Opinions

This case involves a challenge to a modified version of the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program that expanded its scope to verify voter citizenship by incorporating Social Security Administration (SSA) records. Organizations including the League of Women Voters sued, arguing the modifications violated the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act.

1. Whether the modified SAVE program violated the confidentiality provision of the Social Security Act, which prohibits disclosure of social security numbers and related records
2. Whether the modifications violated substantive and procedural protections of the Privacy Act of 1974, including requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking before implementing new routine uses of personal information
3. Whether the modifications were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
4. Whether 8 U.S.C. §1373 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) authorizes DHS to request and receive citizenship information from SSA notwithstanding other statutory restrictions on disclosure

The Supreme Court granted the Government's application for a stay of the District Court's order vacating the modified SAVE program. The majority held that the Government is likely to succeed on the merits because 8 U.S.C. §1373, which contains "notwithstanding" clauses prohibiting interference with the exchange of citizenship information with DHS, necessarily authorizes DHS to request and receive citizenship information from SSA, thereby superseding restrictions in the Social Security Act and Privacy Act. The majority reasoned that §1373(c), which requires DHS to respond to state and local inquiries about citizenship status, contemplates an information-sharing regime like the modified SAVE program. The Court also found that the Government would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay because the order prevents it from using the program it believes best suited to assist states in verifying voter citizenship, and that the equities weigh in favor of a stay. Justice Jackson's dissent argued that §1373 does not affirmatively authorize disclosure but merely prohibits government entities from interfering with lawful exchanges, that the Government failed to show the modified SAVE system complied with applicable privacy laws, and that the majority improperly ignored the harms to lawful voters, including recently naturalized citizens at risk of disenfranchisement.

This case involves a dispute over which congressional redistricting map Missouri must use in the 2026 election. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that a 2025 redistricting map cannot take effect without voter approval in a referendum, requiring use of the 2022 map instead, but federal courts attempted to enjoin Missouri from using the 2022 map and require use of the 2025 map.

1. Whether Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires a state to use a newly enacted redistricting map in a general election when state law prohibits its implementation without voter referendum approval
2. Whether federal courts may alter election rules on the eve of an election, particularly when voting has already begun
3. The proper application of the Purcell principle, which prohibits lower federal courts from changing election rules close to an election
4. Whether the Missouri Supreme Court's September 3 decision constituted an impermissible last-minute change to election rules

The Supreme Court granted the stay application and upheld its prior September 10 stay order, keeping the 2022 map in effect for the 2026 congressional election. The Court reasoned that: (1) the Court's precedents have not established that Article I, Section 2 requires use of a primary election map in a general election, and the merits are not entirely clear-cut; (2) the Purcell principle strongly favors staying the lower court injunctions because the election had already begun with ballots printed, mailed, and absentee voting underway; (3) the Eighth Circuit incorrectly applied Purcell by blaming the Missouri Supreme Court for destabilization, when the state court had clearly warned in May 2026 that the 2025 map would not take effect without voter approval; and (4) states are free to decide whether last-minute election changes serve their interests, subject to limited federal law constraints. The Court stayed all District Court and Court of Appeals orders requiring use of the 2025 map.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant, Malik D. Parsons, appeals a conviction in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The case involves a federal criminal matter where the defendant challenges his conviction or sentence.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this errata sheet, which is a procedural document issued to correct typographical errors in the original opinion rather than to address substantive legal matters.

This document is an errata sheet that amends the Court's opinion issued on September 11, 2026. The amendment corrects a grammatical error on page 3, line 8, changing "seventy-months" to "seventy-months'" (adding a possessive apostrophe). The errata sheet does not indicate a change to the substantive ruling itself, only a correction to the written text of the opinion.

This is an appeal concerning whether Rhode Island waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for discrimination claims brought under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA) by incarcerated individuals against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections. The court addresses whether RICRA discrimination claims fall within the State Tort Claims Act's general waiver of sovereign immunity.

1. Whether RICRA discrimination claims constitute "actions of tort" under Rhode Island's State Tort Claims Act, which contains a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity for all tort actions
2. Whether Rhode Island's waiver of sovereign immunity in the State Tort Claims Act extends to suits in federal court, not just state court
3. Whether the waiver applies to discrimination claims created by a statute enacted after the State Tort Claims Act was passed
4. Whether the stringent federal standard for finding Eleventh Amendment waivers—requiring "the most express language or such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction"—is satisfied

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections' motion for summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds. The court held that Rhode Island waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for RICRA discrimination claims. The court's reasoning proceeded as follows: (1) The Rhode Island Supreme Court previously held in Laird v. Chrysler Corp. that the State Tort Claims Act manifests a legislative intent to broadly waive sovereign immunity for all actions of tort in both state and federal court; (2) The Rhode Island Supreme Court answered the certified question by holding that RICRA discrimination claims are "actions of tort" analogous to negligence or medical malpractice claims; (3) Reading the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretations of state law in Laird and the certified question answer together, there is "no room for any other reasonable construction" than that Rhode Island waived immunity for RICRA claims; (4) The court rejected RIDOC's arguments that: (a) the state legislature's intent was not sufficiently clear regarding RICRA specifically, (b) the waiver should not apply to torts created by later-enacted statutes, and (c) the waiver applies only to state court suits. The court emphasized that when a state's highest court has expressly held that a state statute includes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, that determination is dispositive of the federal law question.

This case involves KalshiEX LLC, a financial services company operating a designated contract market (DCM), challenging Ohio and Tennessee state gambling laws as preempted by the federal Commodities Exchange Act (CEA). The company sought preliminary injunctions to prevent state enforcement actions against its sports-event contracts, with conflicting results in the two district courts.

1. Whether Kalshi has a cause of action under Ex parte Young to challenge state enforcement of gambling laws based on federal preemption
2. Whether Kalshi's sports-event contracts constitute "swaps" under the CEA's statutory definition, thereby falling within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction
3. Whether the CEA expressly or impliedly preempts Ohio's and Tennessee's gambling laws as applied to Kalshi's sports-event contracts
4. Whether the rule of last antecedent applies to extend CFTC jurisdiction to all agreements traded on a DCM, regardless of whether they are swaps

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Southern District of Ohio's denial of a preliminary injunction and vacated the Middle District of Tennessee's grant of a preliminary injunction. The court held:

1. Kalshi has a valid cause of action under Ex parte Young to seek equitable relief enjoining state officials from enforcing state laws claimed to be preempted by federal law, as this is distinguishable from Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., which addressed enforcement of federal statutes rather than preemption defenses.
2. Kalshi's sports-event contracts do not constitute "swaps" under 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii). For an event to be "associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence," it must be intrinsically associated with a financial consequence such that hedging financial risk or deriving pricing information would be beneficial. Sports events like who wins a game or how many corner kicks occur have only downstream economic consequences, not inherent financial consequences like interest rate changes. The court rejected Kalshi's broad interpretation that would expose millions of Americans to criminal liability for ordinary gambling activities.
3. The rule of last antecedent does not apply to § 2(a)(1)(A). The series-qualifier canon applies instead, meaning the modifier "involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery" applies to the entire series of "accounts, agreements, and transactions," not just transactions.
4. Even assuming arguendo that Kalshi's sports-event contracts are swaps, the CEA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts the states' gambling laws. The "exclusive jurisdiction" provision is an unusual express preemption provision that focuses on delineating responsibility among regulatory bodies rather than preempting state law. The provision displaces only direct enforcement and regulatory authority over DCM licensing and operation, not ancillary regulations that incidentally burden DCMs. The presumption against preemption applies with particular force because gambling regulation is a field traditionally occupied by the states. The CEA contains more typical express preemption language elsewhere, and Congress's failure to use such language in § 2(a)(1)(A) indicates no intent to preempt state gaming laws.

This is a federal drug trafficking appeal in which Srecko Walker was convicted of three cocaine-related offenses involving a conspiracy to distribute cocaine through the mail. Walker appeals his convictions on multiple grounds, including challenges to the search warrant, admission of proffer statements, and denial of his right to confront a witness.

1. Whether the search warrant for Walker's residence was supported by probable cause
2. Whether the district court properly admitted Walker's proffer statements at trial despite Federal Rule of Evidence 410 protections
3. Whether Walker's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights were violated when he was unable to cross-examine co-defendant Rasic
4. Whether Walker validly waived his Rule 410 and Confrontation Clause protections

The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED Walker's convictions on all grounds. On the search warrant, the court held that the affidavit established probable cause. The affidavit detailed Walker's criminal history, observations of two drug transactions occurring shortly after Walker left the residence, confirmation that Walker's phone number matched the dealer's number provided by a purchaser, and his relationship to the residence owner. The court found this created a fair probability that evidence of drug dealing would be found at the residence. Alternatively, even if the warrant were defective, the good-faith exception applied because the affidavit was not "bare bones" and contained sufficient factual allegations linking Walker to drug trafficking. On the proffer statements, the court held that Walker waived his Rule 410 protections. Although the proffer agreement initially protected Walker's statements, it contained an exception allowing the government to use statements if Walker offered evidence or arguments materially inconsistent with his proffer. When Walker's counsel presented an opening argument suggesting Walker was involved only in a buyer-seller relationship rather than a conspiracy, defense counsel conceded this was inconsistent with the proffer and agreed that such statements should be admissible. This constituted an intentional relinquishment of a known right, effecting a valid waiver. On the Confrontation Clause issue, the court held that Walker waived his right to confront Rasic. When Rasic became unavailable to testify, the court offered Walker the choice of delaying trial or instructing the jury to disregard Rasic's testimony. Walker, through counsel, requested the limiting instruction and personally confirmed his agreement with this approach. This constituted a valid waiver of his confrontation rights, as Walker intentionally relinquished his ability to cross-examine Rasic.

This is a federal drug trafficking appeal in which Gary Howard, a confidential informant for the Department of Homeland Security who engaged in unauthorized drug dealing, challenges his convictions on three drug conspiracy and distribution counts. Howard was arrested during two separate sting operations and claims his trial was unfair due to the exclusion of his handler's testimony and the admission of evidence from a warrantless search.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by granting the handler's motion to quash a subpoena based on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination concerns, and whether this deprived Howard of a fair trial on his public authority defense
2. Whether evidence from a warrantless search of Howard's home and cell phone was properly admitted under the inevitable discovery doctrine exception to the exclusionary rule
3. Whether the trial evidence was sufficient to support convictions on three drug conspiracy and distribution counts
4. Whether the district court properly denied Howard's motions to suppress evidence, dismiss for vindictive prosecution, sever counts, and declare a mistrial
5. Whether Howard's 156-month sentence was reasonable

The Court of Appeals affirmed Howard's convictions and sentence. The court held:

1. Subpoena Quashing: The district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the handler's subpoena because the handler had reasonable cause to fear self-incrimination from multiple sources: potential use of testimony in a pending appeal, exposure of past perjury, and risk of witness-tampering charges. The court found Howard's public authority defense was not disabled, as the jury was permitted to consider it and ample evidence showed Howard lacked actual authorization for the drug deals.
2. Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: Evidence from the warrantless search was properly admitted because law enforcement had probable cause to search Howard's home and cell phone, and would have obtained a search warrant through routine procedures. The court distinguished Riley v. California, holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule, not the warrant requirement.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence: Sufficient evidence supported convictions on all three counts. For the conspiracy charge, the court found a conditional agreement existed between Howard and his co-defendant to purchase cocaine, distinguishing it from a mere buyer-seller relationship. For the attempted possession charge, the jury could reasonably infer Howard intended to complete the purchase despite having only partial funds. For the 2017 conspiracy charge, recordings and testimony established Howard's participation in a drug distribution conspiracy.
4. Other Motions: The motion to sever counts was waived for failure to renew at close of evidence; the vindictive prosecution claim failed due to lack of objective evidence of malice; and the mistrial motion was waived by failure to file in writing as required by the court.
5. Sentencing: The 156-month sentence within the Guidelines range was reasonable and presumptively valid, as the district court adequately considered aggravating and mitigating factors.

This is an immigration case in which Juan Antonio Perez-Garcia petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his request for reinstatement of voluntary departure. The central issue is whether the court has jurisdiction to review the BIA's failure to consider evidence of Perez-Garcia's bond payment when deciding whether to reinstate his voluntary departure period.

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of voluntary departure given statutory provisions that limit judicial review of discretionary relief decisions
2. Whether the BIA's failure to consider evidence of bond payment constitutes reviewable legal error or unreviewable factual error under Patel v. Garland
3. Whether an agency's complete failure to consider dispositive evidence in the record constitutes legal error requiring remand

The majority (Judges Desai and Mendoza) held that the court has jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision and that the BIA committed legal error by failing to consider Perez-Garcia's proof of bond payment. The court reasoned that while judicial review of discretionary relief is generally limited, the Real ID Act preserves jurisdiction to review "constitutional claims or questions of law." The BIA's failure to consider highly probative or dispositive evidence—here, the only relevant evidence on a dispositive issue—constitutes legal error, not merely a factual determination. The court distinguished Patel, which involved quintessential factual determinations about credibility and subjective intent requiring weighing of conflicting evidence, from this case where the BIA simply ignored evidence entirely. The court remanded for the BIA to reconsider whether to reinstate voluntary departure.

Judge Collins dissented in part, arguing the court lacks jurisdiction because the BIA's error was factual, not legal. He contended that the BIA correctly stated the applicable legal rule but simply misapprehended the facts regarding whether Perez-Garcia posted the bond. Under Patel, factual determinations in discretionary relief cases are unreviewable, and characterizing obvious factual errors as legal errors effectively eviscerates the jurisdictional bar.

This is a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Alex Medrano alleged that two Bell Gardens Police Department officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force when they approached him with guns drawn and aimed at his head to execute a felony arrest warrant. The case involves the application of qualified immunity doctrine to police officers' use of force during arrest.

1. Whether the officers violated Medrano's Fourth Amendment rights by approaching him with firearms drawn and aimed at his head during the execution of a felony arrest warrant
2. Whether the officers' conduct constituted excessive force under the Graham v. Connor balancing test, which requires weighing the severity of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the government's interests
3. Whether Medrano's claimed Fourth Amendment right was "clearly established" under existing law at the time of the arrest, which is necessary to overcome qualified immunity

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and ruled in favor of the officers. The majority held that:

1. No Fourth Amendment Violation: The officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by approaching Medrano with weapons drawn. Although pointing guns at a suspect constitutes a high level of force, the officers reasonably believed that Medrano had committed serious felony drug offenses, posed a threat to their safety (given his gang affiliation, prior flight from law enforcement, erratic behavior, and the presence of a pit bull), and was actively evading a felony arrest warrant. Under the Graham balancing test, these government interests justified the use of force employed.
2. Clearly Established Law: Even assuming excessive force occurred, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because Medrano's claimed right was not clearly established. The court distinguished Robinson v. Solano County, which involved officers investigating a misdemeanor and terrorizing an unarmed, compliant suspect, from the present case involving a felony arrest of a suspect believed to be dangerous and actively evading arrest.

