Opinions

This is a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) medical malpractice case brought by a patient and her family members against the United States for negligence by healthcare providers at a federally funded health center. The providers failed to refer the patient for neuroimaging that could have detected a slow-growing brain tumor, resulting in permanent neurological injuries when the tumor was eventually discovered and surgically removed.

1. Whether the Reyes Plaintiffs (husband and children) satisfied the FTCA's administrative exhaustion requirement for their loss-of-consortium claims when only the primary plaintiff submitted an administrative claim
2. Whether the district court properly awarded damages for the plaintiff's loss as a homemaker under Rhode Island law
3. Whether the healthcare providers breached the standard of care by failing to refer the patient for neuroimaging despite presenting symptoms of a secondary headache condition
4. Whether the providers' negligence caused the patient's permanent injuries
5. Whether the medical expense damages award was excessive

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part:

1. Loss of Consortium Claims (Reversed): The Reyes Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because each claimant must separately present their own claims to the agency with specific identification and a sum certain of damages. The primary plaintiff's administrative claim, which did not name the husband or children or specify damages for their loss-of-consortium claims, was insufficient. The court vacated the $3.5 million loss-of-consortium damages award.
2. Homemaker Damages (Vacated and Remanded): The district court's $2.92 million homemaker damages award was unsupported by evidence and grossly excessive. Under Rhode Island law, homemaker damages must reflect the fair value of services the plaintiff would have provided, considering that homemaker status depends on having primary responsibility for a home and family living therein. The court remanded for recalculation, noting that the plaintiff's homemaking services (primarily childcare) would likely have ended when her youngest child turned eighteen (approximately 14 years), not over her entire 50-year life expectancy. The court also instructed the district court to first determine whether the plaintiff waived her right to homemaker damages.
3. Standard of Care and Breach (Affirmed): The healthcare providers breached the standard of care. The court credited the plaintiff's expert testimony that primary-care providers should refer patients for neuroimaging when they present "red flags" indicating a secondary cause of headaches. The providers breached the standard of care through: (1) failure to refer for imaging despite multiple red flags across multiple visits; (2) inadequate medical documentation; and (3) misdiagnosis of the patient with migraines when her symptoms were inconsistent with migraine presentations.
4. Causation (Affirmed): The providers' negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries. Although the court erred in finding that surgery could have been avoided through alternative therapies (the alternative drugs were not FDA-approved until after the plaintiff's surgery and only for children), this error was harmless. The delay in imaging and diagnosis sufficiently caused the plaintiff's injuries by increasing surgical risks. Earlier diagnosis would have allowed for a smaller tumor resection with lower complication rates, whereas the delayed surgery involved a larger tumor, bleeding, and brain swelling that contributed to the permanent cerebellar strokes.
5. Medical Expense Damages (Modified): The court affirmed the medical expense damages award of $662,194.62 but modified it to $658,594.62 by excluding $3,600 for a spinal MRI that was not causally connected to the government's negligence. The court rejected the government's arguments that expert testimony was required to establish the medical bills and that a summary chart was inadmissible.
6. Pain and Suffering Damages (Affirmed): The court affirmed the pain and suffering awards of $240,800 for pre-diagnosis pain ($100 per day) and $6,387,500 for post-diagnosis pain and suffering ($350 per day for 50 years), finding these amounts were not grossly excessive or shocking to the conscience.

This is a disability discrimination case brought under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, in which a plaintiff challenges a health insurance plan's exclusion of coverage for weight-loss medications, alleging it discriminates against individuals with obesity as a disability.

1. Whether a health insurance plan's blanket exclusion of weight-loss medication coverage constitutes intentional disability discrimination under Section 1557 of the ACA
2. Whether the exclusion constitutes proxy discrimination—treating individuals differently based on neutral criteria closely associated with a protected class
3. Whether the exclusion constitutes facial discrimination by explicitly targeting obesity
4. Whether the exclusion can be shown through a deliberate indifference theory
5. Whether the exclusion has a disparate impact on individuals with obesity by denying them meaningful access to prescription drug benefits

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that Holland failed to state a plausible claim for disability discrimination under any theory:

1. Proxy Discrimination: Holland failed to adequately plead that the exclusion is sufficiently closely associated with disability because weight-loss medications are FDA-approved for both obese and overweight individuals with weight-related conditions, not exclusively for those with disabling obesity. Her unsupported allegations that non-disabled individuals would not be significantly affected were conclusory conjecture.
2. Facial Discrimination: The exclusion is facially neutral because it applies to all enrollees seeking weight-loss medications regardless of obesity status, not solely to those diagnosed with obesity.
3. Deliberate Indifference: Holland failed to plausibly allege that Elevance knew obesity qualified as a federally protected disability or that the company knew the exclusion was substantially likely to violate Section 1557. Allegations of "thoughtless indifference or benign neglect" are insufficient.
4. Disparate Impact: Holland failed to adequately allege that enrollees with obesity lack meaningful access to the prescription drug benefit. The ACA's nondiscrimination requirement does not mandate coverage for every form of medically necessary treatment for a disabled individual's condition.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a tortious interference claim brought by Kendell Seafood Imports against Mark Foods, a competitor in the fish import business. Kendell alleged that Mark Foods interfered with its agreement with a fish distributor, Chilean Sea Bass, Inc.

1. Whether the district court properly applied a pending motion to dismiss to an amended complaint that was subsequently filed.
2. Whether Kendell adequately pleaded all elements of a tortious interference claim under Rhode Island law, specifically: (1) existence of a contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional and improper interference; and (4) damages.
3. Whether the allegations in the amended complaint provided sufficient factual support to establish that Mark Foods had knowledge of Kendell's agreement with the fish distributor.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that: (1) the district court properly applied the pending motion to dismiss to the amended complaint because the amended complaint did not alter the relevant arguments in the motion; and (2) Kendell failed to adequately plead the knowledge element of tortious interference. The court found that allegations that Mark Foods attempted to solicit the distributor's business between 2012 and 2020 by sending purchase requests and proposed prices were insufficient to establish that Mark Foods knew of Kendell's specific agreement with the distributor for 2021. At most, these allegations implied that Mark Foods knew it had lost out to competitors in the past and hoped to compete for the catch going forward, which does not establish knowledge of the particular agreement alleged.

This is an appeal of a $16.1 billion damages award to minority shareholders of YPF, an Argentine oil and gas company, who sued the Argentine Republic for failing to conduct a required tender offer when it expropriated a majority stake in the company in 2012. The case involves complex questions of Argentine contract, corporate, and expropriation law, as well as jurisdictional issues regarding whether a U.S. court should have adjudicated claims arising from a foreign sovereign's actions.

1. Whether minority shareholders have standing to bring breach of contract claims based on the timing of when the Republic's tender offer obligation was triggered
2. Whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the doctrines of forum non conveniens and international comity abstention
3. Whether YPF's corporate bylaws created bilateral contractual obligations between the Republic and minority shareholders enforceable through damages claims under Argentine civil law
4. Whether the Republic's breach of contract claims are precluded by Argentina's General Expropriation Law, which bars third-party actions that impede an expropriation
5. Whether promissory estoppel claims are cognizable under Argentine law as an alternative to breach of contract claims
6. Whether YPF had an affirmative obligation to enforce the tender offer requirements against the Republic

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment on the breach of contract claims against the Republic and affirmed dismissals of promissory estoppel claims and judgment for YPF. The court held that:

1. Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims because the Republic exercised control over the expropriated shares when the expropriation law was enacted in May 2012, triggering the tender offer obligation, and plaintiffs held shares at that time.
2. The court declined to decide forum non conveniens and international comity issues given the full merits briefing and trial, but noted these were serious concerns.
3. Under Argentine law, corporate bylaws do not create bilateral contractual obligations between shareholders enforceable through damages suits. The bylaws are organizational rules governing corporate governance rather than mutual promises creating reciprocal obligations between shareholders. Section 28(A) of the bylaws, which specifically addressed government acquisitions, does not create a bilateral obligation owed by the Republic to minority shareholders.
4. Even if the bylaws created a bilateral contract, the breach of contract claims are barred by Argentina's General Expropriation Law (GEL), which precludes third-party actions that "impede the expropriation or its effects." The court found that these damages claims, which have subjected the Republic to ten years of litigation and a $16.1 billion judgment, effectively impede the expropriation and must be channeled through the GEL's compensation procedures rather than private contract law.
5. Promissory estoppel is not an autonomous source of obligation under Argentine law and cannot serve as an alternative basis for liability when a contractual relationship exists or when no independent obligation can be identified.
6. YPF had no affirmative obligation to enforce the tender offer requirements or sanctions against the Republic. The bylaws impose obligations on the acquiring shareholder and the bidder, not on YPF itself, except for a narrow administrative task of mailing notice to shareholders.
7. Shareholders could have pursued remedies under Argentine corporate law mechanisms, as other YPF shareholders did, by challenging shareholder resolutions in Argentine courts.

This is an immigration case in which a 70-year-old Jamaican lawful permanent resident and U.S. Navy veteran seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings based on a change in law. Ramsay was deported in 2007 based on a 1996 drug conviction, but a 2023 Second Circuit decision in Minter held that the statute under which he was convicted was categorically overbroad compared to federal law.

1. Whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying Ramsay's motion to reopen by finding he failed to exercise due diligence required for equitable tolling of the time limits on motions to reopen and reconsider
2. Whether an earlier Second Circuit decision in Harbin v. Sessions (2017) constituted a "fundamental change in law" that should have prompted Ramsay to file his motions earlier, rather than waiting for the Minter decision (2023)
3. Whether a litigant must raise arguments that have been unequivocally rejected by the BIA as having no merit in order to demonstrate reasonable diligence

The Second Circuit GRANTED Ramsay's petition for review and VACATED the BIA's order denying his motions to reopen and reconsider. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by misreading and mischaracterizing Ramsay's arguments. Specifically, the BIA incorrectly concluded that Ramsay cited Harbin for the proposition that the statute was categorically overbroad, when Ramsay actually only cited Harbin for the narrower proposition that the term "narcotic drug" was indivisible. The court reasoned that it was not until Minter that the statute was held to be "categorically overbroad," and therefore Ramsay could not have raised this argument based on Harbin alone. The court also rejected the government's argument that Ramsay should have raised statutory overbreadth arguments before any favorable precedent existed, noting that petitioners have no rights to pursue until the law changes to entitle them to relief. The case was REMANDED to the BIA to reconsider whether Ramsay is entitled to equitable tolling in light of the Minter decision.

This is a disciplinary case against attorney Daniel A. Pallen for submitting briefs to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals containing inaccurate case citations and summaries that were generated by artificial intelligence and never verified by the attorney before filing.

1. Whether the attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (duty of candor to the court) by making false statements of material fact or law and failing to correct them
2. Whether the attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 (duty to provide competent representation) by failing to verify citations and legal authorities before submitting them to the court
3. What sanctions are appropriate for an attorney who submits AI-generated legal research without verification and then mischaracterizes the errors as immaterial

The court found that while the attorney's conduct was deeply troubling, he did not clearly violate Pa. R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1) because it was debatable whether he "knowingly" made false statements given that he failed to read the cases. However, the court unanimously found that the attorney violated Pa. R.P.C. 1.1 by failing to exercise the thoroughness necessary for competent representation. Specifically, the attorney should have verified all citations before filing the opening brief, should have checked them after receiving the government's response brief pointing out errors, and should not have characterized the inaccuracies as "immaterial misstatements" about "tangential details" without having read the authorities. The court imposed a reprimand as the sanction, noting that this was the first opportunity to address AI use in the court and that the attorney had shown contrition after the show cause order. The court warned that future violators may face more severe sanctions including monetary sanctions. A concurring/dissenting opinion argued that the attorney violated Pa. R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1) regarding legal arguments and that more severe sanctions were warranted given the attorney's continued misconduct even after being put on notice of the errors.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Jerone Holman challenges his 66-month prison sentence for felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Holman raises constitutional, sentencing guideline, and reasonableness arguments on appeal.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession prohibition violates the Second Amendment on its face or as applied to Holman
2. Whether the district court erred in applying the "large capacity magazine" enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(3) without Holman's objection, and the proper standard for plain error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)
3. Whether Holman's 66-month sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Holman's conviction and sentence on all grounds. First, the court rejected Holman's Second Amendment challenges as foreclosed by binding Fourth Circuit precedent (United States v. Canada and United States v. Hunt), and alternatively held that even under the Bruen two-step test, the felon-in-possession prohibition is constitutional as applied to Holman given his violent felony conviction and extensive criminal history involving firearms and substance abuse violations. Second, the court found no error in applying the large capacity magazine enhancement, holding that: (1) "large capacity" is genuinely ambiguous and the Sentencing Commission's definition of "more than 15 rounds" is reasonable and entitled to deference under Kisor v. Wilkie; (2) Holman possessed a magazine capable of holding more than 15 rounds based on the 31-32 rounds recovered; and (3) the gun was clearly capable of accepting the magazines. The court provided an extensive discussion of plain error review under Rule 52(b) and the four-prong Olano test, emphasizing that the presumption of prejudice from a Guidelines miscalculation can be overcome by countervailing factors, including the district court's conscientious sentencing process and careful consideration of § 3553(a) factors. Third, the court found the sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable, noting the district court adequately considered Holman's self-defense argument and rejected it as uncompelling given the circumstances.

This appeal involves a constitutional challenge by commercial fishers to the appointment of members of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council under the Appointments Clause, and whether the unconstitutional appointment of Council members taints the Final Rule implementing Amendment 54, which significantly reduced Greater Amberjack catch limits.

1. Whether members of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council are "officers" subject to the Appointments Clause or merely advisors/employees
2. Whether Council members exercise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States" under the test established in Lucia v. SEC
3. Whether specific Council powers—including veto authority, authority to propose plans and amendments, default status of Council decisions, emergency regulation powers, and authority to assemble the administrative record—constitute significant authority
4. Whether any unconstitutional appointment provisions are severable from the Magnuson-Stevens Act
5. Whether the Final Rule implementing Amendment 54 must be vacated due to constitutional defects in Council member appointments
6. Whether Council members are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by the President

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government on alternative grounds. The court held:

1. Appointments Clause Analysis: Council members hold continuing offices established by law and therefore satisfy the first prong of the officer test. However, the court found that only the Council's veto power—specifically the requirement that the Secretary obtain supermajority Council approval to repeal a fishery management plan and majority approval for limited-access fishing programs—constitutes significant authority sufficient to make Council members officers subject to the Appointments Clause. The Council's other powers (proposing plans, default status of decisions, emergency regulation authority, and record assembly) do not confer significant authority because the Secretary retains ultimate review and approval authority.
2. Severability: The court severed the unconstitutional veto provisions from the Magnuson-Stevens Act, finding that: (1) the remaining statutory provisions can function independently, as the Council's core responsibility of drafting proposed plans remains intact; and (2) Congress would have enacted the statute without the veto provisions, as the veto power was not essential to the Act's purpose of providing informed cooperative co-management of fisheries with stakeholder input.
3. Final Rule Not Vacated: Because the unconstitutional veto powers were not actually used in the Assistant Administrator's independent decision to promulgate the Final Rule implementing Amendment 54, the Final Rule need not be vacated. The court found that the Assistant Administrator treated the veto provisions as merely advisory when making the independent decision to promulgate the Final Rule.
4. Jurisdiction Over Amendment 54: The court vacated the district court's order to the extent it permitted a challenge to Amendment 54 itself, holding that judicial review under the Magnuson-Stevens Act is limited to regulations promulgated by the Secretary and actions taken by the Secretary under those regulations, not to the Council's proposed amendments.
5. Removal Challenge: The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the removal challenge, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite elements of harm from unconstitutional removal restrictions, specifically failing to demonstrate a substantiated desire by the President to remove the unconstitutionally insulated Council member.

This is a civil rights case brought by a pretrial detainee who gave birth prematurely in her jail cell, resulting in her infant's death ten days later. The plaintiff sued the jail's Medical Director under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging denial of adequate medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment when the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted
2. Whether the Medical Director violated the pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care by denying her the right to be secure in her basic human needs
3. Whether the Medical Director had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee
4. Whether the Medical Director is entitled to qualified immunity

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Medical Director. The court held that: (1) it has jurisdiction over the appeal because on cross-motions for summary judgment, both the grant and denial are reviewable; (2) the Medical Director did not violate the detainee's constitutional rights because he lacked subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm—he did not open the daily report email containing information about the detainee's abdominal cramps until after she had already given birth, and the prior medical plan for elective induction gave him no reason to believe she faced imminent serious risk; and (3) the Medical Director is entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff failed to establish that the right she claims was violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. A concurring opinion agreed the Medical Director was entitled to qualified immunity but disagreed that summary judgment was appropriate on the underlying merits, arguing a jury could infer knowledge of the obvious and substantial risk of an unattended birth.

This is a criminal appeal in which Marshall Grace challenges his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, as well as his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Grace also challenges the trial court's denial of his Batson challenge regarding the prosecution's peremptory strike of a black juror.

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Grace's conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 846
2. Whether the prosecution engaged in purposeful racial discrimination in exercising a peremptory strike against a black juror in violation of Batson v. Kentucky
3. Whether the trial court erred by sua sponte questioning a juror to develop additional race-neutral reasons for the prosecution's peremptory strike

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in full. Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the court found ample evidence supporting Grace's conspiracy conviction, including: approximately 441 grams of methamphetamine found in his vehicle that Grace admitted owning; Grace's admission that he purchased eight ounces monthly for two years and supplied drugs to co-conspirators Tardie and Lonie; testimony from Lonie showing Grace supplied approximately 28 grams daily since 2019; and text messages from Lonie and Tardie requesting drug supplies even while Grace was in custody. Regarding the Batson challenge, the court held that although the trial court erred by sua sponte questioning the juror Davis to develop additional race-neutral reasons (contrary to Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent requiring prosecutors to state their reasons and stand on their plausibility), the district court correctly denied Grace's Batson challenge. The court reasoned that Grace failed to meet his burden of proving purposeful discrimination at step three of the Batson analysis because: (1) two black jurors were ultimately empaneled with one black alternate, negating claims of systematic exclusion; (2) the prosecution's stated race-neutral reason (that Davis had seven sons, one of whom had served time in jail) was not clearly pretextual on its face; and (3) the prosecution struck non-black jurors as well, demonstrating the strikes were not based solely on race.

This is an appeal in a criminal sentencing case where the defendant sought rehearing en banc to challenge the use of acquitted conduct in his sentencing. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing, finding itself bound by Supreme Court precedent.

1. Whether a sentencing court may consider conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted
2. The constitutional implications of acquitted-conduct sentencing under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
3. The fairness and legitimacy concerns raised by considering acquitted conduct in sentencing
4. The application of acquitted-conduct sentencing when overlapping charges result in conviction on one charge and acquittal on another

The petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc were both DENIED. Although the court acknowledged serious constitutional concerns and fundamental fairness issues with acquitted-conduct sentencing, it held that Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Watts (1997) squarely binds the Fifth Circuit to permit sentencing courts to consider acquitted conduct. The court noted that as an inferior court, it cannot provide the relief sought even if it reheard the case en banc. The court further found that the facts of this case—where the jury acquitted the defendant of possession while convicting him of conspiracy based on the same events—were not appropriate for reconsideration of this issue, particularly given the 2024 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines Section 1B1.3(c) that now prohibits considering acquitted conduct in most instances except when such conduct establishes the instant offense of conviction.

This is a civil rights case arising from an officer-involved shooting death. Baker's estate and family sued two police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when they shot and killed Baker as he attempted to flee in a stolen vehicle.

1. Whether the officers' conduct violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right against excessive force
2. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity based on the "second round" of shots fired after Baker's vehicle began moving away from the officers
3. How to apply the "clearly established law" standard for qualified immunity in officer-involved shooting cases following the Supreme Court's decision in Mullenix v. Luna
4. Whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, constitute a Fourth Amendment violation

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Officer Coborn regarding the second round of shots. The court held that:

1. Lytle v. Bexar County clearly established that firing at the back of a fleeing vehicle can constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, even though Mullenix modified how the "clearly established" standard is formulated in shooting cases
2. The facts here, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, are sufficiently similar to Lytle to put a reasonable officer on notice that shooting at Baker's vehicle as it moved away was unconstitutional
3. A genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether Coborn had sufficient time to perceive that any threat had passed before firing the second round
4. Coborn is not entitled to qualified immunity for the second round of shots, and the case should proceed beyond the summary judgment stage to determine the ultimate merits

This is a petition for review of an SEC order upholding sanctions against Eric Smith for violating securities laws and regulations. Smith challenges FINRA's jurisdiction over him and argues that the SEC proceedings violated Article III and the Seventh Amendment by denying him a jury trial before an Article III judge.

1. Whether FINRA had statutory jurisdiction to discipline Smith despite his failure to register as a FINRA member
2. Whether Smith's failure to exhaust his constitutional claims before the SEC bars appellate review
3. Whether the SEC proceedings violated Article III and the Seventh Amendment by denying Smith a jury trial (addressed in dicta)

The court denied Smith's petition for review on two grounds. First, on the statutory question, the court held that FINRA had jurisdiction over Smith because he was a "person associated with a member" under 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(21), as he controlled CSSC-BD, a FINRA member firm, through his majority ownership of its parent company. Second, on the constitutional question, the court held that Smith failed to exhaust his Seventh Amendment and Article III claims before the SEC, barring appellate review. The court rejected Smith's three arguments for excusing non-exhaustion: (1) the SEC lacked competence to adjudicate constitutional claims (the SEC has repeatedly done so); (2) Jarkesy represented an intervening change in law (it merely applied existing precedent, and Smith failed to raise it to the SEC despite having the opportunity); and (3) raising the issue would have been futile (the SEC could have provided a remedy by vacating sanctions and pursuing enforcement in federal court). In dicta, the court noted that had Smith properly exhausted his constitutional claims, he likely would have had a strong argument for a jury trial under Jarkesy, as the case involved common-law fraud claims seeking legal remedies, and the public rights exception would not apply to non-consenting non-members.

This is a federal criminal appeal concerning the interpretation of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), specifically whether 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) requires an incarcerated defendant to apply gradually accumulated deposits from family and friends in his prison trust account toward unpaid restitution obligations.

1. Whether § 3664(n) applies only to one-time, lump-sum financial windfalls from a single source, or also to substantial aggregated sums from multiple sources that gradually accrue over time
2. Whether the district court's turnover order violated the original judgment's restitution payment provisions
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine which funds in Myers's trust account were prison wages versus deposits from family and friends
4. Whether § 3664(n) applies to accumulated prison wages

The panel majority affirmed the district court's turnover order. The court held that § 3664(n) applies not just to one-time financial windfalls, but also to substantial aggregated sums from multiple sources—like family and friends—that gradually accrue in an inmate's trust account. The majority rejected Myers's argument that the statute's use of the singular "source" and present-tense "receives" limits application to single sources and resources substantial at the time of receipt. Applying the Dictionary Act's rule that singular forms include the plural, the court concluded "any source" encompasses multiple sources. The court also held that the district court properly invoked § 3664(n) to turn over $1,233.73 in accumulated deposits, did not violate the judgment's restitution provisions (which set a floor, not a ceiling, on payments), and did not abuse its discretion in declining an evidentiary hearing. The government's approach of assuming all 2022 prison wages remained unspent and deducting them from the total was reasonable and conservative. Judge McKeown dissented, arguing § 3664(n) applies only to resources substantial at the time of receipt, and that accumulated resources should be addressed under § 3664(k)'s "material change in circumstances" provision with its "interests of justice" discretion. Judges Wardlaw, Gould, Koh, and Mendoza dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing the majority created a circuit split, improperly conflated § 3664(n) and § 3664(k), and deprived inmates of funds needed for necessities and reentry.

This is an environmental law case challenging the EPA's approval of Florida's assumption of Clean Water Act Section 404 permitting authority and the Fish and Wildlife Service's biological opinion and incidental take statement supporting that approval. Environmental groups sued, arguing the federal agencies violated the Endangered Species Act by failing to conduct adequate consultation and analysis before approving Florida's permitting program.

1. Whether environmental groups have standing to challenge the agencies' actions and whether their claims are ripe for judicial review
2. Whether the Fish and Wildlife Service's Biological Opinion complied with Endangered Species Act requirements by deferring species-specific effects analysis to a "technical assistance process" rather than conducting it during the consultation
3. Whether the Incidental Take Statement violated ESA regulations by failing to specify the amount or extent of incidental take and by failing to require reinitiation of consultation if take limits were exceeded
4. Whether the EPA violated the ESA by failing to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service regarding indirect effects on marine species
5. Whether vacatur of the EPA's approval is the appropriate remedy

The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that: (1) environmental groups have standing and their claims are ripe; (2) the Fish and Wildlife Service's Biological Opinion was unlawful because it failed to conduct the required effects analysis and instead improperly relied on a less rigorous "technical assistance process" that was specifically designed to be "streamlined" and less burdensome than ESA Section 7 requirements; (3) the Incidental Take Statement violated ESA regulations by failing to quantify the amount or extent of incidental take and by failing to mandate reinitiation of consultation if take limits were exceeded; (4) the EPA violated the ESA by relying on both the deficient Biological Opinion and Incidental Take Statement to approve Florida's program; (5) the EPA erred in failing to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service regarding indirect effects on marine species; and (6) vacatur of the EPA's approval is warranted because the agencies' violations were serious and could not be cured by further explanation on remand. The court reasoned that while programmatic consultations are permissible under the ESA, they do not excuse agencies from performing rigorous effects analyses as required by the statute and regulations, and agencies cannot delegate their ESA responsibilities to states without ensuring compliance with ESA protections.

This is an appeal of a Court of Chancery decision in a dispute between Paul Witmer and Armistice Capital, LLC and Armistice Capital Master Fund, Ltd. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's judgment on the merits of the parties' claims.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this order, as the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision based on the reasoning stated in the lower court's August 14, 2025 Memorandum Opinion.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The Court adopted the reasoning and conclusions set forth in the Court of Chancery's Memorandum Opinion dated August 14, 2025, without providing additional analysis in this order.

This is an appeal from a Court of Chancery decision in a dispute involving Cardinal Capital Management, L.L.C., Robert Garfield, and Laborers Local No. 231 Pension Fund against Newmark Group, Inc. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's judgment on the merits of the case.

The opinion does not specify the particular legal issues addressed, as the Court affirmed the lower court's decision based on its August 13, 2025 bench ruling without restating the issues in this order.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The Court adopted the reasoning and conclusions set forth in the Court of Chancery's August 13, 2025 bench ruling, without providing additional analysis or commentary in this appellate order.

This is a breach of contract case arising from Triller Group Inc.'s failure to promptly file a Securities and Exchange Commission registration for 54 million shares issued to former convertible noteholders in a 2024 merger. The plaintiff, acting as stockholder representative, obtained a default judgment and now seeks damages of approximately $248-256 million.

1. Whether the "New York Rule" for calculating damages applies to a failure to file a registration statement for securities that were delivered to the plaintiff
2. Whether the plaintiff's damages calculation methodology—using the peak post-merger stock price of $4.75 per share multiplied by the entire block of shares—is appropriate
3. Whether the court can award damages on the limited paper record without an evidentiary hearing
4. Whether contract damages should be limited to the plaintiff's expectation interest rather than providing a windfall based on assumed total loss of unregistered shares

The court denied the plaintiff's request for damages on the papers and ordered an evidentiary hearing. The court found that: (1) the applicability of the New York Rule is questionable because the cited precedents involve fundamentally different harms (temporary suspension of active registrations, total failure to deliver assets, abandoned IPOs, and fiduciary duty breaches) rather than failure to initially register delivered securities; (2) even if the New York Rule applies, concerns exist about using the peak post-merger price as the "highest intermediate price" during a reasonable time period, as liquidating 54 million shares at peak price without market depression seems improbable and would credit the plaintiff with unrealistic market prescience; (3) the plaintiff's assumption that restricted shares are worthless is unproven, as unregistered shares may retain value in private transactions, and granting peak price damages would constitute an improper windfall; and (4) the magnitude of the requested award and the unresolved legal and factual issues require an evidentiary hearing where the plaintiff must brief why the New York Rule applies and provide expert analysis on realistic liquidation timelines and current fair market value of the restricted shares.

This is a derivative shareholder action brought by Bryan Dorsey on behalf of Roots Foods Holdings, Inc. and related entities against Robert T. Jones, with Jones filing counterclaims. The case involves disputes over corporate governance, asset transfers, and the effect of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors executed by one of the plaintiff entities.

1. Whether a general assignment for the benefit of creditors requires substitution of the assignee as a party to ongoing litigation under Court of Chancery Rule 25(c)
2. Whether the plaintiff entities retain standing to sue after being forfeited and subsequently revived by the Delaware Secretary of State
3. Whether the individual plaintiff (Dorsey) maintains derivative standing on behalf of the corporate entities
4. Whether various counterclaims constitute derivative or direct claims and whether they satisfy applicable pleading requirements
5. Whether specific counterclaims adequately plead fraud under Rule 9(b), derivative standing under Rule 23.1, or state a claim under Delaware General Corporation Law sections 271 and 109

The court denied all of Jones' motions challenging the plaintiffs' standing and authority to proceed. The court held that: (1) the general assignment for the benefit of creditors does not require mandatory substitution of the assignee under Rule 25(c); (2) the entity plaintiffs' revival by the Delaware Secretary of State restored them to good standing and retroactively validated their prior actions, including continued participation in this litigation; and (3) Dorsey maintains proper derivative standing as a stockholder. Regarding the counterclaim, the court dismissed Counts II, III, V, VII, X, XI, and XIII as derivative claims because Jones failed to adequately plead derivative standing under Rule 23.1 and Section 327 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, specifically failing to allege temporal facts about his stockholder status and failing to plead demand futility. The court dismissed Counts VI, VIII, and IX as fraud-based claims for failure to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b). The court dismissed Count IV under the law-of-the-case doctrine and Count XII for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (punitive damages are not available in the Court of Chancery). However, the court allowed the Section 109 claim in Count I to survive, finding that Jones adequately pleaded a direct claim that the board violated the Delaware General Corporation Law by attempting to eliminate stockholders' statutory right to amend bylaws.

This is a Delaware corporate governance dispute under Section 225 of the Delaware General Corporation Law in which plaintiff Ami Shafrir Berg sought to remove defendants Shai Bar-Lavi and Saul Bienenfeld as directors of Tracki, Inc., claiming to be the company's sole stockholder. The court determined that Berg's ownership claim rests on fabricated documents and lacks merit.

1. Whether Berg is a valid stockholder of Tracki, Inc., and therefore has standing to remove the defendants as directors under 8 Del. C. § 225
2. The authenticity and validity of the 2019 Written Consent and 2019 Stock Ledger upon which Berg bases his ownership claim
3. Whether Berg's post-formation conduct is consistent with claimed ownership of Tracki
4. Whether the defendants' corporate misconduct and false statements warrant fee-shifting under the bad faith exception to the American Rule
5. Whether Tracki complied with Delaware statutory requirements for director election under 8 Del. C. § 108

The court entered judgment for the defendants and found Berg lacks standing to pursue the Section 225 action. The court's reasoning includes:

1. Fabrication of Documents: Forensic expert testimony demonstrated that the 2019 Written Consent was created using the 2020 Written Consent (drafted in July 2020) as a template, proving the 2019 documents were fabricated and could not be contemporaneous with Tracki's February 2019 formation. Font analysis revealed text color mismatches and the use of CID Type 2 font (common in Asian languages) in portions granting shares to Berg, who resides in Thailand.
2. Implausible "Secret Pact" Narrative: Berg's claim that he kept his ownership secret due to a "secret pact" with Bar-Lavi to protect Bar-Lavi's reputational interests in a hypothetical public offering was found to be implausible and contradicted by Berg's own representations to the Israeli court that Vestigo owned Tracki.
3. Corporate Process Defects: Tracki's certificate of incorporation did not name initial directors, and no organization meeting or written consent was held to elect directors as required by 8 Del. C. § 108. This fundamental defect rendered the 2019 Written Consent and stock issuance invalid.
4. Pattern of Conduct: Berg's post-formation conduct contradicted his ownership claim. He executed documents representing Tracki as a Vestigo subsidiary, signed bank loan documents listing Tracki as a Vestigo asset, and as recently as October 2023 clarified to third parties that he was not Tracki's owner. Only in this litigation did he claim ownership.
5. Lack of Valid Stock Ledger: The only stock ledger in the record (the 2019 Stock Ledger) was fabricated, requiring the court to look to extrinsic evidence of Berg's conduct, which consistently demonstrated Vestigo's ownership.
6. Attorneys' Fees: Although the defendants engaged in serious misconduct—including backdating corporate documents and submitting false sworn affidavits—Berg's fabrication of documents to perpetrate fraud on the court constituted clear bad faith litigation conduct. The court shifted 50% of the defendants' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to account for both parties' misconduct, noting that "this suit is a product of mutual deceit."

This is a derivative action brought by an investor in a feeder fund on behalf of a master fund, alleging that the board of directors and investment manager breached their fiduciary duties by approving a transaction that concentrated the fund's assets into a single illiquid security in a company with significant red flags, failing to pursue a promised liquidation plan, and continuing to collect management fees despite dramatically reduced responsibilities.

1. Whether the outside directors of a Delaware limited partnership owe fiduciary duties equivalent to corporate directors and whether those duties were breached when approving an asset sale that violated the fund's diversification policy
2. Whether the board's approval of the asset sale without obtaining a fairness opinion, outside advice, or adequate deliberation constitutes gross negligence sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule
3. Whether the board breached its duties by failing to pursue a stated dissolution plan after the asset sale closed
4. Whether the board breached its duties by allowing the investment manager's advisory agreement to renew at the same fee despite the fund's dramatically changed circumstances
5. Whether the buyer and its CEO aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by the directors and investment manager

The court denied the outside directors' motion to dismiss Count I (breach of fiduciary duty claims) and the buyer's motion to dismiss Count VI (aiding and abetting claim), finding that the complaint states claims on which relief can be granted. The court ruled that:

1. The outside directors owe fiduciary duties equivalent to corporate directors based on the limited partnership agreement's delegation of general partner authority to the board and express provisions equating their duties to those of Delaware corporate directors.
2. The complaint pleads sufficient facts to support an inference of gross negligence in approving the asset sale. The board approved a fundamental transaction—converting a diversified portfolio of 125 alternative investments into a single illiquid security—at a single meeting without a fairness opinion, outside advisors, or independent investigation. The board relied solely on the interested investment manager despite numerous red flags about the buyer, including its lack of profitability, goodwill comprising 84% of assets from questionable related-party transactions, resignation of the buyer's CFO over misappropriation concerns, resignation of four outside directors, termination of two audit firms, and an SEC investigation.
3. The complaint adequately alleges breach of the duty of care regarding the board's failure to pursue the stated dissolution plan and failure to renegotiate the investment manager's annual fee despite the fund's transformation from managing 125 alternative investments to holding a single security.
4. The complaint states a claim for aiding and abetting because the buyer and its CEO had knowledge of the directors' breaches and provided substantial assistance by negotiating the asset sale and making representations about the transaction.

This is an appeal case involving plaintiffs Michael A. Manzo, Michael K. Manzo, Louis V. Manzo, and Paul A. Auwaerter, M.D. against defendants Samuel Wohlstadter and Nadine Wohlstadter. The case was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this errata sheet, which only documents a minor correction to the court's opinion issued on March 24, 2026.

This document is an errata sheet that amends the court's opinion by inserting "[sic]" after the word "contact" on page 3, line 26. The errata sheet does not contain the substantive ruling or reasoning of the court, as it is merely a technical correction to the original opinion.

This is an appeal by parents and their children challenging decisions made by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education and its Board regarding educational policies or practices affecting their children.

The document provided is an errata sheet that corrects minor typographical and formatting errors in the Court's opinion issued on March 20, 2026. The specific substantive legal issues addressed in the underlying opinion are not detailed in this errata sheet.

This errata sheet does not contain the Court's substantive ruling. Rather, it amends the previously issued opinion by making three technical corrections: (1) removing a period after "petition for cert. filed" on page 12, line 14; (2) removing a period after "petition for cert. filed" in footnote 7 on page 12; and (3) correcting the spacing in "Onto" to "On to" on page 15, line 14. The substantive ruling and reasoning would be found in the original opinion of March 20, 2026.

This is an ERISA fiduciary duty case in which pension fund trustees sued mortgage servicers for mismanaging residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). The central issue is whether the underlying mortgages constitute "plan assets" under ERISA, which would trigger fiduciary duties owed to the pension plan.

1. Whether mortgages underlying residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) issued as notes under indenture agreements qualify as "plan assets" under the Department of Labor's plan-asset regulation
2. Whether mortgages underlying RMBSs issued as trust certificates (regular-interest certificates) qualify as "plan assets" under the DOL regulation
3. Whether the notes and certificates constitute "equity interests" under the regulation's definition, which requires determining if they are treated as indebtedness with no substantial equity features, or alternatively, if they represent beneficial interests in trusts
4. Whether Ocwen, as mortgage servicer, acted in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the mortgages

The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held:

1. Indenture Notes (AHM 2004-4, AHM 2005-3, HLT 2006-HI1): The mortgages underlying these notes are NOT plan assets. The notes constitute traditional debt instruments with fixed interest payments and maturity dates, exposing noteholders only to credit risk. The supposed equity features identified by the trustees—thin capitalization, subordination to general creditors, and contingent payment based on mortgage pool performance—do not constitute "substantial equity features" under the regulation. The court reasoned that under the traditional debt-equity distinction, equity requires a "realistic possibility of upside potential" through a residual interest, which these notes lack. Universal credit risk is not a substantial equity feature.
2. REMIC Trust Certificates (CSFB 2003-27, MASTR 2003-5, GSR 2005-7F): The mortgages underlying the regular-interest certificates ARE plan assets. The court held that the certificates represent "beneficial interests in a trust" under the plain language of the DOL regulation, which explicitly provides that beneficial interests in trusts are equity interests. Under New York law (governing the trusts), holders of regular-interest certificates are beneficiaries entitled to receive benefits from the trust. Therefore, the look-through exception applies, making the underlying mortgages plan assets.
3. Fiduciary Status: The court remanded the question of whether Ocwen acted in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the mortgages underlying the REMIC trusts, following the preferred practice of allowing the district court to address arguments in the first instance.

This is a federal appellate case addressing whether time credits earned under the First Step Act (FSA) can be used to reduce a federal inmate's term of supervised release. The case involves a habeas corpus petition filed by an inmate challenging the Bureau of Prisons' calculation and application of his earned FSA time credits.

1. Whether FSA time credits earned under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) can be applied to reduce a prisoner's term of supervised release, or whether they can only be used to accelerate the start of prerelease custody or supervised release
2. Whether the habeas petition became moot once the petitioner was transferred to prerelease custody
3. The proper interpretation of the phrase "applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release" in the FSA statute

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that FSA time credits cannot be used to reduce a prisoner's term of supervised release. Instead, the credits can only be applied to accelerate the beginning of prerelease custody or supervised release by up to twelve months. The court reasoned that the statute's second sentence, which directs the Bureau of Prisons to transfer eligible prisoners into prerelease custody or supervised release, clarifies that the first sentence's reference to applying credits "toward time in" supervised release means moving the prisoner "in the direction of" supervised release (i.e., starting it earlier), not reducing the duration of supervised release itself. The court found this interpretation supported by: (1) the statute's cross-reference to Section 3624(g), which explicitly contemplates early transfer to supervised release; (2) the detailed eligibility requirements in Section 3624(g) that would be rendered meaningless if credits could reduce supervised release terms; (3) the absence of any specified agency responsible for reducing supervised release terms; and (4) the fact that supervised release is imposed by courts, not the Bureau of Prisons. Because the petitioner had already received the maximum benefit available under the FSA (transfer to prerelease custody with twelve months of credits applied), his petition was moot, and the district court's judgment was vacated and remanded for dismissal.

This is an immigration law case in which a 70-year-old Jamaican lawful permanent resident, who was deported in 2007 based on a drug conviction, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The case turns on whether the BIA properly applied the equitable tolling doctrine after a change in law made his conviction no longer removable.

1. Whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying Ramsay's motion to reopen based on a failure to exercise due diligence for purposes of equitable tolling
2. Whether the BIA properly interpreted Ramsay's arguments regarding the overbreadth of New York's narcotic drug statute compared to the federal Controlled Substances Act
3. Whether a change in law (the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Minter) constituted an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling of the time limits for motions to reopen
4. Whether petitioners must raise statutory overbreadth arguments before a change in law to preserve their rights

The Court GRANTED Ramsay's petition for review and VACATED the BIA's order denying his motions to reconsider and reopen. The Court held that the BIA abused its discretion by misreading and mischaracterizing Ramsay's arguments. Specifically, the BIA incorrectly relied on Harbin v. Sessions (2017) to conclude that Ramsay should have moved to reopen after that decision, when Ramsay's motions actually relied on Minter (2023) for the proposition that the narcotic drug statute was categorically overbroad. The Court reasoned that Ramsay could not be expected to raise arguments that had no legal basis until the law changed in Minter, and that reasonable diligence does not require raising arguments the BIA has already rejected as meritless. The case was REMANDED to the BIA to reconsider whether Ramsay is entitled to equitable tolling in light of Minter.

This is an appeal of a $16.1 billion damages judgment awarded to minority shareholders of YPF, an Argentine oil and gas company, against the Argentine Republic for failing to conduct a required tender offer when it expropriated a majority stake in the company in 2012. The case involves the interpretation and application of Argentine contract, corporate, and expropriation law to determine whether shareholders can recover damages for the Republic's breach of corporate bylaws.

1. Whether minority shareholders have standing to bring breach of contract claims based on the timing of when the Republic's tender offer obligation was triggered
2. Whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under forum non conveniens and international comity doctrines
3. Whether corporate bylaws create bilateral contractual obligations between shareholders enforceable through damages claims under Argentine civil law
4. Whether the Republic's public expropriation law (General Expropriation Law) precludes private contract-based damages claims arising from an expropriation
5. Whether promissory estoppel claims are cognizable under Argentine law as an alternative to breach of contract claims
6. Whether YPF had an affirmative obligation to enforce the tender offer requirements against the Republic

The Court of Appeals REVERSED the district court's judgment for plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims against the Republic and AFFIRMED the dismissal of promissory estoppel claims and judgment for YPF. The court held that:

1. Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims, as the Republic exercised control over the expropriated shares when the expropriation law was enacted in May 2012, triggering the tender obligation while plaintiffs still held shares.
2. The court declined to decide forum non conveniens and international comity issues given its reversal on the merits.
3. Under Argentine law, corporate bylaws do not create bilateral contractual obligations between shareholders enforceable through damages suits. Bylaws are organizational rules governing corporate governance rather than mutual promises creating reciprocal obligations between shareholders. Section 28(A) of YPF's bylaws, while naming the Republic, does not establish a specific bilateral obligation owed to minority shareholders.
4. Even if the bylaws created a bilateral contract, the claims would be precluded by Argentina's General Expropriation Law (GEL), which bars third-party actions that "impede the expropriation or its effects." The court found that the damages claims, which have subjected the Republic to ten years of litigation and a judgment equal to 45% of its annual budget, effectively impede the expropriation and fall within the GEL's prohibition. Argentine case law establishes that contractual conditions cannot interfere with properly declared expropriations; instead, disputes must be resolved through the GEL's compensation-setting mechanism.
5. Promissory estoppel is not an autonomous source of obligation under Argentine law and cannot serve as an alternative basis for liability where a contractual relationship exists or where no separate obligation can be identified.
6. YPF had no affirmative obligation under the bylaws to enforce the tender requirements or sanctions against the Republic. The bylaws imposed obligations on the acquiring shareholder and the bidder, not on YPF itself, which had only narrow administrative tasks.

This is a federal criminal appeal challenging the admissibility of DNA evidence obtained through probabilistic genotyping software (TrueAllele) in a firearm possession case. The defendant appeals the district court's denial of his Daubert motion to exclude the DNA evidence, as well as his Second Amendment and sentencing challenges.

1. Whether probabilistic genotyping software (TrueAllele) is sufficiently reliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to be admissible in federal trials
2. Whether the defendant was entitled to access TrueAllele's source code for testing purposes
3. Whether § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of firearm) violates the Second Amendment as applied to the defendant
4. Whether the defendant's 78-month sentence, imposed to run consecutively to anticipated state parole violation sentence, constitutes an abuse of discretion

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on all issues. The court held that:

1. TrueAllele Reliability: The government established by a preponderance that TrueAllele's probabilistic genotyping methodology is reliable under Daubert by demonstrating: (1) testability through laboratory-created multi-source DNA mixtures; (2) calculable error rates showing false-positive rates of 0.005% and approximately one in 146 trillion for the likelihood ratio in this case; (3) compliance with established forensic DNA standards; (4) peer review and publication of validation studies; and (5) general acceptance in the forensic DNA identification field. The court reasoned that while TrueAllele is not perfect, the evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than a merits standard of correctness, and the methodology has adequate scientific foundations for admissibility.
2. Source Code Access: The defendant was not entitled to access TrueAllele's source code. The court found that testability requires only that a methodology be capable of being tested using objective criteria, not that proprietary source code be disclosed. The defendant had sufficient access to the algorithm, could run TrueAllele on test data, and had access to validation studies and change logs. The court noted that Daubert is not a criminal discovery device and that other mechanisms (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Brady obligations, and cross-examination) ensure fairness in prosecutions.
3. Second Amendment Challenge: The district court correctly rejected the defendant's Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) because the defendant was serving a term of parole under state law at the time of his federal arrest, which forecloses his as-applied challenge and dooms his facial challenge under Third Circuit precedent.
4. Sentencing: The 78-month sentence, within the Guidelines range of 77-96 months and imposed to run consecutively to any state sentence, was not an abuse of discretion. The district court properly considered the defendant's criminal history and risk of recidivism in determining that a consecutive sentence was appropriate to achieve reasonable punishment for the instant offense.

This is an antitrust case where Megatel Homes sought to develop property outside Mansfield, Texas and needed retail water utility services from Johnson County Special Utility District (JCSUD), but Mansfield blocked the provision of water services through a contractual restriction requiring its prior written consent. Megatel sued Mansfield for Sherman Act violations and state law claims, and the district court dismissed based on state-action immunity.

1. Whether Mansfield is entitled to state-action immunity under the Sherman Act for blocking water utility services to the Cipriani Property
2. Whether the Texas Water Code clearly articulates and affirmatively expresses a state policy authorizing Mansfield (as opposed to JCSUD) to act anticompetitively in restricting water service provision
3. Whether state-action immunity requires that the specific municipality seeking immunity be the intended beneficiary of the state's authorization to monopolize, not merely that the state has authorized monopolies generally

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of state-action immunity and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that while the Texas Water Code clearly expresses a state policy to displace competition in retail water utilities through the certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) system, it grants that monopoly authority exclusively to the utility holding the CCN (JCSUD in this case), not to Mansfield. The court reasoned that state-action immunity requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether state law authorizes the defendant to engage in the challenged conduct, and (2) whether the state authorized that conduct with intent to displace competition. Mansfield failed the first step because Texas law granted the exclusive right to provide water in the Cipriani Property's area to JCSUD, not to Mansfield. Therefore, Mansfield did not demonstrate that it was delegated authority to act anticompetitively, and state-action immunity does not apply to shield the City from antitrust liability at this stage.

This is a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeal in which Michael Hagar, a pro se litigant convicted of cyberstalking and making interstate threats, sought production of an email and its complete header information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The case involves the scope of FOIA's disclosure obligations and whether agencies must create new records to comply with FOIA requests.

1. Whether a magistrate judge exceeded her authority by terminating Hagar's summary judgment motion as premature through a scheduling order
2. Whether FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) and the Privacy Act's law-enforcement exception applied to redacted names and email addresses in the "To" line of the email
3. Whether the FBI was required to produce the email's header information (metadata) or whether doing so would constitute the creation of a new record, which FOIA does not mandate
4. Whether the district court properly denied Hagar's post-judgment motions for reconsideration, relief from judgment, and judicial notice
5. Whether the district court committed judicial misconduct

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the FBI and denied all of Hagar's post-judgment motions. The court's reasoning proceeded as follows:

1. Magistrate Judge's Authority: The magistrate judge properly exercised her pretrial docket-management authority by issuing a scheduling order that terminated Hagar's summary judgment motion without prejudice, rather than resolving it on the merits. This was a proper exercise of authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
2. "To" Line Information: The court found this issue moot because the FBI provided Hagar with an unredacted copy of the email while the FBI's summary judgment motion was pending. Once a record has been turned over, a FOIA claim becomes moot.
3. Header Information: The court affirmed that producing the email's header information would require the FBI to create a new record, which FOIA does not mandate. The court relied on its precedent in Rutila v. United States Department of Transportation, 72 F.4th 692 (5th Cir. 2023), which established that when an agency does not maintain requested information in a separate record form and would have to take steps to extract and compile it into a new document, FOIA does not require such creation. The court found no meaningful difference between taking a screenshot (as in Rutila) and copying header information into a separate text file or Word document. Although the FBI has access to the header information, it does not maintain it as a separate record, and extracting it would constitute creating a new record beyond FOIA's requirements.
4. Post-Judgment Motions: The court affirmed the district court's denial of Hagar's motions for reconsideration, relief from judgment, and judicial notice because they raised the same arguments already addressed and disposed of on appeal.
5. Judicial Misconduct Claims: The court dismissed Hagar's judicial misconduct allegations as meritless, finding that they amounted to disagreement with adverse rulings rather than evidence of actual misconduct. The court noted that judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for bias or partiality claims, and Hagar identified no extrajudicial source of bias or procedural irregularity.

This is an appeal of a district court's order compelling arbitration of claims arising from a nursing home resident's death and confirming the subsequent arbitration award in favor of the nursing home. The executor of the resident's estate challenged the enforceability of the arbitration agreement and the arbitrator's decision.

1. Whether an attorney-in-fact who signed an arbitration agreement without explicitly stating she was acting in that capacity had authority to bind the principal to arbitration under Kentucky law
2. Whether the terms "Resident" and "Resident Representative" in the arbitration agreement were too indefinite to be enforceable
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying reconsideration based on allegedly intervening changes in controlling law
4. Whether the arbitration award should be vacated based on the arbitrator's alleged failure to disclose prior misconduct and application of an incorrect legal standard

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues. The court held that: (1) under Kentucky law, an attorney-in-fact need not explicitly state that capacity when signing an arbitration agreement if she signs as an authorized representative and does not affirmatively represent herself as acting in a different capacity; (2) the terms "Resident" and "Resident Representative" were not indefinite because they were clarified by reference to the broader admission agreement; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration because the cited case (Woford) applied existing law rather than establishing an intervening change in controlling law; and (4) the arbitration award should not be vacated because the arbitrator's three-decade-old public censure did not demonstrate partiality to the nursing home, and the arbitrator properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in his comprehensive evaluation of the claims.

This case involves a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act brought by Victory Global LLC (doing business as Brough Brothers), an African American-owned bourbon distillery, against Fresh Bourbon LLC, another African American-owned bourbon company, regarding competing claims about which company was "first" in the bourbon industry.

1. Whether Fresh Bourbon made "literally false" statements in its marketing claims about being the first African American-owned bourbon distillery or producer in Kentucky
2. Whether Fresh Bourbon's statements were "misleading" and, if so, whether Brough Brothers presented evidence that these statements deceived consumers
3. Whether Fresh Bourbon's statements were material to consumer purchasing decisions
4. The proper interpretation of terms like "distill," "produce," "develop," "distillery," and "master distiller" in the context of bourbon production

The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Fresh Bourbon. The court held that Brough Brothers failed to establish that Fresh Bourbon made any literally false statements. The court found that Fresh Bourbon's challenged statements were at most ambiguous or misleading, capable of being interpreted as true under reasonable alternative readings. Specifically:

1. Statements about being "first to distill, produce, or develop" bourbon were ambiguous because they could reasonably mean Fresh Bourbon's agents made bourbon first (true) rather than that Fresh Bourbon opened its physical distillery first (false)
2. The Kentucky Senate resolution's reference to Fresh Bourbon as the "first black-owned distillery" was not literally false because it stated the Senate "considered" it to be first, and "distillery" can mean a bourbon company rather than just a physical location
3. The LEX 18 article's title about the "first African American-owned distillery coming to Lexington" was ambiguous and could reasonably be interpreted as referring to Lexington specifically, making it true
4. The claim about the "first African American Master Distiller" was not verifiable as false because "master distiller" is a subjective marketing term with no industry-wide definition

This is a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan law by four female inmates at Huron Valley Correctional Facility who suffered from a prolonged scabies outbreak that prison officials allegedly failed to properly diagnose and treat. The inmates sued high-level Michigan Department of Corrections officials, Wayne State University medical officials, and Corizon Health (the prison's medical contractor) for deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs and dangerous prison conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as for gross negligence under Michigan law.

1. Whether non-treating prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by relying on medical contractors' decisions regarding diagnosis and treatment of the scabies outbreak
2. Whether the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights were "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violations, such that qualified immunity does not apply
3. Whether the inmates adequately pleaded deliberate indifference under both a medical-needs theory and a conditions-of-confinement theory
4. Whether non-treating prison officials were the proximate cause of the inmates' injuries under Michigan's Government Tort Liability Act, thereby defeating state-law immunity
5. Whether qualified immunity should be decided at the pleading stage or deferred until summary judgment

The majority (Judges Murphy and Larsen) reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claims and affirmed the denial of state-law immunity on the negligence claims. The court held that: (1) no clearly established law would have alerted the non-treating MDOC and Wayne State officials that they violated the Eighth Amendment by relying on Corizon medical professionals' treatment and prevention decisions; (2) prison officials generally do not act with deliberate indifference when they rely on medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible for prisoner care, absent additional circumstances showing recklessness; (3) the inmates failed to identify any precedent that would have notified the officials that they had a duty to second-guess the medical contractors' diagnosis and treatment decisions; (4) the inmates adequately pleaded proximate causation under Michigan law for their negligence claims, which requires further factual development through discovery rather than resolution at the pleading stage; and (5) qualified immunity was appropriately addressed at the pleading stage because the novelty of the inmates' claims made the defect apparent from the complaint's face. Judge White dissented from the qualified immunity ruling, arguing that the inmates plausibly alleged clearly established Eighth Amendment violations based on the yearslong, worsening outbreak affecting nearly 200 inmates, the officials' knowledge of the problem through grievances and meetings, and the officials' failure to take reasonable measures despite Corizon's documented poor track record and the mounting evidence that the treatment plan was ineffective.

This is a breach of contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing case in which a former senior executive at Sotera Health Company seeks to recover millions of dollars in unvested performance-based equity units that he forfeited upon his resignation in September 2022. The plaintiff contends that the vesting threshold for his equity was satisfied before his departure and that the defendants manipulated corporate transactions to prevent vesting.

1. Whether the plaintiff's Class B-2 Units vested based on the "Sponsors Inflow Trigger Date" requirement that each sponsor receive cash inflows equal to at least 2.5 times their respective cash outflows, specifically whether two transactions constitute "Sponsor Inflows": (a) a $1.13 billion payment made in 2015 to a predecessor GTCR fund, and (b) a $397 million margin loan taken by Warburg in 2021.
2. Whether the defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by: (a) structuring the IPO, secondary offering, and block trade to artificially suppress sponsor returns and prevent vesting, and (b) constructively terminating the plaintiff by demoting him to force his resignation before vesting occurred.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the vesting conditions were satisfied before his resignation.

The Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. The court held that:

1. Breach of Contract Claim: The plaintiff failed to prove that the Sponsors Inflow Trigger Date was satisfied before his resignation. The $1.13 billion payment to GTCR Fund IX in 2015 does not qualify as a "Sponsor Inflow" because: (a) GTCR Fund IX is a separate corporate entity not included in the definition of "Sponsor" in the governing agreements, and Fund IX and Fund XI were not under common control; and (b) the payment was for a buyout of a predecessor entity's equity, not a cash payment "with respect to or in exchange for Membership Units" as required by the contract. The $397 million margin loan also does not constitute a Sponsor Inflow because it was a loan secured by collateral that had to be repaid, not a cash payment representing a return on investment. Additionally, GTCR did not participate in the margin loan, and since GTCR had not met the 2.5x threshold, the trigger date could not have occurred even if the margin loan counted for Warburg.
2. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim: The plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants breached the implied covenant. Regarding the IPO, the court found that it was a primary offering that did not generate proceeds for the sponsors and was pursued based on legitimate business advice from JP Morgan, not to prevent vesting. The Board's decision not to accelerate vesting was reasonable and based on valid business considerations including retention risks and the need for leadership stability. Regarding the secondary offering, the court found that market conditions—not a scheme to avoid vesting—drove the offering size and the underwriters' decision not to exercise the greenshoe option. The court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on deposition testimony from a former CFO as insufficient to prove bad faith. Regarding the block trade, the court found multiple legitimate business reasons for not pursuing it, including concerns about market signaling before a major trial, a declining stock price, and shrinking market demand. The court also rejected the constructive termination claim, finding that the plaintiff left of his own volition by exercising a contractual right to resign for "Good Reason," that his working conditions were not intolerable, and that the implied covenant does not apply when the contract addresses the conduct at issue.
3. Declaratory Judgment Claim: The plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment was denied as duplicative of the failed breach of contract claim.

This is a criminal sentencing case addressing whether a defendant's abscondment from supervised release automatically extends the term of supervised release beyond what a sentencing judge ordered. Isabel Rico violated her supervised release conditions and absconded, committing a drug offense after her judicially-ordered supervised release term expired, raising the question of whether that offense could be treated as a supervised release violation.

1. Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes an automatic extension of a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds and fails to report to their probation officer
2. Whether a crime committed after the expiration of a judicially-ordered supervised release term can constitute a supervised release violation if the defendant was absconding during the period
3. The proper interpretation of "tolling" versus "extending" a supervised release term under the Act
4. Whether common-law principles regarding escaped prisoners support an automatic extension rule
5. The scope of a sentencing court's authority to consider post-expiration conduct when revising a sentence for supervised release violations

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding that the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize automatic extension of a supervised release term based on abscondment. The Court's reasoning included:

1. Textual Analysis: The Act specifies when supervised release begins (upon release from imprisonment) and sets maximum lengths (one, three, or five years depending on offense severity), with no mention of automatic extension for abscondment. The Act provides specific tools for addressing violations—revocation and additional imprisonment—but does not include automatic extension.
2. Statutory Limitations on Extension: Section 3583(e)(2) permits extension only after a hearing, within statutory maximums, and before the term expires. Section 3583(i) allows post-expiration proceedings only for matters arising before expiration and only if a warrant issued during the term. Section 3624(e) provides a true tolling rule for imprisonment of 30+ consecutive days. The cumulative detail of these specific rules suggests the absence of an automatic extension rule is intentional.
3. Rejection of Government Arguments: The Court rejected the government's argument based on supervision requiring "observation and direction," finding that provisions merely describe probation officer duties during "the term imposed" by the court. The Court also noted the government's theory created an anomaly—treating Rico as simultaneously off and on supervised release.
4. Precedent: Mont v. United States merely recognized the express tolling rule in §3624(e) for imprisonment, highlighting the absence of an automatic extension rule. United States v. Johnson rejected efforts to add rules Congress did not enact.
5. Common Law: While common law may support pausing a sentence clock for escaped prisoners, the government seeks a different rule—imposing new punishment by extending supervised release. Unlike an escaped prisoner not serving his sentence, an absconding defendant remains bound by release terms and can be punished for violations under existing statutory tools.
6. Policy Concerns: The Court rejected the government's policy argument that §3583(i)'s warrant-or-summons requirement may leave courts powerless, holding that complaints about statutory requirements should be directed to Congress, not the courts.

