whether the in-state defendant (Schinke) was fraudulently joined, which would allow the court to disregard his citizenship for jurisdictional purposes
3. Whether the plaintiff had any possibility of establishing a Bowman claim (Virginia wrongful discharge claim) against the in-state defendant based on alleged violations of Virginia Code § 40.1-28.7:9 (wage discussion statute)
4. Whether a statute that provides its own exclusive remedial scheme precludes a Bowman claim based on that statute

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case. The court held that the district court erred in finding fraudulent joinder. Although Virginia courts have held that statutes with exclusive remedial schemes cannot support Bowman claims, no Virginia court has specifically addressed whether § 40.1-28.7:9 precludes a Bowman claim. Because there is a "possibility" that a Virginia court could allow the Bowman claim—even if improbable—the defendants failed to meet the "heavy burden" of proving fraudulent joinder. The court emphasized that when uncertain about how a state court would resolve novel state law questions, federal courts should resolve doubts in favor of remanding to state court. The case was remanded for the district court to consider other arguments about fraudulent joinder that were not previously addressed.

This is an appeal concerning a district court's obligation to liberally construe pro se prisoner complaints under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Daniel Jackson, a pro se inmate, filed a civil rights complaint alleging medical mistreatment at a correctional facility, and the district court screened his complaint as asserting only Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims rather than also identifying potential Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims.

1. Whether a district court must construe pro se prisoner complaints to identify all cognizable legal theories suggested by the factual allegations, or whether it may focus on the complaint's "essential grievance"
2. Whether Jackson's factual allegations plausibly stated both an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and an ADA failure to accommodate claim
3. The proper standard for liberally construing pro se civil rights complaints and the limits of that obligation
4. Whether the district court erred by failing to identify an ADA claim during PLRA screening

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The majority held that while district courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings and identify the strongest arguments they suggest, they are not required to conjure up every possible legal claim from a complaint's factual allegations. The court established that when a complaint's "essential grievance" clearly points to one legal theory, courts need not scour pleadings for stray phrases that could support alternative theories. Here, Jackson's allegations predominantly focused on the defendants' deliberate disregard of his serious medical needs, which naturally aligned with an Eighth Amendment claim rather than an ADA accommodation claim. The majority reasoned that: (1) Jackson's factual allegations were almost exclusively aimed at the defendants' awareness and conscious disregard of his medical needs, suggesting personal spite rather than disability discrimination; (2) Jackson himself repeatedly characterized his claims as Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims in subsequent filings; (3) Jackson failed to hint at an ADA claim despite being capable of alleging additional claims, as evidenced by his later assertion of a retaliation claim; and (4) even if an ADA claim were plausible, it would not have been stronger than the Eighth Amendment claim already identified. The court emphasized that district courts are not legal advocates for pro se litigants and should not be required to explore exhaustively all potential claims not readily apparent from the allegations. Judge Floyd dissented, arguing that the factual allegations equally supported both an Eighth Amendment claim and an ADA claim, and that the district court should have identified both theories during PLRA screening, particularly because Jackson sought injunctive relief that could be addressed through either legal framework.

This is a class action appeal challenging a district court's remedial order in a prison conditions case. Inmates at Louisiana State Penitentiary sued alleging unconstitutional medical care and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. After finding liability, the district court issued a remedial order appointing special masters to develop and oversee implementation of remedial plans.

1. Whether the Fifth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the district court's remedial order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (final decisions) or § 1292(a)(1) (interlocutory injunctions)
2. Whether the remedial order violates the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) by failing to apply the "needs-narrowness-intrusiveness" standard and by improperly appointing three special masters and requiring the state to pay their fees
3. Whether the district court properly found ongoing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs despite significant post-trial improvements made by the prison
4. Whether the district court properly applied ADA/RA standards to prison medical care

The en banc Fifth Circuit (with dissents) held that it has appellate jurisdiction and VACATED and REMANDED the case. The majority found jurisdiction exists under either § 1291 or § 1292(a)(1), applying a pragmatic approach to finality in institutional-reform litigation. The majority ruled that the remedial order violated the PLRA in multiple respects: (1) it failed to apply the needs-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements; (2) it improperly appointed three special masters instead of one as authorized by the PLRA; (3) it violated the statutory process for selecting special masters; and (4) it improperly required Louisiana to pay special masters' fees, which the PLRA mandates come from federal Judiciary appropriations. The majority also held that the district court erred in finding ongoing deliberate indifference, as the prison had made substantial improvements in medical care, staffing, and procedures post-trial that the district court refused to consider. The court emphasized that deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard requiring subjective recklessness, not mere negligence or unsuccessful treatment. The majority remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal standards and with consideration of post-trial improvements. Judge Richman concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing some deliberate indifference remained regarding specific inmates. Judges Haynes and Higginson dissented on jurisdictional grounds, arguing the remedial order was not final and did not constitute an appealable injunction.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, challenged a Michigan state-court custody order that removed her daughter from her custody and sought relief based on alleged due process violations and state-law claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of legal process, and conspiracy.

1. Whether the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction bars federal courts from hearing a § 1983 civil-rights claim challenging the constitutional validity of a state custody order.
2. Whether a plaintiff's federal constitutional claim challenging a custody order is a legitimate federal question or merely a pretense to avoid the domestic-relations exception.
3. Whether dismissal at the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) was appropriate when the federal claim was not obviously frivolous or a pretense.

The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that while the domestic-relations exception generally precludes federal courts from hearing cases involving divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees, the exception does not apply when a plaintiff asserts legitimate federal constitutional or statutory claims seeking to vindicate federal rights in the context of a domestic-relations dispute, even if relief would include nullification of a domestic-relations decree. The court reasoned that Johnson's due process claim—alleging the state court ordered custody removal without notice, without a finding of parental unfitness, and without adequate procedural protections—is a constitutional claim not subject to the domestic-relations exception on its face. Although Johnson sought custody restoration (a remedy requiring fitness and best-interest findings), her federal claim was not obviously a mere pretense rather than a legitimate constitutional claim. Therefore, dismissal at the screening stage was premature, and the case should proceed for further evaluation on the merits.

This is a bankruptcy appeal concerning whether a chapter 13 debtor who is ineligible for discharge can confirm a plan that modifies the statutory requirements for lien retention by a secured creditor. The debtor filed chapter 13 shortly after receiving a chapter 7 discharge, making her ineligible for a chapter 13 discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f), and proposed to keep her vehicle financed by Santander by paying the claim in full with modified interest while providing that Santander's lien would be released upon completion of plan payments rather than upon discharge.

1. Whether a bankruptcy court may confirm a chapter 13 plan that deviates from the mandatory requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) by substituting "completion of plan payments" as the event triggering lien release instead of the statutory alternatives: payment in full under non-bankruptcy law or discharge under section 1328.
2. Whether the plain language of section 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) is ambiguous or contains a gap when applied to chapter 20 debtors (those ineligible for chapter 13 discharge).
3. Whether practical or equitable considerations permit deviation from the mandatory statutory language of section 1325(a)(5).

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the bankruptcy court's confirmation order. The court held that section 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) is mandatory and unambiguous, requiring that a secured creditor retain its lien until the earlier of: (1) payment of the underlying debt under non-bankruptcy law, or (2) discharge under section 1328. The court rejected the debtor's argument that the statute was ambiguous or contained a gap requiring judicial interpretation. The panel reasoned that Congress deliberately used the disjunctive "or" to limit the triggering events for lien release to only these two alternatives, and that a bankruptcy court has no discretion to add a third event (completion of plan payments) not found in the statutory text. The court applied the Sixth Circuit's binding precedent in Shaw v. Aurgroup Financial Credit Union, which held that provisions in section 1325(a) are mandatory requirements with no discretion for deviation. The court concluded that for a chapter 20 debtor without the secured creditor's acceptance, the only viable option is to pay the claim in full under applicable non-bankruptcy law (including the contract rate of interest), and that any gap or undesirable outcome is a matter for Congress to address, not the courts.

This is a tax law case involving whether the Internal Revenue Service has authority under 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(4)(A) to assess and collect restitution following a person's conviction of federal tax-related crimes. The case concerns Paul Daugerdas, who was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the IRS through a fraudulent tax shelter scheme and sentenced to pay $371 million in criminal restitution.

1. Whether the IRS has statutory authority under § 6201(a)(4)(A) to assess and collect restitution imposed for Title 18 (criminal) offenses, specifically when the underlying crime is conspiracy to defraud the IRS rather than a direct tax code violation.
2. Whether the IRS's administrative assessment of restitution is limited by the payment schedule established by the district court at criminal sentencing.
3. Whether the IRS's imposition of a federal tax lien on the defendant's property is authorized.
4. Whether the IRS's authority to assess parallel restitution violates separation of powers principles.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's judgment for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on all issues. The court held that: (1) § 6201(a)(4)(A) authorizes the IRS to assess and collect restitution for Title 18 tax-related offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the IRS, when the restitution obligation arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3556 for conduct resulting in failure to pay taxes; (2) the IRS is not bound by the payment schedule established in the criminal sentencing order and may treat the restitution amount as immediately due and payable, similar to tax assessments; (3) the IRS properly filed a notice of federal tax lien on Daugerdas's property, as the criminal restitution order itself created a lien under 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c), and the IRS's lien under 26 U.S.C. § 6321 was authorized; and (4) no separation of powers violation occurred, as Congress properly enacted measures in both Title 18 and Title 26 to address assessment and collection of restitution in tax-related criminal cases.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Ryan Milbeck appeals the dismissal of his claims that law enforcement officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home and arresting him without a valid warrant. The case centers on whether a Wisconsin "temporary felony want" (a police-issued database alert) can substitute for a judicially-issued arrest warrant.

1. Whether officers may enter a suspect's home to make an arrest based on a "temporary felony want" issued by a law enforcement officer rather than a judicial officer
2. Whether probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to claims of unlawful warrantless home entry
3. Whether municipalities can be held liable under Monell for failure to train officers on the constitutional requirements for home entry and valid warrants
4. Whether supervisors can be held personally liable for verifying a defective warrant
5. Whether the prosecutor is immune from suit for malicious prosecution

The court affirmed the dismissal of claims for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy (claims 3-6, 8), but vacated and remanded claims for unlawful entry, defective warrant, supervisory liability against the police chief, and municipal liability for failure to train (claims 1, 2, 7, 9). The court held that: (1) Milbeck plausibly alleged that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home pursuant to a facially defective "temporary felony want" without a valid warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, because only a neutral and detached magistrate—not a police officer—may issue an arrest warrant; (2) probable cause is not a defense to unlawful warrantless entry claims; (3) municipalities may be liable for failure to train officers on the constitutional distinction between temporary felony "wants" and valid warrants when such training failure would be patently obvious; (4) the police chief may be personally liable for verifying the defective warrant; (5) the prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit; and (6) the detective's supervisors cannot be held liable without allegations they knew the "want" would be used as a substitute for a valid warrant for in-home arrest.

This is an immigration law case involving judicial review of an agency's denial of a waiver of inadmissibility. Danuta Dec, a Polish citizen with an approved family-based visa petition filed by her sister, sought a waiver of the ten-year bar on admission that applies to aliens unlawfully present for more than one year, but the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her application because her deceased mother, rather than her sister, was the qualifying relative for purposes of the relevant statute.

1. Whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to review the USCIS's denial of Dec's waiver of inadmissibility application
2. Whether waiver eligibility determinations are discretionary decisions committed to agency discretion by law, making them unreviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
3. Whether the statutory language "no court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by [the agency] regarding a waiver" under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) precludes judicial review of eligibility determinations, not just ultimate discretionary decisions
4. Whether Dec's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1154(l) imposes nondiscretionary duties on USCIS that are amenable to judicial review
5. Whether sanctions should be imposed on Dec's counsel for including non-existent case citations and false quotations in her appellate brief

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that:

1. Waiver eligibility determinations are inherently discretionary and unreviewable because the statute requires the agency to be satisfied that extreme hardship exists, making the determination one of agency discretion rather than a judicially reviewable legal conclusion. The Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Garland supported this interpretation by distinguishing statutes that include "satisfaction" language (like § 1182) from those that do not (like § 1229b).
2. The statutory language "no court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by [the agency] regarding a waiver" is unambiguous and jurisdiction-stripping. The word "decision" encompasses all determinations relating to waivers, including threshold eligibility determinations, not just the ultimate discretionary decision. The phrase "regarding a waiver" has a broadening effect in legal contexts.
3. Congress's choice to include a proviso allowing judicial review of legal matters in one statute (§ 1252(a)(2)(D)) but not in § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) demonstrates that the omission was intentional, and construing the latter to allow review of eligibility determinations would render the statutory distinction meaningless surplusage.
4. The APA's presumption of reviewability is rebutted by both the discretionary nature of the decision and the explicit jurisdiction-stripping language in the statute.
5. Although Dec could potentially seek judicial review of a legal conclusion if faced with a final removal order in a court of appeals under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), no such avenue is available at the district court level for waiver eligibility determinations.
6. Regarding the AI-related citation errors, the court admonished Dec's counsel for including non-existent citations and false quotations but declined to impose further sanctions. The court found her explanation credible that the errors resulted from copying and pasting from an old brief rather than intentional deception or use of AI, and noted her acceptance of responsibility and sincere apology. The court emphasized the importance of attorney diligence in verifying citations and quotations, regardless of whether AI is involved.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a state criminal conviction for armed robbery. Maurice Holt was convicted based on evidence including his possession of stolen property, identifications by two co-defendants, and circumstantial evidence, and he sought federal habeas relief arguing that the trial court improperly excluded photographs and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

1. Whether the trial court's exclusion of "masked persons photographs" from the defendant's Facebook violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and his right to present a complete defense
2. Whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington based on counsel's failure to: (a) call witness Britney Quade; (b) call witness Michael Hays; (c) introduce DNA evidence; (d) introduce height and weight evidence comparing the defendant to his nephew; (e) impeach a victim with a prior statement about the nephew casing the apartment; and (f) cross-examine a co-defendant with a letter
3. The proper standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) when a state appellate court assumes evidentiary error but finds no constitutional violation

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief and upheld the state conviction on both grounds.

1. Photograph Exclusion: The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in rejecting the constitutional claim. Although the photographs may have been relevant, they were cumulative of detective testimony about similar images of the co-defendants with weapons taken around the same time as the robbery. The exclusion was not arbitrary or disproportionate because the photographs were of only peripheral importance to the defense, and state evidence rules permitting exclusion of cumulative evidence do not violate the Constitution. Even if exclusion violated the defendant's rights, any error was not prejudicial because the evidence against him was substantial and the addition of the murky photographs would not have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The court found that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Strickland on each of the six bases for ineffective assistance:
   1. Failure to call Quade: No prejudice because her testimony would have contradicted the defendant's own trial testimony about his whereabouts and she had severe credibility problems (drug use and close relationship to defendant)
   2. Failure to call Hays: Reasonable minds could differ, but the state court reasonably found no prejudice given Hays's credibility problems and the indirect nature of his testimony
   3. Failure to introduce DNA evidence: No prejudice because the absence of DNA could be easily explained by the prosecution, and other co-defendants' DNA was also absent from the scene
   4. Failure to introduce height/weight evidence: No prejudice because the four-inch height difference between the defendant (5'9") and his nephew (6') was too small to matter, and jurors understand that height estimates are rough
   5. Failure to impeach victim with casing statement: Even if deficient performance, no prejudice because the statement would have been cumulative of the victims' initial (later retracted) identification of the nephew as the third robber
   6. Failure to use letter from co-defendant: No prejudice because the letter was inconclusive and ambiguous, and the co-defendant testified that the defendant was not involved
3. Cumulative Error: The court conducted a cumulative analysis and found that even considering all of counsel's errors together, the state's case was sufficiently strong (stolen property sold by defendant shortly after robbery, both defendant and third robber from east side of Madison, pretrial identifications by co-defendants) that the errors did not create a substantial likelihood of a different result.

This is a civil rights case arising from the 2016 fatal shooting of unarmed Terence Crutcher by Tulsa Police Officer Betty Shelby. The administrator of Crutcher's estate sued Shelby for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and brought municipal liability claims against the City of Tulsa under Monell v. Department of Social Services.

1. Whether Officer Shelby's use of deadly force against an unarmed, non-threatening suspect violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force
2. Whether any constitutional violation was "clearly established" law at the time of the shooting, entitling Shelby to qualified immunity
3. Whether the Estate adequately pleaded municipal liability claims against the City of Tulsa based on: (a) failure to train officers; (b) failure to adequately screen applicants during hiring; and (c) failure to investigate and discipline officer misconduct

The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Officer Shelby on qualified immunity grounds, but affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claims against the City. Reasoning: On the Excessive Force Claim: The court held that viewing facts in the Estate's favor, Shelby violated Crutcher's Fourth Amendment rights. Applying the Graham v. Connor factors and Larsen factors for deadly force cases, all three Graham factors weighed against Shelby: (1) the severity of the suspected crime (non-violent misdemeanors) was minor; (2) Crutcher posed no immediate threat—he was unarmed, had his hands raised, was ten feet away, made no hostile motions, and showed no intent to harm anyone; and (3) Crutcher was not actively resisting or fleeing, only being "passively noncompliant." The court rejected the district court's reliance on a blurry video frame to establish that Crutcher lowered his arms, finding it insufficient to contradict the Estate's version of events at summary judgment. On Clearly Established Law: The court reversed the district court's overly narrow framing of the clearly established right. The district court had defined the right with rigid specificity to match only this case's facts, requiring "fundamental similarity" to prior cases. The court held the proper formulation is broader: that it was clearly established that "an officer may not shoot an unarmed and unthreatening suspect," citing Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and multiple Tenth Circuit precedents (Zuchel, Zia Trust, Walker) establishing this principle years before 2016. Officers need not find cases with identical facts but must draw commonsense parallels between prior cases and circumstances they encounter. On Monell Claims: The court affirmed dismissal of all three municipal liability theories: (1) Failure to Train: The Estate failed to plausibly allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees or that the training deficiency was a "highly predictable" consequence of the City's actions. Merely alleging "high rates of excessive-force complaints" without details about prior incidents and their similarities was insufficient to show the City had notice its training was deficient. (2) Failure to Screen: While Shelby's past incidents (brandishing a knife, threatening violence) suggested she was prone to using force, the legal standard requires showing it was a "plainly obvious consequence" of hiring her that a third party's federal rights would be violated. Three incidents with no physical injuries or convictions did not meet this strict standard. (3) Failure to Investigate/Discipline: The Estate's allegations were too general and speculative. The failure to discipline Shelby after the shooting could not have caused the shooting (temporal impossibility). Prior investigative and disciplinary failures were not alleged to involve excessive force, making their relevance purely speculative and too broad to state a plausible claim. The court remanded for the district court to reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law wrongful-death claim against the City.

This consolidated appeal involves three civil beneficiary claims brought by minor sex trafficking victims against hotel operators under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The appellants also asserted negligence claims under Georgia common law. The district court granted summary judgment for the hotel operators, and the appellants appealed.

1. What constitutes "participation in a venture" under § 1595(a) of the TVPRA—specifically, whether merely renting hotel rooms to traffickers with knowledge of trafficking constitutes participation in a venture
2. What knowledge standard applies to the "knowledge" element of a beneficiary claim—whether defendants must have knowledge of a TVPRA violation specific to the plaintiff victim or merely knowledge that a TVPRA violation occurred
3. Whether minor sex trafficking victims were "invitees" or "licensees" under Georgia premises liability law, which determines the duty of care owed by hotel operators

The court vacated summary judgment and remanded all three cases for trial. The Eleventh Circuit clarified that "participation in a venture" under § 1595 requires more than an arm's-length transaction; it requires a defendant to take part in a common undertaking involving shared legal risks and potential profits with traffickers. The court held that merely renting rooms to traffickers with knowledge of trafficking does not constitute participation in a venture, but offering "personalized support" to a trafficking operation does. Regarding knowledge, the court rejected the requirement that defendants must know the identity of the specific victim, holding instead that constructive or actual knowledge that the venture violated the TVPRA is sufficient. For the negligence claims, the court held that whether the victims were invitees or licensees is a jury question, as the victims had a dual purpose for being at the hotel (as guests and trafficking victims), and the hotel benefited from their presence through room rentals and convenience store purchases.

This is a motion for confidential treatment of two exhibits (pleadings from a related federal court action) filed in a Delaware Court of Chancery advancement litigation. The plaintiff sought to seal documents that were originally filed publicly in federal court but inadvertently filed without a seal designation in the Delaware proceeding.

1. Whether documents that are publicly available in federal court (accessible via PACER and free online repositories) qualify for confidential treatment under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 5.1(b)(2)
2. Whether the four-part test for confidential treatment is satisfied: (1) information maintained confidentially; (2) information not otherwise publicly available; (3) public access causes particularized harm; and (4) harm outweighs public interest
3. The proper standard for denying confidential treatment when documents are already in the public domain

The court denied the motion for confidential treatment without prejudice. The court held that because the New Jersey pleadings are currently publicly available on PACER (at a $3 cost per document), freely available on the Free Law Project's RECAP Archive, and accessible through PacerMonitor, they do not satisfy the second requirement of Rule 5.1(b)(2)—that the information not be otherwise publicly available. The court noted that Delaware law presumes a strong public right of access to judicial records and that only limited types of information qualify for confidential treatment. The court declined to address whether the documents would cause particularized harm or whether such harm would outweigh the public interest, reserving those determinations for a future motion if the documents are sealed in the New Jersey federal court action and are no longer publicly accessible elsewhere.