This is a petition for rehearing en banc in a habeas corpus case involving David Scott Detrich, an inmate in the Arizona Department of Corrections, challenging his conviction or sentence.

The key legal issue is whether the full court should reconsider a prior panel decision in this habeas corpus matter on appeal.

The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. The court found that no judge of the court requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc, and therefore the petition does not meet the requirements for en banc reconsideration under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 and Ninth Circuit General Order 5.8. The court also stated that no further petitions for rehearing will be entertained.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Roman Sterlingov, a dual Swedish-Russian national, challenges his convictions for creating and operating Bitcoin Fog, a cryptocurrency mixer allegedly used to facilitate money laundering and conceal illicit transactions. Sterlingov was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering, substantive money laundering, and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, and sentenced to 150 months imprisonment.

1. Whether venue was proper in the District of Columbia for all four counts, particularly based on an undercover FBI agent's transactions with Bitcoin Fog conducted from D.C.
2. Whether the government proved criminal conduct within the applicable statute of limitations periods
3. Whether expert testimony regarding IP address analysis and Reactor (a cryptocurrency clustering tool) satisfied reliability requirements under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert standards
4. Whether denial of access to Reactor's source code violated Sterlingov's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and Fifth Amendment Due Process rights
5. Whether admission of evidence regarding Welcome to Video (a child sexual abuse material darknet site) violated Rule 403 and constituted constructive amendment of the indictment
6. Whether a willful blindness jury instruction was properly given
7. Whether the District Court correctly calculated the amount of laundered funds for sentencing purposes

The Court of Appeals affirmed all convictions and the 150-month sentence. On venue, the court held that venue was proper in D.C. for all counts because: (1) for the money laundering counts, the FBI agent received laundered funds in D.C.; (2) for the conspiracy count, the transfer of funds to and from Bitcoin Fog in D.C. furthered the conspiracy; and (3) for the unlicensed money transmission counts, Bitcoin Fog served customers in D.C. The court rejected the statute of limitations challenge, finding that the FBI agent's November 2019 undercover transactions with Bitcoin Fog fell within the applicable limitations periods, and that evidence supported an inference the conspiracy continued with unknown co-conspirators within the limitations period. Regarding expert testimony, the court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony from Mazars (IP overlap analysis), Scholl, and Bisbee (Reactor clustering analysis), finding the testimony reliable based on the experts' explanations of methodology, experience, anecdotal evidence of accuracy, industry-wide acceptance of Reactor, and corroborating evidence—noting that Daubert factors are not exhaustive and that blockchain tracing is too new to require peer review. The court rejected Sterlingov's Confrontation Clause challenge to denial of Reactor's source code, holding that machine-generated evidence is not testimonial and does not implicate the Confrontation Clause, and rejected his Due Process claim because he failed to explain why the source code was material to his defense and his counsel had access to the underlying heuristics. The court upheld admission of Welcome to Video evidence under Rule 403, finding it had probative value in showing the type of activity Bitcoin Fog facilitated and that prejudice was limited by redaction of video titles. The court found no constructive amendment because jury instructions limited guilt to conspiracy involving drug dealing, not child pornography. The court rejected challenges to cooperating witness testimony as forfeited for lack of adequate briefing but found it admissible as relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. The court upheld the willful blindness instruction, finding both prongs of the test were satisfied: Sterlingov claimed lack of knowledge regarding whether he saw Agent Price's messages, and evidence showed he deliberately designed Bitcoin Fog to avoid learning about illicit uses. Finally, the court upheld the $400 million laundered funds calculation, holding that Sterlingov bore the burden of proving the amount of criminally derived funds and failed to meet that burden by presenting no information about the allegedly legitimate funds.

This is an administrative law case in which Alstom Transportation challenges the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) decision to waive the "Buy America" requirement for the Brightline West high-speed rail project, allowing Brightline to purchase trains manufactured by Siemens abroad instead of domestically produced trains. The court addresses whether Alstom has Article III standing to bring this challenge and, if so, whether the FRA's waiver decision was lawful.

1. Whether Alstom has Article III standing to challenge the FRA's waiver of the Buy America requirement, specifically whether Alstom suffered a concrete injury that was caused by the agency action and would be redressed by a favorable court decision.
2. Whether the FRA's interpretation of the Buy America waiver provision was correct, particularly regarding whether the waiver applies based on current non-availability or future availability of domestically-produced goods.
3. Whether the FRA's decision to grant the waiver was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The majority held that Alstom has Article III standing and that the FRA's waiver decision was lawful. On standing, the court found that Alstom suffered a concrete injury (lost profits from losing a valuable business opportunity) that was traceable to the FRA's waiver and would be redressed by vacating it. The court reasoned that the $3 billion in federal funding created a stark economic choice for Brightline: either purchase trains from Alstom to retain the funding or lose the funding by purchasing from Siemens. Commonsense economic inferences made it substantially likely that Brightline would choose Alstom if the waiver were vacated. On the merits, the court held that the FRA correctly interpreted the waiver provision as applying based on present-tense non-availability of domestically-produced high-speed trains capable of traveling at 186 mph, not future availability. The court also found the waiver decision was not arbitrary because the FRA reasonably explained its decision based on significant technological differences between the trains and the specialized nature of high-speed rail manufacturing. Judge Walker dissented on the standing issue, arguing that Alstom failed to show that Brightline would likely abandon its contract with Siemens and choose Alstom, as Brightline might instead renegotiate with Siemens or seek an alternative waiver.

This case involves a challenge by Anthropic PBC to the Department of War's exclusion of Claude, an artificial intelligence product, from the federal supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018. The Department excluded Claude after Anthropic refused to remove contractual prohibitions on the use of its AI model for lethal autonomous warfare and mass domestic surveillance.

1. Whether the Department of War had jurisdiction to exclude Anthropic from its supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act
2. Whether Claude's use constitutes a "supply chain risk" as defined by the statute, specifically whether Anthropic's ability to enforce contractual restrictions on Claude's functionality qualifies as "manipulating" the design or operation of a covered information-technology product
3. Whether less intrusive measures were reasonably available to reduce the alleged supply chain risk
4. Whether an urgent national security interest justified immediate exclusion without advance notice and opportunity to respond
5. Whether the exclusion violated Anthropic's Fifth Amendment due process rights
6. Whether the exclusion violated Anthropic's First Amendment free speech rights by retaliating against the company's advocacy for AI safety restrictions

The court upheld the Department of War's exclusion of Anthropic from its supply chain. The majority held that:

1. The court had jurisdiction to review the covered procurement actions taken under the Supply Chain Security Act
2. Anthropic's ability and willingness to enforce contractual restrictions on Claude's functionality through model training constitutes "manipulating" the design and operation of a covered information-technology product within the statutory definition of "supply chain risk." The court rejected Anthropic's argument that "manipulate" requires proof of malicious intent, holding that the statute focuses on the effect of manipulation, not the intent behind it
3. The Department reasonably concluded that less intrusive measures were not available, as the contested use restrictions were not self-defining and the Department could not reliably test new model versions in advance to ensure they would perform as needed
4. The Secretary's determination that an urgent national security interest required immediate action was reasonable given the rapid evolution of AI technology, the Department's strategic need for AI systems, and recent disputes over Claude's use in military operations. Anthropic suffered no prejudice from the delayed notice because it received post-deprivation process and the materials it submitted would not have changed the Department's decision
5. The exclusion did not violate due process because post-deprivation process satisfied constitutional requirements where the government must act quickly for national security reasons
6. The exclusion did not violate the First Amendment because the Department excluded Anthropic based on its refusal to agree to a contract term deemed essential to national security, not because of its advocacy for AI safety restrictions. The causal connection required for a retaliation claim was absent

This is a property dispute between neighboring landowners regarding the use and maintenance of Persimmon Tree Lane, a private unpaved farm lane in Delaware. The Petitioners own a commercial poultry farm that relies on the lane for access, while the Respondent owns the lane itself and adjoining property. The court determined the proportionate share of maintenance and restoration costs each party must bear.

1. Whether an express easement exists for the Petitioners' use of the lane
2. How to allocate responsibility for routine maintenance costs between the dominant estate owner (Petitioners) and servient estate owner (Respondent)
3. Whether the lane requires restoration beyond ordinary maintenance and how restoration costs should be allocated
4. Whether the Respondent is entitled to recover attorneys' fees based on bad faith conduct by the Petitioners

The court ruled that: (1) an express easement exists in the Petitioners' deed; (2) the Petitioners shall bear 75% of reasonable third-party maintenance costs and the Respondent shall bear 25%, based on proportional use of the lane; (3) the lane requires restoration to reestablish an adequate crown for drainage, and the same 75%-25% cost allocation applies to restoration expenses; (4) the Respondent is not entitled to attorneys' fees, as the Petitioners' conduct does not meet the stringent "bad faith" exception to Delaware's American Rule. The court reasoned that the Petitioners' heavy commercial traffic from their expanded poultry operation (approximately 75% of total lane use) places materially greater burden on the lane than the Respondent's residential and agricultural use (approximately 25%), and therefore costs should be allocated proportionally. The court also noted that the Respondent, as owner of the servient estate, shall arrange for restoration and future maintenance through independent third-party contractors.

This is an appeal involving a class action lawsuit brought by individuals against magisterial district judges and Lancaster County regarding their official capacities and practices at the Lancaster County Prison. The case involves a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc.

The opinion does not detail the substantive legal issues on the merits, as this order addresses only procedural matters regarding rehearing petitions rather than the underlying claims in the case.

The court GRANTED the appellants' petition for panel rehearing and directed the Clerk to file an amended opinion contemporaneously with the order. However, the court clarified that the revisions do not affect the disposition of the appeal, so the judgment remains as originally filed. The court DENIED the appellees' petition for rehearing en banc, as no judge who concurred in the original decision requested rehearing and a majority of the circuit judges did not vote for rehearing.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Kerron Andrews sued the Baltimore City Police Department and two detectives for violating his Fourth Amendment rights by using a cell-site simulator (Hailstorm) to track his cellphone location to a private residence without a warrant. Andrews was arrested based on this tracking, spent nearly two years in pretrial detention, and was ultimately released after Maryland courts ruled the warrantless use of the simulator violated his constitutional rights.

1. Whether the use of a cell-site simulator to track a suspect's real-time cellphone location constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether the detectives are entitled to qualified immunity based on whether the constitutional right violated was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct
3. Whether the detectives are entitled to Maryland public official immunity
4. Whether the Baltimore City Police Department can be held liable under Monell doctrine for municipal policy or practice violations
5. Whether a pen register order (PRO) obtained by the detectives satisfied Fourth Amendment warrant requirements

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The Fourth Circuit held that: (1) the use of a cell-site simulator to track a cellphone's real-time location does constitute a Fourth Amendment search, particularly when used to locate a suspect inside a private residence; however, (2) the detectives are entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional right was not "clearly established" at the time of the 2014 conduct, as no federal appellate court had previously addressed whether cell-site simulator use constitutes a search; (3) the detectives are also entitled to Maryland public official immunity for state constitutional claims; and (4) Andrews failed to present sufficient evidence of a municipal policy or practice to hold the police department liable under Monell doctrine, as the non-disclosure agreement with the FBI alone was insufficient to establish an unconstitutional custom or policy. The court reasoned that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence had not kept pace with rapidly evolving technology, and legislative and policy changes clarifying the warrant requirement occurred after the events in question, making it unreasonable to expect the officers to have known their conduct violated clearly established law.

This is an appeal of a trust dispute case in which Elizabeth Koeberer challenged the dismissal of her claims against the trustee, bank, attorneys, and siblings related to the handling of a testamentary trust established by her mother in 2013. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims.

1. Whether Koeberer stated a viable negligence per se claim under the Bank Secrecy Act
2. Whether Koeberer's Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) claim was timely filed
3. Whether the economic-loss rule bars Koeberer's negligence claim against Chase Bank
4. Whether Koeberer stated a viable claim for violations of NACHA operating rules
5. Whether Koeberer established an abuse-of-process claim against her siblings
6. Whether the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims

The court affirmed dismissal of all claims. Regarding the Bank Secrecy Act claim, the court held that because the Act contains no private right of action, Koeberer cannot use a violation to support a negligence per se claim under Ohio law. The EFTA claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, as the alleged violations occurred in 2014-2015 but the complaint was filed in February 2025; the discovery rule and continuing-violation doctrine do not apply to the EFTA's limitations period. The negligence claim against Chase Bank was barred by Ohio's economic-loss rule because Koeberer failed to identify a tort duty independent of contractual obligations, and Ohio law does not recognize a fiduciary duty between a bank and its customer absent special circumstances. The NACHA claim failed because the deposit account agreement did not incorporate NACHA rules or identify Koeberer as an intended beneficiary. The abuse-of-process claims against her siblings failed because the probate court had authority to rule on the motions at issue, and merely acting with bad intentions does not constitute abuse of process. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims once all federal claims were dismissed.

This is a First Amendment pre-enforcement challenge to Tennessee's "Recruitment Provision," which criminalizes intentionally recruiting unemancipated minors to obtain abortions that would be illegal in Tennessee, regardless of where the abortion is performed. Two abortion-rights advocates challenged the statute as violating the First Amendment both facially and as applied to their counseling and advocacy activities.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge, including whether they face a credible threat of prosecution under the statute
2. Whether the Recruitment Provision violates the First Amendment as applied to plaintiffs' speech and counseling activities
3. Whether the Recruitment Provision is facially overbroad under the First Amendment
4. Whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague (not reached by the court)

The Sixth Circuit AFFIRMED the district court's judgment, holding that: (1) plaintiffs have standing to challenge the statute based on a credible threat of enforcement, satisfying all McKay factors; (2) the Recruitment Provision violates the First Amendment as applied to plaintiffs because it constitutes viewpoint discrimination restricting their ability to counsel minors about legal abortion options, and Tennessee forfeited its strict scrutiny defense; and (3) the statute is facially overbroad because a substantial portion of its applications restrict protected speech about legal abortions. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language applies to recruitment for legal abortions performed in other states, not just illegal abortions, and therefore criminalizes protected speech including counseling, encouragement, and emotional support. The court rejected Tennessee's attempts to narrowly construe the statute and distinguished the statute from laws regulating speech integral to criminal conduct, since the statute applies to legal abortions. The court also rejected the dissent's analogy to sex trafficking, noting that abortion is legal in many states post-Dobbs and Americans hold varied views on abortion regulation.

This is a federal jurisdiction case involving a landlord-tenant dispute over water intrusion and mold contamination in military housing. Defendants removed the state court action to federal court based on federal enclave, federal officer, and federal agency jurisdiction, but the district court remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed on remand from the Supreme Court.