This case concerns whether Cox Communications, an Internet service provider, can be held secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by its subscribers. Sony Music Entertainment sued Cox for contributory liability, arguing that Cox should be liable for continuing to provide Internet service to subscribers whose IP addresses were associated with known copyright infringement.

1. Whether an Internet service provider can be held contributorily liable for copyright infringement based solely on knowledge that its service will be used by some subscribers to infringe copyrights
2. The proper scope of secondary copyright liability under the Copyright Act, specifically whether it is limited to two forms: inducement and services tailored to infringement
3. Whether the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe harbor provision for ISPs presupposes that ISPs can be held liable for serving known infringers

The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and held that Cox Communications is not contributorily liable for its subscribers' copyright infringement. The Court ruled that contributory liability requires proof that a service provider intended its service to be used for infringement, which can only be shown through two bases: (1) the provider actively induced the infringement through specific acts such as promotion and marketing, or (2) the service provided is tailored to infringement and incapable of substantial noninfringing uses. The Court found that Cox neither induced its users' infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement. Internet access is capable of substantial noninfringing uses, and Cox actively discouraged infringement through warnings, service suspensions, and account terminations. The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's holding that mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is sufficient for contributory liability, emphasizing that such knowledge alone is insufficient under established precedent. The Court also addressed Sony's argument regarding the DMCA safe harbor, clarifying that the DMCA creates defenses from liability rather than imposing new liability, and that failure to qualify for the safe harbor does not adversely affect other defenses to liability.

This is an appeal by four University of Puerto Rico employees challenging the district court's denial of declaratory relief regarding alleged First Amendment violations stemming from the continued deduction of union dues from their paychecks after they requested to resign from the union following the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. AFSCME.

1. Whether the employees' claims for retrospective and prospective declaratory judgments remain justiciable or have become moot following the cessation of dues deductions by the University of Puerto Rico and the union.
2. Whether the voluntary cessation doctrine applies to prevent a finding of mootness when defendants have changed their conduct in response to a Supreme Court ruling rather than as litigation strategy.
3. Whether an admission of error by the defendants and implementation of new policies to comply with Janus eliminate the threat of future constitutional violations.

The First Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The court held that both the retrospective and prospective declaratory relief sought by the employees are moot. Regarding the retrospective declaration, the court reasoned that declaring past conduct unconstitutional would be merely advisory since the conduct has ceased and the employees have already received a binding judgment requiring reimbursement of deducted dues. Regarding the prospective declaration, the court applied the voluntary cessation doctrine and concluded that the defendants' burden to show mootness was satisfied because: (1) the cessation of dues deductions resulted from the Janus Supreme Court ruling rather than litigation strategy; (2) the defendants admitted error and acknowledged that further dues collection violates Janus; (3) the defendants implemented new policies requiring affirmative employee consent before collecting dues; and (4) there is no reasonable expectation that the challenged conduct will be repeated. The court found that a declaration stating what the defendants already agreed was the law would serve no purpose.

This is a federal drug trafficking case in which Rafael Antonio Fabian was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Fabian appeals his conviction, jury instructions, 15-year sentence (below the Guidelines recommendation of life), and the imposition of standard conditions of supervised release.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, or whether the relationship between Fabian and co-defendant Suriel constituted only a buyer-seller transaction exempt from conspiracy liability
2. Whether the district court properly responded to jury notes requesting exhibits that would "link" Fabian to certain evidence without improperly injecting itself into jury deliberations
3. Whether the 15-year sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable given a Guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment
4. Whether standard conditions of supervised release were properly imposed when not pronounced at sentencing

The court AFFIRMED the conviction and sentence but VACATED the imposition of standard conditions of supervised release and REMANDED for further proceedings. Regarding sufficiency of evidence: The court held that sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy conviction. Although a buyer-seller relationship alone cannot constitute conspiracy, the evidence showed Fabian had a financial stake in Suriel's ongoing crack distribution through prolonged cooperation, mutual trust, and standardized dealings. Fabian supplied wholesale quantities of cocaine on consignment, knew Suriel was cooking it into crack, advised Suriel on cooking methods, and benefited from the sales. The jury's rejection of Fabian's credibility arguments regarding cooperating witnesses was entitled to deference. Regarding jury instructions: The court held the district court did not err in responding to the jury's request for exhibits "linking" Fabian to certain evidence. The court properly reminded jurors they were sole fact-finders, provided relevant exhibits with contextualizing testimony, and did not abuse its discretion by providing additional germane evidence or declining to ask clarifying questions that might intrude on deliberations. Regarding sentencing: The court held the 15-year sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, correctly calculated drug weights using preponderance-of-the-evidence standard (including acquitted conduct), and properly applied the criminal-livelihood enhancement. The sentence was well below the Guidelines range and did not "shock the conscience" or constitute manifest injustice. Regarding supervised release conditions: The court held that under United States v. Maiorana, the district court erred by imposing standard conditions of supervised release in the written judgment without pronouncing them at sentencing or making the defendant aware of them. The court VACATED these conditions and REMANDED for the district court to either: (1) pronounce the conditions at a new sentencing hearing with opportunity for objection, or (2) decline to reimpose them.

This is an appeal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a federal prisoner challenging the Bureau of Prisons' calculation of time credits earned under the First Step Act (FSA). The central issue is whether FSA time credits can be applied to reduce a prisoner's term of supervised release or only to accelerate the start of supervised release.

1. Whether FSA time credits earned under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) can be used to reduce a federal inmate's term of supervised release
2. Whether Rivera-Perez's habeas petition became moot once he was transferred to prerelease custody
3. The proper interpretation of the phrase "applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release" in the FSA statute

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment and held that FSA time credits cannot be used to reduce a term of supervised release. The court concluded that when time credits are "applied toward" prerelease custody or supervised release, they accelerate the start date of those statuses rather than reducing their duration. The court reasoned that the second sentence of Section 3632(d)(4)(C), which directs the BOP to transfer eligible prisoners into prerelease custody or supervised release, clarifies that the statute addresses early transfers from prison, not reductions in supervised release terms. The court also found that allowing credits to reduce supervised release terms would create implausible consequences, including: (1) the statute would address two different processes without clear congressional intent; (2) detailed eligibility requirements for early transfers would not apply to supervised release reductions; (3) the statute fails to specify which agency would reduce supervised release terms; (4) the interpretation would bypass judicial oversight required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); and (5) prisoners could potentially eliminate their entire supervised release terms. Because Rivera-Perez had already received the maximum benefit available under the FSA (a 12-month acceleration of his supervised release start date) when transferred to prerelease custody, his petition was moot, and the case was vacated and remanded for dismissal.

This is an ERISA fiduciary duty case in which pension fund trustees sued mortgage servicers for mismanaging residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). The central issue is whether the underlying mortgages constitute "plan assets" under ERISA, which would trigger fiduciary duties owed to the pension plan.

1. Whether mortgages underlying residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) qualify as "plan assets" under the Department of Labor's plan-asset regulation (29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101)
2. Whether the Plan's investments in notes issued under indenture agreements constitute "equity interests" under the regulation's definition
3. Whether the Plan's investments in trust certificates issued by REMIC trusts constitute "equity interests" or "beneficial interests in a trust"
4. Whether the "substantial equity features" test applies differently to debt instruments versus beneficial interests in trusts
5. Whether Ocwen acted in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the mortgages

The Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held:

1. Indenture Notes (AHM 2004-4, AHM 2005-3, HLT 2006-HI1): The mortgages underlying these notes are NOT plan assets. The notes are treated as traditional debt instruments with fixed interest payments and maturity dates, lacking substantial equity features. Although the trusts were thinly capitalized and the notes' repayment depended on mortgage pool performance, these factors do not constitute substantial equity features because noteholders held no residual interest in the trusts and bore only credit risk, not performance risk.
2. REMIC Trust Certificates (CSFB 2003-27, MASTR 2003-5, GSR 2005-7F): The mortgages underlying the regular-interest certificates ARE plan assets. The court found that the certificates represent "beneficial interests in a trust" under the regulation's explicit definition, which automatically qualifies them as equity interests. Under New York law (governing the REMIC trusts), holders of regular-interest certificates are beneficiaries entitled to receive trust income from the mortgages. The regulation clearly states that "beneficial interest[s] in a trust are equity interests," triggering the look-through exception that treats underlying trust assets as plan assets.
3. Fiduciary Status: The court remanded the question of whether Ocwen acted in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the mortgages underlying the REMIC trusts, allowing the district court to address this issue in the first instance rather than deciding it on appeal.

This is an immigration law case involving statutory interpretation of federal removal eligibility requirements. The petitioner, a Honduran national, challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that his Virginia misdemeanor conviction renders him ineligible for cancellation of removal under federal immigration law.

1. Whether a Class 1 misdemeanor conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-186.3(A)(2) (identity fraud) constitutes "a crime involving moral turpitude" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)
2. Whether a Class 1 misdemeanor carrying a maximum sentence of twelve months constitutes "a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)
3. Whether twelve months in Virginia state law is equivalent to one year for purposes of federal immigration law

The Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review and affirmed the BIA's decision. The court held that: (1) the identity fraud offense is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) a Class 1 misdemeanor carrying a maximum twelve-month sentence qualifies as "a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed" because twelve calendar months equals one calendar year. The court rejected three arguments: first, that Virginia's distinction between misdemeanor (twelve months) and felony (one year) sentences creates a temporal difference (there is none); second, that "or" should be read as "and," requiring both a possible one-year sentence and a possible sentence exceeding one year (the word "or" is disjunctive); and third, that "one year or longer" is a term of art meaning "more than one year" or felony (the plain language controls over legislative history). The court emphasized that Congress knows how to use "more than one year" language when it chooses to, and the statutory text must be given its ordinary meaning.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges the application of United States Sentencing Guidelines enhancements to his conviction for attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant argues that the Guidelines enhancements should not apply because his offense involved fictitious minors created by law enforcement, not actual minors.

1. Whether the term "minor" in U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A) and (b)(5) unambiguously excludes fictitious minors created by law enforcement
2. Whether the Guidelines commentary's definition of "minor" to include fictitious minors is entitled to deference
3. Whether the district court committed plain error in applying the enhancements based on fictitious minors
4. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) itself permits conviction based on fictitious minors

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. The court held that: (1) the term "minor" in the Guidelines enhancements is ambiguous regarding whether it includes fictitious minors, as dictionary definitions do not specify whether a minor must be an actual person, and the plain language of the provisions does not resolve this ambiguity; (2) the Guidelines commentary's definition of "minor" to include fictitious minors falls within the zone of ambiguity and is entitled to deference as the Sentencing Commission's official position, consistent with how § 2422(b) has been interpreted by sister circuits; (3) the district court did not err in applying the enhancements; and (4) even if error had occurred, it would not constitute plain error because no Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit, or uniform sister circuit precedent supports the defendant's narrow interpretation of "minor." The court reasoned that the enhancements focus on the defendant's conduct rather than actual harm to a victim, making it anomalous to exclude fictitious minors from their application when the underlying conviction itself permits fictitious minors.

This is an appeal by Timothy Barton of a district court's approval of property sales and settlement agreements in a receivership established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) following allegations that Barton violated securities laws. The Fifth Circuit addresses jurisdictional issues and the merits of the district court's receivership management decisions.

1. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the district court's approval of the Amerigold Suites property sale
2. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the district court's ratification of two settlement agreements
3. Whether the district court erred in approving the sale of the Hall Street property before final judgment on liability
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that the Hall Street property sale was in the best interest of the receivership estate
5. Whether the district court properly followed statutory procedures under 28 U.S.C. § 2001 for property sales

The court partially dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's judgment. Specifically: (1) the appeal regarding the Amerigold Suites sale was dismissed as moot because the sale was cancelled and no effectual relief could be granted; (2) the appeals regarding the two settlement agreements were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because they were non-sale administrative orders not reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) or the collateral order doctrine, and the issue was foreclosed by the court's prior decision in Barton II; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the Hall Street property sale because the sale price met the statutory requirement of at least two-thirds of appraised value, the receiver properly marketed the property, and the sale benefitted the estate by avoiding continued interest accrual at approximately $1,023 per day. The court rejected Barton's argument that sales should not be approved before final judgment absent exigent circumstances, finding no legal support for such a requirement.

This is an insurance contract dispute in which Schoening Investment LP sought recovery under a commercial property insurance policy issued by Cincinnati Casualty Company for damage to Kentucky properties. The case involves the interpretation of whether the insurer properly deducted depreciation from repair cost settlements when the policyholder had not yet completed repairs.

1. Whether the insurance policy's Valuation provision, which defines "Actual Cash Value" as "replacement cost less a deduction that reflects depreciation," applies to repair costs or only to total property value.
2. Whether Schoening qualified for the Optional Coverage provision that promised "Replacement Cost without deduction for depreciation," which required the policyholder to actually repair the property first.
3. Whether the policy language is ambiguous and should be construed in favor of the policyholder.
4. Whether the anti-surplusage canon should override the plain language of the contract.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Cincinnati Casualty properly deducted depreciation from the repair cost settlement. The court reasoned that: (1) the Valuation provision applies to repair costs and defines them as "Actual Cash Value," which includes a depreciation deduction; (2) Schoening did not qualify for the Optional Coverage provision because it had not actually repaired the property, which was a condition precedent to receiving depreciation-free payment; (3) the policy language is unambiguous and clearly equates repair costs with "Actual Cash Value" as determined under the Valuation provision; (4) Schoening's interpretation would render the Optional Coverage provision meaningless and ignore the policy's plain language; and (5) Schoening forfeited its ambiguity argument by failing to raise it in the district court.

This is a federal sentencing appeal in which the defendant challenges the district court's determination that his prior Oregon conviction for attempted first-degree assault qualifies as a crime of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which was used to increase his base offense level for felon in possession of a firearm.

1. Whether an Oregon conviction for attempted first-degree assault qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (the "force clause")
2. Whether the phrase "attempted use" of physical force in the force clause requires the "probable desistance" test applied to substantive criminal offenses or instead requires only a "substantial step" toward the use of physical force
3. Whether Oregon's "substantial step" requirement for attempted first-degree assault necessarily entails the "attempted use" of physical force required by the force clause

The court affirmed the sentence. The Ninth Circuit held that under United States v. Linehan, the phrase "attempted use" of physical force means a "substantial step" toward the use of physical force, and this definition does not incorporate the "probable desistance" test applied to substantive criminal offenses. Because Oregon's attempted first-degree assault statute requires a defendant to take a substantial step toward causing serious physical injury to another, it necessarily entails a substantial step toward the use of physical force and therefore qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause. The court reasoned that Linehan adopted the established common-law meaning of "attempt" without requiring the more restrictive probable desistance test, and that the force clause does not require comparison to a generic federal attempt offense. Therefore, the district court properly increased the defendant's base offense level based on the prior conviction.

This is a criminal appeal addressing whether a district court properly corrected a sentencing error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a). David Wayne DePape was convicted of attempting to kidnap a federal officer and assaulting a family member of a federal official, but the sentencing court failed to allow him to allocute (personally address the court) before imposing sentence, in violation of Rule 32.

1. Whether a district court's failure to afford a defendant the right to allocute under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) constitutes an "arithmetical, technical, or other clear error" that may be corrected under Rule 35(a)
2. Whether the scope of Rule 35(a) is limited to errors that do not require reexercise of sentencing discretion
3. Whether the district court violated due process by granting the government's Rule 35(a) motion without extensive adversarial briefing

The court affirmed DePape's sentence, holding that a Rule 32 allocution violation constitutes "other clear error" correctable under Rule 35(a). The court reasoned that: (1) the failure to afford allocution is "unquestionably erroneous" and thus falls within Rule 35(a)'s plain text; (2) allocution is a vital, long-recognized procedural right dating back to 1689, making the error clearly discernible from the sentencing record; (3) Rule 35(a) is not limited to errors that avoid reexercise of sentencing discretion, as correcting arithmetical and technical errors often requires such reconsideration; and (4) no due process violation occurred because DePape received notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard on the motion to reopen sentencing.

This is an environmental law case in which the State of Alaska challenged the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) critical habitat designations for two species of Arctic seals under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The district court vacated the designations as unlawful, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the critical habitat designations for both seal species.

1. Whether the court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal by an intervenor-defendant (Center for Biological Diversity) from a remand order when the agency (NMFS) voluntarily dismissed its own appeal
2. Whether NMFS's critical habitat designations complied with the ESA's definition of "occupied critical habitat," specifically whether NMFS was required to find that the entire designated area is itself "essential" to species conservation
3. Whether NMFS was required to consider foreign nation conservation efforts and foreign habitat when making critical habitat designations
4. Whether NMFS abused its discretion by declining to exclude certain coastal areas requested for exclusion by Alaska and the North Slope Borough
5. Whether the designations complied with the ESA's "prudency" requirement

The court held that it had jurisdiction over the Center's appeal because the district court's remand order resolved discrete legal issues, application of erroneous rulings would result in a wasted proceeding, and the Center could not obtain a favorable outcome on remand.

On the merits, the court reversed the district court on three main issues:

1. Occupied Critical Habitat Definition: The ESA only requires NMFS to identify "physical or biological features" essential to conservation within occupied areas; it does not require a separate finding that the entire designated area itself is "essential" or an explanation of why a smaller area would not suffice. The plain statutory language supports NMFS's interpretation, and the contrast with the unoccupied habitat standard (which expressly requires areas to be "essential") confirms this reading.
2. Foreign Conservation Efforts and Habitat: The ESA does not require NMFS to consider foreign nation conservation efforts or foreign habitat when designating critical habitat. The statute explicitly requires such consideration for listing decisions but omits it from the critical habitat designation provision, indicating Congress's intentional distinction. NMFS already considered these factors at the listing stage.
3. Exclusion Decisions: NMFS acted within its discretion in declining to exclude coastal areas. Although the agency must consider relevant economic, national security, and other impacts, the decision to exclude areas is discretionary. NMFS prepared extensive impact reviews, found economic impacts would be "small," and reasonably explained that designation provides incremental conservation benefits beyond existing consultation requirements.

On cross-appeal, the court affirmed the district court's rejection of Alaska's prudency argument. The "prudency" language creates a narrow exception applicable only in rare circumstances (such as when designation would alert poachers or when habitat destruction is not a cause of decline). NMFS adequately explained why this exception did not apply, noting that habitat destruction is a primary threat to the seals and designation would not increase threats to them.

The court reinstated the critical habitat designations for both seal species and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Center and NMFS.

This is an environmental law case in which the State of Alaska challenged the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) critical habitat designations for two species of Arctic seal under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The district court vacated the designations as unlawful, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, upholding NMFS's authority to make the designations.

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear an intervenor-defendant's appeal from a remand order when the agency has voluntarily dismissed its own appeal
2. Whether NMFS's critical habitat designations comply with the ESA's definition of "occupied critical habitat"
3. Whether NMFS was required to consider foreign nation conservation efforts and foreign habitat when making critical habitat designations
4. Whether NMFS abused its discretion by declining to exclude certain coastal areas requested for exclusion by Alaska and the North Slope Borough
5. Whether the designations comply with the ESA's "prudency" requirement

The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the Center for Biological Diversity's appeal because the remand order resolved discrete legal issues, application of erroneous rulings would result in a wasted proceeding, and the Center could not obtain a favorable outcome on remand.

On the merits, the court reversed the district court's judgment that the designations were unlawful on three grounds:

1. Occupied Critical Habitat: The ESA requires only that NMFS identify "physical or biological features" essential to conservation within occupied areas; it does not require a separate finding that the entire designated area itself is "essential." The plain statutory text defines "critical habitat" as specific areas "on which are found" essential features, not areas that are themselves essential. The contrast with the unoccupied habitat provision, which expressly requires areas to be "essential," confirms this interpretation.
2. Foreign Conservation Efforts: The ESA does not require NMFS to consider foreign nation conservation efforts or foreign habitat when designating critical habitat. Unlike the provision governing threatened species listings, which expressly requires consideration of foreign conservation efforts, the critical habitat designation provision contains no such requirement. Congress's deliberate omission of this language from the critical habitat provision is dispositive.
3. Exclusions: NMFS acted within its discretion in declining to exclude coastal areas. Although the agency must "take into consideration" economic and other relevant impacts, the decision to exclude areas is entirely discretionary. NMFS adequately considered the relevant factors through extensive Regulatory Impact Reviews and reasonably explained why the benefits of designation outweighed the benefits of exclusion, including incremental conservation benefits and enhanced public awareness.

On cross-appeal, the court affirmed the district court's rejection of Alaska's prudency argument. The ESA's "to the maximum extent prudent" language creates only a narrow exception to the obligation to designate critical habitat, applicable only in rare circumstances such as when designation would alert poachers or when habitat destruction is not a cause of decline. NMFS adequately explained why this exception did not apply, noting that habitat destruction is a primary threat to the seals and that designation would not increase threats to them.

The court reversed the district court's judgment, reinstated the critical habitat designations for both seal species, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Center and NMFS.

This is a class action case under the Administrative Procedure Act brought by federal student loan borrowers seeking loan forgiveness based on borrower defense claims against fraudulent educational institutions. The case involves a dispute over the Department of Education's deadline to adjudicate applications from borrowers who applied after a settlement agreement was executed.

1. Whether the Department of Education is entitled to relief from the settlement agreement's deadline to adjudicate Post-Class Applicant borrower defense applications under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5)
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the DOE's motion for relief from the January 28, 2026 adjudication deadline
3. Whether a stay pending appeal should be granted to delay enforcement of the settlement agreement's deadlines

The court denied the Department of Education's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The court held that the DOE failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because it could not show that two district courts clearly abused their discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief. The court reasoned that the DOE knew over three years in advance that the Post-Class Applicant group exceeded 205,000 people and could point to no changed circumstances that would make application of the settlement agreement inequitable. The Supreme Court's precedent in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail establishes that modification of a settlement should not be granted where a party relies on events that were anticipated when entering the agreement. The court found the remaining factors for granting a stay were insufficient to overcome the DOE's weak showing on the likelihood of success on the merits.

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case brought by Terry Joyner, a white police officer with the Atlanta Police Department, against the City of Atlanta and police officials. Joyner alleged racial discrimination in denial of promotion to Captain, retaliation for reporting racial discrimination complaints and ticket fixing, and violations of the First Amendment and Georgia Whistleblower Act.

1. Whether Joyner established a Title VII retaliation claim based on alleged discrimination occurring six years before his denial of promotion
2. Whether the removal of Joyner's flextime work schedule constituted a materially adverse employment action supporting a First Amendment retaliation claim
3. Whether the removal of flextime was clearly established as unconstitutional, defeating qualified immunity
4. Whether Joyner's ticket-fixing complaint satisfied the Georgia Whistleblower Act's requirement of reporting a violation of law, rule, or regulation
5. Whether the jury verdict form properly reflected the elements of a Title VII mixed-motive discrimination claim
6. Whether Joyner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his discrimination claim

1. Title VII Retaliation Claim (2008 complaint): The court affirmed summary judgment against Joyner. The six-year gap between his 2008 racial discrimination complaint and the 2014 promotion denial, combined with unrefuted evidence that the decision-maker (Chief Turner) was unaware of the complaint, defeated the causation element required for Title VII retaliation claims.
2. First Amendment Retaliation Claim (ticket-fixing report): The court reversed summary judgment and held that Joyner presented a genuine issue of material fact. The removal of flextime privileges one week after reporting ticket fixing to the FBI and OPS constituted a materially adverse employment action because: (a) flextime was an important privilege of employment; (b) Joyner used it for over 12 years to work a second job and supplement income by two-thirds; (c) he used it to pick up his young children from school as required by his divorce decree; and (d) the loss would likely chill a reasonable employee's protected speech. The court also held that it was clearly established law that government officials cannot strip employees of important employment privileges in retaliation for protected speech, defeating qualified immunity.
3. Georgia Whistleblower Act Claim: The court affirmed summary judgment against Joyner because he failed to specify which law, rule, or regulation was violated by the alleged ticket-fixing conduct. The statute requires reporting of violations of specific laws, rules, or regulations, and Joyner's complaint did not identify any such violation.
4. Motion to Amend Pleadings: The court affirmed denial of Joyner's mid-trial motion to add a § 1981 claim. The City would have been prejudiced by the addition of a claim with different causation standards and unlimited damages after key witnesses testified. Additionally, the jury's verdict that Joyner was not denied promotion doomed any discrimination claim.
5. Jury Instructions and Verdict Form: The court affirmed the district court's decisions regarding jury instructions and the verdict form. The first question asking whether Joyner was denied promotion accurately reflected the law—it is a necessary element of a Title VII discrimination claim that must be established before considering whether race was a motivating factor. The court properly instructed the jury that employers cannot discriminate based on race, and the jury is presumed to follow instructions. The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to provide additional portions of the City Code regarding anti-discrimination policies when the jury only requested the section on appointment authority.
6. Judgment as a Matter of Law: The court affirmed denial of Joyner's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the discrimination claim. Although Chief Turner testified that he considered race when making appointments, credibility determinations and weighing of evidence are jury functions. The jury could reasonably find that Turner's stated reasons for not promoting Joyner (his poor performance, failure to express interest in promotion, and practice of moving new captains out of their current zones) were the actual motivating factors, even if race played some role in his general appointment practices.

This is an appeal from a Court of Chancery decision in a commercial dispute involving US Trading Company Metals RE, LLC against USA Rare Earth, LLC and related defendants. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's rulings on the merits of the case.

The opinion does not specify the particular legal issues addressed, as the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision based on its prior memoranda and orders without detailing the substantive claims or defenses in this order.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The Court based its affirmance on the reasoning provided in the lower court's Memorandum Opinion dated October 20, 2023; Order dated December 8, 2023; Memorandum Opinion dated April 22, 2024; and Order dated May 10, 2024, without restating those reasons in this appellate opinion.

This is a Delaware Supreme Court case addressing stockholder inspection rights under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The case involves Rhode Island's Employees' Retirement System seeking to inspect Paramount Global's books and records to investigate potential corporate wrongdoing related to the sale of National Amusements and Paramount's handling of acquisition proposals.

1. Whether a stockholder may rely on post-demand evidence (evidence that arises or is disclosed after serving the inspection demand) when establishing a "credible basis" to suspect corporate wrongdoing under Section 220
2. Whether hearsay statements from confidential, unnamed sources in news articles are sufficiently reliable to support a credible basis finding
3. Whether the stockholder's reliance on post-demand evidence prejudiced the corporation

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision and established the following rulings:

1. Post-Demand Evidence: The Court held that while stockholders are generally limited to evidence available at the time of demand, the Court of Chancery may, in its discretion, consider post-demand evidence under exceptional circumstances when: (a) material events occur after the demand but before trial, and (b) the stockholder's reliance on such evidence does not prejudice the corporation. The Court rejected Paramount's argument for a categorical ban on post-demand evidence, finding nothing in Section 220's text prohibits such consideration and noting that a categorical rule would create inefficiencies requiring stockholders to serve new demands whenever material post-demand evidence emerges.
2. Confidential Sources in News Articles: The Court affirmed that hearsay statements in news articles from reputable publications can be sufficiently reliable to support a credible basis finding, even when sources are confidential and unnamed. The Court emphasized this is a fact-specific inquiry, not a categorical rule based solely on publication reputation. The Court of Chancery properly considered multiple factors including: the number of articles (47), corroboration by company public filings, reputation of outlets and journalists, specificity of assertions, absence of unreliability indicators, and Paramount's own reliance on similar articles.
3. No Prejudice Finding: The Court found no abuse of discretion in the Court of Chancery's conclusion that Paramount suffered no prejudice from Rhode Island's reliance on post-demand evidence, noting that the evidence pertained to Paramount's own conduct, the parties stipulated to certain evidence's admissibility, and Paramount offered its own post-demand evidence.
4. Credible Basis Established: The Court upheld the finding that Rhode Island demonstrated a credible basis to suspect that Redstone and National Amusements breached their duty of loyalty by channeling potential buyers away from a company-level transaction toward a National Amusements-level transaction.

This case involves a dispute over the enforceability of a stock purchase agreement's forum selection provision and an arbitrator's decision regarding earnout payments. WWEC Holdings III Corp. purchased a Mississippi LLC from David Hackman for $28.9 million plus a potential earnout based on adjusted EBITDA, with disputes over earnout calculations to be resolved by an independent arbitrator whose decision would be final absent fraud, intentional misrepresentation, or manifest error.

1. Whether the Delaware Court of Chancery or Mississippi Federal Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority or committed manifest error regarding the earnout calculation
2. Whether fraud claims arising from the stock purchase agreement must be brought in Delaware courts under the forum selection provision, despite being filed in Mississippi Federal Court
3. Whether the defendant breached the forum selection provision by filing lawsuits in Mississippi Federal Court
4. Whether the Court has equitable subject matter jurisdiction over the action
5. Whether declaratory judgment claims regarding the validity of fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are ripe for judicial determination

The Court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. Specifically:

1. Counts I and II (Arbitrator Authority and Manifest Error): Dismissed without prejudice in deference to the first-filed Enforcement Action in Mississippi Federal Court. The Court found that the specific carve-out in Section 1.5(e)(ii) of the SPA permits judgment to be entered upon the arbitrator's determination "in any court having jurisdiction over any Party in order to enforce such determination," which allows the defendant to pursue enforcement in Mississippi Federal Court.
2. Counts III and IV (Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation): Motion to dismiss denied. The Court held that the broad forum selection provision in Section 8.10 requires that "[a]ny suit, action or other proceeding arising out of or relating to" the SPA must be brought exclusively in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Fraud claims arising from the SPA fall within this broad provision, and the narrow carve-out in Section 1.5(e)(ii) applies only to enforcement of the arbitrator's award, not fraud claims. The Court also found the declaratory judgment claims were ripe because the defendant had already filed the fraud action in Mississippi Federal Court, demonstrating an actual controversy.
3. Count V (Breach of Forum Selection Provision): Motion to dismiss granted in part and denied in part. The breach claim was dismissed to the extent it was based on the Enforcement Action (which was permitted under Section 1.5(e)(ii)), but sustained to the extent it was based on the Fraud Action (which violated Section 8.10 by being filed in Mississippi rather than Delaware).
4. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Court found it had equitable subject matter jurisdiction because WWEC sought equitable relief, including an injunction against the defendant prosecuting the actions in violation of the forum selection provision.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a securities fraud and unfair business practices lawsuit based on a forum selection clause contained in promissory notes. The plaintiffs invested in a biopharmaceutical company based on allegedly fraudulent representations and seek to recover their losses in Massachusetts federal court, but the defendants moved to dismiss based on a clause requiring disputes to be resolved in Delaware courts.

1. Whether the plaintiffs' claims "arise out of" the promissory notes and thus fall within the scope of the forum selection clause, despite plaintiffs' argument that the fraud preceded the notes themselves
2. Whether the forum selection clause is enforceable under Massachusetts public policy protecting investors and securities purchasers
3. Whether nonsignatory defendants can enforce a forum selection clause signed by a corporate entity on their behalf

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without prejudice. The court held that: (1) the plaintiffs' claims arise out of the promissory notes because the suit requires interpretation of the notes, the notes themselves contain the alleged misrepresentations, and all claimed injuries stem from the purchase of the notes; (2) the forum selection clause is enforceable because plaintiffs failed to meet their heavy burden of showing that Massachusetts public policy bars enforcement—they identified no Massachusetts case declining enforcement on investor protection grounds, and Delaware courts would provide an adequate remedy; and (3) nonsignatory defendants may enforce the forum selection clause when the claims clearly originate from the sale of and misrepresentations in the notes. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that mere inconvenience of out-of-state litigation renders the clause unenforceable.

This is an employment retaliation case in which an employee appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. Harris claimed he was terminated in retaliation for requesting reasonable accommodation for a disability and exercising rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).

1. Whether Harris established a causal nexus between his protected conduct (requesting reasonable accommodation for a disability under Massachusetts law and/or FMLA relief) and his termination
2. Whether the temporal sequence of events—National Grid's termination decision preceding Harris's assertion of protected rights—precludes a finding of retaliation
3. Whether National Grid's actions demonstrated retaliation or, conversely, accommodation of Harris's rights

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for National Grid. The court held that Harris failed to establish the required causal connection between protected conduct and his termination because the chronology of events clearly demonstrated that National Grid decided to terminate Harris on July 30 when it issued an ultimatum that he return to his service territory immediately—before Harris first claimed to have a preexisting medical condition requiring accommodation. The court reasoned that causation moves forward in time, not backward, and therefore protected conduct occurring after an adverse employment action cannot serve as the predicate for retaliation. Additionally, the court found that National Grid's subsequent handling of Harris's accommodation request—providing detailed guidance on required medical documentation and extending deadlines—demonstrated respect for rather than retaliation against his assertion of rights. Harris was ultimately terminated only after he failed to provide adequate medical documentation to support his accommodation request, nearly three weeks after the initial termination decision.

This is a securities law case involving investors who purchased exchange-traded notes (ETNs) issued by Barclays and subsequently challenged a 4:1 reverse split of those securities. The investors alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933 by claiming the reverse split constituted an unregistered sale and was tied to a misleading registration statement.

1. Whether a reverse split of securities constitutes a "sale" under Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act, which prohibits the sale of unregistered securities
2. Whether investors can trace post-split ETNs to a particular registration statement to establish liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act, which prohibits misleading registration statements
3. Whether the April 2021 pricing supplement issued by Barclays constituted a new registration statement covering the ETNs distributed through the reverse split

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that: (1) a reverse split does not constitute a "sale" under the Securities Act because it does not involve a meaningful change in the nature of the investment or investment risks—investors simply exchanged four notes for one note of equivalent value in a mandatory, involuntary transaction requiring no investment decision; and (2) the investors failed to trace their post-split ETNs to the April Supplement because that supplement governed only Barclays' own inventory of post-split ETNs used in market-making transactions, not the ETNs distributed to investors through the reverse split. The court reasoned that subjecting mandatory splits to Securities Act registration requirements would not advance the statute's purpose of protecting investors through disclosure, since investors have no choice in mandatory splits and make no investment decision.

This is a federal drug trafficking case in which Rafael Antonio Fabian was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison, substantially below the Guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment, and appeals on multiple grounds including sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, sentencing reasonableness, and conditions of supervised release.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, or whether the relationship between Fabian and his co-conspirator constituted only a buyer-seller transaction
2. Whether the district court properly responded to jury notes requesting exhibits linking Fabian to certain evidence without improperly injecting itself into jury deliberations
3. Whether the 15-year sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable given a Guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment
4. Whether standard conditions of supervised release were properly imposed without being pronounced at sentencing

The court AFFIRMED the conviction and sentence but VACATED the standard conditions of supervised release and REMANDED for further proceedings. Specifically: (1) Sufficiency of Evidence: The court held that sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy conviction. The evidence demonstrated that Fabian supplied wholesale quantities of cocaine on consignment to Suriel, knowing it would be converted to crack cocaine and resold, advised Suriel on crack production, had a financial stake in Suriel's sales, and exercised control over Suriel's business operations. This went beyond a simple buyer-seller relationship and established a conspiracy. The court rejected Fabian's argument that a buyer-seller exception instruction was required. (2) Jury Instructions and Response to Jury Notes: The district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury's request for exhibits "linking" Fabian to certain evidence. The court properly reminded jurors they were the sole fact-finders, provided relevant exhibits with contextualizing testimony, and did not improperly advocate for guilt. The court's response was fair and within its considerable discretion. (3) Sentencing Reasonableness: Both procedurally and substantively, the 15-year sentence was reasonable. The court properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, properly calculated drug weights using preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for acquitted conduct (as permitted under then-applicable law), and properly applied the criminal-livelihood enhancement. The sentence was well below the Guidelines range and did not shock the conscience or constitute manifest injustice. The court was not required to anticipate Amendment 826 (concerning acquitted conduct) or address crack-powder cocaine sentencing disparities. (4) Standard Conditions of Supervised Release: The court erred by imposing standard conditions of supervised release in the written judgment without pronouncing them at sentencing or making Fabian aware of them. Under United States v. Maiorana, non-mandatory conditions must be orally pronounced or the defendant must be directed to a written copy with express adoption. The case was remanded for the district court to either properly impose the conditions with Fabian's awareness and opportunity to object, or to strike them from the judgment.

This is an immigration law case involving a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision regarding Josue Roman Sanchez's eligibility for relief based on moral character grounds.

Whether the petitioner's scholastic achievements and rehabilitative efforts are sufficient to rebut the presumption of lack of good moral character in light of multiple DUI convictions.

The court's original opinion (filed March 10, 2025) was amended on March 24, 2026 to correct a stylistic error. The amended ruling states that the petitioner's scholastic achievements and rehabilitative efforts are insufficient to rebut the presumption of lack of good moral character because the record demonstrates that the DUI convictions were not an isolated "aberration" given their frequency. The amendment did not change the Court's disposition or judgment, only corrected the language for clarity.

This is an appeal by servicemembers and their spouses who alleged that Maryland state courts violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) by failing to comply with procedural protections before entering judgments against them. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Maryland and the Justices of the Maryland Supreme Court in their official capacities, seeking damages and injunctive relief for violations that occurred during the domestication and enforcement of foreign judgments against them.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to sue the Governor and Supreme Court Justices for alleged SCRA violations, specifically whether their injuries are fairly traceable to the defendants' acts or omissions
2. Whether the domestication of foreign judgments under Maryland's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act triggers SCRA protections
3. Whether the issuance of writs of garnishment implicates SCRA procedural requirements
4. Whether plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint alleging additional defendants (administrative judges and clerks) would cure the standing deficiency

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The majority held that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue any of the defendants because their injuries are not fairly traceable to the defendants' acts or omissions. The court reasoned that while the SCRA directly obligates state courts to comply with its procedural protections, the Justices' failure to promulgate redundant state rules incorporating SCRA requirements did not determinatively or coercively cause the state court clerks' violations. The Relief Act already imposed binding federal obligations on the clerks independent of any state rule, so the Justices' inaction was merely a failure to remind officials of pre-existing duties. The court found no evidence that clerks would have complied with federal law if state rules had incorporated the same protections, making the causal chain too speculative to satisfy traceability requirements. Similarly, plaintiffs failed to show any connection between the Governor's general executive authority and the judicial clerks' conduct. The court also found that plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint adding administrative judges and clerks as defendants would be futile because plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts showing how these officials' acts or omissions caused the injury. Judge Gregory's dissent argued that the Justices' rules would have a predictable and determinative effect on administrative judges' and clerks' compliance, and that the court should recognize that judicial employees naturally look to local rules for guidance on their obligations.

This is an immigration appeal in which a Salvadoran national and former gang member seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order denying him deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The petitioner argues he faces a clear probability of torture if returned to El Salvador due to harsh prison conditions and his past experiences with police torture.

1. Whether El Salvador's harsh prison conditions are specifically intended by the government to inflict torture as required under the CAT
2. Whether the petitioner's past instances of torture by Salvadoran police establish a clear probability of future torture
3. Whether the petitioner's gang affiliation and prior police encounters increase his individual risk of torture upon return to El Salvador
4. The proper standard of review for factual findings in CAT cases (substantial evidence standard with high deference to the immigration judge)

The Fifth Circuit upheld the BIA's denial of CAT protection on two grounds. First, substantial evidence supports the finding that El Salvador's harsh prison conditions are not specifically intended by the government to inflict torture. The court found that while conditions are poor, the government has taken credible steps to punish officials for human rights abuses, and advertising poor conditions as a deterrent to gang activity does not demonstrate intent to torture. Second, the court found that although Salvadoran security forces previously tortured the petitioner on two occasions, his future risk of torture is only speculative. The court reasoned that isolated instances of past torture do not establish a clear probability of future torture, especially since the petitioner was not tortured during an 11-year prior prison term. The court also noted that El Salvador's "state of exception" policy may actually decrease the risk of targeted torture by allowing detention of gang members without needing to inflict harm to secure confessions. The court emphasized the highly deferential substantial evidence standard for reviewing CAT factual findings and found no basis to overturn the immigration judge's well-reasoned conclusions.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a murder conviction where the state failed to disclose initial witness interviews and intentionally destroyed recordings of those interviews. The petitioner argues these actions violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights under Brady v. Maryland and California v. Trombetta/Arizona v. Youngblood.

1. Whether the state's failure to disclose initial interviews with three eyewitnesses constituted a Brady violation requiring reversal of the conviction
2. Whether the state's intentional destruction of recordings of those interviews violated due process under Trombetta and Youngblood, and whether the trial court's chosen remedy (barring the prosecution from calling the witnesses) was constitutionally adequate
3. The appropriate standard of review for habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which requires showing the state court acted "contrary to" or made an "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief. Although the court acknowledged that the state's conduct in hiding and destroying evidence was troubling and violated due process principles, it held that under the highly deferential § 2254 standard, the petitioner failed to meet the demanding requirements for habeas relief. On the Brady claim, the court deferred to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' finding that the suppressed witness statements were not "favorable" to the petitioner because the witnesses did not identify him as the shooter, likely would not have identified him anyway, and the mere destruction of recordings does not compel a conclusion they contained exculpatory evidence. On the Trombetta/Youngblood claim, the court held that neither Supreme Court precedent indisputably forbids the remedy imposed (barring prosecution from calling the witnesses) nor compels a different remedy such as an adverse-inference instruction. The court emphasized that while it might have analyzed the issues differently on direct review, § 2254 requires great deference to state court decisions, and relief is warranted only where "no possibility [exists that] fairminded jurists could disagree" with the state court's decision.

This is a Fourth Amendment excessive force case arising from a drug search warrant execution in which law enforcement officers tackled a suspect and struck him with a rifle barrel, causing a head injury requiring stitches. Steinhoff sued three officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the use of force was excessive and violated his constitutional rights.

1. Whether Detective Kowalczyk's tackle of Steinhoff during the execution of a search warrant for methamphetamine violated the Fourth Amendment and whether the right was clearly established at the time of the incident.
2. Whether Investigator Malovrh's alleged intentional strike to Steinhoff's head with a rifle barrel constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and whether qualified immunity applies.
3. The proper standard for evaluating excessive force claims during dynamic, high-risk drug raids involving suspects with violent histories.
4. Whether disputed factual questions regarding intent and the circumstances of the rifle strike preclude summary judgment.

The court affirmed qualified immunity for Detective Kowalczyk, holding that even assuming Steinhoff was compliant and not attempting to flee, the tackle did not violate clearly established law given the dangerous circumstances of a drug raid involving individuals with violent histories and potential flight risk. The court emphasized that officers executing such warrants must make split-second judgments in dynamic situations, and no clearly established precedent put Detective Kowalczyk on notice that his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed summary judgment for Investigator Malovrh regarding the rifle strike, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of an intentional blow to warrant jury consideration. The court noted that Steinhoff's testimony of seeing a rifle swing toward his head while standing, the audible "clink" on the video, the severity of the injury, and the fact that only Investigator Malovrh had a rifle (other than Captain Ramberg who did not participate) created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the blow was intentional. The court concluded that if intentional, such a blow could constitute deadly force against a non-resisting suspect, violating clearly established law, and remanded for trial.

This case involves a petition for review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders establishing a methodology for calculating exit fees that members of Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., a generation-and-transmission cooperative, must pay to terminate their long-term all-requirements contracts and leave the cooperative. The central dispute concerns whether FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting a lost-revenues approach and adopting a balance-sheet approach for calculating these exit fees.

1. Whether FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by rejecting a lost-revenues approach to calculating exit fees in favor of a balance-sheet approach
2. Whether the balance-sheet approach violates cost-causation principles under the Federal Power Act's "just and reasonable" standard
3. Whether FERC properly adopted a transmission-crediting mechanism and whether it was arbitrary to include non-networked debt in the transmission credit
4. Whether FERC acted arbitrarily by applying the balance-sheet approach to Eastern Interconnection members despite potential obligations under Tri-State's contract with Basin Electric Power Cooperative
5. Whether FERC properly distinguished prior precedent regarding lost-revenues approaches in exit-fee calculations

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed FERC's orders and denied Tri-State's petitions for review. The court held that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking and did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in any of its decisions. Specifically:

1. Lost-Revenues Approach: FERC reasonably rejected the lost-revenues approach because: (1) there is no breach of contract when a member exits under the tariff, so breach-of-contract damages are inappropriate; (2) the approach would overcompensate Tri-State by allowing it to recover decades of projected revenues never actually earned; (3) neither the Service Contracts nor bylaws mandate a lost-revenues approach; and (4) the approach would improperly deter member withdrawal and violate cost-causation principles.
2. Balance-Sheet Approach: FERC reasonably adopted the balance-sheet approach because it: (1) accounts for departing members' ownership interests in Tri-State; (2) reflects the likelihood that departing members will continue using Tri-State's transmission services; (3) allows Tri-State to mitigate costs through the two-year notice period; (4) satisfies the exit fee's purpose of compensating Tri-State for costs incurred to serve the departing member; and (5) is supported by substantial record evidence. The approach is not arbitrary merely because it is novel.
3. Transmission-Crediting Mechanism: FERC reasonably adopted the transmission credit and properly applied it to departing members' entire OATT invoices because: (1) applying the credit to the entire invoice ensures departing members receive the full benefit of their transmission-related debt payments; (2) applying it only to debt-related portions would create a windfall for Tri-State; and (3) FERC did not arbitrarily change the credit's purpose by including non-networked debt, as the credit's purpose was always to ensure full recovery of transmission-related debt costs while preventing double recovery and cost shifts.
4. Eastern Interconnection Members: FERC reasonably applied the balance-sheet approach to Eastern Interconnection members despite the Basin contract because: (1) FERC has broad discretion to handle related but discrete issues in separate proceedings; (2) the exit-fee methodology and Tri-State's Basin contract obligations are distinct issues; (3) FERC concluded in a separate proceeding that Tri-State would not breach the Basin contract by allowing member withdrawals; and (4) any potential breach affects a member's ability to exit regardless of the methodology used.
5. Precedent: FERC reasonably distinguished prior cases (Shoshone, Norwood, American Wind, and Wabash) because they involved different factual circumstances, different contracts, or different procedural contexts, and none mandated the use of a lost-revenues approach in all cooperative member exit situations.

The court emphasized that it affords great deference to FERC in rate decisions and that its role is limited to ensuring FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, not to substituting its own judgment for FERC's. The court found that FERC weighed competing views, selected an exit-fee formula with adequate record support, and intelligibly explained its reasons for its choices.

Concurrence/Dissent: Judge McHugh concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on all issues except the inclusion of non-networked debt in the transmission credit. Judge McHugh argued that including non-networked debt in the credit is inconsistent with FERC's stated purpose of preventing cost shifts to remaining members, as it would naturally shift costs to other members for the departing member's share of non-networked transmission debt.

This is a criminal appeal of an orthopedic surgeon, Lawrence Alexander, who was convicted of making a false statement relating to health care matters under 18 U.S.C. § 1035 in connection with a durable medical equipment company's Medicare enrollment application. Alexander was acquitted on a conspiracy charge but convicted on the false statement charge and sentenced to 33 months imprisonment with restitution and forfeiture orders.

1. Whether venue was proper in the Southern District of Florida
2. Whether the indictment sufficiently stated an offense under § 1035
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support conviction under § 1035, including whether the false statement was material to Medicare
4. Whether the evidence supported conviction under an aiding and abetting theory
5. Whether jury instructions on materiality and deliberate ignorance were proper
6. Whether the forfeiture order of $125,000 was proper
7. Whether the restitution order of $315,704.52 was proper

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and most of the district court's orders but vacated the restitution award and remanded for further proceedings. Specifically:

1. Venue: Affirmed as proper based on overwhelming circumstantial evidence that the crime occurred in the Southern District of Florida, where Silent Hill was located, the defendants resided, and Waxman's office was situated.
2. Motion to Dismiss: Affirmed the denial of the motion because the indictment sufficiently tracked the statutory language of § 1035 and provided adequate notice of the charges with factual allegations about Medicare enrollment requirements.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence—Materiality: Affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence that the false ownership statement was material to Medicare because expert testimony established that ownership disclosures are important to Medicare's decisions regarding enrollment and billing privileges, and false information could lead to enrollment termination.
4. Sufficiency of Evidence—Aiding and Abetting: Affirmed the conviction, finding the government proved all three elements: (1) the substantive offense was committed; (2) Alexander contributed to the false statement by providing his mother's information and suggesting she be listed as owner; and (3) Alexander intended to aid the submission because he consented to CMS 855S forms before submission and Waxman never signed documents on his mother's behalf without permission.
5. Jury Instructions: Affirmed both instructions. The materiality instruction was subject to invited error because Alexander himself proposed the identical language he later challenged. The deliberate ignorance instruction argument was waived because Alexander raised it for the first time in his reply brief.
6. Forfeiture: Affirmed the $125,000 forfeiture order. Although the district court failed to enter a preliminary forfeiture order before sentencing as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B), the procedural error was harmless because Alexander had fair notice of the forfeiture claim, the specific amount, and a full opportunity to contest it at the hearing.
7. Restitution: Vacated and remanded. The court found insufficient evidence that the January 2019 false statement actually caused Medicare's loss. While a § 1035 conviction requires only that a false statement be capable of influencing a decision, restitution requires proof that the defendant's conduct actually and proximately caused the victim's loss. The government failed to show that Medicare ever reviewed or relied upon the January 2019 form, and the parties stipulated that no letter of receipt or processing was produced. Mere speculation that Medicare might have relied on the form is insufficient to meet the government's burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

This is an appeal of a Court of Chancery decision in a commercial dispute where the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs and awarded them attorneys' fees and costs related to defendants' discovery misconduct. The Delaware Supreme Court addresses whether the appeal is properly before it or should be dismissed as interlocutory.

1. Whether the appeal is a final judgment or an interlocutory order subject to dismissal under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42
2. Whether an order titled "Final Order and Judgment" is conclusively final for appellate purposes when material issues remain unresolved
3. Whether the unresolved amount of attorneys' fees prevents the judgment from being final

The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. The court held that despite the order's title as "Final Order and Judgment," it was not truly final because the amount of attorneys' fees awarded in the Sanctions Decision remained unresolved in the Court of Chancery. The court applied the legal standard that a final judgment must "determine the merits of the controversy or define the rights of the parties and leave nothing for future determination or consideration." Since material issues—specifically the amount of attorneys' fees—remained pending before the trial court, the appeal was premature and lacked appellate jurisdiction. The court allowed defendants to apply the filing fee to any future appeal filed after a truly final order is entered.

This is a Delaware limited liability company dispute in which a member and former director alleges that the company's board of directors acted in bad faith by withholding tax distributions to members for calendar years 2022 through 2025, contrary to the operating agreement's requirements.

1. Whether the board of directors breached its obligation under the operating agreement to make quarterly tax distributions to members when cash was available after reasonable reserves
2. Whether the board acted in good faith in withholding tax distributions, given the operating agreement's presumption that the board is conclusively presumed to act in good faith when it subjectively believes its decisions are in the company's best interests
3. Whether the board made required quarterly determinations of available cash and reserves
4. Whether the board's true motive was to pressure members to sell their equity at a discount

The court denied the company's request for leave to move for summary judgment. The court reasoned that although the operating agreement contains a presumption of good faith, the determination of whether the board acted in bad faith involves credibility assessments and weighing of evidence regarding the board's motivations that are best resolved at trial rather than on summary judgment. The court noted that even where facts are undisputed, summary judgment may be declined when a more thorough exploration of the facts is needed to properly apply the law, and that trial was only weeks away, making it the appropriate forum to assess the parties' evidence and credibility.

This is a guardianship case involving an 86-year-old man with cognitive impairment where the appointed guardian sought emergency court authorization to withdraw life-sustaining mechanical ventilation and change the ward's code status from "full code" to a more restrictive status. The case addresses the interaction between Delaware's newly adopted Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and Court of Chancery Rule 178-A regarding a guardian's authority to override a ward's health-care instructions.

1. Whether a guardian may override a ward's health-care instructions regarding code status and life-sustaining treatment without court authorization under the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of 2023 (16 Del. C. § 2522).
2. The conflict between Court of Chancery Rule 178-A and the substantive requirements of the Act regarding guardian authority over life-sustaining treatment decisions.
3. Whether the ward's April 2024 Do Not Resuscitate directive was validly revoked by his October 2024 election of "full code" status, and whether that later instruction was made with capacity.
4. The evidentiary standard required for court authorization to override a valid health-care instruction made with capacity—specifically, whether clear and convincing evidence supports overriding the ward's wishes.
5. The proper scope of the court's role as "conscientious steward" when evaluating a guardian's request to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.

The court denied the Emergency Petition. The court held that:

1. The Act's substantive requirement that a guardian obtain court authorization before revoking or disregarding a health-care instruction (16 Del. C. § 2522(a)) controls over the procedural Rule 178-A, which attempted to permit guardians to act upon medical confirmation of irreversible decline without court approval. The court's rule-making authority cannot override statutory provisions.
2. The ward's April 2024 DMOST (Do Not Resuscitate directive) was validly revoked by his October 25, 2024 election of "full code" status. The medical record expressly documented that J.L.S. "had capacity to make the decision" at that time, and the Act presumes capacity unless rebutted. The Guardian did not present evidence rebutting this presumption.
3. The ward reaffirmed his full code preference in January 2026 while awake and oriented to person and place, further supporting the validity of his October 2024 instruction.
4. Although the physicians' testimony established a grave medical prognosis and irreversible decline, the Act does not permit a guardian or court to disregard a valid health-care instruction solely because of worsened prognosis or to substitute the court's assessment of medical circumstances for a health-care instruction made with capacity.
5. The Guardian failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard required to authorize action inconsistent with J.L.S.'s full code instructions. There was no evidence that J.L.S. lacked capacity when he elected full code status, and the Guardian did not seek such a finding.
6. The court emphasized its role as a "conscientious steward" for those who cannot advocate for themselves, and that role requires respecting valid health-care instructions made with capacity, even when medical circumstances have deteriorated significantly.

This is a Fourth Amendment excessive force case arising from the arrest of a protester at a sit-in at the Vermont state capitol. The central issue is whether a police sergeant was entitled to qualified immunity when he used a rear wristlock on a passively resisting protester to remove her from the building.

1. Whether the use of a rear wristlock on a passively resisting protester during arrest constitutes excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether prior Circuit precedent (Amnesty America v. West Hartford) clearly established that such conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, thereby denying qualified immunity
3. The standard for determining when a constitutional right is "clearly established" for qualified immunity purposes—specifically, whether precedent must involve factually identical circumstances or whether "fundamentally similar" facts suffice

The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that Sergeant Zorn was entitled to qualified immunity. The majority reasoned that Amnesty America did not clearly establish that Zorn's specific conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because: (1) Amnesty America involved a wide range of aggressive conduct without clearly holding that any particular action violated the Constitution; (2) Amnesty America acknowledged that a reasonable jury could find the officers' use of force was objectively reasonable; (3) Zorn gave repeated warnings before using the wristlock, distinguishing his conduct from the Amnesty America case; and (4) the prior precedent lacked the "high degree of specificity" required to put a reasonable officer on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful. Justice Sotomayor's dissent argued that Amnesty America specifically addressed rear wristlocks on passively resisting protesters and clearly established that such conduct could constitute excessive force, and that the majority improperly required a factually identical case rather than merely "fundamentally similar" circumstances.

This is an appeal concerning whether New York City's Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGMVPL), which establishes a two-year revival window for civil claims arising from sexual and gender-based violence, is preempted by New York State's earlier revival windows under the Child Victims Act (CVA) and Adult Survivors Act (ASA). The plaintiff brought claims that would have been time-barred absent the City's 2022 amendments to the VGMVPL.

1. Whether the VGMVPL's two-year revival window (March 2023 to March 2025) is preempted by the CVA's and ASA's earlier revival periods under the doctrine of conflict preemption
2. Whether the CVA and ASA occupy the field of revival actions for sexual assault claims, thereby precluding local legislation under the doctrine of field preemption
3. Whether the state and city laws regulate sufficiently different conduct to avoid preemption
4. The scope of home rule authority for New York City municipalities under the New York State Constitution

Rather than deciding the case, the Second Circuit certified the preemption question to the New York Court of Appeals. The court found that: (1) no controlling precedent from the New York Court of Appeals exists on whether the CVA and ASA preempt the VGMVPL's revival window; (2) the question involves important issues of state public policy, including home rule principles and the state's policy of providing remedies to victims of sexual abuse; and (3) certification would resolve the litigation and allow numerous pending state court cases to be decided by the appropriate state court. The court noted that both sides presented forceful arguments rooted in statutory text and history, and that New York's general preemption law was insufficient to predict with confidence how the Court of Appeals would rule. The panel retained jurisdiction to decide the case once it receives the Court of Appeals' response.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction freezing assets of loan guarantors in a breach of contract action. Lenders (Leadenhall) sought to freeze both borrowers' and guarantors' assets after the borrowers defaulted on a $609 million loan, but the appellate court addressed whether the district court had authority to freeze the guarantors' assets specifically.

1. Whether a district court has equitable power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to issue a preliminary injunction freezing assets of guarantors when the creditor claims no lien or equitable interest in those assets, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999)
2. Whether Leadenhall established a lien on the guarantors' assets based on the guarantee agreement
3. Whether Leadenhall established an equitable interest in the guarantors' assets based on its contract claims
4. Whether the preliminary injunction could be alternatively affirmed as a prejudgment attachment under New York law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64

The Second Circuit vacated the portion of the preliminary injunction restraining the guarantors' assets and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Grupo Mexicano prohibits a district court from issuing a preliminary injunction freezing assets in which no lien or equitable interest is claimed, and this prohibition applies to the guarantors' assets in this case
2. Leadenhall failed to establish a lien on the guarantors' assets because: (a) the guarantors did not pledge any of their own assets as collateral; (b) Leadenhall has no contractual right to foreclose upon or control the guarantors' assets; and (c) Leadenhall is therefore not a secured creditor as to the guarantors
3. Leadenhall failed to establish an equitable interest because: (a) its contract claims seek only monetary damages for breach of contract, which is quintessentially a legal remedy, not an equitable one; (b) the obligation at issue is for the guarantors to pay money (fungible assets), not to restore particular identified property; (c) specific performance of a contract to pay money was not traditionally available in equity; and (d) Leadenhall seeks no final equitable relief (such as restitution, rescission, or accounting) to which a preliminary asset freeze could be ancillary
4. The district court's reliance on the guarantee agreement was misplaced because guaranteeing payment of a debt does not create an equitable interest in the guarantor's assets when the claim is for money damages
5. The alternative basis of prejudgment attachment under New York law could not be affirmed because the district court made no factual findings required for attachment (such as whether guarantors acted with intent to frustrate enforcement), and the parties were not afforded an opportunity to brief this distinct remedy

This is a securities law case in which investors challenged Barclays' issuance of exchange-traded notes (ETNs) under the Securities Act of 1933. The investors claimed that Barclays violated the Securities Act by conducting a 4:1 reverse split of the ETNs without proper registration and by relying on a registration statement containing allegedly misleading information.

1. Whether a reverse split of securities constitutes a "sale" under Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act, which prohibits the sale of unregistered securities
2. Whether investors can trace post-split ETNs to a particular registration statement to establish liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act, which prohibits misleading registration statements
3. Whether the April 2021 pricing supplement issued by Barclays constituted a new registration statement covering the ETNs distributed through the reverse split

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that: (1) a reverse split does not constitute a "sale" under the Securities Act because it does not involve a meaningful change in the nature of the investment or investment risks—investors simply exchanged four notes for one note of equal value without making any investment decision or providing consideration; and (2) the investors failed to trace their post-split ETNs to the April Supplement because that supplement governed only Barclays' inventory of post-split ETNs held for market-making transactions, not the ETNs distributed to investors through the reverse split. The court reasoned that the reverse split was a mandatory, involuntary transaction that did not advance the Securities Act's purpose of protecting investors through disclosure, and that the April Supplement's language and context demonstrated it was not a registration statement for the split ETNs themselves.