This is a Delaware LLC governance dispute involving early investors in Aspen Power Partners LLC challenging the adoption of an amended operating agreement following a $200 million capital infusion by The Carlyle Group. The plaintiffs, who hold Class A and Class B units, claim the amendment violated their consent rights and fiduciary duties.

1. Whether Class A unit holders have standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of their holding company (APP Management) given a contractual waiver of derivative rights
2. Whether Class B unit holders have standing under Delaware LLC Act Section 18-110 to challenge board composition and voting changes
3. Whether the amended agreement violated Class B holders' consent rights regarding modifications to preemptive rights and distribution schedules
4. Whether individual managers breached fiduciary duties to APP Management by voting to amend the operating agreement
5. Whether managers breached the APP Management LLC Agreement by failing to obtain unanimous consent before exercising rights under the Aspen Power agreement

The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in substantial part. The Class A plaintiffs lack standing entirely because: (1) they are not members or managers of Aspen Power itself, only indirect holders through APP Management; (2) they contractually waived their right to bring derivative claims without unanimous consent of all APP Management members; and (3) they are not parties to or intended third-party beneficiaries of the Aspen Power operating agreement. The court dismissed all derivative claims brought by Class A plaintiffs (Counts II, IV, V, VII, VIII, and IX). The Class B plaintiffs have standing to challenge board composition under Section 18-110(a) but their claim fails on the merits because the board composition remained unchanged. Their Section 18-110(b) claim fails because they had no right to participate in the board vote being challenged. However, two narrow aspects of the Class B plaintiffs' breach of contract claims survive dismissal: (1) the modification of the MOIC Uplift schedule, which may have altered their distribution interests in violation of Section 14.2(b); and (2) the expansion of excluded securities and waiver of preemptive rights, which may have adversely modified their preemptive rights in violation of Section 14.2(f). The court found these claims reasonably conceivable at the pleading stage, though it rejected other breach theories regarding board seats, phantom preferred units, drag-along rights, and consulting rights. The court emphasized that Delaware LLC law respects freedom of contract and that individuals acting in separate corporate capacities owe duties to the entity they serve, not to entities that appointed them.

This is a stockholder derivative action challenging B. Riley Financial's board of directors for approving a $2.6 billion take-private acquisition of Franchise Group, Inc., led by Brian Kahn, a friend of B. Riley's founder. The plaintiff alleges breach of fiduciary duty after Kahn was later implicated in a massive securities fraud at a third-party entity (Prophecy Asset Management), causing B. Riley to suffer approximately $490 million in write-downs.

1. Whether the plaintiff adequately pleaded demand futility under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, specifically whether a majority of the board faces a substantial likelihood of liability or lacks independence under the Zuckerberg standard
2. Whether the board breached its duty of oversight under the Caremark doctrine by failing to monitor risks associated with Kahn and FRG
3. Whether the board made materially false and misleading disclosures about the FRG transaction and B. Riley's relationship with Kahn
4. Whether outside directors were dominated by or lacked independence from Bryant Riley, the company's founder and Co-CEO

The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 23.1 for failure to plead demand futility. The court held:

1. Substantial Likelihood of Liability: The plaintiff failed to establish that a majority of the board faces substantial likelihood of liability. Under Caremark, the board did not utterly fail to implement oversight systems (Caremark prong one) because the company had an active Audit Committee, external auditors, and outside counsel. Regarding conscious disregard of red flags (Caremark prong two), the plaintiff improperly relied on constructive knowledge rather than actual knowledge of misconduct. The alleged "red flags"—declining financial projections, debt downgrades, and loan collateralization—were business risks, not evidence of illegal conduct. Critically, the fraud occurred at Prophecy Asset Management, a third-party entity, not at B. Riley or FRG, so the board had no duty to monitor Prophecy's internal compliance. The plaintiff's theory essentially sought to impose liability for negligent due diligence on an investment that later soured, which is a matter of business judgment, not bad faith.
2. Disclosure Claims: The plaintiff failed to adequately plead that directors knowingly or intentionally issued materially false statements. By hedging allegations with "recklessly" rather than pleading knowing or intentional misconduct, the plaintiff fell short of pleading disloyalty with particularity. The complaint relied on impermissible group pleading and failed to show which individual directors made or caused the misleading statements.
3. Director Independence: The court found that five of the six contested outside directors (Brandt, D'Agostino, LaBran, Sheldon, and Walters) remained presumptively independent from Bryant Riley. The plaintiff's allegations of independence-destroying relationships were insufficient, consisting of ordinary course director compensation, stale business and personal ties (such as attending the same college decades ago, shared fraternity membership, casual social meetings), and generic social relationships. The court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to characterize Riley as a "de facto controller" based on his 23.8% ownership stake. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that Brandt was a "de facto employee" of B. Riley based on her employment at FaZe Holdings, a separate company in which B. Riley held only a minority stake.
4. Conclusion: Because the plaintiff failed to plead that a majority of the board faces substantial likelihood of liability or lacks independence, demand was not excused as futile. The board therefore retains control over the litigation asset, and the court declined to reach the Rule 12(b)(6) merits analysis.

This is a civil action brought by U.S. citizens injured in terrorist attacks in Israel against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). The case involves jurisdictional issues and the constitutionality of the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA), which creates a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the PLO and PA in ATA cases.

1. Whether the PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
2. Whether the court should recall its earlier mandate that vacated the district court's judgment due to lack of personal jurisdiction
3. Whether a district court judgment entered without personal jurisdiction can be revived when Congress later enacts legislation establishing a constitutional basis for jurisdiction
4. Whether the defendants are entitled to a new trial based on the admission of expert testimony at the original trial

The court GRANTED the plaintiffs' motion to recall the November 28, 2016 mandate and AFFIRMED the district court's October 1, 2015 judgment for $655.5 million. The court held that: (1) the Supreme Court's decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization established that the Fifth Amendment permits more flexible jurisdictional standards than the Fourteenth Amendment, and the PSJVTA satisfies Fifth Amendment requirements by tying federal jurisdiction to conduct closely related to the United States and implicating important foreign policy concerns; (2) the PSJVTA applies retroactively to this case because Congress and the President expressly intended it to apply to cases pending on or after August 30, 2016, and the defendants had clear notice after the PSJVTA's enactment that their post-enactment conduct could subject them to jurisdiction; (3) all factors favoring recall of the mandate under circuit precedent were satisfied, including supervening change in law, preservation of the issue, lack of substantial time lapse, and equities favoring recall; (4) a district court judgment entered without jurisdiction is not absolutely void and can be salvaged when post-judgment developments, including congressional action, cure the jurisdictional defect; and (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony regarding the structure of terrorist organizations and the relationship between the defendants and terrorist groups, and any errors were harmless.

This is a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) medical malpractice case brought by a patient and her family members against the United States for negligence by healthcare providers at a federally funded health center. The providers failed to refer the patient for neuroimaging that could have detected a slow-growing brain tumor, resulting in permanent neurological injuries when the tumor was eventually discovered and surgically removed.

1. Whether the Reyes Plaintiffs (husband and children) satisfied the FTCA's administrative exhaustion requirement for their loss-of-consortium claims when only the primary plaintiff submitted an administrative claim
2. Whether the district court properly awarded damages for the plaintiff's loss as a homemaker under Rhode Island law
3. Whether the healthcare providers breached the standard of care by failing to refer the patient for neuroimaging despite presenting symptoms of a secondary headache condition
4. Whether the providers' negligence caused the patient's permanent injuries
5. Whether the medical expense damages award was excessive

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part:

1. Loss of Consortium Claims (Reversed): The Reyes Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because each claimant must separately present their own claims to the agency with specific identification and a sum certain of damages. The primary plaintiff's administrative claim, which did not name the husband or children or specify damages for their loss-of-consortium claims, was insufficient. The court vacated the $3.5 million loss-of-consortium damages award.
2. Homemaker Damages (Vacated and Remanded): The district court's $2.92 million homemaker damages award was unsupported by evidence and grossly excessive. Under Rhode Island law, homemaker damages must reflect the fair value of services the plaintiff would have provided, considering that homemaker status depends on having primary responsibility for a home and family living therein. The court remanded for recalculation, noting that the plaintiff's homemaking services (primarily childcare) would likely have ended when her youngest child turned eighteen (approximately 14 years), not over her entire 50-year life expectancy. The court also instructed the district court to first determine whether the plaintiff waived her right to homemaker damages.
3. Standard of Care and Breach (Affirmed): The healthcare providers breached the standard of care. The court credited the plaintiff's expert testimony that primary-care providers should refer patients for neuroimaging when they present "red flags" indicating a secondary cause of headaches. The providers breached the standard of care through: (1) failure to refer for imaging despite multiple red flags across multiple visits; (2) inadequate medical documentation; and (3) misdiagnosis of the patient with migraines when her symptoms were inconsistent with migraine presentations.
4. Causation (Affirmed): The providers' negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries. Although the court erred in finding that surgery could have been avoided through alternative therapies (the alternative drugs were not FDA-approved until after the plaintiff's surgery and only for children), this error was harmless. The delay in imaging and diagnosis sufficiently caused the plaintiff's injuries by increasing surgical risks. Earlier diagnosis would have allowed for a smaller tumor resection with lower complication rates, whereas the delayed surgery involved a larger tumor, bleeding, and brain swelling that contributed to the permanent cerebellar strokes.
5. Medical Expense Damages (Modified): The court affirmed the medical expense damages award of $662,194.62 but modified it to $658,594.62 by excluding $3,600 for a spinal MRI that was not causally connected to the government's negligence. The court rejected the government's arguments that expert testimony was required to establish the medical bills and that a summary chart was inadmissible.
6. Pain and Suffering Damages (Affirmed): The court affirmed the pain and suffering awards of $240,800 for pre-diagnosis pain ($100 per day) and $6,387,500 for post-diagnosis pain and suffering ($350 per day for 50 years), finding these amounts were not grossly excessive or shocking to the conscience.

This is a disability discrimination case brought under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, in which a plaintiff challenges a health insurance plan's exclusion of coverage for weight-loss medications, alleging it discriminates against individuals with obesity as a disability.

1. Whether a health insurance plan's blanket exclusion of weight-loss medication coverage constitutes intentional disability discrimination under Section 1557 of the ACA
2. Whether the exclusion constitutes proxy discrimination—treating individuals differently based on neutral criteria closely associated with a protected class
3. Whether the exclusion constitutes facial discrimination by explicitly targeting obesity
4. Whether the exclusion can be shown through a deliberate indifference theory
5. Whether the exclusion has a disparate impact on individuals with obesity by denying them meaningful access to prescription drug benefits

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that Holland failed to state a plausible claim for disability discrimination under any theory:

1. Proxy Discrimination: Holland failed to adequately plead that the exclusion is sufficiently closely associated with disability because weight-loss medications are FDA-approved for both obese and overweight individuals with weight-related conditions, not exclusively for those with disabling obesity. Her unsupported allegations that non-disabled individuals would not be significantly affected were conclusory conjecture.
2. Facial Discrimination: The exclusion is facially neutral because it applies to all enrollees seeking weight-loss medications regardless of obesity status, not solely to those diagnosed with obesity.
3. Deliberate Indifference: Holland failed to plausibly allege that Elevance knew obesity qualified as a federally protected disability or that the company knew the exclusion was substantially likely to violate Section 1557. Allegations of "thoughtless indifference or benign neglect" are insufficient.
4. Disparate Impact: Holland failed to adequately allege that enrollees with obesity lack meaningful access to the prescription drug benefit. The ACA's nondiscrimination requirement does not mandate coverage for every form of medically necessary treatment for a disabled individual's condition.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a tortious interference claim brought by Kendell Seafood Imports against Mark Foods, a competitor in the fish import business. Kendell alleged that Mark Foods interfered with its agreement with a fish distributor, Chilean Sea Bass, Inc.

1. Whether the district court properly applied a pending motion to dismiss to an amended complaint that was subsequently filed.
2. Whether Kendell adequately pleaded all elements of a tortious interference claim under Rhode Island law, specifically: (1) existence of a contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional and improper interference; and (4) damages.
3. Whether the allegations in the amended complaint provided sufficient factual support to establish that Mark Foods had knowledge of Kendell's agreement with the fish distributor.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that: (1) the district court properly applied the pending motion to dismiss to the amended complaint because the amended complaint did not alter the relevant arguments in the motion; and (2) Kendell failed to adequately plead the knowledge element of tortious interference. The court found that allegations that Mark Foods attempted to solicit the distributor's business between 2012 and 2020 by sending purchase requests and proposed prices were insufficient to establish that Mark Foods knew of Kendell's specific agreement with the distributor for 2021. At most, these allegations implied that Mark Foods knew it had lost out to competitors in the past and hoped to compete for the catch going forward, which does not establish knowledge of the particular agreement alleged.

This is an appeal of a $16.1 billion damages award to minority shareholders of YPF, an Argentine oil and gas company, who sued the Argentine Republic for failing to conduct a required tender offer when it expropriated a majority stake in the company in 2012. The case involves complex questions of Argentine contract, corporate, and expropriation law, as well as jurisdictional issues regarding whether a U.S. court should have adjudicated claims arising from a foreign sovereign's actions.

1. Whether minority shareholders have standing to bring breach of contract claims based on the timing of when the Republic's tender offer obligation was triggered
2. Whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the doctrines of forum non conveniens and international comity abstention
3. Whether YPF's corporate bylaws created bilateral contractual obligations between the Republic and minority shareholders enforceable through damages claims under Argentine civil law
4. Whether the Republic's breach of contract claims are precluded by Argentina's General Expropriation Law, which bars third-party actions that impede an expropriation
5. Whether promissory estoppel claims are cognizable under Argentine law as an alternative to breach of contract claims
6. Whether YPF had an affirmative obligation to enforce the tender offer requirements against the Republic

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment on the breach of contract claims against the Republic and affirmed dismissals of promissory estoppel claims and judgment for YPF. The court held that:

1. Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims because the Republic exercised control over the expropriated shares when the expropriation law was enacted in May 2012, triggering the tender offer obligation, and plaintiffs held shares at that time.
2. The court declined to decide forum non conveniens and international comity issues given the full merits briefing and trial, but noted these were serious concerns.
3. Under Argentine law, corporate bylaws do not create bilateral contractual obligations between shareholders enforceable through damages suits. The bylaws are organizational rules governing corporate governance rather than mutual promises creating reciprocal obligations between shareholders. Section 28(A) of the bylaws, which specifically addressed government acquisitions, does not create a bilateral obligation owed by the Republic to minority shareholders.
4. Even if the bylaws created a bilateral contract, the breach of contract claims are barred by Argentina's General Expropriation Law (GEL), which precludes third-party actions that "impede the expropriation or its effects." The court found that these damages claims, which have subjected the Republic to ten years of litigation and a $16.1 billion judgment, effectively impede the expropriation and must be channeled through the GEL's compensation procedures rather than private contract law.
5. Promissory estoppel is not an autonomous source of obligation under Argentine law and cannot serve as an alternative basis for liability when a contractual relationship exists or when no independent obligation can be identified.
6. YPF had no affirmative obligation to enforce the tender offer requirements or sanctions against the Republic. The bylaws impose obligations on the acquiring shareholder and the bidder, not on YPF itself, except for a narrow administrative task of mailing notice to shareholders.
7. Shareholders could have pursued remedies under Argentine corporate law mechanisms, as other YPF shareholders did, by challenging shareholder resolutions in Argentine courts.

This is an immigration case in which a 70-year-old Jamaican lawful permanent resident and U.S. Navy veteran seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings based on a change in law. Ramsay was deported in 2007 based on a 1996 drug conviction, but a 2023 Second Circuit decision in Minter held that the statute under which he was convicted was categorically overbroad compared to federal law.

1. Whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying Ramsay's motion to reopen by finding he failed to exercise due diligence required for equitable tolling of the time limits on motions to reopen and reconsider
2. Whether an earlier Second Circuit decision in Harbin v. Sessions (2017) constituted a "fundamental change in law" that should have prompted Ramsay to file his motions earlier, rather than waiting for the Minter decision (2023)
3. Whether a litigant must raise arguments that have been unequivocally rejected by the BIA as having no merit in order to demonstrate reasonable diligence

The Second Circuit GRANTED Ramsay's petition for review and VACATED the BIA's order denying his motions to reopen and reconsider. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by misreading and mischaracterizing Ramsay's arguments. Specifically, the BIA incorrectly concluded that Ramsay cited Harbin for the proposition that the statute was categorically overbroad, when Ramsay actually only cited Harbin for the narrower proposition that the term "narcotic drug" was indivisible. The court reasoned that it was not until Minter that the statute was held to be "categorically overbroad," and therefore Ramsay could not have raised this argument based on Harbin alone. The court also rejected the government's argument that Ramsay should have raised statutory overbreadth arguments before any favorable precedent existed, noting that petitioners have no rights to pursue until the law changes to entitle them to relief. The case was REMANDED to the BIA to reconsider whether Ramsay is entitled to equitable tolling in light of the Minter decision.

This is a disciplinary case against attorney Daniel A. Pallen for submitting briefs to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals containing inaccurate case citations and summaries that were generated by artificial intelligence and never verified by the attorney before filing.

1. Whether the attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (duty of candor to the court) by making false statements of material fact or law and failing to correct them
2. Whether the attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 (duty to provide competent representation) by failing to verify citations and legal authorities before submitting them to the court
3. What sanctions are appropriate for an attorney who submits AI-generated legal research without verification and then mischaracterizes the errors as immaterial

The court found that while the attorney's conduct was deeply troubling, he did not clearly violate Pa. R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1) because it was debatable whether he "knowingly" made false statements given that he failed to read the cases. However, the court unanimously found that the attorney violated Pa. R.P.C. 1.1 by failing to exercise the thoroughness necessary for competent representation. Specifically, the attorney should have verified all citations before filing the opening brief, should have checked them after receiving the government's response brief pointing out errors, and should not have characterized the inaccuracies as "immaterial misstatements" about "tangential details" without having read the authorities. The court imposed a reprimand as the sanction, noting that this was the first opportunity to address AI use in the court and that the attorney had shown contrition after the show cause order. The court warned that future violators may face more severe sanctions including monetary sanctions. A concurring/dissenting opinion argued that the attorney violated Pa. R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1) regarding legal arguments and that more severe sanctions were warranted given the attorney's continued misconduct even after being put on notice of the errors.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Jerone Holman challenges his 66-month prison sentence for felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Holman raises constitutional, sentencing guideline, and reasonableness arguments on appeal.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession prohibition violates the Second Amendment on its face or as applied to Holman
2. Whether the district court erred in applying the "large capacity magazine" enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(3) without Holman's objection, and the proper standard for plain error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)
3. Whether Holman's 66-month sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Holman's conviction and sentence on all grounds. First, the court rejected Holman's Second Amendment challenges as foreclosed by binding Fourth Circuit precedent (United States v. Canada and United States v. Hunt), and alternatively held that even under the Bruen two-step test, the felon-in-possession prohibition is constitutional as applied to Holman given his violent felony conviction and extensive criminal history involving firearms and substance abuse violations. Second, the court found no error in applying the large capacity magazine enhancement, holding that: (1) "large capacity" is genuinely ambiguous and the Sentencing Commission's definition of "more than 15 rounds" is reasonable and entitled to deference under Kisor v. Wilkie; (2) Holman possessed a magazine capable of holding more than 15 rounds based on the 31-32 rounds recovered; and (3) the gun was clearly capable of accepting the magazines. The court provided an extensive discussion of plain error review under Rule 52(b) and the four-prong Olano test, emphasizing that the presumption of prejudice from a Guidelines miscalculation can be overcome by countervailing factors, including the district court's conscientious sentencing process and careful consideration of § 3553(a) factors. Third, the court found the sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable, noting the district court adequately considered Holman's self-defense argument and rejected it as uncompelling given the circumstances.

This appeal involves a constitutional challenge by commercial fishers to the appointment of members of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council under the Appointments Clause, and whether the unconstitutional appointment of Council members taints the Final Rule implementing Amendment 54, which significantly reduced Greater Amberjack catch limits.