1. Whether federal enclave jurisdiction exists over the Saipan Property located at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado based on the 1897 California cession statute, the 1940 federal acquisition statute, and the Submerged Lands Act
2. Whether the defendants (San Diego Family Housing and Lincoln Military Property Management) qualify for removal under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), and the proper interpretation of "acting under" a federal officer in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish
3. Whether San Diego Family Housing qualifies as a federal agency under 28 U.S.C. § 451 and the six-factor Hoag Ranches test

The court affirmed the district court's remand order, holding that no basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Regarding federal enclave jurisdiction: The court held that regardless of whether the Saipan Property was created through dredging and filling operations (1941-1943) or acquired through civil condemnation (1955), the defendants failed to provide evidence that the federal government assented to exclusive jurisdiction over the property as required by the 1940 Act. The plain meaning of "acquire" encompasses land created by dredging and filling, and the 1897 California statute's requirement that land be "ceded or conveyed" to the United States precludes application to land created by the government itself. Regarding federal officer removal: The court clarified the federal officer removal doctrine in light of Plaquemines, holding that removal requires: (1) the defendant must be a federal officer or person "acting under" a federal officer; (2) the suit must be "for or relating to any act under color of such office"; and (3) the defendant must assert a colorable federal defense. Critically, a defendant need not show that federal duties specifically required or strictly caused the challenged conduct. However, the defendants failed to satisfy the "acting under" requirement because they did not show involvement in an effort to assist federal officers' duties. The court found: (1) defendants operated independently rather than as the Navy's agent; (2) federal oversight did not rise to subjection, guidance, or control; (3) the mold management plan left defendants significant discretion and merely required compliance with applicable laws; and (4) while defendants performed basic governmental tasks, this factor alone is insufficient, and allowing removal would sweep in every military contractor dispute contrary to Congress's MPHI purpose. Regarding federal agency status: The court applied the six-factor Hoag Ranches test and concluded SDFH is not a federal agency because: (1) leasing military housing under MPHI is not exclusively governmental; (2) government control is limited; (3) initial capitalization does not show ongoing operational financing; (4) the private partner Lincoln/Clark retains exclusive management and control, making the government's interest merely custodial or incidental; (5) no statute identifies SDFH as an agency; and (6) SDFH is not treated as an arm of the government for other purposes.

This is a class action appeal concerning whether PeopleConnect, Inc., which operates Classmates.com, violated California's right-of-publicity statute (Cal. Civ. Code § 3344) by making individuals' names searchable in digitized yearbooks without consent. The district court certified damages and injunctive classes, and PeopleConnect appealed the certification order.

1. Whether the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied when the defendant argues that § 3344 requires proof that an individual's name was actually searched, rather than merely searchable
2. Whether § 3344 claims can be adjudicated on a classwide basis without individualized evidence of injury (mental anguish or economic harm)
3. Whether the district court identified adequate methods to identify and exclude class members who consented to the use of their names or whose names are not searchable
4. Whether the lead plaintiff adequately represents the class under Rule 23(a)(4), including whether her decision to proceed solely on a "searchable" theory creates an intraclass conflict with class members whose names were actually searched
5. Whether the lead plaintiff adequately represents the injunctive class despite her name no longer being searchable on the website

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's certification of both damages and injunctive classes. On predominance, the court held that: (1) whether searchability alone is sufficient to establish a § 3344 violation is a merits question that cannot be decided at the certification stage; the district court properly focused on whether common evidence could establish the "direct connection" element, which the statute designates as a question of fact; (2) economic injury can be established through common evidence and reasonable inferences, such as that a company using someone's likeness in advertising believes it has value; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that occasional instances of individuals sharing names, individuals who registered for accounts or donated yearbooks, and technical searchability issues do not defeat predominance or manageability, as these can be addressed through self-certification, cross-checking, and later claim administration processes. On adequacy, the court held that: (1) PeopleConnect's argument that the lead plaintiff's decision to proceed solely on a searchable theory creates an intraclass conflict was not properly raised at the certification stage, but the court provided guidance for the district court if the issue is raised on remand, noting that courts should consider whether the strategic choice secures benefits of aggregate litigation and strikes a justifiable balance between abandoned and pursued claims; (2) the lead plaintiff adequately represents the injunctive class because her theory requires only searchability (not actual searching), and PeopleConnect cannot moot her claim by voluntarily ceasing the challenged conduct after suit was filed.

This is a False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam action brought by relators Mei Ling and the Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley against the City of Los Angeles for allegedly misrepresenting its compliance with federal housing accessibility laws to obtain federal housing funds. The United States intervened and the parties settled the FCA claims for $38.3 million, which the district court approved as fair, adequate, and reasonable.

1. Whether a Voluntary Compliance Agreement (VCA) between the City and the Department of Housing and Urban Development constitutes an "alternate remedy" under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5), which would entitle relators to a share of any recovery pursued through that alternate remedy.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in approving the FCA settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B), despite the settlement amount being significantly lower than the Government's initial damages calculation.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's approval of the FCA settlement. The court held that:

1. The VCA was not an "alternate remedy" under the FCA because an alternate remedy must "take the place of" the FCA suit, and here the FCA action proceeded to a successful $38 million settlement. The VCA explicitly carved out FCA claims and addressed different legal violations (the City's underlying civil rights violations regarding accessible housing) rather than the fraud claim at issue in the FCA (false certifications of compliance). The court distinguished the case from Barajas, where the government pursued a suspension/debarment proceeding that effectively prevented relators from continuing their original action.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement amount because the Government is entitled to substantial deference in settling qui tam cases, and the settlement was reasonable given the extended litigation, discovery, and negotiation over nine years, the City's vigorous defense, the Government's recalculation of damages using a "benefit-of-the-bargain approach," and legitimate public policy considerations regarding the City's budget constraints for affordable housing and other public goods.

This is an employment discrimination case in which a registered nurse challenged her employer's mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy on religious grounds. The case addresses whether the employee adequately pleaded a prima facie religious discrimination claim under Title VII and Oregon state law when her detailed religious objections were contained in a letter not attached to the original complaint.

1. Whether the district court properly considered the employee's religious exemption request letter under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine when deciding a motion to dismiss
2. Whether the employee adequately pleaded that the employer's vaccination policy conflicted with her bona fide religious beliefs to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
3. The proper standard for evaluating whether an employee's objection to an employment policy is based on genuine religious conviction versus purely secular concerns, particularly following the court's recent decision in Detwiler
4. Whether courts may examine the sincerity and reasonableness of asserted religious beliefs at the pleading stage

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that: (1) the religious exemption letter was central to the employee's claim and should have been considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, even though not attached to the complaint; (2) the employee adequately pleaded a prima facie religious discrimination claim by specifically explaining her religious objection to the vaccine based on her Christian faith's opposition to abortion and the use of fetal cells in vaccine development, supported by biblical citation; (3) while courts must distinguish between religious and purely secular objections, they cannot probe the sincerity or reasonableness of religious beliefs themselves; and (4) the employee's objection satisfied the plausibility standard because it demonstrated a nexus between her religious convictions and her objection to the policy, unlike the plaintiff in Detwiler whose objection appeared based solely on secular medical concerns. The court emphasized that judges are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation and must accept sincere religious beliefs at face value.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in a case where a cisgender high school wrestler and her mother challenge state and school district policies that permit transgender student athletes to compete on teams aligned with their gender identity. The plaintiffs sought emergency relief requiring notice and an opt-out opportunity when their daughter competes against transgender athletes.

1. Whether plaintiffs demonstrated a genuine emergency necessitating urgent relief
2. Whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claims, relying on Mahmoud v. Taylor and Mirabelli v. Bonta
3. Whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Title IX claims, given that the Supreme Court left this question open in West Virginia v. B.P.J.
4. Whether the balance of hardships tips in plaintiffs' favor and whether the proposed injunction is appropriately tailored
5. Whether granting the injunction would compromise other students' privacy rights under federal law

The Ninth Circuit denied the application for an emergency preliminary injunction pending appeal. The court found that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the required factors for injunctive relief. Specifically: (1) plaintiffs did not demonstrate a genuine emergency—wrestling season does not begin until mid-November, well after their requested relief date of September 25, 2026; (2) plaintiffs failed to make a strong showing on the merits, as their Due Process claims do not fit within the holdings of Mahmoud or Mirabelli, and the Title IX question remains open under Supreme Court precedent; (3) the balance of hardships does not tip sharply in plaintiffs' favor because the District already permits K.M.K. to forfeit matches without adverse consequences, and plaintiffs' proposed injunction is overbroad—seeking notice of all transgender athletes across multiple sports rather than addressing the specific harm from one student; and (4) granting the injunction would compromise other students' privacy rights by requiring disclosure of sensitive information about transgender students, which would constitute a mandatory injunction subject to a heightened standard that plaintiffs did not satisfy.

This is a breach of contract case in which Castle Tire Disposal seeks a contingent value payment from Liberty Tire Services of Ohio under an asset purchase agreement, arguing that a private equity firm's acquisition of Liberty's indirect parent company constitutes a "Change of Control" triggering the payment obligation.

1. Whether the acquisition of Liberty Recycling Parent Inc. (Liberty Ohio's indirect parent) by I Squared Capital constitutes a qualifying "Merger" under the Change of Control provision of the APA
2. Whether the transaction resulted in Liberty Ohio's equityholders of record holding less than 50% of the voting power of the surviving or acquiring entity, as required by the Change of Control definition
3. Whether the principle of corporate separateness prevents collapsing the entity structure to treat an upstream parent's acquisition as a Change of Control of a downstream subsidiary
4. Whether "equityholders of record" refers to record owners of Liberty Ohio's membership interests or the ultimate beneficial owner (ECP) in the broader Liberty enterprise

The court granted Liberty Ohio's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the I Squared transaction did not constitute a Change of Control under the APA. The court reasoned that: (1) the APA's plain language limits a qualifying Merger to an "acquisition of Buyer (or its successor)"—meaning Liberty Ohio itself—and the acquisition of Liberty Ohio's indirect parent does not satisfy this requirement; (2) the sale of a parent company's stock is not a transfer of its downstream subsidiary's assets, as corporate separateness principles recognize that a subsidiary is a separate legal entity; (3) "equityholders of record" unambiguously refers to the record owners of Liberty Ohio's membership interests, not the ultimate beneficial owner (ECP) at the top of the ownership chain; and (4) Castle failed to plead nonconclusory facts showing that Liberty Ohio's equityholders of record held less than 50% of the relevant voting power after the transaction. The court declined to relieve Castle of the bargain struck between two sophisticated parties and refused to use extrinsic evidence or discovery to recharacterize the transaction structure.

This is a contract enforcement case in which Curonix LLC seeks declaratory judgments and equitable relief against Laura Tyler Perryman regarding the validity and enforceability of various agreements involving the transfer of intellectual property, contracts, and equity interests in companies related to neurostimulator technology development. The case arises from Perryman's subsequent refusal to honor agreements she previously executed.

1. Whether the doctrine of res judicata bars Perryman from relitigating the validity of the Micron Assignment Agreements, which were previously determined to be valid and enforceable by the Florida Bankruptcy Court in a Settlement Approval Order.
2. Whether Perryman validly transferred her StimQ common shares to Stimwave pursuant to the Security Exchange Agreement and whether Curonix, as Stimwave's successor, holds title to those shares.
3. Whether Perryman is obligated under the Security Exchange Agreement to execute and deliver Bahamian Registration Documentation necessary to register the transferred StimQ shares, and whether specific performance is an appropriate remedy.

The court granted Curonix's motion for summary judgment on all three counts. On Count I, the court held that res judicata bars Perryman from contesting the validity of the Micron Assignment Agreements because: (1) the Florida Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction; (2) Perryman was a party in interest and participated in the bankruptcy proceedings; (3) the validity of the Micron Assignment Agreements was the precise issue decided; (4) the issue was decided against Perryman; and (5) the Settlement Approval Order became final. On Count IV, the court determined that the Security Exchange Agreement unambiguously obligates Perryman to transfer 75,000 StimQ shares to Stimwave. The court rejected Perryman's claim that she was "mistakenly included" in the agreement, noting that she herself signed the agreement as a "Transferor" and later confirmed her ownership of 75,000 shares in correspondence with KLIM. The court found that Curonix, as Stimwave's successor under the Asset Purchase Agreement, now holds title to these shares. On Count V, the court ordered specific performance requiring Perryman to execute and deliver the Bahamian Registration Documentation. The court found that: (1) a valid contract exists (the Security Exchange Agreement); (2) Curonix is ready, willing, and able to perform; and (3) the balance of equities favors Curonix because Perryman faces no harm from complying with her contractual obligations while Curonix is prevented from receiving shares to which it is contractually entitled.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case concerning whether a former General Counsel of Care One, LLC is entitled to advancement of legal fees and expenses under the company's operating agreement. The court must determine whether Care One's equitable defenses of unclean hands and equitable estoppel bar the former General Counsel's advancement claim.

1. Whether a former General Counsel's contractual right to advancement under an LLC operating agreement is barred by the equitable defense of unclean hands
2. Whether a former General Counsel's contractual right to advancement is barred by the equitable defense of equitable estoppel
3. Whether a General Counsel owed fiduciary duties to his client (the LLC) regarding disclosure of material facts about advancement rights and the means to eliminate them
4. Whether a General Counsel's failure to disclose that an operating agreement amendment did not eliminate vested advancement rights for existing officers, and failure to inform the client of waiver agreements as an alternative mechanism, constitutes inequitable conduct

The Court ruled in favor of Care One and denied Lugo's advancement claim based on the doctrine of unclean hands. The Court found that Lugo, as General Counsel, received clear instructions from Care One's Manager (Straus) to eliminate all advancement rights except for Straus himself. Although Lugo took some action by amending the operating agreement, he knew this amendment would not eliminate the vested advancement rights of existing officers, including his own. Lugo also knew that waiver agreements were a straightforward mechanism to accomplish Straus's instructions. Despite this knowledge, Lugo failed to: (1) obtain waivers from existing officers; (2) inform Straus that the amendment did not eliminate existing vested rights; or (3) advise Straus that waivers were available. Instead, Lugo allowed Straus to believe the problem had been solved through the amendment alone. The Court reasoned that Lugo's conduct violated his fiduciary duty as General Counsel to act in good faith and provide full disclosure to his client. The inequitable conduct had an immediate and necessary relation to Lugo's advancement claim itself, as Lugo would not possess the advancement right but for his improper conduct. The Court emphasized that while Delaware strongly favors advancement as a matter of public policy, this policy must be balanced against the principle that courts of equity should not assist parties who come before them with unclean hands. The Court did not reach Care One's equitable estoppel defense.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of Bankruptcy Code § 510(b) in Puerto Rico's bankruptcy-type restructuring proceedings under PROMESA. The court addresses whether a trustee's $8.5 billion proof of claim alleging that the Commonwealth impaired statutory and constitutional protections granted to induce the purchase of PREPA revenue bonds constitutes a claim for "damages arising from the purchase or sale" of securities subject to mandatory subordination.