This case involves a dispute between a labor union and a nuclear power plant operator over whether a grievance concerning healthcare contribution adjustments must be submitted to arbitration under their collective bargaining agreement. The union sought to compel arbitration of a 2022 benefits dispute, while the company argued the grievance fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause.

1. Whether a grievance regarding healthcare contribution adjustments falls within the scope of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement
2. Whether the union's claimed right derives from the current collective bargaining agreement or from a prior arbitration award and framework agreements that were superseded by a merger clause
3. The proper standard for determining arbitrability when the merits and arbitrability questions are inextricably intertwined
4. Whether a court may examine factual predicates (whether Energy Harbor's health plan actually increased costs) when determining whether a dispute arises under a specific contract provision

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision and held that the grievance falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause. The majority reasoned that although the arbitration clause is broad, the union's grievance does not arise from the collective bargaining agreement itself. The union's claimed right to increased contributions rests on a prior arbitration award and framework agreements that were nullified by the merger clause in the new agreement. Article VIII of the new agreement only requires Energy Harbor to match increases it makes to its own health care plan; since there was no evidence that Energy Harbor increased its health care plan costs from 2021 to 2022, the dispute could not arise under that provision. The court held that examining whether Energy Harbor's health plan actually incurred an increase was a necessary predicate fact to determine arbitrability, not an impermissible inquiry into the merits. The dissent argued that the union's grievance invokes a right plainly found in the CBA and that the majority improperly examined the merits of the claim rather than simply determining whether the grievance arose from a specific contract provision.

This is an appellate matter in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the government's petition for panel rehearing in a criminal case against Nicole K. Schuster, vacating its previously issued opinion and judgment from January 14, 2026.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this order, as it is a procedural ruling on the petition for rehearing rather than a substantive opinion on the merits.

The court granted the government's petition for panel rehearing, vacated the opinion and judgment issued on January 14, 2026, and indicated that a revised opinion and judgment would be filed. The court did not provide reasoning in this order, as it is a procedural grant of rehearing rather than a decision on the underlying legal questions.

This case involves a professional pilot, Glen Hardwick, whose pilot's license was suspended for 150 days by the FAA after he twice flew an airplane whose physical tail number did not match its registration documents and airworthiness certificate. Hardwick appealed to the NTSB, which affirmed the suspension, and he subsequently petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review.

1. Whether Hardwick reasonably relied on representations from the aircraft owner and the FAA that the registered tail number had reverted, justifying his belief that the plane was airworthy and properly registered
2. Whether the 150-day suspension was an excessive penalty for what Hardwick characterized as merely administrative violations with no safety implications
3. Whether the NTSB arbitrarily and capriciously treated Hardwick differently than pilot Scott Breeze, who flew the same aircraft under similar circumstances but was not suspended
4. Whether the NTSB's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence

The Fifth Circuit denied Hardwick's petition and upheld the 150-day suspension. The court held that: (1) Hardwick's reasonable reliance defense failed because, as pilot-in-command, he had the independent obligation and ability to verify the aircraft's registration and airworthiness status, and he ignored multiple red flags including taped-on tail numbers, paperwork warnings from the owner, and a written Condition Notice from FAA inspectors; (2) the tail number reversion theory lacked factual and legal support, and even if it had merit, it would not excuse Hardwick's failure to verify current registration status; (3) the suspension was not excessive because the NTSB sanctioned Hardwick for flying an unairworthy aircraft due to mismatched registration and airworthiness certificates, which constitutes a sanctionable violation regardless of whether the violation was administrative or safety-related; and (4) differential treatment of Breeze was not arbitrary because the FAA later determined that Breeze had actually displayed the correct tail number and was properly registered, whereas Hardwick displayed the incorrect tail number and lacked a valid airworthiness certificate for his aircraft's registered number.

This is a criminal appeal in which Jaterron Williamson challenges his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), arguing that the statute violates the Second Amendment and exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to Williamson, specifically whether his prior felony convictions for "Deadly Conduct – Discharge Firearm at Individual" are analogous to colonial-era offenses punishable by execution or estate forfeiture under the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen.
2. Whether § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.
3. Whether the district court erred by relying on pre-Bruen caselaw rather than applying the correct post-Bruen legal framework.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Williamson's conviction. The court held that Williamson's as-applied Second Amendment challenge fails because his prior felony convictions for deadly conduct are closely analogous to the deadly conduct conviction relied upon in United States v. Reyes, which had already rejected a similar as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1). The court noted that one panel cannot overturn another panel's decision absent an intervening change in law or Supreme Court action. The court also found that Williamson's Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed by binding precedent. While the concurring opinion expressed doubts about whether prior precedent correctly rejected enumerated-powers challenges to § 922(g)(1) and noted inconsistencies in how courts have applied the Bruen framework to as-applied challenges, the court was bound by existing circuit precedent and therefore affirmed the conviction.

This is a federal drug trafficking and firearms case in which Paul Curry was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Curry appeals his convictions and 154-month sentence, challenging the sufficiency of evidence, the admission of jail call recordings, and the reasonableness of his sentence.

1. Whether sufficient evidence supported Curry's convictions on Count II (possession of cocaine with intent to distribute) and Count V (carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime)
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting jail call recordings where Curry discussed money and the vehicle
3. Whether Curry's 154-month sentence was substantively unreasonable given his physical and mental health conditions
4. Whether Curry waived his sufficiency of evidence challenge by failing to renew his Rule 29 motion after declining to present defense evidence

The Sixth Circuit affirmed all of Curry's convictions and his sentence. On sufficiency of evidence: The court held that Curry did not waive his sufficiency challenge because when the defense rested without presenting evidence, the close of the government's case constituted the "close of all evidence." Regardless, the court found sufficient evidence for both convictions. For Count II, the approximately one ounce of cocaine found in the vehicle, combined with a digital scale, sandwich bags, large sums of money on Cash App cards, and expert testimony that drug dealers (not users) typically carry such items, supported the intent to distribute element. For Count V, the loaded firearm found in the center console next to Curry, in close proximity to the drug evidence, was sufficient to show he carried the firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime. On jail call admissions: The court found the recordings were relevant to establish Curry's control of the vehicle (which was registered to Francine Gill), as Curry discussed paying for the car and having money in it. The calls were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 because they made it more probable that Curry controlled the vehicle despite Gill's registration. The court rejected Curry's Rule 403 prejudice argument, finding the government properly focused on vehicle ownership and the large sums of money as evidence of intent to distribute. On sentencing: The court rejected Curry's claim that his 154-month sentence was substantively unreasonable. Although the district court considered Curry's IQ of 62, major depressive disorder, stage V chronic kidney disease, and hypertension, it properly weighed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and determined that punishment, deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation counseled for the within-Guidelines sentence. The sentence fell in the middle of the 144-165 month Guidelines range and carried a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, which Curry failed to rebut. The court's recommendation for a medical facility and mental health aftercare demonstrated it did not ignore Curry's health conditions. The court's denial of a downward departure was unreviewable on appeal because there was no evidence the court believed it lacked authority to grant one.

This is a First Amendment retaliation case arising from the arrest of Daniel and Shatina Grady during a police shooting investigation in Michigan. The Gradys were arrested for obstructing officers and refusing to comply with orders to leave the police perimeter, and they subsequently sued officers for retaliatory arrest based on their protected speech (filming and criticizing police).

1. Whether officers had probable cause to arrest the Gradys under Michigan law for obstructing officers and failing to comply with lawful orders
2. Whether the Gradys satisfied the "narrow exception" to the probable cause rule established in Nieves v. Bartlett, which permits retaliatory arrest claims to proceed when a plaintiff presents objective evidence that similarly situated individuals not engaged in protected speech were not arrested
3. Whether the neighbors across the street from the target residence were "similarly situated" comparators for purposes of the Nieves exception
4. Whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and held that the Gradys' First Amendment retaliation claim fails as a matter of law. The court concluded: (1) Officers had probable cause to arrest the Gradys under Michigan law for obstructing officers and refusing to comply with lawful orders to back away from the police perimeter; (2) The Gradys failed to satisfy the Nieves exception because their proposed comparators (neighbors across the street) were not "similarly situated"—the neighbors did not engage in the same conduct that gave rise to probable cause for the Gradys' arrest (entering the perimeter and defying direct orders); (3) For comparators to be "similarly situated" under Nieves, they must have engaged in similar conduct to that which led to the claimant's arrest, and the Gradys' comparators failed this baseline requirement; (4) The Gradys presented no other objective evidence to satisfy the Nieves exception; and (5) Therefore, the general rule that probable cause defeats retaliatory arrest claims applies, and officers Cratsenburg and Pearson are entitled to qualified immunity.

This is a federal drug conspiracy appeal in which Michael Bailey, an incarcerated member of the Aryan Nation gang, was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl. Bailey appealed his 300-month sentence, challenging the jury instructions, admission of evidence, and sufficiency of evidence supporting the convictions.

1. Whether the jury instructions on conspiracy elements were accurate and complete, specifically whether the district court erred by using two elements instead of three and by failing to provide a specific instruction on law enforcement officer credibility
2. Whether evidence of Bailey's gang affiliation was relevant and whether its probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice
3. Whether disciplinary records showing Bailey's cell phone possession while incarcerated were properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
4. Whether a recorded phone call between Bailey and his mother was properly authenticated and admissible
5. Whether sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 846

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Bailey's convictions on all grounds. The court held that: (1) the conspiracy instructions accurately reflected the law, with the two-element formulation being substantively equivalent to the later-amended three-element version; (2) no specific law enforcement credibility instruction was required because the jury received adequate general witness credibility instructions; (3) gang affiliation evidence was relevant to demonstrate the relationship between co-conspirators and was not unfairly prejudicial, especially given a limiting instruction; (4) disciplinary records showing cell phone possession were admissible to prove identity and opportunity under Rule 404(b), and Bailey waived his hearsay objection to the phone call while the authentication foundation was sufficient; and (5) sufficient evidence supported the convictions, as Bailey coordinated drug transactions weekly for months through contraband cell phones, connected suppliers to purchasers, instructed co-conspirators on drug distribution, and benefited from the proceeds, demonstrating his knowledge of and voluntary participation in the conspiracy.

This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Marion Thomas against police officers Daniel McAuliffe and Michael Botica, and the City of Chicago, challenging his arrest following a traffic stop. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of Thomas's motion for a new trial.

1. Whether the "Issues" jury instruction improperly allowed the jury to consider whether officers had probable cause to arrest for any crime under the "any crime" rule, rather than only for resisting arrest
2. Whether the "Authorized Acts" jury instruction was erroneous for failing to define the distinction between "resisting" and "obstructing" a police officer under Illinois law
3. Whether Officer Morales's testimony regarding a "grinder" found in the vehicle (which differed from his deposition reference to a "cutter") constituted fraud warranting a new trial as a sanction
4. Whether defense counsel's question about Thomas's criminal record, though objected to and sustained, warranted a new trial

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on all grounds. The court held:

1. The "Issues" instruction was legally correct because under the "any crime" rule established in Devenpeck v. Alford, a false arrest claim is defeated when there was probable cause to arrest for any crime. The officers had probable cause to arrest Thomas for both the turn-signal violation and marijuana possession.
2. The "Authorized Acts" instruction, read as a whole with the other instructions, adequately conveyed the law without requiring explicit definitions of "resisting" versus "obstructing." The instruction sufficiently informed the jury that Thomas had an obligation to comply with lawful police commands, and the jury could reasonably conclude he obstructed the officers through his refusal to comply with their commands.
3. Officer Morales's testimony about the "grinder" did not constitute fraud or willful misconduct warranting a new trial. The discrepancy between "cutter" and "grinder" represented a disagreement about colloquial names for marijuana tools rather than fraudulent testimony. The district court properly handled the issue through cross-examination and a stipulation informing the jury of the inconsistency.
4. Thomas suffered no prejudice from the question about his criminal record because the court sustained his objection, he never answered, and the jury was instructed that questions and objections are not evidence.

This is an immigration law case in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addresses whether it has jurisdiction to review a petition challenging only a denial of Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief without also challenging the underlying final order of removal. The court holds that it lacks jurisdiction over such standalone CAT claims.

1. Whether a petition for review challenging only a denial of CAT relief, without challenging the final order of removal, is sufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)
2. Whether an order denying CAT protection merges into the final order of removal for purposes of judicial review
3. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Monsalvo v. Bondi (regarding voluntary departure orders) extends to CAT orders
4. Whether a jurisdictional ruling can be given prospective effect only
5. Whether a petitioner may amend a petition to add a nominal challenge to the removal order to invoke jurisdiction

The Ninth Circuit dismissed Navarrete's petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that: (1) Congress has conferred jurisdiction to review only "final orders of removal" under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); (2) pursuant to Supreme Court precedent in Nasrallah v. Barr, Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, and Riley v. Bondi, an order denying CAT protection does not affect the validity of the final order of removal and therefore does not merge into it; (3) CAT claims can only be reviewed as part of a petition challenging a final order of removal, requiring an independent jurisdictional basis; (4) Monsalvo v. Bondi, which addressed voluntary departure orders, is distinguishable because voluntary departure orders condition the authority to remove altogether, while CAT orders merely condition the manner of removal; (5) a jurisdictional ruling cannot be made prospective only as a matter of law; and (6) Navarrete's request to amend his petition to add a nominal challenge to his removal order was properly denied as futile because he conceded any such challenge would be baseless and frivolous, failing to meet the requirement of asserting at least a colorable claim.

This is a criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of unlawfully dealing firearms without a license. The case addresses whether a sentencing enhancement for firearms trafficking requires that the transferee actually be an unlawful possessor or intend to use the firearm unlawfully, or merely that the defendant believed this to be true.

1. Whether Application Note 13 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) requires that the transferee actually be an unlawful possessor or intend to use the firearm unlawfully, or only that the defendant "knew or had reason to believe" this to be the case
2. Whether Ferrari preserved his argument on appeal when he shifted from arguing he lacked the requisite belief to arguing the enhancement requires an objective truth requirement
3. Whether out-of-circuit interpretations of similar criminal firearms statutes should guide interpretation of the sentencing enhancement

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's application of the firearms trafficking enhancement. The court held that the plain text of Application Note 13 does not require that the transferee actually be an unlawful possessor or intend to use the firearm unlawfully. Rather, the enhancement applies if the defendant "knew or had reason to believe" this to be true, regardless of whether the belief was accurate. The court reasoned that: (1) Ferrari preserved his claim challenging the enhancement's applicability because his basic argument remained the same despite shifting legal theories; (2) the ordinary meaning of "reason to believe" does not include an "and it must be true" requirement; (3) the Sentencing Commission could have included such a requirement but did not; (4) the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits agree with this interpretation; and (5) Ferrari's reliance on the Tenth Circuit's Francis decision and out-of-circuit interpretations of separate criminal statutes was unpersuasive. Since Ferrari abandoned his factual argument that he lacked the requisite belief and the facts showed he had reason to believe the undercover agents were unlawful possessors, the enhancement was properly applied.

This is a Free Exercise Clause and Free Speech Clause challenge to California's prohibition on sectarian instruction in charter school independent study programs. Parents sought to use faith-based curricula in state-funded independent study programs but were denied, and they sued claiming the denial violated their First Amendment rights.

1. Whether California's prohibition on sectarian or denominational doctrine in public schools, including charter school independent study programs, violates the Free Exercise Clause when applied to deny parents' requests to use religious curricula
2. Whether the independent study programs constitute "public school programs" subject to secular education requirements, or alternatively, whether they are subsidies for private homeschooling that cannot discriminate based on religious status
3. Whether requiring parents to use state-approved secular materials in independent study programs constitutes compelled speech in violation of the Free Speech Clause
4. Whether California's Blaine Amendment, which prohibits teaching of "sectarian or denominational doctrine" in public schools, facially discriminates between religious doctrines in violation of the First Amendment

The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. The majority held that: (1) California's independent study programs are public school programs with critical features characteristic of public schools under Carson v. Makin (free to attend, accept all students, substantially equivalent to classroom instruction, aligned to state standards, coordinated by state-certified teachers), and therefore California may condition participation on secular curricula without violating the Free Exercise Clause; (2) a public school's curriculum constitutes government speech not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny, so requiring use of state-approved materials does not violate the Free Speech Clause; and (3) the extensive legal requirements applicable to independent study programs make them public school programs that defeat plaintiffs' free exercise claim. The dissenting judges argued that the programs are fundamentally homeschooling with parental choice and supervision, that recent Supreme Court precedent (Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, Carson) prohibits discrimination against religious beneficiaries of generally available public benefits, and that California's Blaine Amendment either discriminates between religions or impermissibly targets religion for disfavored treatment.

This is a federal preemption case in which Upside Foods, a California-based lab-grown meat producer, challenged Florida's ban on the manufacture, distribution, and sale of cultivated meat (SB 1084) as preempted by the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA). Upside sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the state law.

1. Whether the appeal became moot due to the filing of an amended complaint or the district court's dismissal of preemption claims
2. Whether Upside has a cause of action in equity to challenge a state law as preempted by federal law, given the PPIA's exclusive enforcement provision
3. Whether Florida's categorical ban on lab-grown meat is preempted by the PPIA's Facilities Provision, which preempts state laws imposing different or additional requirements "with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any official establishment"
4. Whether Florida's ban is preempted by the PPIA's Ingredients Provision, which preempts state laws imposing different or additional "ingredient requirements"

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The court held: (1) the appeal was not moot despite the amended complaint and dismissal order, as the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter the status of the case on interlocutory appeal; (2) Upside has a valid cause of action in equity to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against a preempted state law, as this is a well-established remedy rooted in the Supremacy Clause and Ex parte Young doctrine, and the PPIA's exclusive enforcement provision does not preclude such equitable claims; and (3) on the merits, Upside is unlikely to succeed because SB 1084 is not preempted by either the Facilities Provision or the Ingredients Provision. The court reasoned that the Facilities Provision applies only to state laws with a direct relationship to the premises, facilities, and onsite operations of poultry processors, and SB 1084 is merely a categorical product ban that does not regulate how Upside operates its facilities. Similarly, the Ingredients Provision addresses physical components of food products, not product bans, so a categorical ban on lab-grown meat is not an "ingredient requirement." The court distinguished National Meat Association v. Harris, noting that California's swine law regulated onsite operations and handling, whereas Florida's law simply bans an end product without instructing how to process it.

This is an appeal concerning whether New York City's Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGMVPL), which establishes a two-year revival window for civil claims arising from sexual and gender-based violence, is preempted by earlier revival windows in New York State's Child Victims Act (CVA) and Adult Survivors Act (ASA). The plaintiff brought claims that would have been time-barred absent the City's 2022 amendments to the VGMVPL.

1. Whether New York State's CVA and ASA preempt New York City's VGMVPL revival window under the doctrine of conflict preemption, given that the state laws provide earlier revival periods than the city law.
2. Whether the CVA and ASA occupy the field of revival actions for sexual assault claims, thereby precluding local legislation under the doctrine of field preemption.
3. The scope of home rule authority granted to New York City under the New York State Constitution and the proper balance between state and local legislative power.
4. Whether the state and city laws regulate sufficiently different conduct to avoid preemption.

Rather than deciding the preemption question itself, the Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals, finding that no controlling precedent exists on this issue. The court determined that certification was appropriate because: (1) the New York Court of Appeals has never addressed whether the CVA and ASA preempt the VGMVPL's revival window; (2) the question implicates significant state policy issues including home rule principles under the New York State Constitution and the state's policy of providing remedies to victims of sexual abuse; and (3) resolution of the certified question will determine the outcome of the case. The court noted that both sides presented forceful arguments grounded in statutory text and legislative history, and that dozens of lower state court decisions await resolution of this question. The panel retained jurisdiction to decide the case once it receives the New York Court of Appeals' response.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction freezing assets of loan guarantors in a breach of contract action. Lenders (Leadenhall) sued borrowers and their parent company guarantors for breach of a loan agreement, seeking to freeze both the borrowers' and guarantors' assets pending judgment. The guarantors appealed the asset freeze, arguing the district court lacked authority to freeze their assets under the Supreme Court's decision in Grupo Mexicano.

1. Whether a district court has equitable power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to issue a preliminary injunction freezing a guarantor's assets when the creditor claims no lien or equitable interest in those assets, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999)
2. Whether the lender (Leadenhall) established a lien on the guarantors' assets based on the guaranty agreement
3. Whether the lender established an equitable interest in the guarantors' assets based on the nature of the relief sought
4. Whether the asset freeze could be alternatively affirmed as a prejudgment attachment under New York law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals VACATED the portion of the preliminary injunction freezing the guarantors' assets and REMANDED for further proceedings. The court held that under Grupo Mexicano, a court cannot issue a preliminary injunction freezing assets in which no lien or equitable interest is claimed. The court found that: (1) Leadenhall failed to establish a lien on the guarantors' assets because the guaranty agreement did not pledge any of the guarantors' assets as collateral, and Leadenhall pointed to no current legal right to foreclose upon or control those assets; (2) Leadenhall failed to establish an equitable interest because it sought only monetary damages for breach of contract, which is a legal claim, not equitable relief, and the contract claims did not seek any final equitable relief such as restitution, rescission, or an accounting of profits that would give rise to an equitable interest; and (3) the alternative basis of prejudgment attachment under state law could not be affirmed because the district court made no factual findings regarding whether the guarantors acted with intent to frustrate enforcement of a judgment, and such findings were not evident from the record. The court noted that the injunction restraining the borrowers' assets was not challenged and therefore remained in place.

This is a criminal appeal in which Nicole Schuster challenges her guilty plea to violating the Procurement Integrity Act (PIA), 41 U.S.C. § 2102(a), for disclosing a competitor's confidential bid information from a prior procurement to give another company a competitive advantage in a pending procurement. Schuster argues the District Court erred in accepting her plea because the factual basis was insufficient under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3).

1. The proper interpretation of 41 U.S.C. § 2102(a)'s requirement that disclosed bid information relate to a procurement "to which the information relates" — specifically, whether information from a past procurement can violate the statute when disclosed in connection with a pending procurement for a similar product.
2. Whether the District Court committed plain error in accepting Schuster's guilty plea without a sufficient factual basis establishing that the disclosed information was the same in substance as information submitted for the pending procurement.
3. Whether the error affected Schuster's substantial rights under the plain error standard of review.
4. The appropriate remedy when a guilty plea is vacated due to insufficient factual basis — whether the defendant should receive an acquittal or be allowed to replead.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Schuster's conviction and remanded for repleading. The court held that:

1. Statutory Interpretation: The phrase "to which the information relates" in § 2102(a) requires that disclosed information from a past procurement must be "the same in substance" as information submitted as part of a pending procurement to constitute a violation. The court rejected the Government's broader interpretation that information merely "related to" a pending procurement would suffice, finding that such a reading would erase the statutory distinction between pre- and post-award disclosures and render the "before the award" language meaningless.
2. Plain Error: The District Court plainly erred in accepting Schuster's plea because the plea memorandum established only that the SU22 and SU25 machines were "virtually identical" but contained no facts showing that the bid information Company 2 submitted for the SU22 was the same in substance as the information it submitted for the SU25. The similarity of the end products does not establish similarity of the bid information, particularly given that Company 2's SU22 bid was rejected as "technically unacceptable" while its SU25 bid was rejected only for price, suggesting material differences in the technical components.
3. Substantial Rights: The error affected Schuster's substantial rights because there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, she would not have entered the plea. Without facts establishing that the disclosed information related to the pending procurement, the Government's case was insufficient, and requiring the Government to provide actual facts would have allowed Schuster to evaluate the strength of the case and assess potential defenses.
4. Remedy: The appropriate remedy is vacatur and remand for repleading, not entry of judgment of acquittal. A Rule 11(b)(3) error is trial error, not a determination of insufficient evidence, so it does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Unlike a trial verdict of guilty, a court's acceptance of a guilty plea does not represent the Government's full case presentation, so remand allows the Government an opportunity to present additional evidence if it chooses to pursue repleading.

This case concerns whether a street preacher previously convicted of violating a city ordinance restricting expressive activity can bring a §1983 suit seeking to enjoin future enforcement of that ordinance based on First Amendment grounds. The central issue is whether the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine, which bars §1983 suits that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior conviction, applies to suits seeking purely prospective relief.

1. Whether Heck v. Humphrey bars §1983 suits challenging the constitutionality of a statute when the plaintiff was previously convicted under that statute
2. Whether the Heck bar applies differently when a plaintiff seeks only prospective injunctive relief rather than damages or release from custody
3. Whether a judgment invalidating a statute necessarily implicates the validity of a prior conviction under that statute for purposes of the Heck analysis
4. The proper scope of the "necessarily imply the invalidity of conviction" language from Heck when applied to forward-looking relief

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower courts and held that Olivier's suit seeking purely prospective relief—an injunction preventing future enforcement of the city ordinance—may proceed despite his prior conviction for violating that ordinance. The Court reasoned that Heck does not bar suits seeking wholly prospective relief because such suits do not collaterally attack prior convictions, do not create parallel litigation risks, and do not depend on proving the invalidity of a prior conviction. The Court distinguished between Heck-type claims seeking damages or release (which require proving a conviction was invalid) and forward-looking injunctive relief (which merely prevents future prosecutions). The Court relied on precedent from Wooley v. Maynard, Edwards v. Balisok, and Wilkinson v. Dotson, which established that prospective injunctive relief falls outside habeas corpus's core and therefore outside Heck's concerns. The Court also noted that interpreting Heck to bar all suits where success would "necessarily imply" invalidity of a prior conviction would produce absurd results, such as barring suits by individuals with clean records from challenging the same statute. Therefore, the Heck language must be read in context as addressing claims that are really assaults on prior convictions, not forward-looking suits to prevent future prosecutions.

This is an appeal of federal drug trafficking and RICO conspiracy convictions for three members of La Asociación Ñeta, a prison-based criminal organization. The defendants challenged the admission of certain hearsay statements at trial, arguing they violated the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule established in United States v. Petrozziello.

1. Whether statements recounted in witness testimony and intercepted phone calls were properly admitted as coconspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and the Petrozziello standard, which requires: (a) proof by preponderance that the declarant was a coconspirator, (b) corroborated by extrinsic evidence, (c) that the statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy
2. Whether any errors in admitting such statements were harmless in light of other evidence presented at trial
3. Whether the cumulative effect of any admitted errors violated the defendant Millán's right to a fair trial

The court affirmed all three defendants' convictions. The court held that:

1. The District Court did not clearly err in finding that the challenged statements satisfied the Petrozziello requirements. The court applied deferential clear error review to the District Court's findings that declarants were coconspirators, statements were made during the conspiracy, and statements furthered the conspiracy's objectives.
2. To the extent any Petrozziello errors occurred, they were harmless because: (a) substantial unchallenged evidence of guilt existed, including testimony from cooperating witnesses who pleaded guilty to the same conspiracy charges; (b) many challenged statements were cumulative of other properly admitted evidence; and (c) the government did not need to prove personal involvement in drug sales to establish conspiracy liability.
3. Regarding Millán's cumulative error claim, even assuming arguendo that multiple statements were erroneously admitted, the overwhelming evidence of his knowing agreement to facilitate the conspiracy—including his leadership role, involvement in drug operations, control over member sanctions, and direct communications with coconspirators—rendered any cumulative error harmless and insufficient to warrant overturning the convictions.
4. The court rejected several procedural challenges, including arguments that certain statements were not properly preserved for appeal and that some challenges were waived by failure to raise plain error arguments.

This is a business litigation case involving a company president who learned of an opportunity to acquire his former business while employed, advised his employer to reject the opportunity, then attempted to acquire it himself. The employer sued for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation, and trademark infringement, and the jury returned a verdict against the defendant on all counts.

1. Whether expert testimony regarding lost profits from a failed acquisition was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert standards, despite being based on pre-pandemic financial projections that became inaccurate.
2. Whether the district court properly excluded tax returns that were disclosed too late in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3).
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by proceeding with trial when the defendant's lead counsel contracted COVID-19 and participated remotely.
4. Whether the jury's verdict on trade secret misappropriation claims was supported by sufficient evidence under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and Massachusetts law.
5. Whether a contractual fee-shifting provision in an IP Agreement authorized recovery of attorneys' fees for litigation involving breach of contract claims beyond just injunctive relief.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in full. The court held:

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert's lost-profits testimony because it was based on sufficient facts and reliable methodology, even though it relied on pre-pandemic projections. The expert provided a cogent reason for projecting higher "but-for" earnings than actual performance, and the jury was able to evaluate and challenge the testimony through cross-examination.
2. The district court properly excluded the late-disclosed tax returns as a discovery sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, since the defendant failed to disclose them until seven days before trial despite knowing they existed, depriving the opposing party of opportunity to conduct additional discovery.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with trial despite counsel's COVID-19 illness, as the defendant was ably represented by both in-person and remote counsel, offered no concrete examples of prejudice, and the lead counsel herself rejected the option to argue in person with a mask.
4. The district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law overturning the trade secret verdict because: (a) financial information about the target company was owned by the seller, not the employer, and the employer had no right to control its use; and (b) the employer's internal strategy to forgo the acquisition was not kept secret and therefore could not qualify as a trade secret.
5. The fee-shifting provision in the IP Agreement authorized recovery of attorneys' fees for enforcing the agreement's covenants, including the covenant requiring exclusive devotion to the employer's interests. Since the defendant's pursuit of the acquisition breached this covenant, fees incurred in litigating that breach were properly awarded, and California law permitted recovery without apportionment when fees supported both compensable and non-compensable claims.

This case involves a constitutional challenge to a Massachusetts regulation requiring that publicly funded special education services for private school students be provided at public schools or neutral locations rather than at the students' private schools. Parents of children with disabilities enrolled in private schools challenged the regulation as violating the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. Whether the Massachusetts "Place Regulation" violates the fundamental parental right to direct the upbringing and education of children (the Pierce right) under the Due Process Clause
2. Whether the regulation violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against parents who exercise their fundamental right to choose private education
3. Whether the regulation violates the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
4. Whether state law creates an entitlement to on-site special education services that the Place Regulation unlawfully denies
5. Whether the regulation is rationally related to legitimate state interests under rational basis review

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that:

1. Due Process Claim: The Place Regulation does not restrict the fundamental parental right to choose private education. While parents have a constitutional right to send their children to private school, the state is not required to subsidize that choice or provide public benefits on identical terms to private and public school students. The regulation merely defines the terms on which the state will provide publicly funded services and does not bar or penalize private school enrollment. Under Supreme Court precedent (Maher v. Roe, Harris v. McRae, Norwood v. Harrison), the government may decline to finance a constitutional choice on the claimant's preferred terms. The regulation survives rational basis review because it is rationally related to Massachusetts's legitimate interests in providing special education services while complying with the state constitution's Anti-Aid Amendment.
2. Equal Protection Claim: Because the Place Regulation does not burden the fundamental parental right, rational basis review applies. The regulation rationally classifies public and private school students for purposes of administering publicly funded services in compliance with the state constitution. The Parents' reliance on Romer v. Evans fails because that case involved unprecedented disqualification of a class from seeking protection and animus, neither of which is present here.
3. Privileges or Immunities Clause: The clause protects only rights of national citizenship, which the Parents did not allege were infringed. The court declined to adopt an alternative framework based on Justice Thomas's concurrence in McDonald, reaffirming that the Due Process Clause is the proper source for fundamental rights protection.

This is an appeal of a mortgage servicer dispute in which a Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor alleged that communications sent to him by his mortgage servicers violated the automatic stay on debt collection and constituted unfair debt collection practices under federal and state law.

1. Whether monthly account statements, payoff statements, and 1098 tax forms sent to a debtor during Chapter 13 bankruptcy constitute "debt collection activity" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
2. Whether the communications violated the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)
3. Whether the documents contained inaccurate calculations in violation of federal and state consumer protection laws
4. Whether the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the mortgage servicers. The court held that:

1. None of the communications constituted debt collection activity under the FDCPA because: (a) the monthly statements and payoff statements contained clear, unequivocal disclaimers stating they were not attempts to collect a debt and were for informational purposes only; (b) the payoff statements were sent at the debtor's request, not as unsolicited collection efforts; and (c) the 1098 tax forms were purely informational tax documents with no demand for payment
2. The communications did not violate the automatic stay because purely informational documents do not constitute prohibited collection activity
3. The district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims because the federal claims were properly dismissed
4. The court distinguished the case from Koontz v. SN Servicing Corporation, where disclaimers did not fully disavow debt collection intent, because here the disclaimers explicitly stated no debt collection was occurring and instructed the debtor not to make payments to the servicers

This case involves a Fifth Circuit review of an FTC cease-and-desist order against Intuit for deceptive advertising of its TurboTax Free Edition product. The court addresses whether the FTC violated the Constitution's separation of powers by adjudicating a deceptive advertising claim before an administrative law judge rather than in an Article III court.

1. Whether deceptive advertising claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act involve "private rights" or "public rights" under the constitutional framework established by the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy
2. Whether the FTC's administrative adjudication of deceptive advertising claims violates Article III of the Constitution by vesting judicial power in non-Article III tribunals
3. Whether deceptive advertising claims have roots in common law fraud and deceit, making them traditional private rights actions
4. Whether the FTC's broad cease-and-desist order is constitutional and appropriately tailored

The Fifth Circuit GRANTED Intuit's petition for review and VACATED the FTC's cease-and-desist order. The court held that deceptive advertising claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act involve private rights that must be adjudicated in Article III courts, not before administrative law judges. The court's reasoning was based on the following:

1. Private Rights Analysis: The court determined that deceptive advertising claims are "in their nature" traditional actions at law and equity because they share a common core with common law fraud and deceit. Both require proof of a material misrepresentation likely to mislead reasonable consumers/parties.
2. Common Law Roots: The court found overwhelming evidence that Section 5 did not create a new duty regarding deceptive advertising. That duty long predated the FTC Act and could be enforced by private parties in actions at common law or equity for fraud, deceit, or unfair competition. Courts immediately following the FTC Act's passage in 1914 recognized its "unfair methods of competition" standard was derived from common law.
3. Jarkesy Framework: Following the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy, the court applied a rigorous test requiring close attention to whether claims trace their ancestry to common law actions. The court distinguished this case from Atlas Roofing (involving workplace safety standards that had no common law precedent) because deceptive advertising claims have clear common law roots.
4. Rejection of FTC Arguments: The court rejected the FTC's arguments that: (a) the proceeding involves public rights because the government pursues equitable remedies on the public's behalf (finding this circular reasoning); (b) technical distinctions between Section 5 claims and common law fraud eliminate the private rights character; and (c) 110 years of agency practice can transmute private rights into public ones.
5. Remedy Similarity: The court noted that cease-and-desist orders are analogous to traditional equitable remedies like injunctions, further supporting the conclusion that private rights are at stake.
6. Remand for Article III Adjudication: The court remanded the case to the FTC for proceedings in federal court, noting that on remand, the standard of proof may be elevated from substantial evidence to preponderance of the evidence, and the necessity and scope of any cease-and-desist order would need reconsideration.

This is a franchise dispute case in which Fetch! Pet Care, Inc., a nationwide pet-care services franchisor, sought a preliminary injunction against thirty-one former franchisees who formed an association (IAFF), ceased paying royalties, sent rescission notices, and began operating competing businesses. The district court partially denied the injunction, and Fetch! appealed.

1. Whether the district court properly applied the "unclean hands" equitable doctrine to deny Fetch! injunctive relief based on its allegedly deceptive marketing and sale of franchise agreements
2. Whether Fetch! demonstrated irreparable harm sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction, particularly in the context of pending arbitration
3. The proper legal standard for showing irreparable harm in preliminary injunction cases within the Sixth Circuit
4. Whether the "1.0" legacy franchisees were entitled to invoke the unclean hands defense based on Fetch!'s conduct in cutting off their system access

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's partial denial of the preliminary injunction. The court held that:

1. Unclean Hands Doctrine Applied to "2.0" Franchisees: The district court properly applied unclean hands to deny injunctive relief against the "2.0" franchisees (including managed-services franchisees) based on clear, convincing evidence that Fetch! engaged in deceptive marketing practices, including: (a) removing distinctions between "1.0" and "2.0" models from disclosure documents; (b) aggressively recruiting through promotional videos touting unrealistic profit projections ($900,000 in annual gross sales); and (c) marketing the managed-services model as passive income when it required substantial effort. The court found that franchisees were unaware of model differences, never became profitable, and were effectively forced out of their agreements.
2. Unclean Hands Doctrine Applied to "1.0" Legacy Franchisees: Although the district court did not reach this issue, the appellate court applied unclean hands to the three legacy "1.0" franchisees based on Fetch!'s conduct in cutting off their system access without notice or opportunity to cure, in violation of state franchise laws. The court found sufficient evidence that Fetch! committed the first material breach by terminating access before the franchisees operated competing businesses or misused proprietary information, and that these franchisees had no intention to compete while arbitration was pending.
3. Clarification on Irreparable Harm Standard: The court clarified that the same four preliminary injunction criteria from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council apply regardless of whether claims are pending arbitration, rejecting the district court's heightened standard. The court also rejected the "clear and convincing" standard for showing irreparable harm, holding that the federal standard requiring only that "irreparable injury is likely" applies. The court noted that competitive injuries are inherently irreparable because they are difficult to calculate, making the speculative nature of Fetch!'s harms precisely what qualifies them as irreparable.
4. Overall Result: The court affirmed the district court's partial denial of the preliminary injunction, allowing the former franchisees to continue operating their competing businesses (subject to restrictions on trademark use and communication with other Fetch! franchisees), while the parties proceed to arbitration on the underlying merits.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a felon-in-possession of a firearm charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The defendant challenged the statute's constitutionality under the Second Amendment, and the district court granted his motion to dismiss, but intervening circuit precedent established a new legal standard requiring reconsideration.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms, is constitutional under the Second Amendment as established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi
2. The proper burden of proof in as-applied Second Amendment challenges to firearm regulations—specifically, whether the government or the defendant bears the burden of proving dangerousness
3. What criminal history and circumstances must be considered when determining whether an individual defendant poses sufficient danger to justify disarmament under § 922(g)(1)
4. Whether a defendant's status on supervised release is dispositive of the constitutional inquiry

The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider the defendant's motion to dismiss under the correct legal standard. The court held that: (1) under United States v. Williams, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to dangerous people, but individuals must have a reasonable opportunity to prove they don't fit the class-wide generalization; (2) the burden rests with the defendant to demonstrate he is not dangerous; (3) courts must make fact-specific determinations considering the unique circumstances of the individual's convictions, including the entire criminal history (not just felonies), misdemeanor convictions for assault and domestic violence, and other relevant evidence; (4) a defendant's supervised release status is not automatically dispositive but must be evaluated under the totality of circumstances test established in United States v. Goins; and (5) remand was appropriate because the existing record (limited to a criminal history report without details of underlying circumstances) was insufficient for the district court to make the required individualized dangerousness assessment, and the defendant was not provided an opportunity to present arguments regarding why his specific circumstances do not prove dangerousness.

This is a criminal appeal in which Adam Power challenges his guilty pleas to thirty-four child pornography counts and his resulting sixty-year prison sentence. Power sought to vacate his guilty pleas to eight counts for lack of factual basis and alternatively challenged his sentence as substantively unreasonable.

1. Whether the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) by accepting guilty pleas without an adequate factual basis for eight of the thirty-four counts.
2. Whether Power demonstrated prejudice sufficient to warrant vacating his guilty pleas under the plain error standard, requiring a showing that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the alleged error.
3. Whether Power's sixty-year sentence was substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including arguments that it constituted a de facto life sentence, was affected by allegedly outdated sentencing guidelines enhancements, and created unwarranted sentencing disparities.

The court affirmed the district court's judgment on all grounds. Regarding the guilty pleas, the court found that although Power failed to object below, even under the plain error standard he could not demonstrate prejudice because: (1) acquittal on the eight challenged counts would still result in a de facto life sentence (560 years versus 740 years), making trial an irrational choice; (2) Power strategically pleaded guilty across the board to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility and argue for a lower sentence; and (3) the record contained no evidence of confusion, hesitation, or misunderstanding on Power's part. Regarding the sentence's substantive reasonableness, the court held that: (1) Power's de facto life sentence argument failed because he never presented life expectancy data to the district court; (2) the district court adequately explained the sentence consistent with § 3553(a) factors by characterizing the crimes as "heinous," dismissing proffered mitigating evidence, and emphasizing public protection and deterrence; (3) Power's argument about outdated sentencing enhancements was based on miscalculation—the Guidelines range would have been identical without those enhancements; and (4) unwarranted disparity challenges to below-Guidelines sentences are non-starters because the Sentencing Guidelines themselves serve as an anti-disparity formula.

This case involves a stockholder's claim for declaratory relief and damages regarding stock allegedly issued to him by Lam Research Corporation in 1988. The plaintiff seeks recognition as a stockholder and compensation for approximately $25 million in stock value, but the company has no record of his ownership and marked the shares as lost during a 1989 merger.

1. Whether the plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief (issuance of stock certificate), conversion, and breach of contract are barred by the three-year statute of limitations
2. Whether any tolling doctrines (inherently unknown injuries, fraudulent concealment, or equitable tolling for breach of fiduciary duties) apply to extend the limitations period
3. Whether the plaintiff was on inquiry notice that his stockholder status was disputed, which would cut off any tolling period
4. Whether the doctrine of laches bars the plaintiff's claims as untimely

The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that all three of the plaintiff's claims are barred by laches and the statute of limitations. The court reasoned that: (1) each claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, and the claims accrued in November 1989 when the company marked the stock as lost, making them time-barred when filed in December 2024; (2) the plaintiff was on inquiry notice for decades that his stockholder status was disputed because he never received stockholder communications despite the company being a public company that regularly mailed proxy statements, and he never received dividends despite the company paying them for at least eight years; (3) a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have inquired about his stockholder status upon failing to receive these communications and dividends; (4) the plaintiff could have easily discovered the issue through a phone call or simple inquiry; and (5) the defendant is presumed prejudiced by the delay, and the 30-year gap makes it difficult to do justice given the obscurity of original transactions and potential loss of evidence.

This is an insurance claim dispute in a receivership proceeding involving United Contractors Insurance Company, Inc. (UCIC). The claimant, Rejeanne Bernier, objected to the Receiver's determination that her claim for property damage related to remodeling work and alleged concealment of insurance coverage should be valued at $0.

1. Whether the Receiver properly determined that Bernier had no viable claim against UCIC for property damage arising from construction work performed by her son and his company
2. Whether Bernier's allegation of concealment of UCIC's insurance policy created liability for UCIC
3. Whether the prior California Superior Court judgment, which found neither party established a valid contract or cause of action, precluded Bernier from pursuing a claim against UCIC
4. Whether the Receiver's different valuations for two subparts of the claim (964.01 and 964.02) were internally inconsistent

The court upheld the Receiver's determination and denied Bernier's objection. The magistrate found that: (1) Bernier failed to establish a viable claim against UCIC because she had agreed to work with her son individually, not with ICS (UCIC's insured); (2) even if UCIC had sufficient connection to Bernier, the insurance policy contained an exclusion precluding liability for property damage from breach of contract—Bernier's legal theory; (3) the prior California court judgment, which found that neither party proved what their "arrangement" was and that both parties' stories were false, precluded recovery; (4) the different valuations for subparts 964.01 and 964.02 were appropriate because they involved different types of damage; and (5) evidence showed that Travelers insurance had already compensated Bernier for her property damage. The court characterized the litigation as part of a long-running series of frequently frivolous lawsuits and recommended acceptance of the Receiver's claim recommendation.

This is an immigration case in which Edina and Redzo Hodzic, Bosnian Muslims from Serbia and North Macedonia respectively, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of their motions to reopen removal proceedings. The Hodzics entered the United States using forged passports in 2000, were placed in removal proceedings, and have been fighting deportation for over two decades.

1. Whether the BIA erred in denying the Hodzics' motion to reopen sua sponte by failing to apply the statutory definition of "exceptional circumstances" rather than the "exceptional situations" standard
2. Whether the BIA's decision was arbitrary and capricious for failing to explain why the Hodzics' circumstances were insufficient to warrant reopening
3. Whether a fundamental change in case law (Niz-Chavez v. Garland) constituted grounds for reopening under the "exceptional situations" standard
4. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Light Enterprises v. Raimondo prohibits deference to the BIA's decision
5. Whether the BIA violated the Hodzics' Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights

The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the Hodzics' petitions for review. The court held that: (1) the BIA properly applied the "exceptional situations" standard rather than the statutory "exceptional circumstances" definition, as these apply to different contexts; (2) no controlling precedent requires the BIA to provide detailed explanations when denying sua sponte reopening motions; (3) while fundamental changes in case law may constitute "exceptional situations," the BIA retains discretion to deny reopening even when such situations exist, and the Hodzics failed to adequately explain why Niz-Chavez compelled reopening; (4) Loper Light is inapplicable because the Hodzics' claims involve discretionary authority rather than statutory interpretation; (5) the BIA's exercise of purely discretionary sua sponte authority does not create a cognizable liberty interest, so the procedural due process claim fails; and (6) the substantive due process claim based on family integrity was waived for lack of development in the brief.

This is a civil rights case in which a pretrial detainee alleges that a corrections officer violated his constitutional rights by sexually abusing him during a purported contraband search. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addresses whether the officer is entitled to qualified immunity from the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment claim.

1. The scope of appellate jurisdiction for interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials, specifically whether the court can review factual disputes and administrative exhaustion requirements.
2. The appropriate legal standard for evaluating sexual abuse claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether it differs from the standard for Eighth Amendment claims brought by convicted prisoners.
3. Whether the officer's alleged conduct—grabbing, squeezing, and twisting the detainee's genitals during a search—violated the detainee's clearly established constitutional rights.

The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The court held that:

1. Its appellate jurisdiction was limited to determining whether, accepting the detainee's version of events as true, the officer violated clearly established constitutional rights. The court lacked jurisdiction to review factual disputes or the officer's administrative exhaustion arguments.
2. The standard for sexual abuse claims by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment differs from the Eighth Amendment standard. Because pretrial detainees cannot be punished at all, they are protected from any objectively unreasonable treatment. An officer's intentional contact with a pretrial detainee's genitals violates the Fourteenth Amendment if it is not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose or is excessive in relation to that purpose. Unlike Eighth Amendment claims, the officer's subjective intent is not required to establish a violation.
3. On the detainee's account, the officer's conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment because: (a) the manner of the search was grossly excessive for detecting contraband; (b) grabbing, squeezing, and twisting genitals could never be necessary for a lawful search and caused physical injury; (c) the officer made no effort to limit the intrusion or protect privacy; and (d) the officer's alleged statement "How'd you like that, mother fucker?" suggested a punitive purpose. The court also noted the conduct violated the facility's own search policies.
4. It was clearly established by 2019 that pretrial detainees have a right to be free from objectively unreasonable treatment and that contact with genitals must be justified by a legitimate nonpunitive purpose and proportional to that purpose. Any reasonable officer would have understood that the alleged conduct was unlawful.

These consolidated cases involve terrorism victims seeking to recover assets held by Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The plaintiffs, victims of Taliban-directed terrorist attacks including the 1998 embassy bombings and 9/11, sought to attach or execute judgments against assets frozen by the U.S. government after the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021.

1. Whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) shields DAB's assets based on Executive Branch recognition of Afghanistan as a foreign state, or whether courts must independently determine whether DAB qualifies as a "foreign state" under the FSIA's statutory text
2. Whether the Executive Branch's recognition decision is conclusive for FSIA purposes or whether courts retain independent authority to interpret the FSIA's jurisdictional scope
3. Whether the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) overrides FSIA immunity for "blocked assets of [a] terrorist party," and if so, whether an entity's status as a terrorist party's agency or instrumentality must be determined at the time assets were blocked or at the time of the turnover order
4. Whether DAB constitutes an "agency or instrumentality" of Afghanistan or the Taliban under current political realities

The court denied rehearing en banc, affirming the panel majority's decision that DAB's assets enjoy immunity under the FSIA. The panel held that the Executive Branch's formal recognition of Afghanistan as a foreign state is conclusive for FSIA purposes, and that DAB qualifies as an agency or instrumentality of Afghanistan entitled to immunity. Additionally, the panel concluded that under the TRIA, an entity's status as a terrorist party's agency or instrumentality must be assessed as of the date the assets were blocked, not when the turnover order is issued.

Reasoning: The majority (Nardini and Lohier) agreed that the Executive Branch is generally entrusted with the power to recognize foreign governments. However, the dissenters (Sullivan, joined by Livingston, Bianco, and Park; and separately Menashi) argued that the panel conflated diplomatic recognition with statutory immunity interpretation. Sullivan's dissent contended that the FSIA was enacted specifically to transfer immunity determinations from the Executive to the courts, and that courts must independently interpret whether an entity qualifies as a "foreign state" under the statute's text. Menashi's dissent agreed that while the President's recognition of Afghanistan is conclusive, DAB is not an agency or instrumentality of Afghanistan but rather of the Taliban, and therefore should not receive immunity. Both dissenters also argued the TRIA should apply because DAB is currently controlled by the Taliban, making the blocked assets available to terrorism victims regardless of the entity's status when the assets were frozen.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a lawsuit brought by parents of students with disabilities and an advocacy organization against the Fairfax County School Board and Virginia Department of Education, alleging systemic violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The parents and organization sought declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy alleged procedural defects in the due process hearing system.

1. Whether the Chaplicks were required to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA before filing suit, and whether any exceptions to the exhaustion requirement applied
2. Whether the Binghams' claims in this lawsuit were impermissibly duplicative of their pending federal lawsuit challenging their child's IEP
3. Whether Hear Our Voices, Inc. (HOV), a nonprofit advocacy organization, had standing to sue on behalf of its members or in its own right

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on all three grounds. First, the court held that the Chaplicks failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the IDEA. Although recognizing a narrow futility exception, the court found that administrative proceedings would not have been futile because a hearing officer could have granted relief regarding D.C.'s placement. The court rejected arguments that exhaustion would be futile as a practical matter due to alleged bias in the hearing officer system, finding that such allegations do not overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity afforded to administrative officers. Second, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Binghams' claims as duplicative of their pending lawsuit, as both cases involved substantially similar factual allegations, challenged the same decisions, and sought relief for the same injury—FCPS's alleged denial of a FAPE to M.B. Third, the court held that HOV lacked standing both to sue on behalf of its members and to sue in its own right. HOV could not assert representational standing because it could not identify any member with the right to pursue the claims (the Chaplicks failed to exhaust and the Binghams' claims were duplicative), and allowing HOV to circumvent these requirements would undermine the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. Additionally, HOV failed to establish standing in its own right because the alleged diversion of resources resulted from HOV's own budgetary choices rather than from defendants' actions, and therefore did not constitute a cognizable concrete injury.

This is an appeal concerning the interpretation of Department of Labor regulations governing how to calculate a year of coal mine employment under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA). The case addresses whether a coal miner must demonstrate a 365-day employment relationship with a coal mine operator in addition to working 125 days in the mines, or whether working 125 days within a one-year period is sufficient to establish a year of employment for purposes of the BLBA's fifteen-year presumption.

1. The proper interpretation of 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32), which defines a "year" of coal mine employment for all purposes under the BLBA
2. Whether a miner must show both a 365-day employment relationship and 125 working days within that period, or only 125 working days within a one-year time period
3. Whether the regulation's plain language, structure, history, and the BLBA's remedial purpose support one interpretation over the other
4. The applicability of prior Fourth Circuit precedent (Armco and Daniels) interpreting predecessor regulations to the current regulation
5. Whether deference should be afforded to the Department of Labor's interpretation under Kisor v. Wilkie

The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Benefits Review Board's decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration. The court held that 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32) unambiguously requires only that a miner demonstrate 125 working days within a calendar year (or partial periods totaling one year) to establish a year of employment for purposes of the BLBA's fifteen-year presumption. The regulation does not require miners to also establish a 365-day employment relationship with a coal mine operator. The court's reasoning was based on: (1) the plain language of the regulation, which contains no mention of a 365-day employment requirement and focuses instead on 125 working days; (2) the regulation's structure and subsections, particularly subsection (i) which explicitly states that working 125 days "has worked one year in coal mine employment for all purposes under the Act" without mentioning an employment relationship requirement, and subsection (iii) which contemplates situations where employment lasts less than a calendar year; (3) the BLBA's remedial purpose, which Congress designed to simplify rather than restrict miners' access to benefits; (4) the regulation's history, showing that the 2001 revision removed language requiring "regular employment" and an "employment relationship," instead focusing on actual working days; and (5) alignment with the Sixth Circuit's holding in Shepherd v. Incoal, Inc. The court rejected prior Fourth Circuit dicta from Armco and Daniels as non-binding and inapplicable because those cases involved predecessor regulations with different language. The court also declined to defer to the Department of Labor's interpretation under Kisor because the regulation's text is unambiguous.

This is a False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam action brought by a pharmaceutical company whistleblower alleging that Forest Laboratories falsely reported the lowest prices it charged private companies for drugs under the Medicaid Rebate Statute, thereby causing the federal government and states to overpay for Medicaid drugs. The case involves the interpretation of the FCA's scienter requirement following the Supreme Court's decision in Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., which established a subjective scienter standard.

1. Whether the False Claims Act's scienter requirement is subjective (focusing on the defendant's actual knowledge and beliefs) or objective (based on what a reasonable person would know)
2. Whether a pharmaceutical manufacturer can be held liable under the FCA for submitting claims based on an objectively reasonable but potentially incorrect interpretation of an ambiguous statute if the manufacturer was subjectively aware of a substantial risk that its interpretation was wrong
3. Whether the Medicaid Rebate Statute requires drug manufacturers to aggregate rebates and discounts provided to multiple entities in a distribution chain when calculating and reporting the "Best Price" for drugs
4. Whether the plaintiff adequately pleaded the elements of falsity and scienter at the motion to dismiss stage

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Scienter Standard: Following the Supreme Court's decision in Schutte, the FCA scienter requirement is subjective, focusing on the defendant's actual knowledge and beliefs rather than what an objectively reasonable person would have known. A defendant can be liable if it acted with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of claims submitted to the government.
2. Ambiguity and Scienter: Ambiguity in a statute does not preclude liability under the FCA. A company cannot exploit statutory ambiguities by relying on an objectively reasonable interpretation if the company is subjectively aware of a substantial risk that its interpretation is incorrect. The court emphasized that companies dealing with the government are expected to know the law and familiarize themselves with legal requirements.
3. Sufficiency of Pleading: The plaintiff adequately pleaded scienter through allegations that: (a) Forest's McKenna letter to CMS demonstrated it understood CMS's proposed rule to require aggregation of discounts; (b) CMS declined to adopt Forest's suggested changes in the final 2007 rule; (c) Forest subsequently conducted an audit to eliminate stacked rebates for most customers following the rulemaking, suggesting awareness of CMS's interpretation; and (d) Forest continued reporting Best Prices without aggregation despite this awareness. These allegations, accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage, sufficiently support an inference of reckless disregard.
4. Pleading Standard: While FCA claims are fraud-based and subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard, scienter may be alleged generally. Direct proof of scienter is often unavailable at the pleading stage, and courts must not impose an unreasonably high bar for pleading this element.
5. Falsity as Separate Element: The court clarified that falsity is a distinct element from scienter. Unlike scienter, statutory ambiguity is not a defense to falsity. Falsity is an objective inquiry—even reasonable interpretations of a regulation can be false as a matter of law for FCA purposes. The court declined to reach the falsity issue and remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether reporting Best Price without aggregating all rebates and discounts was objectively false under the Medicaid Rebate Statute.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of Bloosurf LLC's complaint against T-Mobile USA for alleged network interference and tortious interference with business relationships. Bloosurf, a telecommunications provider, claimed T-Mobile's transmissions interfered with its service and disrupted its relationships with FCC-licensee universities.

1. Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over network interference claims, or whether the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction
2. Whether Bloosurf's Communications Act claim is barred by the statute's election-of-remedies provision (47 U.S.C. § 207)
3. Whether Bloosurf's state-law tort claims regarding network interference are preempted by the Communications Act (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A))
4. Whether the general saving clause (47 U.S.C. § 414) preserves Bloosurf's state-law claims
5. Whether Bloosurf properly preserved its argument regarding which tort test applies to its tortious interference claim

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all counts. The court held:

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The district court had subject matter jurisdiction. The court rejected T-Mobile's argument that the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction, clarifying that preemption is not a jurisdictional doctrine but rather a substantive merits question.
2. Count 1 (Communications Act Claim): Dismissed because Bloosurf's earlier FCC complaint triggered the election-of-remedies provision in Section 207, which prohibits a party from pursuing the same issues in both the FCC and federal court. Bloosurf filed an FCC complaint in November 2022 asserting the same network interference claims it later brought to federal court, thereby forfeiting its right to litigate those claims in court.
3. Counts 3-6 (State-Law Tort Claims for Network Interference): Dismissed as preempted by Section 332(c)(3)(A), which prohibits states from regulating the entry of commercial mobile services. The court held that state tort duties requiring T-Mobile to operate only on its licensed frequencies, transmit at lower decibels, and deploy 5G differently would burden T-Mobile's ability to provide wireless service coverage and thus are preempted. The general saving clause in Section 414 does not preserve these claims because they conflict with the express preemption in Section 332(c)(3)(A).
4. Count 2 (Tortious Interference with Business Relationships): Dismissed because Bloosurf forfeited its argument on appeal. Bloosurf urged the district court to apply one test for tortious interference but then argued on appeal that the court should have applied a different test. This argument-switching was not preserved and does not meet the high bar for fundamental error required to overcome forfeiture in civil cases.

This is a civil negligence case in which Officer John Ford sued DeRay McKesson, a Black Lives Matter activist, for injuries sustained when he was struck in the face with a rock during a protest in Baton Rouge that turned violent. The case involves questions about protest leader liability under Louisiana negligence law and First Amendment protections for protest speech.

1. Whether McKesson owed Officer Ford a duty of care under Louisiana law to exercise reasonable care in organizing and leading the protest
2. Whether McKesson breached that duty by organizing the protest in a manner where violent confrontation with police was foreseeable
3. Whether McKesson's conduct was the cause-in-fact of Officer Ford's injuries
4. Whether the risk of harm to Officer Ford fell within the scope of protection afforded by the duty owed
5. Whether imposing negligence liability on McKesson violates the First Amendment

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for McKesson and remanded for trial. The majority held that: (1) Louisiana law recognizes a duty not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party, which McKesson owed to Officer Ford; (2) sufficient evidence exists that McKesson was a leader of the protest who helped plan it, amplified it on social media, directed protesters onto the highway, and was present during looting and violence, creating genuine disputes of material fact on whether he breached his duty; (3) a reasonable jury could find McKesson's conduct was the cause-in-fact of Officer Ford's injuries based on evidence that he led demonstrators onto the highway in a foreseeable violent confrontation; (4) the risk of harm to police officers falls within the scope of protection of the duty; and (5) the First Amendment does not immunize McKesson from liability because the negligence theory fits within established exceptions to First Amendment protection identified in prior precedent, and the intervening Supreme Court decision in Counterman v. Colorado does not overturn the court's prior First Amendment analysis. The dissent argued that Officer Ford failed to present sufficient evidence of McKesson's leadership or causal connection to his injuries, and that the majority's holding impermissibly chills First Amendment protections by allowing protest leaders to be held liable for foreseeable violence without requiring proof of intent to incite that specific violence.

This is a criminal appeal in which the United States challenges a district court's dismissal of an indictment charging James Wesley Burger, an 18-year-old, with three counts of transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The charges arose from statements Burger allegedly made in a Roblox online gaming platform experience called "Church" in January 2025, which the government contends were threats of violence against Christians and churches.