1. Whether members of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council are "officers" subject to the Appointments Clause or merely advisors/employees
2. Whether Council members exercise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States" under the test established in Lucia v. SEC
3. Whether specific Council powers—including veto authority, authority to propose plans and amendments, default status of Council decisions, emergency regulation powers, and authority to assemble the administrative record—constitute significant authority
4. Whether any unconstitutional appointment provisions are severable from the Magnuson-Stevens Act
5. Whether the Final Rule implementing Amendment 54 must be vacated due to constitutional defects in Council member appointments
6. Whether Council members are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by the President

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government on alternative grounds. The court held:

1. Appointments Clause Analysis: Council members hold continuing offices established by law and therefore satisfy the first prong of the officer test. However, the court found that only the Council's veto power—specifically the requirement that the Secretary obtain supermajority Council approval to repeal a fishery management plan and majority approval for limited-access fishing programs—constitutes significant authority sufficient to make Council members officers subject to the Appointments Clause. The Council's other powers (proposing plans, default status of decisions, emergency regulation authority, and record assembly) do not confer significant authority because the Secretary retains ultimate review and approval authority.
2. Severability: The court severed the unconstitutional veto provisions from the Magnuson-Stevens Act, finding that: (1) the remaining statutory provisions can function independently, as the Council's core responsibility of drafting proposed plans remains intact; and (2) Congress would have enacted the statute without the veto provisions, as the veto power was not essential to the Act's purpose of providing informed cooperative co-management of fisheries with stakeholder input.
3. Final Rule Not Vacated: Because the unconstitutional veto powers were not actually used in the Assistant Administrator's independent decision to promulgate the Final Rule implementing Amendment 54, the Final Rule need not be vacated. The court found that the Assistant Administrator treated the veto provisions as merely advisory when making the independent decision to promulgate the Final Rule.
4. Jurisdiction Over Amendment 54: The court vacated the district court's order to the extent it permitted a challenge to Amendment 54 itself, holding that judicial review under the Magnuson-Stevens Act is limited to regulations promulgated by the Secretary and actions taken by the Secretary under those regulations, not to the Council's proposed amendments.
5. Removal Challenge: The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the removal challenge, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite elements of harm from unconstitutional removal restrictions, specifically failing to demonstrate a substantiated desire by the President to remove the unconstitutionally insulated Council member.

This is a civil rights case brought by a pretrial detainee who gave birth prematurely in her jail cell, resulting in her infant's death ten days later. The plaintiff sued the jail's Medical Director under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging denial of adequate medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment when the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted
2. Whether the Medical Director violated the pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care by denying her the right to be secure in her basic human needs
3. Whether the Medical Director had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee
4. Whether the Medical Director is entitled to qualified immunity

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Medical Director. The court held that: (1) it has jurisdiction over the appeal because on cross-motions for summary judgment, both the grant and denial are reviewable; (2) the Medical Director did not violate the detainee's constitutional rights because he lacked subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm—he did not open the daily report email containing information about the detainee's abdominal cramps until after she had already given birth, and the prior medical plan for elective induction gave him no reason to believe she faced imminent serious risk; and (3) the Medical Director is entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff failed to establish that the right she claims was violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. A concurring opinion agreed the Medical Director was entitled to qualified immunity but disagreed that summary judgment was appropriate on the underlying merits, arguing a jury could infer knowledge of the obvious and substantial risk of an unattended birth.

This is a criminal appeal in which Marshall Grace challenges his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, as well as his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Grace also challenges the trial court's denial of his Batson challenge regarding the prosecution's peremptory strike of a black juror.

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Grace's conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 846
2. Whether the prosecution engaged in purposeful racial discrimination in exercising a peremptory strike against a black juror in violation of Batson v. Kentucky
3. Whether the trial court erred by sua sponte questioning a juror to develop additional race-neutral reasons for the prosecution's peremptory strike

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in full. Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the court found ample evidence supporting Grace's conspiracy conviction, including: approximately 441 grams of methamphetamine found in his vehicle that Grace admitted owning; Grace's admission that he purchased eight ounces monthly for two years and supplied drugs to co-conspirators Tardie and Lonie; testimony from Lonie showing Grace supplied approximately 28 grams daily since 2019; and text messages from Lonie and Tardie requesting drug supplies even while Grace was in custody. Regarding the Batson challenge, the court held that although the trial court erred by sua sponte questioning the juror Davis to develop additional race-neutral reasons (contrary to Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent requiring prosecutors to state their reasons and stand on their plausibility), the district court correctly denied Grace's Batson challenge. The court reasoned that Grace failed to meet his burden of proving purposeful discrimination at step three of the Batson analysis because: (1) two black jurors were ultimately empaneled with one black alternate, negating claims of systematic exclusion; (2) the prosecution's stated race-neutral reason (that Davis had seven sons, one of whom had served time in jail) was not clearly pretextual on its face; and (3) the prosecution struck non-black jurors as well, demonstrating the strikes were not based solely on race.

This is an appeal in a criminal sentencing case where the defendant sought rehearing en banc to challenge the use of acquitted conduct in his sentencing. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing, finding itself bound by Supreme Court precedent.

1. Whether a sentencing court may consider conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted
2. The constitutional implications of acquitted-conduct sentencing under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
3. The fairness and legitimacy concerns raised by considering acquitted conduct in sentencing
4. The application of acquitted-conduct sentencing when overlapping charges result in conviction on one charge and acquittal on another

The petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc were both DENIED. Although the court acknowledged serious constitutional concerns and fundamental fairness issues with acquitted-conduct sentencing, it held that Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Watts (1997) squarely binds the Fifth Circuit to permit sentencing courts to consider acquitted conduct. The court noted that as an inferior court, it cannot provide the relief sought even if it reheard the case en banc. The court further found that the facts of this case—where the jury acquitted the defendant of possession while convicting him of conspiracy based on the same events—were not appropriate for reconsideration of this issue, particularly given the 2024 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines Section 1B1.3(c) that now prohibits considering acquitted conduct in most instances except when such conduct establishes the instant offense of conviction.

This is a civil rights case arising from an officer-involved shooting death. Baker's estate and family sued two police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when they shot and killed Baker as he attempted to flee in a stolen vehicle.

1. Whether the officers' conduct violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right against excessive force
2. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity based on the "second round" of shots fired after Baker's vehicle began moving away from the officers
3. How to apply the "clearly established law" standard for qualified immunity in officer-involved shooting cases following the Supreme Court's decision in Mullenix v. Luna
4. Whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, constitute a Fourth Amendment violation

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Officer Coborn regarding the second round of shots. The court held that:

1. Lytle v. Bexar County clearly established that firing at the back of a fleeing vehicle can constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, even though Mullenix modified how the "clearly established" standard is formulated in shooting cases
2. The facts here, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, are sufficiently similar to Lytle to put a reasonable officer on notice that shooting at Baker's vehicle as it moved away was unconstitutional
3. A genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether Coborn had sufficient time to perceive that any threat had passed before firing the second round
4. Coborn is not entitled to qualified immunity for the second round of shots, and the case should proceed beyond the summary judgment stage to determine the ultimate merits

This is a petition for review of an SEC order upholding sanctions against Eric Smith for violating securities laws and regulations. Smith challenges FINRA's jurisdiction over him and argues that the SEC proceedings violated Article III and the Seventh Amendment by denying him a jury trial before an Article III judge.

1. Whether FINRA had statutory jurisdiction to discipline Smith despite his failure to register as a FINRA member
2. Whether Smith's failure to exhaust his constitutional claims before the SEC bars appellate review
3. Whether the SEC proceedings violated Article III and the Seventh Amendment by denying Smith a jury trial (addressed in dicta)

The court denied Smith's petition for review on two grounds. First, on the statutory question, the court held that FINRA had jurisdiction over Smith because he was a "person associated with a member" under 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(21), as he controlled CSSC-BD, a FINRA member firm, through his majority ownership of its parent company. Second, on the constitutional question, the court held that Smith failed to exhaust his Seventh Amendment and Article III claims before the SEC, barring appellate review. The court rejected Smith's three arguments for excusing non-exhaustion: (1) the SEC lacked competence to adjudicate constitutional claims (the SEC has repeatedly done so); (2) Jarkesy represented an intervening change in law (it merely applied existing precedent, and Smith failed to raise it to the SEC despite having the opportunity); and (3) raising the issue would have been futile (the SEC could have provided a remedy by vacating sanctions and pursuing enforcement in federal court). In dicta, the court noted that had Smith properly exhausted his constitutional claims, he likely would have had a strong argument for a jury trial under Jarkesy, as the case involved common-law fraud claims seeking legal remedies, and the public rights exception would not apply to non-consenting non-members.

This is a federal criminal appeal concerning the interpretation of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), specifically whether 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) requires an incarcerated defendant to apply gradually accumulated deposits from family and friends in his prison trust account toward unpaid restitution obligations.

1. Whether § 3664(n) applies only to one-time, lump-sum financial windfalls from a single source, or also to substantial aggregated sums from multiple sources that gradually accrue over time
2. Whether the district court's turnover order violated the original judgment's restitution payment provisions
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine which funds in Myers's trust account were prison wages versus deposits from family and friends
4. Whether § 3664(n) applies to accumulated prison wages

The panel majority affirmed the district court's turnover order. The court held that § 3664(n) applies not just to one-time financial windfalls, but also to substantial aggregated sums from multiple sources—like family and friends—that gradually accrue in an inmate's trust account. The majority rejected Myers's argument that the statute's use of the singular "source" and present-tense "receives" limits application to single sources and resources substantial at the time of receipt. Applying the Dictionary Act's rule that singular forms include the plural, the court concluded "any source" encompasses multiple sources. The court also held that the district court properly invoked § 3664(n) to turn over $1,233.73 in accumulated deposits, did not violate the judgment's restitution provisions (which set a floor, not a ceiling, on payments), and did not abuse its discretion in declining an evidentiary hearing. The government's approach of assuming all 2022 prison wages remained unspent and deducting them from the total was reasonable and conservative. Judge McKeown dissented, arguing § 3664(n) applies only to resources substantial at the time of receipt, and that accumulated resources should be addressed under § 3664(k)'s "material change in circumstances" provision with its "interests of justice" discretion. Judges Wardlaw, Gould, Koh, and Mendoza dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing the majority created a circuit split, improperly conflated § 3664(n) and § 3664(k), and deprived inmates of funds needed for necessities and reentry.

This is an environmental law case challenging the EPA's approval of Florida's assumption of Clean Water Act Section 404 permitting authority and the Fish and Wildlife Service's biological opinion and incidental take statement supporting that approval. Environmental groups sued, arguing the federal agencies violated the Endangered Species Act by failing to conduct adequate consultation and analysis before approving Florida's permitting program.

1. Whether environmental groups have standing to challenge the agencies' actions and whether their claims are ripe for judicial review
2. Whether the Fish and Wildlife Service's Biological Opinion complied with Endangered Species Act requirements by deferring species-specific effects analysis to a "technical assistance process" rather than conducting it during the consultation
3. Whether the Incidental Take Statement violated ESA regulations by failing to specify the amount or extent of incidental take and by failing to require reinitiation of consultation if take limits were exceeded
4. Whether the EPA violated the ESA by failing to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service regarding indirect effects on marine species
5. Whether vacatur of the EPA's approval is the appropriate remedy

The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that: (1) environmental groups have standing and their claims are ripe; (2) the Fish and Wildlife Service's Biological Opinion was unlawful because it failed to conduct the required effects analysis and instead improperly relied on a less rigorous "technical assistance process" that was specifically designed to be "streamlined" and less burdensome than ESA Section 7 requirements; (3) the Incidental Take Statement violated ESA regulations by failing to quantify the amount or extent of incidental take and by failing to mandate reinitiation of consultation if take limits were exceeded; (4) the EPA violated the ESA by relying on both the deficient Biological Opinion and Incidental Take Statement to approve Florida's program; (5) the EPA erred in failing to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service regarding indirect effects on marine species; and (6) vacatur of the EPA's approval is warranted because the agencies' violations were serious and could not be cured by further explanation on remand. The court reasoned that while programmatic consultations are permissible under the ESA, they do not excuse agencies from performing rigorous effects analyses as required by the statute and regulations, and agencies cannot delegate their ESA responsibilities to states without ensuring compliance with ESA protections.

This is an appeal of a Court of Chancery decision in a dispute between Paul Witmer and Armistice Capital, LLC and Armistice Capital Master Fund, Ltd. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's judgment on the merits of the parties' claims.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this order, as the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision based on the reasoning stated in the lower court's August 14, 2025 Memorandum Opinion.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The Court adopted the reasoning and conclusions set forth in the Court of Chancery's Memorandum Opinion dated August 14, 2025, without providing additional analysis in this order.

This is an appeal from a Court of Chancery decision in a dispute involving Cardinal Capital Management, L.L.C., Robert Garfield, and Laborers Local No. 231 Pension Fund against Newmark Group, Inc. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's judgment on the merits of the case.

The opinion does not specify the particular legal issues addressed, as the Court affirmed the lower court's decision based on its August 13, 2025 bench ruling without restating the issues in this order.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The Court adopted the reasoning and conclusions set forth in the Court of Chancery's August 13, 2025 bench ruling, without providing additional analysis or commentary in this appellate order.

This is a breach of contract case arising from Triller Group Inc.'s failure to promptly file a Securities and Exchange Commission registration for 54 million shares issued to former convertible noteholders in a 2024 merger. The plaintiff, acting as stockholder representative, obtained a default judgment and now seeks damages of approximately $248-256 million.

1. Whether the "New York Rule" for calculating damages applies to a failure to file a registration statement for securities that were delivered to the plaintiff
2. Whether the plaintiff's damages calculation methodology—using the peak post-merger stock price of $4.75 per share multiplied by the entire block of shares—is appropriate
3. Whether the court can award damages on the limited paper record without an evidentiary hearing
4. Whether contract damages should be limited to the plaintiff's expectation interest rather than providing a windfall based on assumed total loss of unregistered shares

The court denied the plaintiff's request for damages on the papers and ordered an evidentiary hearing. The court found that: (1) the applicability of the New York Rule is questionable because the cited precedents involve fundamentally different harms (temporary suspension of active registrations, total failure to deliver assets, abandoned IPOs, and fiduciary duty breaches) rather than failure to initially register delivered securities; (2) even if the New York Rule applies, concerns exist about using the peak post-merger price as the "highest intermediate price" during a reasonable time period, as liquidating 54 million shares at peak price without market depression seems improbable and would credit the plaintiff with unrealistic market prescience; (3) the plaintiff's assumption that restricted shares are worthless is unproven, as unregistered shares may retain value in private transactions, and granting peak price damages would constitute an improper windfall; and (4) the magnitude of the requested award and the unresolved legal and factual issues require an evidentiary hearing where the plaintiff must brief why the New York Rule applies and provide expert analysis on realistic liquidation timelines and current fair market value of the restricted shares.

This is a derivative shareholder action brought by Bryan Dorsey on behalf of Roots Foods Holdings, Inc. and related entities against Robert T. Jones, with Jones filing counterclaims. The case involves disputes over corporate governance, asset transfers, and the effect of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors executed by one of the plaintiff entities.

1. Whether a general assignment for the benefit of creditors requires substitution of the assignee as a party to ongoing litigation under Court of Chancery Rule 25(c)
2. Whether the plaintiff entities retain standing to sue after being forfeited and subsequently revived by the Delaware Secretary of State
3. Whether the individual plaintiff (Dorsey) maintains derivative standing on behalf of the corporate entities
4. Whether various counterclaims constitute derivative or direct claims and whether they satisfy applicable pleading requirements
5. Whether specific counterclaims adequately plead fraud under Rule 9(b), derivative standing under Rule 23.1, or state a claim under Delaware General Corporation Law sections 271 and 109

The court denied all of Jones' motions challenging the plaintiffs' standing and authority to proceed. The court held that: (1) the general assignment for the benefit of creditors does not require mandatory substitution of the assignee under Rule 25(c); (2) the entity plaintiffs' revival by the Delaware Secretary of State restored them to good standing and retroactively validated their prior actions, including continued participation in this litigation; and (3) Dorsey maintains proper derivative standing as a stockholder. Regarding the counterclaim, the court dismissed Counts II, III, V, VII, X, XI, and XIII as derivative claims because Jones failed to adequately plead derivative standing under Rule 23.1 and Section 327 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, specifically failing to allege temporal facts about his stockholder status and failing to plead demand futility. The court dismissed Counts VI, VIII, and IX as fraud-based claims for failure to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b). The court dismissed Count IV under the law-of-the-case doctrine and Count XII for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (punitive damages are not available in the Court of Chancery). However, the court allowed the Section 109 claim in Count I to survive, finding that Jones adequately pleaded a direct claim that the board violated the Delaware General Corporation Law by attempting to eliminate stockholders' statutory right to amend bylaws.

This is a Delaware corporate governance dispute under Section 225 of the Delaware General Corporation Law in which plaintiff Ami Shafrir Berg sought to remove defendants Shai Bar-Lavi and Saul Bienenfeld as directors of Tracki, Inc., claiming to be the company's sole stockholder. The court determined that Berg's ownership claim rests on fabricated documents and lacks merit.

1. Whether Berg is a valid stockholder of Tracki, Inc., and therefore has standing to remove the defendants as directors under 8 Del. C. § 225
2. The authenticity and validity of the 2019 Written Consent and 2019 Stock Ledger upon which Berg bases his ownership claim
3. Whether Berg's post-formation conduct is consistent with claimed ownership of Tracki
4. Whether the defendants' corporate misconduct and false statements warrant fee-shifting under the bad faith exception to the American Rule
5. Whether Tracki complied with Delaware statutory requirements for director election under 8 Del. C. § 108

The court entered judgment for the defendants and found Berg lacks standing to pursue the Section 225 action. The court's reasoning includes:

1. Fabrication of Documents: Forensic expert testimony demonstrated that the 2019 Written Consent was created using the 2020 Written Consent (drafted in July 2020) as a template, proving the 2019 documents were fabricated and could not be contemporaneous with Tracki's February 2019 formation. Font analysis revealed text color mismatches and the use of CID Type 2 font (common in Asian languages) in portions granting shares to Berg, who resides in Thailand.
2. Implausible "Secret Pact" Narrative: Berg's claim that he kept his ownership secret due to a "secret pact" with Bar-Lavi to protect Bar-Lavi's reputational interests in a hypothetical public offering was found to be implausible and contradicted by Berg's own representations to the Israeli court that Vestigo owned Tracki.
3. Corporate Process Defects: Tracki's certificate of incorporation did not name initial directors, and no organization meeting or written consent was held to elect directors as required by 8 Del. C. § 108. This fundamental defect rendered the 2019 Written Consent and stock issuance invalid.
4. Pattern of Conduct: Berg's post-formation conduct contradicted his ownership claim. He executed documents representing Tracki as a Vestigo subsidiary, signed bank loan documents listing Tracki as a Vestigo asset, and as recently as October 2023 clarified to third parties that he was not Tracki's owner. Only in this litigation did he claim ownership.
5. Lack of Valid Stock Ledger: The only stock ledger in the record (the 2019 Stock Ledger) was fabricated, requiring the court to look to extrinsic evidence of Berg's conduct, which consistently demonstrated Vestigo's ownership.
6. Attorneys' Fees: Although the defendants engaged in serious misconduct—including backdating corporate documents and submitting false sworn affidavits—Berg's fabrication of documents to perpetrate fraud on the court constituted clear bad faith litigation conduct. The court shifted 50% of the defendants' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to account for both parties' misconduct, noting that "this suit is a product of mutual deceit."

This is a derivative action brought by an investor in a feeder fund on behalf of a master fund, alleging that the board of directors and investment manager breached their fiduciary duties by approving a transaction that concentrated the fund's assets into a single illiquid security in a company with significant red flags, failing to pursue a promised liquidation plan, and continuing to collect management fees despite dramatically reduced responsibilities.

1. Whether the outside directors of a Delaware limited partnership owe fiduciary duties equivalent to corporate directors and whether those duties were breached when approving an asset sale that violated the fund's diversification policy
2. Whether the board's approval of the asset sale without obtaining a fairness opinion, outside advice, or adequate deliberation constitutes gross negligence sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule
3. Whether the board breached its duties by failing to pursue a stated dissolution plan after the asset sale closed
4. Whether the board breached its duties by allowing the investment manager's advisory agreement to renew at the same fee despite the fund's dramatically changed circumstances
5. Whether the buyer and its CEO aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by the directors and investment manager

The court denied the outside directors' motion to dismiss Count I (breach of fiduciary duty claims) and the buyer's motion to dismiss Count VI (aiding and abetting claim), finding that the complaint states claims on which relief can be granted. The court ruled that:

1. The outside directors owe fiduciary duties equivalent to corporate directors based on the limited partnership agreement's delegation of general partner authority to the board and express provisions equating their duties to those of Delaware corporate directors.
2. The complaint pleads sufficient facts to support an inference of gross negligence in approving the asset sale. The board approved a fundamental transaction—converting a diversified portfolio of 125 alternative investments into a single illiquid security—at a single meeting without a fairness opinion, outside advisors, or independent investigation. The board relied solely on the interested investment manager despite numerous red flags about the buyer, including its lack of profitability, goodwill comprising 84% of assets from questionable related-party transactions, resignation of the buyer's CFO over misappropriation concerns, resignation of four outside directors, termination of two audit firms, and an SEC investigation.
3. The complaint adequately alleges breach of the duty of care regarding the board's failure to pursue the stated dissolution plan and failure to renegotiate the investment manager's annual fee despite the fund's transformation from managing 125 alternative investments to holding a single security.
4. The complaint states a claim for aiding and abetting because the buyer and its CEO had knowledge of the directors' breaches and provided substantial assistance by negotiating the asset sale and making representations about the transaction.