1. Whether the Board's motion to enforce the Commonwealth Plan was timely filed, or alternatively, whether the district court properly granted leave to amend the Board's earlier objection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)
2. Whether the Trustee's proof of claim seeks "damages arising from the purchase or sale" of PREPA revenue bonds within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 510(b), specifically:
   1. Whether § 510(b) applies only to claims alleging misconduct at the time of the securities transaction or extends to post-purchase misconduct
   2. Whether § 510(b) is limited to specific causes of action or encompasses statutory and constitutional violations
   3. Whether the claim seeks "damages" or merely bond repayment
3. Whether the canon of constitutional avoidance requires a narrower construction of § 510(b) to avoid impairing constitutional causes of action
4. Whether § 510(b) mandates subordination to a level below General Unsecured Claims

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's classification of the Trustee's proof of claim as a Class 64 Section 510(b) Subordinated Claim, holding:

1. Timeliness: The district court properly granted the Board leave to amend its earlier objection under Rule 15(a), as the Board sought to resolve the classification issue as soon as practicable and no undue delay or prejudice warranted denial of the amendment.
2. Section 510(b) Application: The court held that § 510(b) applies to the Trustee's claim based on the following reasoning:
   1. The plain text of § 510(b) does not limit its application to claims alleging misconduct at the time of the securities transaction; the phrase "arising from" requires only a causal relationship between the securities transaction and the alleged damages, not temporal proximity to the transaction.
   2. The court rejected the Bondholders' argument that § 510(b) applies only to specific causes of action, holding that the provision encompasses "a wide variety of causes of actions arising out of securities transactions" and that claimants cannot avoid subordination by pleading different legal theories.
   3. The Trustee's claim seeks damages for impairment of protections that induced the Bondholders' purchase of the bonds, not ordinary bond repayment. Although measured by reference to unpaid principal and interest, the claim seeks compensation for the Commonwealth's alleged breach of separate statutory protections, not payment on the bonds themselves.
   4. The Trustee's own allegations establish a sufficient causal nexus: the Commonwealth granted the Statutory Covenant specifically to induce investment in the bonds, the Bondholders were materially induced to purchase based on those protections, and the Commonwealth subsequently impaired those protections.
   5. The court distinguished In re Khan, where the debtor's later independent wrong (conversion) displaced the securities transaction as the source of damages. Here, by contrast, the purchase of securities is central to the claim because the very protections allegedly impaired induced that purchase.
3. Constitutional Avoidance Canon: The canon of constitutional avoidance does not alter the interpretation of § 510(b) because: (1) the statute is not ambiguous as applied to these facts; (2) the text of § 510(b) contains no carve-out for constitutional causes of action; and (3) § 510(b)'s application depends on the causal relationship between claimed damages and the securities transaction, not on the particular legal theory pleaded. The court did not reach the merits of the Bondholders' constitutional claims.
4. Level of Subordination: The Bondholders waived their argument that § 510(b) mandates subordination only to claims senior or equal to their secured interest in the PREPA bonds, as they failed to raise this distinct argument to the district court.

This is a criminal appeal in which a defendant challenges the district court's denial of his motion to terminate supervised release. The court addresses whether a defendant must serve one year of his current term of supervised release before being eligible for early termination, or whether prior service of one year of supervised release satisfies the statutory requirement.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) requires a defendant to serve one year of the specific term of supervised release he seeks to terminate, or whether prior service of one year of any supervised release term satisfies the requirement.
2. Whether a new term of supervised release imposed following revocation and re-imprisonment constitutes a separate "term" for purposes of the one-year eligibility requirement.
3. When the one-year clock begins to run for purposes of early termination eligibility.

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to terminate supervised release. The court held that the one-year requirement in § 3583(e)(1) applies to each individual term of supervised release, meaning a defendant must serve one year of the specific term he seeks to terminate. The court reasoned that: (1) the ordinary meaning of "term" refers to a set period of time imposed by the court; (2) the statutory language and context indicate that the term of supervised release sought to be terminated must itself satisfy the one-year requirement; (3) Supreme Court precedent and circuit case law distinguish between pre-revocation and post-revocation terms as separate and distinct; (4) the statutory purpose of facilitating rehabilitation and easing transition from imprisonment supports requiring one year of the current term before termination; and (5) the 1994 addition of § 3583(h) reinforces that post-revocation supervised release terms function as new supervisory periods with their own one-year requirements. Because the appellant filed his motion less than two months into his post-revocation term of supervised release, the district court lacked authority to grant the motion.

This is a class action civil rights case in which plaintiffs who were detained in Lancaster County Prison pending trial challenged the constitutionality of bail-setting procedures used by Magisterial District Judges. Plaintiffs alleged violations of their Equal Protection, Due Process, and Sixth Amendment rights, claiming that judges set bail without considering their ability to pay and without providing counsel at preliminary arraignments.

1. Whether the District Court properly abstained under Younger v. Harris from reviewing plaintiffs' Equal Protection and Due Process claims challenging state bail procedures
2. Whether plaintiffs have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at preliminary arraignments in Pennsylvania
3. Whether bail determinations constitute a "critical stage" of criminal proceedings requiring appointed counsel

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the District Court's order abstaining under Younger, holding that Younger abstention was inappropriate because plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin ongoing state criminal prosecutions themselves, but rather sought only to require that judges consider ability to pay in bail determinations—a distinct ancillary issue that could not be raised as a defense to criminal charges and would not interfere with prosecutions. The court distinguished the case from O'Shea v. Littleton, which involved challenges to nearly every stage of criminal proceedings, whereas plaintiffs here sought relief on a single, discrete issue. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the Sixth Amendment claim, reasoning that while the right to counsel attaches at the preliminary arraignment, that proceeding itself is not a "critical stage" requiring appointed counsel because it lacks the trial-like confrontation necessary for critical stage protection—no prosecutor is present, the judge merely reads charges without questioning the defendant, and the defendant can challenge the bail determination at any time thereafter.

This is an administrative law case in which Cargill, Inc. seeks appellate review of a Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission order that reversed an administrative law judge's decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings regarding a citation for unsafe nitrogen dioxide levels in a mine escapeway. The Secretary of Labor moves to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on the absence of a final order.

1. Whether the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction to review a non-final administrative order from the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
2. Whether the finality requirement applies to appeals of administrative agency decisions under the Mine Safety and Health Act
3. Whether the Commission's remand order constitutes a "final order" under 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1)
4. Whether the statutory language in § 816(a)(1) and § 816(b) rebuts the presumption of finality required before judicial review

The court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that:

1. A strong presumption exists that judicial review of administrative decisions is available only when agency action becomes final, and Congress must clearly rebut this presumption through statutory language or structure
2. The Mine Safety and Health Act does not rebut the finality presumption; the term "order" in § 816(a)(1) incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act's definition requiring a "final disposition" of a matter
3. The Commission's remand order is not final because it does not mark the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process and leaves substantive issues unresolved, including the "significant and substantial" nature of the violation and the appropriate penalty amount
4. Cargill's argument based on the express finality requirement in § 816(b) fails because the strong presumption of finality across all administrative review provisions overrides any negative implication from the omission of "final" in § 816(a)(1), and the word "also" in § 816(b) indicates continuity rather than a departure from § 816(a)'s requirements
5. Allowing review of this interlocutory order would impermissibly permit piecemeal appeals, which the finality requirement is designed to prevent

This is an appeal of a Rule 41(g) motion seeking the return of seized cash. FBI agents lawfully seized $585,000 from Lionel Cannon's safe during a drug trafficking investigation, but FBI Special Agent Scott Bowman stole $218,200 before the money was officially inventoried. Cannon moved for the return of the stolen cash that was never forfeited.

1. Whether sovereign immunity bars a Rule 41(g) claim for return of seized cash that was lost (stolen by an agent) but later recovered through criminal forfeiture proceedings against the agent
2. Whether the fungibility of money distinguishes it from other property for purposes of Rule 41(g) claims
3. Whether Cannon is entitled to the return of seized funds when the government has recovered traceable proceeds through forfeiture
4. Whether Cannon lawfully possessed the seized cash, or whether it constitutes drug proceeds subject to forfeiture

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government. The majority held that:

1. Sovereign immunity does not bar Cannon's Rule 41(g) claim because the government has recovered money traceable to the funds it lost. The court distinguished this case from Ordonez v. United States (which barred claims for lost or destroyed property) by recognizing that money is fungible and that the government currently possesses funds traceable to the stolen cash through criminal forfeiture proceedings against Agent Bowman.
2. Money differs from other property because its value lies in its unit of account and exchange value, not in the physical bills themselves. Therefore, requiring return of the exact same bills would be impractical and inconsistent with how the government itself handles seized currency through electronic deposit and transfer.
3. Once criminal proceedings end, the person from whom property is seized has a presumptive right to its return, and the government bears the burden of demonstrating a legitimate reason to retain it. The government can rebut this presumption by showing the property is contraband, subject to forfeiture, or that the defendant is not entitled to lawful possession.
4. The government failed to meet its burden here. The additional $218,000 is not contraband (currency is not contraband), is not subject to forfeiture (the statute of limitations has expired), and the government provided insufficient evidence that Cannon lacked lawful possession. Cannon provided evidence of lawful sources (employment income, car sales, gifts) and the government failed to dispute it.
5. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with the government bearing the burden on remand to prove how much it has obtained from Agent Bowman's forfeiture.

This is an appeal of a civil action brought under the Montreal Convention by a passenger who alleged injuries sustained during a physical altercation with flight attendants and a federal law enforcement agent on a Delta Air Lines flight. The central issue is whether Delta Air Lines is immune from liability under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) for injuries resulting from law enforcement's actions following the airline's report of suspicious passenger behavior.

1. Whether ATSA immunity applies only to the initial disclosure of suspicious activity to law enforcement, or whether it extends to conduct by law enforcement that flows from such disclosure
2. Whether genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether the passenger's conduct was "suspicious" under the ATSA
3. Whether the airline was solely responsible for the passenger's injuries or whether law enforcement's independent decisions contributed to the injuries
4. Whether the passenger can recover for emotional injuries under the Montreal Convention when the airline is immune for all physical injuries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Delta Air Lines. The court held that:

1. ATSA immunity applies not only to the disclosure itself but also to conduct that flows from law enforcement's decisions following such disclosure, consistent with the statute's plain text and purpose of encouraging airlines to report security concerns without fear of civil liability
2. No genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether the passenger's conduct was suspicious—his frequent movement through the cabin, multiple bathroom visits, peering into the first-class section, photographing flight attendants, and staring at passengers constituted suspicious behavior to a reasonable airline employee
3. The airline was not solely responsible for the passenger's injuries; the federal law enforcement agent made independent decisions regarding restraint and custody
4. Because Delta is immune for all physical injuries, the passenger cannot recover for emotional injuries under the Montreal Convention, which requires bodily injury as a prerequisite

This is a federal appellate case involving a class action lawsuit brought by residents living near Seattle-Tacoma Airport against Alaska Airlines, Delta Airlines, and the Port of Seattle for pollution caused by aircraft emissions and fuselage debris. The plaintiffs asserted state tort and constitutional claims seeking cleanup, remediation, and compensation for health and property damage.

1. Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claims, specifically whether they constituted an improper "collateral attack" on federal agency orders that should be reviewed exclusively in the courts of appeals
2. Whether the plaintiffs' state law claims were expressly preempted by Section 233 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7573, which restricts states from enforcing emissions standards that differ from federal standards
3. Whether the Navy test—which allows state regulation of aircraft emissions if compliance does not require aircraft alterations—applied to bar preemption
4. Whether the plaintiffs could proceed under Section 233's exception allowing enforcement of standards identical to federal standards

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held:

1. Jurisdiction/Collateral Attack Doctrine: The district court properly exercised jurisdiction. The collateral attack doctrine did not apply because the plaintiffs' complaint targeted a broad course of variably regulated conduct rather than challenging specific, identifiable agency orders. The defendants could not identify particular agency actions that were "inescapably intertwined" with the complaint's allegations.
2. Express Preemption Under Section 233: The plaintiffs' state law claims were expressly preempted by Section 233 of the Clean Air Act. The court reasoned that: (a) the word "standard" in Section 233 includes state common law rules; (b) the word "respecting" has a broad scope covering matters relating to emissions; (c) the plaintiffs' claims—whether framed as negligence, battery, trespass, public nuisance, or inverse condemnation—all fundamentally concern the emission of air pollutants from aircraft; and (d) even the plaintiffs' failure-to-cleanup theory relates to the original act of emission and thus falls within Section 233's preemptive scope.
3. Navy Test Inapplicable: The Navy test, which allowed state regulation of aircraft emissions if compliance did not require aircraft alterations, did not apply. Navy involved a narrow factual circumstance (jet engine test cells with smokestack filtration systems), whereas this case involved direct aircraft emissions in flight—the core of Section 233's preemptive reach.
4. Identical Standard Exception: Although Section 233 permits states to enforce standards identical to federal EPA standards, the plaintiffs' complaint failed because it contained no allegation that the defendants were violating federal emissions standards. The plaintiffs intentionally omitted such allegations, and this omission was fatal to their complaint.

This is a Social Security disability insurance benefits appeal in which the claimant, Kristin Collard, challenged an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) denial of her application for disability benefits based on fibromyalgia, migraines, and degenerative disc disease. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether the ALJ properly evaluated Collard's subjective symptom testimony, lay witness testimony, and medical opinions in determining she was not disabled.

1. Whether the ALJ properly discredited Collard's subjective testimony regarding her symptoms and functional limitations under the "clear and convincing reasons" standard
2. Whether the ALJ's reliance on Collard's past work history as a hospital patient care technician was a valid basis to reject her testimony of worsening, disabling symptoms
3. Whether the ALJ properly analyzed Collard's activities of daily living in discrediting her testimony
4. Whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that Collard could effectively treat her symptoms with medication
5. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated lay testimony from Collard's family members and co-worker
6. Whether the ALJ properly rejected the opinions of Collard's treating physicians

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that:

1. The ALJ erred in characterizing Collard's work history as evidence against disability, finding that a past ability to work through pain is entirely consistent with testimony of worsening impairments that become disabling over time. The court rejected the government's argument that Collard's consistent work record undermined her credibility, noting that claimants should not face a "logical trap" where either inconsistent or consistent work histories are used against them.
2. The ALJ erred in analyzing Collard's activities of daily living by merely listing activities she performed without acknowledging aspects of the evidence consistent with her disability claim, failing to meet the required standard of connecting her activities to work capacity.
3. Substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's rationale that Collard could effectively treat her symptoms with medication, as she had tried multiple treatments with only partial pain control and continued physical limitations.
4. The ALJ improperly relied on Collard's unremarkable appearance and test results at doctor's appointments to discount her fibromyalgia testimony, as fibromyalgia is diagnosed entirely on the basis of patient-reported symptoms and objective evidence cannot be required for a condition that eludes objective measurement.
5. The ALJ erred in rejecting lay testimony from Collard's family members and co-worker simply because it was consistent with Collard's own testimony, given the errors identified in the ALJ's analysis of her subjective testimony.
6. The ALJ properly rejected the treating physicians' opinions because they were contradicted by other medical evidence and the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for the rejection, including that some opinions were conclusory and lacked adequate support.