1. Whether a district court may dismiss an indictment on a Rule 12 motion based on First Amendment protection for "true threats" when disputed factual questions remain regarding whether the defendant's statements constitute true threats.
2. The proper standard for determining whether statements constitute "true threats" unprotected by the First Amendment, including the role of context and the respective roles of judge and jury in making this determination.
3. Whether the context of role-playing in an online gaming platform categorically immunizes statements from criminal prosecution under the threats statute.
4. Whether the district judge's comments expressing personal views about acquitting the defendant and concerns about the government's conduct warrant reassignment of the case on remand.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the indictment and remanded for trial. The court held that:

1. Rule 12 Dismissal Standard: A district court may only dismiss an indictment on a Rule 12 motion when the infirmity is essentially one of law or when all material facts are undisputed. Whether a statement constitutes a "true threat" is generally a question of fact for the jury, not a legal question suitable for pretrial dismissal. The court cannot grant a motion to dismiss based on sufficiency of evidence when factual questions are embraced in the general issue.
2. Disputed Facts Preclude Dismissal: The district court erred by resolving contested factual issues at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Specifically, the court improperly determined that: (a) Burger was not subjectively aware of the threatening nature of his communications (a subjective mental state question); and (b) no reasonable person would interpret the statements as threats (an objective question). The government presented evidence that two Roblox users who witnessed the statements understood them to be genuine threats rather than role-playing, which is probative of both the subjective and objective prongs of the "true threats" test.
3. Context is Critical but Disputed: While context is critical to the "true threats" analysis, the parties disputed the proper characterization of the context here. The district court found the statements were made in a "role-playing context," but the government contended they were serious expressions of intent to commit violence. The testimony of the two tipsters would be material to resolving this factual dispute and could not be properly evaluated without a trial on the merits.
4. Online Platform Does Not Provide Categorical Immunity: Speaking on Roblox or similar platforms does not categorically immunize someone from the criminal code. The nature of the platform is relevant context but does not automatically shield threatening statements from prosecution.
5. No Reassignment Required: Although the district judge made comments expressing personal views (stating he would acquit if he were on the jury and characterizing a potential trial as "impossible"), these statements do not establish bias or partiality warranting reassignment. Such expressions of impatience and dissatisfaction, while perhaps unnecessary, fall within the bounds of imperfect human behavior and do not meet the high standard for reassignment. The court trusted the judge's commitment to faithfully execute a fair trial.
6. Mootness of Release Order Appeal: The government's appeal of the district court's December 14 order releasing Burger without conditions was dismissed as moot because the district court subsequently issued a December 29 order imposing conditions of release (home detention, GPS monitoring, firearm prohibition, and counseling requirement), making the earlier order no longer effective.

This is a criminal appeal involving charges of transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). An 18-year-old defendant made statements in a Roblox online gaming experience that were reported to the FBI, and the district court dismissed the indictment on First Amendment grounds, concluding no reasonable juror could find the statements constituted "true threats" beyond a reasonable doubt.

1. Whether statements made in an online gaming platform (Roblox) constitute "true threats" unprotected by the First Amendment, or whether they are protected speech such as role-playing, trolling, or hyperbole
2. Whether the question of whether statements are "true threats" is a legal question suitable for pretrial dismissal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, or a factual question requiring trial
3. Whether the district court properly resolved disputed factual issues regarding the context and meaning of the defendant's statements at the motion-to-dismiss stage
4. Whether the district judge's comments suggesting he would acquit the defendant if he were on the jury warrant reassignment of the case on remand

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the indictment and remanded for trial. The court held that whether statements constitute "true threats" is generally a question for the jury, not a legal question suitable for pretrial dismissal. The court found that disputed factual issues existed regarding: (1) whether an objectively reasonable person would interpret the statements as serious expressions of intent to commit violence, and (2) whether the defendant was subjectively aware of the threatening nature of his communications. The court reasoned that the context of the statements—including the role-playing nature of the Roblox platform and the reactions of other players who reported the statements as threats—presented factual disputes that could not be resolved on an incomplete record without testimony from the witnesses who reported the threats. The court also declined to reassign the case to a different judge, finding that while the district judge's comments were intemperate, they did not establish bias or partiality requiring reassignment under the applicable standard.

This is a criminal appeal involving charges of transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). An 18-year-old defendant made statements in a Roblox online gaming platform that were alleged to constitute threats of violence, and the district court dismissed the indictment on First Amendment grounds, concluding no reasonable juror could find the statements were "true threats" unprotected by the First Amendment.

1. Whether statements made in an online gaming context constitute "true threats" under the First Amendment, which requires both: (a) an objectively reasonable person would interpret the speech as a serious expression of intent to cause harm, and (b) the speaker was subjectively aware of the threatening nature
2. Whether the question of whether statements are "true threats" is properly resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, or whether it requires a trial on the merits
3. Whether context—including the role-playing nature of the gaming platform and the reactions of other players—is a disputed factual question that must be resolved at trial
4. Whether the district judge's comments expressing personal views about acquittal and concerns about fair trial procedures warrant reassignment of the case on remand

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the indictment and remanded for trial. The court held that whether Burger's statements constitute "true threats" is a factual question for the jury, not a legal question that can be resolved pretrial under Rule 12. The court found that disputed factual issues existed regarding: (1) whether an objectively reasonable person in the gaming context would interpret the statements as serious threats of violence, considering the reactions of actual players who reported the statements; and (2) whether Burger was subjectively aware of the threatening nature of his communications. The court reasoned that context is critical to the true threats analysis, and the testimony of the two Roblox users who witnessed and reported the statements would be material to determining whether a reasonable jury could find the statements were true threats. The court also rejected reassignment of the judge, finding that while the judge's comments were intemperate, they did not establish bias or partiality sufficient to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reassignment.

This is a criminal appeal in which Andrew Golobic, a former Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent, was convicted of multiple federal crimes including deprivation of constitutional rights under color of law, obstructing a sex-trafficking investigation, witness tampering, and destruction of records. Golobic sexually coerced at least six women he supervised in the Alternatives-to-Detention program and obstructed the investigation into his conduct.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by excusing a juror who became ill during deliberations
2. Whether the indictment was multiplicitous by charging the same offense in multiple counts in violation of double jeopardy
3. Whether the obstruction of justice enhancement could apply to conduct occurring before the formal start of the federal investigation
4. Whether the abduction enhancement constituted sentencing based on acquitted conduct
5. Whether the district court impermissibly double-counted the same conduct through multiple enhancements
6. Whether the Sentencing Guidelines violated statutory maximums
7. Whether Golobic was properly required to register as a sex offender

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Golobic's convictions and 144-month sentence. The court held:

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the juror, who required hospitalization with abnormal test results after nearly five days of deliberations
2. The three counts were not multiplicitous because each required proof of distinct elements: Count 2 required interference with a sex-trafficking investigation; Count 5 required witness tampering with intent to prevent reporting to law enforcement; and Count 6 required destruction of records
3. The obstruction of justice enhancement properly applied to pre-investigation conduct under the 2006 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, which expanded the enhancement to cover conduct occurring "with respect to" an investigation, including prior to its formal commencement
4. The abduction enhancement did not constitute sentencing on acquitted conduct because the jury never had the opportunity to acquit Golobic of abduction (which was not charged), and the "no" response to the kidnapping interrogatory did not constitute a unanimous acquittal
5. The three enhancements applied to the deprivation of rights conviction targeted distinct aspects of the crime: abuse of federal authority, exploitation of professional control, and manipulation of the victim's vulnerable circumstances
6. The guidelines range for Count 4 was properly limited to twelve months under the applicable guideline, and the overall sentence did not exceed statutory maximums for any count
7. Golobic was properly required to register as a sex offender because his conviction for obstructing a sex-trafficking investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d) falls within the statutory definition of a federal sex offense

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging the denial of a § 2254 petition filed by Marvin Johnson, who was convicted of kidnapping, murdering a thirteen-year-old boy, and raping and robbing the boy's mother. Johnson's death sentence was vacated and replaced with life without parole while his appeal was pending, raising jurisdictional questions about whether the case became moot.

1. Whether the state court's resentencing of Johnson to life without parole rendered his federal habeas petition moot and stripped the appellate court of jurisdiction;
2. Whether Johnson's trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington by allowing the jury to hear evidence of Johnson's prior criminal history;
3. Whether Johnson's appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise a Confrontation Clause claim regarding hearsay statements made by a jailhouse informant (Mickey Alexander) to police detectives.

The court AFFIRMED the district court's denial of Johnson's habeas petition. On jurisdiction, the court held that the resentencing did not render the case moot or strip appellate jurisdiction because habeas review focuses on the lawfulness of the petitioner's custody simpliciter, not on a particular judgment. The court distinguished habeas proceedings from direct appeals, noting that habeas power derives from the fact of detention, not from a specific judgment. Penalty-phase claims became moot due to the resentencing, but guilt-phase claims remained reviewable. On the trial counsel ineffectiveness claim, the court found no prejudice because: (1) Johnson himself conceded guilt to all charges in his closing argument; (2) standby counsel conceded guilt to three of five counts; and (3) for the remaining counts (felony murder and kidnapping), the evidence was overwhelming and unrelated to Johnson's criminal history. The court found that no reasonable juror would have thought Johnson's prior criminal history relevant to whether Daniel was alive when restrained or whether serious physical harm was inflicted post-restraint. On the appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim regarding the Confrontation Clause violation, the court assumed arguendo that a constitutional violation occurred but found no prejudice because Johnson and standby counsel both conceded that Johnson robbed Tina, making it not reasonably probable that exclusion of the Alexander evidence would have changed the guilt-phase outcome.

This is an appeal of a Social Security disability benefits determination in which the claimant challenges the Administrative Law Judge's decision to assign little weight to her treating psychologist's opinion regarding her mental limitations. The case involves a lengthy administrative history with multiple remands, and the court's review is limited to whether the claimant was disabled during the period from August 14, 2015, to August 31, 2017.

1. Whether the ALJ properly discounted the treating psychologist's (Dr. Matusiak's) opinion that the claimant had significant limitations in performing complex work tasks
2. Whether the ALJ adequately considered the relevant regulatory factors in weighing the treating physician's opinion, including the length and nature of the treatment relationship, consistency with other evidence, and the physician's specialization
3. Whether the ALJ's determination that the claimant's mental impairments were non-severe was supported by substantial evidence

The court affirmed the ALJ's decision and the district court's judgment. The court held that the ALJ properly considered the relevant regulatory factors and provided well-supported reasons for assigning little weight to Dr. Matusiak's opinion. Specifically, the court found the ALJ's reasoning sound because: (1) Dr. Matusiak's opinion was inconsistent with other medical evidence in the record, including opinions from Dr. Manos and Dr. Rabin, as well as treatment notes showing generally normal psychiatric symptoms; (2) Dr. Matusiak's opinion was not well-supported by his own treatment notes, which did not document significant limitations in memory, attention, concentration, or ability to interact; (3) the treatment relationship was relatively brief (five months) and focused primarily on pain-related frustrations rather than mental health limitations; and (4) the ALJ was aware of Dr. Matusiak's specialization in pain management. The court applied a deferential standard of review, noting that the ALJ need not explicitly address every regulatory factor as long as the reasoning is minimally articulated and supported by the record as a whole.

This is an appeal of an arbitration award in a dispute between USAA Savings Bank and a customer whose credit card account was closed. The case involves whether an arbitrator exceeded her authority by awarding punitive damages without conducting a required post-award review as specified in the arbitration agreement.

1. Whether an arbitrator exceeded her authority under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)) by failing to conduct a post-award review of punitive damages as expressly required by the arbitration agreement.
2. Whether the arbitrator's failure to comply with the post-award review requirement constitutes an interpretation of the arbitration agreement or a disregard of its plain language.
3. Whether the arbitrator properly prioritized American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules over the express terms of the arbitration agreement regarding punitive damages procedures.
4. Whether USAA was deprived of meaningful opportunity to challenge the punitive damages award.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and vacated the arbitration award. The court held that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by issuing a final punitive damages award without first conducting the post-award review required by the arbitration agreement. The court reasoned that: (1) the arbitration agreement's language requiring a post-award review of punitive damages with a reasoned written explanation is clear and unambiguous; (2) the arbitrator was required to apply the terms of the arbitration agreement when they conflicted with AAA rules, but she ignored this express contractual requirement; (3) by disregarding the plain language of the agreement, the arbitrator was not interpreting the contract but rather dispensing her own brand of justice; and (4) parties are entitled to have their bargained-for contractual rights enforced. The court denied the appellee's motion for sanctions and remanded the case to the arbitrator to conduct the required post-award review in accordance with the arbitration agreement. Judge Lee dissented, arguing the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the agreement and that USAA had adequate opportunity to challenge the punitive damages.

This is an arbitration case in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The employee plaintiff challenged the validity of an arbitration agreement in her employment contract, and the district court ruled the agreement was unconscionable and refused to enforce it, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the arbitration agreement clearly delegated the question of its own validity to an arbitrator.

1. Whether a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement that clearly and unmistakably reserves to an arbitrator the power to resolve questions of the agreement's validity can be defeated by the presence of a severability clause that references a "court or other body of competent jurisdiction."
2. Whether federal law or state law governs the determination of whether parties agreed to delegate arbitrability questions to an arbitrator.
3. Whether the incorporation of JAMS arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to delegate arbitrability questions to an arbitrator.
4. Whether state-court decisions applying state law can be used to negate a delegation clause in a contract governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that:

1. The parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to have an arbitrator resolve any challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement through their incorporation of the JAMS rules, which explicitly delegate such questions to the arbitrator.
2. The presence of a severability clause does not negate or render ambiguous the clear delegation to an arbitrator; both clauses can be given effect simultaneously, as the severability clause applies whether a court or arbitrator interprets the contract.
3. Federal law, not state law, governs the question of whether parties agreed to delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator, as this is an arbitration-specific rule under the Federal Arbitration Act.
4. The district court erred in relying on state-court decisions that would apply a rule disfavoring arbitration, as such state rules are preempted by the FAA.
5. The district court should not have addressed whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable; instead, it should have enforced the delegation clause and allowed the arbitrator to resolve that question.

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case in which an African American police officer challenges his termination by Miami-Dade County Police Department, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for filing EEOC complaints. The Eleventh Circuit affirms summary judgment in favor of the County on both claims.

1. Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework by demonstrating that similarly situated non-African American employees were treated more favorably
2. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination to survive summary judgment after failing to establish a prima facie case
3. Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation and presented evidence that the County's legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for discipline were pretextual or that retaliatory intent could be inferred
4. The proper application of the "similarly situated in all material respects" standard established in Lewis v. City of Union City for evaluating comparator evidence

The Court affirmed summary judgment for the County on both discrimination and retaliation claims. On the discrimination claim, the Court held that Johnson failed to establish a prima facie case because none of his ten proposed comparators were similarly situated in all material respects—they had materially different disciplinary histories and had not engaged in the same misconduct (insubordination and disrespect) as Johnson. Without a valid comparator, Johnson lost the presumption of discriminatory intent and had to present a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence. The Court found that Johnson's comparators alone, being distinguishable, could not raise a reasonable inference of discrimination. On the retaliation claim, the Court assumed Johnson made a prima facie case but found the County provided legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the discipline based on Johnson's extensive disciplinary history. The Court rejected Johnson's arguments that suspicious timing (two months between EEOC complaints and discipline) and alleged inconsistencies in the County's explanations demonstrated retaliation, finding these arguments were unsupported speculation and conjecture rather than evidence from which a jury could infer retaliatory intent.

This is an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment case in which a death row inmate challenged Georgia's lethal injection execution method, claiming his severely compromised veins would cause him substantial pain during execution. The inmate appealed the district court's judgment in favor of prison officials, arguing the court misapplied the law, made clear factual errors, and improperly allowed certain testimony.

1. Whether a prisoner challenging an execution method must prove the method creates a substantial risk of serious harm before the court must consider alternative execution methods
2. Whether the district court's factual findings regarding the condition of the inmate's veins and the feasibility of establishing intravenous access were clearly erroneous
3. Whether evidentiary errors—allowing the defendant's medical expert to examine the inmate the morning of trial and permitting anonymous remote testimony from execution team members—were prejudicial

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for the prison officials. The court held that: (1) a prisoner need not establish a feasible alternative execution method if the planned method does not present a substantial risk of serious harm in the first place; (2) the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous because the inmate's recent medical records showing successful intravenous access without complications provided permissible support for the conclusion that access would not be difficult; and (3) any evidentiary errors were harmless because the district court's decision rested primarily on the inmate's medical records rather than the challenged testimony, and the inmate waived objections by declining to depose the expert witness or submit a rebuttal report.

This is an appeal of a motion to dismiss in a restrictive covenant enforcement case where a former employee of Payscale Inc. joined a competitor. The Court of Chancery dismissed Payscale's claims for breach of non-compete, non-solicitation, and confidentiality provisions, as well as tortious interference claims. Payscale appealed the dismissals.

1. Whether Payscale adequately pleaded a claim for breach of a nationwide, eighteen-month non-compete covenant at the motion to dismiss stage
2. Whether the non-compete's geographic scope and temporal duration were reasonable given the employee's role and the company's business interests
3. Whether the consideration provided (profit interest units) was adequate to support the restrictive covenants
4. Whether Payscale adequately pleaded breaches of non-solicitation and confidentiality provisions
5. Whether Payscale stated a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations

The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Non-Compete Clause: Payscale adequately pleaded a reasonably conceivable claim for breach of the non-compete. The trial court improperly drew inferences against Payscale at the pleading stage by finding the covenant facially unenforceable. The court found it reasonably conceivable that the nationwide scope and eighteen-month duration were reasonable given: (i) Norman's senior-level position overseeing nationwide sales operations; (ii) her involvement in company-wide strategic decisions; (iii) Payscale's nationwide operations; and (iv) the eighteen-month restriction being tied to protecting high-value, long-term Enterprise customer relationships (typical three-year contracts).
2. Consideration: The trial court erred in concluding the consideration was "vanishingly small." At the pleading stage, the court cannot determine that contingent consideration (profit interest units worth $0 at issuance but potentially valuable upon a sale) is inadequate. The adequacy of consideration is properly addressed in the balancing-of-equities analysis, not at the motion to dismiss stage. The court must accept well-pleaded allegations that the PIUs had significant value at the time of a potential sale.
3. Legitimate Business Interests: It is reasonably conceivable that the non-compete advances Payscale's legitimate economic interests in protecting goodwill and confidential information. The trial court's concerns about the covenant's scope (including unnamed subsidiaries and having a "worldwide" effect) were based on inferences drawn against Payscale. The amended complaint adequately alleged that Payscale is Topco's only operating subsidiary and all subsidiaries conduct the same business, making the restriction reasonably tailored to Payscale's interests.
4. Non-Solicitation and Confidentiality Provisions: Payscale's allegations were not conclusory. The complaint contained particularized factual statements including: Norman's high-ranking position; the loss of at least five Enterprise customers within two months of Norman joining BetterComp; the difficulty of re-signing lost Enterprise customers; and that one-third of BetterComp's employees are former Payscale employees. These allegations support a reasonable inference that Norman solicited clients or disclosed confidential information.
5. Tortious Interference with Contract: Because the breach of contract claim (Count I) was improperly dismissed, the tortious interference with contract claim (Count II), which depends on Count I's viability, must also be reversed.

This case involves a dispute among four heirs to a $100 million estate regarding the administration of assets held in a Delaware limited liability company (Marylill LLC). One heir, Lorene Murphy, filed suit in Delaware seeking to dissolve Marylill, reform the operating agreement of a subsidiary LLC, and assert breach of fiduciary duty claims against the other heirs serving as personal representatives, despite having previously negotiated and agreed to a settlement in Florida probate court that explicitly contemplated Marylill's continued existence.

1. Whether Plaintiff has standing to seek judicial dissolution of Marylill under Delaware's LLC Act (Section 18-802) or through equitable dissolution when she is neither a member nor manager of the LLC
2. Whether Plaintiff adequately pleaded a claim for reformation of the LAEC operating agreement based on alleged mutual or unilateral mistake with the required particularity
3. Whether the personal representatives, as managers of LAEC, owe fiduciary duties to Plaintiff as a beneficiary of the estate
4. Whether the Florida probate court's jurisdiction and the parties' settlement agreement preclude Delaware court intervention

The Court of Chancery granted the motions to dismiss all four counts of the Amended Complaint. The court held:

1. Dissolution Claims (Counts I and III): Plaintiff lacks standing to seek dissolution under Section 18-802 because she is neither a member nor manager of Marylill. While equitable dissolution remains available as a remedy in exceptional circumstances, Plaintiff failed to plead facts demonstrating the "manifest" showing required for equity to intervene. The court found that Plaintiff's indirect relationship to Marylill, combined with her own negotiation and execution of a settlement agreement explicitly contemplating Marylill's continued existence through at least June 2026, made it unreasonable to grant her equitable relief to undo that agreement.
2. Reformation Claim (Count II): Plaintiff failed to plead her reformation claim with the particularity required by Delaware law. She did not allege that the personal representatives knew of her mistaken belief and remained silent, did not claim they believed the Investment Director position would be included in the LAEC Agreement, and provided only conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts. The exhibits presented did not require the Investment Director position to be included in the operating agreements.
3. Fiduciary Duty Claim (Count IV): The personal representatives, as managers of LAEC, do not owe fiduciary duties to Plaintiff. Under the plain language of the LAEC Agreement, the managers owe fiduciary duties only to LAEC and its sole member (Marylill), not to beneficiaries of the estate. Plaintiff is neither a party to nor bound by the LAEC Agreement. The Settlement Agreement, which is independent of the LAEC Agreement, does not create fiduciary duties but rather establishes contractual rights regarding Plaintiff's role as "Investment Director."

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in which Rodolfo Carr, convicted of first-degree murder in 2004 for a shooting that occurred in 1974, challenges his conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds. Carr claims his right to a speedy trial was violated due to a thirty-year delay between the crime and trial, and that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to develop and present evidence supporting his speedy-trial claim.

1. Whether Carr's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the delay in prosecution, specifically whether the speedy-trial clock began running when the murder complaint was issued in 1974 (under Massachusetts law) or when the indictment was filed in 1997 (under federal law).
2. Whether a police "Wanted Poster" circulated after the 1974 shooting, combined with the complaint, constitutes the "public, official accusation" required to trigger the federal speedy-trial clock.
3. Whether Carr's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to develop and present evidence that he lived openly under his own name for most of the period between 1975 and 1994.
4. Whether Carr's appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise trial counsel's deficient performance regarding the speedy-trial claim on direct appeal.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on all claims. On the Speedy-Trial Clock: The court held that under binding First Circuit precedent (Rashad v. Walsh and Butler v. Mitchell), the federal speedy-trial clock begins when formal charges are brought through an indictment or information, not when a complaint is issued. A police "Wanted Poster" does not constitute the formal "public accusation" required by the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, the relevant period for Carr's federal speedy-trial claim is only the seven years from his 1997 indictment to his 2004 trial, not the thirty years from the 1974 shooting. Because Carr never argued that this seven-year delay violated his speedy-trial rights, any such claim is waived. On Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The court applied the two-pronged Strickland v. Washington test and found Carr could not satisfy either prong. On the performance prong, the court held that Carr's attorneys' strategic decision to rely on other evidence of the government's lack of diligence, rather than emphasizing evidence of his open living during 1975-1994, was not "so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made" it. The attorneys were aware of some of this evidence and made a reasonable professional judgment about trial strategy. On the prejudice prong, the court found no reasonable probability that additional evidence about Carr's open living would have changed the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's analysis of the Barker speedy-trial factors, particularly given Carr's repeated use of aliases with law enforcement and his denial of his identity to Boston police in 1994. The court also noted that the trial record already contained some evidence of Carr's use of his own name, and the state court had acknowledged the government's lack of diligence but weighed Carr's apparent evasion more heavily.

This is a putative class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging Massachusetts's Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act as an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. The plaintiff alleges that the statute's interest-payment provisions deprive unclaimed property owners of just compensation.

1. Whether the plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief regarding unclaimed property held by the state
2. Whether the plaintiff's Takings Clause claim is ripe for adjudication under Article III
3. Whether the plaintiff's claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity
4. Whether the state's interest-payment scheme on unclaimed property constitutes a constitutional taking requiring just compensation

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on standing and ripeness grounds. The court held that under either plausible interpretation of the complaint, the plaintiff's claims fail Article III requirements. First, if the complaint challenges the interest rate he would receive upon claiming his property, the claim is not ripe because it depends on contingent future events (whether he will claim the property and what compensation he would receive), and no taking has yet occurred as to the time-value of the property. Second, if the complaint alleges a completed taking when the property was delivered to the Treasurer, the claim is ripe but the plaintiff lacks standing to seek prospective relief because the injury is a past harm that has already occurred, not an ongoing or future injury. The court reasoned that prospective relief requires either a continuing injury or a sufficient threat of future injury, neither of which the plaintiff demonstrated.

This is a civil rights case in which a pretrial detainee alleges that a corrections officer sexually abused him during a search for contraband. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addresses whether the officer is entitled to qualified immunity from the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment claim.

1. The scope of appellate jurisdiction for interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials, specifically whether the court can review factual disputes and administrative exhaustion requirements
2. The appropriate legal standard for evaluating sexual abuse claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether it differs from the standard for convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment
3. Whether the officer's alleged conduct—grabbing, squeezing, and twisting the detainee's genitals during a search—violated clearly established constitutional rights

The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The court held that: (1) its appellate jurisdiction is limited to determining whether, accepting the detainee's version of events as true, the officer violated clearly established rights; (2) the standard for sexual abuse claims by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment is an objective reasonableness test, not the subjective intent-based test used for Eighth Amendment claims by convicted prisoners; (3) pretrial detainees cannot be subjected to any punishment and are entitled to protection from objectively unreasonable treatment; (4) on the detainee's account, the officer's conduct was objectively unreasonable because it was grossly excessive relative to any legitimate search purpose, caused physical injury, was conducted without regard for privacy, and the officer's alleged statement suggested punitive intent; and (5) it was clearly established by 2019 that such conduct violated the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court dismissed other aspects of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings.

These consolidated cases involve terrorism victims seeking to recover assets held by Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The plaintiffs, including victims of the 1998 embassy bombings and 9/11 attacks, sought to attach or execute judgments against Taliban-controlled assets, but the courts dismissed their claims based on Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) immunity.

1. Whether the Executive Branch's recognition of Afghanistan as a foreign state conclusively establishes FSIA immunity for DAB's assets, or whether courts must independently interpret "foreign state" under the FSIA's statutory text
2. Whether DAB qualifies as an "agency or instrumentality" of Afghanistan (rather than the Taliban) entitled to FSIA immunity
3. Whether the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) overrides FSIA immunity for "blocked assets of a terrorist party," and if so, whether DAB's status as a Taliban agency must be assessed at the time assets were blocked or at the time of the turnover order
4. The proper allocation of authority between the Executive and Judicial branches in determining foreign state status for FSIA purposes

The court denied rehearing en banc, affirming the panel's decision that DAB's assets enjoy FSIA immunity. However, the opinions reveal significant disagreement on the underlying legal principles:

1. Panel/Majority Position (affirmed): The Executive Branch's formal recognition of Afghanistan as a foreign state conclusively establishes it as a "foreign state" under the FSIA, and DAB qualifies as an agency or instrumentality of Afghanistan. The TRIA does not apply because DAB was not a Taliban agency when the assets were blocked.
2. Judge Sullivan's Dissent (from denial of rehearing en banc): The panel erred by conflating diplomatic recognition with statutory immunity interpretation. Courts have an independent duty to interpret "foreign state" under the FSIA's text, and the Executive's views merit no special deference. Additionally, the TRIA should apply because DAB is currently controlled by the Taliban, and the statute's plain language covers "blocked assets of a terrorist party" without requiring the entity to have been a terrorist agency at the blocking date.
3. Judge Menashi's Dissent (from denial of rehearing en banc): While the President's recognition decision is conclusive regarding whether Afghanistan is a foreign state, courts must independently apply the FSIA's statutory standards to determine whether DAB qualifies as an "agency or instrumentality." The record demonstrates the Taliban (not the State of Afghanistan) currently controls DAB, so it should not receive immunity. Similarly, under the TRIA, an entity's status as a terrorist agency should be assessed at the time of the turnover order, not the blocking date, to reflect "current political realities."
4. Judges Nardini and Lohier's Concurrence: Agreed with denying rehearing, endorsing the view that the Executive Branch is generally entrusted with recognizing foreign governments.

This case involves a dispute between two bankruptcy debtors and Goldman Sachs Bank USA over whether the debtors' claims for violations of the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code must be arbitrated pursuant to arbitration clauses in the debtors' credit card agreements. The Fourth Circuit addresses the tension between the Federal Arbitration Act's strong policy favoring arbitration and the Bankruptcy Code's foundational purposes.

1. Whether a § 362(k) claim for violation of the bankruptcy automatic stay must be arbitrated pursuant to valid arbitration clauses in credit card agreements, applying the test from Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2. Whether arbitration of a bankruptcy statutory claim creates an "inherent conflict" with the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code that would preclude arbitration despite the FAA's general policy favoring arbitration.
3. Whether a bankruptcy court has discretion to deny a motion to compel arbitration when such a conflict exists.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of Goldman Sachs' motion to compel arbitration. The court held that arbitration of the § 362(k) claim would create inherent conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code's underlying purposes, thereby precluding arbitration under the McMahon test. Specifically, the court identified the following conflicts:

1. Centralization of disputes: Arbitration would undermine the bankruptcy court's core purpose of centralizing all claims and disputes in one forum to harmonize the interests of debtors and creditors and prevent piecemeal litigation.
2. Erosion of the automatic stay: Arbitration would diminish the "breathing spell" the automatic stay provides to debtors, a fundamental protection under the Bankruptcy Code designed to give debtors a "fresh start."
3. Uniformity of bankruptcy law: Arbitration would undermine the constitutional requirement that bankruptcy laws be applied uniformly throughout the United States, as different arbitrators might reach different conclusions with limited appellate review.
4. Loss of bankruptcy expertise: Arbitration would bypass the specialized expertise of bankruptcy judges, who are appointed specifically to preside over bankruptcy matters and understand the complexities of the Bankruptcy Code.
5. Deterrent effect of punitive damages: Relegating punitive damages awards to private arbitration would undermine the deterrent purpose of such damages, which is designed to discourage future violations of the automatic stay.

This is a criminal appeal in which Arturo Mendoza challenges conditions of supervised release imposed after his guilty plea to transporting child pornography. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether the district court properly imposed location-monitoring, financial-disclosure, and credit-approval conditions as part of Mendoza's supervised release.

1. Whether the district court erred in imposing a home-detention component as part of the location-monitoring condition when it explicitly stated at sentencing that it was imposing only "standalone" location monitoring
2. Whether the district court erred in failing to specify the duration of location monitoring, leaving it blank in the written judgment
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions of supervised release when no restitution order had been entered
4. Whether these conditions comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and the Sentencing Commission's policy statements

The Fifth Circuit VACATED all three conditions and REMANDED for correction. The court's reasoning:

1. Home Detention Component: The court found a clerical error between the oral pronouncement at sentencing (no home detention) and the written judgment (home detention included), which may be corrected on appeal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.
2. Duration of Location Monitoring: The court found plain error in failing to specify the duration. The vague judgment violates due-process principles by failing to give Mendoza fair notice of how long his liberty will be restricted and invites arbitrary enforcement. The error affected substantial rights and the fairness of judicial proceedings.
3. Financial-Disclosure and Credit-Approval Conditions: The court found an abuse of discretion because: (a) no restitution order had actually been entered, making the stated justification unsound; (b) the conditions impose greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary without a restitution order; and (c) the Sentencing Commission's policy statements explicitly limit these conditions to cases where restitution, forfeiture, or fines are actually imposed. The government's argument that restitution is mandatory in child pornography cases was rejected because restitution is mandatory only to the extent the court determines evidence of cognizable victim losses.

This is a bankruptcy appeal concerning whether a master supply agreement (MSA) and individual purchase orders (POs) between Midea (manufacturer) and Corelle (distributor) constitute a single indivisible contract or separate divisible contracts. Midea objected to Corelle's reorganization plan that allowed Corelle to retain indemnification rights for products purchased under completed POs while assigning the MSA to a purchaser.

1. Whether the bankruptcy court's divisibility finding should be reviewed under a clear-error standard or de novo standard
2. Whether the MSA and POs constitute divisible or indivisible contracts under Texas law
3. Whether Corelle's retention of indemnification rights for completed POs violates 11 U.S.C. § 365(f), which governs assignment of executory contracts in bankruptcy

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of Midea's objection. The court held that: (1) clear-error review was the appropriate standard because the divisibility determination involved primarily factual work using course-of-performance evidence; (2) the MSA and POs are divisible contracts based on the parties' intent, the distinct subject matter of each agreement, and the course of performance showing separate assent to each PO with variable terms; and (3) because the POs are separable contracts, Corelle's retention of indemnification rights for completed POs does not violate § 365(f), as no partial assignment of an executory contract occurred. The court reasoned that the MSA provided a framework for an ongoing business relationship with open-ended transactions, while each PO constituted a unique transaction with separately negotiated terms including price, quantity, and specifications.

This is an appeal of a supervised release revocation sentence in which the defendant challenges the district court's imposition of a 36-month term of reimprisonment (the statutory maximum) after finding violations of his supervised release conditions. The defendant argues the judge improperly emphasized the seriousness of his violations over the Sentencing Guidelines advisory range and the "breach of trust" theory of revocation.

1. The proper weight to be given to the seriousness of supervised release violations versus the Sentencing Guidelines advisory range and policy statements in revocation proceedings
2. Whether the "breach of trust" theory of supervised-release revocation limits a judge's consideration of violation severity
3. The scope of judicial discretion in imposing reimprisonment terms following supervised release revocation
4. Whether the district judge impermissibly considered retribution for the underlying criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (an issue addressed in the recent Supreme Court decision in Esteras v. United States)

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 36-month reimprisonment term. The court held that:

1. District judges possess particularly broad discretion in supervised-release revocation proceedings, and appellate review is highly deferential, reversing only if the term is "plainly unreasonable"
2. The Sentencing Guidelines range and policy statements are nonbinding recommendations that do not limit judicial discretion in revocation cases
3. Emphasizing the seriousness of supervised-release violations is entirely consistent with the "breach of trust" theory because a more serious violation reflects a more serious breach of trust, and Congress requires courts to consider the nature of violations
4. The nature and circumstances of the defendant's violations fall within the statutory factors that courts must consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)
5. The defendant failed to raise a claim under Esteras v. United States regarding impermissible consideration of retribution for the underlying offense, and the judge's decision was well within his discretion and not plainly unreasonable

This is a petition for rehearing en banc in a case concerning the procedural due process rights of a prisoner facing transfer to disciplinary segregation. The majority denied the petition, but three judges dissented, arguing that the panel decision improperly applied a lenient due process standard to disciplinary proceedings.

1. Whether inmates facing transfer to disciplinary segregation are entitled to the informal, non-adversarial due process standard established in Wilkinson v. Austin, or the more rigorous procedural protections established in Wolff v. McDonnell, including the right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence.
2. Whether the panel's extension of Adams v. Reagle to categorically preclude Wolff protections in disciplinary segregation cases conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and creates an improper circuit split.
3. Whether the distinction between administrative transfers (which receive minimal due process) and disciplinary punishments (which should receive heightened protections) should be maintained in prison law.
4. Whether the severe conditions of Torres's three-month disciplinary segregation—including lack of a bed, a leaking toilet spewing sewage, mold, and mildew—required greater procedural protections than were afforded.

The petition for rehearing en banc was DENIED by majority vote. However, the dissenting opinion (joined by three judges) argued that the Torres majority erred by extending Adams v. Reagle to hold that prisoners facing disciplinary segregation receive only informal, non-adversarial due process. The dissenters contended that: (1) Supreme Court precedent in Wolff v. McDonnell requires more robust procedural protections for disciplinary segregation cases, including the right to call witnesses and present evidence; (2) at least six other federal circuits apply the Wolff standard to disciplinary proceedings, and the Seventh Circuit's approach creates an improper circuit split; (3) the distinction between administrative transfers (which warrant minimal process) and disciplinary punishments (which warrant heightened process) is well-established in Supreme Court jurisprudence and reflects the different purposes and factual determinations involved; (4) the Torres majority's categorical rule conflicts with the Seventh Circuit's own prior precedent; and (5) the severe conditions of Torres's confinement—three months in a cell with raw sewage, mold, and insects—demonstrate why procedural protections are essential to prevent arbitrary punishment and protect inmates' constitutional rights.

This consolidated appeal involves three defendants convicted of firearm possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals previously convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. The defendants challenge the statute's constitutionality under the Second Amendment.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment on its face
2. Whether § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment as applied to the individual defendants
3. Whether the statute's categorical disarmament of domestic violence misdemeanants without individualized dangerousness determinations comports with the Second Amendment framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen
4. Whether § 922(g)(9) is consistent with historical traditions of firearm regulation, particularly surety laws and "going armed" laws

The court affirmed the convictions, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is constitutional both facially and as applied to the defendants. The court applied the two-step Bruen framework. At step one, the court acknowledged that the Second Amendment's plain text presumptively protects domestic violence misdemeanants as members of "the people." However, at step two, the court held that the government overcame this presumption by demonstrating that § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court found § 922(g)(9) analogous to historical surety laws and "going armed" laws, which disarmed individuals deemed dangerous to others' physical safety. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that § 922(g)(9) differs from § 922(g)(8) (upheld in Rahimi) because it imposes permanent rather than temporary bans and lacks individualized dangerousness findings. The court reasoned that § 922(g)(9) applies to those criminally convicted of domestic violence (unlike § 922(g)(8), which applies to those merely subject to restraining orders), and that historical precedent supports categorical disarmament of groups deemed dangerous without individualized determinations. The court also noted that domestic violence has high recidivism rates and that the presence of firearms makes domestic violence significantly more likely to be deadly. Therefore, the court held that § 922(g)(9) need not be subject to misdemeanor-by-misdemeanor litigation and is constitutional as applied to all three defendants.

This is a consolidated appeal of three criminal convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. The defendants challenged the statute as violating the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to their particular circumstances.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment on its face
2. Whether § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment as applied to the individual defendants
3. Whether the plain text of the Second Amendment presumptively protects domestic violence misdemeanants from firearm prohibitions
4. Whether § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation in the United States
5. Whether categorical disarmament of domestic violence misdemeanants without individualized dangerousness determinations comports with the Second Amendment

The Ninth Circuit affirmed all three convictions, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is constitutional both facially and as applied to the defendants. The court applied the two-step framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. At step one, the court acknowledged that the Second Amendment's plain text presumptively protects domestic violence misdemeanants, as they are "people" within the scope of the amendment. However, at step two, the court found that the government overcame this presumption by demonstrating that § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court reasoned that § 922(g)(9) is analogous to historical surety laws and "going armed" laws that disarmed individuals deemed dangerous to others' physical safety. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that § 922(g)(9) differs meaningfully from § 922(g)(8) (which prohibits firearm possession by those subject to domestic violence restraining orders) because: (1) § 922(g)(9) applies to those criminally convicted of domestic violence rather than merely accused, making it stronger; (2) the burden is comparable or justified by past behavior; and (3) domestic violence misdemeanants present a clear threat of physical violence based on their prior conduct. Regarding the as-applied challenges, the court held that § 922(g)(9) is not susceptible to misdemeanor-by-misdemeanor litigation because the statute categorically disarms a class Congress deemed dangerous. The court relied on historical evidence showing that legislatures have long possessed the power to categorically disarm groups without individualized dangerousness determinations. The court noted that domestic violence has a high recidivism rate (40-80%) and that firearms dramatically increase the lethality of domestic violence. Therefore, § 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to all three defendants, each of whom was convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

This is a consolidated appeal of three criminal convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. The defendants challenged the statute as violating the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to their circumstances.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment on its face
2. Whether § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment as applied to the individual defendants
3. Whether the plain text of the Second Amendment protects domestic violence misdemeanants from firearm prohibitions
4. Whether § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation under the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen
5. Whether § 922(g)(9) requires individualized judicial determinations of dangerousness or permits categorical disarmament

The court affirmed all three convictions, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is constitutional both facially and as applied to the defendants. The court applied the two-step Bruen framework and concluded: (1) The Second Amendment's plain text presumptively protects domestic violence misdemeanants, as they are members of "the people" within the national community. (2) However, the government overcame this presumption by demonstrating that § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation, specifically analogous to surety laws and "going armed" laws that historically disarmed individuals deemed dangerous to others. The court emphasized that § 922(g)(9) targets individuals convicted of misdemeanors involving use or threatened use of physical force against domestic partners, and that domestic violence has a high recidivism rate and becomes significantly more deadly when firearms are present. Regarding as-applied challenges, the court held that § 922(g)(9) permits categorical disarmament of all domestic violence misdemeanants without requiring misdemeanor-by-misdemeanor litigation, similar to the categorical approach upheld for felony disarmament under § 922(g)(1). Congress's determination that domestic violence offenders are dangerous justified this categorical approach without individualized dangerousness findings.

This is a Social Security disability benefits case in which the claimant appealed the denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The central issue concerns whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) properly addressed conflicting job-number evidence when determining whether the claimant could perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.

1. Whether the claimant's counter job-number evidence was "significant and probative" under the framework established in Wischmann v. Kijakazi, 68 F.4th 498 (9th Cir. 2023)
2. Whether the ALJ was required to address and resolve discrepancies between the vocational expert's job-number estimates and the claimant's contrary evidence
3. What constitutes "probative" evidence in the context of conflicting job-number estimates, particularly regarding data sources, methodology, and the expertise of those producing the evidence
4. Whether the ALJ's conclusory statement that the vocational expert's testimony was more persuasive constituted sufficient "addressing" and "resolving" of the inconsistencies

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Powley's counter job-number evidence was both significant and probative because: (a) it was produced using data sources and methodologies frequently relied upon by the SSA (SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro and U.S. Census Bureau data); (b) the evidence was substantially more detailed than the evidence rejected in Wischmann, including 91 pages of supporting documentation with clear identification of sources and methodology; (c) the evidence was produced by Powley's attorney as stated in his letter to the Appeals Council; and (d) the discrepancies between Arne's and Powley's job numbers were stark and comparable to those found significant in prior cases (e.g., 39,425 vs. 27 for eyeglass assembler; 24,700 vs. "not applicable" for jewelry preparer; 14,700 vs. 19 for fishing equipment assembler).
2. The court clarified that while replicating a VE's methodology and using the same sources are relevant factors in determining probativeness, they are not dispositive. The key requirement is that evidence be produced using data sources and methodologies frequently relied upon by the SSA.
3. The ALJ failed to properly address the inconsistencies because the ALJ merely stated that Arne's testimony was more persuasive based on his experience and expertise, without actually addressing the specific conflicts between the job-number data from the same or comparable databases.
4. The ALJ failed to resolve the inconsistency, as the conflict between the data remained unresolved after the ALJ's conclusory determination.
5. When significant and probative counter evidence is presented, the ALJ must both address the specific discrepancies in the data and resolve the inconsistencies, not merely reject the evidence based on the VE's credentials.

This is an appeal concerning the Government's motion to vacate a previously published appellate decision in a case involving Temporary Protected Status (TPS) holders challenging the Secretary of Homeland Security's vacatur and termination of TPS designations for Venezuela and Haiti. The Government argues that the case became moot when the district court subsequently entered partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, warranting vacatur of the appellate opinion under Munsingwear.

1. Whether an appellate decision should be vacated when the underlying case becomes moot after the appellate opinion has been published
2. Whether post-decisional mootness (mootness arising after an appellate decision is issued) warrants the extraordinary remedy of vacatur
3. The appropriate equitable factors to consider when deciding whether to vacate a published opinion for post-decisional mootness
4. Whether the timing of the district court's summary judgment order—occurring after the appellate decision but before the mandate issued—affects the vacatur analysis

The court denied the Government's motion to vacate. The court held that while the case may have become moot when the district court entered partial summary judgment on September 5, 2025, this mootness arose after the appellate opinion was published on August 29, 2025. The court distinguished this case from Munsingwear, which applies to cases that become moot before an appellate decision is rendered. For post-decisional mootness, vacatur is an extraordinary remedy requiring sufficient justification. Applying three equitable factors—(1) the value of the opinion to the legal community, (2) prejudice to the parties, and (3) whether mootness arose from voluntary conduct—the court found that all factors weighed against vacatur. The court emphasized that judicial precedents are presumptively valuable and should not be withdrawn absent compelling public interest; the Government was not prejudiced because it could seek en banc rehearing or certiorari and had already raised similar arguments in a subsequent appeal; and involuntary mootness does not mandate vacatur. The court also noted that a Supreme Court stay order remained in place, muting any prejudicial impact of the appellate decisions.

This is an employment discrimination and breach of contract case in which Dr. Lana Foster, one of the first Black educators in Echols County Schools, sued school officials for failing to implement a settlement agreement requiring them to revise hiring practices. The school officials appealed on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that uncertainty about personal liability under § 1981 shields them from suit.

1. Whether school officials are entitled to qualified immunity when they allegedly interfere with a settlement agreement based on racial animus, despite uncertainty about whether government officials can be held personally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
2. Whether § 1981 protects against interference with contractual rights by non-parties to the contract
3. Whether the wrongfulness of conduct (qualified immunity analysis) is distinct from questions about the rules of individual liability

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The court held that: (1) school officials' alleged conduct of refusing to implement the settlement agreement because of Foster's race violated clearly established law under § 1981, which prohibits impairing a person's right to make and enforce contracts; (2) § 1981 protects against third-party interference with contractual rights, as established in precedent like Faraca v. Clements and Moore v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corporation; and (3) an official's uncertainty about whether they can be held personally liable is irrelevant to qualified immunity analysis—what matters is whether the official knew or should have known their conduct was unlawful. The court rejected the officials' argument that uncertainty about personal liability under § 1981 provides a shield, reasoning that qualified immunity protects officials from liability for reasonable mistakes about open legal questions, not from liability for knowingly violating clearly established law.

This appeal concerns whether David Handler's claims for breach of contract and related remedies are barred by collateral estoppel based on findings made in a prior action determining that Handler was not a partner in Centerview Partners Holdings LP. The case involves disputes over Handler's employment terms, compensation rights, and whether the parties entered into an oral partnership agreement.

1. Whether findings regarding Handler's compensation as an employee were essential to the judgment in the prior action that Handler was not a partner of Topco
2. Whether the issue of Handler's compensation rights as an employee was actually litigated and decided by a valid and final judgment in the prior action
3. Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Handler's counterclaims for breach of the 2008 Letter, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment
4. The proper application of the "essential to the judgment" requirement for collateral estoppel, particularly in light of the narrow scope of the prior books and records action

The Delaware Supreme Court REVERSED the Court of Chancery's dismissal of Counts Three, Four, and Five based on collateral estoppel. The Court held that:

1. The Standing Opinion's findings regarding Handler's compensation as an employee were not essential to the judgment that Handler was not a partner, because the determination that Handler was not a partner did not depend on a conclusion that the parties had replaced his previous employment terms.
2. The issue of what compensation Handler was entitled to as an employee after the November 8th Meeting was not litigated and decided by a valid and final judgment in the prior action. The Standing Opinion merely stated that the 2008 Letter "remained operative" and that Handler's "vested rights" would be determined in the plenary action, indicating the court did not finally determine the specific terms of Handler's compensation.
3. The narrow scope of the prior books and records action—which focused solely on whether Handler was a partner entitled to inspect books and records—did not encompass a full determination of Handler's employment compensation rights.
4. The "obvious causal relationship" test from Rogers v. Morgan did not apply here because, unlike in Rogers, the factual findings about compensation were not necessary to reach the judgment that Handler was not a partner.

This case involves a dispute between two property owners over the existence and enforceability of a cross-easement that would allow traffic from Reybold's property to use the highway entrance on Summit's adjacent property. The original property owner, Viola Carter, signed a record plan containing a note stating that "a cross easement is hereby established" between the two parcels.

1. Whether a property owner's signature and certification on a record plan containing a note establishing a cross-easement creates a binding private express easement
2. Whether the cross-easement is enforceable by a subsequent purchaser despite being reflected in a record plan note, given New Castle County Code Section 20-70(a) which restricts enforcement of record plan notations to the county
3. Whether Viola Carter's intent to create the easement can be inferred from her signature and certification on the record plan, or whether additional evidence of intent is required
4. Whether the distinction between a private easement and a record plan notation affects enforceability by private parties

The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery's judgment and ruled in favor of Reybold. The Court held that by signing and certifying the record plan containing the note "a cross easement is hereby established," Viola Carter created a binding private express cross-easement that runs with the land. The Court reasoned that: (1) the note contains plain and direct language evidencing intent to create an easement; (2) a property owner's signature and certification on a record plan is not a ministerial act but rather constitutes the owner's acknowledgment that the plan is her "act and plan" and her voluntary agreement to the concepts shown; (3) the county code restriction on enforcing record plan notations does not prevent private parties from enforcing private easements reflected in those notations; (4) easements need not be bilateral agreements, so DelDOT's involvement in requiring the note does not negate the private easement; and (5) allowing future purchasers to defeat private easements by claiming the owner "only" signed the plan would undermine the certainty and reliability of record plans in the land development process. Therefore, Summit, as a subsequent purchaser, is bound by the cross-easement.

This case involves a dispute over a vehicle financing agreement where the buyer, Shelly Fang, sought to vacate an arbitration award issued in favor of Toyota Auto Receivables. The arbitrator had denied Fang's claims and awarded Toyota relief on counterclaims for replevin and breach of contract after Fang allegedly defaulted on her payment obligations under a Retail Installment Sale Contract.

1. Whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding Toyota relief on counterclaims for replevin and breach of contract, thereby allegedly transforming the arbitration into a debt collection proceeding
2. Whether the arbitrator engaged in misconduct by limiting discovery and refusing to compel additional production of evidence
3. Whether the arbitrator improperly issued an award without conducting a full evidentiary hearing
4. Whether the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in rejecting Fang's securitization theories and other claims

The Court granted Toyota's Motion for Summary Judgment and confirmed the arbitration award. The court held that:

1. The arbitrator did not exceed his authority because Toyota's counterclaims arose from the same transaction as Fang's claims and fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement contained in the Retail Installment Sale Contract
2. The arbitrator acted within his discretion in limiting discovery, as the Federal Arbitration Act grants arbitrators broad discretion over discovery matters, and Fang was not denied a fundamentally fair hearing
3. The arbitrator was entitled to resolve the dispute through dispositive motion practice without a full evidentiary hearing, as the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules authorize arbitrators to determine what evidence is admitted and how it will be presented
4. Fang's remaining arguments challenging the arbitrator's evaluation of securitization evidence and other theories constituted challenges to the merits of the award rather than the arbitration process, which fall outside the narrow scope of judicial review under the FAA
5. Under the FAA, courts may only vacate arbitration awards on narrow statutory grounds (corruption, fraud, partiality, misconduct, or excess of authority), and mere disagreement with the arbitrator's conclusions or procedural decisions does not justify vacatur

This is a criminal appeal in which Mark Anthony Figueroa challenges his conviction for money laundering conspiracy. Figueroa argues that the district court improperly admitted testimony regarding a cooperating witness's kidnapping by drug cartel members and certain law enforcement testimony that constituted prejudicial overview testimony and ultimate issue opinions.

1. Whether testimony from cooperating witness Magana about his kidnapping and beating by drug cartel members was relevant and unduly prejudicial, and whether it improperly lent sympathy and credibility to his testimony.
2. Whether DEA Special Agent O'Shaughnessy provided improper overview testimony by identifying members of a drug trafficking organization and previewing other evidence.
3. Whether Officer Hernandez improperly opined on the ultimate issue by repeatedly referring to the cash as "drug proceeds."
4. Whether auditor George improperly testified on the ultimate issue by identifying individuals and characterizing transactions as money laundering.
5. Whether the cumulative effect of these alleged errors, even if individually harmless, warranted reversal of the conviction.

The First Circuit affirmed Figueroa's conviction. The court held that even if the challenged testimony was erroneously admitted, any such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Specifically:

1. Regarding Magana's kidnapping testimony: Although the court assumed arguendo that the testimony was irrelevant and improperly lent sympathy to Magana, the error was harmless because substantial corroborating evidence existed independent of Magana's credibility, including recorded phone calls, text messages, videotaped money drops, and Figueroa's own incriminating statements.
2. Regarding O'Shaughnessy's overview testimony: The court found that any error was harmless because the district court gave a swift curative instruction regarding "guilt by association," and the government presented direct evidence (WhatsApp messages between Figueroa and Coboj-Acosta) that more directly established Figueroa's involvement in drug sales.
3. Regarding Hernandez's "drug proceeds" references: The court found this error harmless in light of the ample evidence linking the money to drug proceeds, including testimony about Figueroa's money laundering operation involvement, text messages, recorded conversations, and evidence of Figueroa's connection to drug trafficking.
4. Regarding George's testimony: The court found this claim waived because Figueroa devoted minimal effort to developing the argument.
5. Regarding cumulative error: The court rejected the cumulative error argument, finding that even considered together, the asserted errors did not achieve the "critical mass necessary to cast a shadow upon the integrity of the verdict."

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration in an employment misclassification case. Abdulkadir Abdisalam, a courier for Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC (SDS), sued for wage violations under Massachusetts law, and SDS sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in an agreement between SDS and Abdul Courier, LLC, a corporation that SDS required Abdisalam to form.

1. Whether the district court or an arbitrator should decide whether Abdisalam was bound by the arbitration provision (the "gateway dispute" of arbitrability)
2. Whether Abdisalam was a signatory to the Vendor Agreement between SDS and Abdul Courier, LLC, such that he could be bound by its arbitration clause
3. Whether SDS could compel Abdisalam to arbitrate as a nonsignatory under three alternative equitable estoppel theories: (a) direct benefits estoppel, (b) intertwined claims estoppel, and (c) successor-in-interest theory

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of SDS's motion to compel arbitration on all grounds. The court held that: (1) the district court correctly determined it had jurisdiction to decide the threshold question of arbitrability because Abdisalam attacked the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate; (2) under the plain language of the Vendor Agreement and Massachusetts law, Abdisalam signed only as the "Owner" of Abdul Courier, LLC, not in his personal capacity, and therefore was not a signatory to the agreement; (3) direct benefits estoppel did not apply because any benefits Abdisalam received flowed indirectly through Abdul Courier, LLC's relationship with SDS, not directly from the Vendor Agreement itself, and the court declined to pierce the corporate veil; (4) intertwined claims estoppel, which Massachusetts courts have applied to allow nonsignatories to compel signatories to arbitrate, does not extend to allowing signatories to compel nonsignatories to arbitrate; and (5) successor-in-interest theory did not apply because Abdul Courier, LLC remained defunct after its involuntary dissolution and did not reorganize into another entity, and Abdisalam's continued performance of services alone did not make him a successor in interest under Massachusetts law.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in which an incarcerated individual, Elvin Suarez, appeals a district court's grant of summary judgment against him on two Eighth Amendment claims alleging that prison and mental health officials violated his rights by placing him in disciplinary housing despite his serious mental illness and failing to provide adequate mental health treatment.

1. Whether genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether defendants knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to Suarez's mental health from placement in disciplinary confinement and inadequate medical care
2. Whether defendants disregarded known risks through action or inaction, satisfying the "deliberate indifference" standard under the Eighth Amendment
3. Whether each defendant had the authority and ability to mitigate the serious risks to Suarez's health
4. Whether a seriously mentally ill inmate's failure to explicitly report symptoms to staff precludes a finding that officials knew of decompensation
5. The proper standard for evaluating summary judgment in Eighth Amendment cases involving conditions of confinement versus inadequate medical care claims

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals VACATED the district court's grant of summary judgment and REMANDED for trial. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to each defendant's knowledge of serious risks to Suarez's health and their disregard of those risks on both the conditions of confinement and medical needs claims. The court reasoned that: (1) Knowledge Standard: An official "knows of" an excessive risk when aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk exists and draws that inference. Knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and the obviousness of the risk. A defendant need not intend harm; reckless disregard suffices. (2) DOCCS Defendants (Horan and Morton): Both had genuine disputes regarding knowledge and disregard. Horan personally observed Suarez's concerning behavior during the disciplinary hearing, heard expert testimony that Suarez was unsuitable for disciplinary housing, yet imposed an above-guidelines sanction. Morton signed the incident report, made weekly SHU rounds, reviewed JCMC recommendations, and submitted an AOT petition acknowledging Suarez's serious mental health risks, yet failed to remove him from confinement or refer him for treatment. (3) OMH Defendants (Kulick, DiNardo, Qayyum, Reynolds, and Baker): All had genuine factual disputes. Each had authority to place Suarez in the Forensic Diagnostic Unit (FDU) at any time. The court rejected the argument that Suarez's denials of hallucinations precluded a finding of knowledge, noting that mental health professionals understand that seriously mentally ill individuals may not accurately self-report symptoms, especially when unmedicated. Observable signs of decompensation (inappropriate laughter, blunted affect, sporadic eye contact, behavioral changes) combined with knowledge of Suarez's history, medication discontinuation, and documented risk factors created triable issues. (4) Disregard: Despite having authority to intervene (remove from confinement, refer for treatment, divert to FDU), defendants failed to take action despite knowing of risks. This failure to remedy known risks constitutes deliberate indifference. (5) Competing Inferences: The court emphasized that where the record permits competing inferences—that defendants sincerely believed their actions were adequate versus that they recklessly disregarded known risks—summary judgment is improper and the jury must resolve the factual dispute.

This is a criminal appeal in which Nautica Hamilton challenges her conviction and sentence for production and attempted production of child pornography. Hamilton appeals her statutory maximum sentence of 360 months, arguing that the government's references to her sex during sentencing arguments violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee.

1. Whether Hamilton's appeal waiver bars her appeal
2. Whether the government's statements referencing Hamilton's sex at sentencing violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee
3. Whether Hamilton can demonstrate plain error or structural error to overcome her failure to object at sentencing

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Hamilton's sentence. The court held that:

1. Although the appeal waiver issue was raised, the court resolved the case on the merits instead
2. Hamilton failed to satisfy the plain-error standard because, although the government made statements referencing her sex, the district court did not explicitly rely on her sex in imposing the statutory maximum sentence and instead emphasized the seriousness of the offense, her motivation, and abuse of trust
3. Hamilton could not demonstrate structural error because prosecutorial statements at sentencing do not affect the framework of sentencing proceedings to the point of rendering them fundamentally unfair, especially where the district court did not reference the government's statements in announcing the sentence

This is a criminal appeal in which Elijah Porter challenges his conviction for possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). Porter appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through license plate reader technology and a vehicle search, as well as the district court's rejection of his Second Amendment challenge to the statute.

1. Whether the use of automatic license plate reader (LPR) technology to obtain vehicle location data constitutes a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant
2. Whether the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on an LPR hit revealing an outstanding arrest warrant
3. Whether the Glock pistol and machinegun conversion switch were lawfully discovered under the plain view doctrine
4. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits possession of machineguns, violates the Second Amendment facially or as applied to Porter

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Porter's conviction on all grounds. The court held that: (1) LPR technology does not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy because individuals traveling on public thoroughfares have no privacy interest in their movements, and motorists have no privacy interest in their license plates; the LPR system is more analogous to beeper tracking in Knotts than to cell-site location information in Carpenter; (2) Officer Hoggard had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop based solely on the LPR hit revealing an outstanding arrest warrant for Porter, and no physical description of the driver was required; (3) the Glock pistol and machinegun conversion switch were lawfully discovered in plain view under the officer's eye-level observation, and the body camera footage, though ambiguous, did not plainly contradict the district court's credibility finding that the officer saw the firearm in plain view; and (4) the Second Amendment challenge to § 922(o) must fail because Fifth Circuit precedent in Hollis v. Lynch forecloses such challenges, holding that machineguns are dangerous and unusual weapons that do not receive Second Amendment protection, and the Supreme Court's decision in Bruen does not unequivocally overrule this precedent.