This is an appeal case involving plaintiffs Michael A. Manzo, Michael K. Manzo, Louis V. Manzo, and Paul A. Auwaerter, M.D. against defendants Samuel Wohlstadter and Nadine Wohlstadter. The case was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this errata sheet, which only documents a minor correction to the court's opinion issued on March 24, 2026.

This document is an errata sheet that amends the court's opinion by inserting "[sic]" after the word "contact" on page 3, line 26. The errata sheet does not contain the substantive ruling or reasoning of the court, as it is merely a technical correction to the original opinion.

This is an appeal by parents and their children challenging decisions made by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education and its Board regarding educational policies or practices affecting their children.

The document provided is an errata sheet that corrects minor typographical and formatting errors in the Court's opinion issued on March 20, 2026. The specific substantive legal issues addressed in the underlying opinion are not detailed in this errata sheet.

This errata sheet does not contain the Court's substantive ruling. Rather, it amends the previously issued opinion by making three technical corrections: (1) removing a period after "petition for cert. filed" on page 12, line 14; (2) removing a period after "petition for cert. filed" in footnote 7 on page 12; and (3) correcting the spacing in "Onto" to "On to" on page 15, line 14. The substantive ruling and reasoning would be found in the original opinion of March 20, 2026.

This is an ERISA fiduciary duty case in which pension fund trustees sued mortgage servicers for mismanaging residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). The central issue is whether the underlying mortgages constitute "plan assets" under ERISA, which would trigger fiduciary duties owed to the pension plan.

1. Whether mortgages underlying residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) issued as notes under indenture agreements qualify as "plan assets" under the Department of Labor's plan-asset regulation
2. Whether mortgages underlying RMBSs issued as trust certificates (regular-interest certificates) qualify as "plan assets" under the DOL regulation
3. Whether the notes and certificates constitute "equity interests" under the regulation's definition, which requires determining if they are treated as indebtedness with no substantial equity features, or alternatively, if they represent beneficial interests in trusts
4. Whether Ocwen, as mortgage servicer, acted in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the mortgages

The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held:

1. Indenture Notes (AHM 2004-4, AHM 2005-3, HLT 2006-HI1): The mortgages underlying these notes are NOT plan assets. The notes constitute traditional debt instruments with fixed interest payments and maturity dates, exposing noteholders only to credit risk. The supposed equity features identified by the trustees—thin capitalization, subordination to general creditors, and contingent payment based on mortgage pool performance—do not constitute "substantial equity features" under the regulation. The court reasoned that under the traditional debt-equity distinction, equity requires a "realistic possibility of upside potential" through a residual interest, which these notes lack. Universal credit risk is not a substantial equity feature.
2. REMIC Trust Certificates (CSFB 2003-27, MASTR 2003-5, GSR 2005-7F): The mortgages underlying the regular-interest certificates ARE plan assets. The court held that the certificates represent "beneficial interests in a trust" under the plain language of the DOL regulation, which explicitly provides that beneficial interests in trusts are equity interests. Under New York law (governing the trusts), holders of regular-interest certificates are beneficiaries entitled to receive benefits from the trust. Therefore, the look-through exception applies, making the underlying mortgages plan assets.
3. Fiduciary Status: The court remanded the question of whether Ocwen acted in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the mortgages underlying the REMIC trusts, following the preferred practice of allowing the district court to address arguments in the first instance.

This is a federal appellate case addressing whether time credits earned under the First Step Act (FSA) can be used to reduce a federal inmate's term of supervised release. The case involves a habeas corpus petition filed by an inmate challenging the Bureau of Prisons' calculation and application of his earned FSA time credits.

1. Whether FSA time credits earned under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) can be applied to reduce a prisoner's term of supervised release, or whether they can only be used to accelerate the start of prerelease custody or supervised release
2. Whether the habeas petition became moot once the petitioner was transferred to prerelease custody
3. The proper interpretation of the phrase "applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release" in the FSA statute

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that FSA time credits cannot be used to reduce a prisoner's term of supervised release. Instead, the credits can only be applied to accelerate the beginning of prerelease custody or supervised release by up to twelve months. The court reasoned that the statute's second sentence, which directs the Bureau of Prisons to transfer eligible prisoners into prerelease custody or supervised release, clarifies that the first sentence's reference to applying credits "toward time in" supervised release means moving the prisoner "in the direction of" supervised release (i.e., starting it earlier), not reducing the duration of supervised release itself. The court found this interpretation supported by: (1) the statute's cross-reference to Section 3624(g), which explicitly contemplates early transfer to supervised release; (2) the detailed eligibility requirements in Section 3624(g) that would be rendered meaningless if credits could reduce supervised release terms; (3) the absence of any specified agency responsible for reducing supervised release terms; and (4) the fact that supervised release is imposed by courts, not the Bureau of Prisons. Because the petitioner had already received the maximum benefit available under the FSA (transfer to prerelease custody with twelve months of credits applied), his petition was moot, and the district court's judgment was vacated and remanded for dismissal.

This is an immigration law case in which a 70-year-old Jamaican lawful permanent resident, who was deported in 2007 based on a drug conviction, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The case turns on whether the BIA properly applied the equitable tolling doctrine after a change in law made his conviction no longer removable.

1. Whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying Ramsay's motion to reopen based on a failure to exercise due diligence for purposes of equitable tolling
2. Whether the BIA properly interpreted Ramsay's arguments regarding the overbreadth of New York's narcotic drug statute compared to the federal Controlled Substances Act
3. Whether a change in law (the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Minter) constituted an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling of the time limits for motions to reopen
4. Whether petitioners must raise statutory overbreadth arguments before a change in law to preserve their rights

The Court GRANTED Ramsay's petition for review and VACATED the BIA's order denying his motions to reconsider and reopen. The Court held that the BIA abused its discretion by misreading and mischaracterizing Ramsay's arguments. Specifically, the BIA incorrectly relied on Harbin v. Sessions (2017) to conclude that Ramsay should have moved to reopen after that decision, when Ramsay's motions actually relied on Minter (2023) for the proposition that the narcotic drug statute was categorically overbroad. The Court reasoned that Ramsay could not be expected to raise arguments that had no legal basis until the law changed in Minter, and that reasonable diligence does not require raising arguments the BIA has already rejected as meritless. The case was REMANDED to the BIA to reconsider whether Ramsay is entitled to equitable tolling in light of Minter.

This is an appeal of a $16.1 billion damages judgment awarded to minority shareholders of YPF, an Argentine oil and gas company, against the Argentine Republic for failing to conduct a required tender offer when it expropriated a majority stake in the company in 2012. The case involves the interpretation and application of Argentine contract, corporate, and expropriation law to determine whether shareholders can recover damages for the Republic's breach of corporate bylaws.

1. Whether minority shareholders have standing to bring breach of contract claims based on the timing of when the Republic's tender offer obligation was triggered
2. Whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under forum non conveniens and international comity doctrines
3. Whether corporate bylaws create bilateral contractual obligations between shareholders enforceable through damages claims under Argentine civil law
4. Whether the Republic's public expropriation law (General Expropriation Law) precludes private contract-based damages claims arising from an expropriation
5. Whether promissory estoppel claims are cognizable under Argentine law as an alternative to breach of contract claims
6. Whether YPF had an affirmative obligation to enforce the tender offer requirements against the Republic

The Court of Appeals REVERSED the district court's judgment for plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims against the Republic and AFFIRMED the dismissal of promissory estoppel claims and judgment for YPF. The court held that:

1. Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims, as the Republic exercised control over the expropriated shares when the expropriation law was enacted in May 2012, triggering the tender obligation while plaintiffs still held shares.
2. The court declined to decide forum non conveniens and international comity issues given its reversal on the merits.
3. Under Argentine law, corporate bylaws do not create bilateral contractual obligations between shareholders enforceable through damages suits. Bylaws are organizational rules governing corporate governance rather than mutual promises creating reciprocal obligations between shareholders. Section 28(A) of YPF's bylaws, while naming the Republic, does not establish a specific bilateral obligation owed to minority shareholders.
4. Even if the bylaws created a bilateral contract, the claims would be precluded by Argentina's General Expropriation Law (GEL), which bars third-party actions that "impede the expropriation or its effects." The court found that the damages claims, which have subjected the Republic to ten years of litigation and a judgment equal to 45% of its annual budget, effectively impede the expropriation and fall within the GEL's prohibition. Argentine case law establishes that contractual conditions cannot interfere with properly declared expropriations; instead, disputes must be resolved through the GEL's compensation-setting mechanism.
5. Promissory estoppel is not an autonomous source of obligation under Argentine law and cannot serve as an alternative basis for liability where a contractual relationship exists or where no separate obligation can be identified.
6. YPF had no affirmative obligation under the bylaws to enforce the tender requirements or sanctions against the Republic. The bylaws imposed obligations on the acquiring shareholder and the bidder, not on YPF itself, which had only narrow administrative tasks.

This is a federal criminal appeal challenging the admissibility of DNA evidence obtained through probabilistic genotyping software (TrueAllele) in a firearm possession case. The defendant appeals the district court's denial of his Daubert motion to exclude the DNA evidence, as well as his Second Amendment and sentencing challenges.

1. Whether probabilistic genotyping software (TrueAllele) is sufficiently reliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to be admissible in federal trials
2. Whether the defendant was entitled to access TrueAllele's source code for testing purposes
3. Whether § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of firearm) violates the Second Amendment as applied to the defendant
4. Whether the defendant's 78-month sentence, imposed to run consecutively to anticipated state parole violation sentence, constitutes an abuse of discretion

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on all issues. The court held that:

1. TrueAllele Reliability: The government established by a preponderance that TrueAllele's probabilistic genotyping methodology is reliable under Daubert by demonstrating: (1) testability through laboratory-created multi-source DNA mixtures; (2) calculable error rates showing false-positive rates of 0.005% and approximately one in 146 trillion for the likelihood ratio in this case; (3) compliance with established forensic DNA standards; (4) peer review and publication of validation studies; and (5) general acceptance in the forensic DNA identification field. The court reasoned that while TrueAllele is not perfect, the evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than a merits standard of correctness, and the methodology has adequate scientific foundations for admissibility.
2. Source Code Access: The defendant was not entitled to access TrueAllele's source code. The court found that testability requires only that a methodology be capable of being tested using objective criteria, not that proprietary source code be disclosed. The defendant had sufficient access to the algorithm, could run TrueAllele on test data, and had access to validation studies and change logs. The court noted that Daubert is not a criminal discovery device and that other mechanisms (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Brady obligations, and cross-examination) ensure fairness in prosecutions.
3. Second Amendment Challenge: The district court correctly rejected the defendant's Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) because the defendant was serving a term of parole under state law at the time of his federal arrest, which forecloses his as-applied challenge and dooms his facial challenge under Third Circuit precedent.
4. Sentencing: The 78-month sentence, within the Guidelines range of 77-96 months and imposed to run consecutively to any state sentence, was not an abuse of discretion. The district court properly considered the defendant's criminal history and risk of recidivism in determining that a consecutive sentence was appropriate to achieve reasonable punishment for the instant offense.

This is an antitrust case where Megatel Homes sought to develop property outside Mansfield, Texas and needed retail water utility services from Johnson County Special Utility District (JCSUD), but Mansfield blocked the provision of water services through a contractual restriction requiring its prior written consent. Megatel sued Mansfield for Sherman Act violations and state law claims, and the district court dismissed based on state-action immunity.

1. Whether Mansfield is entitled to state-action immunity under the Sherman Act for blocking water utility services to the Cipriani Property
2. Whether the Texas Water Code clearly articulates and affirmatively expresses a state policy authorizing Mansfield (as opposed to JCSUD) to act anticompetitively in restricting water service provision
3. Whether state-action immunity requires that the specific municipality seeking immunity be the intended beneficiary of the state's authorization to monopolize, not merely that the state has authorized monopolies generally

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of state-action immunity and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that while the Texas Water Code clearly expresses a state policy to displace competition in retail water utilities through the certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) system, it grants that monopoly authority exclusively to the utility holding the CCN (JCSUD in this case), not to Mansfield. The court reasoned that state-action immunity requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether state law authorizes the defendant to engage in the challenged conduct, and (2) whether the state authorized that conduct with intent to displace competition. Mansfield failed the first step because Texas law granted the exclusive right to provide water in the Cipriani Property's area to JCSUD, not to Mansfield. Therefore, Mansfield did not demonstrate that it was delegated authority to act anticompetitively, and state-action immunity does not apply to shield the City from antitrust liability at this stage.

This is a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeal in which Michael Hagar, a pro se litigant convicted of cyberstalking and making interstate threats, sought production of an email and its complete header information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The case involves the scope of FOIA's disclosure obligations and whether agencies must create new records to comply with FOIA requests.

1. Whether a magistrate judge exceeded her authority by terminating Hagar's summary judgment motion as premature through a scheduling order
2. Whether FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) and the Privacy Act's law-enforcement exception applied to redacted names and email addresses in the "To" line of the email
3. Whether the FBI was required to produce the email's header information (metadata) or whether doing so would constitute the creation of a new record, which FOIA does not mandate
4. Whether the district court properly denied Hagar's post-judgment motions for reconsideration, relief from judgment, and judicial notice
5. Whether the district court committed judicial misconduct

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the FBI and denied all of Hagar's post-judgment motions. The court's reasoning proceeded as follows:

1. Magistrate Judge's Authority: The magistrate judge properly exercised her pretrial docket-management authority by issuing a scheduling order that terminated Hagar's summary judgment motion without prejudice, rather than resolving it on the merits. This was a proper exercise of authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
2. "To" Line Information: The court found this issue moot because the FBI provided Hagar with an unredacted copy of the email while the FBI's summary judgment motion was pending. Once a record has been turned over, a FOIA claim becomes moot.
3. Header Information: The court affirmed that producing the email's header information would require the FBI to create a new record, which FOIA does not mandate. The court relied on its precedent in Rutila v. United States Department of Transportation, 72 F.4th 692 (5th Cir. 2023), which established that when an agency does not maintain requested information in a separate record form and would have to take steps to extract and compile it into a new document, FOIA does not require such creation. The court found no meaningful difference between taking a screenshot (as in Rutila) and copying header information into a separate text file or Word document. Although the FBI has access to the header information, it does not maintain it as a separate record, and extracting it would constitute creating a new record beyond FOIA's requirements.
4. Post-Judgment Motions: The court affirmed the district court's denial of Hagar's motions for reconsideration, relief from judgment, and judicial notice because they raised the same arguments already addressed and disposed of on appeal.
5. Judicial Misconduct Claims: The court dismissed Hagar's judicial misconduct allegations as meritless, finding that they amounted to disagreement with adverse rulings rather than evidence of actual misconduct. The court noted that judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for bias or partiality claims, and Hagar identified no extrajudicial source of bias or procedural irregularity.

This is an appeal of a district court's order compelling arbitration of claims arising from a nursing home resident's death and confirming the subsequent arbitration award in favor of the nursing home. The executor of the resident's estate challenged the enforceability of the arbitration agreement and the arbitrator's decision.

1. Whether an attorney-in-fact who signed an arbitration agreement without explicitly stating she was acting in that capacity had authority to bind the principal to arbitration under Kentucky law
2. Whether the terms "Resident" and "Resident Representative" in the arbitration agreement were too indefinite to be enforceable
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying reconsideration based on allegedly intervening changes in controlling law
4. Whether the arbitration award should be vacated based on the arbitrator's alleged failure to disclose prior misconduct and application of an incorrect legal standard

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues. The court held that: (1) under Kentucky law, an attorney-in-fact need not explicitly state that capacity when signing an arbitration agreement if she signs as an authorized representative and does not affirmatively represent herself as acting in a different capacity; (2) the terms "Resident" and "Resident Representative" were not indefinite because they were clarified by reference to the broader admission agreement; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration because the cited case (Woford) applied existing law rather than establishing an intervening change in controlling law; and (4) the arbitration award should not be vacated because the arbitrator's three-decade-old public censure did not demonstrate partiality to the nursing home, and the arbitrator properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in his comprehensive evaluation of the claims.

This case involves a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act brought by Victory Global LLC (doing business as Brough Brothers), an African American-owned bourbon distillery, against Fresh Bourbon LLC, another African American-owned bourbon company, regarding competing claims about which company was "first" in the bourbon industry.

1. Whether Fresh Bourbon made "literally false" statements in its marketing claims about being the first African American-owned bourbon distillery or producer in Kentucky
2. Whether Fresh Bourbon's statements were "misleading" and, if so, whether Brough Brothers presented evidence that these statements deceived consumers
3. Whether Fresh Bourbon's statements were material to consumer purchasing decisions
4. The proper interpretation of terms like "distill," "produce," "develop," "distillery," and "master distiller" in the context of bourbon production

The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Fresh Bourbon. The court held that Brough Brothers failed to establish that Fresh Bourbon made any literally false statements. The court found that Fresh Bourbon's challenged statements were at most ambiguous or misleading, capable of being interpreted as true under reasonable alternative readings. Specifically:

1. Statements about being "first to distill, produce, or develop" bourbon were ambiguous because they could reasonably mean Fresh Bourbon's agents made bourbon first (true) rather than that Fresh Bourbon opened its physical distillery first (false)
2. The Kentucky Senate resolution's reference to Fresh Bourbon as the "first black-owned distillery" was not literally false because it stated the Senate "considered" it to be first, and "distillery" can mean a bourbon company rather than just a physical location
3. The LEX 18 article's title about the "first African American-owned distillery coming to Lexington" was ambiguous and could reasonably be interpreted as referring to Lexington specifically, making it true
4. The claim about the "first African American Master Distiller" was not verifiable as false because "master distiller" is a subjective marketing term with no industry-wide definition

This is a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan law by four female inmates at Huron Valley Correctional Facility who suffered from a prolonged scabies outbreak that prison officials allegedly failed to properly diagnose and treat. The inmates sued high-level Michigan Department of Corrections officials, Wayne State University medical officials, and Corizon Health (the prison's medical contractor) for deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs and dangerous prison conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as for gross negligence under Michigan law.

1. Whether non-treating prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by relying on medical contractors' decisions regarding diagnosis and treatment of the scabies outbreak
2. Whether the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights were "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violations, such that qualified immunity does not apply
3. Whether the inmates adequately pleaded deliberate indifference under both a medical-needs theory and a conditions-of-confinement theory
4. Whether non-treating prison officials were the proximate cause of the inmates' injuries under Michigan's Government Tort Liability Act, thereby defeating state-law immunity
5. Whether qualified immunity should be decided at the pleading stage or deferred until summary judgment

The majority (Judges Murphy and Larsen) reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claims and affirmed the denial of state-law immunity on the negligence claims. The court held that: (1) no clearly established law would have alerted the non-treating MDOC and Wayne State officials that they violated the Eighth Amendment by relying on Corizon medical professionals' treatment and prevention decisions; (2) prison officials generally do not act with deliberate indifference when they rely on medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible for prisoner care, absent additional circumstances showing recklessness; (3) the inmates failed to identify any precedent that would have notified the officials that they had a duty to second-guess the medical contractors' diagnosis and treatment decisions; (4) the inmates adequately pleaded proximate causation under Michigan law for their negligence claims, which requires further factual development through discovery rather than resolution at the pleading stage; and (5) qualified immunity was appropriately addressed at the pleading stage because the novelty of the inmates' claims made the defect apparent from the complaint's face. Judge White dissented from the qualified immunity ruling, arguing that the inmates plausibly alleged clearly established Eighth Amendment violations based on the yearslong, worsening outbreak affecting nearly 200 inmates, the officials' knowledge of the problem through grievances and meetings, and the officials' failure to take reasonable measures despite Corizon's documented poor track record and the mounting evidence that the treatment plan was ineffective.

This is a breach of contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing case in which a former senior executive at Sotera Health Company seeks to recover millions of dollars in unvested performance-based equity units that he forfeited upon his resignation in September 2022. The plaintiff contends that the vesting threshold for his equity was satisfied before his departure and that the defendants manipulated corporate transactions to prevent vesting.

1. Whether the plaintiff's Class B-2 Units vested based on the "Sponsors Inflow Trigger Date" requirement that each sponsor receive cash inflows equal to at least 2.5 times their respective cash outflows, specifically whether two transactions constitute "Sponsor Inflows": (a) a $1.13 billion payment made in 2015 to a predecessor GTCR fund, and (b) a $397 million margin loan taken by Warburg in 2021.
2. Whether the defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by: (a) structuring the IPO, secondary offering, and block trade to artificially suppress sponsor returns and prevent vesting, and (b) constructively terminating the plaintiff by demoting him to force his resignation before vesting occurred.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the vesting conditions were satisfied before his resignation.

The Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. The court held that:

1. Breach of Contract Claim: The plaintiff failed to prove that the Sponsors Inflow Trigger Date was satisfied before his resignation. The $1.13 billion payment to GTCR Fund IX in 2015 does not qualify as a "Sponsor Inflow" because: (a) GTCR Fund IX is a separate corporate entity not included in the definition of "Sponsor" in the governing agreements, and Fund IX and Fund XI were not under common control; and (b) the payment was for a buyout of a predecessor entity's equity, not a cash payment "with respect to or in exchange for Membership Units" as required by the contract. The $397 million margin loan also does not constitute a Sponsor Inflow because it was a loan secured by collateral that had to be repaid, not a cash payment representing a return on investment. Additionally, GTCR did not participate in the margin loan, and since GTCR had not met the 2.5x threshold, the trigger date could not have occurred even if the margin loan counted for Warburg.
2. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim: The plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants breached the implied covenant. Regarding the IPO, the court found that it was a primary offering that did not generate proceeds for the sponsors and was pursued based on legitimate business advice from JP Morgan, not to prevent vesting. The Board's decision not to accelerate vesting was reasonable and based on valid business considerations including retention risks and the need for leadership stability. Regarding the secondary offering, the court found that market conditions—not a scheme to avoid vesting—drove the offering size and the underwriters' decision not to exercise the greenshoe option. The court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on deposition testimony from a former CFO as insufficient to prove bad faith. Regarding the block trade, the court found multiple legitimate business reasons for not pursuing it, including concerns about market signaling before a major trial, a declining stock price, and shrinking market demand. The court also rejected the constructive termination claim, finding that the plaintiff left of his own volition by exercising a contractual right to resign for "Good Reason," that his working conditions were not intolerable, and that the implied covenant does not apply when the contract addresses the conduct at issue.
3. Declaratory Judgment Claim: The plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment was denied as duplicative of the failed breach of contract claim.

This is a criminal sentencing case addressing whether a defendant's abscondment from supervised release automatically extends the term of supervised release beyond what a sentencing judge ordered. Isabel Rico violated her supervised release conditions and absconded, committing a drug offense after her judicially-ordered supervised release term expired, raising the question of whether that offense could be treated as a supervised release violation.

1. Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes an automatic extension of a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds and fails to report to their probation officer
2. Whether a crime committed after the expiration of a judicially-ordered supervised release term can constitute a supervised release violation if the defendant was absconding during the period
3. The proper interpretation of "tolling" versus "extending" a supervised release term under the Act
4. Whether common-law principles regarding escaped prisoners support an automatic extension rule
5. The scope of a sentencing court's authority to consider post-expiration conduct when revising a sentence for supervised release violations

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding that the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize automatic extension of a supervised release term based on abscondment. The Court's reasoning included:

1. Textual Analysis: The Act specifies when supervised release begins (upon release from imprisonment) and sets maximum lengths (one, three, or five years depending on offense severity), with no mention of automatic extension for abscondment. The Act provides specific tools for addressing violations—revocation and additional imprisonment—but does not include automatic extension.
2. Statutory Limitations on Extension: Section 3583(e)(2) permits extension only after a hearing, within statutory maximums, and before the term expires. Section 3583(i) allows post-expiration proceedings only for matters arising before expiration and only if a warrant issued during the term. Section 3624(e) provides a true tolling rule for imprisonment of 30+ consecutive days. The cumulative detail of these specific rules suggests the absence of an automatic extension rule is intentional.
3. Rejection of Government Arguments: The Court rejected the government's argument based on supervision requiring "observation and direction," finding that provisions merely describe probation officer duties during "the term imposed" by the court. The Court also noted the government's theory created an anomaly—treating Rico as simultaneously off and on supervised release.
4. Precedent: Mont v. United States merely recognized the express tolling rule in §3624(e) for imprisonment, highlighting the absence of an automatic extension rule. United States v. Johnson rejected efforts to add rules Congress did not enact.
5. Common Law: While common law may support pausing a sentence clock for escaped prisoners, the government seeks a different rule—imposing new punishment by extending supervised release. Unlike an escaped prisoner not serving his sentence, an absconding defendant remains bound by release terms and can be punished for violations under existing statutory tools.
6. Policy Concerns: The Court rejected the government's policy argument that §3583(i)'s warrant-or-summons requirement may leave courts powerless, holding that complaints about statutory requirements should be directed to Congress, not the courts.

This case concerns whether Cox Communications, an Internet service provider, can be held secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by its subscribers. Sony Music Entertainment sued Cox for contributory liability, arguing that Cox should be liable for continuing to provide Internet service to subscribers whose IP addresses were associated with known copyright infringement.

1. Whether an Internet service provider can be held contributorily liable for copyright infringement based solely on knowledge that its service will be used by some subscribers to infringe copyrights
2. The proper scope of secondary copyright liability under the Copyright Act, specifically whether it is limited to two forms: inducement and services tailored to infringement
3. Whether the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe harbor provision for ISPs presupposes that ISPs can be held liable for serving known infringers

The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and held that Cox Communications is not contributorily liable for its subscribers' copyright infringement. The Court ruled that contributory liability requires proof that a service provider intended its service to be used for infringement, which can only be shown through two bases: (1) the provider actively induced the infringement through specific acts such as promotion and marketing, or (2) the service provided is tailored to infringement and incapable of substantial noninfringing uses. The Court found that Cox neither induced its users' infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement. Internet access is capable of substantial noninfringing uses, and Cox actively discouraged infringement through warnings, service suspensions, and account terminations. The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's holding that mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is sufficient for contributory liability, emphasizing that such knowledge alone is insufficient under established precedent. The Court also addressed Sony's argument regarding the DMCA safe harbor, clarifying that the DMCA creates defenses from liability rather than imposing new liability, and that failure to qualify for the safe harbor does not adversely affect other defenses to liability.

This is an appeal by four University of Puerto Rico employees challenging the district court's denial of declaratory relief regarding alleged First Amendment violations stemming from the continued deduction of union dues from their paychecks after they requested to resign from the union following the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. AFSCME.

1. Whether the employees' claims for retrospective and prospective declaratory judgments remain justiciable or have become moot following the cessation of dues deductions by the University of Puerto Rico and the union.
2. Whether the voluntary cessation doctrine applies to prevent a finding of mootness when defendants have changed their conduct in response to a Supreme Court ruling rather than as litigation strategy.
3. Whether an admission of error by the defendants and implementation of new policies to comply with Janus eliminate the threat of future constitutional violations.

The First Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The court held that both the retrospective and prospective declaratory relief sought by the employees are moot. Regarding the retrospective declaration, the court reasoned that declaring past conduct unconstitutional would be merely advisory since the conduct has ceased and the employees have already received a binding judgment requiring reimbursement of deducted dues. Regarding the prospective declaration, the court applied the voluntary cessation doctrine and concluded that the defendants' burden to show mootness was satisfied because: (1) the cessation of dues deductions resulted from the Janus Supreme Court ruling rather than litigation strategy; (2) the defendants admitted error and acknowledged that further dues collection violates Janus; (3) the defendants implemented new policies requiring affirmative employee consent before collecting dues; and (4) there is no reasonable expectation that the challenged conduct will be repeated. The court found that a declaration stating what the defendants already agreed was the law would serve no purpose.

This is a federal drug trafficking case in which Rafael Antonio Fabian was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Fabian appeals his conviction, jury instructions, 15-year sentence (below the Guidelines recommendation of life), and the imposition of standard conditions of supervised release.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, or whether the relationship between Fabian and co-defendant Suriel constituted only a buyer-seller transaction exempt from conspiracy liability
2. Whether the district court properly responded to jury notes requesting exhibits that would "link" Fabian to certain evidence without improperly injecting itself into jury deliberations
3. Whether the 15-year sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable given a Guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment
4. Whether standard conditions of supervised release were properly imposed when not pronounced at sentencing

The court AFFIRMED the conviction and sentence but VACATED the imposition of standard conditions of supervised release and REMANDED for further proceedings. Regarding sufficiency of evidence: The court held that sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy conviction. Although a buyer-seller relationship alone cannot constitute conspiracy, the evidence showed Fabian had a financial stake in Suriel's ongoing crack distribution through prolonged cooperation, mutual trust, and standardized dealings. Fabian supplied wholesale quantities of cocaine on consignment, knew Suriel was cooking it into crack, advised Suriel on cooking methods, and benefited from the sales. The jury's rejection of Fabian's credibility arguments regarding cooperating witnesses was entitled to deference. Regarding jury instructions: The court held the district court did not err in responding to the jury's request for exhibits "linking" Fabian to certain evidence. The court properly reminded jurors they were sole fact-finders, provided relevant exhibits with contextualizing testimony, and did not abuse its discretion by providing additional germane evidence or declining to ask clarifying questions that might intrude on deliberations. Regarding sentencing: The court held the 15-year sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, correctly calculated drug weights using preponderance-of-the-evidence standard (including acquitted conduct), and properly applied the criminal-livelihood enhancement. The sentence was well below the Guidelines range and did not "shock the conscience" or constitute manifest injustice. Regarding supervised release conditions: The court held that under United States v. Maiorana, the district court erred by imposing standard conditions of supervised release in the written judgment without pronouncing them at sentencing or making the defendant aware of them. The court VACATED these conditions and REMANDED for the district court to either: (1) pronounce the conditions at a new sentencing hearing with opportunity for objection, or (2) decline to reimpose them.

This is an appeal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a federal prisoner challenging the Bureau of Prisons' calculation of time credits earned under the First Step Act (FSA). The central issue is whether FSA time credits can be applied to reduce a prisoner's term of supervised release or only to accelerate the start of supervised release.

1. Whether FSA time credits earned under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) can be used to reduce a federal inmate's term of supervised release
2. Whether Rivera-Perez's habeas petition became moot once he was transferred to prerelease custody
3. The proper interpretation of the phrase "applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release" in the FSA statute

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment and held that FSA time credits cannot be used to reduce a term of supervised release. The court concluded that when time credits are "applied toward" prerelease custody or supervised release, they accelerate the start date of those statuses rather than reducing their duration. The court reasoned that the second sentence of Section 3632(d)(4)(C), which directs the BOP to transfer eligible prisoners into prerelease custody or supervised release, clarifies that the statute addresses early transfers from prison, not reductions in supervised release terms. The court also found that allowing credits to reduce supervised release terms would create implausible consequences, including: (1) the statute would address two different processes without clear congressional intent; (2) detailed eligibility requirements for early transfers would not apply to supervised release reductions; (3) the statute fails to specify which agency would reduce supervised release terms; (4) the interpretation would bypass judicial oversight required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); and (5) prisoners could potentially eliminate their entire supervised release terms. Because Rivera-Perez had already received the maximum benefit available under the FSA (a 12-month acceleration of his supervised release start date) when transferred to prerelease custody, his petition was moot, and the case was vacated and remanded for dismissal.

This is an ERISA fiduciary duty case in which pension fund trustees sued mortgage servicers for mismanaging residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). The central issue is whether the underlying mortgages constitute "plan assets" under ERISA, which would trigger fiduciary duties owed to the pension plan.

1. Whether mortgages underlying residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) qualify as "plan assets" under the Department of Labor's plan-asset regulation (29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101)
2. Whether the Plan's investments in notes issued under indenture agreements constitute "equity interests" under the regulation's definition
3. Whether the Plan's investments in trust certificates issued by REMIC trusts constitute "equity interests" or "beneficial interests in a trust"
4. Whether the "substantial equity features" test applies differently to debt instruments versus beneficial interests in trusts
5. Whether Ocwen acted in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the mortgages

The Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held:

1. Indenture Notes (AHM 2004-4, AHM 2005-3, HLT 2006-HI1): The mortgages underlying these notes are NOT plan assets. The notes are treated as traditional debt instruments with fixed interest payments and maturity dates, lacking substantial equity features. Although the trusts were thinly capitalized and the notes' repayment depended on mortgage pool performance, these factors do not constitute substantial equity features because noteholders held no residual interest in the trusts and bore only credit risk, not performance risk.
2. REMIC Trust Certificates (CSFB 2003-27, MASTR 2003-5, GSR 2005-7F): The mortgages underlying the regular-interest certificates ARE plan assets. The court found that the certificates represent "beneficial interests in a trust" under the regulation's explicit definition, which automatically qualifies them as equity interests. Under New York law (governing the REMIC trusts), holders of regular-interest certificates are beneficiaries entitled to receive trust income from the mortgages. The regulation clearly states that "beneficial interest[s] in a trust are equity interests," triggering the look-through exception that treats underlying trust assets as plan assets.
3. Fiduciary Status: The court remanded the question of whether Ocwen acted in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the mortgages underlying the REMIC trusts, allowing the district court to address this issue in the first instance rather than deciding it on appeal.

This is an immigration law case involving statutory interpretation of federal removal eligibility requirements. The petitioner, a Honduran national, challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that his Virginia misdemeanor conviction renders him ineligible for cancellation of removal under federal immigration law.

1. Whether a Class 1 misdemeanor conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-186.3(A)(2) (identity fraud) constitutes "a crime involving moral turpitude" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)
2. Whether a Class 1 misdemeanor carrying a maximum sentence of twelve months constitutes "a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)
3. Whether twelve months in Virginia state law is equivalent to one year for purposes of federal immigration law

The Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review and affirmed the BIA's decision. The court held that: (1) the identity fraud offense is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) a Class 1 misdemeanor carrying a maximum twelve-month sentence qualifies as "a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed" because twelve calendar months equals one calendar year. The court rejected three arguments: first, that Virginia's distinction between misdemeanor (twelve months) and felony (one year) sentences creates a temporal difference (there is none); second, that "or" should be read as "and," requiring both a possible one-year sentence and a possible sentence exceeding one year (the word "or" is disjunctive); and third, that "one year or longer" is a term of art meaning "more than one year" or felony (the plain language controls over legislative history). The court emphasized that Congress knows how to use "more than one year" language when it chooses to, and the statutory text must be given its ordinary meaning.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges the application of United States Sentencing Guidelines enhancements to his conviction for attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant argues that the Guidelines enhancements should not apply because his offense involved fictitious minors created by law enforcement, not actual minors.

1. Whether the term "minor" in U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A) and (b)(5) unambiguously excludes fictitious minors created by law enforcement
2. Whether the Guidelines commentary's definition of "minor" to include fictitious minors is entitled to deference
3. Whether the district court committed plain error in applying the enhancements based on fictitious minors
4. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) itself permits conviction based on fictitious minors

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. The court held that: (1) the term "minor" in the Guidelines enhancements is ambiguous regarding whether it includes fictitious minors, as dictionary definitions do not specify whether a minor must be an actual person, and the plain language of the provisions does not resolve this ambiguity; (2) the Guidelines commentary's definition of "minor" to include fictitious minors falls within the zone of ambiguity and is entitled to deference as the Sentencing Commission's official position, consistent with how § 2422(b) has been interpreted by sister circuits; (3) the district court did not err in applying the enhancements; and (4) even if error had occurred, it would not constitute plain error because no Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit, or uniform sister circuit precedent supports the defendant's narrow interpretation of "minor." The court reasoned that the enhancements focus on the defendant's conduct rather than actual harm to a victim, making it anomalous to exclude fictitious minors from their application when the underlying conviction itself permits fictitious minors.

This is an appeal by Timothy Barton of a district court's approval of property sales and settlement agreements in a receivership established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) following allegations that Barton violated securities laws. The Fifth Circuit addresses jurisdictional issues and the merits of the district court's receivership management decisions.

1. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the district court's approval of the Amerigold Suites property sale
2. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the district court's ratification of two settlement agreements
3. Whether the district court erred in approving the sale of the Hall Street property before final judgment on liability
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that the Hall Street property sale was in the best interest of the receivership estate
5. Whether the district court properly followed statutory procedures under 28 U.S.C. § 2001 for property sales

The court partially dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's judgment. Specifically: (1) the appeal regarding the Amerigold Suites sale was dismissed as moot because the sale was cancelled and no effectual relief could be granted; (2) the appeals regarding the two settlement agreements were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because they were non-sale administrative orders not reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) or the collateral order doctrine, and the issue was foreclosed by the court's prior decision in Barton II; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the Hall Street property sale because the sale price met the statutory requirement of at least two-thirds of appraised value, the receiver properly marketed the property, and the sale benefitted the estate by avoiding continued interest accrual at approximately $1,023 per day. The court rejected Barton's argument that sales should not be approved before final judgment absent exigent circumstances, finding no legal support for such a requirement.

This is an insurance contract dispute in which Schoening Investment LP sought recovery under a commercial property insurance policy issued by Cincinnati Casualty Company for damage to Kentucky properties. The case involves the interpretation of whether the insurer properly deducted depreciation from repair cost settlements when the policyholder had not yet completed repairs.

1. Whether the insurance policy's Valuation provision, which defines "Actual Cash Value" as "replacement cost less a deduction that reflects depreciation," applies to repair costs or only to total property value.
2. Whether Schoening qualified for the Optional Coverage provision that promised "Replacement Cost without deduction for depreciation," which required the policyholder to actually repair the property first.
3. Whether the policy language is ambiguous and should be construed in favor of the policyholder.
4. Whether the anti-surplusage canon should override the plain language of the contract.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Cincinnati Casualty properly deducted depreciation from the repair cost settlement. The court reasoned that: (1) the Valuation provision applies to repair costs and defines them as "Actual Cash Value," which includes a depreciation deduction; (2) Schoening did not qualify for the Optional Coverage provision because it had not actually repaired the property, which was a condition precedent to receiving depreciation-free payment; (3) the policy language is unambiguous and clearly equates repair costs with "Actual Cash Value" as determined under the Valuation provision; (4) Schoening's interpretation would render the Optional Coverage provision meaningless and ignore the policy's plain language; and (5) Schoening forfeited its ambiguity argument by failing to raise it in the district court.

This is a federal sentencing appeal in which the defendant challenges the district court's determination that his prior Oregon conviction for attempted first-degree assault qualifies as a crime of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which was used to increase his base offense level for felon in possession of a firearm.

1. Whether an Oregon conviction for attempted first-degree assault qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (the "force clause")
2. Whether the phrase "attempted use" of physical force in the force clause requires the "probable desistance" test applied to substantive criminal offenses or instead requires only a "substantial step" toward the use of physical force
3. Whether Oregon's "substantial step" requirement for attempted first-degree assault necessarily entails the "attempted use" of physical force required by the force clause

The court affirmed the sentence. The Ninth Circuit held that under United States v. Linehan, the phrase "attempted use" of physical force means a "substantial step" toward the use of physical force, and this definition does not incorporate the "probable desistance" test applied to substantive criminal offenses. Because Oregon's attempted first-degree assault statute requires a defendant to take a substantial step toward causing serious physical injury to another, it necessarily entails a substantial step toward the use of physical force and therefore qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause. The court reasoned that Linehan adopted the established common-law meaning of "attempt" without requiring the more restrictive probable desistance test, and that the force clause does not require comparison to a generic federal attempt offense. Therefore, the district court properly increased the defendant's base offense level based on the prior conviction.

This is a criminal appeal addressing whether a district court properly corrected a sentencing error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a). David Wayne DePape was convicted of attempting to kidnap a federal officer and assaulting a family member of a federal official, but the sentencing court failed to allow him to allocute (personally address the court) before imposing sentence, in violation of Rule 32.

1. Whether a district court's failure to afford a defendant the right to allocute under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) constitutes an "arithmetical, technical, or other clear error" that may be corrected under Rule 35(a)
2. Whether the scope of Rule 35(a) is limited to errors that do not require reexercise of sentencing discretion
3. Whether the district court violated due process by granting the government's Rule 35(a) motion without extensive adversarial briefing

The court affirmed DePape's sentence, holding that a Rule 32 allocution violation constitutes "other clear error" correctable under Rule 35(a). The court reasoned that: (1) the failure to afford allocution is "unquestionably erroneous" and thus falls within Rule 35(a)'s plain text; (2) allocution is a vital, long-recognized procedural right dating back to 1689, making the error clearly discernible from the sentencing record; (3) Rule 35(a) is not limited to errors that avoid reexercise of sentencing discretion, as correcting arithmetical and technical errors often requires such reconsideration; and (4) no due process violation occurred because DePape received notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard on the motion to reopen sentencing.

This is an environmental law case in which the State of Alaska challenged the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) critical habitat designations for two species of Arctic seals under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The district court vacated the designations as unlawful, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the critical habitat designations for both seal species.

1. Whether the court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal by an intervenor-defendant (Center for Biological Diversity) from a remand order when the agency (NMFS) voluntarily dismissed its own appeal
2. Whether NMFS's critical habitat designations complied with the ESA's definition of "occupied critical habitat," specifically whether NMFS was required to find that the entire designated area is itself "essential" to species conservation
3. Whether NMFS was required to consider foreign nation conservation efforts and foreign habitat when making critical habitat designations
4. Whether NMFS abused its discretion by declining to exclude certain coastal areas requested for exclusion by Alaska and the North Slope Borough
5. Whether the designations complied with the ESA's "prudency" requirement

The court held that it had jurisdiction over the Center's appeal because the district court's remand order resolved discrete legal issues, application of erroneous rulings would result in a wasted proceeding, and the Center could not obtain a favorable outcome on remand.