This is a criminal appeal in which Marcello Rivera challenges his jury conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of ammunition as a felon, as well as his 300-month prison sentence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed both the conviction and sentence, finding no reversible error in the district court's evidentiary rulings, sentencing calculations, or handling of trial procedures.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by converting seized cash ($5,972) into its methamphetamine equivalent for sentencing purposes
2. Whether the district court properly applied a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for drug distribution
3. Whether the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 by failing to address three objections to the presentence investigation report
4. Whether the district court erred in allowing a case agent to testify in both lay and expert capacities (dual-role testimony)
5. Whether text message exhibits were properly admitted as evidence of intent under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
6. Whether the district court properly excluded Rivera's recorded post-arrest statements as impeachment evidence
7. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), prohibiting felon possession of ammunition, is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment

1. Cash Conversion: The court affirmed the conversion of seized cash to drug equivalent, holding that the jury's special verdict finding all $5,972 constituted methamphetamine proceeds satisfied the requirement for a nexus between the money and drug-related activities. The district court properly relied on this finding to convert the cash to between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine.
2. Premises Enhancement: The court upheld the two-level enhancement, adopting the Sixth Circuit's reasoning from United States v. Johnson and the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Tekola. The court found that Rivera knowingly maintained his home for manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine, as evidenced by storage materials, scales, packaging supplies, and text messages showing drug deals conducted from the residence.
3. Rule 32 Objections: The court rejected Rivera's claim that the district court failed to address three objections. The court found that Rivera agreed to allow the district court to overrule all objections except those relating to drug quantity, the premises enhancement, and a criminal history issue, and the district court explicitly addressed all three remaining objections on the record.
4. Dual-Role Testimony: The court found no plain error in the district court's handling of the case agent's testimony. The court properly instructed the jury on dual-role testimony using the Ninth Circuit's model instruction, bifurcated the testimony into lay and expert phases with other witnesses testifying between phases, and had the government specify whether questions addressed the agent's training or investigation participation.
5. Text Message Exhibits: The court upheld admission of text messages between Rivera and customers discussing drug prices and meeting plans, finding them admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) as evidence of intent to distribute rather than merely possess methamphetamine.
6. Recorded Statements: The court affirmed exclusion of Rivera's recorded post-arrest statements denying drug dealing and firearm sales. The court held that Rivera could not introduce his own hearsay statements for the truth of the matter asserted to impeach the agent's testimony about an unrecorded inculpatory statement. Even if error occurred, it would be harmless given the substantial physical evidence of drug trafficking and felon ammunition possession.
7. Second Amendment Challenge: The court declined to reach the merits of Rivera's facial constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) because he failed to preserve the claim by filing a pre-trial motion and did not demonstrate good cause for the failure. The court noted that even if reached, the argument would be foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent upholding the statute.

This is a derivative action brought by minority members of a Delaware limited liability company against the company's manager and its accountant for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment arising from unauthorized self-interested transactions. The plaintiffs seek equitable dissolution of the company.

1. Whether the court has personal jurisdiction over the accountant defendant under Delaware's long-arm statute and the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction
2. Whether the plaintiffs' claims are time-barred under the doctrine of laches, applying the analogous three-year statute of limitations
3. Whether the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of their claims as of 2016, which would preclude tolling of the limitations period
4. Whether the discrete act method or continuing wrong method applies to determine when the breach of fiduciary duty claims accrued

The court granted both defendants' motions to dismiss. First, the court dismissed the accountant (Lucas) for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), finding that although Lucas did not waive his jurisdictional defense through procedural missteps, the plaintiffs failed to establish a Delaware-directed act necessary to invoke the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that a properly pleaded aiding and abetting claim alone is insufficient; there must be an "anchoring Delaware act." Second, the court dismissed all claims against the manager (Warner) under Rule 12(b)(6) based on the laches defense. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims accrued no later than the end of 2016 when the last challenged transaction occurred, but the plaintiffs did not file suit until May 2025—well beyond the analogous three-year statute of limitations. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the continuing wrong doctrine applied, finding instead that the discrete act method governed because the alleged wrongs consisted of identifiable lending and financing decisions made at different points in time that were not inexorably intertwined. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice by 2016 when they received financial statements showing a glaring disparity between approximately $7.7 million in notes receivable and only $49,000 in reported annual interest income (0.64% of outstanding balance). This red flag was sufficient to require the plaintiffs to investigate further, and they could not rely on equitable tolling doctrines once on inquiry notice. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had neither alleged nor persuasively argued unusual circumstances warranting departure from the analogous statute of limitations.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in a capital murder case where Gerald Marshall, convicted and sentenced to death for a 2003 armed robbery and murder in Texas, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge his conviction and sentence on multiple constitutional grounds that were procedurally defaulted in state court.

1. Whether Marshall demonstrated a substantial showing of denial of constitutional rights to warrant issuance of a COA under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)
2. Whether Marshall's procedurally defaulted claims can be excused based on: (a) cause and actual prejudice; (b) fundamental miscarriage of justice/actual innocence; or (c) ineffective state habeas counsel
3. Whether the State presented false or misleading testimony regarding the identity of the shooter
4. Whether the State violated Brady v. Maryland by suppressing the identity of an anonymous tipster
5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective at the guilt and penalty phases
6. Whether racial discrimination tainted the prosecution and death penalty decision
7. Whether the State used inconsistent theories at Marshall's trial versus co-defendant Worthy's trial

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals DENIED Marshall's application for a certificate of appealability. The court held that Marshall failed to demonstrate reasonable debatability regarding any of his claims and did not overcome the procedural default imposed by Texas law. Specifically:

1. False/Misleading Evidence Claim: Marshall failed to show knowing use of false testimony by the State or actual prejudice. Contradictions between trial testimony and other evidence merely establish credibility questions for the jury and do not constitute perjury.
2. Inconsistent Theories Claim: The use of inconsistent theories in separate trials of co-defendants is not a violation of due process under Fifth Circuit precedent, and Marshall presented no evidence of knowing use of perjured testimony.
3. Brady Violation Claim: While the State may have inadvertently suppressed the identity of the tipster (Derrell McQueen), the evidence was immaterial because the jury heard the underlying information from the tip, and disclosure of the tipster's identity alone would not have altered the outcome.
4. Racial Discrimination Claim: Marshall could have raised this claim earlier using data and precedents available at the time of trial and his initial habeas petition. Statistical evidence of prosecutorial decisions does not demonstrate purposeful discrimination in Marshall's individual case, which requires "exceptionally clear proof."
5. Guilt-Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Trial counsel's performance was not deficient. Counsel adequately investigated eyewitness discrepancies, impeached identification testimony, and cross-examined jailhouse informants. Marshall's speculation about what additional investigation might have revealed is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance.
6. Penalty-Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Counsel began mitigation investigations over a year before trial, enlisted a mitigation specialist, and presented substantial evidence of Marshall's troubled childhood and mental illness. Marshall merely expressed discontent with the degree of assistance provided rather than establishing deficient performance.
7. Actual Innocence/Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice: Marshall failed to meet the high bar of showing "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" in light of new evidence. His arguments merely emphasized differences between testimony at different trials while ignoring record evidence supporting the jury's verdict.
8. Exhaustion Exception: Systemic defects in Texas's habeas counsel appointment system do not fall under the catch-all exception to exhaustion requirements, and Marshall presented no reasonable debate that his state habeas proceedings were "ineffective."

This is a Second Amendment case in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether Hawaii's firearm licensing requirements—specifically a 30-day permit validity period and a police inspection requirement for certain firearms—violate the Second Amendment. The en banc court reversed a district court injunction that had blocked these provisions, holding that Hawaii's "shall-issue" licensing regime is presumptively constitutional under the Second Amendment.

1. Whether Hawaii's 30-day permit validity period for handgun acquisitions violates the Second Amendment
2. Whether Hawaii's requirement to bring certain firearms to a police station for inspection violates the Second Amendment
3. How to interpret and apply footnote 9 of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, which addresses "shall-issue" licensing regimes
4. Whether the Second Amendment's plain text covers the acquisition of firearms, or only possession and carry
5. What constitutes an "infringement" of Second Amendment rights
6. Whether non-abusive, objective "shall-issue" laws are presumptively constitutional or must satisfy Bruen's two-step historical analysis

The en banc majority reversed the district court's injunction and held that Hawaii's shall-issue regime comports with the Second Amendment. The majority reasoned that Bruen footnote 9 establishes that objective, non-abusive "shall-issue" licensing regimes are presumptively constitutional. The court held that Hawaii's challenged provisions impose only modest, procedural burdens that do not materially impede citizens from acquiring firearms and do not constitute "abusive ends" that would deny ordinary citizens their Second Amendment rights. The majority declined to undertake a full historical analysis under Bruen's two-step framework, instead applying the "abusive ends" test from footnote 9. However, three dissenting opinions disagreed with this approach. Judge Nelson's dissent (joined by others) argued that footnote 9 does not create a separate "carve-out" from Bruen's framework and applies only to public-carry licensing, not firearm acquisition. Under proper application of Bruen, the dissenters contended that Hawaii failed to identify historical analogues for its regulations and therefore the district court's judgment should have been affirmed. Judge Nelson argued that the Second Amendment's plain text covers acquisition of arms, and Hawaii provided no historical tradition supporting its 30-day deadline or inspection requirements. Judge Forrest would have affirmed on the merits and narrowed the injunction's scope. Judge VanDyke proposed "bright-line" rules holding that regulations not adopted by most other states should be unconstitutional.

This is a criminal appeal in which Walter Glenn Primrose challenges his convictions for conspiracy to make false statements to the Department of Defense, aggravated identity theft, and passport fraud. Primrose assumed the identity of a deceased infant named Bobby Edward Fort and lived under that assumed identity for over 30 years, including while serving in the U.S. Coast Guard.

1. Whether a person can "adversely possess" another person's identity through extended use, analogous to adverse possession of real property
2. Whether the government proved the requisite specific intent (knowing and willful conduct) for conspiracy to make false statements to the DOD regarding DEERS identification applications
3. Whether aggravated identity theft charges can stand when the defendant claims the assumed identity belonged to him after 30 years of use, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Dubin v. United States
4. Whether the defendant's Fort passport was "secured by reason of a false statement" under 18 U.S.C. § 1542, given his claim that he had assumed the Fort identity since 1987

The Ninth Circuit affirmed all of Primrose's convictions. The court rejected his novel "adverse possession" theory, holding that there is no legal basis for concluding that one can obtain the legal right to another person's identity through extended use. The court found sufficient evidence that Primrose knowingly and willfully made false statements to the DOD, as demonstrated by his admission of his true birth name, his concern about background checks when enlisting, his destruction of documents, and his concealment of his actions. Regarding aggravated identity theft, the court held that the misuse of Fort's identity was precisely what made Primrose's false statements to the DOD criminal, satisfying the requirement under Dubin that the means of identification be "at the crux" of the underlying offense. Finally, the court affirmed the passport fraud conviction, finding ample evidence that Primrose secured the Fort passport with statements he knew were false, regardless of his subjective belief that he had become Bobby Fort.

This is a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) class action case in which CenturyLink obtained a consumer's credit report after she completed four of five steps in an online ordering process but before she submitted her final order. Bultemeyer claimed CenturyLink willfully violated FCRA by pulling her credit report without her having "initiated" a business transaction, while CenturyLink argued it had a legitimate business need for the information and a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

1. Whether CenturyLink violated the FCRA provision permitting credit reports "in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer" when it pulled Bultemeyer's credit report after step four but before she clicked "submit" at step five
2. Whether CenturyLink's interpretation of "initiated" was objectively reasonable under the Safeco defense, which shields defendants from willful FCRA violations if their statutory reading is not objectively unreasonable
3. Whether CenturyLink's reading had foundation in statutory text, whether courts of appeals had previously interpreted the relevant provision, and whether authoritative agency guidance warned CenturyLink away from its interpretation

The Ninth Circuit reversed the jury verdict and held that CenturyLink was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its Safeco defense. The court concluded that CenturyLink's interpretation of "initiated" was objectively reasonable because: (1) the term "initiated" is undefined in FCRA and bears multiple reasonable meanings based on dictionary definitions meaning "commence" or "begin"; (2) no court of appeals had previously addressed when a business transaction is initiated in the online context; and (3) no authoritative agency guidance was sufficiently specific to warn CenturyLink away from its interpretation. The court noted that while the FTC's 1998 advisory opinion and 2011 report addressed automobile dealerships, they did not specifically address online telecommunications transactions. Therefore, CenturyLink did not act in reckless disregard of statutory duty, and the $140 million jury verdict was reversed. The concurring opinions disagreed on the merits: Judge Clifton would have held that completing four of five steps constitutes initiation of a transaction, while Judge Bybee would have required the consumer to know the full cost and click "submit" before initiation occurs, but both joined the Safeco defense analysis.

This is an appeal of a life insurance policy dispute in which the plaintiff challenges an insurance company's refusal to pay out on a policy that lapsed before the policyholder's death. The case turns on whether California Insurance Code section 10113.72(a), enacted in 2012, applies retroactively to policies issued before the statute took effect on January 1, 2013.

1. Whether California Insurance Code section 10113.72(a)—which requires insurers to provide applicants with a designation form allowing them to designate a third party to receive notice of policy lapse or termination—applies to life insurance policies issued before the statute's effective date of January 1, 2013.
2. Whether the statute's requirement to provide designation forms applies only to new policies issued after enactment or to all existing policies in force when the statute took effect.
3. How to reconcile the California Supreme Court's statement in McHugh that sections 10113.71 and 10113.72 apply to "all life insurance policies in force" with the specific language of section 10113.72(a) referring to "applicants" rather than "policy owners."

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of New York Life Insurance and Annuity Corporation. The court held that section 10113.72(a) applies only to new policies issued after January 1, 2013, and does not apply retroactively to policies issued before that date. The court relied on the California Supreme Court's decision in McHugh v. Protective Life Insurance Co., which explicitly stated that section 10113.72(a) "unmistakably applies only to new policies." The court reasoned that the statute's language referring to "applicants" making designations "before a policy is issued" indicates a forward-looking application to new policies only. The court further explained that while other subsections of section 10113.72 (subsections (b) and (c)) apply to all policies, subsection (a)'s requirement to provide a designation form at the point of application would be nonsensical if applied to policies already issued. Therefore, the Corporation was not required to send a designation form to Mr. Linhart, whose policy was issued in 2007.

This is a Fourth Amendment excessive force case in which the estate of Channing Spivey appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment and qualified immunity to Captain Mason Adcock, a police officer who fatally shot Spivey. The appeal challenges whether Adcock's use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances.