This is a criminal appeal in which two physicians convicted of making false statements relating to health care matters challenge the $125,000 fines imposed as part of their sentences on grounds of procedural unreasonableness, substantive unreasonableness, and violation of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.

1. Whether the defendants' appellate waivers in their plea agreements bar review of their challenges to the fines
2. Whether the $125,000 fines are grossly disproportional to the offense under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause
3. What scope of offense conduct should be considered when evaluating proportionality for excessive fines purposes

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's imposition of the fines. First, the court held that the defendants' procedural and substantive reasonableness challenges to the fines were barred by valid appellate waivers contained in their plea agreements, which the defendants knowingly and voluntarily agreed to. Second, assuming the Eighth Amendment challenge was not barred by the waiver, the court rejected it on the merits. The court held that the relevant offense for proportionality analysis includes the full scope of admitted conduct (2,986 fraudulent claims totaling $166,632.22 in losses), not merely the single false statement to which the defendants pled guilty. Applying the proportionality test, the court found the $125,000 fine was not grossly disproportional because: (1) the offense was an extensive year-long fraudulent billing scheme; (2) the fine was more than double the advisory Guidelines range but less than half the statutory maximum of $333,264.44; (3) the statutory maximum reflected legislative judgment that the offense was serious; and (4) the defendants caused significant intangible harm to the healthcare system beyond the monetary loss, which the fine appropriately punished and deterred.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of interstate transportation of stolen goods and conspiracy to transport stolen goods interstate. Yousef operated as a professional "fence," purchasing stolen cell phones obtained from armed robberies in Michigan and reselling them domestically and internationally for profit.

1. Whether the district court properly applied sentencing enhancements for theft from the person of another, possession of a dangerous weapon, and physical restraint of a victim based on coconspirators' conduct under the "relevant conduct" doctrine.
2. Whether the armed robberies and associated conduct fell within the scope of Yousef's jointly undertaken criminal activity.
3. Whether the district court properly applied a sophisticated-means sentencing enhancement based on Yousef's technical expertise in bypassing anti-theft mechanisms and operating internationally.

The court affirmed the 109-month sentence. The court held that five of six factors under the Donadeo test supported attributing the coconspirators' conduct to Yousef as relevant conduct. The robberies were part of a single scheme because: (1) Yousef was essential to the robbers' success, providing technical expertise, market knowledge, and logistical support; (2) the robbers were essential to Yousef, supplying his entire inventory; (3) Yousef actively coordinated with and directed the robbers rather than passively purchasing stolen goods; and (4) Yousef's participation was extensive and long-term. The court rejected Yousef's argument that the professional-fence enhancement categorically prohibited attribution of theft-related conduct. The court also upheld the sophisticated-means enhancement, finding that Yousef's technical expertise in "cleaning" stolen phones, his knowledge of international markets, and his multi-jurisdictional operations constituted sophisticated means to conceal the offense, regardless of whether such conduct was ordinary in the black-market cell phone trade.

This is a prisoner civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which an inmate at Western Illinois Correctional Center appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious dental needs. The appeal focuses on whether the inmate properly exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).

1. Whether the inmate's September 20, 2022 grievance was sufficient to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA for an ongoing denial of adequate dental care, or whether a separate grievance was required following a September 26, 2022 appointment
2. Whether the inmate was required to name the dental assistant (Cox) specifically in his grievance to exhaust remedies against her
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the inmate's motion for class certification when proceeding pro se

The court reversed in part and affirmed in part. On the exhaustion issue, the court held that Boyce's September 20, 2022 grievance was sufficient to exhaust his administrative remedies because it described an ongoing failure to provide adequate dental care and put prison officials on notice of the problem. The court reasoned that under Turley v. Rednour, prisoners need not file multiple successive grievances about the same continuing condition. The court rejected the defendants' argument that a separate grievance was required for the September 26 appointment, finding that the prison itself deemed the grievance moot based on actions taken six days later. The court also rejected Cox's argument that she must be named specifically, finding that Boyce provided sufficient descriptive information to identify the dental staff involved. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the exhaustion ground, and the case was remanded. On class certification, the court affirmed the district court's denial, holding that an unrepresented pro se litigant lacks the necessary counsel and resources to adequately represent a class in such a complex suit.

This is a Fourth Amendment appeal challenging the validity of an anticipatory search warrant and its execution in a federal drug investigation. Floyd Suggs appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his apartment during a controlled delivery of fentanyl pills.

1. Whether an anticipatory search warrant was valid when it described a multi-unit address as a "single-family residence," and whether the investigating agent knew or should have known the address contained multiple units
2. Whether agents executed the warrant reasonably after discovering the address contained multiple units
3. Whether exceptions to the warrant requirement (exigent circumstances and plain view doctrine) justified the warrantless entry into Suggs's unit

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the suppression motion on three independent grounds. First, the court held the warrant was valid because the investigating agent, McKeown, neither knew nor should have known the address contained two units based on the totality of circumstances available at the time the warrant was issued (USPS database results, parcel records, investigative databases, and photographs all suggested a single-family residence). Second, the court held agents executed the warrant reasonably because, although they should have discovered the multi-unit nature upon entering the front vestibule, they immediately limited their search to Suggs's unit (the proper target) after encountering him in the common stairwell with purple-stained hands and clothing. Third, even if the warrant were invalid, the court held agents lawfully entered Suggs's unit under the exigent circumstances doctrine (reasonable fear of evidence destruction) and lawfully seized evidence under the plain view doctrine (obviously incriminating evidence observed during a protective sweep).

This is a qui tam action under the False Claims Act brought by Adventist Health System of West against pharmaceutical manufacturers for allegedly fraudulently inflating drug prices under the Section 340B Program, causing the federal and state governments to overpay millions of dollars through Medicaid, Medicare, and government-funded clinics.

1. Whether Adventist's False Claims Act claims are barred by Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, which held there is no private right of action under Section 340B for covered entities to sue drug manufacturers for overcharging.
2. Whether Adventist's FCA claims are "in essence" claims to enforce Section 340B, which would be impermissible under Astra.
3. Whether Adventist plausibly pleaded falsity under the FCA, particularly regarding pricing violations that allegedly occurred before the January 1, 2019 effective date of HRSA's final rule imposing civil penalties.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that: (1) Adventist's FCA claims are not barred by Section 340B or Astra because Adventist brings an independent FCA action seeking recovery for losses incurred by the government, not seeking compensatory damages for itself as a covered entity; (2) Adventist's claims are not "in essence" claims to enforce Section 340B because they allege false claims submitted to the government resulting in overpayment, rather than merely alleging direct violations of Section 340B's pricing formula; (3) barring Adventist's claims would undermine the FCA, which Congress intended to reach "all types of fraud, without qualification," and Congress did not expressly except Section 340B claims from FCA coverage; and (4) Adventist plausibly pleaded falsity by alleging that the statutory formula itself, even before the 2019 regulation, required penny pricing ($0.01) when the ceiling price fell to zero or below, and that the sudden price drops after January 2019 evidenced prior noncompliance.

This is an employment discrimination case in which Hua Jiang, an accomplished engineer with a Ph.D., challenged the City of Tulsa's decision to hire a younger, white candidate without a college degree for the position of water-treatment plant superintendent. Jiang alleged that the city's stated preference for leadership experience was pretextual discrimination based on his race and age, and that the city retaliated against him by changing job requirements after he complained.

1. Whether the city's stated reason for hiring another candidate—preference for leadership experience—was pretextual discrimination under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
2. Whether procedural irregularities in the hiring process (certifying unqualified candidates and later relaxing job requirements) demonstrated pretext
3. Whether the subjective nature of the interview and evaluation process revealed hidden discriminatory intent
4. Whether Jiang's superior technical qualifications established pretext through overqualification
5. Whether the city retaliated against Jiang by changing the job description in response to his discrimination complaint

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City of Tulsa on all claims. The court held that Jiang failed to present evidence that the city's stated reason for hiring Hutchcraft—that he possessed both technical knowledge and leadership experience—was pretextual. Specifically, the court found:

1. The procedural irregularities (hiring candidates who didn't meet written degree requirements and later relaxing those requirements) did not establish pretext because the city presented unrebutted evidence of a consistent past practice of substituting experience for education, even for positions requiring specific degrees.
2. The subjective nature of the hiring process did not reveal pretext because the evaluators used consistent criteria across all candidates, documented their reasoning, and multiple reviewers participated in the evaluation.
3. Jiang's superior technical qualifications did not establish pretext because the city wanted both technical knowledge and leadership experience, and Hutchcraft possessed significantly more leadership experience than Jiang, who concededly lacked meaningful supervisory experience.
4. The city's retaliation claim failed because Jiang did not contradict the city's explanation that it changed the job description to reflect its longstanding past practice, not to retaliate against his complaint.

This is an appeal of a habeas corpus petition challenging a guilty plea to a federal drug offense based on ineffective assistance of counsel regarding immigration consequences. The defendant, a long-term U.S. resident without citizenship, argues his attorney failed to adequately advise him that his conviction would result in automatic deportation.

1. Whether defense counsel's advice regarding immigration consequences of a guilty plea to a controlled-substance offense violated the Sixth Amendment standard established in Padilla v. Kentucky
2. Whether counsel's advice was deficient because it was equivocal (advising only of a "risk" of deportation rather than stating deportation would be "automatic" or "practically inevitable")
3. Whether counsel affirmatively misadvised the defendant by telling him not to worry about immigration consequences until after imprisonment
4. Whether the defendant suffered prejudice from the deficient advice (requiring remand for factual development)

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the habeas petition and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. When immigration consequences of a conviction are "truly clear"—as they are for controlled-substance offenses like heroin distribution—counsel must provide equally clear advice that deportation is "automatic," "presumptively mandatory," or "practically inevitable," not merely that it "may" occur
2. Counsel's advice was deficient on two grounds: (a) it was equivocal, failing to convey the certainty of deportation consequences, and (b) it was affirmatively misleading by suggesting the defendant should not worry about immigration consequences until after sentencing, which robbed him of the opportunity to negotiate a plea that might mitigate deportation risks
3. The district court erred in finding that notice of a "risk" of deportation satisfied Padilla's requirements when the law clearly mandates deportation for such offenses
4. The case was remanded for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether the defendant suffered prejudice—i.e., whether there is a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty had he received proper advice about automatic deportation

This is a wrongful death case arising from a shooting incident in Las Vegas, New Mexico, where law enforcement responded to a standoff but was unable to intervene before the victim was fatally shot. The plaintiffs sued multiple law enforcement agencies and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Mexico state law, alleging defendants failed to rescue the victim during the incident.

1. Whether law enforcement officers violated the victim's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to intervene during an active shooting incident, and whether qualified immunity bars the § 1983 claim
2. Whether law enforcement breached New Mexico's statutory duty to investigate under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-1
3. Whether law enforcement negligently trained, supervised, or retained personnel
4. Whether plaintiffs could recover for loss of consortium

The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants on all claims. On the § 1983 claim, the court held that defendants did not violate the victim's constitutional rights because: (1) the special-relationship doctrine did not apply as the victim was not involuntarily restrained by the government; and (2) the danger-creation doctrine did not apply because defendants did not affirmatively act to create or increase the victim's vulnerability to danger—rather, the private actor (Alirez) created the danger through his own violence. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that inaction constitutes an affirmative act, holding that "mere inaction in the face of a known danger of private violence is not enough" to trigger a due-process violation.

On the state-law negligent investigation claim, the court held that under New Mexico law and traditional tort principles, defendants could not be held liable because Alirez's active shooting and continuous deadly threats to law enforcement prevented officers from intervening. The court applied the principle from Methola v. Eddy County that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act does not authorize liability "in situations where the state may not have been able to act for some specific reason." Since the officers' inability to act was excused by the life-threatening danger posed by the shooter, plaintiffs' negligent investigation claim failed.

The court further held that plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims for negligent training, supervision, and retention, as well as loss of consortium, were contingent on establishing tortious conduct by the officers at the scene. Since no such tortious conduct occurred, these claims also failed.

This is a Fourth Amendment case in which the defendant, Kylear Williams, was charged with felon in possession of ammunition after police conducted a protective sweep of his girlfriend's car during a traffic stop and recovered a loaded handgun and ammunition from under the driver's seat. Williams moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that his girlfriend, Ajanaya Richardson, was armed and dangerous, which would have been necessary to justify the protective sweep.

1. Whether police had reasonable suspicion that Ms. Richardson was armed and dangerous, as required to justify a protective sweep of the vehicle under the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether a romantic relationship between a passenger and an arrested driver, standing alone, provides sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective sweep of the vehicle
3. Whether the totality of circumstances—including Ms. Richardson's polite and cooperative demeanor, valid identification, lack of criminal history, and absence of any observed dangerous behavior—supported reasonable suspicion of dangerousness
4. The proper application of the protective sweep doctrine established in Michigan v. Long to passengers rather than drivers

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the suppression motion and vacated Williams's conviction. The court held that the protective sweep was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The majority reasoned that while officers could reasonably suspect Ms. Richardson might have access to a weapon hidden in the car, they lacked reasonable suspicion that she was "dangerous." The court rejected the district court's per se rule that a romantic relationship with a gang-affiliated person automatically creates reasonable suspicion of dangerousness. Instead, applying the totality of circumstances test, the court found that Ms. Richardson's polite and cooperative behavior, valid driver's license, lack of criminal history, absence of intoxication or anger, and the fact that she and Williams did not communicate after his arrest all weighed against a finding of dangerousness. The court distinguished the case from United States v. Dennison, where suspicious circumstances at 3 a.m. in a high-crime parking lot supported reasonable suspicion, whereas here Ms. Richardson was lawfully driving on a public street at 8:23 p.m. and had just arrived at her boyfriend's residential home. The court also cited favorably to a Fifth Circuit decision (United States v. Johnson) reaching a similar conclusion that a romantic relationship alone, without additional facts suggesting dangerousness, cannot justify a protective sweep.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant Linwood Thorne challenges the validity of a cell-site-simulator warrant used to locate him, arguing that the warrant violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) because the issuing magistrate judge lacked sufficient basis to find that his cell phone was located within the District of Columbia when the warrant was issued. Thorne was convicted of drug-trafficking and firearms offenses.

1. Whether a cell-site-simulator warrant issued by a D.C. magistrate judge violated Rule 41(b)'s venue requirement when the affidavit did not establish with sufficient certainty that the targeted cell phone was located within the District of Columbia at the time of issuance
2. Whether the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applies to alleged violations of Rule 41(b)
3. What standard of proof—"probable cause" or "reason to believe"—is required to establish that a person or property is located within a district under Rule 41(b)

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Thorne's motion to suppress evidence. The court held that even assuming the magistrate judge erred in issuing the cell-site-simulator warrant, the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applies because the investigating officers reasonably relied on the warrant in good faith. The court reasoned that: (1) the officers properly obtained and relied on a warrant issued by a judicial officer; (2) the officers submitted a warrant application that appropriately addressed the venue issue and provided facts supporting the magistrate judge's findings; (3) the asserted error was attributable only to the issuing magistrate judge, not to the investigating officers, who were entitled to rely on the judge's conclusion regarding jurisdiction; and (4) suppression would not deter police misconduct since the officers acted without deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct. The court also noted that eleven sister circuits have extended the good-faith exception to Rule 41(b) jurisdictional violations. The court declined to resolve the merits of Thorne's primary argument regarding the appropriate standard of proof under Rule 41(b), but suggested in dicta that the probable-cause standard may be more appropriate than the "reason to believe" standard applied by the district court.

This is an appeal of a Foreign Service officer's challenge to decisions by the Foreign Service Grievance Board denying her grievance and related motions. The central issue is whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred under the Foreign Service Act's 180-day limitations period for judicial review.

1. Whether a timely motion for reconsideration renders an underlying agency order nonfinal and resets the statute of limitations for seeking judicial review under the Foreign Service Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4140(a)
2. Whether the district court properly applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to dismiss counts I-IV as time-barred
3. Whether count V, challenging the Board's injunction barring further filings, states a claim for relief under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that:

1. The district court erred in dismissing counts I-IV as time-barred. Following established precedent from Outland v. Civil Aeronautics Board and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, a timely motion for reconsideration renders the underlying agency order nonfinal for purposes of judicial review and resets the statute of limitations. Because Simmons filed her motion for reconsideration on December 14, 2022 (within the 90-day period allowed by Board rules), the September 16, 2022 order became nonfinal, and a new 180-day limitations period began running on April 12, 2023 when the Board denied reconsideration. Simmons' October 10, 2023 complaint was therefore timely filed.
2. The court affirmed the dismissal of count V for failure to state a claim. Simmons failed to demonstrate she had a right to file a second petition for attorney's fees outside the 30-day window required by Board regulations, nor did she show she had a right to seek permission for a second motion for reconsideration. The Board's injunction against further filings was not arbitrary or capricious, as the Board had adequately explained its reasoning in prior orders, and Simmons failed to establish a protected property interest under due process principles.

This is a Delaware limited liability company dispute in which O.R.C. Partners, LLC seeks to compel inspection of books and records from SBTN Holdings, LLC. The central issue is whether O.R.C. is a member of SBTN Holdings with statutory standing to demand access to the company's records.

1. Whether O.R.C. is a member of SBTN Holdings entitled to inspect books and records under Delaware Code § 18-305(a)
2. Which governing agreement controls SBTN Holdings' internal affairs: the "Partnership Agreement" signed in September 2017 or the "Purported Operating Agreement" allegedly signed by Trachtingot's family members
3. Whether the Partnership Agreement was rescinded by the parties' subsequent "settlement agreement" and failed negotiations over a replacement operating agreement
4. Whether O.R.C.'s capital contribution was transformed into a loan when SBTN Holdings made a partial payment to O.R.C. from refinancing proceeds
5. Whether O.R.C. is entitled to recover attorneys' fees for litigating this action

The Court entered judgment for O.R.C., holding that O.R.C. is an 80% member of SBTN Holdings with standing to inspect books and records. The Court's reasoning proceeded as follows:

1. The Partnership Agreement Governs SBTN Holdings: The Court found that the Partnership Agreement, not the Purported Operating Agreement, governs the parties' relationship and SBTN Holdings' internal affairs. The Purported Operating Agreement lacked authenticity because: (a) only Trachtingot's self-serving testimony supported its execution; (b) no contemporaneous documents corroborated its existence; (c) Trachtingot never disclosed it to O.R.C.; and (d) it made no logical sense that Trachtingot's family members, who made no investment and played no role, would own all membership interests. By contrast, the Partnership Agreement was clearly executed, memorialized O.R.C.'s $1,625,000 investment, and governed SBTN Holdings' internal management through provisions addressing capital contributions, profit distribution, voting, and transfer restrictions.
2. The Partnership Agreement Was Not Rescinded: Although the parties attempted in 2018 to replace the Partnership Agreement with a new operating agreement following Levy's exit, they never reached agreement on the replacement document. The Court held that the parties' failure to finalize a new agreement meant the Partnership Agreement remained in effect. The parties never signed a "cancellation document" despite contemplating one, and nothing in the record evidenced an intent to cancel the Partnership Agreement before reaching a replacement agreement.
3. O.R.C.'s Investment Remained a Membership Interest, Not a Loan: The Court rejected Defendant's argument that O.R.C.'s capital contribution was transformed into a loan when SBTN Holdings made a partial payment from refinancing proceeds. The evidence showed O.R.C. never agreed to this characterization. Instead, the parties' course of dealing consistently treated O.R.C. as a member: O.R.C. received K-1s as a member, SBTN Holdings represented O.R.C. as a member in organizational charts, and O.R.C. paid management fees as a member.
4. Attorneys' Fees Denied: The Court declined to award attorneys' fees to O.R.C. under the exception to Delaware's American Rule, which requires clear evidence of bad faith conduct that is "glaringly egregious." The Court found that Defendant's decision to litigate the case, even though ultimately unsuccessful, did not meet this stringent standard. The Court noted that merely disproving a party's positions at trial is insufficient to establish bad faith warranting fee-shifting.

This is a contract dispute between a Delaware corporation and its former co-founder regarding the valuation and repurchase of the co-founder's equity shares. The parties executed a Separation Agreement in 2021 establishing a valuation process, followed by a Stock Repurchase Agreement implementing that transaction, but later disputed a contractual price adjustment required in 2024.

1. Whether the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on a forum selection clause in the Stock Repurchase Agreement
2. Whether the defendant breached the Stock Repurchase Agreement's forum selection clause by filing suit in North Carolina instead of Delaware
3. Whether the Stock Repurchase Agreement extinguished or superseded the Separation Agreement, thereby making the valuation dispute subject to Delaware jurisdiction
4. Whether the court should exercise discretionary jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment claim when a parallel action is pending in another forum

The court ruled as follows:

1. Personal Jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2) Motion Denied): The court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant because he expressly consented to Delaware jurisdiction through the Stock Repurchase Agreement's forum selection clause. The clause's language covering disputes "in relation to" the agreement is sufficiently broad to allow the court to determine its own jurisdictional scope, even when the underlying dispute concerns contract interpretation.
2. Breach of Contract Claim (Count II Dismissed with Prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6)): The defendant did not breach the forum selection clause by filing in North Carolina because the underlying valuation dispute arises under the Separation Agreement, not the Stock Repurchase Agreement. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the Stock Repurchase Agreement's "Release and Waiver" provision extinguished the Separation Agreement, finding that: (a) the release covers claims arising from the 2021 stock sale but not future performance obligations triggered three years later; (b) the Stock Repurchase Agreement repeatedly incorporates and relies upon the Separation Agreement, indicating it was an implementing document rather than a novation; and (c) the plaintiff's position was internally inconsistent because it relied on the Note's incorporation of the Separation Agreement's valuation metrics while simultaneously arguing the Separation Agreement was extinguished.
3. Declaratory Judgment Claim (Count I Dismissed without Prejudice under Rule 12(b)(3) and for Overripeness): The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claim on two independent grounds. First, under forum non conveniens analysis using the Cryo-Maid factors, North Carolina is the more appropriate forum because: the primary witness and defendant reside there; the Separation Agreement was executed and performed there; the agreement is governed by North Carolina law; and no witnesses or evidence are in Delaware. Second, the declaratory judgment claim is "overripe" because a parallel action is pending in North Carolina that will fully resolve the controversy through coercive remedies (damages and return of shares), making a declaratory judgment unnecessary and inefficient. The court applied the Burris factors and found that the plaintiff filed this suit anticipatorily as a tactical maneuver to gain forum advantage, that the defendant is a willing litigant pursuing affirmative relief, and that judicial economy favors allowing the North Carolina action to proceed.
4. Preliminary Injunction Motion Denied as Moot: Because the breach of contract claim was dismissed, the motion for a preliminary anti-suit injunction was denied as moot.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which a Delaware corporation seeks a declaration that preferred stockholders do not hold anti-dilution rights in the corporation's stock. The defendants, who purchased preferred membership units in a predecessor Pennsylvania limited liability company that contained anti-dilution protections, claim those rights survived through a merger and redomestication to Delaware.

1. Whether anti-dilution preferences contained in a Pennsylvania LLC's operating agreement survive a merger into a Pennsylvania corporation whose certificate of incorporation does not include such protections
2. Whether Pennsylvania law requires individual consent of preferred members to eliminate anti-dilution rights through merger
3. Whether anti-dilution preferences constitute "debts, liabilities, or duties" that remain attached to a corporation under Delaware's redomestication statute (DGCL § 265(f))
4. Whether a side letter agreement between the LLC's manager and a preferred member creates enforceable anti-dilution rights that survive the merger and redomestication

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on both the declaratory judgment claim and the defendants' counterclaim for breach of the side letter. The court held that: (1) under Pennsylvania law, a merger "legally moots" the terms of membership interests, including anti-dilution preferences, even without individual member consent, as established in Seven Springs Farm, Inc. v. Croker; (2) anti-dilution preferences are not "debts, liabilities, or duties" under DGCL § 265(f) but rather contractual relations arising from stock ownership, and therefore do not remain attached to the corporation upon redomestication, citing Federal United Corp. v. Havender; and (3) the side letter does not contain an unambiguous anti-dilution provision—Paragraph 2 protects only aggregate dilution of the preferred class (not individual ownership percentages), and Paragraph 4 merely required the manager to honor equity interests in successor entities, which occurred through the merger and redomestication. The court emphasized that Delaware law requires certainty in corporate capital structure instruments and that anti-dilution rights must be clearly expressed in the certificate of incorporation or unambiguously stated in contracts.

This consolidated appeal concerns challenges to a preliminary injunction blocking a sweeping categorical "freeze" of federal financial assistance implemented by various federal agencies following President Trump's executive orders in January 2025. The case involves twenty-two states and the District of Columbia challenging the freeze as violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), with a secondary appeal addressing enforcement of the injunction against FEMA.

1. Whether the case became moot when the OMB Memorandum was rescinded, and application of the voluntary cessation doctrine
2. Whether the States' challenge constitutes an impermissible "programmatic attack" under the APA
3. Whether the challenged agency actions were "committed to agency discretion by law" and thus unreviewable under APA § 701(a)(2)
4. Whether the States are likely to succeed on claims that the funding freeze was arbitrary and capricious
5. Whether the States demonstrated irreparable harm and whether the balance of equities and public interest favor the preliminary injunction
6. Whether the preliminary injunction impermissibly orders payment of money in violation of the Tucker Act and sovereign immunity principles established in Department of Education v. California
7. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction to enforce the preliminary injunction against FEMA

The First Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction in part and vacated it in part, and affirmed the orders enforcing the injunction against FEMA.

1. Mootness: The court rejected the Government's mootness argument, finding that the District Court properly applied the voluntary cessation doctrine. The rescission of the OMB Memorandum was "in name only" because the substantive funding freeze continued after the formal rescission, as evidenced by the White House Press Secretary's statement that "the federal funding freeze" remained "in full force and effect" and continued agency actions freezing funds.
2. Programmatic Attack: The court rejected the Government's argument that the States mounted an impermissible programmatic attack. The States challenged discrete, agency-wide categorical freezes implemented by each agency defendant, which are reviewable final agency actions under the APA, not broad programmatic attacks.
3. Committed to Agency Discretion: The court rejected the Government's argument that the challenged actions were committed to agency discretion by law. Lincoln v. Vigil, which addressed allocation of lump-sum appropriations, did not address an agency's discretion to withhold obligated funds, and agencies do not have unreviewable discretion to categorically stop disbursing obligated funds without reasoned explanation.
4. Arbitrary and Capricious: The court agreed the States are likely to succeed in showing the funding freeze was arbitrary and capricious. The immediate and categorical nature of the freeze, combined with the mere twenty-four-hour implementation deadline, demonstrates that the Agency Defendants failed to meaningfully consider the obvious reliance interests of fund recipients and the scope of their statutory authority. The "to the extent permissible by law" caveat in the OMB Memorandum was "window dressing" given how agencies actually implemented the directive as a mandatory freeze.
5. Irreparable Harm, Balance of Equities, and Public Interest: The court affirmed the District Court's findings on these Winter factors. The States face nonpecuniary harms including disruption to student instruction, layoffs, reduced services, impediments to healthcare delivery, and budget upheaval. The Government's asserted harms (interference with lawful authority, inability to retrieve funds, chilling effect) do not outweigh these concrete injuries, particularly where the States are likely to succeed on the merits.
6. Tucker Act Limitation: The court vacated the preliminary injunction to the extent it required the Agency Defendants to make "disbursements to the States on awarded grants" and "executed contracts," finding that under Department of Education v. California and National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association, the APA does not provide jurisdiction to order relief designed to enforce contractual obligations to pay money—such claims must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. However, the court upheld the portions of the injunction prohibiting implementation of the OMB Directive and ordering agencies to cease freezing funds, as these do not constitute direct orders to pay money.
7. FEMA Enforcement Orders: The court affirmed the District Court's orders granting the States' motion to enforce the preliminary injunction against FEMA and denying FEMA's motion for reconsideration. FEMA's "manual review process" was essentially an adoption of the enjoined funding freeze scheme. The enforcement order, properly read, does not impermissibly order payment of money but rather requires FEMA to cease implementing the proscribed funding freeze and comply with the preliminary injunction's directive not to pause or impede disbursement of appropriated funds.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in which an incarcerated individual, Elvin Suarez, appeals a grant of summary judgment against him, alleging that New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and Office of Mental Health (OMH) employees violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate indifference to his serious mental health conditions and medical needs.

1. Whether genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether defendants knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to Suarez's mental health from placement in disciplinary housing and inadequate psychiatric medication
2. Whether defendants disregarded known risks through action or inaction, constituting deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment
3. Whether the standard for deliberate indifference requires proof of intentional harm or merely reckless disregard of a known risk
4. Whether non-medical DOCCS personnel and OMH medical staff had the authority and ability to mitigate serious risks to Suarez's health
5. Whether a plaintiff's failure to explicitly report symptoms to staff precludes an inference that defendants knew of decompensation

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals VACATED the District Court's grant of summary judgment and REMANDED for further proceedings. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact exist on both Eighth Amendment claims (conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care) as to each defendant's knowledge of a serious risk to Suarez's health and each defendant's disregard of that risk.

Key reasoning:

1. Knowledge Standard: An official "knows of" an excessive risk when aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk exists and draws that inference. Knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and from the obvious nature of the risk itself. A plaintiff need not prove the defendant intended harm—only that the defendant recklessly disregarded a known risk.
2. Disregard Standard: Disregard can occur through action or inaction. Defendants may be deliberately indifferent by refusing to remedy a known risk, discontinuing significant medical treatments, choosing less efficacious treatment plans, intentionally denying or delaying care, or confining an inmate to segregated housing despite knowing of its deleterious effects on mental health.
3. Ability to Act: Liability requires that the defendant had some ability to mitigate the serious risk. A defendant cannot be deliberately indifferent to a risk if lacking authority to address it.
4. DOCCS Defendants (Horan and Morton): Genuine disputes exist regarding whether these defendants knew Suarez was decompensating and disregarded that risk. Evidence supporting knowledge includes: Horan's observation of Suarez appearing "a little bit off" and lacking connection during the disciplinary hearing; testimony from the SHU clinician that Suarez was unsuitable for disciplinary housing; Morton's weekly SHU rounds, review of JCMC recommendations, discontinuation of deprivation orders, and submission of an AOT petition acknowledging Suarez's serious mental health problems and treatment noncompliance. Both defendants had authority to remove Suarez from disciplinary housing or refer him for further treatment but failed to do so despite these indicators.
5. OMH Defendants (Kulick, DiNardo, Qayyum, Reynolds, Baker): Genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment for all OMH defendants. Evidence supporting knowledge includes: Kulick's intake evaluation documenting Suarez's history of hallucinations and her identification of disciplinary sanctions as risk factors; her observation of Suarez in a spit mask with sporadic eye contact after his altercation; DiNardo's testimony that placement in SHU can cause decompensation and that Suarez was unsuitable for disciplinary housing; Qayyum's discontinuation of Zyprexa despite knowing Suarez would decompensate without medication and receiving the Kirby Discharge Summary warning of this risk; and Reynolds's observations of inappropriate smiling and laughter indicating decompensation. All OMH defendants had authority to place Suarez in the Forensic Diagnostic Unit (FDU) for crisis treatment at any time but failed to do so.
6. Plaintiff's Silence Not Dispositive: The District Court erred in relying on the fact that Suarez did not explicitly tell staff he was hallucinating as establishing, as a matter of law, that defendants lacked knowledge of decompensation. Mental health professionals should recognize that seriously mentally ill individuals may not accurately self-report symptoms, particularly when non-compliant with medication. Circumstantial evidence and observable signs of decompensation (inappropriate laughter, blunted affect, disorientation, behavioral changes) can support an inference of knowledge.
7. Competing Inferences at Summary Judgment: Where the record permits both an inference that defendants sincerely believed their actions were adequate and an inference that they knew and disregarded a serious risk, summary judgment is improper and the question must be submitted to a jury.

This is a criminal appeal in which Rohan Lyttle challenges his conviction for conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, transportation of goods taken by fraud, and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. Lyttle and his family members operated businesses in New York and Jamaica that were used to launder proceeds from an advance-fee lottery scam targeting elderly Americans.

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Lyttle's wire fraud conviction on Count 7, specifically whether it was reasonably foreseeable that a victim would use a credit card (rather than cash) to purchase auto parts
2. Whether the District Court properly applied a three-level managerial enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1(b) by finding Lyttle was a "manager or supervisor" of criminal activity involving five or more participants
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 by admitting two exhibits: (1) a 63-second clip from a 2013 news report about Jamaica-based lottery scams, and (2) a summary of the computer's browser history showing titles of videos related to various scams

The Third Circuit affirmed Lyttle's conviction and sentence on all grounds. Regarding the wire fraud conviction: The court held that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could conclude that the wire communication was reasonably foreseeable. The court noted that Lyttle accepted delivery of the auto parts and had knowledge of the purchases, and that regardless of "Goldberg's" preference for cash or Ro-Cars's cash-based business model, a rational jury could find it reasonably foreseeable that a purchaser of over $15,000 in auto parts might use a credit card, especially for large purchases typically made through electronic payment. Regarding the managerial enhancement: The court affirmed the enhancement, holding that Lyttle exercised a degree of control and oversight over his co-defendants in the money laundering operation. The evidence showed that Lyttle educated his co-defendants on how to operate the business entities to maximize cash flow and profits, and carefully delegated tasks and authority to perpetuate the fraud. The court clarified that a "manager or supervisor" under § 3B1.1(b) is someone who exercises some degree of control over others involved in the offense, which is a step down from "organizer or leader" but still requires meaningful oversight. Regarding the evidentiary issues: The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either exhibit. The video clip was relevant to show that the person who viewed it may have known how advance-fee lottery scams work, and the District Court properly limited its scope, provided a limiting instruction, and took steps to mitigate prejudicial impact. The browser history summary had similar probative value but with a more muted effect since it consisted only of video titles. Both exhibits were relevant under Rule 401 and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect under Rule 403.

This is an appeal concerning the award of costs to Southern Methodist University (SMU) as the prevailing party in a Title IX and negligence lawsuit brought by former student-athletes who suffered hip injuries while competing on the women's rowing team. The underlying claims were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, and SMU sought to recover litigation costs totaling over $221,000.

1. Whether SMU qualified as a "prevailing party" entitled to costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) despite one plaintiff's claims surviving summary judgment
2. Whether the Pacheco factors (considering the losing party's financial resources, prevailing party misconduct, difficulty of legal issues, public benefit, and relative financial resources) warranted denying costs to SMU
3. Whether SMU met its burden to prove the necessity and amount of specific costs, including: (a) video recordings and written transcripts of depositions under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2), and (b) copying and exemplification costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4)

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of $184,033.11 in costs to SMU. The court held that: (1) SMU was a prevailing party entitled to costs because it obtained summary judgment with prejudice as to eight of nine plaintiffs, which constituted a material alteration of the legal relationship; (2) none of the Pacheco factors weighed in favor of denying costs, as plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to rebut the strong presumption favoring cost awards to prevailing parties; and (3) SMU adequately demonstrated the necessity of both video deposition recordings and written transcripts under § 1920(2), as well as copying and exemplification costs under § 1920(4). The court clarified that necessity, not convenience, is the key factor in determining recoverable costs, and that district courts have broad discretion in making these determinations.

This is a Fourth Amendment appeal challenging the lawfulness of an investigatory Terry stop conducted by the Laredo Police Department. The defendant was stopped based on a be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) alert for a vehicle suspected of involvement in a shots-fired incident, and evidence obtained from the stop was used to charge him with being a felon in possession of firearms.

1. Whether the BOLO issued by the Laredo Police Department provided reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory Terry stop of the defendant's vehicle
2. Whether the BOLO lacked sufficient specificity to establish reasonable suspicion
3. Whether law enforcement officers possessed "collective knowledge" when conducting the investigatory work that led to the BOLO
4. Whether bodycam footage and screenshots obtained during the stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree"

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned that:

1. The BOLO contained considerable specificity, including the vehicle's color, year, make, model, license plate number, and notation of paper plates, which provided law enforcement with reasonable suspicion comparable to prior cases
2. The BOLO was based on multiple sources of information—the initial shots-fired investigation, Officer Garza's observation of a parked vehicle, and a prior traffic stop—rather than solely on an eyewitness account, providing a substantial investigative foundation
3. The officers involved in the investigation satisfied the "collective knowledge" requirement through dispatch communications and vehicle-mounted computers, meeting the standard of "some degree of communication"
4. Because the Terry stop was lawful, all of the defendant's remaining arguments predicated on the stop being unlawful necessarily failed, including claims regarding bodycam footage suppression and privacy expectations

This is a criminal appeal in which a defendant convicted of illegal reentry challenges the district court's imposition of two supervised-release conditions, arguing they were not adequately pronounced at sentencing as required by United States v. Diggles.

1. Whether a district court properly pronounces discretionary supervised-release conditions by orally adopting them from the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)
2. Whether the district court must explicitly verify that a defendant reviewed the PSR with counsel before adopting conditions from the PSR
3. Whether the defendant had adequate notice of and opportunity to object to the supervised-release conditions
4. The appropriate standard of review when a defendant fails to object to conditions at sentencing

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court held that: (1) Diggles permits a sentencing court to pronounce discretionary conditions by orally adopting a written document containing those conditions, such as the PSR, and this is the preferred method of pronouncement; (2) the district court properly pronounced the conditions by informing the defendant he "shall comply with the additional conditions as noted in the appendix of the [PSR]"; (3) while Rule 32 requires verification that a defendant reviewed the PSR with counsel, no explicit question is required—the court need only ensure the defendant had an opportunity to review it, which the record demonstrated here through the defendant's month-long access to the PSR, his filing of a no-objection statement, and counsel's affirmation at sentencing; and (4) the defendant had multiple opportunities to object but never did, warranting plain error review rather than abuse of discretion review. The dissent argued that the district court failed to confirm the defendant actually reviewed the PSR, which is a fundamental requirement under Diggles.

This case involves two consolidated appeals concerning whether pension plans violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by using outdated mortality tables to calculate qualified joint and survivor annuities (QJSAs) for married participants. Retired employees from Kellogg Company and FedEx Corporation challenged their plans' use of mortality data from the 1960s and 1970s, arguing this violated ERISA's requirement that QJSAs be "actuarially equivalent" to single life annuities (SLAs).

1. Whether ERISA's actuarial equivalence requirement in 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d) prohibits pension plans from using unreasonably outdated mortality tables and actuarial assumptions when calculating QJSAs.
2. Whether the term "actuarial equivalent" as used in § 1055(d) imposes substantive limits on the actuarial assumptions plans may use, or whether it merely requires that plans adhere to whatever assumptions they disclose in their plan documents.
3. Whether the absence of express "reasonableness" language in § 1055(d), compared to other ERISA provisions that explicitly require reasonable actuarial assumptions, indicates Congress did not intend to impose such a requirement.

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district courts' dismissals and held that § 1055(d)'s actuarial equivalence requirement prohibits pension plans from using unreasonably outdated mortality tables or other unreasonable actuarial assumptions. The majority reasoned that "actuarial equivalent" is a term of art understood by actuarial scientists in 1974 (when ERISA was enacted) to mean that two benefits have equal present value when calculated using mortality assumptions that reasonably reflect the life expectancy of the relevant benefit recipients. The court found that using decades-old mortality data from the 1960s and 1970s fails to reasonably reflect the life expectancy of modern-day retirees and therefore does not produce actuarially equivalent benefits. The court emphasized that reasonableness is a range, not a precise prescription, and that plan actuaries deserve deference when their assumptions fall "within the scope of professional acceptability" in actuarial science. The plaintiffs' allegations that defendants used unreasonably outdated mortality data stated plausible claims for violation of § 1055 and breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. The case was remanded for further proceedings. Judge Nalbandian dissented, arguing that the plain text of § 1055(d) contains no reasonableness requirement and that Congress knew how to impose such requirements when it chose to do so in other ERISA provisions.

This is an immigration removal case in which the court must determine whether a Kentucky conviction for receiving stolen property qualifies as a federal aggravated felony. The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that his Kentucky conviction makes him deportable.

1. Whether Kentucky Revised Statutes Section 514.110 (receiving stolen property statute) categorically matches the federal definition of aggravated felony receipt of stolen property
2. Whether Section 514.110 requires subjective knowledge or belief that property was stolen, or whether it permits conviction based on constructive knowledge or objective "reason to believe" standards
3. Whether the Kentucky statute's "reason to believe" language encompasses deliberate ignorance, constructive knowledge, or requires actual subjective knowledge as the federal definition demands

The court certified the question to the Kentucky Supreme Court rather than issuing a final ruling. The court found that Kentucky case law, particularly Commonwealth v. Griffin and Martin v. Commonwealth, creates genuine uncertainty about whether Section 514.110 requires subjective knowledge or permits conviction based on constructive knowledge (what a reasonable person would have known). Since the federal definition of aggravated felony receipt of stolen property requires subjective knowledge or belief that property was stolen, and the Kentucky statute's mental state requirement is unclear, the court determined it cannot confidently determine whether the statutes match categorically. The court certified the question to the Kentucky Supreme Court to clarify whether Section 514.110 requires subjective knowledge or belief, or whether a jury could convict merely by finding that a reasonable person would have known the property was stolen.

This is an insurance coverage dispute in which the successors of Lorrayne Hartnett's trust challenged Jackson National Life Insurance Company's denial of home health care benefits under a long-term care insurance policy. Hartnett, age 94, suffered a hip fracture during the COVID-19 pandemic and received post-surgical care at home on her physician's recommendation rather than in a nursing facility, but the insurer refused to cover the home care expenses.

1. Whether Hartnett's Nursing Care Policy "provides benefits for home health care" under Illinois Administrative Code § 2012.70(a)(2), which prohibits policies from requiring that claimants first receive nursing services in an institutional setting before home health care services are covered
2. Whether the policy's alternative plan of care provision constitutes an affirmative benefit for home health care or merely a discretionary option for the insurer to consider
3. Whether Jackson National breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by denying coverage when Hartnett was not simultaneously receiving benefits in a nursing facility

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for Jackson National. The majority held that Hartnett's policy does not "provide benefits for home health care" as required by the Illinois regulation. The alternative plan of care provision merely presents a discretionary avenue for the insured to request and the insurer to consider alternative care arrangements—it does not affirmatively guarantee home health care benefits. The majority reasoned that interpreting the provision as providing home health care benefits would be inconsistent with the flexibility inherent in alternative plan of care provisions. Additionally, the court found no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Jackson National was entitled to enforce the express contractual terms requiring that Hartnett be "receiving benefits under this policy" before triggering the alternative plan of care benefit, a condition Hartnett did not meet. Judge Ripple dissented in part, arguing the case presented a novel question of Illinois law that should have been certified to the Illinois Supreme Court, as no Illinois court had previously interpreted the relevant administrative code section.

This is a habeas corpus appeal challenging a prison disciplinary sanction imposed on an Indiana inmate who attacked a correctional officer. The inmate sought federal review of the deprivation of nearly 19 years of good time credits, raising due process and Eighth Amendment claims.

1. Whether the hearing officer violated due process by finding without sufficient evidence that the inmate inflicted serious bodily injury on the correctional officer
2. Whether the deprivation of nearly 19 years of good time credits constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense of battery
3. Whether the inmate waived his claims by failing to properly raise them in his amended petition filing

The court affirmed the district court's denial of the habeas petition. On the merits, the court held:

1. Due Process Claim: The hearing officer did not violate due process. The administrative record contained sufficient evidence under the lenient "some evidence" standard to support the finding of serious bodily injury, including the sergeant's report of multiple blows to the face and head causing bleeding and double vision, a shoulder injury requiring outside medical treatment, and the need for pepper spray to subdue the inmate. The court rejected the inmate's argument that photographs or documentary evidence was required, finding that the conduct report met the constitutional standard of reliability.
2. Eighth Amendment Claim: The sanction was not unconstitutionally disproportionate. The court applied its traditional three-factor test for prison discipline (circumstances of the offense, disciplinary record, and original offense) rather than the Solem factors used for criminal sentencing, finding that all factors favored the state. The unprovoked, brutal attack on a correctional officer by a convicted murderer, combined with the need to maintain institutional security, justified the severe sanction.
3. Waiver Issue: The inmate did not waive his claims. Although he filed a brief rather than a formal amended petition, the brief referenced and defended his original habeas petition, which contained both claims on appeal, so the claims were properly preserved.

This is a personal jurisdiction and venue case involving a wrongful-death and survivor action brought by the Estate of Susan Cox and her husband Mark Cox against Gritman Medical Center and Dr. Patricia Marciano for allegedly over-prescribing pharmaceutical drugs that led to Susan's fatal overdose. The plaintiffs, who lived in Washington, sued the Idaho-based defendants in the Eastern District of Washington.

1. Whether the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Idaho defendants under Washington's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
2. Whether the defendants had minimum contacts with Washington sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction
3. Whether the plaintiffs' claims arose out of or related to the defendants' forum contacts
4. Whether exercising jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice
5. Whether the district court properly denied jurisdictional discovery regarding general personal jurisdiction
6. Whether venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and held that both Dr. Marciano and Gritman Medical Center are subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Washington. The court found that: (1) Washington's long-arm statute's "transaction of business" provision was satisfied because the defendants' repeated transmission of prescriptions to Washington pharmacies constituted business transactions in Washington; (2) the defendants had minimum contacts with Washington because they were located on the Idaho/Washington border, specifically cultivated treatment relationships with Washington residents, and routinely transmitted prescriptions to Washington pharmacies at the patient's request; (3) the plaintiffs' claims arose out of and related to these forum contacts, as the prescription transmissions were central to the medical malpractice allegations; and (4) exercising jurisdiction was reasonable under the fair play and substantial justice standard, as the defendants had purposefully availed themselves of Washington's benefits and protections by complying with Washington law regarding prescription transmission. The court also held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims—including where Susan ingested the prescriptions, overdosed, and died—occurred in Washington. The court did not reach the issue of whether jurisdictional discovery should have been granted regarding general jurisdiction, as specific jurisdiction was established. The court distinguished the case from Wright v. Yackley, where a doctor's single prescription transmission to another state was insufficient for jurisdiction, emphasizing that here the defendants engaged in systematic and continuing cross-border activities with knowledge of the patient's Washington residence.

This is a criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of illegal reentry into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The defendant challenges the sentencing enhancement applied by the district court based on a prior conviction for making false statements to federal officers.

1. Whether the district court properly applied an eight-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(3)(B) based on a prior false-statement conviction when that conviction was grouped with a prior illegal-reentry conviction and sentenced concurrently.
2. Whether the sentence imposed for the false-statement offense was "controlled" or "replaced" by the sentence for the illegal-reentry offense, making it impossible to determine the appropriate enhancement.
3. Whether the application of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(3) to the defendant's circumstances is ambiguous, warranting deference to Sentencing Commission commentary or application of the rule of lenity.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. The court held that: (1) the text of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(3) is unambiguous and clearly directs courts to apply enhancements based on the actual sentence imposed for prior non-reentry felony convictions, regardless of grouping; (2) the defendant's sentence for the false-statement offense was not "replaced" by the reentry sentence but rather the charges were properly grouped under the Guidelines, and the 35-month sentence imposed for the false-statement conviction triggered the eight-level enhancement; (3) the history and purpose of § 2L1.2 support using sentence length as a straightforward measure of offense seriousness, which simplifies application and avoids complex categorical analyses; (4) the application is not ambiguous—the district court's characterization of it as a "tough call" reflected discretionary concerns about harshness, not textual ambiguity; and (5) the rule of lenity does not apply absent genuine ambiguity in the Guidelines text.

This is a Delaware Chancery Court case involving a dispute over the advancement of legal fees and expenses in an indemnification matter. Panzura Holdings, LLC sought declaratory and injunctive relief regarding advancement obligations to defendant Jill Stelfox, who filed counterclaims and applications for advancement of her legal fees incurred in defending against the underlying litigation.

1. Whether contingent fee arrangements with a 50% premium are reasonable and properly advanced
2. Whether an oral modification of a contingent fee agreement into an hourly arrangement is valid under California law
3. Whether fees for a motion to disqualify opposing counsel qualify for advancement when related to both covered and non-covered claims
4. Whether fees incurred after notice of intent to dismiss but before actual dismissal with prejudice are advanceable
5. The appropriate standard of review for fee requests at the advancement stage versus the indemnification stage

The court granted Stelfox's applications for advancement of legal fees and expenses. The court held that: (1) the 50% contingency premium on Delaware Counsel fees is reasonable and advanceable; (2) the oral modification of the Cochran Firm's fee agreement is valid and the fees are advanceable; (3) fees for the motion to disqualify are advanceable because the motion would have been filed based on Stelfox's defense of the cross-complaint; (4) fees for subpoenas and motions cannot be apportioned with precision and therefore are advanced in whole; (5) fees incurred after notice of intent to dismiss but before actual dismissal with prejudice remain advanceable because a threat of litigation persisted; and (6) Stelfox is entitled to fees-on-fees and prejudgment interest. The court emphasized that advancement stage review is less scrutinizing than indemnification stage review and should not involve detailed line-item analysis absent clear abuse.

This is a breach of contract case in which Fortis Advisors, representing former shareholders of Unknown Worlds Entertainment, sued Krafton Inc. for wrongfully terminating three key executives (Charlie Cleveland, Max McGuire, and Ted Gill) and seizing operational control of the video game studio in violation of an Equity Purchase Agreement. The case addresses whether Krafton had contractual "Cause" to terminate these executives and whether specific performance should be granted to restore their positions and operational control.

1. Whether Krafton breached the Equity Purchase Agreement by terminating the Key Employees without "Cause" as defined in the contract
2. The meaning of "Cause" under the EPA, specifically what constitutes an "intentional act of dishonesty"
3. Whether the Key Employees' role changes and reduced involvement in game development constituted intentional dishonesty
4. Whether the Key Employees' downloads of company data constituted intentional dishonesty or grounds for termination
5. Whether Krafton's post-termination justifications are barred by the mend-the-hold and after-acquired evidence doctrines
6. Whether specific performance is an appropriate remedy to restore the Key Employees' positions and operational control

The court ruled in favor of Fortis Advisors and found that Krafton breached the Equity Purchase Agreement by wrongfully terminating the Key Employees without Cause.

Key Reasoning:

1. Definition of "Cause": The court interpreted "intentional act of dishonesty" to require that a Key Employee acted with the conscious objective to deceive Krafton. This is a high bar that goes beyond merely taking unauthorized actions or making inaccurate statements. The modifier "intentional" must elevate the required level of intent above that demanded by "dishonesty" alone.
2. Role Changes Were Not Dishonest: The court found that Cleveland and McGuire transparently communicated their transition away from game development roles. Krafton had actual knowledge of these changes through multiple channels: (a) direct communications from Gill to Krafton's Maria Park in February 2024 that Cleveland would not work directly on Subnautica 2; (b) Cleveland's public statements about pursuing filmmaking, which were shared with Krafton leadership; (c) salary reductions from $400,000 to $100,000 that were entered into Krafton's HR systems; and (d) formal title changes in July 2024 that Krafton approved. Because the changes were transparent and Krafton consented to them, there was no deception or intent to mislead.
3. Data Downloads Were Protective, Not Deceptive: Although the Key Employees' downloads of company data were technically wrongful, they were not intentional dishonesty. The downloads occurred in response to Krafton's hostile actions—locking them out of the Steam publishing platform, commandeering the Unknown Worlds website, and threatening a takeover. The Key Employees' motive was defensive and protective of the company, not to deceive Krafton. Critically, they did not loot the company for personal gain, steal data to form a competing venture, or sell secrets to rivals. They kept the materials confidential and returned them promptly after termination.
4. Mend-the-Hold Doctrine: Krafton's original termination notices cited only the Key Employees' "intention to proceed with a premature release of Subnautica 2" as the basis for termination. During litigation, Krafton abandoned this justification and pivoted to the role changes and data downloads. The mend-the-hold doctrine bars Krafton from changing its contractual justification mid-litigation when it was aware of the role changes before July 1 but did not rely on them in the termination notices.
5. After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine: For the data downloads, which Krafton discovered after the July 1 terminations, the court applied the after-acquired evidence doctrine requiring that the conduct be "of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of discharge." Krafton failed to meet this burden because: (a) the downloads do not constitute "intentional dishonesty" under the EPA; and (b) Krafton's true motivation in June 2025 was avoiding a $250 million earnout payment, not addressing employee misconduct. Krafton's executives were focused on executing "Project X"—either forcing a deal on the earnout or executing a takeover—not on legitimate employment concerns.
6. Specific Performance Remedy: The court granted specific performance to remedy Krafton's breaches. Ted Gill is reinstated as CEO of Unknown Worlds with full operational authority over the studio. The court declined to return Cleveland and McGuire to their peripheral roles, reasoning that restoring Gill's authority vindicates the sellers' operational rights. Gill may proceed with the early access release of Subnautica 2 when he deems it appropriate. To ensure the remedy is not illusory, the earnout period is equitably extended by the duration of Gill's ouster. Whether Krafton wrongfully impaired the earnout and whether money damages are owed are reserved for Phase Two of the litigation.

This is a Delaware limited liability company dispute concerning the validity of a founder's attempt to remove two officers/managing board members. The founder, Phillip McNeill Jr., purported to remove Christopher Ropko (CEO) and Thomas Burdi (COO) from their positions through a unilateral written consent, claiming authority under a voting agreement that required them to vote in the same manner as him.

1. Whether a voting agreement that requires two board members to "vote in the same manner" as another member constitutes a proxy granting unilateral authority to execute board actions on their behalf
2. Whether the founder could unilaterally remove officers through a written consent signed only by himself, purporting to act on behalf of the entire managing board
3. Whether the founder had independent authority to remove the officers based on his designation of them to their positions
4. Whether the requirement for formal managing board action should be excused as futile
5. Whether the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorneys' fees under a contractual fee-shifting provision

The court ruled in favor of Ropko and Burdi on all counts. The court held that:

1. The voting agreement is not a proxy and does not grant McNeill authority to vote on the plaintiffs' behalf or execute board actions unilaterally. A voting agreement is a contractual covenant to vote in a certain manner, distinct from a proxy which transfers voting authority.
2. The operating agreement explicitly requires a majority vote of the managing board (with all members participating) to remove officers. Because plaintiffs held two of three board seats, at least one of them had to vote in favor of removal. McNeill's unilateral written consent, even purporting to act on their behalf under the voting agreement, did not satisfy this requirement.
3. McNeill did not designate plaintiffs as managing board members; rather, they became board members by virtue of holding the CEO and COO officer positions. Therefore, McNeill lacked unilateral authority to remove them under the provision governing removal of designated board members.
4. The requirement for formal managing board action is not excused as futile. Delaware law emphasizes the importance of board deliberation, group dynamics, and procedural formality. A meeting would have allowed plaintiffs to argue against their removal and potentially persuade other board members.
5. Plaintiffs, as the prevailing parties, are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses under Section 11.10 of the operating agreement's fee-shifting provision.

This is an errata sheet for a United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit opinion in a criminal case involving the United States as appellee and Crystall Kareem Robles-López as the defendant-appellant. The errata sheet contains corrections to an opinion issued under provisional seal on February 3, 2026.

The document provided is an errata sheet containing only technical corrections to the original opinion. The substantive legal issues addressed in the underlying opinion are not detailed in this errata sheet.

This errata sheet does not contain a ruling on the merits. Rather, it contains the following corrections to the original opinion:

1. Correction of the caption to replace "W. Connor Winn, Assistant U.S. Attorney" with "W. Connor Winn, Appellate Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice"
2. Expansion of footnote 10 on page 22 to clarify that the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Puerto Rico litigated the case prior to oral argument, with subsequent appellate briefing presented by an attorney from the Criminal Division
3. Multiple corrections within footnote 10 to replace references to "government" with "USAO" (U.S. Attorney's Office) and to correct verb tenses and clarify the source of certain arguments

This is an age discrimination case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Massachusetts state law. Joanne Walsh, a 55-year-old IT employee, sued HNTB Corporation alleging unlawful age discrimination based on her placement on a performance improvement plan (PIP) and subsequent constructive discharge.

1. Whether Walsh's notice of appeal was timely filed, given that her initial trial counsel withdrew and she filed an extension request as a pro se litigant before retaining new counsel
2. Whether placement on a PIP constitutes an adverse employment action under the ADEA and Massachusetts law, applying the Supreme Court's standard from Muldrow v. City of St. Louis
3. Whether Walsh suffered a constructive discharge—working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign—based on comments made during the PIP period and post-PIP management conduct
4. Whether cessation of pay raises and loss of job duties constitute adverse employment actions

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HNTB on all claims. On Timeliness: The court held that Walsh's January 19, 2024 motion to extend the notice of appeal deadline constituted the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, making her May 15, 2024 appeal timely. The motion was filed within the initial 30-day appeal period, demonstrated intent to appeal, and contained the required information identifying the parties, the appropriate appellate court, and the judgment being appealed. On the PIP as an Adverse Action: Under the Muldrow standard, which eliminates the materiality requirement and focuses on whether an action leaves an employee "worse off" regarding terms or conditions of employment, the court found that Walsh's PIP did not constitute an adverse action. The PIP was characterized as "documented counseling" that did not assign new duties, alter her title or compensation, or limit her advancement opportunities. Although the PIP may have caused distress and may have been motivated by age bias, it did not objectively alter the terms or conditions of her employment. On Other Alleged Adverse Actions: The court rejected Walsh's claims regarding cessation of pay raises (finding she had reached the maximum salary for her position) and loss of job duties (finding her allegations were conclusory and unsupported by specific evidence). On Constructive Discharge: The court held that even viewing HNTB's conduct holistically, the working conditions did not become so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. While Clark's harsh comments during the PIP and Vealey's comment about replacing her with "younger, cheaper people" may have suggested age animus, these comments occurred months before her resignation and did not demonstrate an objectively intolerable workplace. Post-PIP complaints about Vealey's management style—including that he took credit for her work, micromanaged, and pressured faster responses—reflected subjective perceptions rather than objective facts rising to the level of intolerable conditions. The court emphasized that employees must endure the "ordinary slings and arrows" of workplace dynamics and are not entitled to a workplace free from difficult management or office politics. Walsh's successful completion of the PIP, continued employment for ten months thereafter without demotion or pay reduction, and the fact that no one asked her to leave undermined her claim that she had no choice but to resign.

This is a civil rights case brought by an incarcerated individual challenging the constitutionality of a South Carolina Department of Corrections policy that prohibited out-of-cell exercise for inmates undergoing reception and evaluation. The plaintiff alleges that the deprivation of exercise for approximately ten months total across two separate incarceration periods violated his Eighth Amendment rights, particularly given his serious pre-existing physical disabilities.

1. Whether the deprivation of out-of-cell exercise for extended periods constitutes an objectively sufficiently serious Eighth Amendment violation
2. Whether prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm when denying exercise opportunities despite knowledge of the plaintiff's physical disabilities and repeated requests
3. Whether the right to out-of-cell exercise was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations, precluding qualified immunity
4. Whether a prison director could be held liable under supervisory liability theory for subordinates' implementation of a blanket no-exercise policy

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated in part and affirmed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court held that:

1. Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against the Kirkland officials. The court found sufficient evidence that the approximately five-month deprivation of out-of-cell exercise, combined with the plaintiff's documented physical disabilities and inability to exercise in his small, crowded cell, created a substantial risk of serious physical and mental harm.
2. The officials' blanket safety justification was insufficient to overcome the plaintiff's claim because penological justifications must be particularized to individual inmates, and the officials presented no evidence that the plaintiff posed an individualized security risk.
3. The right to regular out-of-cell exercise absent exceptional circumstances was clearly established by over fifty years of Fourth Circuit precedent and Supreme Court authority, so the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity.
4. The plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the supervisory liability claim against the prison director, as he did not establish that the director had actual or constructive knowledge that the policy posed a widespread and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury.