On the merits, the court reversed the district court on three main issues:

1. Occupied Critical Habitat Definition: The ESA only requires NMFS to identify "physical or biological features" essential to conservation within occupied areas; it does not require a separate finding that the entire designated area itself is "essential" or an explanation of why a smaller area would not suffice. The plain statutory language supports NMFS's interpretation, and the contrast with the unoccupied habitat standard (which expressly requires areas to be "essential") confirms this reading.
2. Foreign Conservation Efforts and Habitat: The ESA does not require NMFS to consider foreign nation conservation efforts or foreign habitat when designating critical habitat. The statute explicitly requires such consideration for listing decisions but omits it from the critical habitat designation provision, indicating Congress's intentional distinction. NMFS already considered these factors at the listing stage.
3. Exclusion Decisions: NMFS acted within its discretion in declining to exclude coastal areas. Although the agency must consider relevant economic, national security, and other impacts, the decision to exclude areas is discretionary. NMFS prepared extensive impact reviews, found economic impacts would be "small," and reasonably explained that designation provides incremental conservation benefits beyond existing consultation requirements.

On cross-appeal, the court affirmed the district court's rejection of Alaska's prudency argument. The "prudency" language creates a narrow exception applicable only in rare circumstances (such as when designation would alert poachers or when habitat destruction is not a cause of decline). NMFS adequately explained why this exception did not apply, noting that habitat destruction is a primary threat to the seals and designation would not increase threats to them.

The court reinstated the critical habitat designations for both seal species and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Center and NMFS.

This is an environmental law case in which the State of Alaska challenged the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) critical habitat designations for two species of Arctic seal under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The district court vacated the designations as unlawful, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, upholding NMFS's authority to make the designations.

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear an intervenor-defendant's appeal from a remand order when the agency has voluntarily dismissed its own appeal
2. Whether NMFS's critical habitat designations comply with the ESA's definition of "occupied critical habitat"
3. Whether NMFS was required to consider foreign nation conservation efforts and foreign habitat when making critical habitat designations
4. Whether NMFS abused its discretion by declining to exclude certain coastal areas requested for exclusion by Alaska and the North Slope Borough
5. Whether the designations comply with the ESA's "prudency" requirement

The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the Center for Biological Diversity's appeal because the remand order resolved discrete legal issues, application of erroneous rulings would result in a wasted proceeding, and the Center could not obtain a favorable outcome on remand.

On the merits, the court reversed the district court's judgment that the designations were unlawful on three grounds:

1. Occupied Critical Habitat: The ESA requires only that NMFS identify "physical or biological features" essential to conservation within occupied areas; it does not require a separate finding that the entire designated area itself is "essential." The plain statutory text defines "critical habitat" as specific areas "on which are found" essential features, not areas that are themselves essential. The contrast with the unoccupied habitat provision, which expressly requires areas to be "essential," confirms this interpretation.
2. Foreign Conservation Efforts: The ESA does not require NMFS to consider foreign nation conservation efforts or foreign habitat when designating critical habitat. Unlike the provision governing threatened species listings, which expressly requires consideration of foreign conservation efforts, the critical habitat designation provision contains no such requirement. Congress's deliberate omission of this language from the critical habitat provision is dispositive.
3. Exclusions: NMFS acted within its discretion in declining to exclude coastal areas. Although the agency must "take into consideration" economic and other relevant impacts, the decision to exclude areas is entirely discretionary. NMFS adequately considered the relevant factors through extensive Regulatory Impact Reviews and reasonably explained why the benefits of designation outweighed the benefits of exclusion, including incremental conservation benefits and enhanced public awareness.

On cross-appeal, the court affirmed the district court's rejection of Alaska's prudency argument. The ESA's "to the maximum extent prudent" language creates only a narrow exception to the obligation to designate critical habitat, applicable only in rare circumstances such as when designation would alert poachers or when habitat destruction is not a cause of decline. NMFS adequately explained why this exception did not apply, noting that habitat destruction is a primary threat to the seals and that designation would not increase threats to them.

The court reversed the district court's judgment, reinstated the critical habitat designations for both seal species, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Center and NMFS.

This is a class action case under the Administrative Procedure Act brought by federal student loan borrowers seeking loan forgiveness based on borrower defense claims against fraudulent educational institutions. The case involves a dispute over the Department of Education's deadline to adjudicate applications from borrowers who applied after a settlement agreement was executed.

1. Whether the Department of Education is entitled to relief from the settlement agreement's deadline to adjudicate Post-Class Applicant borrower defense applications under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5)
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the DOE's motion for relief from the January 28, 2026 adjudication deadline
3. Whether a stay pending appeal should be granted to delay enforcement of the settlement agreement's deadlines

The court denied the Department of Education's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The court held that the DOE failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because it could not show that two district courts clearly abused their discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief. The court reasoned that the DOE knew over three years in advance that the Post-Class Applicant group exceeded 205,000 people and could point to no changed circumstances that would make application of the settlement agreement inequitable. The Supreme Court's precedent in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail establishes that modification of a settlement should not be granted where a party relies on events that were anticipated when entering the agreement. The court found the remaining factors for granting a stay were insufficient to overcome the DOE's weak showing on the likelihood of success on the merits.

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case brought by Terry Joyner, a white police officer with the Atlanta Police Department, against the City of Atlanta and police officials. Joyner alleged racial discrimination in denial of promotion to Captain, retaliation for reporting racial discrimination complaints and ticket fixing, and violations of the First Amendment and Georgia Whistleblower Act.

1. Whether Joyner established a Title VII retaliation claim based on alleged discrimination occurring six years before his denial of promotion
2. Whether the removal of Joyner's flextime work schedule constituted a materially adverse employment action supporting a First Amendment retaliation claim
3. Whether the removal of flextime was clearly established as unconstitutional, defeating qualified immunity
4. Whether Joyner's ticket-fixing complaint satisfied the Georgia Whistleblower Act's requirement of reporting a violation of law, rule, or regulation
5. Whether the jury verdict form properly reflected the elements of a Title VII mixed-motive discrimination claim
6. Whether Joyner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his discrimination claim

1. Title VII Retaliation Claim (2008 complaint): The court affirmed summary judgment against Joyner. The six-year gap between his 2008 racial discrimination complaint and the 2014 promotion denial, combined with unrefuted evidence that the decision-maker (Chief Turner) was unaware of the complaint, defeated the causation element required for Title VII retaliation claims.
2. First Amendment Retaliation Claim (ticket-fixing report): The court reversed summary judgment and held that Joyner presented a genuine issue of material fact. The removal of flextime privileges one week after reporting ticket fixing to the FBI and OPS constituted a materially adverse employment action because: (a) flextime was an important privilege of employment; (b) Joyner used it for over 12 years to work a second job and supplement income by two-thirds; (c) he used it to pick up his young children from school as required by his divorce decree; and (d) the loss would likely chill a reasonable employee's protected speech. The court also held that it was clearly established law that government officials cannot strip employees of important employment privileges in retaliation for protected speech, defeating qualified immunity.
3. Georgia Whistleblower Act Claim: The court affirmed summary judgment against Joyner because he failed to specify which law, rule, or regulation was violated by the alleged ticket-fixing conduct. The statute requires reporting of violations of specific laws, rules, or regulations, and Joyner's complaint did not identify any such violation.
4. Motion to Amend Pleadings: The court affirmed denial of Joyner's mid-trial motion to add a § 1981 claim. The City would have been prejudiced by the addition of a claim with different causation standards and unlimited damages after key witnesses testified. Additionally, the jury's verdict that Joyner was not denied promotion doomed any discrimination claim.
5. Jury Instructions and Verdict Form: The court affirmed the district court's decisions regarding jury instructions and the verdict form. The first question asking whether Joyner was denied promotion accurately reflected the law—it is a necessary element of a Title VII discrimination claim that must be established before considering whether race was a motivating factor. The court properly instructed the jury that employers cannot discriminate based on race, and the jury is presumed to follow instructions. The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to provide additional portions of the City Code regarding anti-discrimination policies when the jury only requested the section on appointment authority.
6. Judgment as a Matter of Law: The court affirmed denial of Joyner's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the discrimination claim. Although Chief Turner testified that he considered race when making appointments, credibility determinations and weighing of evidence are jury functions. The jury could reasonably find that Turner's stated reasons for not promoting Joyner (his poor performance, failure to express interest in promotion, and practice of moving new captains out of their current zones) were the actual motivating factors, even if race played some role in his general appointment practices.

This is an appeal from a Court of Chancery decision in a commercial dispute involving US Trading Company Metals RE, LLC against USA Rare Earth, LLC and related defendants. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's rulings on the merits of the case.

The opinion does not specify the particular legal issues addressed, as the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision based on its prior memoranda and orders without detailing the substantive claims or defenses in this order.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The Court based its affirmance on the reasoning provided in the lower court's Memorandum Opinion dated October 20, 2023; Order dated December 8, 2023; Memorandum Opinion dated April 22, 2024; and Order dated May 10, 2024, without restating those reasons in this appellate opinion.

This is a Delaware Supreme Court case addressing stockholder inspection rights under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The case involves Rhode Island's Employees' Retirement System seeking to inspect Paramount Global's books and records to investigate potential corporate wrongdoing related to the sale of National Amusements and Paramount's handling of acquisition proposals.

1. Whether a stockholder may rely on post-demand evidence (evidence that arises or is disclosed after serving the inspection demand) when establishing a "credible basis" to suspect corporate wrongdoing under Section 220
2. Whether hearsay statements from confidential, unnamed sources in news articles are sufficiently reliable to support a credible basis finding
3. Whether the stockholder's reliance on post-demand evidence prejudiced the corporation

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision and established the following rulings:

1. Post-Demand Evidence: The Court held that while stockholders are generally limited to evidence available at the time of demand, the Court of Chancery may, in its discretion, consider post-demand evidence under exceptional circumstances when: (a) material events occur after the demand but before trial, and (b) the stockholder's reliance on such evidence does not prejudice the corporation. The Court rejected Paramount's argument for a categorical ban on post-demand evidence, finding nothing in Section 220's text prohibits such consideration and noting that a categorical rule would create inefficiencies requiring stockholders to serve new demands whenever material post-demand evidence emerges.
2. Confidential Sources in News Articles: The Court affirmed that hearsay statements in news articles from reputable publications can be sufficiently reliable to support a credible basis finding, even when sources are confidential and unnamed. The Court emphasized this is a fact-specific inquiry, not a categorical rule based solely on publication reputation. The Court of Chancery properly considered multiple factors including: the number of articles (47), corroboration by company public filings, reputation of outlets and journalists, specificity of assertions, absence of unreliability indicators, and Paramount's own reliance on similar articles.
3. No Prejudice Finding: The Court found no abuse of discretion in the Court of Chancery's conclusion that Paramount suffered no prejudice from Rhode Island's reliance on post-demand evidence, noting that the evidence pertained to Paramount's own conduct, the parties stipulated to certain evidence's admissibility, and Paramount offered its own post-demand evidence.
4. Credible Basis Established: The Court upheld the finding that Rhode Island demonstrated a credible basis to suspect that Redstone and National Amusements breached their duty of loyalty by channeling potential buyers away from a company-level transaction toward a National Amusements-level transaction.

This case involves a dispute over the enforceability of a stock purchase agreement's forum selection provision and an arbitrator's decision regarding earnout payments. WWEC Holdings III Corp. purchased a Mississippi LLC from David Hackman for $28.9 million plus a potential earnout based on adjusted EBITDA, with disputes over earnout calculations to be resolved by an independent arbitrator whose decision would be final absent fraud, intentional misrepresentation, or manifest error.

1. Whether the Delaware Court of Chancery or Mississippi Federal Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority or committed manifest error regarding the earnout calculation
2. Whether fraud claims arising from the stock purchase agreement must be brought in Delaware courts under the forum selection provision, despite being filed in Mississippi Federal Court
3. Whether the defendant breached the forum selection provision by filing lawsuits in Mississippi Federal Court
4. Whether the Court has equitable subject matter jurisdiction over the action
5. Whether declaratory judgment claims regarding the validity of fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are ripe for judicial determination

The Court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. Specifically:

1. Counts I and II (Arbitrator Authority and Manifest Error): Dismissed without prejudice in deference to the first-filed Enforcement Action in Mississippi Federal Court. The Court found that the specific carve-out in Section 1.5(e)(ii) of the SPA permits judgment to be entered upon the arbitrator's determination "in any court having jurisdiction over any Party in order to enforce such determination," which allows the defendant to pursue enforcement in Mississippi Federal Court.
2. Counts III and IV (Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation): Motion to dismiss denied. The Court held that the broad forum selection provision in Section 8.10 requires that "[a]ny suit, action or other proceeding arising out of or relating to" the SPA must be brought exclusively in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Fraud claims arising from the SPA fall within this broad provision, and the narrow carve-out in Section 1.5(e)(ii) applies only to enforcement of the arbitrator's award, not fraud claims. The Court also found the declaratory judgment claims were ripe because the defendant had already filed the fraud action in Mississippi Federal Court, demonstrating an actual controversy.
3. Count V (Breach of Forum Selection Provision): Motion to dismiss granted in part and denied in part. The breach claim was dismissed to the extent it was based on the Enforcement Action (which was permitted under Section 1.5(e)(ii)), but sustained to the extent it was based on the Fraud Action (which violated Section 8.10 by being filed in Mississippi rather than Delaware).
4. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Court found it had equitable subject matter jurisdiction because WWEC sought equitable relief, including an injunction against the defendant prosecuting the actions in violation of the forum selection provision.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a securities fraud and unfair business practices lawsuit based on a forum selection clause contained in promissory notes. The plaintiffs invested in a biopharmaceutical company based on allegedly fraudulent representations and seek to recover their losses in Massachusetts federal court, but the defendants moved to dismiss based on a clause requiring disputes to be resolved in Delaware courts.

1. Whether the plaintiffs' claims "arise out of" the promissory notes and thus fall within the scope of the forum selection clause, despite plaintiffs' argument that the fraud preceded the notes themselves
2. Whether the forum selection clause is enforceable under Massachusetts public policy protecting investors and securities purchasers
3. Whether nonsignatory defendants can enforce a forum selection clause signed by a corporate entity on their behalf

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without prejudice. The court held that: (1) the plaintiffs' claims arise out of the promissory notes because the suit requires interpretation of the notes, the notes themselves contain the alleged misrepresentations, and all claimed injuries stem from the purchase of the notes; (2) the forum selection clause is enforceable because plaintiffs failed to meet their heavy burden of showing that Massachusetts public policy bars enforcement—they identified no Massachusetts case declining enforcement on investor protection grounds, and Delaware courts would provide an adequate remedy; and (3) nonsignatory defendants may enforce the forum selection clause when the claims clearly originate from the sale of and misrepresentations in the notes. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that mere inconvenience of out-of-state litigation renders the clause unenforceable.

This is an employment retaliation case in which an employee appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. Harris claimed he was terminated in retaliation for requesting reasonable accommodation for a disability and exercising rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).

1. Whether Harris established a causal nexus between his protected conduct (requesting reasonable accommodation for a disability under Massachusetts law and/or FMLA relief) and his termination
2. Whether the temporal sequence of events—National Grid's termination decision preceding Harris's assertion of protected rights—precludes a finding of retaliation
3. Whether National Grid's actions demonstrated retaliation or, conversely, accommodation of Harris's rights

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for National Grid. The court held that Harris failed to establish the required causal connection between protected conduct and his termination because the chronology of events clearly demonstrated that National Grid decided to terminate Harris on July 30 when it issued an ultimatum that he return to his service territory immediately—before Harris first claimed to have a preexisting medical condition requiring accommodation. The court reasoned that causation moves forward in time, not backward, and therefore protected conduct occurring after an adverse employment action cannot serve as the predicate for retaliation. Additionally, the court found that National Grid's subsequent handling of Harris's accommodation request—providing detailed guidance on required medical documentation and extending deadlines—demonstrated respect for rather than retaliation against his assertion of rights. Harris was ultimately terminated only after he failed to provide adequate medical documentation to support his accommodation request, nearly three weeks after the initial termination decision.

This is a securities law case involving investors who purchased exchange-traded notes (ETNs) issued by Barclays and subsequently challenged a 4:1 reverse split of those securities. The investors alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933 by claiming the reverse split constituted an unregistered sale and was tied to a misleading registration statement.

1. Whether a reverse split of securities constitutes a "sale" under Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act, which prohibits the sale of unregistered securities
2. Whether investors can trace post-split ETNs to a particular registration statement to establish liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act, which prohibits misleading registration statements
3. Whether the April 2021 pricing supplement issued by Barclays constituted a new registration statement covering the ETNs distributed through the reverse split

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that: (1) a reverse split does not constitute a "sale" under the Securities Act because it does not involve a meaningful change in the nature of the investment or investment risks—investors simply exchanged four notes for one note of equivalent value in a mandatory, involuntary transaction requiring no investment decision; and (2) the investors failed to trace their post-split ETNs to the April Supplement because that supplement governed only Barclays' own inventory of post-split ETNs used in market-making transactions, not the ETNs distributed to investors through the reverse split. The court reasoned that subjecting mandatory splits to Securities Act registration requirements would not advance the statute's purpose of protecting investors through disclosure, since investors have no choice in mandatory splits and make no investment decision.

This is a federal drug trafficking case in which Rafael Antonio Fabian was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison, substantially below the Guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment, and appeals on multiple grounds including sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, sentencing reasonableness, and conditions of supervised release.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, or whether the relationship between Fabian and his co-conspirator constituted only a buyer-seller transaction
2. Whether the district court properly responded to jury notes requesting exhibits linking Fabian to certain evidence without improperly injecting itself into jury deliberations
3. Whether the 15-year sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable given a Guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment
4. Whether standard conditions of supervised release were properly imposed without being pronounced at sentencing

The court AFFIRMED the conviction and sentence but VACATED the standard conditions of supervised release and REMANDED for further proceedings. Specifically: (1) Sufficiency of Evidence: The court held that sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy conviction. The evidence demonstrated that Fabian supplied wholesale quantities of cocaine on consignment to Suriel, knowing it would be converted to crack cocaine and resold, advised Suriel on crack production, had a financial stake in Suriel's sales, and exercised control over Suriel's business operations. This went beyond a simple buyer-seller relationship and established a conspiracy. The court rejected Fabian's argument that a buyer-seller exception instruction was required. (2) Jury Instructions and Response to Jury Notes: The district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury's request for exhibits "linking" Fabian to certain evidence. The court properly reminded jurors they were the sole fact-finders, provided relevant exhibits with contextualizing testimony, and did not improperly advocate for guilt. The court's response was fair and within its considerable discretion. (3) Sentencing Reasonableness: Both procedurally and substantively, the 15-year sentence was reasonable. The court properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, properly calculated drug weights using preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for acquitted conduct (as permitted under then-applicable law), and properly applied the criminal-livelihood enhancement. The sentence was well below the Guidelines range and did not shock the conscience or constitute manifest injustice. The court was not required to anticipate Amendment 826 (concerning acquitted conduct) or address crack-powder cocaine sentencing disparities. (4) Standard Conditions of Supervised Release: The court erred by imposing standard conditions of supervised release in the written judgment without pronouncing them at sentencing or making Fabian aware of them. Under United States v. Maiorana, non-mandatory conditions must be orally pronounced or the defendant must be directed to a written copy with express adoption. The case was remanded for the district court to either properly impose the conditions with Fabian's awareness and opportunity to object, or to strike them from the judgment.

This is an immigration law case involving a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision regarding Josue Roman Sanchez's eligibility for relief based on moral character grounds.

Whether the petitioner's scholastic achievements and rehabilitative efforts are sufficient to rebut the presumption of lack of good moral character in light of multiple DUI convictions.

The court's original opinion (filed March 10, 2025) was amended on March 24, 2026 to correct a stylistic error. The amended ruling states that the petitioner's scholastic achievements and rehabilitative efforts are insufficient to rebut the presumption of lack of good moral character because the record demonstrates that the DUI convictions were not an isolated "aberration" given their frequency. The amendment did not change the Court's disposition or judgment, only corrected the language for clarity.

This is an appeal by servicemembers and their spouses who alleged that Maryland state courts violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) by failing to comply with procedural protections before entering judgments against them. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Maryland and the Justices of the Maryland Supreme Court in their official capacities, seeking damages and injunctive relief for violations that occurred during the domestication and enforcement of foreign judgments against them.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to sue the Governor and Supreme Court Justices for alleged SCRA violations, specifically whether their injuries are fairly traceable to the defendants' acts or omissions
2. Whether the domestication of foreign judgments under Maryland's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act triggers SCRA protections
3. Whether the issuance of writs of garnishment implicates SCRA procedural requirements
4. Whether plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint alleging additional defendants (administrative judges and clerks) would cure the standing deficiency

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The majority held that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue any of the defendants because their injuries are not fairly traceable to the defendants' acts or omissions. The court reasoned that while the SCRA directly obligates state courts to comply with its procedural protections, the Justices' failure to promulgate redundant state rules incorporating SCRA requirements did not determinatively or coercively cause the state court clerks' violations. The Relief Act already imposed binding federal obligations on the clerks independent of any state rule, so the Justices' inaction was merely a failure to remind officials of pre-existing duties. The court found no evidence that clerks would have complied with federal law if state rules had incorporated the same protections, making the causal chain too speculative to satisfy traceability requirements. Similarly, plaintiffs failed to show any connection between the Governor's general executive authority and the judicial clerks' conduct. The court also found that plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint adding administrative judges and clerks as defendants would be futile because plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts showing how these officials' acts or omissions caused the injury. Judge Gregory's dissent argued that the Justices' rules would have a predictable and determinative effect on administrative judges' and clerks' compliance, and that the court should recognize that judicial employees naturally look to local rules for guidance on their obligations.