1. Whether Captain Adcock violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force when he fatally shot Channing Spivey, an unarmed man experiencing a mental health crisis due to terminal brain cancer and medication withdrawal
2. Whether a reasonable officer in Adcock's position could have perceived a threat of serious physical harm or death, which is the proper legal standard for evaluating excessive force claims
3. Whether uncontroverted evidence establishes that Spivey struck Adcock during their physical altercation, and whether this fact is genuinely disputed
4. Whether information communicated to Adcock by Deputy Penny and civilian Zana Bloodsworth is relevant to assessing the reasonableness of Adcock's perception of threat

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and qualified immunity to Captain Adcock. The court held that a reasonable officer in Adcock's position could have reasonably perceived that Spivey posed a threat of serious physical harm or death. The court emphasized that the relevant standard is not whether a threat actually existed, but whether a reasonable officer could have perceived one from the officer's perspective in the moment. The court found that Adcock had probable cause to believe deadly force was necessary based on: (1) Spivey's violent, irrational behavior stemming from terminal brain cancer and medication withdrawal; (2) Spivey's demonstrated violence against property (shattering vehicle and ambulance windows with bare fists); (3) the ineffectiveness of non-lethal force (taser); (4) Spivey's physical superiority over Adcock (6'3" and 199 pounds versus Adcock's 5'9" and 180 pounds); (5) Spivey striking Adcock multiple times during their physical altercation, including a blow that nearly rendered Adcock unconscious; (6) Spivey's non-compliance with repeated verbal commands; (7) the chaotic, rapidly evolving circumstances requiring split-second decision-making; and (8) the threat posed not only to Adcock but to his family and others inside his home. The court rejected the estate's argument that there was a genuine factual dispute about whether Spivey struck Adcock, finding uncontroverted testimony from Adcock, Deputy Penny, EMS records, and photographic evidence all corroborated that Spivey did strike Adcock. The court emphasized that officers are entitled to deference when making split-second judgments in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances, and that perfection is not required.

This is an appeal of the Copyright Royalty Board's Phase I allocation of cable retransmission royalty fees for 2014-2017 among six competing claimant groups (sports, public television, devotional, program suppliers, Canadian, and commercial television). The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball and Public Broadcasting Service challenged the allocation as arbitrary and capricious.

1. Whether the Copyright Royalty Board reasonably relied on Dr. Tyler's regression analysis, particularly the "sensitivity test" that excluded cable systems paying only the statutory minimum fee
2. Whether the Board reasonably applied the McLaughlin Adjustment to the Bortz Survey methodology
3. Whether the Board's three adjustments to the regression analysis (Adjustments A, B, and C) were arbitrary
4. Whether the Board adequately explained how it combined the regression analysis and survey results to arrive at final allocation percentages
5. Whether the Board's treatment of must-carry broadcast stations was reasonable
6. Whether the Board's post-hearing request for PBS-NCTA carriage agreements violated due process

The court rejected nearly all of the appellants' challenges to the Board's use of the regression analysis and survey methodology. The court found that: (1) the sensitivity test was a reasonable response to changed market conditions following WGNA's conversion from broadcast to cable network; (2) the McLaughlin Adjustment was a reasonable longstanding methodology; (3) the three adjustments to the regression were reasonably explained; (4) the Board's treatment of must-carry stations was consistent with statutory framework; and (5) the post-hearing request for carriage agreements was not arbitrary or a due process violation. However, the court found a critical deficiency in the Board's final determination: the Board failed to adequately explain the final step of how it merged the regression analysis and survey results to calculate the final allocation percentages for each claimant group. The Board stated it "weighted heavily" certain evidence for different claimants but never explained how much weight was assigned to each methodology or how the individual assessments were reconciled into allocations totaling 100%. The court noted that the final allocations contained unexplained anomalies—for example, JSC received 36.13% in 2014, which fell below both the regression estimate (37.48%) and survey result (39%), despite the Board stating it "weighted heavily" the survey. The court vacated the final determination and remanded for further explanation of the allocation methodology.

This case involves a First Amendment challenge to Capitol Police Board regulations that prohibit public demonstrations on the Eastern Steps of the U.S. Capitol unless sponsored by a member of Congress. Reverend Patrick Mahoney sought to pray and demonstrate on the steps without congressional sponsorship and challenged the constitutionality of the sponsorship requirement.

1. Whether the Eastern Steps constitute a traditional public forum, designated public forum, limited public forum, or nonpublic forum for First Amendment purposes
2. Whether the Traffic Regulations' requirement that demonstrations be sponsored by a member of Congress are reasonable restrictions on speech in the forum
3. Whether the district court's universal injunction prohibiting enforcement of the regulations against anyone exceeded the court's equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789

The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Mahoney on his First Amendment claim but vacated the universal injunction. The majority held that while the Eastern Steps are a nonpublic forum (not a traditional public forum), the Traffic Regulations are unreasonable because they grant members of Congress unbridled discretion to determine who may demonstrate. The court found that allowing demonstrations only with congressional sponsorship violates the First Amendment because it permits government officials to arbitrarily control access to speech at the seat of Congress. However, the court vacated the universal injunction as exceeding the district court's equitable authority under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., which limits injunctions to providing complete relief to the parties before the court. The case was remanded for the district court to fashion an appropriate injunction tailored to Mahoney's injury.

This is a sentencing appeal in a health insurance fraud case where a licensed psychiatrist was convicted of defrauding multiple insurers by billing for services not rendered. The defendant appeals both the loss calculation used for sentencing enhancement and the restitution amount imposed.

1. Whether the district court properly calculated "intended loss" for sentencing enhancement purposes under the Alphas burden-shifting framework—specifically, whether intended loss should be measured by the amount billed or by the contract reimbursement rates the defendant anticipated receiving as an in-network provider.
2. Whether the restitution order should be offset by claims for allegedly legitimate services that went unpaid by the insurers.

The court affirmed both the loss calculation and restitution order. Regarding intended loss, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in using the billed amount rather than contract rates. Although the defendant's status as an in-network provider supported his argument that he expected only contract amounts, the evidence—including his pro se civil lawsuits filed before trial claiming the full billed amounts and his acceptance of overpayments without reimbursement—supported the finding that he intended to take as much as possible from the insurers. The court rejected the defendant's failure to present evidence rebutting the presumption and noted that attorney argument cannot substitute for missing evidence. Regarding restitution, the court held that a criminal restitution hearing is not the proper venue to offset restitution with allegedly legitimate unpaid claims, which should instead be resolved through civil suits or administrative processes with the insurers.

This is an employment discrimination case where a terminated Somerville police officer sued city officials for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and tortious interference with advantageous relations under Massachusetts law. The case involves the interplay between federal court litigation and parallel arbitration proceedings under a collective bargaining agreement.

1. Whether the district court properly admitted evidence of an arbitration decision ordering the plaintiff's reinstatement (without back pay) for purposes of calculating damages, and whether the Gardner-Denver factors applied to this limited evidentiary use.
2. Whether the district court erred in permitting the jury to award damages based on the mayor's post-arbitration decision to place the plaintiff on paid administrative leave, when this decision was not alleged in the original complaint and the plaintiff never sought to amend the pleadings.
3. The proper application of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(b)(1) and 15(b)(2) regarding when unpleaded factual issues may be tried without formal amendment of the pleadings.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's admission of the arbitration decision for the limited purpose of calculating damages, finding no abuse of discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and holding that the Gardner-Denver factors were inapplicable because the arbitration decision was not admitted as substantive evidence of retaliation. The court emphasized that a clear limiting instruction to the jury adequately addressed any prejudicial effect. However, the court reversed the jury's award of damages based on the mayor's July 2021 decision to place the plaintiff on paid leave. The court held that this decision constituted an unpleaded "issue" (a central point of factual dispute) that required compliance with Rule 15(b). Because the defendants consistently objected throughout the litigation that the paid-leave decision was not pleaded, there was no express consent to try this issue. The court found no implied consent either, as the defendants introduced evidence about the paid-leave decision only to show consistency in the mayor's conduct in response to Brady letters, not to consent to a separate basis for liability. The plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 15(b)(1) by not seeking to amend the complaint despite the defendants' repeated objections, and Rule 15(b)(2) was not satisfied because the defendants never consented to trying the unpleaded issue. The court therefore reversed the damages awarded for the paid-leave decision while affirming the damages awarded for the termination decision.

This is a criminal appeal in which Duane Taylor challenges two sentencing enhancements imposed after his conviction for kidnapping, interstate travel for illicit sex, and production of child pornography involving a thirteen-year-old victim. Taylor disputes the application of a vulnerable-victim enhancement and a pattern-of-child-sex-crimes enhancement.

1. Whether the District Court properly applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for a vulnerable victim under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), specifically whether Taylor "knew or should have known" of the victim's vulnerabilities and whether those vulnerabilities "facilitated" the crime.
2. Whether Taylor's crimes constituted a "pattern" of child sex crimes requiring at least two separate occasions under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1), or whether they amounted to a single occasion.
3. Whether the pattern enhancement applies only to convictions or to any "prohibited sexual conduct" regardless of conviction status.
4. How to determine what constitutes separate "occasions" for purposes of the pattern enhancement.

The Third Circuit affirmed Taylor's sentence and both enhancements.

1. Vulnerable-Victim Enhancement: The court found no clear error in the District Court's factual findings. Taylor had lived with the victim and her family for over a year and was aware of her cognitive defects and developmental delays, as evidenced by video showing her thumb-sucking during the crimes. The victim's vulnerabilities facilitated the crimes by preventing her from recognizing danger and verbalizing requests for help. Taylor's own mental health issues did not negate his knowledge of the victim's vulnerabilities.
2. Pattern Enhancement: The court adopted the Supreme Court's definition from Wooden v. United States (595 U.S. 360 (2022)), holding that an "occasion" means an event or episode. Separate occasions are determined by considering temporal proximity, interruption, distance, and similarity of crimes. The enhancement applies to any "prohibited sexual conduct," not just convictions. Taylor's four rapes occurring at three or more separate locations across the better part of a day constituted separate occasions, thus satisfying the "pattern" requirement of at least two separate occasions. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in applying this enhancement.

This is an immigration law case in which a certified class of asylum seekers who entered the United States without inspection and were screened for expedited removal challenged the constitutionality of mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which provides no opportunity for bond hearings. The government appealed the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss on jurisdictional and constitutional grounds.

1. Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the class's due process claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), which strips courts of jurisdiction over certain issues related to expedited removal
2. Whether the class's due process challenge to mandatory detention is barred by Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), which held that noncitizens at the threshold of initial entry have limited due process rights

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the government's motion to dismiss on both grounds. First, the court held that none of the four provisions of § 1252(a)(2)(A) precluded jurisdiction because the class's claim challenges the constitutionality of the detention statute itself, not individual determinations or the application of expedited removal to specific individuals. Section 1252(e)(3) does not independently limit jurisdiction but rather provides an exception to § 1252(a)(2)(A)'s bars. Second, the court rejected the government's broad reading of Thuraissigiam, holding that the Supreme Court's decision applies only to noncitizens apprehended at the "threshold of initial entry" (such as those apprehended within 25 yards of the border immediately after entry). The bond hearing class, which includes noncitizens apprehended anywhere in the United States within two years of entry, is fundamentally differently situated. The court emphasized that decades of precedent establish that noncitizens within U.S. territory, legally or illegally, are protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court further reasoned that Thuraissigiam addressed admission rights, not detention rights, and that protection against arbitrary detention has been a central tenet of British and American legal traditions since the Magna Carta. Therefore, noncitizens who arrive illegally and are found away from the border well after arrival retain constitutional protections against arbitrary detention.

This case involves a constitutional challenge to Delaware's permanent absentee voting statute brought by two candidates in the 2026 general election. The plaintiffs argued that the statute unconstitutionally expands the categories of absentee voters beyond those enumerated in the Delaware Constitution and fails to adequately verify voter eligibility.

1. Whether the permanent absentee voting statute violates Article V, Section 4A of the Delaware Constitution by expanding the enumerated categories of absentee voters to include voters who are no longer eligible to vote absentee
2. Whether the statute's verification procedures comply with Article V, Section 1 of the Delaware Constitution's requirement to "best secure secrecy and the independence of the voter, preserve the freedom and purity of elections, and prevent fraud, corruption, and intimidation"
3. Whether the statute's presumption of continued eligibility by automatically mailing ballots violates the constitutional language requiring voters to be unable to appear "at such general election" (singular)
4. The appropriate standard for evaluating facial constitutional challenges to legislation

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision and upheld the constitutionality of the permanent absentee voting statute. The Court held that:

1. The statute does not expand the categories of absentee voters beyond those permitted by the Delaware Constitution; rather, it narrows eligibility to a subset of constitutionally-permitted absentee voters
2. The statute prohibits voters with permanent absentee status from voting absentee if they are no longer eligible, requiring them to keep the Department informed of changes in their eligibility status
3. The Department's verification procedures—including pre-election letters reminding voters of eligibility requirements, removal of voters with undeliverable mail, removal of deceased voters, and requiring voters to attest to continuing eligibility on each ballot—are adequate and consistent with the permanent voter registration process
4. The constitutional language regarding "shall be unable" and "such general election" refers to a voter's eligibility in each general election, not a requirement for recertification in each election
5. Article V, Section 1 delegates to the General Assembly the discretion to prescribe the means and methods of voting to ensure election purity, and the statute's procedures satisfy this requirement
6. Under the facial challenge standard, where the presumption of constitutionality is at its highest, the statute can be applied consistently with the Delaware Constitution, and even imperfect enforcement procedures do not render every application of the statute unconstitutional

This is an administrative law case in which Berkey International, LLC challenges the EPA's issuance of a Stop Sale, Use, or Removal Order prohibiting the distribution of water filters containing silver, a registered pesticide. Berkey argues the EPA's action was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).

1. Whether the EPA had "reason to believe" that Berkey's water filters violated FIFRA by containing an unregistered pesticide (silver) and being misbranded
2. Whether Berkey's water filters qualify for exemptions under FIFRA as "devices" or "treated articles"
3. Whether the EPA improperly relied on nonbinding guidance without following notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
4. Whether the EPA violated Berkey's Fifth Amendment due process rights by issuing the Stop Order without prior notice or opportunity to be heard

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Berkey's motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The court held that:

1. Berkey failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because it did not substantiate its claim that the silver in the filters was not intended for a pesticidal purpose. Under FIFRA's pre-authorization regime, the burden fell on Berkey to demonstrate that the filters qualified for device or treated article exemptions, and Berkey's reliance solely on the president's declaration was insufficient.
2. The filters did not qualify as exempt "devices" because they incorporated silver, a pesticidal substance, and regulations since the 1970s explicitly exclude water filters "containing substances" from the device exemption.
3. The filters did not qualify as "treated articles" because Berkey failed to show that the silver was registered for the non-pesticidal use of protecting the filters themselves, and the EPA could not verify such registration.
4. The EPA had adequate basis in the administrative record to believe the filters were pesticidal products, including the presence of silver and pesticidal claims made on labels and websites claiming removal of viruses and bacteria.
5. Berkey failed to show a likelihood of success on its notice-and-comment claim because 40 C.F.R. § 152.15 independently provided regulatory authority for the EPA's determination that the filters were pesticide products intended for pesticidal purposes.
6. Berkey's Fifth Amendment due process claim was waived because Berkey failed to adequately brief and argue it in the district court proceedings.