This is a False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam action brought by Troy Sheldon against his former employer, Forest Laboratories, alleging that Forest falsely reported the lowest prices it charged private companies for pharmaceuticals under the Medicaid Rebate Statute, thereby causing the federal government and states to overpay for Medicaid drugs. The case addresses the application of the subjective scienter standard established by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. to FCA claims involving ambiguous statutory interpretation.

1. Whether Sheldon adequately pleaded the scienter element of an FCA claim under the subjective standard established in Schutte, which requires proof that a defendant acted with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of claims submitted to the government.
2. Whether a company can be held liable under the FCA for submitting claims based on an objectively reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute if the company was subjectively aware of a substantial risk that its interpretation was incorrect.
3. Whether the Medicaid Rebate Statute requires drug manufacturers to aggregate rebates and discounts provided to multiple entities in a distribution chain when calculating and reporting the "Best Price" to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
4. The proper pleading standards for scienter in FCA cases and the distinction between scienter (subjective) and falsity (objective) elements.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The majority held that Sheldon adequately pleaded scienter under the subjective standard. The court found that Sheldon's allegations sufficiently established that Forest was subjectively aware of a substantial risk that CMS interpreted the Rebate Statute to require aggregation of rebates and discounts across multiple entities, based on: (1) Forest's McKenna letter to CMS expressing concern about the proposed rule's aggregation requirement and CMS's refusal to modify the language; (2) Forest's subsequent 2008 data audit that eliminated stacked rebates for most customers, demonstrating Forest's understanding of CMS's interpretation; and (3) Forest's continued failure to aggregate rebates despite this awareness. The court reasoned that under Schutte, ambiguity in a statute does not preclude liability if a defendant becomes aware of the government's interpretation and continues to rely on its own interpretation. The court emphasized that the subjective scienter standard focuses on the defendant's thoughts and beliefs, not on whether the defendant's interpretation was objectively reasonable. The court declined to address the objective falsity element, remanding that issue to the district court for determination in the first instance. Judge Keenan's dissent argued that the plain language of the Rebate Statute unambiguously defines "best price" as the lowest price available to a single purchaser, not an aggregated price across multiple entities, and therefore Sheldon failed to allege falsity as a matter of law.

This is an appeal of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in a civil rights case where a property owner sued the City of Corpus Christi for allegedly selectively enforcing building code violations against her historic property while not enforcing the same code against other properties. The plaintiff brought a "class of one" equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

1. Whether the plaintiff adequately pleaded a municipal liability claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, which requires showing that an official policy or custom of the municipality was the moving force behind a constitutional violation
2. Whether the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a pattern or practice of selective enforcement to establish an official municipal policy or custom
3. Whether a single instance of allegedly uneven enforcement can support a claim of municipal liability for selective code enforcement

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead a municipal policy or custom necessary to establish municipal liability under Monell. Although the plaintiff alleged that the City had "policies, customs and/or practices" of selective enforcement, she provided only one example—the City's treatment of the Ritz Theatre—to support this claim. The court found that a single instance of arguably uneven enforcement cannot establish a pattern or practice sufficient for municipal liability. The plaintiff did not plead facts demonstrating that the City's conduct occurred "for so long and with such frequency" as to demonstrate the municipality's knowledge and acceptance of the disputed conduct. The court noted that even if the enforcement was "uneven," it fell short of demonstrating a pattern of constitutional violations. Because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the municipal liability requirement under Monell, the court did not address the substance of the constitutional claim itself.

This is an appeal of a supervised release revocation case in which Terrell Williams was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment after violating the conditions of his supervised release by defrauding a woman out of $300,000 through a kidnapping scam, faking drug tests to conceal ongoing drug use, and driving with a suspended license.

1. Whether the district court improperly considered punishment for the underlying fraud conduct when revoking supervised release, or whether it properly considered deterrence, public protection, and breach of trust as permissible sentencing factors.
2. Whether the 30-month revocation sentence was substantively reasonable given the seriousness of Williams's violations and his prior below-Guidelines sentence.
3. Whether a supervised-release condition prohibiting communication with Williams's girlfriend infringed his constitutional right to marriage and was properly imposed.

The court affirmed the district court's revocation of supervised release and all sentencing decisions. The court held that: (1) the district court properly considered deterrence and public protection as sentencing factors, and breach of trust is a permissible consideration distinct from impermissible retribution, even after recent Supreme Court precedent limiting retribution in revocation sentences; (2) the 30-month sentence was substantively reasonable because it was necessary to protect the public from Williams's serious violations and was justified by his breach of the trust placed in him through his original below-Guidelines sentence; and (3) the communication restriction with his girlfriend was a valid special condition because it directly protected the public by preventing future fraud conspiracies and protected the girlfriend from Williams's documented threats to kill her, and the condition did not necessarily infringe his marriage rights since he could seek modification or permission from his probation officer.

This consolidated appeal involves Glenn Whiting and his attorney Van Irion challenging the district court's denial of motions to recuse and awards of sanctions and attorneys' fees stemming from multiple lawsuits Whiting filed against the City of Athens, Tennessee and its officials. The cases arose from disputes over a 2022 fireworks event, the cancellation of a 2023 fireworks show, and settlement negotiations.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying motions to recuse the judges assigned to the cases
2. Whether Whiting's defamation claims were frivolous and properly sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
3. Whether Whiting's First Amendment retaliation claims were frivolous and properly sanctioned
4. Whether attorneys' fees were properly awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (federal civil rights statute)
5. Whether attorneys' fees were properly awarded under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-113 (state law)
6. Whether the district court properly segregated fees between federal and state law claims

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders in all respects. The court held:

1. Recusal: The motions to recuse were properly denied. The court declined to revisit its prior ruling in an earlier appeal (Whiting I) because "like cases should generally be treated alike."
2. Defamation Claims (§ 1927): Whiting's defamation claim against Mayor Sherlin was frivolous because the statements were opinions, protected by litigation privilege, and protected by legislative privilege. The court found Irion's conduct sanctionable because he: (a) failed to conduct basic legal research that would have revealed controlling Tennessee precedent (Issa); (b) admitted the claims were meritless in his response to the motion to dismiss; and (c) was part of a pattern of vexatious litigation.
3. First Amendment Retaliation Claims (§ 1927): All three retaliation claims were frivolous:
   • In No. 25-5424 (2022 fireworks): Whiting failed to show adverse action by defendants; parents' requests to stop filming children were not government action, and Whiting admitted having no evidence of retaliatory motive. Additionally, Whiting sued defendants who were never at the event and failed to use the proper John Doe procedure.
   • In No. 24-5918 (2023 fireworks cancellation): The fire chief's statement to media explaining the cancellation was not adverse action capable of chilling speech, especially since Whiting continued suing despite this alleged retaliation.
   • In No. 24-5919 (settlement negotiations): The Mayor's responsive statements at city council meetings were not adverse action; the First Amendment protects government officials' right to respond to criticism. Additionally, the claim was barred by legislative immunity, which Whiting himself conceded.
4. Pattern of Vexatious Litigation: The court emphasized that Whiting has sued the City fourteen times in five years, beginning with a 2020 suit over a building he did not own. This pattern of harassing litigation justified sanctions as a matter of deterrence and protection of public resources.
5. Attorneys' Fees Under § 1988: Properly awarded because appellees were the prevailing party and Whiting's claims were frivolous. The district court properly segregated fees by reducing awards by 60% in one case to account for overlap between federal and state law work, and in other cases credited defendants' representations that the federal claim work would have been necessary regardless.
6. Attorneys' Fees Under Tennessee Law (T.C.A. § 29-20-113): Properly awarded because Whiting sued defendants in their individual capacities, the defendants prevailed on the merits, and the statute applies broadly to any successful defense without limitation.
7. Procedural Issues: The court rejected Whiting's arguments that: (a) he was pro se when sanctioned (only Irion was sanctioned under § 1927); (b) bad faith was required (it is not under § 1927); and (c) no show cause order was issued (appellees explicitly moved for sanctions).

This case involves consolidated appeals arising from lawsuits filed by Glenn Whiting regarding a 2022 fireworks show incident in Athens, Tennessee. The opinion addresses sanctions imposed on Whiting's attorneys, Van Irion and Russ Egli, for serious misconduct in their appellate briefs, including citation of fake cases, misrepresentation of facts and law, and defiance of a court order to show cause.

1. Whether Whiting's appeals are frivolous under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, both as filed and as argued
2. Whether the court has inherent authority to sanction attorneys for bad faith litigation conduct beyond the remedies available under Rule 38
3. Whether citation of fabricated case law and misrepresentation of the record constitutes frivolous advocacy warranting sanctions
4. Whether the court's show cause order was valid and whether attorneys' responses challenging the order's validity had merit
5. What sanctions are appropriate for the attorneys' misconduct

The court sanctioned both attorneys under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 and the court's inherent authority. The court found the appeals frivolous as argued because the attorneys submitted over two dozen fake citations and misrepresented facts and law. The court rejected the attorneys' arguments that the show cause order was invalid, finding that Local Rule 46 does not restrict the court's power to impose litigation sanctions and that clerk-signed orders are valid. The court imposed the following sanctions: (1) joint and several reimbursement of appellees' reasonable attorneys' fees on appeal in all three cases; (2) joint and several payment of double costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920; (3) $15,000 individual fines to the court registry as punitive sanctions; and (4) referral to the chief judge for potential disciplinary proceedings. The court emphasized that citing fake cases violates the duty of candor to the tribunal, harms the court's ability to function, and breaches the trust necessary for the adversarial system to work. Aggravating factors included the attorneys' prior disciplinary history for lack of candor, their defiance of the show cause order, and their disrespectful responses accusing the court of harassment.

This is an appeal of a federal employment termination case in which a VA physician challenges the removal of his medical license and employment by the Department of Veterans Affairs. The physician argues that the removal procedures were arbitrary, capricious, and violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights.

1. Whether the Appeals Board's exclusion of the physician's 154-page Rebuttal submitted the evening before the hearing was arbitrary and capricious
2. Whether the Appeals Board adequately analyzed aggravating and mitigating factors in upholding the severe penalty of removal and revocation of clinical privileges
3. Whether the VA violated procedural requirements in the Veterans Health Administration Handbook, including delays in completing the comprehensive review, improper signatory on removal documents, and failure to provide complete evidence
4. Whether the combined procedural decisions denied the physician his Fifth Amendment due process rights to notice, statement of reasons, and opportunity to be heard

The court affirmed the Appeals Board's decision to remove the physician. The court held that: (1) the exclusion of the Rebuttal was justified because it was submitted after the deadline with no advance notice to the agency, and the physician was allowed to consult it during testimony; (2) the Appeals Board's analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors was sufficient because it referenced thorough Douglas factor analyses conducted in prior removal documents; (3) alleged Handbook violations were either not actual violations or were harmless errors, as the Acting Chief of Staff was involved in the decision despite a procedural error in who signed the removal letter, and the physician received the evidence file; and (4) the physician received adequate due process through multiple notices, opportunities to be heard, months to prepare, legal representation, expert witness support, and multiple hearing extensions.

This is an insurance coverage dispute involving a commercial general liability policy where the insured (Griffith Foods International and Sterigenics U.S.) sought coverage for defense costs in tort litigation arising from alleged injuries caused by ethylene oxide emissions in Willowbrook, Illinois. The central issue concerns whether a pollution exclusion clause in the insurance policy bars coverage for these claims.

1. Whether a pollution exclusion in a standard-form commercial general liability insurance policy applies to bar coverage for emissions of ethylene oxide released over a 35-year period
2. Whether a permit or regulation authorizing emissions is relevant to assessing the application of a pollution exclusion
3. Whether ambiguity in the pollution exclusion clause at the time of the defense tender would require the insurer to defend the insured, despite the Illinois Supreme Court's later clarification of the law

The Court of Appeals affirmed that the pollution exclusion applies and bars coverage. The Illinois Supreme Court, responding to a certified question, held unequivocally that "a permit or regulation authorizing emissions (generally or at any particular levels) has no relevance in assessing the application of a pollution exclusion within a standard-form commercial general liability policy." The Court rejected the insureds' argument that ambiguity existed before the Illinois Supreme Court's decision, finding that the best reading of Illinois law, particularly American States Insurance Company v. Koloms, already supported applying the pollution exclusion. The Court concluded that the discharge of ethylene oxide emissions "fits squarely within" the plain language of the pollution exclusion and declined to find ambiguity where none exists. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment for Griffith and Sterigenics and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for National Union Fire Insurance Company.

This is an insurance coverage dispute arising from tort litigation involving alleged injuries caused by ethylene oxide emissions in Illinois. The case concerns whether a pollution exclusion in a commercial general liability insurance policy bars coverage and the insurer's duty to defend.

1. Whether a pollution exclusion in a standard-form commercial general liability insurance policy applies to bar coverage when the insured has permits or regulations authorizing emissions
2. Whether ambiguity in the pollution exclusion existed at the time the insurer was requested to defend, which would require coverage under Illinois law
3. Whether the Illinois Supreme Court's clarification of the pollution exclusion retroactively affected the insurer's duty to defend

The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the pollution exclusion applies and bars coverage. The court held that the discharge of ethylene oxide emissions fits squarely within the plain language of the pollution exclusion and that permits or regulations authorizing emissions have no relevance in assessing the exclusion's application. The court rejected the insureds' argument that ambiguity existed before the Illinois Supreme Court's decision, finding that the best reading of Illinois law, particularly the 1997 American States Insurance Company v. Koloms decision, indicated the exclusion applied. The court reversed the district court's judgment for the insureds and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for National Union Fire Insurance Company.

This is an appeal of a partial denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis in which Hector Cervantes-Torres sought to vacate his convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing a firearm as an alien unlawfully present in the United States. Five years after his 2014 conviction, the Supreme Court held in Rehaif v. United States that a defendant's knowledge of belonging to a category of persons barred from possessing firearms is a necessary element of a § 922(g) conviction, but no such instruction was given at Cervantes-Torres's trial.

1. Whether the failure to provide a Rehaif instruction constitutes an error of the most fundamental character warranting coram nobis relief
2. What standard of review applies to coram nobis petitions—specifically, whether a "reasonable probability" of a different outcome must be shown or whether the instructional error itself is automatically fundamental
3. Whether intervening Supreme Court precedent on harmless error and plain error review applies to coram nobis petitions
4. The proper historical scope and application of the writ of coram nobis in federal courts

The court affirmed the district court's partial denial of the coram nobis petition. The majority held that even under the plain error standard applicable on direct appeal, Cervantes-Torres cannot prevail because there is no reasonable probability that a jury would have reached a different verdict had it received a proper Rehaif instruction. The court emphasized three key facts: (1) Cervantes-Torres was physically deported in 2003 and warned of a 10-year reentry bar; (2) he received and read a 2012 USCIS letter explicitly stating he did not have lawful permanent resident status; and (3) his green card extension sticker expired in April 2013, before his October 2013 arrest. The majority rejected the dissent's argument that no probability analysis is required and that the failure to give a Rehaif instruction is per se fundamental error. The court reasoned that because the error would not be plain on direct appeal (given the failure to object), it cannot be of the most fundamental character required for coram nobis relief. Judge Nelson's concurrence argued that the writ of coram nobis should be limited to its historical scope of correcting factual errors and that the Supreme Court's expansion of the writ in United States v. Morgan was ahistorical and should be reconsidered. Judge Desai's dissent argued that the failure to provide a Rehaif instruction relieved the prosecution of proving an essential element of the offense, constituting fundamental error under precedent, and that Cervantes-Torres presented significant evidence of his belief that he was a lawful permanent resident, creating a reasonable probability of a different outcome if properly instructed.

This is a First Amendment challenge to Montana House Bill 359 (H.B. 359), which restricts "drag story hours" and "sexually oriented performances" in schools and libraries receiving state funding, as well as sexually oriented performances on public property and in state-funded venues. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the statute.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to H.B. 359
2. Whether H.B. 359's drag-story-hour provision is a content-based restriction on purely expressive activity subject to strict scrutiny
3. Whether H.B. 359's sexually oriented performance restrictions are content-based restrictions subject to strict scrutiny
4. Whether the restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest
5. Whether H.B. 359 is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment
6. Whether the district court properly applied tiered scrutiny analysis to facial content-based claims

The court affirmed the preliminary injunction, holding:

1. Standing: Plaintiffs have Article III standing because at least one plaintiff demonstrated injury-in-fact for each statutory provision (showing intent to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by the statute and credible threat of prosecution), injuries are fairly traceable to H.B. 359, and injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court applied relaxed standing requirements applicable to First Amendment pre-enforcement challenges.
2. Drag Story Hours (Section 3(2)): The restriction is a content-based restriction on purely expressive activity subject to strict scrutiny. Drag story hours constitute purely expressive activity (comparable to theater performances and beauty pageants). The statute is content-based on its face because it: (a) applies only to particular content (children's books read by certain speakers); (b) restricts based on speaker identity (drag kings and queens); and (c) draws distinctions based on the content of expression (flamboyant or parodic personas). The restriction cannot be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, as the Legislature's stated purpose was to protect children from the "effects" of drag story hours. The restriction is not justified by secondary effects doctrine because it targets the primary effects of speech on the audience, not secondary effects like crime or property values. The restriction fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
3. Sexually Oriented Performances (Sections 2(1), 3(1), 3(3)(a), 3(3)(b)): These restrictions are also content-based restrictions on purely expressive activity subject to strict scrutiny. They fail strict scrutiny because they are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The court rejected defendants' argument that the restrictions target only obscenity or "indecent" speech, noting that Montana already has separate obscenity statutes and that H.B. 359's definitions do not conform to the Miller-Ginsberg standard for obscenity as to minors. The court emphasized that while the government has a legitimate interest in protecting children, it cannot create new categories of unprotected speech or restrict protected speech based on general offensiveness.
4. Tiered Scrutiny Framework: The court clarified that tiered scrutiny analysis properly applies to facial content-based claims, distinct from overbreadth analysis. When a statute is shown to be content-based and fails strict scrutiny, the analysis ends and the law is facially invalid without need to apply overbreadth doctrine.
5. Preliminary Injunction Standard: The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that all Winter factors weigh in favor of a preliminary injunction: plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claims, they face irreparable harm absent relief, the balance of equities tips in their favor, and an injunction is in the public interest.

This is an appeal concerning whether the Federal Reserve Banks have discretionary authority to deny a state-chartered bank's application for a master account. Custodia Bank, a Wyoming-chartered Special Purpose Depository Institution focused on digital assets, applied for a master account with the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and was denied, leading to this dispute over the Reserve Banks' statutory authority.

1. Whether the Federal Reserve Banks have statutory discretion to deny master account applications from eligible depository institutions
2. Whether the Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA), specifically 12 U.S.C. § 248a(c)(2), mandates that eligible nonmember depository institutions have access to Federal Reserve services and master accounts
3. Whether the Federal Reserve Act § 342 grants the Reserve Banks unconstrained discretion over accepting deposits and accounts
4. Whether the Toomey Amendment's requirement for a public database of master account requests affirms or limits Reserve Bank discretion
5. Whether granting the Reserve Banks unreviewable discretion over master accounts raises constitutional concerns under the Appointments Clause regarding the appointment and removal of Reserve Bank presidents
6. Whether mandamus relief is available to compel issuance of a master account

The petition for rehearing en banc was DENIED. The majority of the court (with only three judges voting to grant rehearing) upheld the lower court's decision that the Federal Reserve Banks have discretion to deny master account applications and that mandamus relief is not available. However, Judge Tymkovich filed a dissent from the denial of rehearing, joined by Judge Eid, arguing that: (1) the plain language of the MCA § 248a(c)(2) mandates that all eligible nonmember depository institutions have access to Federal Reserve services, which necessarily includes master accounts; (2) the Federal Reserve Act § 342 does not grant unconstrained discretion but merely authorizes the Banks to accept deposits; (3) even if § 342 granted discretion, the later-enacted MCA constrained it; (4) the Toomey Amendment supports transparency objectives, not discretionary authority; and (5) the majority's interpretation likely creates constitutional problems under the Appointments Clause by vesting significant unreviewable authority in unelected Reserve Bank presidents. Judge Tymkovich argued that Custodia, as an eligible Wyoming-chartered depository institution, is entitled to a master account as a matter of statutory right, and that the case warrants full court consideration due to its implications for the state-federal dual banking system.

This is a civil rights case arising from a police use-of-force incident in which Officer Jon Grubbs deployed a taser against Jerry Blasingame, a 65-year-old homeless man suspected of panhandling, causing him to fall down a steep 30-foot embankment and suffer severe injuries including traumatic brain damage and quadriplegia. The estate's guardian sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force against both Officer Grubbs and the City of Atlanta.

1. Whether Officer Grubbs is entitled to qualified immunity from a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim
2. Whether the Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of a taser while in a vulnerable elevated position was "clearly established" at the time of the incident
3. Whether the City of Atlanta is liable under § 1983 for municipal liability based on failure to enforce body-worn camera policies
4. Whether the jury's $20 million punitive damages award against Officer Grubbs is constitutionally excessive under the BMW v. Gore guideposts
5. Whether the district court properly denied relief under Rule 60(b) and deferred ruling on attorney's fees

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects, with modifications:

1. Qualified Immunity Denied: The court held that Officer Grubbs violated Mr. Blasingame's clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Although the officer raised qualified immunity only during trial, the court found this was permissible since qualified immunity had been properly pleaded in the answer. The court concluded that using a taser against a non-dangerous, unarmed suspect fleeing down a steep embankment constituted "obvious clarity" excessive force, even without a directly analogous prior case, relying on the principle that conduct can be so egregious that any reasonable officer would know it violates the Constitution.
2. Municipal Liability Rejected: The court affirmed judgment for the City of Atlanta, holding that Mr. Edwards failed to establish that the City's failure to enforce body-worn camera policies was the "moving force" behind Officer Grubbs' constitutional violation. The court found no pattern of similar excessive force violations by officers who failed to use cameras, no evidence that Officer Grubbs intentionally disabled his camera to hide misconduct, and no prior incidents involving the officer that would have put the City on notice of inadequate training or supervision.
3. Punitive Damages Reduced: The court affirmed the district court's reduction of punitive damages from $20 million to $1 million. Applying the three BMW guideposts, the court found: (1) Officer Grubbs' conduct was reprehensible but not overly egregious (an isolated incident without intentional malice, and he called for an ambulance); (2) the 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was appropriate given the substantial compensatory award; and (3) the $20 million award far exceeded comparable civil and criminal penalties and punitive damages in similar cases, depriving Officer Grubbs of adequate constitutional notice.
4. Rule 60(b) Motion: The court did not reach the merits of Mr. Edwards' Rule 60(b) motion regarding medical expenses under Georgia law because he abandoned his arguments by failing to address the district court's reasons for denial.
5. Attorney's Fees: The court affirmed the district court's discretionary deferral of the attorney's fees ruling until after completion of the appeal, finding no abuse of discretion.

This case involves a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's 2020 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) percentage standards, specifically EPA's refusal to account for past "retroactive exemptions" granted to small refineries when calculating annual renewable fuel requirements. The petitioners sought to require EPA to adjust future standards to compensate for past exemptions that reduced renewable fuel demand.

1. Whether EPA's 2020 Rule, which adjusted percentage standards to account for projected future small refinery exemptions but not past retroactive exemptions, was unlawful;
2. Whether petitioners' challenge to the 2020 Rule remained justiciable after EPA issued the 2022 Rule that superseded and reaffirmed the 2020 Rule's approach;
3. Whether the court could issue a prospective declaration regarding EPA's alleged "policy" of refusing to account for past retroactive exemptions in future rulemakings;
4. Whether material changes to the RFS statutory framework (post-2022 provisions giving EPA discretion to set volume goals rather than Congress setting them) affected the viability of petitioners' legal challenge.

The D.C. Circuit dismissed the consolidated petitions as moot. The court held that because the 2020 Rule was superseded by the 2022 Rule, which recalculated the 2020 standards and reaffirmed EPA's approach, the original challenge to the 2020 Rule was moot under the default rule that challenges to superseded agency actions are plainly moot. The court rejected petitioners' argument that their challenge to EPA's "policy" remained live and equally applicable to future rulemakings, distinguishing the cited precedents on three grounds: (1) petitioners sought a purely prospective advisory opinion rather than challenging a specific identifiable agency action; (2) the legal challenge was not "equally applicable" to future rulemakings because the operative statutory provisions had materially changed mid-litigation, shifting from congressionally-mandated volume targets to EPA discretionary determination of targets based on multiple factors; and (3) EPA was actively considering whether to account for past exemptions in its 2026-2027 rulemaking, creating uncertainty about whether EPA even maintained the "policy" petitioners challenged. The court noted that petitioners could raise their challenge again in the context of a specific future annual rulemaking.

This is an administrative law case in which a Navy Lieutenant challenged the Secretary of the Navy's decision to remove him from a promotion list and detach him from his ship following an unauthorized absence from his post. The Lieutenant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Secretary, arguing the Navy's actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

1. Whether the Lieutenant was appointed to the rank of Lieutenant Commander by operation of law under 10 U.S.C. § 624(d), which limits the duration of delayed appointments to 18 months.
2. Whether the Board for Correction of Naval Records acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that the Lieutenant exhibited "substandard performance of duty over an extended period of time" as grounds for detachment from his assignment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. First, the court held that 10 U.S.C. § 624(d)(5) limits only the duration of a permissible delay in appointments and does not by itself effectuate an automatic appointment, particularly where the Executive has decided against promoting the candidate. Second, the court held that the Board for Correction of Naval Records did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in finding substandard performance over an extended period. The court reasoned that although the Lieutenant's fitness reports were often positive, his unauthorized absence from the ship, combined with prior documented deficiencies (a written reprimand in September 2019 and verbal counseling in October 2019), supported the Navy's finding. The court applied the highly deferential "arbitrary or capricious" standard applicable to military factfinding and deferred to the Navy's expertise in assessing the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving a petition for dissolution and winding up of an LLC. The court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for the petitioner's failure to retain substitute counsel within the required timeframe and for failure to prosecute the action over a 33-month period.

1. Whether the petitioner's failure to retain substitute counsel within 30 days of its original counsel's withdrawal constitutes grounds for dismissal
2. Whether the petitioner's failure to prosecute the action under Court of Chancery Rule 41(b) warrants dismissal
3. Whether the respondent is entitled to an award of attorney's fees based on the petitioner's alleged bad faith conduct
4. Whether the respondent is entitled to an award of costs as the prevailing party

The court granted the motion to dismiss on both grounds. First, the petitioner failed to comply with the court's order requiring substitute counsel to be retained within 30 days, and as an entity, the petitioner must have counsel to prosecute the action. Second, the petitioner failed to prosecute the case, with no substantive activity for 33 months following the denial of its temporary restraining order motion. All claims were dismissed with prejudice. The court denied the request for attorney's fees, finding that the respondent failed to meet the stringent evidentiary burden of demonstrating "clear evidence" of bad faith conduct, which requires showing "glaring egregiousness." However, the court granted the request for costs under Court of Chancery Rule 54(d), as the respondent was the prevailing party and no facts made cost-shifting inequitable.

This is a post-trial opinion in a breach of contract case involving a $10 million secured loan made to a borrower controlled by A.R. Thane Ritchie. The borrower defaulted, the parties settled with the lender acquiring ownership of the borrower's subsidiary and its real estate collateral, but the borrower later refused to recognize the settlement and interfered with the lender's rights, prompting this lawsuit.

1. Whether the Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim based on requests for injunctive relief and specific performance
2. Whether the Island Subsidiary is an indispensable party under Rule 19
3. Whether the court has jurisdiction over real property located in St. Barthélemy, French jurisdiction
4. Whether the lender breached the loan agreement or settlement agreement
5. Whether Alpha Carta, as a third-party intervenor, has standing to assert fraudulent transfer claims against the borrower and lender
6. Whether Alpha is a bona fide creditor entitled to bring fraudulent transfer claims
7. Whether the borrower and Alpha engaged in bad-faith litigation conduct warranting sanctions

The court ruled in favor of the lender and the subsidiary on the breach of contract claim. The court found: (1) it has subject matter jurisdiction based on the lender's bona fide request for injunctive relief and specific performance, as money damages alone would be inadequate given the unique nature of real estate collateral; (2) the Island Subsidiary is not an indispensable party because it no longer exists as a separate entity after domesticating to Florida, and even if it did, the court could accord complete relief among existing parties; (3) the court has authority to order the borrower to comply with its obligations regarding the subsidiary shares and properties despite foreign jurisdiction issues; (4) the lender owns the subsidiary shares and properties pursuant to the settlement agreement, which the borrower breached by interfering with the lender's ownership and access; (5) Alpha lacks standing to assert fraudulent transfer claims because it is not a bona fide creditor but rather an equity investor that characterized its equity investments as loans, and because the claims are collusive given that Ritchie controls both Alpha and the borrower; and (6) the borrower and Alpha engaged in bad-faith litigation conduct including obstructing discovery, making false statements, filing frivolous removal notices, and manipulating financial records. The court awarded the lender €3 million in damages, recovery of expenses including attorneys' fees due to bad-faith conduct, and equitable subordination of Alpha's loans to the lender's recovery. The court ordered the borrower to cease interfering with the lender's ownership and take all necessary actions to ensure the lender can control the subsidiary shares and properties.

This is an immigration appeal case in which a Sri Lankan national seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. The BIA dismissed his claims based on a finding that he provided material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (LTTE), without addressing the merits of his underlying claims.

1. Whether the BIA was required to determine whether the petitioner would be eligible for asylum or statutory withholding of removal "but for" the material support bar, to enable him to pursue a discretionary waiver from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
2. Whether the petitioner established entitlement to withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.
3. Whether the BIA was required to make a factual determination that the petitioner provided material support under duress.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals GRANTED the petition in part and REMANDED the case to the BIA. The court held that:

1. But-For Eligibility Determination Required: The BIA erred by failing to determine whether the petitioner would be eligible for asylum or statutory withholding of removal absent the material support bar. The court reasoned that Congress created an integrated statutory scheme pairing a broad material support bar with a discretionary exemption process administered by USCIS. The USCIS regulations require that an applicant first be "determined to be otherwise eligible" for relief before the agency will consider a waiver application. By declining to address the merits of the petitioner's asylum and withholding claims, the BIA effectively nullified Congress's exemption framework and deprived the petitioner of any viable path to seek a waiver. The court relied on the BIA's own precedent in Matter of M-H-Z-, which stated that immigration judges "should ordinarily determine first whether an alien is otherwise eligible for the benefit or protection sought" before considering the material support bar. The court interpreted "ordinarily" as establishing a default rule, not unbounded discretion, and found the BIA failed to provide reasoned justification for departing from this practice.
2. CAT Claims Denied: The court DENIED the petition regarding CAT relief, finding substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon return to Sri Lanka. The court noted that the petitioner's ability to safely relocate within Sri Lanka, his repeated entries and exits using his own passport, and his three-and-a-half years of living in Maskeliya without incident undermined his claim that the government was seeking him for torture.
3. Duress Determination Not Required: The court held that the BIA was not required to make a factual determination regarding whether the petitioner provided material support under duress. The court reasoned that duress determinations are within the sole discretion of USCIS under the Secretary of Homeland Security's delegated authority, and such a finding is not a prerequisite to seeking a waiver—USCIS applies its own criteria when evaluating waiver applications.

This is an interlocutory appeal in a civil rights case where police officers arrested Guo Hua Jin following a 911 call reporting a domestic violence assault. The charges against Jin were subsequently dismissed, and she sued the officers for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The central issue is whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity based on arguable probable cause.

1. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review an interlocutory denial of qualified immunity when disputed facts exist regarding probable cause
2. Whether the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Jin for assault based on the information available to them at the time of arrest
3. Whether police officers must apply heightened credibility scrutiny to witness statements in domestic violence cases compared to other criminal matters
4. Whether officers must investigate an arrestee's protestations of innocence or interview available third-party witnesses before making an arrest

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and held that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The majority concluded that:

1. The court has appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine because the officers contend they are entitled to qualified immunity even under facts most favorable to the plaintiff
2. Arguable probable cause existed for Jin's arrest based on the totality of circumstances: the 911 call reporting an assault with an umbrella, the victim's visible injuries (laceration and bruising on his arm), the victim's physical demonstration of how he was struck, and the son's corroborating statements—regardless of whether the son witnessed the incident or was the 911 caller
3. The district court erred in suggesting that police officers should apply heightened credibility scrutiny to witness statements in domestic violence cases. The court emphasized that probable cause determinations must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in the same manner as any other alleged crime, and the mere fact that a witness is involved in a domestic dispute does not, by itself, raise doubt as to the witness's veracity
4. The officers were not required to investigate the plaintiff's protestations of innocence or interview potentially corroborating neighbors before making an arrest. Once officers possess probable cause, they need not conduct additional investigation to eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence
5. The uncontroverted evidence—the 911 call, visible injuries, the victim's demonstration of the assault, and the son's corroborated statements—was sufficient to establish arguable probable cause for arrest, even accepting all facts most favorably to the plaintiff

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case in which a former casino table games dealer sued his employer under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to join the Tribal Casino Gaming Enterprise (TCGE), a wholly-owned enterprise of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, as a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.

1. Whether TCGE is a "necessary party" under Rule 19(a) to Peterson's employment discrimination and retaliation claims against Harrah's NC Casino Company
2. Whether the district court could accord complete relief among existing parties without TCGE's participation
3. Whether TCGE's contractual interests with Harrah's would be impaired by a judgment in Peterson's favor
4. Whether the district court properly applied the precedent established in Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co. to this case

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding TCGE was a necessary party under Rule 19(a). The court reasoned that: (1) the finding that TCGE was Peterson's employer does not automatically make TCGE a necessary party, as both the FMLA and USERRA recognize joint employers and joint employers are not ipso facto necessary parties; (2) Harrah's failed to show that TCGE was the only entity that could reinstate Peterson or that TCGE's presence was necessary to award monetary damages; (3) the district court's reliance on impaired contractual interests was speculative because the court lacked the current Management Agreement governing the Harrah's-TCGE relationship; and (4) the case was distinguishable from Yashenko, which involved a challenge to a tribal policy explicitly embedded in the management agreement, whereas Peterson's claims did not implicate any identified contractual provision or tribal policy. The court emphasized that Harrah's bore the burden of proving necessity and failed to meet it on the incomplete record.

This is a civil case brought by Iraqi detainees against CACI Premier Technology, Inc., a military contractor, alleging torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT) at Abu Ghraib Prison during the Iraq War. The case involves claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for conspiracy to commit torture and conspiracy to commit CIDT, with the jury finding CACI liable and awarding $3 million in compensatory damages and $11 million in punitive damages to each plaintiff.

1. Whether the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS for conduct occurring in Iraq, including whether the presumption against extraterritoriality applies
2. Whether conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT are cognizable causes of action under the ATS
3. Whether corporations can be held liable under the ATS
4. Whether CACI is entitled to derivative sovereign immunity as a government contractor
5. Whether the political question doctrine bars judicial review of military decisions
6. Whether the Federal Tort Claims Act's combatant activities exception preempts ATS claims
7. Whether state secrets doctrine prevents the case from proceeding
8. Whether the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and whether damages were appropriate

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict in part and vacated in part with instructions on remand. Key holdings include:

1. Jurisdiction Under ATS: The court found jurisdiction proper under three alternative theories: (1) Iraq's detention facilities were within U.S. territorial jurisdiction because the United States exercised complete jurisdiction and control through the Coalition Provisional Authority from June 2003 to June 2004; (2) even if Iraq was not U.S. territory, torture is analogous to piracy and subject to universal jurisdiction, so the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply; and (3) sufficient conduct relevant to the ATS's focus occurred domestically, including hiring, security clearance issuance, and failure to prevent torture, which violated international treaty obligations.
2. Conspiracy Cause of Action: The court held that conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT are cognizable causes of action under the ATS because they rest on norms of customary international law well-established in post-WWII war crimes tribunals, international criminal court statutes, and the Convention Against Torture. The court found this case presents a proper exercise of judicial discretion under Sosa because it does not implicate foreign relations concerns and aligns with Congressional intent expressed in the Torture Victim Protection Act.
3. Corporate Liability: The court adopted Justice Gorsuch's reasoning from Nestlé to hold that the ATS permits corporate liability. The statute distinguishes between plaintiffs and defendants but does not suggest defendants must be individuals, and the original purpose of the ATS—to prevent foreign entanglements by providing a federal forum for injuries to foreign nationals—would not be furthered by limiting defendants to individuals.
4. Derivative Sovereign Immunity: The court held CACI was not entitled to derivative sovereign immunity because CACI failed to establish that the government authorized the specific unlawful conduct at issue. The court found that CACI materially departed from its contractual obligations, which required military control over interrogation operations, and therefore could not claim immunity based on government authorization.
5. Political Question Doctrine: The court held the case is justiciable because the conduct alleged—torture and CIDT—is unlawful under any legal framework. The court explained that while the reasonableness of military conduct may not be justiciable, the lawfulness of conduct assuredly is, and the jury's verdict necessarily included a finding that plaintiffs were subjected to unlawful treatment.
6. FTCA Preemption: The court declined to follow the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Saleh v. Titan Corp. that the FTCA's combatant activities exception preempts ATS claims. The court distinguished ATS claims from state tort law claims and found no basis for preemption of international law claims.
7. Sovereign Immunity of the United States: The court vacated the district court's denial of the government's motion to dismiss CACI's third-party claims against the United States, holding that the ATS does not waive sovereign immunity and the United States is entitled to sovereign immunity even for jus cogens violations.
8. Damages: The court did not address damages issues in detail in the portions provided, indicating these issues would be considered on remand.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Jonathan Wayne Lanaute challenges his career-offender sentence enhancement based on two prior Louisiana armed robbery convictions. Lanaute argues that Louisiana armed robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under federal sentencing guidelines because it does not require intentional use or threat of force.

1. Whether Louisiana armed robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) for purposes of the career-offender enhancement
2. Whether a crime that is classified as "general intent" under state law can be committed with reckless or negligent intent
3. Whether Louisiana case law demonstrates that armed robbery can be committed through merely reckless or negligent conduct
4. Whether the defendant met the "realistic probability" standard by identifying actual state court cases applying the statute to conduct falling outside the federal crime-of-violence definition

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that Lanaute's prior Louisiana armed robbery convictions qualify as crimes of violence under the force clause. The court held that although armed robbery is a general intent crime under Louisiana law, this classification alone does not permit conviction based on reckless or negligent conduct. The court found that Lanaute failed to meet the "realistic probability" standard by pointing to actual Louisiana cases where courts upheld armed robbery convictions based on reckless or negligent intent. The three Louisiana appellate cases Lanaute cited addressed only whether force or intimidation occurred at all, not whether it was intentional, and the facts of those cases demonstrated the defendants knowingly used force. The court reasoned that armed robbery inherently requires intentional use or threat of force to accomplish the taking, and therefore satisfies the force clause requirement for crimes of violence.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in which Scot Gaither, convicted in 2004 of kidnapping and first-degree manslaughter in the death of his business partner, challenges his conviction and life sentence. Gaither appeals the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition, raising claims about his right to counsel on direct appeal and the alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.

1. Whether Gaither validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on direct appeal when he explicitly and repeatedly requested to proceed pro se despite warnings from the state about the dangers of self-representation.
2. Whether Gaither's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to or correct the prosecutor's allegedly misleading statements about the legal definition of "restraint" during closing argument in the kidnapping charge.
3. Whether Gaither procedurally defaulted on his ineffective assistance claim by failing to raise it in state court and whether he can overcome that default through the "cause and prejudice" exception or the narrow Martinez v. Ryan exception.
4. Whether the court should remand for an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Gaither's habeas petition on both claims. On the first claim regarding waiver of appellate counsel: The court held that Gaither validly and knowingly waived his right to counsel on direct appeal. Gaither "fervently and repeatedly asserted his right to represent himself" in multiple filings over several months, explicitly invoking his Kentucky Constitutional right to be heard by himself and stating he did not want appointed counsel. The court found this waiver particularly clear because Gaither maintained his position even after the state's Department of Public Advocacy sent him a detailed letter warning of the dangers of pro se representation, including the stakes of life imprisonment without parole. The court concluded that Gaither "didn't proceed pro se by default—it's what he wanted from the start" and that "it's difficult to imagine how Gaither could've made it any clearer that he didn't want counsel on appeal." On the second claim regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel: The court held that Gaither's claim lacked merit and that he procedurally defaulted on it by failing to raise it in state court. The court found the prosecutor's closing argument statements about "restraint" were not misleading when read in context. The prosecution presented a cohesive kidnapping narrative supported by overwhelming evidence, including inmate testimony of Gaither's confession, physical evidence, and circumstantial evidence. The court applied the demanding Strickland standard for ineffective assistance claims and found that Gaither could not overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's decision not to object was a reasonable tactical choice. The court further held that even if the statements were problematic, Gaither could not demonstrate "actual prejudice" because the evidence against him was overwhelming and the jury received accurate jury instructions on the definition of restraint. Therefore, Gaither could not satisfy the "cause and prejudice" exception to procedural default, nor could he invoke the Martinez v. Ryan exception because his underlying claim lacked merit. On the request for an evidentiary hearing: The court declined to remand for an evidentiary hearing, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) prohibits such hearings even when an attorney's negligence prevented proper development of the factual record, citing Shinn v. Ramirez.

This is a civil rights case in which Christopher Raddant, a pretrial detainee, sued police officers and Douglas County, Wisconsin, alleging they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during his arrest and booking at a police station. The district court granted summary judgment on most claims, allowed only limited claims to proceed to trial, and the jury found in favor of the defendants on those claims.

1. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on Raddant's excessive force claim regarding events in the receiving cell of the police station
2. Whether video evidence can resolve excessive force claims at the summary judgment stage, and when video evidence "utterly discredits" a non-movant's version of events under Scott v. Harris
3. Whether the use of force was objectively reasonable under the Kingsley v. Hendrickson standard for pretrial detainees, considering factors such as the need for force, extent of injury, officer efforts to limit force, security concerns, perceived threats, and active resistance
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding Raddant's expert witnesses regarding causation and extent of injuries

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all matters. The court held that:

1. The video evidence from the receiving cell "utterly discredits" Raddant's version of events and leaves no material disputes for a jury. The video clearly shows Raddant resisting as he entered the receiving cell by extending his foot as a brake and resisting being turned into the room. When officers moved him onto a concrete bunk with a mattress, Raddant's own unstable positioning and the slippery mattress caused him to fall—not intentional force by the officers.
2. Under the Scott v. Harris standard, video evidence can resolve excessive force claims at summary judgment only in the rare case where it offers "irrefutable evidence" that "utterly discredits" the non-movant's account. This case fell within that narrow exception because the video clearly depicted the events and left no room for reasonable jury interpretation.
3. Applying the Kingsley factors, the officers' use of force was objectively reasonable. Although Raddant was in a relatively safe location (a police station), handcuffed, and surrounded by officers, he was actively resisting. The officers reasonably interpreted his actions as resistance, and the amount of force used was not excessive. The resulting injury was an unfortunate accident rather than excessive force. Courts are not in the position to second-guess police decisions about de-escalation or timing; they can only assess whether force violated the Constitution.
4. The issue of expert witness exclusion became moot because Raddant did not appeal the jury verdict on the limited claims that went to trial, leaving no remaining appealable issues regarding liability or damages related to those experts' testimony.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in a capital murder case where Michael Stephen Combs challenges his 1993 conviction and death sentence for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated first-degree murder of Janine Lee. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of Combs' § 2254 habeas petition, which raised multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase.

1. Whether the California Supreme Court's summary denial of penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claims constituted an unreasonable application of the Strickland v. Washington standard under AEDPA
2. Whether trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to adequately investigate and present evidence of Combs' biological family background and social history, including his biological mother
3. Whether counsel was ineffective in preparing expert witnesses and allowing them to testify about conflicting diagnoses, including antisocial personality disorder
4. Whether counsel failed to present mitigating evidence regarding substance abuse, lack of remorse, and Combs' role as a follower rather than leader
5. Whether counsel was ineffective in responding to juror questions and failing to request limiting instructions on victim impact testimony
6. Whether counsel's dissemination of a court-appointed expert's report constituted deficient performance
7. Whether cumulative error warranted habeas relief
8. Whether to expand the certificate of appealability to cover competency and juror bias claims

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably determined that Combs failed to state a prima facie case for relief on his penalty-phase ineffective assistance claims under Strickland. Specifically:

1. Investigation of Biological Family: The court found that trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation of Combs' biological mother despite being unable to locate her. Investigators followed multiple leads, obtained medical records, and tracked her to Wisconsin before the trail went cold. The court rejected Combs' argument that counsel should have searched further in Texas, finding that counsel's efforts were reasonable given the fruitless leads and uncertainty about whether they were tracking the correct person.
2. Expert Witness Preparation: The court concluded counsel adequately prepared mental health experts, who reviewed extensive records, participated in multiple conferences with counsel, and conducted comprehensive neuropsychological testing and imaging. The fact that experts offered differing diagnoses did not constitute deficient performance, as the experts explained the reasons for their differences and all testified that Combs suffered from brain damage.
3. Antisocial Personality Disorder Testimony: The court found counsel had reasonable strategic reasons for presenting experts who testified about antisocial personality disorder diagnoses, as these diagnoses were in Combs' medical records and could not be avoided. The experts qualified or rejected the diagnosis with mitigating explanations, and the prosecution could have discovered and presented this evidence anyway under Buchanan v. Kentucky.
4. Failure to Rebut Lack of Remorse: The court held that counsel's failure to investigate the biological family did not constitute deficient performance, and even if it had, Combs failed to show prejudice. The prosecution's argument focused on Combs' statements to detectives (that the murder would have been "worth it" only if Lee had $5,000-$10,000), not his trial demeanor. Juror declarations about lack of remorse were inadmissible under state and federal law.
5. Evidence of Follower Status: The court found that counsel actually presented evidence that Combs was a follower, including testimony from family members and teachers. Even if counsel had been deficient, the overwhelming evidence that Combs planned and orchestrated the murder precluded a finding of prejudice.
6. Substance Abuse Expert: The court concluded counsel was not deficient for failing to present a substance abuse specialist when counsel presented expert testimony about Combs' amphetamine use and its effects, and none of the retained experts recommended hiring an addiction specialist. Combs' own statements that he was sober when planning the murder and only used amphetamines four hours before contacting the victim would have undermined such testimony.
7. Dissemination of Court-Appointed Expert's Report: The court found counsel's provision of Dr. Oshrin's report to defense experts was reasonable strategy, as the experts relied on it in forming their opinions. Withholding the report would have been futile because other medical providers reached the same conclusions, and once counsel put Combs' mental state at issue, the prosecution was entitled to rebut it.
8. Juror Questions: The court found that counsel either addressed the issues raised in jurors' questions through witness testimony or had reasonable strategic reasons for not doing so. Most questions were from alternate jurors who did not participate in deliberations.
9. Victim Impact Instruction: The court held that no victim impact testimony was presented at the penalty phase, so counsel could not be deficient for failing to request a limiting instruction on non-existent testimony.
10. Prosecutor's "Thrilled" Question: The court found the prosecutor's question was not misconduct and counsel's failure to object was not deficient performance, as the question was a fair characterization of Dr. Fischer's testimony that Combs could function in prison.
11. Cumulative Error: The court rejected Combs' cumulative error argument, finding that the individual claims did not establish a pattern of deficient performance.
12. Certificate of Appealability: The court granted a certificate of appealability on Combs' subclaim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a second competency hearing at the penalty phase, but affirmed the denial of that claim. The court denied a certificate of appealability for Combs' competency and juror bias claims.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction in a First Amendment challenge brought by NetChoice, a trade association of online businesses, against California's Age-Appropriate Design Code Act (CAADCA), which regulates how online services handle children's data and privacy. The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether NetChoice is likely to succeed on its facial constitutional challenges to the statute.

1. Whether NetChoice met its burden for a facial First Amendment challenge to the CAADCA's coverage definition under the Moody standard, which requires showing that a substantial number of the law's applications are unconstitutional relative to its plainly legitimate sweep
2. Whether the age estimation requirement facially violates the First Amendment
3. Whether the data use restrictions and dark patterns restriction are unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause
4. Whether the enjoined notice-and-cure provision is volitionally severable from the CAADCA's remaining valid provisions under California law

The court affirmed the preliminary injunction only as to the data use restrictions and dark patterns restriction on vagueness grounds, finding that these provisions fail to clearly delineate proscribed conduct because terms like "material detriment" and "best interests of children" lack sufficient definition. The court vacated the preliminary injunction as to: (1) the entire CAADCA based on the coverage definition, holding that NetChoice failed to develop an adequate record showing that unconstitutional applications substantially outweigh constitutional ones under Moody; (2) the age estimation requirement, finding the record insufficient to determine whether it facially violates the First Amendment and remanding for further development; and (3) the severability determination regarding the notice-and-cure provision, finding it unclear at this stage whether the remaining provisions are volitionally severable from the enjoined cure period. The court emphasized that facial challengers bear a high burden under Moody to catalog the law's full range of applications and that NetChoice's focus on social media companies while ignoring applications to other online services (like ride-sharing or financial services) was insufficient.

This case involves a challenge to Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) by Olympus Spa, a Korean women-only nude spa owned by Christian Korean Americans, which was ordered to admit preoperative transgender women. The spa challenged the enforcement action on First Amendment grounds, claiming violations of free speech, free exercise of religion, and freedom of association.

1. Whether WLAD's prohibition on discrimination based on "sexual orientation" (defined to include "gender expression or identity") applies to the spa's policy excluding preoperative transgender women
2. Whether WLAD's enforcement against the spa violates the First Amendment right to free speech by requiring changes to the spa's published entrance policy
3. Whether WLAD's enforcement violates the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
4. Whether WLAD's enforcement violates the First Amendment right to freedom of association (both intimate and expressive)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the spa's complaint. The majority held that: (1) WLAD unambiguously applies to the spa's conduct because the statute defines "sexual orientation" to include "gender expression or identity," and the spa's policy discriminates based on gender identity; (2) the required changes to the spa's entrance policy constitute only an incidental burden on speech and survive intermediate scrutiny under the O'Brien test, as they regulate unlawful conduct rather than speech; (3) WLAD is a neutral and generally applicable law that survives rational basis review under the Free Exercise Clause, as it does not target religion and applies equally to religious and secular entities; and (4) the spa is not an intimate or expressive association entitled to First Amendment protection, as it is a commercial establishment open to the public for a fee with no selective membership or expressive purpose. Judge Lee dissented, arguing that WLAD does not cover transgender status as a standalone protected class and that the statute's application violates the spa owners' free exercise rights.

This consolidated appeal concerns a congressionally mandated land exchange under the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, whereby the U.S. Forest Service must transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land (including Oak Flat, a sacred Apache ceremonial site) containing a massive copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC in exchange for over 5,000 acres of equally appraised private land. Multiple plaintiff groups challenged the land exchange on various statutory and constitutional grounds.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing and prudential standing to bring their claims
2. Whether the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) complies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), including analyses of cumulative water impacts, agency comments, mitigation measures, alternative mining techniques, and page limit requirements
3. Whether the appraisals of the exchanged lands comply with the Land Exchange Act's requirement that appraisals be conducted according to nationally recognized standards and reflect equal value
4. Whether the government satisfied its consultation obligations under the Land Exchange Act and Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
5. Whether the land exchange violates plaintiffs' religious liberty rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution

The court affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims:

1. Standing: Plaintiffs established both Article III standing and prudential standing. They demonstrated imminent injury from the land exchange's physical and visual impacts on traditional cultural places, and showed that favorable judicial decisions would likely redress their injuries by potentially halting or delaying the exchange.
2. Appraisal Claims: The Forest Service's appraisal methodology was proper. Under the general mining laws, Resolution Copper holds unpatented mining claims giving it exclusive possessory rights to minerals in the "Mining Claim Zone." The appraisal correctly excluded the value of minerals that Resolution already owned the right to mine, as including such value would force Resolution to pay twice for rights it already possessed. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments as fundamentally challenging the Mining Law of 1872 rather than the appraisal itself.
3. NEPA Claims: Under the Supreme Court's deferential standard in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County (2025), which holds that NEPA is purely procedural and agencies need not weigh environmental consequences in any particular way, plaintiffs' six NEPA arguments all failed:
   • Cumulative water impacts: The government was not required to analyze impacts from separate future projects (Superstition Vistas development) over which it lacked regulatory authority
   • Other agencies' comments: The government adequately addressed comments from the Bureau of Land Management and Arizona State Land Department within the FEIS
   • Mitigation measures: The FEIS contained hundreds of pages analyzing mitigation measures, and the agency's discretionary choices about detail were entitled to substantial deference
   • Extra-record evidence: Even assuming an exception applied, the FEIS adequately addressed the topics raised in the declarations regarding tailings, acid rock drainage, and hydrological concerns
   • Alternative mining techniques: The agency reasonably rejected alternative mining methods as technically and economically infeasible, noting that 80 percent of copper would have to be abandoned if alternatives were used
   • Page limits: Any violation of the BUILDER Act's page limit requirements was harmless error, as the thorough analysis did not materially impede NEPA's goals
4. Consultation Claims: Both the Land Exchange Act and Section 106 of the NHPA are procedural statutes that do not mandate particular substantive outcomes. The government's consultation efforts over two decades were thorough and not arbitrary and capricious. The government's written response to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation's recommendations demonstrated good faith consideration, even though it explained the limits of its authority over mining operations on private land after the exchange.
5. Religious Liberty Claims: The Lopez Plaintiffs' RFRA and Free Exercise Clause claims were foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States (2024), which held that the land disposition was not subject to strict scrutiny under Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association because it involved no coercion, discrimination, penalty, or denial of equal rights. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025) abrogated Apache Stronghold, finding that Mahmoud addressed education and coercive policies, not government property disposition, and that the Supreme Court itself declined to rehear Apache Stronghold in light of Mahmoud.

This consolidated appeal concerns a congressionally mandated land exchange under the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, whereby the United States Forest Service must transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land (including Oak Flat, a sacred Apache ceremonial site) containing a massive copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. Multiple plaintiff groups challenged the land exchange on various statutory and constitutional grounds.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing and prudential standing to bring their claims
2. Whether the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) complies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), including claims regarding cumulative water impacts, consideration of agency comments, mitigation measures, expert evidence, alternative mining techniques, and page limit requirements
3. Whether the appraisals of the exchanged lands comply with the Land Exchange Act's requirement for equal-value exchanges conducted under nationally recognized appraisal standards
4. Whether the government satisfied its consultation obligations under the Land Exchange Act and Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
5. Whether the land exchange violates plaintiffs' religious liberty rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' preliminary injunction requests. The court held:

1. Standing: Plaintiffs established Article III standing by demonstrating imminent injury (permanent destruction of sacred lands and environmental impacts) traceable to the land exchange and redressable by judicial action. AMRC also established prudential standing for its appraisal claims under the flexible zone-of-interests test, as the Land Exchange Act contains provisions protecting public and Native groups' interests.
2. Appraisal Claims: The Forest Service's appraisal methodology was not erroneous. Under the general mining laws, Resolution Copper holds unpatented mining claims giving it exclusive possessory rights to the minerals in the "Mining Claim Zone." Therefore, the government correctly excluded the value of those minerals from its appraisal, as they were not part of the federal estate. Including their value would force Resolution Copper to pay twice for rights it already owns.
3. NEPA Claims: Applying the Supreme Court's deferential standard from Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County (2025), the court found the FEIS adequate. The government was not required to: (a) quantitatively analyze cumulative water impacts from a separate, future housing development over which it has no regulatory authority; (b) provide exhaustive responses to every agency comment; (c) analyze mitigation measures in greater detail; (d) consider extra-record expert declarations; (e) analyze alternative mining techniques that would be economically infeasible; or (f) comply with page limit requirements enacted after the EIS process began. The agency's discretionary choices regarding level of detail and analysis fell within a broad zone of reasonableness.
4. Consultation Claims: Both the Land Exchange Act and Section 106 of the NHPA are procedural statutes that do not mandate particular substantive outcomes. The government's consultation efforts over two decades were thorough and not arbitrary and capricious. The government's written response to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation's recommendations demonstrated good faith consideration, even though it ultimately declined to impose alternative mining techniques due to the Land Exchange Act's limitations on the government's post-transfer authority.
5. Religious Liberty Claims: The Lopez Plaintiffs' RFRA and Free Exercise Clause claims were foreclosed by the en banc Ninth Circuit's decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States (2024), which held that the land transfer was indistinguishable from the government property disposition in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988) and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025) did not abrogate Apache Stronghold because Mahmoud involved education and coercive policies, not government property disposition. The Supreme Court's denial of Apache Stronghold's petition for rehearing in light of Mahmoud further supported this conclusion.

This consolidated appeal concerns a congressionally mandated land exchange under the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, whereby the United States Forest Service must transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land (including Oak Flat, a sacred Apache ceremonial site) containing a massive copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. Multiple plaintiff groups challenged the land exchange on various grounds, including violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause.

1. Whether plaintiffs established Article III standing and prudential standing to bring their claims
2. Whether the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was final agency action subject to judicial review
3. Whether the appraisals of the exchanged lands complied with the Land Exchange Act's requirement for equal-value exchanges conducted according to nationally recognized appraisal standards
4. Whether the FEIS adequately complied with NEPA's procedural requirements, including analysis of cumulative water impacts, consideration of agency comments, mitigation measures, expert evidence, reasonable alternatives, and page length limits
5. Whether the government satisfied its consultation obligations under the Land Exchange Act and Section 106 of the NHPA
6. Whether the land exchange substantially burdened plaintiffs' religious exercise in violation of RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary injunctions, holding that plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims.