This is an immigration appeal in which a Salvadoran national and former gang member seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order denying him deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The petitioner argues he faces a clear probability of torture if returned to El Salvador due to harsh prison conditions and his past experiences with police torture.

1. Whether El Salvador's harsh prison conditions are specifically intended by the government to inflict torture as required under the CAT
2. Whether the petitioner's past instances of torture by Salvadoran police establish a clear probability of future torture
3. Whether the petitioner's gang affiliation and prior police encounters increase his individual risk of torture upon return to El Salvador
4. The proper standard of review for factual findings in CAT cases (substantial evidence standard with high deference to the immigration judge)

The Fifth Circuit upheld the BIA's denial of CAT protection on two grounds. First, substantial evidence supports the finding that El Salvador's harsh prison conditions are not specifically intended by the government to inflict torture. The court found that while conditions are poor, the government has taken credible steps to punish officials for human rights abuses, and advertising poor conditions as a deterrent to gang activity does not demonstrate intent to torture. Second, the court found that although Salvadoran security forces previously tortured the petitioner on two occasions, his future risk of torture is only speculative. The court reasoned that isolated instances of past torture do not establish a clear probability of future torture, especially since the petitioner was not tortured during an 11-year prior prison term. The court also noted that El Salvador's "state of exception" policy may actually decrease the risk of targeted torture by allowing detention of gang members without needing to inflict harm to secure confessions. The court emphasized the highly deferential substantial evidence standard for reviewing CAT factual findings and found no basis to overturn the immigration judge's well-reasoned conclusions.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a murder conviction where the state failed to disclose initial witness interviews and intentionally destroyed recordings of those interviews. The petitioner argues these actions violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights under Brady v. Maryland and California v. Trombetta/Arizona v. Youngblood.

1. Whether the state's failure to disclose initial interviews with three eyewitnesses constituted a Brady violation requiring reversal of the conviction
2. Whether the state's intentional destruction of recordings of those interviews violated due process under Trombetta and Youngblood, and whether the trial court's chosen remedy (barring the prosecution from calling the witnesses) was constitutionally adequate
3. The appropriate standard of review for habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which requires showing the state court acted "contrary to" or made an "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief. Although the court acknowledged that the state's conduct in hiding and destroying evidence was troubling and violated due process principles, it held that under the highly deferential § 2254 standard, the petitioner failed to meet the demanding requirements for habeas relief. On the Brady claim, the court deferred to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' finding that the suppressed witness statements were not "favorable" to the petitioner because the witnesses did not identify him as the shooter, likely would not have identified him anyway, and the mere destruction of recordings does not compel a conclusion they contained exculpatory evidence. On the Trombetta/Youngblood claim, the court held that neither Supreme Court precedent indisputably forbids the remedy imposed (barring prosecution from calling the witnesses) nor compels a different remedy such as an adverse-inference instruction. The court emphasized that while it might have analyzed the issues differently on direct review, § 2254 requires great deference to state court decisions, and relief is warranted only where "no possibility [exists that] fairminded jurists could disagree" with the state court's decision.

This is a Fourth Amendment excessive force case arising from a drug search warrant execution in which law enforcement officers tackled a suspect and struck him with a rifle barrel, causing a head injury requiring stitches. Steinhoff sued three officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the use of force was excessive and violated his constitutional rights.

1. Whether Detective Kowalczyk's tackle of Steinhoff during the execution of a search warrant for methamphetamine violated the Fourth Amendment and whether the right was clearly established at the time of the incident.
2. Whether Investigator Malovrh's alleged intentional strike to Steinhoff's head with a rifle barrel constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and whether qualified immunity applies.
3. The proper standard for evaluating excessive force claims during dynamic, high-risk drug raids involving suspects with violent histories.
4. Whether disputed factual questions regarding intent and the circumstances of the rifle strike preclude summary judgment.

The court affirmed qualified immunity for Detective Kowalczyk, holding that even assuming Steinhoff was compliant and not attempting to flee, the tackle did not violate clearly established law given the dangerous circumstances of a drug raid involving individuals with violent histories and potential flight risk. The court emphasized that officers executing such warrants must make split-second judgments in dynamic situations, and no clearly established precedent put Detective Kowalczyk on notice that his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed summary judgment for Investigator Malovrh regarding the rifle strike, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of an intentional blow to warrant jury consideration. The court noted that Steinhoff's testimony of seeing a rifle swing toward his head while standing, the audible "clink" on the video, the severity of the injury, and the fact that only Investigator Malovrh had a rifle (other than Captain Ramberg who did not participate) created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the blow was intentional. The court concluded that if intentional, such a blow could constitute deadly force against a non-resisting suspect, violating clearly established law, and remanded for trial.

This case involves a petition for review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders establishing a methodology for calculating exit fees that members of Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., a generation-and-transmission cooperative, must pay to terminate their long-term all-requirements contracts and leave the cooperative. The central dispute concerns whether FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting a lost-revenues approach and adopting a balance-sheet approach for calculating these exit fees.

1. Whether FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by rejecting a lost-revenues approach to calculating exit fees in favor of a balance-sheet approach
2. Whether the balance-sheet approach violates cost-causation principles under the Federal Power Act's "just and reasonable" standard
3. Whether FERC properly adopted a transmission-crediting mechanism and whether it was arbitrary to include non-networked debt in the transmission credit
4. Whether FERC acted arbitrarily by applying the balance-sheet approach to Eastern Interconnection members despite potential obligations under Tri-State's contract with Basin Electric Power Cooperative
5. Whether FERC properly distinguished prior precedent regarding lost-revenues approaches in exit-fee calculations

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed FERC's orders and denied Tri-State's petitions for review. The court held that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking and did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in any of its decisions. Specifically:

1. Lost-Revenues Approach: FERC reasonably rejected the lost-revenues approach because: (1) there is no breach of contract when a member exits under the tariff, so breach-of-contract damages are inappropriate; (2) the approach would overcompensate Tri-State by allowing it to recover decades of projected revenues never actually earned; (3) neither the Service Contracts nor bylaws mandate a lost-revenues approach; and (4) the approach would improperly deter member withdrawal and violate cost-causation principles.
2. Balance-Sheet Approach: FERC reasonably adopted the balance-sheet approach because it: (1) accounts for departing members' ownership interests in Tri-State; (2) reflects the likelihood that departing members will continue using Tri-State's transmission services; (3) allows Tri-State to mitigate costs through the two-year notice period; (4) satisfies the exit fee's purpose of compensating Tri-State for costs incurred to serve the departing member; and (5) is supported by substantial record evidence. The approach is not arbitrary merely because it is novel.
3. Transmission-Crediting Mechanism: FERC reasonably adopted the transmission credit and properly applied it to departing members' entire OATT invoices because: (1) applying the credit to the entire invoice ensures departing members receive the full benefit of their transmission-related debt payments; (2) applying it only to debt-related portions would create a windfall for Tri-State; and (3) FERC did not arbitrarily change the credit's purpose by including non-networked debt, as the credit's purpose was always to ensure full recovery of transmission-related debt costs while preventing double recovery and cost shifts.
4. Eastern Interconnection Members: FERC reasonably applied the balance-sheet approach to Eastern Interconnection members despite the Basin contract because: (1) FERC has broad discretion to handle related but discrete issues in separate proceedings; (2) the exit-fee methodology and Tri-State's Basin contract obligations are distinct issues; (3) FERC concluded in a separate proceeding that Tri-State would not breach the Basin contract by allowing member withdrawals; and (4) any potential breach affects a member's ability to exit regardless of the methodology used.
5. Precedent: FERC reasonably distinguished prior cases (Shoshone, Norwood, American Wind, and Wabash) because they involved different factual circumstances, different contracts, or different procedural contexts, and none mandated the use of a lost-revenues approach in all cooperative member exit situations.

The court emphasized that it affords great deference to FERC in rate decisions and that its role is limited to ensuring FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, not to substituting its own judgment for FERC's. The court found that FERC weighed competing views, selected an exit-fee formula with adequate record support, and intelligibly explained its reasons for its choices.

Concurrence/Dissent: Judge McHugh concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on all issues except the inclusion of non-networked debt in the transmission credit. Judge McHugh argued that including non-networked debt in the credit is inconsistent with FERC's stated purpose of preventing cost shifts to remaining members, as it would naturally shift costs to other members for the departing member's share of non-networked transmission debt.

This is a criminal appeal of an orthopedic surgeon, Lawrence Alexander, who was convicted of making a false statement relating to health care matters under 18 U.S.C. § 1035 in connection with a durable medical equipment company's Medicare enrollment application. Alexander was acquitted on a conspiracy charge but convicted on the false statement charge and sentenced to 33 months imprisonment with restitution and forfeiture orders.

1. Whether venue was proper in the Southern District of Florida
2. Whether the indictment sufficiently stated an offense under § 1035
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support conviction under § 1035, including whether the false statement was material to Medicare
4. Whether the evidence supported conviction under an aiding and abetting theory
5. Whether jury instructions on materiality and deliberate ignorance were proper
6. Whether the forfeiture order of $125,000 was proper
7. Whether the restitution order of $315,704.52 was proper

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and most of the district court's orders but vacated the restitution award and remanded for further proceedings. Specifically:

1. Venue: Affirmed as proper based on overwhelming circumstantial evidence that the crime occurred in the Southern District of Florida, where Silent Hill was located, the defendants resided, and Waxman's office was situated.
2. Motion to Dismiss: Affirmed the denial of the motion because the indictment sufficiently tracked the statutory language of § 1035 and provided adequate notice of the charges with factual allegations about Medicare enrollment requirements.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence—Materiality: Affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence that the false ownership statement was material to Medicare because expert testimony established that ownership disclosures are important to Medicare's decisions regarding enrollment and billing privileges, and false information could lead to enrollment termination.
4. Sufficiency of Evidence—Aiding and Abetting: Affirmed the conviction, finding the government proved all three elements: (1) the substantive offense was committed; (2) Alexander contributed to the false statement by providing his mother's information and suggesting she be listed as owner; and (3) Alexander intended to aid the submission because he consented to CMS 855S forms before submission and Waxman never signed documents on his mother's behalf without permission.
5. Jury Instructions: Affirmed both instructions. The materiality instruction was subject to invited error because Alexander himself proposed the identical language he later challenged. The deliberate ignorance instruction argument was waived because Alexander raised it for the first time in his reply brief.
6. Forfeiture: Affirmed the $125,000 forfeiture order. Although the district court failed to enter a preliminary forfeiture order before sentencing as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B), the procedural error was harmless because Alexander had fair notice of the forfeiture claim, the specific amount, and a full opportunity to contest it at the hearing.
7. Restitution: Vacated and remanded. The court found insufficient evidence that the January 2019 false statement actually caused Medicare's loss. While a § 1035 conviction requires only that a false statement be capable of influencing a decision, restitution requires proof that the defendant's conduct actually and proximately caused the victim's loss. The government failed to show that Medicare ever reviewed or relied upon the January 2019 form, and the parties stipulated that no letter of receipt or processing was produced. Mere speculation that Medicare might have relied on the form is insufficient to meet the government's burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

This is an appeal of a Court of Chancery decision in a commercial dispute where the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs and awarded them attorneys' fees and costs related to defendants' discovery misconduct. The Delaware Supreme Court addresses whether the appeal is properly before it or should be dismissed as interlocutory.

1. Whether the appeal is a final judgment or an interlocutory order subject to dismissal under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42
2. Whether an order titled "Final Order and Judgment" is conclusively final for appellate purposes when material issues remain unresolved
3. Whether the unresolved amount of attorneys' fees prevents the judgment from being final

The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. The court held that despite the order's title as "Final Order and Judgment," it was not truly final because the amount of attorneys' fees awarded in the Sanctions Decision remained unresolved in the Court of Chancery. The court applied the legal standard that a final judgment must "determine the merits of the controversy or define the rights of the parties and leave nothing for future determination or consideration." Since material issues—specifically the amount of attorneys' fees—remained pending before the trial court, the appeal was premature and lacked appellate jurisdiction. The court allowed defendants to apply the filing fee to any future appeal filed after a truly final order is entered.

This is a Delaware limited liability company dispute in which a member and former director alleges that the company's board of directors acted in bad faith by withholding tax distributions to members for calendar years 2022 through 2025, contrary to the operating agreement's requirements.

1. Whether the board of directors breached its obligation under the operating agreement to make quarterly tax distributions to members when cash was available after reasonable reserves
2. Whether the board acted in good faith in withholding tax distributions, given the operating agreement's presumption that the board is conclusively presumed to act in good faith when it subjectively believes its decisions are in the company's best interests
3. Whether the board made required quarterly determinations of available cash and reserves
4. Whether the board's true motive was to pressure members to sell their equity at a discount

The court denied the company's request for leave to move for summary judgment. The court reasoned that although the operating agreement contains a presumption of good faith, the determination of whether the board acted in bad faith involves credibility assessments and weighing of evidence regarding the board's motivations that are best resolved at trial rather than on summary judgment. The court noted that even where facts are undisputed, summary judgment may be declined when a more thorough exploration of the facts is needed to properly apply the law, and that trial was only weeks away, making it the appropriate forum to assess the parties' evidence and credibility.

This is a guardianship case involving an 86-year-old man with cognitive impairment where the appointed guardian sought emergency court authorization to withdraw life-sustaining mechanical ventilation and change the ward's code status from "full code" to a more restrictive status. The case addresses the interaction between Delaware's newly adopted Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and Court of Chancery Rule 178-A regarding a guardian's authority to override a ward's health-care instructions.

1. Whether a guardian may override a ward's health-care instructions regarding code status and life-sustaining treatment without court authorization under the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of 2023 (16 Del. C. § 2522).
2. The conflict between Court of Chancery Rule 178-A and the substantive requirements of the Act regarding guardian authority over life-sustaining treatment decisions.
3. Whether the ward's April 2024 Do Not Resuscitate directive was validly revoked by his October 2024 election of "full code" status, and whether that later instruction was made with capacity.
4. The evidentiary standard required for court authorization to override a valid health-care instruction made with capacity—specifically, whether clear and convincing evidence supports overriding the ward's wishes.
5. The proper scope of the court's role as "conscientious steward" when evaluating a guardian's request to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.

The court denied the Emergency Petition. The court held that:

1. The Act's substantive requirement that a guardian obtain court authorization before revoking or disregarding a health-care instruction (16 Del. C. § 2522(a)) controls over the procedural Rule 178-A, which attempted to permit guardians to act upon medical confirmation of irreversible decline without court approval. The court's rule-making authority cannot override statutory provisions.
2. The ward's April 2024 DMOST (Do Not Resuscitate directive) was validly revoked by his October 25, 2024 election of "full code" status. The medical record expressly documented that J.L.S. "had capacity to make the decision" at that time, and the Act presumes capacity unless rebutted. The Guardian did not present evidence rebutting this presumption.
3. The ward reaffirmed his full code preference in January 2026 while awake and oriented to person and place, further supporting the validity of his October 2024 instruction.
4. Although the physicians' testimony established a grave medical prognosis and irreversible decline, the Act does not permit a guardian or court to disregard a valid health-care instruction solely because of worsened prognosis or to substitute the court's assessment of medical circumstances for a health-care instruction made with capacity.
5. The Guardian failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard required to authorize action inconsistent with J.L.S.'s full code instructions. There was no evidence that J.L.S. lacked capacity when he elected full code status, and the Guardian did not seek such a finding.
6. The court emphasized its role as a "conscientious steward" for those who cannot advocate for themselves, and that role requires respecting valid health-care instructions made with capacity, even when medical circumstances have deteriorated significantly.

This is a Fourth Amendment excessive force case arising from the arrest of a protester at a sit-in at the Vermont state capitol. The central issue is whether a police sergeant was entitled to qualified immunity when he used a rear wristlock on a passively resisting protester to remove her from the building.

1. Whether the use of a rear wristlock on a passively resisting protester during arrest constitutes excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether prior Circuit precedent (Amnesty America v. West Hartford) clearly established that such conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, thereby denying qualified immunity
3. The standard for determining when a constitutional right is "clearly established" for qualified immunity purposes—specifically, whether precedent must involve factually identical circumstances or whether "fundamentally similar" facts suffice

The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that Sergeant Zorn was entitled to qualified immunity. The majority reasoned that Amnesty America did not clearly establish that Zorn's specific conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because: (1) Amnesty America involved a wide range of aggressive conduct without clearly holding that any particular action violated the Constitution; (2) Amnesty America acknowledged that a reasonable jury could find the officers' use of force was objectively reasonable; (3) Zorn gave repeated warnings before using the wristlock, distinguishing his conduct from the Amnesty America case; and (4) the prior precedent lacked the "high degree of specificity" required to put a reasonable officer on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful. Justice Sotomayor's dissent argued that Amnesty America specifically addressed rear wristlocks on passively resisting protesters and clearly established that such conduct could constitute excessive force, and that the majority improperly required a factually identical case rather than merely "fundamentally similar" circumstances.

This is an appeal concerning whether New York City's Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGMVPL), which establishes a two-year revival window for civil claims arising from sexual and gender-based violence, is preempted by New York State's earlier revival windows under the Child Victims Act (CVA) and Adult Survivors Act (ASA). The plaintiff brought claims that would have been time-barred absent the City's 2022 amendments to the VGMVPL.

1. Whether the VGMVPL's two-year revival window (March 2023 to March 2025) is preempted by the CVA's and ASA's earlier revival periods under the doctrine of conflict preemption
2. Whether the CVA and ASA occupy the field of revival actions for sexual assault claims, thereby precluding local legislation under the doctrine of field preemption
3. Whether the state and city laws regulate sufficiently different conduct to avoid preemption
4. The scope of home rule authority for New York City municipalities under the New York State Constitution

Rather than deciding the case, the Second Circuit certified the preemption question to the New York Court of Appeals. The court found that: (1) no controlling precedent from the New York Court of Appeals exists on whether the CVA and ASA preempt the VGMVPL's revival window; (2) the question involves important issues of state public policy, including home rule principles and the state's policy of providing remedies to victims of sexual abuse; and (3) certification would resolve the litigation and allow numerous pending state court cases to be decided by the appropriate state court. The court noted that both sides presented forceful arguments rooted in statutory text and history, and that New York's general preemption law was insufficient to predict with confidence how the Court of Appeals would rule. The panel retained jurisdiction to decide the case once it receives the Court of Appeals' response.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction freezing assets of loan guarantors in a breach of contract action. Lenders (Leadenhall) sought to freeze both borrowers' and guarantors' assets after the borrowers defaulted on a $609 million loan, but the appellate court addressed whether the district court had authority to freeze the guarantors' assets specifically.

1. Whether a district court has equitable power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to issue a preliminary injunction freezing assets of guarantors when the creditor claims no lien or equitable interest in those assets, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999)
2. Whether Leadenhall established a lien on the guarantors' assets based on the guarantee agreement
3. Whether Leadenhall established an equitable interest in the guarantors' assets based on its contract claims
4. Whether the preliminary injunction could be alternatively affirmed as a prejudgment attachment under New York law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64

The Second Circuit vacated the portion of the preliminary injunction restraining the guarantors' assets and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Grupo Mexicano prohibits a district court from issuing a preliminary injunction freezing assets in which no lien or equitable interest is claimed, and this prohibition applies to the guarantors' assets in this case
2. Leadenhall failed to establish a lien on the guarantors' assets because: (a) the guarantors did not pledge any of their own assets as collateral; (b) Leadenhall has no contractual right to foreclose upon or control the guarantors' assets; and (c) Leadenhall is therefore not a secured creditor as to the guarantors
3. Leadenhall failed to establish an equitable interest because: (a) its contract claims seek only monetary damages for breach of contract, which is quintessentially a legal remedy, not an equitable one; (b) the obligation at issue is for the guarantors to pay money (fungible assets), not to restore particular identified property; (c) specific performance of a contract to pay money was not traditionally available in equity; and (d) Leadenhall seeks no final equitable relief (such as restitution, rescission, or accounting) to which a preliminary asset freeze could be ancillary
4. The district court's reliance on the guarantee agreement was misplaced because guaranteeing payment of a debt does not create an equitable interest in the guarantor's assets when the claim is for money damages
5. The alternative basis of prejudgment attachment under New York law could not be affirmed because the district court made no factual findings required for attachment (such as whether guarantors acted with intent to frustrate enforcement), and the parties were not afforded an opportunity to brief this distinct remedy

This is a securities law case in which investors challenged Barclays' issuance of exchange-traded notes (ETNs) under the Securities Act of 1933. The investors claimed that Barclays violated the Securities Act by conducting a 4:1 reverse split of the ETNs without proper registration and by relying on a registration statement containing allegedly misleading information.