This is an immigration law case in which a class of noncitizens with final removal orders challenged a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy authorizing removal to countries not designated in their removal orders (third-country removals) without providing notice or opportunity to contest removal based on fear of persecution or torture. The class sought declaratory relief and vacatur of the policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

1. Whether the district court properly certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
2. Whether the district court had jurisdiction over the class's APA claims despite statutory jurisdiction-stripping and jurisdiction-channeling provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(a)(4), 1252(a)(5), 1252(b)(9), and FARRA § 2242(d)
3. Whether DHS must engage in statutory "sequencing" (attempting removal to designated countries first) before removing noncitizens to third countries
4. Whether DHS must provide effective notice and meaningful opportunity to contest removal based on fear of persecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)
5. Whether DHS must provide effective notice and meaningful opportunity to contest removal based on fear of torture under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT)
6. Whether the district court's declaratory and vacatur relief violates 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)'s limitation on injunctive relief

1. Class Certification: The court affirmed the district court's class certification, finding that all class members were similarly situated regarding their entitlement to notice and opportunity to assert fear-based claims before third-country removal, even though they may have different downstream procedural rights.
2. Jurisdiction - § 1252(g): The court held that § 1252(g)'s bar on jurisdiction does not apply because the class is not challenging DHS's decision to execute removal orders, but rather challenging the lawfulness of removing noncitizens to countries not contemplated by their removal orders without procedural protections. The class's claims arise from DHS's adoption of policies regarding country identification, not from execution of the removal orders themselves.
3. Jurisdiction - § 1252(a)(4) and FARRA § 2242(d): The court held that these provisions do not strip jurisdiction because the class's claims arise under the APA, not under the FARRA/CAT or CAT directly. Section 2242(d) merely disclaims that it provides jurisdiction; it does not repeal jurisdiction provided elsewhere.
4. Jurisdiction - § 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9): The court held that § 1252(b)(9)'s jurisdiction-channeling provision does not apply because this case does not seek review of a removal order, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability is determined. Rather, it challenges procedures DHS must follow after deciding to remove someone and choosing to remove them to a country not identified in the removal order—action that post-dates the contexts triggering § 1252(b)(9)'s limitations.
5. Sequencing: The court vacated the district court's declarations regarding statutory sequencing because the representative plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. Each plaintiff had designated their country of citizenship as the removal destination and either had that country refuse them or had secured protection from removal there, meaning they could not show injury from DHS's alleged failure to follow the sequencing requirements.
6. Fear of Persecution: The court affirmed that the Guidance is unlawful under the APA because it violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and related regulations. The court construed these provisions to require DHS to provide eligible class members with effective notice and meaningful opportunity to raise fear-of-persecution claims before third-country removal. The Guidance's failure to provide notice (in cases with diplomatic assurances) or inadequate notice (24 hours or less in other cases) violates these requirements. The court rejected DHS's arguments that: (1) the statute contains no explicit textual requirement for such procedures; (2) § 1231(h) precludes such claims; and (3) DHS has discretion to fashion streamlined procedures.
7. Fear of Torture: The court affirmed that the Guidance is unlawful under the APA because it violates the FARRA/CAT and related regulations. The court construed these provisions to require effective notice and meaningful opportunity to assert fear-of-torture claims before third-country removal. The court applied the constitutional-avoidance canon and presumption of congressional solicitude for fair procedure to reach this interpretation, avoiding serious Fifth Amendment due process concerns. The court rejected DHS's underdeveloped arguments that the regulations plainly refer only to applications during removal proceedings and that regulatory provisions regarding country-specific CAT protection render additional notice unnecessary.
8. Scope of Remedy - § 1252(f)(1): The court affirmed the district court's declaratory judgments and vacatur of the Guidance, holding that § 1252(f)(1)'s limitation on injunctive relief does not bar declaratory relief or vacatur. The court followed its prior precedent in Brito v. Garland, which held that § 1252(f)(1) applies only to injunctions, not declaratory judgments. The court also applied this reasoning to vacatur, noting that: (1) the statute's text and caption mention only injunctions; (2) declaratory relief and vacatur are milder remedies than injunctions; (3) Congress knows how to explicitly prohibit declaratory relief when it chooses to do so; and (4) the Supreme Court in Aleman Gonzalez expressly reserved the question whether § 1252(f)(1) prohibits class-wide declaratory relief. The court noted that this interpretation aligns with the uniform position of courts considering the question after Aleman Gonzalez.

This is an appeal of a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan forgiveness denial. Celebrity of Springfield, LLC, a car dealership, violated the SBA's Corporate Group Rule by borrowing more than the aggregate limit permitted for entities with shared majority ownership, and the SBA denied the company's request for partial loan forgiveness.

1. Whether the CARES Act or its implementing regulations mandate partial forgiveness of a PPP loan obtained in violation of the Corporate Group Rule
2. Whether the SBA abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying partial forgiveness under the Administrative Procedure Act
3. Whether the SBA was required to follow its own regulations regarding loan forgiveness eligibility

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's summary judgment in favor of the SBA. The court held that: (1) neither the CARES Act nor its implementing regulations mandate partial forgiveness when a borrower violates the Corporate Group Rule; (2) the Corporate Group Rule explicitly states that loans exceeding the cap "will not be eligible for forgiveness," which is clear and binding language; (3) the SBA did not abuse its discretion by following its own rules, as agencies are bound by their own regulations; and (4) even if the SBA had discretion, its decision to deny forgiveness was reasonable given Celebrity's failure to track its loans, multiple certifications of compliance, and the violation of over $1 million beyond the cap.

This is a Title VII employment retaliation case in which a university police officer sued West Texas A&M University (WTAMU) after being suspended and discharged following his participation in a sexual misconduct investigation and subsequent recording of his supervisor's conversation. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the adverse employment actions were retaliatory.

1. Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas test, including: (a) whether he engaged in protected activity; (b) whether he suffered adverse employment actions; and (c) whether a causal link existed between the protected activity and adverse actions
2. Whether paid administrative leave and an investigation constitute adverse employment actions under the Burlington Northern standard
3. Whether a causal link exists when the ultimate decision-maker (Burns) had retaliatory motive but relied on an independent investigative panel's recommendations
4. Whether the employer's stated non-retaliatory reason (violation of recording laws and policy) was pretextual given evidence of retaliatory animus

The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. The court held:

1. Protected Activity: Both parties agreed that Crawford's participation in the sexual misconduct investigation was protected activity under Title VII.
2. Adverse Employment Actions: The court found that Crawford's suspension and investigation into his recording of Burns' conversation constituted adverse employment actions. The court rejected the district court's application of outdated Fifth Circuit precedent and applied the Supreme Court's Burlington Northern standard, which asks whether the action would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge. The court found that disciplinary suspension with diminished prestige among coworkers satisfied this standard. However, the court found Crawford could not establish causation for the dishonorable discharge because an independent investigative panel made that recommendation without knowledge of his protected activity.
3. Causal Link: The court found sufficient evidence of causation for the suspension and investigation because Burns knew of Crawford's involvement in the Title IX investigation and made statements indicating he would retaliate against those involved. Burns' knowledge of the protected activity, combined with his retaliatory statements ("stacking bodies," indicating he would fire people involved in investigations), established the causal link at the prima facie stage. However, the causal chain was broken regarding the discharge because the independent panel members stated they were unaware of Crawford's protected activity and conducted an independent investigation without merely "rubber stamping" recommendations.
4. Legitimate Non-Retaliatory Reason: WTAMU met its burden of production by articulating that Crawford violated policy and potentially state law by secretly recording his supervisor and misrepresenting how he made the recording.
5. Pretext: The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding pretext. Evidence that Burns made cryptic statements about "stacking bodies" and "leaving bodies in the wake" of investigations, combined with the temporal proximity between Crawford's participation in the Title IX investigation and subsequent adverse actions (quarantine violations, work routine changes, denial of promotion), could support a jury finding that Burns' stated reason was pretextual. The court noted Crawford had positive performance reviews before the investigations began and that Burns' statements could be construed as indicating retaliatory intent.

This is a criminal appeal case in which the defendant, Devin Chaney, challenged his sentencing for Hobbs Act Robbery and Armed Bank Robbery despite having signed an appeal waiver as part of his plea agreement. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether the Supreme Court's newly established "miscarriage of justice" exception to appeal waivers applies to Chaney's claim that he was improperly designated as a career offender.

1. Whether Chaney's appeal waiver is enforceable under the Supreme Court's new "miscarriage of justice" exception established in Hunter v. United States (2026)
2. Whether the district court's classification of Chaney as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 constitutes egregious error that would qualify as a miscarriage of justice
3. Whether the district court's procedural handling of Chaney's sentencing objection violated the minimum standards of civilized procedure
4. Whether errors in applying sentencing guidelines and calculating sentencing ranges meet the "high bar" for the miscarriage of justice exception

The Fifth Circuit enforced Chaney's appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal. The court held that Chaney failed to identify egregious error meeting the "high bar" established by Hunter I. The court reasoned that: (1) the career offender classification error, even if it occurred, constitutes standard-fare sentencing error that the Supreme Court explicitly stated does not overcome an appeal waiver; (2) there is a 7-3 circuit split on the legal issue, meaning the error was not "obvious" under controlling law; (3) the two unpublished Fifth Circuit decisions Chaney cited post-dated his sentencing and therefore could not establish that an error was apparent under controlling law at the time; (4) the distinction between the "plain error" standard and the "miscarriage of justice" standard means that even clear or plain error does not automatically qualify; and (5) the procedural deficiency claimed—that the district court summarily overruled his objection—does not approach the level of procedural violation contemplated by Hunter I, as Chaney was afforded an opportunity to object and present arguments.

This is a Second Amendment challenge to federal provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922 that prohibit the interstate sale of handguns (the "Nonresident Handgun Purchase Ban"). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether these provisions violate the Second Amendment under the framework established in New York State Pistol & Rifle Association v. Bruen.

1. Whether the Nonresident Handgun Purchase Ban implicates the plain text of the Second Amendment at Bruen Step 1
2. Whether the government met its burden at Bruen Step 2 to justify the Ban as consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearms regulation
3. Whether the existence of a licensee-to-licensee transfer workaround undermines the characterization of the law as a purchase ban
4. Whether the Ban can be justified based on historical colonial and founding-era laws regulating cross-border firearms sales

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The court held that: (1) the Ban implicates the plain text of the Second Amendment at Bruen Step 1 because it categorically prohibits an entire class of lawful firearms purchases, and the existence of a workaround does not change this characterization; (2) the government failed to meet its burden at Bruen Step 2 because the historical analogues it cited—including colonial laws restricting cross-border firearms sales—do not meaningfully align with the Ban's purpose of preventing individuals from evading state firearms laws during peacetime; and (3) the historical record lacks laws meaningfully restricting interstate firearms trade after the United States became established as a single entity, making broad historical comparisons insufficient under the Bruen framework. The court rejected the approach of reading historical laws at an overly general level of abstraction and emphasized that founding-era laws regulating foreign commerce and common defense are inapposite to modern prohibitions on interstate handgun sales.

This is an appeal concerning federal removal jurisdiction in a state lawsuit filed by Kentucky against pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) alleging they contributed to the opioid crisis by conspiring with drug manufacturers to increase prescription opioid supply. The central issue is whether the case was properly removed to federal court under the federal officer removal statute.

1. Whether the PBMs qualify as "persons acting under" a federal officer under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)
2. Whether Kentucky's claims "relate to" conduct performed under color of federal office
3. Whether the PBMs raised colorable federal defenses sufficient to support removal jurisdiction
4. Whether Kentucky's disclaimer of intent to hold PBMs liable for federally controlled conduct defeats removal jurisdiction

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's remand order and held that the case was properly removed to federal court. The court found that all three requirements for removal under § 1442(a)(1) were satisfied: (1) the PBMs act under federal officers because they perform pharmacy benefit services for federal health plans (FEHBA, TRICARE, and VHA) under federal supervision and control; (2) Kentucky's claims relate to federally controlled conduct because the PBMs conduct unified negotiations with drug manufacturers on behalf of all clients (federal and non-federal) without distinguishing between them, making the conduct indivisible; and (3) the PBMs raised colorable federal defenses including Boyle immunity and federal preemption under FEHBA, TRICARE, and ERISA. The court reasoned that Kentucky cannot circumvent removal by disclaiming reliance on the federally controlled aspects of the PBMs' indivisible conduct, and that the complaint targets conduct that flows from an integrated system drawing on negotiations on behalf of all clients.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board sought to enjoin Laborforce from withdrawing union recognition and unilaterally changing employee wages and benefits following employee-initiated decertification petitions.

1. Whether the NLRB Director satisfied the traditional four-factor test for preliminary injunctions, specifically whether irreparable harm would result absent an injunction
2. Whether diminished union support and loss of collective bargaining benefits constitute irreparable harm under Section 10(j)
3. Whether the Director's delay in seeking injunctive relief (7-18 months) affects the irreparable harm analysis
4. Whether harm to the union's organizational efforts or harm to individual employees' material interests should be the focus of the irreparable harm inquiry
5. Whether an employer's wage and benefit increases to employees following decertification preclude a finding of irreparable harm

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The court held that the NLRB Director failed to establish irreparable harm, which is a threshold requirement for Section 10(j) relief. The majority reasoned that: (1) generic claims about erosion of union support and loss of collective bargaining benefits are insufficient to show irreparable harm; (2) Section 10(j) does not create a presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of likely success on the merits, as established by the Supreme Court in Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney; (3) the case implicates employees' statutory right to refrain from unionization, and an injunction might defeat this right as much as vindicate unionization rights, particularly given the material benefits employees received after decertification; (4) the Director's significant delay in seeking the injunction (7-18 months) undermined the urgency required for extraordinary equitable relief; and (5) the Board's potent remedial powers can effectively remedy any violations through its final order. The majority emphasized that Section 10(j) injunctions are extraordinary remedies never awarded as of right, and the Director must make a clear showing of specific, irreparable harm to labor rights protected by the NLRA, not merely generic harms common to labor disputes.

This is an immigration case in which the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the government violated due process rights by ordering Raymundo Meza Medina removed in absentia after sending hearing notice to an address where he could not receive mail. The court addressed whether the government provided constitutionally sufficient notice of removal proceedings.

1. Whether the government violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by sending notice of a removal hearing to a residential address provided by third parties on a bond form, rather than to a mailing address provided by the noncitizen himself
2. Whether compliance with statutory notice requirements under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) satisfies constitutional due process requirements
3. Whether the government had a duty to take additional steps to provide notice after the initial hearing notice was returned as undeliverable
4. Whether remand to the agency was necessary to determine what practicable alternatives existed for notifying the noncitizen of his hearing

The Ninth Circuit granted Meza Medina's petition for review and held that the government violated his due process rights. The court reasoned that notice reasonably calculated to reach a person must be based on the practicalities of the individual case. Here, the government's sole notice attempt relied on a residential address provided by third parties on a bond form that specifically asked for where the "Alien to reside at" rather than a mailing address. When the notice was returned as undeliverable, the government made no further attempts to provide notice. The court rejected the government's arguments that: (1) statutory compliance was sufficient, noting that the address had not been "provided by the alien" as required by regulation; and (2) Meza Medina failed to provide his correct mailing address, finding this contradicted by his sworn statement that he "let the Court know my address to receive notices." The court concluded that remand was unnecessary because reasonable alternatives were clearly available, such as mailing notice to an address Meza Medina provided himself or calling him at his telephone number on the bond form. The removal order was therefore improper, and Meza Medina's motion to reopen should have been granted.