1. Standing: The court found that plaintiffs established both Article III standing and prudential standing. Plaintiffs demonstrated imminent injury from the land exchange's physical and visual impacts on sacred sites and redressability through judicial action that could delay or prevent the transfer. The court rejected arguments that appraisal claims fell outside the zone of interests protected by the Land Exchange Act, applying a flexible, lenient approach to the zone-of-interests test.
2. Appraisal Claims: The court upheld the Forest Service's appraisals, finding no error in the agency's treatment of Resolution Copper's unpatented mining claims. Under the general mining laws, Resolution Copper holds exclusive possessory rights to the minerals in the Mining Claim Zone. The appraisal correctly excluded the value of those minerals from the federal government's estate, as including them would force Resolution Copper to pay twice for rights it already owns. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments as fundamentally challenging the Mining Law of 1872, which remains valid law despite political opposition.
3. NEPA Claims: Applying the Supreme Court's highly deferential standard from Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County (2025), the court rejected all NEPA challenges. The court held that:
   • The government was not required to analyze cumulative impacts from the separate Superstition Vistas development, which was not interrelated to the mine project and over which the Forest Service lacked regulatory authority
   • The government's qualitative analysis of water impacts was entitled to substantial deference, and courts should not micromanage agency discretion regarding the level of detail in an EIS
   • The government adequately considered comments from other agencies (BLM and ASLD) and was not required to address every criticism in equal detail
   • The government considered mitigation measures across hundreds of pages and was not required to analyze them in greater depth
   • Extra-record expert declarations were not properly before the court, and even if considered, the FEIS adequately addressed the topics they raised (tailings, acid rock drainage, hydrological concerns)
   • The government reasonably rejected alternative mining techniques (cut-and-fill, sublevel stoping) as economically and technically infeasible, noting that such methods would require abandoning 80 percent of the copper tonnage
   • Even assuming the FEIS violated new page limit requirements under the BUILDER Act, any violation was harmless error that did not materially impede NEPA's goals
4. Consultation Claims: The court held that both the Land Exchange Act's consultation provisions and Section 106 of the NHPA are procedural statutes that do not mandate any particular substantive outcome. The government satisfied its consultation obligations through two decades of thorough government-to-government consultation with the Tribe. The Tribe's argument that reopening the consultation process negated pre-2021 consultation efforts lacked legal support. Similarly, the government's written response to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation's recommendations demonstrated good faith consideration of those recommendations, even though the government ultimately could not implement them due to its limited regulatory authority over mining operations on private land after the exchange.
5. Religious Liberty Claims: The court held that plaintiffs' RFRA and Free Exercise Clause claims were foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States (2024), which held that the land exchange did not substantially burden plaintiffs' religious exercise under the standard established in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988). The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025) abrogated Apache Stronghold, finding that Mahmoud addressed education contexts and direct coercion of behavior, not the disposition of government property. The Supreme Court's own denial of certiorari in Apache Stronghold in light of Mahmoud further supported this conclusion.
6. Preliminary Injunction: Because plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or even raise serious questions regarding any of their claims, the court did not need to address the other preliminary injunction factors (irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest). However, the court acknowledged the grave harms to Native religious practice and sacred sites, noting that Congress has chosen to authorize the transfer and plaintiffs have raised no viable legal challenges to that decision.

This is an appeal of a civil rights case in which Jacqueline Armendariz and the Chinook Center challenged three search warrants issued by the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) as violating the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. The warrants targeted Armendariz's electronic devices and the Chinook Center's Facebook account following a housing-rights protest in July 2021.

1. Whether the first search warrant for Armendariz's electronic devices lacked a sufficient nexus between the suspected crime (attempted assault) and the devices to be seized
2. Whether the second search warrant's keyword search and file search provisions were overbroad and violated the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement
3. Whether the Facebook warrant targeting the Chinook Center's account was overbroad by requesting "all" posts, messages, and events without sufficient limitation to evidence of specific crimes
4. Whether the officers violated clearly established law despite a neutral magistrate's issuance of the warrants
5. Whether qualified immunity protected the officers from liability
6. Whether municipal liability claims against the City could proceed
7. Whether Armendariz's Fourth Amendment claim against the FBI for retaining her data was properly dismissed

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of most claims. The court held:

1. First Warrant: The court reversed qualified immunity for Detective Summey and Sergeant Ditzler, finding that the warrant lacked arguable probable cause because the affidavit failed to establish a nexus between Armendariz's electronic devices and the alleged attempted assault. The affidavit relied solely on speculative statements about how "people" in general use electronic devices, which was insufficient under Fourth Amendment standards.
2. Second Warrant: The court reversed qualified immunity, finding the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement in two ways: (a) the keyword search was overbroad because it allowed seizure of data unrelated to the crime and failed to distinguish between what could be searched versus seized; and (b) the file search was overbroad because it sought location data and other files from a two-month period for a discrete incident, without explaining why such a broad timeframe was necessary.
3. Facebook Warrant: The court reversed qualified immunity for Detective Steckler and Sergeant Otero, finding the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment by requesting "[a]ll" Facebook posts, messages, and events without limiting the search to evidence of specific crimes. The court emphasized that Facebook warrants warrant particular scrutiny due to the sensitive nature of the data and the availability of more particularized search methods.
4. Clearly Established Law: The court held that the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement is clearly established law, citing cases establishing that warrants must contain limiting principles and cannot authorize exploratory searches. No officer could reasonably believe these warrants were valid.
5. Municipal Liability: The court reversed the dismissal of Fourth Amendment claims against the City and remanded for the district court to determine whether municipal liability was properly alleged.
6. FBI Retention Claim: The court affirmed the dismissal of Armendariz's Fourth Amendment claim against the FBI for retaining her data, finding she waived the issue by failing to properly address it on appeal.
7. State Law Claims: The court reversed the dismissal of state constitutional claims and the Stored Communications Act claim, allowing these to proceed.

Jacob Parlin was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's admission of lay witness testimony from a police officer regarding the quantity of methamphetamine associated with personal use versus distribution.

1. Whether a police officer's testimony about the quantity of methamphetamine typically possessed by users versus distributors constituted improperly admitted expert testimony that was not disclosed prior to trial.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Parlin's intent to distribute methamphetamine without the challenged testimony.
3. Whether any evidentiary error in admitting the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The First Circuit affirmed Parlin's conviction on both counts. The court held that even if the trial court erred in admitting Lieutenant Cunningham's testimony about typical methamphetamine quantities, the error was harmless. The court reasoned that the recorded wiretapped phone conversations between Parlin, Tam, and Duong provided overwhelming evidence of Parlin's involvement in drug distribution, including discussions of pricing strategy, competitive pressures, profit opportunities, supply sourcing, and references to Parlin's customers. These conversations made it "crystal clear" that Parlin was in the business of selling methamphetamine and rendered the suggestion that nearly two pounds of drugs was for personal use "almost preposterous." Therefore, it was highly probable that the jury would have reached the same verdict without Cunningham's testimony, making any evidentiary error harmless.

This is an errata sheet for a First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in a bankruptcy case involving debtors Juan J. Guallini-Indij and Raquel Medina-Rampolla appealing against Banco Popular de Puerto Rico.

The document does not contain substantive legal analysis, as it is solely an errata sheet correcting typographical errors in the original opinion issued on March 4, 2026.

The Court issued two corrections to the original opinion:

1. On page 30, line 10: Changed "a motion for withdraw" to "a motion to withdraw"
2. On page 31, line 17: Changed "un-timeliness" to "untimeliness"

This is an interlocutory appeal in a civil rights case where a plaintiff alleges false arrest and malicious prosecution by an NYPD detective after being arrested for sexual assault on an MTA bus, with charges later dismissed on speedy trial grounds. The appeal addresses whether the detective is entitled to qualified immunity based on arguable probable cause.

1. Whether Detective Friedman is entitled to qualified immunity on federal false arrest and malicious prosecution claims
2. Whether arguable probable cause existed for the arrest and prosecution despite video footage that neither definitively proves nor disproves the alleged assault
3. Whether the MTA bus video footage is "plainly exculpatory" as a matter of law, dissipating probable cause
4. Whether inconsistencies in the complainant's statements undermine her veracity sufficiently to negate probable cause

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and granted Detective Friedman qualified immunity. The court held that arguable probable cause existed for the arrest and prosecution. The court reasoned that: (1) a reasonable police officer could have found probable cause based on the complainant's immediate report, two separate identifications of Sacaza (including in-person), Sacaza's prior involvement in public lewdness incidents, the MTA footage showing the complainant's visible discomfort and emotional distress while Sacaza stood directly behind her, the complainant's decision to videotape Sacaza, and a nearby passenger's decision to console the complainant; (2) although the MTA footage contradicted some aspects of the complainant's account (such as the claim that Sacaza followed her for three blocks) and did not definitively show physical contact, it was not "plainly exculpatory" as a matter of law because it also corroborated other aspects of her account and showed her distress; (3) inconsistencies in the complainant's statements did not necessarily undermine her veracity such that no reasonable officer could find probable cause—a reasonable officer could have discounted these inconsistencies when evaluating a distressed fifteen-year-old's account; and (4) where reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed, arguable probable cause is established, entitling the officer to qualified immunity even if a jury might find otherwise.

This is an immigration appeal case in which a Sri Lankan national seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. The BIA dismissed his claims based on the material support bar—a statutory provision that renders ineligible for relief any person who has provided material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, in this case the LTTE.

1. Whether the BIA was required to determine whether the petitioner would be eligible for asylum or statutory withholding of removal "but for" the material support bar, to enable him to seek a discretionary waiver from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
2. Whether the petitioner established entitlement to withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.
3. Whether the BIA was required to determine whether the petitioner provided material support to the LTTE under duress.

The court GRANTED the petition in part and REMANDED to the BIA. The majority held that:

1. But-For Eligibility Determination Required: The BIA erred by failing to determine whether the petitioner would be eligible for asylum or statutory withholding of removal absent the material support bar. The court reasoned that Congress created an integrated statutory scheme pairing a broad material support bar with a discretionary exemption process. The DHS regulations require that USCIS will only consider exemption applications after the BIA determines the applicant is otherwise eligible for relief. By refusing to make this determination, the BIA frustrated Congress's intent and rendered the exemption process ineffective. The court relied on the BIA's own precedent in Matter of M-H-Z-, which stated that immigration judges "should ordinarily determine first whether an alien is otherwise eligible for the benefit or protection sought" before considering the material support bar. The court interpreted "ordinarily" as establishing a default rule, not unbounded discretion, and noted that the BIA must follow its own precedent.
2. CAT Relief Denied: The court DENIED the petition regarding CAT claims, finding substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish he would more likely than not be tortured upon return to Sri Lanka. The petitioner's ability to relocate within Sri Lanka, his repeated entries and exits using his own passport, and his three-and-a-half years of living in Maskeliya without incident undermined his claim of imminent torture risk.
3. Duress Determination Not Required: The court held that the BIA was not required to determine whether the petitioner provided material support under duress. Unlike the but-for eligibility determination, a duress finding is not a prerequisite for seeking a waiver; rather, USCIS has sole discretion to evaluate duress as part of its exemption application process using specific statutory criteria.

This is an interlocutory appeal in a civil rights case where police officers arrested Guo Hua Jin following a 911 call reporting an assault during a domestic violence dispute. The charges against Jin were subsequently dismissed, and she brought a Section 1983 false arrest claim. The central issue is whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity based on arguable probable cause.

1. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review an interlocutory denial of qualified immunity when disputed facts exist regarding probable cause
2. Whether the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Jin for assault based on the information available to them at the time of arrest
3. Whether police officers must apply heightened credibility scrutiny to witness statements in domestic violence cases compared to other criminal incidents
4. Whether officers must investigate an arrestee's protestations of innocence or interview available third-party witnesses before making an arrest

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and held that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The court concluded that: (1) it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the qualified immunity determination based on facts construed most favorably to Jin; (2) uncontroverted evidence demonstrated arguable probable cause existed for Jin's arrest based on the 911 call, the victim's physical demonstration of the assault, visible injuries, and the son's corroborating statements; (3) disputed facts about whether the son witnessed the assault or made the 911 call were immaterial to the probable cause determination; (4) police officers should not apply heightened credibility scrutiny to domestic violence witness statements compared to other crimes—the "relational dynamic" of domestic disputes does not, by itself, create doubt about witness veracity; and (5) officers are not required to investigate an arrestee's protestations of innocence or interview available third-party witnesses before making an arrest when they already possess probable cause. The court emphasized that probable cause determinations in domestic violence cases must be assessed on a case-by-case basis using the totality of circumstances, just like any other alleged crime, and that requiring additional investigation would hamper police ability to protect domestic violence victims. Judge Kearse dissented, arguing that material factual disputes existed regarding what information the officers actually possessed at the time of arrest, particularly whether they obtained any direct statement from the alleged victim and whether the son was actually present at the incident.

This is a civil rights case involving Luther Poynter, represented by his guardian, against Aaron Bennett in his official capacity as Barren County Jailer and Barren County, Kentucky. The case involves alleged constitutional violations occurring while Poynter was in custody.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this order, as this document is an order granting rehearing en banc rather than a substantive opinion on the merits. The case involves claims against jail officials and the county, likely concerning conditions of confinement or treatment while in custody.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition for rehearing en banc. The court vacated its previous decision and judgment, stayed the mandate, and restored the case to the docket as a pending appeal. The parties were directed to file supplemental briefs, and the case was scheduled for oral argument. This order indicates that a majority of the judges in regular active service voted to reconsider the panel's original decision, suggesting significant legal questions warranted full court review.

This is an appellate order addressing petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc in a case involving a plaintiff's appeal against the Regents of the University of California and various individual defendants.

The key issues concern whether the Ninth Circuit panel should reconsider its prior decision through either a panel rehearing or a rehearing of the entire court en banc.

The court denied both the petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc. The three-judge panel unanimously voted to deny the panel rehearing petition. Regarding the en banc petition, two judges voted to deny it and one judge recommended denial. When the full court was advised of the en banc petition and a judge requested a vote, the matter failed to receive a majority vote from the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration, resulting in denial of the rehearing en banc petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40.

This is a disability discrimination case under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) brought by two blind students against Los Angeles Community College District for failing to provide adequate accommodations and accessible educational materials. The case addresses the availability of damages following the Supreme Court's decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller regarding emotional distress damages under federal antidiscrimination laws.

1. Whether emotional distress damages are recoverable under Title II of the ADA in light of the Supreme Court's Cummings decision, which held that emotional distress damages are unavailable under antidiscrimination laws enacted pursuant to Congress' Spending Clause power
2. Whether the ADA's non-Spending Clause status exempts it from the Cummings rule when its remedies are explicitly defined by reference to the Rehabilitation Act (a Spending Clause statute)
3. Whether plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages for lost educational opportunities as an alternative to emotional distress damages
4. Whether the jury's damages award of $218,500 to Payan and $24,000 to Mason was supported by evidence and proper jury instructions
5. Whether the district court abused its discretion in granting remittitur and reducing damages to only out-of-pocket expenses ($1,650 for Payan and $0 for Mason)

The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the district court's remittitur order, reinstating the jury's full damages award. The court held:

1. Emotional Distress Damages: The court agreed with the district court that emotional distress damages are not available under Title II of the ADA. Although the ADA itself was enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause (not the Spending Clause), Title II explicitly incorporates the remedies of the Rehabilitation Act, which was enacted under the Spending Clause. Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Cummings and Barnes v. Gorman, the remedies available under Title II are coextensive with those of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, neither of which permits emotional distress damages.
2. Lost Educational Opportunities Damages: The court held that plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages for lost educational opportunities under Title II of the ADA, as this is a legally viable form of relief distinct from emotional distress damages. The court found that Payan and Mason presented evidence at trial that they lost opportunities to meaningfully learn class material, engage in classroom discussions, and explore their educational interests due to LACCD's violations.
3. Jury Award Validity: The court concluded the jury's award was consistent with the evidence presented and the district court's general damages instructions, which permitted the jury to compensate the plaintiffs for "any injury" caused by LACCD's ADA violations. The instruction's reference to "expenses" was permissive (using "can"), not restrictive, and did not preclude the jury from awarding damages for lost educational opportunities.
4. Abuse of Discretion: The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether the jury's award was based on the legally viable basis of lost educational opportunities before granting remittitur. The court should have analyzed whether the award could be supported on this alternative ground rather than automatically reducing it to out-of-pocket expenses.

This case involves a challenge to former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem's decisions to vacate and terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for Venezuela and Haiti. The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed a district court decision setting aside these actions as exceeding the Secretary's statutory authority under the TPS statute.

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A)'s judicial review bar—which precludes review of "any determination" regarding TPS "designation, or termination or extension of a designation"—applies to challenges based on the Secretary's lack of statutory authority to vacate TPS designations
2. Whether the Secretary possessed statutory authority to vacate (as opposed to terminate) TPS designations under the plain language of the TPS statute
3. Whether the Secretary's actions were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
4. Whether the panel properly granted universal relief by setting aside the Secretary's actions under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
5. Whether a majority concurrence addressing the APA claims constitutes binding precedent

1. Jurisdiction and Judicial Review Bar: The panel majority (Judges Wardlaw, Mendoza, and Johnstone) held that the judicial review bar does not apply to challenges regarding the scope and extent of the Secretary's statutory authority. The panel concluded that vacating a TPS designation is not an express, implied, or inherent power granted to the Secretary under the statute, and therefore the Secretary exceeded her authority. The dissenting judges (led by Judge Bumatay) argued the judicial review bar clearly applies to all determinations regarding TPS designations, extensions, and terminations, regardless of the theory for challenging them.
2. Statutory Authority: The panel held that the Secretary lacked authority to vacate TPS designations. The plain text of the statute does not grant vacatur power—it only provides for termination after proper notice and a 60-day waiting period. Vacating an extension circumvents these procedural requirements and would render them meaningless. The panel noted that every other court to address this issue reached the same conclusion.
3. APA Claims: The panel affirmed summary judgment on the APA claims, finding the Secretary's actions arbitrary and capricious. The concurring judges (Mendoza and Wardlaw) found that the Secretary's stated rationale was pretextual and that the decision-making process was preordained, based on evidence including the rushed timeline, failure to consider alternatives, and the Secretary's public statements linking the decisions to discriminatory stereotypes about TPS holders.
4. Remedy: The panel set aside the Secretary's unlawful actions under APA § 706(2), restoring the status quo. Judge Nelson's dissent argued the panel failed to properly analyze whether "set aside" authority under § 706(2) extends to universal relief and improperly conflated equitable and statutory remedies in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc.
5. Precedential Effect: The concurring judges (Mendoza and Wardlaw) clarified that their concurrence addresses settled APA principles and does not expand arbitrary-and-capricious review. Judge Nelson's dissent argued the majority concurrence is nonbinding by its own terms and, even if considered, improperly expanded APA review by commingling doctrines and considering extra-record evidence of animus without the requisite showing of bad faith under Department of Commerce v. New York.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which the defendant was convicted of armed bank robbery and possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The defendant appeals, challenging the jury instruction on the firearm possession charge as improperly relieving the government of its burden to prove that he possessed an actual firearm.

1. Whether the jury instruction stating that "witness identification of the weapon as a firearm is sufficient" to prove the firearm element misstates the law and improperly relieves the government of its burden to prove an essential element beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the instruction violates the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by failing to require the jury to determine each element of the offense.
3. Whether credible witness testimony alone can constitute sufficient evidence of firearm possession when the actual weapon is not produced.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury instruction did not commit plain error. The court reasoned that:

1. The instruction accurately stated the statutory definition of a firearm and correctly informed the jury that the government need not produce the actual weapon.
2. When read in combination with all jury instructions—which emphasized the jury's duty to evaluate witness credibility and not automatically accept all evidence—the instruction properly conveyed that credible witness testimony could be a sufficient alternative method of proof that the weapon was a firearm.
3. Although the language "is sufficient" would have been more precise if phrased as "can be sufficient" or "may be sufficient," the instructions as a whole were not flawless but adequately informed the jury of its duty to resolve the issues presented.
4. In this particular case, where the defendant offered no evidence or argument questioning whether the firearm was real (as opposed to a replica or toy), the instruction did not mislead the jury or violate the defendant's constitutional rights.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging state criminal convictions for sexual offenses. The petitioner, Thomas Roye Wahpekeche, argues that the state court lacked jurisdiction because he is a Native American and the crimes occurred in Indian country.

1. Whether Congress disestablished the Citizen Potawatomi Indian reservation through an 1891 statute
2. Whether the crimes occurred in a dependent Indian community, thereby constituting Indian country
3. Whether the crimes occurred on allotted land, thereby constituting Indian country
4. Whether the Oklahoma Enabling Act deprived the state court of jurisdiction
5. Whether various non-jurisdictional claims (ineffective assistance of counsel, due process violations, Indian Child Welfare Act violations) were properly preserved for federal habeas review

The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief on all grounds. The court held that:

1. Congress unambiguously disestablished the entire Citizen Potawatomi reservation in 1891 through statutory language requiring the tribe to "cede, relinquish, and forever and absolutely surrender" all their interests in the land, coupled with $160,000 in compensation—language that created an "almost insurmountable presumption" of congressional intent to diminish the reservation.
2. Petitioner waived his argument that the crimes occurred in a dependent Indian community by raising it for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation, which constitutes waiver under circuit precedent.
3. Petitioner failed to preserve his allotment argument by not adequately raising it when objecting to the magistrate judge's report, and any error would not have been plain or obvious given the trial testimony and incomplete title history.
4. Petitioner failed to explain how the Oklahoma Enabling Act deprived the state court of jurisdiction, presenting only vague and contradictory theories.
5. Petitioner's five other claims (Indian Child Welfare Act violation, ineffective assistance of counsel, improper questioning, evidence storage violation, and rape-shield law violation) were procedurally barred because they were not properly exhausted in state court, and an anticipatory procedural bar applied because the claims would be waived if petitioner returned to state court.

This is a criminal appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a 24-month prison sentence imposed for illegal reentry of a removed alien. The defendant argued the sentence was an unjustified upward variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 4-10 months (or 8-14 months without the fast-track plea discount).

1. Whether the defendant waived his substantive reasonableness challenge by requesting a sentence not to exceed 24 months
2. Whether the district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and provided compelling justification for the upward variance
3. Whether the district court properly considered the defendant's criminal history, nature of the offense, animal cruelty conviction, and need for deterrence in justifying the variance
4. Whether the sentence constitutes a true outlier creating unwarranted sentencing disparities, as evidenced by JSIN national statistics

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the 24-month sentence. The court held that: (1) the defendant did not waive his appeal because he argued for a substantially lower sentence (12-18 months) and never agreed the 24-month sentence was reasonable; (2) the district court thoroughly addressed all § 3553(a) factors and provided compelling reasons for the upward variance, including the defendant's repeated illegal reentry convictions, animal cruelty conviction demonstrating violence, failure to be deterred despite prior convictions, and the seriousness of the offense; (3) district courts may consider facts in sentencing even when those facts already factor into the Guideline range calculation; (4) the animal cruelty conviction was relevant to assessing the seriousness of illegal reentry and the defendant's history and characteristics; (5) the need for deterrence was a valid justification given the defendant's repeated violations despite prior convictions and sentences; and (6) bare national statistics cannot overcome a detailed, individualized explanation by the district court, and JSIN data presented for the first time on appeal cannot cure an adequate explanation already provided by the district court.

This is an appeal by the Operating Engineers Construction Industry and Miscellaneous Pension Fund challenging a decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery in a dispute against Pioneer Natural Resources Company.

The opinion does not specify the particular legal issues addressed, as the court affirmed the lower court's decision by reference to its Letter Opinion dated July 28, 2025, which is not included in this order.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The court adopted the reasoning and conclusions of the lower court as set forth in its Letter Opinion dated July 28, 2025, without providing additional analysis or explanation in this order.

This is a post-trial decision in a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving claims of fraud, breach of an operating agreement, and aiding and abetting fraud. The plaintiffs, who were members of Verdesian Life Sciences LLC, alleged that defendants—including the company's former private equity sponsor and board members—defrauded them into investing additional capital in a 2014 acquisition of Specialty Fertilizer Products (SFP) by misrepresenting or concealing information about SFP's sales programs.

1. Whether plaintiffs' claims for fraud, breach of contract, and aiding and abetting fraud were timely filed or barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches based on inquiry notice
2. Whether defendants made false statements or omitted material information about SFP's "Bulk and Early Fill Programs" with the requisite scienter (knowledge, intent, or reckless indifference)
3. Whether defendants breached the Operating Agreement's requirement to act in good faith
4. Whether Paine Schwartz Partners aided and abetted fraud by other defendants
5. Whether sanctions were appropriate for defendants' belated production of handwritten notes from one defendant

The court entered judgment for all defendants on all claims. The court found that: (1) plaintiffs' claims were time-barred because plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of their claims by April 10, 2014, more than three years before filing suit in October 2018, and therefore equitable tolling did not apply; (2) even on the merits, plaintiffs failed to prove fraud because they could not establish scienter—defendants did not knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly misrepresent or omit information, as evidenced by defendants' substantial diligence efforts, their personal financial investments in the transaction, their disclosure of the quality of earnings report to lenders and institutional investors, and the lack of any rational motive to commit fraud against their own economic interests; (3) plaintiffs similarly failed to prove breach of the Operating Agreement's good faith requirement, which requires the same scienter analysis; (4) the aiding and abetting claim failed both because the predicate fraud claim failed and because it was time-barred; and (5) sanctions for late production of documents were not warranted because the court had already imposed adequate remedies (precluding defendants from using the documents and allowing plaintiffs additional time to review them), and plaintiffs chose not to question witnesses about the belatedly produced materials.

This is a criminal appeal in which Carlos Maldonado-Vargas challenges his convictions for bank fraud and securities fraud. The First Circuit Court of Appeals issued an errata sheet amending its November 14, 2025 opinion to clarify the disposition of the case.

The key legal issues include the validity of Maldonado-Vargas's bank fraud and securities fraud convictions, the appropriateness of his sentence, and the proper characterization and affirmance of the restitution order imposed by the district court.

The court vacated Maldonado-Vargas's bank fraud convictions while affirming his securities fraud conviction and sentence. The court also affirmed the district court's order of restitution as a condition of supervised release. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate opinion. The errata sheet clarified that the restitution order was imposed as a condition of supervised release rather than as a standalone order, and that the case required remand for additional proceedings.

This is an immigration case in which a Honduran national who entered the United States without inspection petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision denying her applications for asylum and withholding of removal based on claims of persecution related to her bisexual identity.

1. Whether the applicant suffered past persecution rising to the threshold level of serious harm required for asylum eligibility
2. Whether any harm experienced had the required nexus to a protected ground (membership in a particular social group based on sexual orientation)
3. Whether the Honduran government was unwilling or unable to protect the applicant from private actors inflicting harm
4. Whether the applicant established a well-founded fear of future persecution that is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable

The court denied the petition for review, affirming the BIA's dismissal of the asylum and withholding of removal claims. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency's findings that: (1) the applicant did not suffer past persecution—her experiences consisted of a single unfulfilled threat from an unknown man, derogatory name-calling, and witnessing violence unrelated to her sexual orientation, which did not rise to the level of persecution; (2) she failed to establish the required nexus between any harm and her sexual orientation, as the primary threat contained no reference to her sexuality and her subjective belief was insufficient; and (3) she did not demonstrate government unwillingness or inability to protect her, as police responded to complaints she filed and dissatisfaction with investigative outcomes does not establish acquiescence or inability to act. The court reasoned that the applicant lived openly as a bisexual woman in Honduras for over two years without physical harm, and the country conditions evidence did not show that conditions for sexual minorities had worsened during that period.

This is an insurance coverage dispute in which GEICO sought to deny no-fault medical benefits to an acupuncture provider based on the provider's alleged improper payment of patient referral fees. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding whether such professional misconduct disqualifies a provider from receiving no-fault reimbursement under New York's Eligibility Regulation.

1. Whether paying third parties for patient referrals in violation of New York's rules of professional conduct constitutes a "failure to meet" a "licensing requirement" under 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65-3.16(a)(12), thereby permitting an insurer to deny no-fault benefits.
2. The scope and interpretation of the Eligibility Regulation and what professional misconduct it authorizes insurers to use as grounds for denying payment.
3. Whether the extensive nature of the kickback and referral scheme resulted in improper cession of control of the professional services corporation to an unlicensed party.

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals held that an insurer may not deny no-fault benefits based on "alleged professional misconduct that falls short of ceding control of a professional services corporation to an unlicensed party." The court reasoned that paying for patient referrals, while a violation of professional conduct rules, does not constitute a failure to meet a licensing requirement under the Eligibility Regulation. The court declined to address GEICO's alternative argument that the scheme was extensive enough to constitute improper cession of control, leaving that issue for the district court to address on remand.

This is an interlocutory appeal in a civil rights case where a plaintiff alleges false arrest and malicious prosecution by an NYPD detective after being arrested for sexual assault on an MTA bus, with charges later dismissed on speedy trial grounds. The appeal addresses whether the detective is entitled to qualified immunity based on arguable probable cause.

1. Whether Detective Friedman is entitled to qualified immunity on federal false arrest and malicious prosecution claims
2. Whether arguable probable cause existed for the arrest and prosecution of Sacaza
3. Whether MTA bus video footage constitutes plainly exculpatory evidence that would negate probable cause
4. Whether inconsistencies in the complainant's statements undermine her veracity sufficiently to dissipate probable cause

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and granted qualified immunity to Detective Friedman. The court held that arguable probable cause existed for the arrest and prosecution. The court reasoned that: (1) a reasonable police officer could have found probable cause based on the complainant's immediate report, two separate identifications of Sacaza (including in-person), Sacaza's history as a person of interest in prior lewdness incidents, and the MTA footage showing the complainant's visible discomfort and emotional distress; (2) while the MTA footage did not definitively show an assault and contradicted some aspects of the complainant's account (such as being followed for three blocks), it also corroborated other aspects and was not plainly exculpatory as a matter of law; (3) inconsistencies in the complainant's statements, even if present, did not rise to the level where no reasonable officer could find probable cause existed; and (4) because reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed, arguable probable cause was established, entitling Friedman to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine after being caught transporting over one kilogram of the drug from the U.S. Virgin Islands to Puerto Rico. The defendant appealed the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession.

1. Whether a district court abuses its discretion by refusing to instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense when the evidence does not sufficiently dispute the differentiating element of the greater offense
2. Whether the quantity of cocaine possessed (over one kilogram) and the circumstances of its transportation and packaging are sufficient to establish intent to distribute as a matter of law, precluding a simple possession instruction
3. The standard for when proof of an element is "sufficiently in dispute" to warrant a lesser-included offense instruction

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's conviction and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the simple possession instruction. The court established that a lesser-included offense instruction is required only when the differentiating elements of the greater offense are "sufficiently in dispute"—meaning either there is sharply conflicting testimony on that element or the conclusion as to the lesser offense can fairly be inferred from the evidence. Here, the overwhelming evidence of intent to distribute—including the quantity (over one kilogram of high-purity cocaine), the brick-style packaging labeled with a brand name, the high purity level, the transportation route from a distribution hub, and minimal personal effects—was so substantial and the evidence of personal use so minimal (only testimony about marijuana use, with no evidence of cocaine use) that no rational jury could have found the defendant lacked intent to distribute. Therefore, the district court properly refused to allow the jury to consider simple possession as an alternative.

This case involves a constitutional and statutory challenge to West Virginia's Medicaid program exclusion of coverage for sex-change surgeries used to treat gender dysphoria. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision that had found the exclusion violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Affordable Care Act, and the Medicaid Act.

1. Whether West Virginia's exclusion of sex-change surgeries from Medicaid coverage violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating based on sex or transgender status
2. Whether the exclusion violates Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act's prohibition on sex discrimination
3. Whether the exclusion violates the Medicaid Act's "availability requirement" and "comparability requirement"
4. Whether the exclusion constitutes facial sex-based classification or uses gender dysphoria as a proxy for discriminating against transgender individuals
5. Whether a private cause of action exists under the Medicaid Act for violations of these requirements

The court reversed the district court's judgment on all three grounds. First, applying the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Skrmetti, the court held that the exclusion does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it does not facially classify based on sex or transgender status. Rather, it classifies based on medical diagnosis (gender dysphoria) and applies evenhandedly to all persons regardless of sex or transgender status. The exclusion passes rational basis review because West Virginia articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons including cost concerns and medical efficacy/safety concerns. Second, the court held that under Skrmetti's application of the Bostock but-for causation standard, the exclusion does not violate Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act because a patient's diagnosis, not sex or transgender status, is the but-for cause of coverage denial. Third, the court held that following the Supreme Court's decision in Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, there is no private cause of action for violations of the Medicaid Act's availability and comparability requirements because these provisions do not use clear and unambiguous rights-creating language and instead address state obligations in a spending-power bargain with the federal government. The court therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the defendants.

This is an appeal of a class certification order in an ERISA fiduciary duty case where former employees of Genworth Financial sought to represent a class of plan participants who invested in BlackRock LifePath Index Funds, alleging the plan sponsor breached its fiduciary duties by imprudently selecting and retaining those funds. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's certification of a mandatory class action under Rule 23(b)(1).

1. Whether ERISA § 502(a)(2) claims for breach of fiduciary duty in the context of a defined contribution plan constitute "individualized monetary claims" that cannot be certified as a mandatory class action under Rule 23(b)(1)
2. Whether the plaintiffs' claims satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement when class members suffered different injuries based on their individual account performance
3. The distinction between defined contribution plans (where assets are allocated to individual accounts) and defined benefit plans (where assets are held collectively) and how this distinction affects class certification of ERISA claims

The Fourth Circuit reversed and vacated the class certification order on two independent grounds:

1. Rule 23(b)(1) Improper: The court held that ERISA § 502(a)(2) claims in the context of a defined contribution plan are "individualized monetary claims" and therefore cannot be certified as a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1). The court distinguished between defined benefit plans (where plan assets are held collectively and a fiduciary breach affects all participants uniformly) and defined contribution plans (where assets are allocated to individual accounts and the amount of loss to each account varies based on individual circumstances such as investment timing, amount invested, and when assets were withdrawn). The court reasoned that in defined contribution plans, each participant can bring their own action to recover losses specific to their individual account, and mandatory class certification without notice or opt-out rights would violate due process principles. The Supreme Court's precedent in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates established that although § 502(a)(2) claims are brought on behalf of the plan, they authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant's individual account—making them individualized claims requiring Rule 23(b)(3) certification with notice and opt-out rights, not Rule 23(b)(1).
2. Commonality Not Satisfied: The court held that the district court erred in finding that ERISA § 502(a)(2) claims "inherently" satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). The court required a rigorous analysis showing that class members suffered the same injury. The evidence demonstrated that many class members suffered no injury at all—the two passive comparator funds that Genworth Financial argued were the appropriate benchmarks underperformed the BlackRock LifePath Index Funds for three separate fund vintages accounting for 42% of invested assets. Because class members' individual circumstances differed dramatically (different investment amounts, different timing of purchases and sales, different market conditions when they invested and withdrew), they did not all suffer the same injury, violating the commonality requirement.

This is an appeal of convictions and sentences for three defendants charged with violent crimes in retaliation for a rival gang member's death. The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit violent crime in aid of racketeering activity (VICAR) and related offenses arising from a gang conflict in Franklin, Virginia.

1. Whether sufficient evidence supported the existence of an "association-in-fact enterprise" under the VICAR statute for "Brandon's crew," a loosely organized group of individuals involved in drug trafficking and gang activities
2. Whether the evidence established the specific intent to murder required for Brooks' VICAR attempted murder conviction based on firing shots into a residence
3. Whether the evidence supported Jenkins' VICAR attempted murder conviction for a shooting that occurred fourteen months after the enterprise's initial criminal activity
4. Whether sufficient evidence supported Newsome's witness tampering conviction for attempting to solicit false testimony from witnesses
5. Whether Newsome's 273-month sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part:

1. AFFIRMED: All three defendants' convictions for conspiracy to commit VICAR murder (Count I), as the court found sufficient evidence that "Brandon's crew" constituted an association-in-fact enterprise with a common purpose (controlling drug trafficking in Franklin), relationships among members, and sufficient longevity. The court rejected arguments that the group lacked formal gang structure, noting that RICO enterprises need not have hierarchies, dues, initiation rites, or formal rules.
2. AFFIRMED: Jenkins' VICAR attempted murder conviction (Count IV) for the February 2019 shooting, holding that a fourteen-month gap in criminal activity does not preclude finding the conduct part of the same continuing enterprise, as RICO permits "spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence."
3. REVERSED: Brooks' VICAR attempted murder (Count II) and related firearms convictions (Count III). The court found insufficient evidence of the specific intent to murder required under Virginia law. Although Brooks fired three shots into a residence, the evidence did not show he knew anyone was inside, knew McNear was at the location, or intended to kill anyone. The court distinguished between general intent (which would support murder if someone died) and the specific intent required for attempted murder, holding that firing at a residence does not automatically establish intent to kill occupants.
4. AFFIRMED: Newsome's witness tampering conviction (Count IX), finding sufficient evidence that he corruptly persuaded witnesses to provide false testimony by asking them to lie about his whereabouts during the relevant dates. The court rejected arguments about jury instruction error and lack of evidence of threats or intimidation, noting that corrupt persuasion alone satisfies the statute.
5. AFFIRMED: Newsome's 273-month sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable, finding the district court properly considered all § 3553(a) factors and adequately explained its sentencing decision, including consideration of Newsome's comparative culpability relative to his co-defendants.
6. VACATED AND REMANDED: Brooks' sentence for resentencing given the vacation of Counts II and III, which had impacted both his Guidelines calculation and the consecutive sentences imposed.

This is a criminal appeal challenging the denial of a motion to suppress evidence in a child sexual abuse material (CSAM) possession and transportation case. The defendant argues that law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment rights by opening and viewing files in his private Google Drive account without a warrant.

1. Whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in files stored in a private cloud-based storage account (Google Drive) despite Google's privacy policy warning that it may analyze content for illegal activity
2. Whether Google's hash-matching algorithm—which generates a digital fingerprint of files—defeats a defendant's expectation of privacy in unopened digital files
3. Whether the private search doctrine applies when law enforcement views files that a private company's algorithm flagged but never actually opened and reviewed
4. Whether the attenuation doctrine applies to break the causal chain between an illegal search and subsequently discovered evidence

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, but on different grounds. The court held:

1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: The defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Google Drive account. Google's privacy policy warning that it may analyze content for illegal activity did not eliminate Fourth Amendment protections, similar to how telephone company monitoring rights do not eliminate privacy expectations in phone calls.
2. Digital Files as Containers: Digital files are containers analogous to sealed envelopes, and the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before opening and examining them, even when probable cause exists that they contain contraband. The automobile exception does not apply to digital files.
3. Private Search Doctrine Does Not Apply: A hash-match alone does not frustrate a defendant's expectation of privacy in unopened files. Hash values are merely indecipherable serial numbers that reveal nothing about file contents. Detective Rider's visual inspection of three unopened files exceeded the scope of Google's private search because: (a) Google had not actually opened those specific files; (b) Fourth Amendment rights are personal and Google's inspection of third-party files cannot affect the defendant's privacy interest in his own files; and (c) a visual inspection reveals far more information than a hash algorithm, which cannot describe image contents.
4. Attenuation Doctrine Applies: Although the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment, suppression was unwarranted because the causal chain between the illegal search and the evidence of conviction was sufficiently attenuated. Three factors supported attenuation: (1) seven months elapsed between the illegal search and discovery of the hard drive and flash drive; (2) multiple intervening voluntary acts by the defendant (two consensual interviews, consent to device searches, and a voluntary confession) broke the causal chain; and (3) the officer's misconduct was not flagrant—it appeared to be based on misunderstanding the law rather than intentional circumvention of the warrant requirement.

This is a criminal appeal in which Heriberto Mendez-Lozano challenges his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to harbor aliens, harboring aliens, hostage-taking, and felon-in-possession charges. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether Mendez-Lozano waived his right to appeal his conviction by limiting his notice of appeal to sentencing issues, and whether the district court properly applied a sentencing enhancement for his role as an organizer or leader of criminal activity.

1. Whether Mendez-Lozano waived his right to appeal his conviction by expressly limiting his notice of appeal to sentencing matters under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(6)
2. Whether the district court erred by denying his motion to sever the felon-in-possession charge and bifurcate the trial, and by failing to include a limiting instruction regarding his felony conviction
3. Whether the district court clearly erred in applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his role as an organizer or leader of criminal activity

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Mendez-Lozano's conviction and sentence. The majority held that Mendez-Lozano waived his right to appeal his conviction by expressly limiting the scope of his notice of appeal to sentencing matters, thereby precluding review of his arguments regarding severance, bifurcation, and limiting instructions. On the merits of the sentencing challenge, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in applying the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement, as the factual findings supporting the enhancement were plausible based on the record as a whole. Judge Graves concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the waiver analysis, arguing that the limiting statement in the notice of appeal should not constitute a waiver of the right to appeal the conviction and that the defendant clearly intended to appeal both conviction and sentence based on the briefing.

This is a labor dispute case under the Fair Labor Standards Act in which plaintiff Francisco Deras appealed the district court's dismissal of his unpaid wages claim against Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc. for failure to comply with a local rule requiring non-resident attorneys to appoint local counsel. The appeal focuses on whether the district court properly denied Deras's motions for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(1) motions for relief from judgment based on an improper standard requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that a dismissal without prejudice amounted to a dismissal with prejudice.
2. Whether the district court properly applied precedent from Campbell v. Wilkinson and Jones v. Meridian Security Insurance Co. in the Rule 60(b) context, or whether those cases addressing Rule 41(b) dismissals were inapplicable.
3. Whether the plaintiff's failure to appoint local counsel within the required fourteen-day deadline constituted "excusable neglect" under the Pioneer Investment Services four-factor test for Rule 60(b)(1) relief.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals VACATED the district court's orders denying Deras's Rule 60(b) motions and REMANDED for further proceedings. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by applying an unprecedented and improper standard in the Rule 60(b) context. Specifically, the district court erred by requiring Deras to demonstrate that his dismissal without prejudice amounted to a dismissal with prejudice as a prerequisite to obtaining Rule 60(b) relief. The court reasoned that Campbell and Jones addressed appeals of Rule 41(b) dismissals, not Rule 60(b) motions, and therefore did not support collapsing the different standards governing these two procedural rules. On remand, the district court must properly consider whether Deras's isolated calendaring error constitutes excusable neglect under the Pioneer factors, rather than imposing the improper threshold requirement.

This is an appeal of a bankruptcy court's decision regarding whether mineral lessors (MSB Owners) could assert administrative expense claims against a debtor oil and gas company (EP Energy) for alleged trespass damages. The case involves interpretation of oil and gas lease termination provisions under Texas law and the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to decide state law issues in the context of federal bankruptcy proceedings.

1. Whether the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the MSB Owners' administrative expense claims under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A), which required determining underlying state law lease termination and tort claims
2. Whether the MSB Owners' administrative expense claims were ripe for adjudication or whether the bankruptcy court should have abstained in favor of state court proceedings
3. Whether EP Energy's temporary 40-day cessation of oil and gas production in May 2020 caused the mineral leases to automatically terminate under the lease's "temporary-cessation provision" in Paragraph XI(d)
4. Whether EP Energy's resumption of production within 40 days was sufficient to maintain the leases, or whether EP was also required to commence drilling or reworking operations within 120 days of the cessation

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy and district courts' decisions on all issues:

1. Jurisdiction: The bankruptcy court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the administrative expense claims. A bankruptcy court may determine underlying state law issues that necessarily must be resolved in deciding core bankruptcy matters like administrative expense requests under § 503. The presence of state law issues does not deprive the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction, and the availability of permissive abstention does not eliminate jurisdiction that otherwise exists.
2. Ripeness: The claims were ripe for adjudication. The underlying events giving rise to the claims were not uncertain or hypothetical—they had already occurred before the motion was filed. The determinative issues presented disputed questions of law that did not require additional factual development. The MSB Owners' decision to seek permissive abstention after expressly invoking the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction did not render the proceeding unripe, particularly since they never withdrew their administrative expense request despite multiple opportunities to do so.
3. Lease Termination: EP Energy's 40-day cessation of production did not cause the leases to automatically terminate. Under Texas law principles governing oil and gas lease interpretation, the temporary-cessation provision in Paragraph XI(d) provides two alternative methods to maintain a lease after production ceases: (1) timely restoration of production, or (2) commencement of drilling or reworking operations within 120 days. Since EP resumed production within 40 days, it satisfied the lease maintenance requirements. The court rejected the MSB Owners' argument that strict compliance with drilling/reworking operations was required regardless of production resumption, finding that such an interpretation would be unreasonable, contrary to industry norms, and would require wasteful expenditures of resources. Texas law requires that automatic termination provisions be expressed with clarity, precision, and unequivocal language, which the MSB Owners' interpretation did not meet.
4. Administrative Expense Claims: Because the leases did not terminate, the MSB Owners could not establish trespass or conversion claims, and therefore their administrative expense claims failed on the merits.

This is a Fourth Amendment case involving a warrantless search of a vehicle. Stephen Woods was charged with felony firearm possession after police discovered a pistol in his car during a search conducted without a warrant. Woods appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment.

1. Whether officers had probable cause to search Woods's vehicle without a warrant under the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement
2. Whether the "fair probability" standard for probable cause was satisfied, or whether officers were required to eliminate all alternative locations where the gun might be located before searching the car
3. Whether officers were required to conduct all other available searches before resorting to a warrantless vehicle search

The court affirmed the district court's denial of the suppression motion. The Sixth Circuit held that officers had probable cause to search Woods's car under the automobile exception. The court reasoned that: (1) two eyewitnesses confirmed Woods had threatened the victim with a gun and assaulted her, establishing probable cause that a crime had been committed; (2) the gun was evidence of those crimes; (3) there was a "fair probability" the gun was in the car because it was last seen in Woods's possession, was not found on his person, in the surrounding area, or during a canine search, and Woods was found in his orange Dodge immediately after the incident; and (4) officers need only establish fair probability, not eliminate all alternative locations. The court rejected Woods's arguments that officers needed to conduct more thorough searches first or that caselaw required elimination of all other possibilities before searching the vehicle.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in a case where plaintiffs challenged Ohio's Unclaimed Funds Act, which allows the state to take ownership of funds held in the state's Unclaimed Funds Trust Fund after ten years. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the escheatment of their funds, claiming violations of the Takings Clause and Due Process Clause.

1. Whether plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable harm sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction preventing the escheatment of unclaimed funds to the state
2. Whether the escheatment of funds constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
3. Whether Ohio's notice provisions for unclaimed funds violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
4. Whether injunctive relief is available to prevent a per se taking under Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid

The court affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, which is a necessary element for obtaining a preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that: (1) the harm at issue involves only money, not physical property; (2) plaintiffs have ten years to claim their funds from the state with interest; (3) if plaintiffs prevail on the merits of their takings or due process claims, they can obtain a money judgment to make them whole; (4) under Knick v. Township of Scott, so long as property owners have some way to obtain compensation after the fact, courts need not enjoin government activities; (5) Cedar Point Nursery does not require injunctive relief for all takings, particularly where monetary compensation is available; and (6) plaintiffs had actual notice of the escheatment through the state's website and other means, which cured any due process deficiency.

This is a federal criminal appeal concerning the sentencing of Derrick Davis for felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). Davis challenges both the procedural soundness and substantive reasonableness of an 84-month above-Guidelines sentence imposed after remand for resentencing.

1. Whether the district judge committed a procedural error by reimposing an above-Guidelines sentence based on contradictory factual findings regarding Davis's involvement in a shooting incident
2. Whether the 84-month sentence is substantively reasonable when the parties agreed on remand that Davis did not participate in the shooting, despite the judge imposing the identical sentence as originally imposed
3. The proper interpretation and significance of Davis's jail phone call in which he boasted about driving recklessly to the scene of the shooting while armed with a loaded handgun
4. The scope of a district judge's discretion on remand after a sentence has been vacated in its entirety

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 84-month sentence. The court found no procedural error because the judge clearly explained that the jail call was significant not as evidence that Davis fired his gun, but rather as evidence of his reckless disregard for the law, his intentional placement of himself at a violent scene while armed, and his pride in breaking the law. The court held that the judge's characterization of the call was not clearly erroneous, as trial judges are in a superior position to assess facts and credibility. Regarding the substantive challenge, the court held that when a sentence is vacated in its entirety, resentencing occurs on a "clean slate," and the judge retains discretion to impose the same sentence after reconsidering the evidence. The court found the 84-month sentence reasonable based on Davis's extensive criminal history spanning over two decades, his lack of rehabilitation despite multiple opportunities, and his demonstrated pride in criminal conduct, which made him a danger to the community and unlikely candidate for rehabilitation.

This is a First Amendment student speech case in which a first-grade student challenged school discipline imposed after she drew a picture containing the phrase "Black Lives Matter any life" and gave it to an African American classmate. The court addressed the extent to which elementary students' speech is protected by the First Amendment and whether the school principal's actions violated those rights.

1. Whether elementary students' speech is protected by the First Amendment and whether the Tinker balancing test applies to elementary student speech
2. What role the students' young age plays in the Tinker analysis—specifically, whether age is dispositive or merely a relevant factor
3. The scope of Tinker's second prong regarding "invasion of the rights of others," particularly regarding speech that denigrates students based on core identifying characteristics such as race
4. Whether the school principal met his burden of showing that restricting the student's speech was reasonably necessary to protect the safety and well-being of students
5. Whether genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case. The court held that: (1) elementary students' speech is protected by the First Amendment and Tinker applies in the elementary school context; (2) the students' young age is a relevant but non-dispositive factor in the Tinker balancing test; (3) schools may regulate student speech under Tinker's second prong when it involves derogatory remarks directed at students' core identifying characteristics such as race, but only when reasonably necessary to protect students' safety and well-being; and (4) the school principal failed to meet his burden of showing that his actions were reasonably undertaken to protect M.C.'s rights because genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether the drawing actually interfered with M.C.'s right to be secure and let alone and whether the disciplinary actions were reasonably necessary. The court reasoned that while the principal's young age gave the school broader discretion, it did not relieve the school of its burden to justify the restriction on B.B.'s First Amendment rights under the Tinker standard, which remains a "demanding standard" that schools must affirmatively prove they meet.

This is an immigration case involving a petition for review and motion to stay removal from the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, denied the petitioners' motion to stay their removal pending resolution of their appeal.

1. Whether the petitioners are entitled to a stay of removal pending review of their petition
2. Whether the Ninth Circuit's longstanding practice of automatically granting stays of removal without assessing the merits complies with Supreme Court precedent, particularly the standards established in Nken v. Holder
3. Whether a three-judge panel properly raised and addressed the lawfulness of the court's internal stay procedures sua sponte, when neither party had explicitly raised the issue
4. The proper procedural mechanism for addressing challenges to the court's internal administrative procedures

The en banc court denied the petitioners' motion to stay removal and lifted the temporary stay that had been in place. The court applied the traditional stay factors under Nken v. Holder and Leiva-Perez v. Holder. However, the en banc court was deeply divided on the broader issue of whether the Ninth Circuit's practice of granting automatic, prolonged stays of removal is lawful. A three-judge panel had previously held that the court's automatic-stay practice was "manifestly unlawful" because it violated Supreme Court precedent requiring individualized assessment of traditional stay factors (likelihood of success on merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest). The en banc court vacated the panel's decision addressing this procedural issue. Chief Judge Murguia's concurrence argued that the lawfulness of the stay practice was not properly before the court because the parties had not raised it, and that such institutional concerns should be addressed through the Court Executive Committee rather than through judicial decisions. Judge Tung's statement criticized the en banc court's refusal to address the panel's findings regarding the unlawfulness of the automatic-stay practice, arguing that the court's failure to engage with the legal reasoning constituted an abdication of the court's duty to explain its decisions and comply with Supreme Court precedent.

This case involves a First Amendment challenge to Colorado state legislators' enforcement of decorum rules at legislative committee hearings that prohibited misgendering and deadnaming of individuals. The plaintiffs, who opposed these rules on ideological grounds, sued the legislators for violating their constitutional rights by promulgating and enforcing the rules.

1. Whether the case is moot given that the legislative session had concluded and the plaintiffs sought prospective relief
2. Whether state legislators are entitled to absolute legislative immunity for their actions in adopting and enforcing committee rules of decorum
3. Whether legislative immunity applies differently to official capacity versus individual capacity suits
4. Whether the distinction between promulgating rules and enforcing rules affects the scope of legislative immunity
5. Whether the challenged conduct falls within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint on legislative immunity grounds, holding:

1. Mootness: The case is not moot because the plaintiffs' request for nominal damages is retrospective and their request for prospective relief remains viable given the legislators' confirmed intent to continue enforcing the challenged rules.
2. Legislative Immunity Applies Regardless of Suit Type: Legislative immunity is available to legislators acting in their legislative capacity regardless of whether they are sued in their individual or official capacity, and it applies to both damages and prospective relief (injunctions and declaratory judgments).
3. Conduct Falls Within Legitimate Legislative Activity: Both the adoption of the decorum rules and their enforcement at legislative hearings constitute legitimate legislative activity entitled to absolute immunity. The adoption of committee rules is a discretionary, policymaking function with prospective implications occurring in a field where legislators traditionally have power. The enforcement of these rules—including interrupting speakers and removing comments from the record—is integral to the legislative process of conducting committee hearings on pending legislation.
4. Reasoning: The court emphasized that legislative immunity is grounded in principles of federalism and separation of powers, and that federal courts should not inquire into the internal workings of state legislatures. The court distinguished the case from Kamplain, where a permanent ban from legislative meetings was found not to be legislative immunity, noting that the enforcement actions here were much narrower and more particularized.

This is an immigration law case involving the interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) and whether a beneficiary of an F2A visa petition (for minor children of lawful permanent residents) should be reclassified to F1 status (for adult children of citizens) or immediate-relative status when the sponsoring parent naturalizes as a U.S. citizen. The case addresses whether "age" in the relevant statute refers to chronological age or statutory age calculated under CSPA provisions.

1. Whether the National Visa Center's reclassification decision constitutes a final agency action subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
2. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2)'s reference to "the age of the alien on the date of the parent's naturalization" means chronological age or statutory age as defined under CSPA provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1)
3. Whether a beneficiary initially petitioned for as an F2A visa applicant should be converted to immediate-relative status (rather than F1 status) when the parent naturalizes, if the beneficiary's statutory age remains under twenty-one at the time of naturalization

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the National Visa Center's reclassification decision is a final agency action subject to judicial review, but reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the Government on the merits. The court held that § 1151(f)(2) refers to the beneficiary's statutory age (calculated under § 1153(h)(1)) rather than chronological age. The court reasoned that: (1) when read in context of the entire statute, "age" in § 1151(f)(2) must refer to statutory age because Congress specifically created a modified age calculation for F2A beneficiaries; (2) the Government's interpretation creates three significant statutory anomalies—it penalizes parents for naturalizing, leaves a gap in CSPA protections, and gives adult beneficiaries greater protections than minor beneficiaries; (3) the Government's interpretation requires reading words into the statute that are not present (F2A-to-F1 conversion), whereas the statutory interpretation interpretation covers all reclassification scenarios; and (4) the legislative history overwhelmingly demonstrates Congress intended to protect child beneficiaries from aging out due to administrative delays and to prevent penalties for parental naturalization. The court agreed with the Ninth, Second, and First Circuits that beneficiaries whose statutory age remains under twenty-one at the time of parental naturalization should be converted to immediate-relative status rather than F1 status.

This is a Title VII employment discrimination case in which the plaintiff appeals the district court's dismissal of his complaint as untimely filed. The plaintiff filed his complaint five days after the 90-day statutory deadline, claiming he was entitled to equitable tolling due to his attorney's failure to respond and Hurricane Idalia's interference with postal delivery.

1. Whether the plaintiff pursued his rights with reasonable diligence, as required for equitable tolling
2. Whether an extraordinary circumstance beyond the plaintiff's control prevented timely filing
3. The appropriate standard of review for equitable tolling decisions at the motion-to-dismiss stage

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and held that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling. The court found that: (1) the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence by attempting to retain counsel, paying consultation fees, repeatedly contacting the law firm, and ultimately paying $28.75 for guaranteed overnight postal delivery; and (2) an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control caused the untimely filing—specifically, the confluence of the attorney's failure to respond despite accepting payment and Hurricane Idalia's severe weather conditions that disrupted postal service in southeastern Georgia where the district court was located. The court emphasized that equitable tolling requires only "reasonable diligence," not "maximum feasible diligence," and that the plaintiff's conduct was at least as diligent as the attorney's conduct in the comparable case of Suarez v. Little Havana Activities. The court also noted that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the five-day delay since it had notice of the claims through the EEOC process.

This is an appeal of a district court order that vacated the Department of Health and Human Services' approval of Indiana's Medicaid program extension (Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0) and remanded the matter to HHS for further proceedings. The central issue is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the remand order.

1. Whether a district court's remand order to a federal agency is a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which limits appellate jurisdiction to final decisions
2. Whether any exceptions to the final-judgment rule apply, including: (a) the agency-appeal exception for remands to federal agencies; (b) the ministerial-proceedings exception; (c) the collateral-order doctrine; or (d) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certification
3. Whether practical considerations, such as the costs of delayed review to Indiana as a sovereign state, justify an exception to the finality requirement
4. Whether the government properly raised merits arguments without filing a cross-appeal

The Court of Appeals dismissed Indiana's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the district court's remand order was not "final" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it did not terminate the litigation but instead left the core dispute unresolved for further proceedings before HHS. The court reasoned that remand orders to federal agencies are "black letter law" non-final orders, and none of the recognized exceptions applied here. Specifically: (1) the agency-appeal exception did not apply because HHS declined to appeal; (2) the remand proceedings will be substantive, not ministerial; (3) the collateral-order doctrine did not apply because the order did not conclusively determine the disputed question, involved an issue integral to the merits, and would be reviewable after final judgment; and (4) the district court's Rule 54(b) certification could not override the lack of finality. The court also rejected Indiana's arguments based on practical costs and its status as a sovereign state. Additionally, the court struck portions of the government's brief in which it argued the merits without filing a cross-appeal, holding that appellees cannot affirmatively attack a judgment without complying with the cross-appeal requirement.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving a dispute between two investors in a joint venture company over alleged breaches of a shareholders agreement and fiduciary duties. Caerus Group and Chemicar Europe formed Finixa USA as a 40-60 joint venture to distribute automotive refinishing products in the United States, but the relationship deteriorated, leading to consolidated litigation with cross-claims.

1. Whether Mitch Penney (CEO and director of Finixa USA) breached his fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by withholding information, denying access to books and records, prioritizing payments to affiliated entities, and focusing sales on a limited customer base
2. Whether Penney breached his employment agreement by failing to provide required monthly reports and CRM database access
3. Whether Caerus breached the shareholders agreement by failing to cause the CEO to provide monthly reports, withholding access to books and records, and permitting unapproved affiliate transactions
4. Whether Caerus aided and abetted Penney's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty

The court granted the motions to dismiss all claims with prejudice. The court held:

1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count III): Dismissed because Chemicar failed to plead sufficient facts supporting gross negligence or bad faith. The allegations regarding withheld information, denied access to books and records, and prioritized payments were conclusory and lacked specific factual support. The allegation about focusing on a single customer group was merely a disagreement with a business decision, not reckless indifference.
2. Breach of Employment Agreement (Count IV): Dismissed because Chemicar failed to plead any theory of compensable harm resulting from the alleged breach. While a party seeking equitable relief need not allege quantifiable harm, Chemicar sought only monetary damages and provided no basis for calculating such damages.
3. Breach of Shareholders Agreement (Count I of Counterclaims): Dismissed on multiple grounds: (a) Section 4(B)(5) imposes a joint obligation on both shareholders to cause the Board to require reports, not solely on Caerus; (b) Section 11 grants shareholders a right to access books and records but does not impose an obligation on Caerus to provide them—the company controls its records; (c) Section 4(C)(2)(b) allegations failed because Chemicar did not plead that Finixa USA lacked sufficient funds to pay all vendors or that Caerus made a policy decision; and (d) allegations regarding unapproved affiliate agreements failed because the initial agreement predated the shareholders agreement and the amended agreement was not shown to involve an affiliate after UYL's acquisition.
4. Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count II of Counterclaims): Dismissed because: (a) the predicate fiduciary duty claim failed; and (b) Chemicar failed to allege "knowing participation" or "substantial assistance" with sufficient factual specificity, relying instead on conclusory allegations that Caerus "assisted" in breaches.
5. Leave to Amend: Denied because Chemicar failed to move to amend before responding to the motions to dismiss, as required by Court of Chancery Rule 15(a)(5)(A), and demonstrated no good cause for departure from this rule.

This is a contract interpretation case involving a membership interest purchase agreement (MIPA) for the sale of a majority stake in Resource Navigation LLC. The dispute centers on whether a party responding to a fraud claim has the right to investigate the claim under the MIPA's indemnification procedures.