1. Whether a reverse split of securities constitutes a "sale" under Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act, which prohibits the sale of unregistered securities
2. Whether investors can trace post-split ETNs to a particular registration statement to establish liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act, which prohibits misleading registration statements
3. Whether the April 2021 pricing supplement issued by Barclays constituted a new registration statement covering the ETNs distributed through the reverse split

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that: (1) a reverse split does not constitute a "sale" under the Securities Act because it does not involve a meaningful change in the nature of the investment or investment risks—investors simply exchanged four notes for one note of equal value without making any investment decision or providing consideration; and (2) the investors failed to trace their post-split ETNs to the April Supplement because that supplement governed only Barclays' inventory of post-split ETNs held for market-making transactions, not the ETNs distributed to investors through the reverse split. The court reasoned that the reverse split was a mandatory, involuntary transaction that did not advance the Securities Act's purpose of protecting investors through disclosure, and that the April Supplement's language and context demonstrated it was not a registration statement for the split ETNs themselves.

This case involves a dispute between a labor union and a nuclear power plant operator over whether a grievance concerning healthcare contribution adjustments must be submitted to arbitration under their collective bargaining agreement. The union sought to compel arbitration of a 2022 benefits dispute, while the company argued the grievance fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause.

1. Whether a grievance regarding healthcare contribution adjustments falls within the scope of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement
2. Whether the union's claimed right derives from the current collective bargaining agreement or from a prior arbitration award and framework agreements that were superseded by a merger clause
3. The proper standard for determining arbitrability when the merits and arbitrability questions are inextricably intertwined
4. Whether a court may examine factual predicates (whether Energy Harbor's health plan actually increased costs) when determining whether a dispute arises under a specific contract provision

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision and held that the grievance falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause. The majority reasoned that although the arbitration clause is broad, the union's grievance does not arise from the collective bargaining agreement itself. The union's claimed right to increased contributions rests on a prior arbitration award and framework agreements that were nullified by the merger clause in the new agreement. Article VIII of the new agreement only requires Energy Harbor to match increases it makes to its own health care plan; since there was no evidence that Energy Harbor increased its health care plan costs from 2021 to 2022, the dispute could not arise under that provision. The court held that examining whether Energy Harbor's health plan actually incurred an increase was a necessary predicate fact to determine arbitrability, not an impermissible inquiry into the merits. The dissent argued that the union's grievance invokes a right plainly found in the CBA and that the majority improperly examined the merits of the claim rather than simply determining whether the grievance arose from a specific contract provision.

This is an appellate matter in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the government's petition for panel rehearing in a criminal case against Nicole K. Schuster, vacating its previously issued opinion and judgment from January 14, 2026.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this order, as it is a procedural ruling on the petition for rehearing rather than a substantive opinion on the merits.

The court granted the government's petition for panel rehearing, vacated the opinion and judgment issued on January 14, 2026, and indicated that a revised opinion and judgment would be filed. The court did not provide reasoning in this order, as it is a procedural grant of rehearing rather than a decision on the underlying legal questions.

This case involves a professional pilot, Glen Hardwick, whose pilot's license was suspended for 150 days by the FAA after he twice flew an airplane whose physical tail number did not match its registration documents and airworthiness certificate. Hardwick appealed to the NTSB, which affirmed the suspension, and he subsequently petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review.

1. Whether Hardwick reasonably relied on representations from the aircraft owner and the FAA that the registered tail number had reverted, justifying his belief that the plane was airworthy and properly registered
2. Whether the 150-day suspension was an excessive penalty for what Hardwick characterized as merely administrative violations with no safety implications
3. Whether the NTSB arbitrarily and capriciously treated Hardwick differently than pilot Scott Breeze, who flew the same aircraft under similar circumstances but was not suspended
4. Whether the NTSB's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence

The Fifth Circuit denied Hardwick's petition and upheld the 150-day suspension. The court held that: (1) Hardwick's reasonable reliance defense failed because, as pilot-in-command, he had the independent obligation and ability to verify the aircraft's registration and airworthiness status, and he ignored multiple red flags including taped-on tail numbers, paperwork warnings from the owner, and a written Condition Notice from FAA inspectors; (2) the tail number reversion theory lacked factual and legal support, and even if it had merit, it would not excuse Hardwick's failure to verify current registration status; (3) the suspension was not excessive because the NTSB sanctioned Hardwick for flying an unairworthy aircraft due to mismatched registration and airworthiness certificates, which constitutes a sanctionable violation regardless of whether the violation was administrative or safety-related; and (4) differential treatment of Breeze was not arbitrary because the FAA later determined that Breeze had actually displayed the correct tail number and was properly registered, whereas Hardwick displayed the incorrect tail number and lacked a valid airworthiness certificate for his aircraft's registered number.

This is a criminal appeal in which Jaterron Williamson challenges his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), arguing that the statute violates the Second Amendment and exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to Williamson, specifically whether his prior felony convictions for "Deadly Conduct – Discharge Firearm at Individual" are analogous to colonial-era offenses punishable by execution or estate forfeiture under the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen.
2. Whether § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.
3. Whether the district court erred by relying on pre-Bruen caselaw rather than applying the correct post-Bruen legal framework.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Williamson's conviction. The court held that Williamson's as-applied Second Amendment challenge fails because his prior felony convictions for deadly conduct are closely analogous to the deadly conduct conviction relied upon in United States v. Reyes, which had already rejected a similar as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1). The court noted that one panel cannot overturn another panel's decision absent an intervening change in law or Supreme Court action. The court also found that Williamson's Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed by binding precedent. While the concurring opinion expressed doubts about whether prior precedent correctly rejected enumerated-powers challenges to § 922(g)(1) and noted inconsistencies in how courts have applied the Bruen framework to as-applied challenges, the court was bound by existing circuit precedent and therefore affirmed the conviction.

This is a federal drug trafficking and firearms case in which Paul Curry was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Curry appeals his convictions and 154-month sentence, challenging the sufficiency of evidence, the admission of jail call recordings, and the reasonableness of his sentence.

1. Whether sufficient evidence supported Curry's convictions on Count II (possession of cocaine with intent to distribute) and Count V (carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime)
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting jail call recordings where Curry discussed money and the vehicle
3. Whether Curry's 154-month sentence was substantively unreasonable given his physical and mental health conditions
4. Whether Curry waived his sufficiency of evidence challenge by failing to renew his Rule 29 motion after declining to present defense evidence

The Sixth Circuit affirmed all of Curry's convictions and his sentence. On sufficiency of evidence: The court held that Curry did not waive his sufficiency challenge because when the defense rested without presenting evidence, the close of the government's case constituted the "close of all evidence." Regardless, the court found sufficient evidence for both convictions. For Count II, the approximately one ounce of cocaine found in the vehicle, combined with a digital scale, sandwich bags, large sums of money on Cash App cards, and expert testimony that drug dealers (not users) typically carry such items, supported the intent to distribute element. For Count V, the loaded firearm found in the center console next to Curry, in close proximity to the drug evidence, was sufficient to show he carried the firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime. On jail call admissions: The court found the recordings were relevant to establish Curry's control of the vehicle (which was registered to Francine Gill), as Curry discussed paying for the car and having money in it. The calls were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 because they made it more probable that Curry controlled the vehicle despite Gill's registration. The court rejected Curry's Rule 403 prejudice argument, finding the government properly focused on vehicle ownership and the large sums of money as evidence of intent to distribute. On sentencing: The court rejected Curry's claim that his 154-month sentence was substantively unreasonable. Although the district court considered Curry's IQ of 62, major depressive disorder, stage V chronic kidney disease, and hypertension, it properly weighed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and determined that punishment, deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation counseled for the within-Guidelines sentence. The sentence fell in the middle of the 144-165 month Guidelines range and carried a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, which Curry failed to rebut. The court's recommendation for a medical facility and mental health aftercare demonstrated it did not ignore Curry's health conditions. The court's denial of a downward departure was unreviewable on appeal because there was no evidence the court believed it lacked authority to grant one.

This is a First Amendment retaliation case arising from the arrest of Daniel and Shatina Grady during a police shooting investigation in Michigan. The Gradys were arrested for obstructing officers and refusing to comply with orders to leave the police perimeter, and they subsequently sued officers for retaliatory arrest based on their protected speech (filming and criticizing police).

1. Whether officers had probable cause to arrest the Gradys under Michigan law for obstructing officers and failing to comply with lawful orders
2. Whether the Gradys satisfied the "narrow exception" to the probable cause rule established in Nieves v. Bartlett, which permits retaliatory arrest claims to proceed when a plaintiff presents objective evidence that similarly situated individuals not engaged in protected speech were not arrested
3. Whether the neighbors across the street from the target residence were "similarly situated" comparators for purposes of the Nieves exception
4. Whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and held that the Gradys' First Amendment retaliation claim fails as a matter of law. The court concluded: (1) Officers had probable cause to arrest the Gradys under Michigan law for obstructing officers and refusing to comply with lawful orders to back away from the police perimeter; (2) The Gradys failed to satisfy the Nieves exception because their proposed comparators (neighbors across the street) were not "similarly situated"—the neighbors did not engage in the same conduct that gave rise to probable cause for the Gradys' arrest (entering the perimeter and defying direct orders); (3) For comparators to be "similarly situated" under Nieves, they must have engaged in similar conduct to that which led to the claimant's arrest, and the Gradys' comparators failed this baseline requirement; (4) The Gradys presented no other objective evidence to satisfy the Nieves exception; and (5) Therefore, the general rule that probable cause defeats retaliatory arrest claims applies, and officers Cratsenburg and Pearson are entitled to qualified immunity.

This is a federal drug conspiracy appeal in which Michael Bailey, an incarcerated member of the Aryan Nation gang, was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl. Bailey appealed his 300-month sentence, challenging the jury instructions, admission of evidence, and sufficiency of evidence supporting the convictions.

1. Whether the jury instructions on conspiracy elements were accurate and complete, specifically whether the district court erred by using two elements instead of three and by failing to provide a specific instruction on law enforcement officer credibility
2. Whether evidence of Bailey's gang affiliation was relevant and whether its probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice
3. Whether disciplinary records showing Bailey's cell phone possession while incarcerated were properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
4. Whether a recorded phone call between Bailey and his mother was properly authenticated and admissible
5. Whether sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 846

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Bailey's convictions on all grounds. The court held that: (1) the conspiracy instructions accurately reflected the law, with the two-element formulation being substantively equivalent to the later-amended three-element version; (2) no specific law enforcement credibility instruction was required because the jury received adequate general witness credibility instructions; (3) gang affiliation evidence was relevant to demonstrate the relationship between co-conspirators and was not unfairly prejudicial, especially given a limiting instruction; (4) disciplinary records showing cell phone possession were admissible to prove identity and opportunity under Rule 404(b), and Bailey waived his hearsay objection to the phone call while the authentication foundation was sufficient; and (5) sufficient evidence supported the convictions, as Bailey coordinated drug transactions weekly for months through contraband cell phones, connected suppliers to purchasers, instructed co-conspirators on drug distribution, and benefited from the proceeds, demonstrating his knowledge of and voluntary participation in the conspiracy.

This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Marion Thomas against police officers Daniel McAuliffe and Michael Botica, and the City of Chicago, challenging his arrest following a traffic stop. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of Thomas's motion for a new trial.

1. Whether the "Issues" jury instruction improperly allowed the jury to consider whether officers had probable cause to arrest for any crime under the "any crime" rule, rather than only for resisting arrest
2. Whether the "Authorized Acts" jury instruction was erroneous for failing to define the distinction between "resisting" and "obstructing" a police officer under Illinois law
3. Whether Officer Morales's testimony regarding a "grinder" found in the vehicle (which differed from his deposition reference to a "cutter") constituted fraud warranting a new trial as a sanction
4. Whether defense counsel's question about Thomas's criminal record, though objected to and sustained, warranted a new trial

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on all grounds. The court held:

1. The "Issues" instruction was legally correct because under the "any crime" rule established in Devenpeck v. Alford, a false arrest claim is defeated when there was probable cause to arrest for any crime. The officers had probable cause to arrest Thomas for both the turn-signal violation and marijuana possession.
2. The "Authorized Acts" instruction, read as a whole with the other instructions, adequately conveyed the law without requiring explicit definitions of "resisting" versus "obstructing." The instruction sufficiently informed the jury that Thomas had an obligation to comply with lawful police commands, and the jury could reasonably conclude he obstructed the officers through his refusal to comply with their commands.
3. Officer Morales's testimony about the "grinder" did not constitute fraud or willful misconduct warranting a new trial. The discrepancy between "cutter" and "grinder" represented a disagreement about colloquial names for marijuana tools rather than fraudulent testimony. The district court properly handled the issue through cross-examination and a stipulation informing the jury of the inconsistency.
4. Thomas suffered no prejudice from the question about his criminal record because the court sustained his objection, he never answered, and the jury was instructed that questions and objections are not evidence.

This is an immigration law case in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addresses whether it has jurisdiction to review a petition challenging only a denial of Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief without also challenging the underlying final order of removal. The court holds that it lacks jurisdiction over such standalone CAT claims.

1. Whether a petition for review challenging only a denial of CAT relief, without challenging the final order of removal, is sufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)
2. Whether an order denying CAT protection merges into the final order of removal for purposes of judicial review
3. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Monsalvo v. Bondi (regarding voluntary departure orders) extends to CAT orders
4. Whether a jurisdictional ruling can be given prospective effect only
5. Whether a petitioner may amend a petition to add a nominal challenge to the removal order to invoke jurisdiction

The Ninth Circuit dismissed Navarrete's petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that: (1) Congress has conferred jurisdiction to review only "final orders of removal" under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); (2) pursuant to Supreme Court precedent in Nasrallah v. Barr, Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, and Riley v. Bondi, an order denying CAT protection does not affect the validity of the final order of removal and therefore does not merge into it; (3) CAT claims can only be reviewed as part of a petition challenging a final order of removal, requiring an independent jurisdictional basis; (4) Monsalvo v. Bondi, which addressed voluntary departure orders, is distinguishable because voluntary departure orders condition the authority to remove altogether, while CAT orders merely condition the manner of removal; (5) a jurisdictional ruling cannot be made prospective only as a matter of law; and (6) Navarrete's request to amend his petition to add a nominal challenge to his removal order was properly denied as futile because he conceded any such challenge would be baseless and frivolous, failing to meet the requirement of asserting at least a colorable claim.

This is a criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of unlawfully dealing firearms without a license. The case addresses whether a sentencing enhancement for firearms trafficking requires that the transferee actually be an unlawful possessor or intend to use the firearm unlawfully, or merely that the defendant believed this to be true.

1. Whether Application Note 13 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) requires that the transferee actually be an unlawful possessor or intend to use the firearm unlawfully, or only that the defendant "knew or had reason to believe" this to be the case
2. Whether Ferrari preserved his argument on appeal when he shifted from arguing he lacked the requisite belief to arguing the enhancement requires an objective truth requirement
3. Whether out-of-circuit interpretations of similar criminal firearms statutes should guide interpretation of the sentencing enhancement

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's application of the firearms trafficking enhancement. The court held that the plain text of Application Note 13 does not require that the transferee actually be an unlawful possessor or intend to use the firearm unlawfully. Rather, the enhancement applies if the defendant "knew or had reason to believe" this to be true, regardless of whether the belief was accurate. The court reasoned that: (1) Ferrari preserved his claim challenging the enhancement's applicability because his basic argument remained the same despite shifting legal theories; (2) the ordinary meaning of "reason to believe" does not include an "and it must be true" requirement; (3) the Sentencing Commission could have included such a requirement but did not; (4) the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits agree with this interpretation; and (5) Ferrari's reliance on the Tenth Circuit's Francis decision and out-of-circuit interpretations of separate criminal statutes was unpersuasive. Since Ferrari abandoned his factual argument that he lacked the requisite belief and the facts showed he had reason to believe the undercover agents were unlawful possessors, the enhancement was properly applied.

This is a Free Exercise Clause and Free Speech Clause challenge to California's prohibition on sectarian instruction in charter school independent study programs. Parents sought to use faith-based curricula in state-funded independent study programs but were denied, and they sued claiming the denial violated their First Amendment rights.

1. Whether California's prohibition on sectarian or denominational doctrine in public schools, including charter school independent study programs, violates the Free Exercise Clause when applied to deny parents' requests to use religious curricula
2. Whether the independent study programs constitute "public school programs" subject to secular education requirements, or alternatively, whether they are subsidies for private homeschooling that cannot discriminate based on religious status
3. Whether requiring parents to use state-approved secular materials in independent study programs constitutes compelled speech in violation of the Free Speech Clause
4. Whether California's Blaine Amendment, which prohibits teaching of "sectarian or denominational doctrine" in public schools, facially discriminates between religious doctrines in violation of the First Amendment

The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. The majority held that: (1) California's independent study programs are public school programs with critical features characteristic of public schools under Carson v. Makin (free to attend, accept all students, substantially equivalent to classroom instruction, aligned to state standards, coordinated by state-certified teachers), and therefore California may condition participation on secular curricula without violating the Free Exercise Clause; (2) a public school's curriculum constitutes government speech not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny, so requiring use of state-approved materials does not violate the Free Speech Clause; and (3) the extensive legal requirements applicable to independent study programs make them public school programs that defeat plaintiffs' free exercise claim. The dissenting judges argued that the programs are fundamentally homeschooling with parental choice and supervision, that recent Supreme Court precedent (Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, Carson) prohibits discrimination against religious beneficiaries of generally available public benefits, and that California's Blaine Amendment either discriminates between religions or impermissibly targets religion for disfavored treatment.

This is a federal preemption case in which Upside Foods, a California-based lab-grown meat producer, challenged Florida's ban on the manufacture, distribution, and sale of cultivated meat (SB 1084) as preempted by the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA). Upside sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the state law.

1. Whether the appeal became moot due to the filing of an amended complaint or the district court's dismissal of preemption claims
2. Whether Upside has a cause of action in equity to challenge a state law as preempted by federal law, given the PPIA's exclusive enforcement provision
3. Whether Florida's categorical ban on lab-grown meat is preempted by the PPIA's Facilities Provision, which preempts state laws imposing different or additional requirements "with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any official establishment"
4. Whether Florida's ban is preempted by the PPIA's Ingredients Provision, which preempts state laws imposing different or additional "ingredient requirements"

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The court held: (1) the appeal was not moot despite the amended complaint and dismissal order, as the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter the status of the case on interlocutory appeal; (2) Upside has a valid cause of action in equity to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against a preempted state law, as this is a well-established remedy rooted in the Supremacy Clause and Ex parte Young doctrine, and the PPIA's exclusive enforcement provision does not preclude such equitable claims; and (3) on the merits, Upside is unlikely to succeed because SB 1084 is not preempted by either the Facilities Provision or the Ingredients Provision. The court reasoned that the Facilities Provision applies only to state laws with a direct relationship to the premises, facilities, and onsite operations of poultry processors, and SB 1084 is merely a categorical product ban that does not regulate how Upside operates its facilities. Similarly, the Ingredients Provision addresses physical components of food products, not product bans, so a categorical ban on lab-grown meat is not an "ingredient requirement." The court distinguished National Meat Association v. Harris, noting that California's swine law regulated onsite operations and handling, whereas Florida's law simply bans an end product without instructing how to process it.

This is an appeal concerning whether New York City's Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGMVPL), which establishes a two-year revival window for civil claims arising from sexual and gender-based violence, is preempted by earlier revival windows in New York State's Child Victims Act (CVA) and Adult Survivors Act (ASA). The plaintiff brought claims that would have been time-barred absent the City's 2022 amendments to the VGMVPL.

1. Whether New York State's CVA and ASA preempt New York City's VGMVPL revival window under the doctrine of conflict preemption, given that the state laws provide earlier revival periods than the city law.
2. Whether the CVA and ASA occupy the field of revival actions for sexual assault claims, thereby precluding local legislation under the doctrine of field preemption.
3. The scope of home rule authority granted to New York City under the New York State Constitution and the proper balance between state and local legislative power.
4. Whether the state and city laws regulate sufficiently different conduct to avoid preemption.

Rather than deciding the preemption question itself, the Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals, finding that no controlling precedent exists on this issue. The court determined that certification was appropriate because: (1) the New York Court of Appeals has never addressed whether the CVA and ASA preempt the VGMVPL's revival window; (2) the question implicates significant state policy issues including home rule principles under the New York State Constitution and the state's policy of providing remedies to victims of sexual abuse; and (3) resolution of the certified question will determine the outcome of the case. The court noted that both sides presented forceful arguments grounded in statutory text and legislative history, and that dozens of lower state court decisions await resolution of this question. The panel retained jurisdiction to decide the case once it receives the New York Court of Appeals' response.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction freezing assets of loan guarantors in a breach of contract action. Lenders (Leadenhall) sued borrowers and their parent company guarantors for breach of a loan agreement, seeking to freeze both the borrowers' and guarantors' assets pending judgment. The guarantors appealed the asset freeze, arguing the district court lacked authority to freeze their assets under the Supreme Court's decision in Grupo Mexicano.

1. Whether a district court has equitable power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to issue a preliminary injunction freezing a guarantor's assets when the creditor claims no lien or equitable interest in those assets, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999)
2. Whether the lender (Leadenhall) established a lien on the guarantors' assets based on the guaranty agreement
3. Whether the lender established an equitable interest in the guarantors' assets based on the nature of the relief sought
4. Whether the asset freeze could be alternatively affirmed as a prejudgment attachment under New York law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64