1. Whether a fraud claim, though not limited to indemnification remedies, nevertheless arises "under" Article IX of the MIPA and thus triggers the investigation rights in Section 9.06(c)
2. Whether the responding party's denial of fraud allegations constitutes a waiver of the contractual investigation right
3. Whether specific performance is an appropriate remedy to enforce the investigation right
4. What scope of investigation is reasonable given the time constraints of the 30-day response period

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs (sellers). The court held that although fraud claims are not limited to indemnification remedies under Section 9.08, they nevertheless arise "under" Article IX because multiple provisions within Article IX specifically govern fraud and intentional misrepresentation claims (Sections 9.01, 9.02, 9.04, 9.07, and 9.08). Therefore, a fraud claim qualifies as a "Direct Claim" under Section 9.06(c), entitling the responding party to an investigation right. The court rejected the defendant's waiver argument, finding that denying fraud allegations while simultaneously demanding to exercise investigation rights does not constitute an unequivocal relinquishment of the contractual right. The court ordered specific performance of the investigation obligation, directing the parties to meet and confer on the scope of investigation, which must be reasonably tailored to occur within the remaining 16 days of the 30-day response period.

This is a breach of contract and fraud case arising from a dispute over film credits for the movie "Hounds of War." Plaintiffs sought equitable relief to restore a producer's name to the film's titles and credits, but the Court of Chancery dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after the film had already been released with the plaintiffs' names included in the credits.

1. Whether the Court of Chancery retained subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' equitable claims after the requested relief (restoration of credits) became moot due to the film's release with all plaintiffs credited
2. Whether the "clean-up doctrine" allowed the Court to exercise jurisdiction over law claims ancillary to the original equitable claims
3. Whether remaining claims could be adequately remedied at law in Superior Court rather than in Chancery Court

The Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1), with leave to transfer to Superior Court. The Court found that: (1) the primary equitable relief sought (restoration of credits) became impossible to grant once the film was released with all plaintiffs credited; (2) the remaining claims for breach of contract and fraud are adequately remedied at law and do not require equitable jurisdiction; (3) the clean-up doctrine did not apply because plaintiffs failed to establish a bona fide equitable claim; and (4) declining to retain jurisdiction would promote judicial efficiency and avoid multiplicity of suits. Plaintiffs were given 60 days to elect to transfer the case to Superior Court under Delaware Code § 1902.

This is a Delaware Chancery Court case involving a dispute between two co-managing members of Priority Responsible Funding LLC (PRF), a litigation finance company. GFO seeks PRF's dissolution due to deadlock, while PPSF and Brett Findler assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, tortious interference, and constructive trust against GFO and related entities.

1. Whether GFO breached fiduciary duties owed to PRF by usurping corporate opportunities and withholding material information regarding PRF's transition to an origination and servicing (O&S) business model
2. Whether GFO breached the PRF LLC Agreement by failing to make distributions to PPSF and by altering PRF's business without written consent of all members
3. Whether GFO and GFOAM tortiously interfered with Brett Findler's business relationships
4. Whether a constructive trust should be imposed as a remedy
5. Whether PRF should be dissolved and wound up due to deadlock between its two 50% managing members

The court ruled in favor of GFO on all counts. The court found that:

1. Fiduciary Duty Claims: PPSF failed to prove GFO breached fiduciary duties. Brett and PPSF voluntarily participated in and consented to PRF's transition to an O&S business model through signed agreements and years of active participation. GFO did not withhold material information, as Brett had access to and reviewed documents detailing the business transformation, including the Funds' management structure and fee arrangements. The corporate opportunity doctrine does not apply because the challenged actions were undertaken with informed consent.
2. Breach of Contract Claims: PPSF failed to prove any breach of the PRF LLC Agreement. Regarding distributions, the plain language of Section 3.5 only requires distributions from investments made by PRF itself, not from the Funds. Since the Funds (not PRF) made all fundings during the relevant period, no distribution obligation was triggered. Regarding the business transition, Section 1.3 permits PRF to engage in any lawful business, and O&S services fall within that scope. Additionally, Brett's years of knowing participation in the O&S model without raising objections constitutes acquiescence to any alleged breach. The court found no actionable disparagement or misuse of confidential information.
3. Tortious Interference Claim: Brett failed to identify any specific business relationship with which GFO or GFOAM interfered, which is required to sustain such a claim. Moreover, any interference was not "wrongful" given Brett's own participation in the challenged conduct.
4. Constructive Trust: A constructive trust is a remedy, not an independent cause of action. Since all underlying claims failed, no constructive trust remedy is available.
5. Dissolution and Winding Up: PRF should be dissolved and wound up because: (1) PPSF and GFO are deadlocked as 50% managing members with no means of resolving the deadlock under the operating agreement; (2) PRF has been essentially non-operative since 2024, with Brett absent from operations, the Funds terminating O&S agreements, and GFO ceasing to fund operations; and (3) the personal conflict between Brett and Gard has made continued operation impracticable. The court appointed a liquidation trustee to oversee the winding up process.

This case arises from a dispute between Caring People (a home healthcare company) and its founder Shalom East, regarding breaches of restrictive covenants and contractual obligations following East's departure and the creation of competing entities (Polaris and Beacon) with former employees. The court addresses claims of breach of contract, tortious interference, and fiduciary duty, as well as counterclaims by East against the company's investor Silver Oak.

1. Whether East breached non-compete, non-solicitation, and confidentiality provisions in the Purchase and Contribution Agreement (PCA), Holdco Agreement, and Incentive Unit Agreement (IUA)
2. Whether the non-compete provision is enforceable or should be blue penciled due to overbroad geographic scope
3. Whether East tortiously interfered with Caring People's contracts with employees Devine and Feder
4. Whether East owed fiduciary duties to Caring People
5. Whether employee Jennifer Devine breached her restrictive covenants under the Business Protection Agreement (BPA) and Devine IUA
6. Whether the BPA is enforceable under New York law
7. Whether Silver Oak breached its obligations regarding tax distributions under the Holdco Agreement

The court ruled largely in favor of Plaintiffs (Caring People), awarding $4.304 million in damages allocated 75% to East and 25% to Devine, plus pre- and post-judgment interest and partial fee shifting. The court also reinstated the original two-year terms of restrictive covenants.

Key holdings:

1. East's Liability: East breached Section 9.1 (non-compete) of the PCA. Although the nationwide geographic scope was overbroad, the court blue penciled it to cover only the six states where Caring People operates, finding the equities favored enforcement given East's sophisticated bargaining position, specific negotiation of terms, and substantial consideration received. The court found East breached Section 9.2 (non-solicitation) by soliciting Devine and Feder to join the Polaris+Beacon+COD team, and breached Section 9.3 (confidentiality) by sharing confidential Caring People documents. East also breached the Holdco Agreement's confidentiality provisions and the East IUA's non-solicitation clause. The court rejected East's fiduciary duty claim, finding it impermissibly bootstrapped onto contract claims and noting that the Holdco Agreement eliminated fiduciary duties.
2. Devine's Liability: The court found the BPA unenforceable under New York law as overbroad, applying New York's more stringent standard for non-competes. However, Devine breached the Devine IUA's non-solicitation provision, specifically the narrower provision barring her from encouraging customers and referral sources to cease or reduce business with Caring People, as evidenced by her contacts with the Amsterdam and Residences facilities. The court found the first part of the non-solicit overbroad but severable, enforcing only the narrower second part.
3. Silver Oak's Liability: Silver Oak breached Section 5.3 of the Holdco Agreement by failing to timely and fully distribute cash to East sufficient to cover his tax liability arising from income allocations related to Employee Retention Tax Credits (ERTC). The court rejected East's implied covenant claim regarding discretionary distributions, finding East failed to prove Silver Oak acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. East failed to prove Silver Oak breached the 2019 COD Agreement regarding post-termination invoices and unbilled visits.
4. Damages and Relief: The court awarded offsetting damages to East for Silver Oak's breach of the tax distribution obligation. The court also reinstated the original two-year restrictive covenant terms to give Plaintiffs the benefit of their bargain.

This is an employment dispute in which a financial advisor (Defendant) left his employer (Plaintiff) and solicited the employer's clients to join him at a new firm. The Plaintiff sued for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Delaware Uniform Trade Secrets Act, while the Defendant countered with a defamation claim.

1. Whether the Defendant breached the confidentiality and non-solicitation provisions of his employment agreement
2. Whether the non-solicitation clause was enforceable under Delaware law
3. Whether the Defendant misappropriated the Plaintiff's trade secrets under the Delaware Uniform Trade Secrets Act
4. Whether the Defendant owed and breached fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff
5. Whether statements in a Form U5 filed by the Plaintiff constituted defamation
6. The appropriate measure of damages for the Defendant's wrongful conduct

The court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff on its breach of contract and trade secrets misappropriation claims. The court found that: (1) the employment agreement was properly assigned from the predecessor entity to the Plaintiff; (2) the Defendant violated Section 3(a) by retaining and using client contact information and downloading confidential files, including passwords, just before resigning; (3) the three-year non-solicitation clause in Section 3(c) was reasonable and enforceable, and the Defendant breached it by mailing announcement cards to clients and calling over 40 clients to solicit their business; (4) the client information constituted protectable trade secrets because it included sensitive financial data and the Plaintiff took reasonable steps to protect it; (5) the Defendant misappropriated these trade secrets by sharing client revenue and asset information with his new employer during hiring negotiations and using client information to send solicitation materials; (6) the fiduciary duty claim failed because it improperly bootstrapped the contract claim without adding independent scope; and (7) the Defendant's defamation counterclaim failed because the statements in the Form U5 were substantially true and/or constituted protected opinion. The court awarded the Plaintiff $765,103 in damages based on lost enterprise value from eleven clients who departed, plus prejudgment and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. The court also issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant from using or disclosing the Plaintiff's confidential information and reinstating the three-year non-solicitation restriction.

This is an appeal by bondholders seeking to recover over $35 million in defaulted principal payments on Argentine sovereign bonds. The case involves complex issues of statutory limitations, collateral estoppel, Argentine trust law, and the effectiveness of a court authorization to sue.

1. Whether the bondholders' claims are time-barred under New York's six-year statute of limitations for contract claims, and whether New York's "savings statute" (N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 205(a)) or COVID-era executive orders toll the limitations period
2. Whether collateral estoppel bars relitigation of whether the bondholders had authority to enforce the bonds and whether reassembly was required
3. Whether Argentine law requires bondholders to "reassemble" their bonds (by returning certificates and depositing cash) before suing to recover unpaid principal
4. Whether an Argentine Commercial Court's authorization for the bondholders to sue on the bonds was effective under Argentine law, particularly in light of an arbitration clause in the trust agreements

The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court held: (1) Claims on the GD65 Bonds are time-barred because the savings statute does not apply when a prior action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction; however, claims on the AR16 Bonds are timely because New York's COVID-era executive orders automatically tolled the statute of limitations for 228 days without requiring any equitable showing by the bondholders. (2) Collateral estoppel does not bar relitigation of the reassembly requirement because the prior appellate decision affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds (lack of authority to sue) and did not reach the reassembly issue. (3) Argentine law does not require reassembly as a condition precedent to suing for unpaid principal, as the court found the Republic's cited authorities (Domec decision, public prosecutor opinion, and trust agreement language) do not establish such a requirement. (4) The Commercial Court's authorization was effective because the arbitration clause in the trust agreements applies only to disputes between parties, and since Caja did not oppose the bondholders' request, there was no dispute requiring arbitration. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the AR16 Bonds claims.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of an employment discrimination case brought by James Miller, a former corrections officer, against supervisory employees at the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. The central procedural issue is whether the district court erred in dismissing Miller's Equal Protection Clause claims under Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) when the defendants had styled their motion as one for summary judgment after discovery was completed.

1. Whether a district court commits procedural error by converting a motion for summary judgment into a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) after discovery has been completed.
2. Whether the pleading standard or the summary judgment standard should apply when a defendant raises facial insufficiency arguments in a motion styled as summary judgment filed after discovery closes.
3. Whether the reasoning in Lugo v. City of Troy (which addressed standing challenges) applies to challenges regarding the sufficiency of pleadings on substantive claims.
4. Whether Rule 12(c) (judgment on the pleadings) permits dismissal based on pleading deficiencies even after discovery concludes.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals VACATED the district court's judgment and REMANDED the case for further proceedings. The majority held that the district court committed procedural error by converting defendants' summary judgment motion into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and analyzing the case under pleading standards rather than summary judgment standards. The court reasoned that: (1) after extensive discovery, the summary judgment standard—which requires consideration of the full evidentiary record—should apply rather than the pleading standard that only examines the complaint's allegations; (2) the reasoning from Lugo v. City of Troy applies equally to substantive claims as it does to standing challenges, as both involve different burdens depending on the litigation stage; (3) converting a summary judgment motion into a dismissal motion wastes the resources expended during discovery and nullifies the purposes of the different procedural standards; (4) defendants' failure to raise pleading deficiencies until the summary judgment stage compounded the error, as Miller could have amended his complaint earlier had the deficiency been identified sooner; and (5) evidence developed during discovery may have cured any pleading deficiencies, making dismissal inappropriate without considering that evidence. The court expressed no opinion on whether the summary judgment record actually supports Miller's claims, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. Judge Sullivan dissented, arguing that Rule 12(c) plainly permits judgment on the pleadings after discovery closes and that Lugo's reasoning is limited to standing challenges, not substantive claims.

This is an insurance coverage dispute where GEICO sought to deny no-fault medical benefits to an acupuncture provider based on the provider's alleged improper payment of kickbacks for patient referrals. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding whether such professional misconduct disqualifies a provider from receiving no-fault reimbursement under New York's Eligibility Regulation.

1. Whether paying third parties for patient referrals in violation of New York's rules of professional conduct constitutes a "failure to meet" a "licensing requirement" under 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65-3.16(a)(12), thereby disqualifying a healthcare provider from receiving no-fault insurance benefits.
2. The scope of the Eligibility Regulation and what types of professional misconduct justify denial of no-fault benefits.
3. Whether the extensive nature of the kickback scheme resulted in improper cession of control of the professional services corporation to an unlicensed party.

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals held that an insurer cannot deny no-fault benefits based on "alleged professional misconduct that falls short of ceding control of a professional services corporation to an unlicensed party." The district court erred in concluding that paying for patient referrals in violation of New York law automatically disqualified the provider from receiving no-fault reimbursements. The court declined to address GEICO's alternative argument that the scheme was extensive enough to constitute improper cession of control, leaving that issue for the district court to address on remand.

This case involves a dispute between bank account co-owners (partnerships) and Peoples Bank regarding the bank's compliance with a judgment creditor's request to turn over funds from accounts in which the judgment debtor held an ownership interest. The partnerships sued the bank for conversion and negligence after the bank released funds to satisfy a judgment against the judgment debtor.

1. Whether a bank acts wrongfully by complying with a "suggestion" under West Virginia's judgment enforcement mechanism when accounts are titled in the names of judgment debtors, even if co-owners claim exclusive ownership.
2. Whether a bank's early release of funds without waiting for a court order constitutes wrongful conversion.
3. Whether judgment debtors have a right to respond to suggestions before a bank releases funds.
4. Whether the partnerships' conversion claim constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the underlying Texas judgment.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the conversion claim. The court held that Peoples Bank did not act wrongfully when it complied with the suggestion process under West Virginia Code § 38-5-14. The court reasoned that: (1) banks serve a ministerial function in judgment enforcement and must comply with court documents requesting turnover of funds; (2) the bank had no reason to doubt that accounts listed in the judgment debtors' names belonged to the judgment debtors, particularly since the judgment debtor had signed deposit agreements showing co-ownership and used the accounts for over twenty years without objecting; (3) West Virginia law expressly authorizes banks to release property before receiving a court order, and the bank's choice to do so was not wrongful; (4) the suggestion mechanism does not require notice to or response from the judgment debtor—only the bank must respond; and (5) allowing such suits would undermine the judgment enforcement system and create a back door for judgment debtors to challenge judgments. The court emphasized that banks are essential to the rule of law and economic system, and that the judgment debtors had other legitimate methods available to challenge the judgment or protect their interests.

This is a class action appeal concerning United Airlines' COVID-19 vaccine mandate and the adequacy of religious and medical accommodations offered to employees. The case involves disputes over whether three proposed classes of affected employees meet the requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

1. Whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class of all employees denied reasonable accommodations satisfies the requirements for certification, particularly regarding commonality, typicality, and whether punitive damages are incidental to injunctive relief.
2. Whether a Rule 23(b)(3) masking-and-testing subclass of non-customer-facing employees satisfies commonality and predominance requirements when class members suffered diverse injuries from the masking-and-testing accommodation.
3. Whether a Rule 23(b)(3) unpaid-leave subclass of customer-facing employees with religious accommodations satisfies commonality and predominance, specifically addressing: (a) whether religious sincerity is a common issue capable of class-wide resolution; (b) whether the reasonableness of unpaid leave as an accommodation can be assessed class-wide; (c) whether the undue hardship defense requires individualized analysis; and (d) whether a class action is the superior method of adjudication.
4. Whether medical accommodation seekers should be included in the unpaid-leave subclass, given that ADA claims require individualized assessments of qualifying disabilities.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's class certification order. The court held:

1. Rule 23(b)(2) Class Rejected: The district court properly rejected the proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class because punitive damages would predominate over injunctive relief. Although United's coercive policy threatened irreparable harm, the policy impacted class members differently (some vaccinated, others accepted unpaid leave, others left employment), requiring individualized inquiries into punitive damages that are not incidental to class-wide injunctive relief.
2. Masking-and-Testing Subclass Rejected: The district court properly rejected this subclass for lack of commonality and predominance. Although the masking-and-testing accommodation was applied uniformly, it inflicted diverse injuries on different employees (difficulty communicating, harassment, breathing problems), requiring individualized proof of adverse employment actions that would predominate over common issues.
3. Medical Accommodation Seekers Excluded: The district court properly excluded ADA claimants from the unpaid-leave subclass because determining whether each employee had a qualifying disability under the ADA requires individualized assessments. United's grant of accommodation does not establish as a matter of law that employees had qualifying disabilities, and the ADA's definition of disability necessarily requires individualized inquiries into major life activities.
4. Religious Accommodation Unpaid-Leave Subclass Certified: The district court properly certified a subclass of customer-facing employees who received religious accommodations and were placed on unpaid leave. The court found:
   1. Religious Sincerity as Common Issue: The common evidence—exemption requests, third-party attestations, and willingness to forgo income—demonstrates sincerity class-wide. While United may challenge individual members' sincerity during class rostering or discovery, the uniform conduct evinces common sincerity sufficient for certification. The court distinguished Braidwood (which involved Title VII exemptions for religious entities) and held that adequate district court analysis of common evidence regarding sincerity satisfies Rule 23 requirements.
   2. Reasonableness of Unpaid Leave: The reasonableness of unpaid leave as an accommodation can be assessed class-wide because all members received identical treatment (indefinite unpaid leave with opportunity to apply for other positions). Individual financial circumstances are irrelevant to reasonableness; the jury can determine in "one stroke" whether the accommodation was reasonable.
   3. Undue Hardship Defense: Whether alternative accommodations (such as masking-and-testing) would have imposed undue hardship can be resolved class-wide. The relevant inquiry is whether burdens would be "substantial in the overall context" of United's business, not employee-specific circumstances. United bears the burden of showing that all possible accommodations would impose undue hardship, which it failed to demonstrate.
   4. Predominance and Superiority: Common questions predominate because liability issues (sincerity, reasonableness, undue hardship) are common, while damages can be calculated using a mathematical formula based on average earnings and a jury-determined multiplier. Compensatory damages for emotional harm may require separate trials, but this does not defeat predominance when central liability issues are common. A class action is superior because it promotes judicial economy by resolving hundreds of employees' identical claims in one proceeding, and some employees fear retaliation if they sue individually.

This is a False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam whistleblower case where Maria Del Carmen Gamboa Ferguson appeals the dismissal of her fraud allegations against Lockheed Martin Corporation. The district court dismissed Ferguson's complaint based on the FCA's first-to-file bar, which prevents multiple relators from bringing related actions based on the same underlying facts.

1. Whether the first-to-file bar under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) applies to Ferguson's complaint when another relator (Girard) previously filed a qui tam action against the same defendant (Lockheed Martin)
2. The proper standard for determining when two complaints allege "the same essential facts" or "material elements" of fraud under the first-to-file bar
3. Whether Ferguson's allegations of subcontractor labor cost inflation constitute the same fraudulent scheme as Girard's allegations of bulk-discount pricing schemes, or whether they represent distinct fraudulent mechanisms
4. Whether a government investigation of Girard's bulk-discount scheme would naturally uncover Ferguson's subcontractor labor inflation scheme

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals REVERSED the district court's dismissal and REMANDED the case for further proceedings. The court held that the first-to-file bar does not apply to Ferguson's complaint because her allegations describe a fundamentally different fraudulent scheme than Girard's allegations, despite both involving TINA and FAR violations related to Lockheed's aircraft programs. The majority reasoned that:

1. The proper analysis requires comparing the actual mechanisms and schemes of fraud, not merely the statutes violated or the general concept of overcharging. Girard alleged a scheme where Lockheed purchased equipment in bulk at discounted prices but fraudulently charged the government full per-unit prices. Ferguson alleged a different scheme where Lockheed knowingly accepted inflated labor cost data from subcontractors without proper verification.
2. The court must focus on whether an investigation into the first claim would uncover the same fraudulent activity alleged in the second claim. A competent investigation of Girard's bulk-discount scheme would not naturally lead to discovering Ferguson's subcontractor labor inflation scheme, as they involve different documents, different types of price manipulation, and different mechanisms of fraud.
3. Ferguson does not merely add details, geographic locations, or additional instances of the same fraud scheme. Rather, she alleges a distinct fraudulent mechanism that would require different investigative approaches and review of different documents (cost-pricing memoranda versus purchase orders and invoices).
4. The first-to-file bar is designed to prevent "parasitic" lawsuits that merely feed off previous disclosures, but Ferguson's complaint provides genuinely valuable information about a different form of fraud that benefits the government's enforcement efforts and does not serve the purposes of the bar to discourage opportunistic plaintiffs.
5. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Branch Consultants and Planned Parenthood, where the second relator merely added details or geographic locations to the same essential scheme. Here, the schemes employ different mechanisms to overcharge the government.

This is a Fourth Amendment case involving a border patrol search at a permanent checkpoint in Texas. Juan Jose Ponce appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained when a Border Patrol agent searched his vehicle and discovered an undocumented woman hidden in a speaker box.

1. Whether Ponce's consent to open the back hatch of his SUV extended to searching containers inside the vehicle, specifically a speaker box
2. Whether the Border Patrol agent had probable cause to search the vehicle and open the speaker box based on observations made during the consensual search
3. Whether the agent's fifteen years of experience at the checkpoint should be credited in the probable cause analysis
4. Whether perceived nervousness alone can support probable cause when combined with other circumstances

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The court held that although Ponce consented only to the agent looking into the back of the SUV, the agent gained probable cause to search the vehicle and open the speaker box based on the totality of circumstances observed during that consensual search. Specifically, the court found probable cause existed based on: (1) the unusual placement of a ladder inside the vehicle rather than on the roof rack; (2) the cluttered condition of the cargo area, which the agent testified is a smuggling tactic; (3) the presence of a speaker box, which the agent knew was commonly used to hide people; (4) the unscrewed lid on the speaker box, indicating it was not being used for its typical purpose; (5) the agent's perception that Ponce was nervous; and (6) Ponce wearing a mask despite claiming to travel alone. The court rejected Ponce's arguments that each fact had an innocent explanation, reasoning that courts must view facts in their totality rather than in isolation, and that officers need not probe every potential innocent explanation when their training and experience support a reasonable belief that contraband is present. The court also rejected the argument that the agent's experience should be given little weight, distinguishing the case from prior precedent and noting that the agent's fifteen years at the specific checkpoint was substantial.

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case in which the plaintiff appeals the district court's orders excluding all evidence and dismissing his case with prejudice due to his counsel's failure to prosecute and comply with discovery orders over a four-year period.

1. Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in granting the motion to exclude all evidence as a discovery sanction
2. Whether the exclusion of evidence was justified under the four-factor framework for exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction
3. Whether dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate sanction for failure to prosecute and comply with discovery orders
4. Whether lesser sanctions would have been more appropriate than dismissal

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders excluding all evidence and dismissing the case with prejudice. The court held that:

1. The district court properly applied the standard four-factor framework for exclusion of evidence (rather than the heightened Conner standard for litigation-ending sanctions), as Fifth Circuit precedent routinely applies the exclusion factors even when exclusion leads to dismissal of claims
2. The exclusion was justified because: (a) defendants were prejudiced by the dilatory development of the case, which deprived them of meaningful understanding of plaintiff's theories and opportunity to file dispositive motions; and (b) a continuance would have been futile given that the district court had already continued trial three times and warned it would not grant another continuance, yet counsel still failed to advance the case
3. Dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because: (a) there was a clear record of delay spanning four years with no significant discovery or case development; (b) lesser sanctions (multiple continuances, attorney's fees orders, and discovery deadlines) proved futile as counsel continued to ignore responsibilities; and (c) defendants were prejudiced because they could not prepare for trial without plaintiff's evidence and were deprived of opportunity to file dispositive motions

This is a civil rights case in which a public school teacher challenges her principal's alleged categorical prohibition on teacher prayer visible to students, claiming violations of her First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The principal appeals the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the teacher's free speech, free exercise, and equal protection claims.

1. Whether the principal's alleged categorical, visibility-based restriction on teacher prayer violates the First Amendment Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
2. Whether the principal is entitled to qualified immunity based on whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the conduct
3. Whether the teacher stated a valid Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against the principal individually
4. Whether the Equal Access Act justifies the principal's restrictions on teacher prayer

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity regarding the First Amendment free speech and free exercise claims, holding that: (1) the complaint plausibly alleged a categorical, visibility-based restriction on private religious expression; (2) such restrictions violate the First Amendment under Kennedy v. Bremerton School District; and (3) Kennedy clearly established this right before the September 2023 conduct at issue. The court rejected the principal's Equal Access Act defense, finding it inapplicable to private teacher religious expression. However, the court reversed as to the equal protection claim, holding that the teacher failed to allege that the principal personally treated her differently from similarly situated employees, which is required to establish personal involvement and discriminatory intent necessary for an equal protection claim against the principal individually.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal involving a capital murder defendant challenging his death sentence on selective prosecution grounds based on evidence that prosecutors sought the death penalty partly due to his non-citizen status. The case raises jurisdictional issues regarding whether the defendant's amended claims are barred as successive habeas petitions under AEDPA and whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review a discovery order issued by a magistrate judge.

1. Whether the Fifth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction to review a discovery order issued by a magistrate judge under the collateral-order doctrine
2. Whether the Harris County District Attorney's Office, as a nonparty, was required to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) objection procedures before appealing
3. Whether the defendant's selective-prosecution claims raised in a 2015 motion to amend and a 2021 Rule 60(b) motion are jurisdictionally barred as successive habeas corpus applications under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)
4. Whether the defendant's claims qualify for exceptions to the successive petition bar under § 2244(b)(2), specifically regarding newly discovered evidence and due diligence
5. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Banister v. Davis (holding that Rule 59(e) motions are not successive petitions) permits the defendant to raise new claims in a motion to amend filed during a pending Rule 59(e) motion

The Fifth Circuit held that: (1) it has jurisdiction over the appeal under the collateral-order doctrine because the prosecutorial work-product privilege implicates a substantial public interest that would be imperiled by delayed review; (2) the Harris County District Attorney's Office has standing to appeal as a nonparty; (3) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant's selective-prosecution claims because they are barred as successive habeas petitions under § 2244(b)(2); and (4) the claims do not satisfy either exception to the successive petition bar because they do not rely on a new rule of constitutional law and could have been discovered through due diligence (the defendant's counsel did not exercise reasonable diligence in searching the prosecution's file before discovering the Siegler Memorandum in December 2014). The court reasoned that although Banister held Rule 59(e) motions are not successive petitions, the defendant's 2015 motion to amend raised claims "that could have been but were not raised before the just-issued decision" and therefore fell outside the narrow scope of Rule 59(e) motions. Similarly, the 2021 Rule 60(b) motion attempting to add new claims based on an intervening change in law was also barred. Consequently, the discovery order was vacated and the selective-prosecution claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging the dismissal of a state prisoner's petition as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The case involves whether a Kentucky state court's allowance of a belated appeal in post-conviction proceedings tolled the federal limitations period.

1. Whether a state post-conviction application remains "pending" for purposes of federal habeas tolling when a prisoner files an appeal after missing the state's 30-day deadline, but within a recognized state-law exception to timeliness rules.
2. Whether Kentucky's belated-appeal exception—which permits appeals when failure to timely file results from deficient counsel—constitutes a valid exception to the state's timeliness requirements under federal law.
3. Whether allowing belated appeals to toll the federal habeas clock undermines AEDPA's finality goals.
4. Whether the federal court should look to how a state procedure functions rather than the labels Kentucky courts apply to it.

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and held that Welch's federal habeas petition was timely. The court reasoned that: (1) Welch's belated appeal fit within a well-established Kentucky common-law exception to the 30-day appeal deadline, which applies when failure to timely appeal results from deficient counsel; (2) because this exception is recognized in Kentucky's Rules of Appellate Procedure, Welch's appeal remained "pending" under federal law, tolling the one-year AEDPA clock; (3) the court must look to how a state procedure functions, not merely the labels Kentucky courts use; (4) Kentucky's treatment of appeal deadlines as jurisdictional, yet permitting exceptions through case law, demonstrates the belated-appeal procedure is a valid exception; and (5) allowing belated appeals to toll (but not resuscitate) the federal clock respects AEDPA's finality goals while honoring the statutory language "pending." The court calculated that only 190 of 365 days had run when Welch filed his federal petition, making it timely.

This is an appeal concerning the denial of motions to intervene in a Clean Water Act case. Agricultural industry groups and the Maumee Coalition II Association sought to intervene as defendants to defend the U.S. EPA's approval of a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for phosphorus in the Maumee River and connected waterways, which environmental organizations and local governments challenged as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.

1. Whether the Maumee Coalition II Association and agricultural industry associations met the criteria for intervention of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), specifically whether they adequately rebutted the presumption of adequate representation by the existing defendants (U.S. EPA and Ohio EPA)
2. Whether the proposed intervenors possessed substantial legal interests in the case and whether those interests would be impaired by the litigation
3. Whether permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) was warranted for the Coalition, considering factors such as timeliness, common questions of law or fact, and whether intervention would unduly delay or prejudice the original parties' rights
4. The proper standard for determining when a proposed intervenor can overcome the presumption of adequate representation by demonstrating divergent arguments or conflicting interests with existing parties

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the agricultural associations' motion to intervene of right and remanded for the district court to grant intervention. The court held that the associations adequately rebutted the presumption of adequate representation because they planned to raise specific statutory arguments that conflicted with U.S. EPA's position—namely, that certain regulatory requirements imposed by EPA are not actually required by the Clean Water Act itself. The court found this conflict of interest sufficient to overcome the presumption, analogizing the situation to prior cases where proposed intervenors demonstrated divergent legal theories from existing parties. The court also found the associations met the other three criteria for intervention of right: they had a substantial interest (their members would be affected by implementation of the TMDL), that interest would be impaired (an adverse ruling could result in more stringent regulatory burdens), and the motion was timely. However, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Coalition's motion to intervene of right, finding the Coalition failed to identify arguments both relevant to the case and unlikely to be raised by existing defendants. The court also affirmed the denial of the Coalition's motion for permissive intervention, finding no clear abuse of discretion where the district court weighed the Coalition's expertise against the risk of unnecessary complication and delay in an already complex case.

This is a criminal appeal in which Isaac Tekola challenges his 105-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and Alprazolam. Specifically, Tekola appeals the district court's imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining his apartment as a premises for drug distribution purposes.

1. Whether the district court properly applied the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement when a defendant uses his primary residence for substantial drug trafficking activities
2. Whether drug trafficking must be the sole purpose of a premises or merely one of the "primary or principal uses" to qualify for the enhancement
3. Whether the district court was required to explicitly compare the frequency of the defendant's "residential use" versus "drug use" of the premises
4. How the interpretation of § 2D1.1(b)(12) relates to the interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), the underlying criminal statute

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's application of the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to determine that drug trafficking was a "primary or principal use" of Tekola's residence, even though the apartment was also his primary home. The court reasoned that: (1) the enhancement was designed to deter drug manufacturing and distribution in homes, particularly where children are present; (2) courts have consistently upheld the enhancement where defendants regularly use their homes for substantial drug trafficking activities alongside residential use; (3) the district court need not explicitly compare residential use to drug use frequency when overwhelming evidence shows the apartment was the central hub of the drug-trafficking business; (4) Tekola's case involved numerous indicia of a drug business, including large quantities of drugs, nearly $13,000 in cash, drug paraphernalia, a pay-owe sheet, and hundreds of drug transactions; and (5) the Shetler decision, which Tekola cited, does not control the interpretation of § 2D1.1(b)(12) because the enhancement is narrower than the underlying criminal statute and is not subject to vagueness challenges.

This is a criminal appeal in which defendant Mackenzie Becker challenges the validity of search warrants executed at his residence following a road-rage incident involving the discharge of a firearm. Becker also raises a Second Amendment challenge to his felon-in-possession conviction.

1. Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause by sufficiently linking defendant to the searched address and connecting the road-rage incident to that address
2. Whether the three-week delay between the incident and warrant application defeated the inference that the firearm would still be at defendant's residence
3. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms, violates the Second Amendment

The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The affidavit established probable cause through: (1) law enforcement database records linking defendant to the West Iliff Lane address; (2) corroborating surveillance observations showing defendant's vehicle from the incident parked in the driveway and defendant washing the car and entering/exiting the house; and (3) the reasonable inference that a firearm used in a crime would be kept at the offender's residence, which belongs to a "special class" of evidence likely to remain at a residence for extended periods. The court rejected defendant's argument that three weeks was too long a delay, finding that firearms are typically not disposed of after crimes and that defendant's prior felony conviction would make replacement difficult. The court also rejected the Second Amendment challenge as foreclosed by binding Tenth Circuit precedent in Vincent v. Bondi.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Rodrick Maurice Hamilton challenges his convictions for conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery arising from an armed robbery at a convenience store in Miami, as well as his 170-month sentence. Hamilton was convicted based on evidence linking him to the crime through his vehicle, phone, clothing, and co-conspirator's DNA.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in giving a jury instruction on flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt
2. Whether the government impermissibly commented on Hamilton's decision not to testify during closing argument and rebuttal, violating the Fifth Amendment
3. Whether the district court erred in denying Hamilton's motion for a new trial and failed to conduct a jury inquiry based on a juror's post-verdict statement expressing regret about the verdict
4. Whether the district court erred procedurally and substantively in imposing a 20-month upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines without advance notice

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Hamilton's convictions and sentence on all grounds. The court found: (1) the flight instruction was proper and supported by substantial evidence of Hamilton's consciousness of guilt; (2) the prosecutor's comments were logical inferences from the evidence rather than impermissible comments on Hamilton's failure to testify, and any error was harmless given the jury's clear instructions on burden of proof; (3) the district court properly denied the new trial motion because Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits inquiry into juror mental processes, and the juror's regret about the verdict fell outside the limited exceptions to this rule; and (4) the sentencing court properly imposed the above-guideline sentence either as a departure (for which adequate notice was provided through the presentence investigation report) or as a variance, and the sentence was substantively reasonable given Hamilton's violent conduct, extensive criminal history, and risk of recidivism.

This is an appeal by bondholders seeking to recover over $35 million in defaulted principal payments on Argentine sovereign bonds. The bondholders had previously sued and lost, but after obtaining authorization from an Argentine court, they refiled their complaint in New York federal court, which again dismissed the case on statute of limitations and collateral estoppel grounds.

1. Whether the bondholders' claims are barred by New York's six-year statute of limitations for contract claims, and whether the savings statute (N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 205(a)) or COVID-era executive orders toll the limitations period
2. Whether collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of whether the bondholders had authority to enforce the bonds and whether reassembly was required
3. Whether Argentine law requires bondholders to "reassemble" their bonds (return certificates and deposit equivalent cash) before suing to recover unpaid principal
4. Whether an Argentine Commercial Court's authorization for the bondholders to sue on behalf of the trustee was effective under Argentine law, particularly in light of an arbitration clause in the trust agreements

The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court held: (1) claims on the GD65 Bonds are time-barred because the savings statute does not apply when prior dismissal was based on lack of personal jurisdiction; however, claims on the AR16 Bonds are timely because New York's COVID-era executive orders automatically tolled the statute of limitations for 228 days without requiring an equitable showing; (2) collateral estoppel does not bar relitigation of the reassembly requirement because the prior appellate decision affirmed on alternative grounds and did not reach the reassembly issue; (3) Argentine law does not require reassembly as a condition precedent to suing for unpaid principal, as the cited Argentine Supreme Court decisions only addressed reassembly requirements for participation in specific debt exchange programs, not for enforcement actions; and (4) the Commercial Court's authorization was effective because the arbitration clause in the trust agreements only applies to disputes between parties, and there was no dispute here since the trustee did not oppose the bondholders' request for authorization. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the timely AR16 Bond claims.

This is an appeal of a civil rights case in which James Miller, a former corrections officer, sued supervisory employees at the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision for racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The central procedural issue is whether the district court erred in dismissing Miller's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards after defendants filed a motion styled as one for summary judgment following the completion of extensive discovery.

1. Whether a district court commits procedural error by converting a motion for summary judgment into a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and applying pleading standards rather than summary judgment standards after discovery has been completed.
2. Whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to challenge the facial sufficiency of pleadings via a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings after discovery has closed.
3. Whether the reasoning in Lugo v. City of Troy (which addressed standing challenges at the summary judgment stage) applies to challenges regarding the sufficiency of substantive claims.
4. The substantive discrimination and retaliation claims themselves, including whether Miller established that he was similarly situated to comparators and whether defendants were personally involved in alleged discrimination.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals VACATED the district court's judgment and REMANDED the case for further proceedings. The majority held that the district court committed procedural error by converting defendants' motion for summary judgment into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and applying pleading standards rather than summary judgment standards. The majority reasoned that:

1. Following the precedent established in Lugo v. City of Troy, when a defendant raises an issue at the summary judgment stage after discovery has been completed, the district court must apply summary judgment standards (Rule 56), not pleading standards (Rule 12(b)(6)).
2. Converting a summary judgment motion into a dismissal motion after extensive discovery wastes the time, effort, and resources invested by the parties and the court in developing the factual record.
3. The pleading standard serves as a screening mechanism in early litigation stages, but once discovery is complete, the summary judgment standard becomes the appropriate framework for determining whether triable issues of fact exist.
4. Defendants' failure to raise pleading deficiencies until the summary judgment stage compounds the error, as Miller could have amended his complaint earlier had the deficiency been identified sooner.
5. Even if Miller's complaint contained conclusory allegations, evidence developed during discovery may have cured those deficiencies and raised genuine disputes of material fact warranting trial.

This is an appeal by the City of Boston and related municipal entities challenging a lower court decision regarding pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs). The case involves claims against OptumRx, Inc., Express Scripts, Inc., and related entities concerning their business practices.

The document provided is an errata sheet that corrects a grammatical error in the majority opinion rather than presenting the substantive legal issues. The full opinion addressing the key legal issues is not included in the text provided.

The court issued an errata sheet on March 2, 2026, correcting a grammatical error in Judge Lynch's majority opinion, changing "PBM's" to "PBMs'" on page 3, line 19. The substantive ruling and reasoning are not detailed in this errata sheet excerpt.

This is an employment discrimination case in which a white male police officer challenged his denial of promotion to Police Chief in favor of an Arab-Muslim candidate. The plaintiff brought claims under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

1. Whether New Jersey's "Background Circumstances Rule"—which imposed a heightened evidentiary burden on non-minority plaintiffs in discrimination cases—remains valid after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services striking down the federal version of the rule under Title VII.
2. Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination under the NJLAD without the Background Circumstances Rule.
3. Whether the defendants' articulated reasons for the promotion decision were pretextual.
4. Whether the plaintiff could bring an employment discrimination claim under § 1983 based on an Equal Protection Clause violation.
5. Whether the plaintiff could proceed against the municipality under § 1981 using a Monell theory.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the NJLAD and § 1983 claims, and affirmed on the § 1981 claim. Reasoning:

1. Background Circumstances Rule: The court predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would strike down the state's version of the Background Circumstances Rule in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ames. The court reasoned that: (a) the NJLAD's text is identical to Title VII's language, protecting "any" person regardless of majority or minority status; (b) the Rule's vagueness makes it susceptible to arbitrary application; (c) New Jersey courts have historically looked to federal law for interpretive guidance; and (d) the Rule is incompatible with the NJLAD's stated purpose of eradicating discrimination in the workplace.
2. Prima Facie Case: Without the Background Circumstances Rule, the plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing: (a) he was qualified for the promotion; (b) he was denied the promotion; and (c) the position was awarded to an applicant with similar or lesser qualifications. The court found sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was qualified and that material factual disputes existed regarding Rabboh's qualifications relative to the plaintiff's.
3. Pretext: The court found material factual disputes regarding whether the defendants' stated justifications were pretextual. Specifically:
   • The defendants conceded they "considered Rabboh's race and religion" in making the decision.
   • The Borough Administrator told the plaintiff the decision was "all about race."
   • Defendant Deauna testified he preferred Rabboh in part because "he's a minority."
   • Defendant Marte stated it was "important to have a minority department head."
   • Defendant Rivera told the plaintiff he did not "look like the people in the town."
   • Regarding qualifications: the Mayor and Councilman Lodato testified the plaintiff was more qualified; Rabboh had disciplinary issues.
   • Regarding interview performance: the Council members were inattentive during the plaintiff's interview; the Borough Administrator said the plaintiff "crushed it."
   • Regarding long-term strategy: Councilman Lodato testified the candidates' plans were similar.
   • Regarding continuity: both candidates committed to serving at least five years.
   • Regarding diversity: naked invocation of diversity preference is not a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason; the defendants' diversity-related comments could be viewed as "code words" for discrimination.
4. Discriminatory Intent: The court found sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence that race and religion "made a difference" in the promotion decision, satisfying the plaintiff's burden of showing that discrimination was a motivating or determinative factor.
5. § 1983 Claim: The court reversed summary judgment on the § 1983 Equal Protection Clause claim, finding that employment discrimination claims can be brought under § 1983 based on constitutional violations (as opposed to pure statutory theories), and that the same McDonnell Douglas analysis applied.
6. § 1981 Claim: The court affirmed summary judgment on the § 1981 claim, holding that § 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for § 1981 violations against state actors, and that the plaintiff's claim was not properly structured as a § 1983 claim based on a Monell theory predicated on a § 1981 violation.

This is an appellate procedural order in a criminal case where Jerome Brown appealed his conviction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals is addressing Brown's petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.

The key procedural issues are: (1) whether the panel should grant Brown's petition for rehearing of the original decision; and (2) whether the full circuit court should rehear the case en banc.

The court granted Brown's petition for panel rehearing, vacating the opinion and judgment entered on December 11, 2025, and directing the Clerk to file an amended opinion and re-enter the judgment. However, the court denied Brown's petition for rehearing en banc, as no judge of the circuit in regular active service requested such rehearing. The amended opinion would presumably address deficiencies or errors identified in the original panel decision.

This is a Black Lung Benefits Act case in which Cedar Coal Company petitions for review of an Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding black lung benefits to Roger Mullins (now deceased, represented by his estate). The case involves disputes over evidentiary limitations and whether substantial evidence supports a finding of legal pneumoconiosis.

1. Whether Dr. Go's medical report violated regulatory limitations on affirmative evidence by interpreting pulmonary function tests (PFTs) that were submitted as treatment records rather than affirmative evidence
2. Whether the ALJ properly weighed competing medical expert opinions regarding whether Mullins suffered from legal pneumoconiosis
3. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Mullins is totally disabled due to legal pneumoconiosis

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Cedar Coal Company's petition for review and affirmed the benefits award. The court held that: (1) Dr. Go's medical report did not violate evidentiary limitations because physicians may review and interpret admissible treatment records in forming medical opinions without converting those records into affirmative evidence; (2) the ALJ properly exercised her role as factfinder in weighing competing expert opinions, crediting Dr. Go's diagnosis of legal pneumoconiosis over contrary opinions from the company's experts; and (3) substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Mullins suffered from totally disabling legal pneumoconiosis, particularly because the opposing experts' opinions were premised on an erroneous failure to diagnose pneumoconiosis, which undermined their credibility on the causation issue.

This is an appeal of a supervised release revocation judgment in which the defendant challenges the validity of the conditions upon which his revocation was based, arguing that certain discretionary supervised release conditions were never properly imposed because they were not orally pronounced at his original sentencing hearing in 2013, only appearing in the written judgment.

1. Whether the defendant's appellate waiver in his plea agreement bars him from challenging the revocation based on invalid supervised release conditions
2. Whether the defendant timely and properly raised a Rogers challenge (requiring oral pronouncement of discretionary supervised release conditions) through appeal of the revocation hearing
3. Whether the district court committed plain error by revoking supervised release based on conditions that were never orally pronounced at sentencing under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020)
4. Whether the defendant's agreement to admit to violations of the challenged conditions constitutes invited error that precludes appellate review

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the revocation judgment and remanded for resentencing. The majority held that: (1) the appellate waiver does not bar a Rogers challenge because such a challenge concerns conditions that were never properly imposed, not an appeal of an imposed sentence; (2) the defendant timely raised the Rogers challenge through appeal of the revocation judgment, which provided a "procedurally appropriate mechanism" under United States v. Newby and United States v. Brantley; (3) the district court committed plain error by revoking supervised release based on standard conditions that appeared only in the written judgment and were never orally pronounced at sentencing, rendering them nullities under Rogers; and (4) the defendant's substantial rights were affected because he was sentenced to imprisonment and extended supervised release based on invalid conditions, and the error implicates due process and liberty interests. The majority rejected the government's argument that the defendant's agreement to admit to the violations constituted invited error, reasoning that requiring defendants to forfeit appellate rights whenever they admit to violations would undermine the integrity of the judicial system. However, the dissent argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the 2013 judgment in a revocation appeal, that no Rogers error occurred because the conditions were incorporated by reference to the presentence report that the defendant had reviewed, and that the defendant invited any error by stipulating to the violations.

This is a maritime negligence case brought by an injured longshore worker under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). The plaintiff appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her negligence claims against the vessel's technical manager after she fell ten feet while unloading cargo.

1. Whether the vessel breached its "turnover duty" by failing to warn longshoremen of latent hazards in the cargo stow, specifically gaps between cargo rolls concealed by plastic sheeting
2. Whether the vessel breached its "active control duty" by maintaining oversight of cargo operations through crew presence at safety meetings and monitoring of the work
3. Whether the alleged hazard was "open and obvious" to a reasonably competent stevedore, thereby negating any duty to warn
4. Whether the vessel retained sufficient control over the cargo hold to be liable under the active control duty

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Grieg Star. The court held that:

1. Turnover Duty: Grieg Star did not breach its turnover duty because the alleged defect (gaps between cargo rolls) was open and obvious to Renteria. Although Grieg Star knew or should have known of the gaps, the plaintiff was aware of the gaps' existence and could have looked through holes in the plastic sheeting to verify conditions before stepping. Since the longshoreman knew of the defect, it was considered open and obvious, and the shipowner had no obligation to warn against it.
2. Active Control Duty: Grieg Star did not breach the active control duty because it had relinquished control of the cargo hold to the stevedore before operations began. The vessel's crew attendance at safety meetings and general oversight of cargo progress did not constitute "active control over the actual methods and operative details" of the longshoreman's work. The cargo hold where the injury occurred was under the stevedore's active control, making the stevedore primarily responsible for remedying hazards in that area.
3. The court emphasized that under maritime law, the primary responsibility for longshoreman safety rests with the stevedore, not the vessel owner, once cargo operations have begun and control has been relinquished.

This is an appeal concerning whether a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit by HPIL Holding, Inc. against minority shareholders and others for alleged looting of the corporation during a state-court receivership proceeding. The district court dismissed the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which limits federal court jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.

1. Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), deprives federal district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear HPIL's lawsuit;
2. Whether HPIL's claims constitute a disguised appeal of state-court judgments or instead assert independent claims based on third-party misconduct;
3. Whether the doctrine applies when a plaintiff alleges injuries from misconduct during legal proceedings rather than from the judgment itself;
4. Whether tension between federal claims and prior state-court rulings triggers Rooker-Feldman jurisdiction bars.

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. The court reasoned that: (1) HPIL's injuries stem from the independent tortious conduct of the defendants (fraud, looting, and pump-and-dump schemes), not from the state court's receivership judgment itself; (2) HPIL does not seek to reverse or appeal the state-court order, which had already been vacated; (3) the lawsuit challenges different wrongs, requests different relief, and involves different parties than the prior state-court proceedings; and (4) Rooker-Feldman applies only to direct appellate challenges to state judgments, not to independent claims that may incidentally conflict with prior state-court reasoning. The court emphasized that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine and that preclusion doctrines, not jurisdictional bars, are the proper mechanism for respecting prior state-court judgments.

This case involves a petition for review of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) order requiring Brown-Forman Corporation to bargain with a union after the company engaged in unfair labor practices (wage increases and benefits) designed to discourage unionization, resulting in a failed union election. The central issue is whether the Board properly relied on a new bargaining order standard (Cemex) created through adjudication rather than rulemaking.

1. Whether Brown-Forman committed unfair labor practices under Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act by announcing and implementing wage increases and benefits timed to discourage union organizing
2. Whether the Board properly considered pre-petition conduct in evaluating unfair labor practice violations
3. Whether the Board exceeded its adjudicatory authority by creating the Cemex bargaining order standard through adjudication rather than through formal rulemaking
4. Whether the Cemex standard, which makes bargaining orders the default remedy when an election is set aside due to unfair labor practices, was properly promulgated and can serve as a basis for the bargaining order against Brown-Forman

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals GRANTED Brown-Forman's petition for review and DENIED the Board's cross-petition for enforcement, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that: (1) substantial evidence supported the Board's findings that Brown-Forman committed unfair labor practices by offering wage increases and benefits to discourage unionization, and the Board properly considered pre-petition conduct; however, (2) the Cemex standard was created through an improper exercise of the Board's adjudicatory authority and therefore cannot serve as a basis for the bargaining order. The court reasoned that the Cemex standard was not derived from case-specific facts to resolve the parties' dispute, but rather was a general rule of broad applicability designed to deter future employer misconduct—a purpose that exceeds the Board's adjudicatory authority and requires formal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court emphasized that while agencies may develop policy through adjudication, they must do so to resolve the particular dispute before them, not to create general rules for future application. Since the Board relied solely on the invalid Cemex standard to issue the bargaining order, the order cannot be enforced.

This is an excessive force case under the Fourth Amendment in which a Canton, Ohio police officer shot and killed a man firing a rifle into the air in celebration of New Year's Day. The central issue is whether the officer violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law by using deadly force without warning against someone engaged in celebratory gunfire, which Canton treats as a misdemeanor.

1. Whether Officer Huber used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he shot James Williams through a privacy fence without warning
2. Whether the law was clearly established at the time of the shooting such that qualified immunity does not shield the officer from liability
3. Whether Huber had probable cause to believe Williams posed a serious threat of physical harm, which is required to justify deadly force under Tennessee v. Garner
4. Whether factual disputes regarding whether Williams moved the rifle toward Huber and whether celebratory gunfire was common in Canton precluded summary judgment

The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The court held that:

1. Constitutional Violation: When the facts are interpreted in the light most favorable to Williams's estate, Huber lacked probable cause to believe Williams posed a threat of serious physical harm. The court emphasized that: (a) it was shortly after midnight on New Year's Day when celebratory gunfire was common in Canton; (b) Huber observed no evidence of violence or criminal activity beyond the gunshots; (c) Williams was committing at most a misdemeanor; (d) Williams never moved the rifle in a threatening manner toward Huber; and (e) Huber never warned Williams or identified himself as police. Therefore, Huber violated the Fourth Amendment by shooting Williams without probable cause that he posed a threat.
2. Clearly Established Law: Although no cases with identical facts existed, the court found this was an "obvious" case where the unlawfulness of Huber's conduct followed immediately from Tennessee v. Garner's holding that officers may use deadly force only when a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm. All reasonable officers would have understood that they cannot shoot a person without warning for discharging a rifle into the air in likely celebratory gunfire on New Year's Day. The court rejected Huber's argument that the case was not obvious merely because Williams was actively shooting, noting that reasonable officers would recognize they cannot automatically shoot in the direction of gunfire without first investigating whether it was lawful activity such as celebratory gunfire.
3. The court noted its holding was narrow and would not apply if officers had additional information suggesting a risk to themselves or others, such as a 911 call reporting an ongoing crime, or if the shooting occurred in unusual circumstances like a crowded park or after a warning to stop.

This is a criminal appeal in which Jerron Williams challenges his guilty plea to assaulting a federal employee and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Williams argues that his plea was invalid because 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) does not qualify as a crime of violence to support his § 924(c) conviction, contrary to what he and everyone at his plea hearing believed.

1. Whether Williams's guilty plea violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and due process rights because the parties allegedly misunderstood whether § 111(b) qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)
2. Whether the magistrate judge adequately explained the essential elements of the charges at the change of plea hearing
3. Whether Williams waived his right to challenge the validity of his plea through his guilty plea, appeal waiver, and failure to raise the argument in his motion to withdraw the plea

The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal on multiple grounds. First, the court held that even if Williams's argument had merit, the magistrate judge properly explained the essential elements of the charges and there was no confusion in the courtroom—everyone understood that Williams's assault on the mail carrier was the "crime of violence" supporting his § 924(c) conviction. Second, and more significantly, the court found that Williams waived his argument three times over: (1) by entering an unconditional guilty plea, which waives the right to contest statutory interpretation of the conviction; (2) by signing a plea agreement with an appeal waiver; and (3) by failing to raise the § 111(b) argument in his motion to withdraw the plea despite knowing about and discussing the theory beforehand. The court reasoned that a valid guilty plea relinquishes claims that contradict the admissions necessarily made by entering the plea, and that strategic decisions not to pursue certain arguments constitute waiver.

This is a class action appeal concerning whether Amazon violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) by collecting and using facial geometry data through its Virtual Try-On (VTO) feature without proper notice, disclosure, or written consent. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all individuals who used the VTO feature on Amazon's mobile website or app while in Illinois.

1. Whether common questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), specifically regarding: (a) whether facial data captured by the VTO constitutes biometric identifiers under BIPA; (b) whether Amazon's use of the VTO means it collected or possessed biometric data; (c) whether Amazon violated BIPA Sections 15(a) and 15(b) by failing to develop data retention policies and obtain written consent; and (d) whether the geographic location requirement (that users were in Illinois) presents an individual question that defeats predominance
2. Whether affirmative defenses (consent, failure to mitigate, estoppel, and waiver) defeat class certification
3. Whether a class action is superior to individual litigation under Rule 23(b)(3), particularly given the potentially high statutory damages ($1,000-$5,000 per violation) and complex expert discovery required

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's class certification decision. The court held that: (1) Common questions about Amazon's liability predominate over the individual question of location, because while proof of location will require individualized inquiries for some class members, Rule 23(b)(3) does not require classwide proof of every element of a claim, and location is more characteristic of individual questions typically isolated in class actions rather than a core liability question; (2) The location element is manageable through a combination of billing addresses, IP and geolocation data, and affidavits, with geolocation data accurate to a city 54% of the time within a 100-kilometer radius, and Amazon retains due process rights to challenge individual proof; (3) Affirmative defenses do not defeat predominance because consent presents a common question (uniform opt-in through the "try on" button), and other defenses relate to damages rather than core liability; (4) A class action is superior to individual litigation because the high costs of expert discovery on the VTO software, the absence of individual BIPA litigation against Amazon, and the potential class size of over 100,000 people make individual suits unlikely, while class resolution will ensure uniform treatment of complex software issues and promote judicial efficiency; and (5) The potentially high aggregate damages do not defeat superiority, as BIPA reflects a permissible legislative judgment about privacy violations, and the district court retains equitable discretion to reduce unconstitutionally excessive damages.

This is an appeal in a class action case brought by Tanya V. Svoboda and Antonella M. Ortiz Colosi against Amazon.com and Amazon.com Services, LLC, with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressing a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc.

The key legal issue concerns the district court's discretion to award classwide damages on a common per-scan basis in the event of a finding of liability.

The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The court amended its prior opinion dated December 17, 2025, to clarify that the district court retained discretion to award damages on a classwide basis by assessing the amount of damages on a common per-scan basis upon a finding of liability. The panel unanimously voted to deny rehearing and issue the amended opinion.

This is a constitutional tort case arising from a 2015 incident in which Calumet City police officers entered Elias Villalobos's home without a warrant, tased him multiple times, and shot him. Villalobos sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations, and the district court granted partial summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim while denying qualified immunity. The officers appealed this denial of qualified immunity on the warrantless entry issue.

1. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the unlawful entry claim when other claims remain for trial
2. Whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering Villalobos's home without a warrant and without exigent circumstances
3. Whether the law was "clearly established" at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have known the warrantless entry was unlawful
4. Whether material factual disputes exist regarding the door exchange and timeline that preclude summary judgment

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order denying qualified immunity on the unlawful entry claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. The district court failed to address both prongs of the qualified immunity test. While it addressed whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment, it did not determine whether the law was "clearly established" at the time—a burden that rests on the plaintiff (Villalobos).
2. Villalobos failed to cite analogous precedent clearly establishing that the officers' conduct was unlawful in 2015. His reliance on distinguishing cases where officers acted constitutionally (such as United States v. Huddleston) does not satisfy his burden; he must point to cases holding that similar conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
3. Material factual disputes exist regarding: (a) who answered the door and what was said, and (b) the timeline of events, which could affect whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry under a totality of circumstances analysis.
4. On remand, Villalobos must identify specific cases with analogous facts that clearly established the unlawfulness of the officers' conduct, and both parties should clarify the disputed facts so the district court can properly apply the qualified immunity test.

This is a Fourth Amendment civil rights case brought by homeowners against police officers and the City of North Las Vegas for conducting a warrantless search of their backyard and shooting their dogs during the search. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

1. Whether officers conducting a warrantless search of the plaintiffs' walled-in backyard (curtilage) were justified by the "hot pursuit" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement when they had lost track of a fleeing suspect for at least eighteen minutes.
2. Whether the officers' shooting of the plaintiffs' two dogs constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
3. Whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity based on clearly established law at the time of the incident.
4. Whether the City of North Las Vegas could be held liable under Monell for failure to train and supervise its officers.
5. Whether the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claim.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and qualified immunity to the officers regarding the warrantless search of the backyard. The court held that the "hot pursuit" exception did not apply because the continuity of the pursuit was broken when officers lost track of the suspect for at least eighteen minutes. Under the clearly established law from United States v. Johnson (2001), officers cannot conduct warrantless searches of private properties merely because they believe a suspect is somewhere in the general vicinity. The court reasoned that allowing such searches would render the concept of "hot pursuit" meaningless and would permit police to conduct warrantless searches while investigating a suspect's whereabouts, contrary to Fourth Amendment protections against general warrants. The court affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Lieutenant Salkoff regarding the shooting of the dogs, holding that given the spontaneous nature of the confrontation and the officers' limited time to plan for the presence of dogs, the officers did not violate clearly established law. However, the court noted that the officers may still be liable for the deaths of the dogs as natural consequences of the warrantless search itself. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City on the Monell claims, finding that the plaintiffs offered no evidence of a pattern of warrantless search violations or other evidence establishing that the City was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' state law claim and remanded the case for further proceedings.