This is a federal constitutional challenge to Idaho's "stockwater amendments," a series of statutes enacted after a state court adjudication confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land. The United States challenged several provisions of these amendments as unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause, arguing they were designed to divest the federal government of its water rights.

1. Whether the federal district court had jurisdiction over the case under the doctrines of prior exclusive jurisdiction and Burford abstention
2. Whether Idaho Code § 42-224, which establishes a procedure for determining forfeiture of stockwater rights, is constitutional as applied to the United States
3. Whether Idaho Code § 42-113(2)(b), which changes appurtenance rules for stockwater rights on federally owned or managed land, is facially unconstitutional
4. Whether the stockwater amendments discriminate against the federal government in violation of the Supremacy Clause

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's jurisdictional holdings, finding that: (1) the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not apply because this action is not in rem but rather challenges the constitutionality of state statutes; and (2) Burford abstention does not apply because none of its three requirements are met—Idaho has not concentrated constitutional challenges in state courts, state courts have no special competence in evaluating federal constitutional issues, and federal review does not disrupt coherent state policy.

On the merits, the court reversed the district court's holding that § 42-224 is constitutional as applied to the United States. Reading the stockwater amendments as a whole, the court found that § 42-224 is part of a statutory scheme designed to divest the United States of its SRBA-decreed stockwater rights. The statute discriminates against the federal government by effectively jeopardizing those rights through burdensome forfeiture proceedings, particularly because the United States lacks express agency agreements with permittees that comply with § 42-224(4). This violates the Supremacy Clause, which immunizes the federal government from state laws that discriminate against it.

The court affirmed the district court's holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional. This provision unlawfully discriminates against the United States by changing appurtenance rules only for stockwater rights associated with federally owned or managed land, thereby creating a mechanism by which permittees can divest the United States of its water rights. The statute does not merely codify the Joyce decision but instead applies to all stockwater rights associated with federal land, including those held by the United States, and allows permittees to convey the United States' own water rights to new permit owners.

This is an immigration case in which Raymundo Meza Medina challenges an in absentia removal order issued after he failed to appear at his removal hearing. Meza Medina argues he never received notice of the hearing due to the government sending it to an incorrect address.

1. Whether the government violated Meza Medina's Fifth Amendment due process rights by ordering him removed in absentia after sending the only notice of his removal hearing to a residential address provided by third parties on a bond form, rather than to his mailing address.
2. Whether compliance with statutory notice requirements under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) is sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process requirements.
3. Whether the government had a duty to take additional steps to provide notice after the initial hearing notice was returned as undeliverable.
4. Whether remand to the agency was necessary to determine what practicable alternatives existed for notifying Meza Medina of his hearing.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Meza Medina's petition for review and held that the government violated his due process rights. The court reasoned as follows:

1. The government's sole attempt to notify Meza Medina of his removal hearing was unreasonably calculated to reach him because it relied on a residential address (not a mailing address) provided by third parties on a bond form that specifically asked for where the "Alien to reside at," not where he received mail.
2. The unreliability of using the bond form as a source for a mailing address was made apparent when the hearing notice was returned as undeliverable, yet the government made no further attempts to provide notice.
3. A government genuinely seeking to inform Meza Medina would not have relied solely on a third party's residential address and would have taken additional steps after learning the notice was undeliverable, particularly where Meza Medina had stated in a sworn declaration that he provided his address to receive notices.
4. The government's argument that it complied with statutory requirements under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26(d) was unavailing because the address used had not been "provided by the alien" as required by that regulation, and statutory compliance does not necessarily satisfy constitutional due process requirements.
5. The government's argument that Meza Medina failed to provide his correct mailing address was contradicted by his sworn statement that he had provided an address to receive notices, which the government did not dispute.
6. Remand for further factfinding was not necessary because the record clearly showed practicable alternatives were available, such as mailing notice to an address provided by Meza Medina himself or calling him at the telephone number on his bond form.

This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal in which the claimant challenged an administrative law judge's (ALJ) denial of her application for disability insurance benefits based on alleged mental and physical impairments, including fibromyalgia, PTSD, panic disorder, ADHD, major depressive disorder, and irritable bowel disease.

1. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion of the claimant's treating physician, Dr. Brandy Thomas, regarding fibromyalgia limitations under the 2017 revised Social Security regulations.
2. Whether the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony regarding the severity of her mental and physical impairments.
3. Whether the ALJ was required to provide "germane reasons" for rejecting lay testimony from the claimant's partner regarding her symptoms and ability to work, and whether the 2017 regulatory revisions abrogated this requirement.
4. Whether the ALJ's errors were harmless or required reversal and remand.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further administrative proceedings. The court held:

1. The ALJ's reasons for finding Dr. Thomas's opinion unpersuasive were invalid. The ALJ improperly relied on normal gait, muscle strength, and range of motion to discredit fibromyalgia-related limitations, which reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of fibromyalgia. The ALJ also committed a factual error in concluding that the claimant taught yoga classes when she only participated in them, and failed to adequately explain why the claimant's self-estimates were unreliable.
2. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ's evaluation of the other physicians' medical opinions (Drs. Adkisson, Castro, and Eisenhauer).
3. The ALJ properly provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony regarding her mental impairments.
4. The ALJ improperly rejected the claimant's testimony regarding her physical impairments and fibromyalgia symptoms for the same reasons that invalidated the rejection of Dr. Thomas's opinion, and also erred by relying on the absence of tender-point examinations to discredit symptom testimony.
5. The ALJ committed legal error by failing to provide any reason—germane or otherwise—for rejecting the lay testimony of the claimant's partner. The 2017 regulatory revisions did not abrogate the "germane reasons" standard for lay testimony. Regulation 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(d) merely states that ALJs need not use the same detailed criteria for nonmedical sources as for medical sources, not that they need provide no explanation at all. The error was not harmless because the partner's testimony contained relevant details about the claimant's symptoms and functional limitations.
6. Although the ALJ committed several harmful errors, remand for an award of benefits was inappropriate because further administrative proceedings would be useful to develop the record.

This is a federal constitutional challenge to a series of Idaho statutes known as the "stockwater amendments," which were enacted after a state court adjudication (the Snake River Basin Adjudication) confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal grazing lands. The United States challenged several provisions of these amendments as unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

1. Whether the federal district court had jurisdiction to hear the case under the doctrines of prior exclusive jurisdiction and Burford abstention
2. Whether Idaho Code § 42-224, which establishes a procedure for determining forfeiture of stockwater rights, is unconstitutional as applied to the United States
3. Whether Idaho Code § 42-113(2)(b), which changes appurtenance rules for stockwater rights associated with federal grazing lands, is facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause
4. The basis for the United States' SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and whether they were acquired through implied agency relationships with federal grazing permittees

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's jurisdictional holdings, finding that: (1) the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not apply because this action is not in rem but rather challenges the constitutionality of state statutes; and (2) Burford abstention does not apply because Idaho has not concentrated constitutional challenges in state courts, state courts have no special competence in federal constitutional issues, and federal review does not disrupt coherent state policy.

On the merits, the court reversed the district court's holding that § 42-224 is constitutional as applied to the United States. Reading the stockwater amendments as a whole, the court found that § 42-224 is part of a statutory scheme designed to divest the United States of its SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and discriminates against the federal government in violation of the Supremacy Clause by effectively jeopardizing those rights through burdensome forfeiture proceedings.

The court affirmed the district court's holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional. The statute unlawfully discriminates against the United States by changing appurtenance rules only for stockwater rights associated with federal grazing lands, thereby creating a mechanism by which federal grazing permittees can divest the United States of its stockwater rights by conveying them to new permit owners.

This case involves a challenge by the United States to the constitutionality of Idaho's "stockwater amendments," a series of statutes enacted after a state court adjudication confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land. The United States argues that these amendments violate the Supremacy Clause by discriminating against the federal government and effectively divesting it of its water rights.

1. Whether the federal district court had jurisdiction to hear the case under the doctrines of prior exclusive jurisdiction and Burford abstention
2. Whether Idaho Code § 42-224, which establishes a procedure for determining forfeiture of stockwater rights, is constitutional as applied to the United States
3. Whether Idaho Code § 42-113(2)(b), which changes appurtenance rules for stockwater rights associated with federal grazing lands, is facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause
4. The basis for the United States' SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and whether an implied agency relationship exists between the United States and its federal grazing permittees

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's jurisdictional holdings, finding that: (1) the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not apply because this action is not in rem but rather challenges the constitutionality of state statutes; and (2) Burford abstention does not apply because none of its three requirements are met. The court reversed the district court's holding that § 42-224 is constitutional as applied to the United States, finding that when read in context with other stockwater amendments, § 42-224 is part of a statutory scheme designed to divest the United States of its SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and therefore discriminates against the federal government in violation of the Supremacy Clause. The court affirmed the district court's holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional, finding that it unlawfully discriminates against the United States by regulating only stockwater rights associated with federally owned or managed land and creating a mechanism by which permittees can divest the United States of its water rights.

This is a federal constitutional challenge brought by the United States against Idaho statutes known as the "stockwater amendments," which were enacted after a state court adjudication confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land. The United States argues that several provisions of these amendments unconstitutionally discriminate against the federal government in violation of the Supremacy Clause.

1. Whether the federal district court had jurisdiction to hear the case under the doctrines of prior exclusive jurisdiction and Burford abstention
2. Whether Idaho Code § 42-224, which establishes a procedure for determining forfeiture of stockwater rights, is unconstitutional as applied to the United States
3. Whether Idaho Code § 42-113(2)(b), which changes appurtenance rules for stockwater rights associated with federally owned or managed land, is facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause
4. The proper basis for the United States' SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and whether an implied agency relationship exists between the United States and its federal grazing permittees

The court affirmed the district court's jurisdictional holdings, finding that: (1) the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not apply because this action is not in rem—it challenges the constitutionality of statutes rather than determining interests in specific property; and (2) Burford abstention does not apply because Idaho has not concentrated constitutional challenges to state statutes in its courts, state courts have no special competence in evaluating federal constitutional issues, and federal review does not disrupt a coherent state policy. On the merits, the court reversed the district court's holding that § 42-224 is constitutional as applied to the United States. Reading the stockwater amendments as a whole, the court found that § 42-224 is part of a statutory scheme designed to divest the United States of its SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and discriminates against the federal government in violation of the Supremacy Clause. The statute effectively jeopardizes the United States' rights by requiring express agency agreements that the United States does not possess and forcing the United States to defend against burdensome collateral attacks. The court affirmed the district court's holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional. This provision unlawfully discriminates against the United States by changing appurtenance rules only for stockwater rights associated with federally owned or managed land, thereby creating a mechanism by which federal grazing permittees can divest the United States of its stockwater rights by conveying those rights to new permit owners.

This is a federal criminal appeal of a four-star Navy Admiral convicted of bribery and related crimes. Admiral Robert P. Burke was found guilty of agreeing to steer a Navy contract to a private company (Next Jump) in exchange for a lucrative post-retirement job offer.

1. Whether the indictment adequately described an "official act" under the bribery statute when Burke lacked direct authority to enter contracts but could order subordinates to do so
2. Whether the district court properly excluded portions of Burke's interview with investigators under Federal Rule of Evidence 106 (rule of completeness)
3. Whether the district court properly excluded an email from Next Jump's co-CEO to impeach his credibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 806
4. Whether two text messages were properly admitted as hearsay exceptions
5. Whether the jury instructions on the mens rea requirement for bribery correctly stated the law regarding "corrupt intent"
6. Whether a missing witness instruction should have been given for Burke's former girlfriend

The Court of Appeals affirmed Burke's convictions on all counts. The court held:

1. Official Act: An Admiral ordering a subordinate to enter into a contract constitutes an "official act" under the bribery statute, consistent with Supreme Court precedent allowing officials to commit official acts by using their position to pressure other officials.
2. Rule 106 Exclusions: The district court properly excluded portions of Burke's interview because the statements Burke sought to admit were separated by approximately 45 pages of transcript and represented his "additional explanation" rather than necessary context for fair presentation. Rule 106 does not require admission of self-serving exculpatory statements in all circumstances.
3. Email Exclusion: The September 2022 email stating Next Jump hired Burke for his leadership skills was not inconsistent with earlier statements that the job was contingent on securing a Navy contract—both statements could coherently coexist (hire him because he's talented, but only if he gets us a contract).
4. Text Messages: Although the admission of the two text messages presented "close questions," any evidentiary error was harmless because Burke's own messages to his girlfriend established the agreement to exchange a job for a contract, and substantial other evidence corroborated guilt.
5. Jury Instructions on "Corruptly": The court identified a legally erroneous jury instruction defining "corruptly" as requiring only that the official have "understanding" that another person "expects" him to be influenced, rather than the correct standard requiring the official's own "intent to be influenced." However, the court declined to reverse because Burke's own defense counsel jointly proposed this erroneous language, constituting invited error that precludes appellate review.
6. Missing Witness Instruction: The district court properly denied a missing witness instruction for Burke's former girlfriend because she was available to both parties and both had strategic reasons not to call her, so she was not "peculiarly" within the government's control.
7. Cumulative Error: The court rejected Burke's argument that cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial, finding that most issues did not constitute actual errors and the two potential errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

This is a procedural order from the Delaware Court of Chancery addressing an emergency motion filed by trustees seeking approval of work orders, contractor payments, and reimbursement for repairs and lost goods related to their condominium unit in a dispute with the King's Grant Condominium Association.

1. Whether the plaintiffs' motion for emergency relief regarding approval of work orders and reimbursement for condominium repairs and lost goods constitutes a genuine emergency warranting expedited judicial review
2. The proper use and abuse of emergency motion procedures in the court system
3. The allocation of limited court resources among competing litigants and cases

The Court denied the emergency designation of the motion. Vice Chancellor David ruled that the relief sought—approval of work orders, contractor payments, and reimbursement for repairs and lost goods—does not constitute a genuine emergency requiring expedited treatment. The Court reasoned that labeling motions as "emergencies" when no real exigency exists constitutes an abuse of the judicial system, as it diverts limited court resources from cases involving true emergencies and other litigants. The Court directed the parties to confer on a reasonable deadline for the defendants' response and indicated the motion would be resolved on a non-expedited basis through normal procedures.

This is a breach of contract case arising from the acquisition of The Bridge, a technology consulting firm, by The North Highland Company LLC. The dispute concerns the seller representative's rights to identify and classify "Qualifying Projects" under an earnout provision that was designed to bridge the valuation gap between the parties.

1. Whether North Highland must provide the seller representative with access to its sales pipeline and pricing tools to identify Qualifying Projects
2. Whether the definition of "Qualifying Project" is limited to the revenue-based criterion in the purchase agreement or whether North Highland may apply extra-contractual carve-outs
3. Whether the mutual-agreement requirement in the Qualifying Project definition operates as a procedural check or permits North Highland to withhold agreement based on operational factors
4. Whether North Highland must provide separate 2026 business unit profit and loss statements for real-time earnout monitoring

The court ruled in favor of the seller representative (Winton) on three of the four expedited issues. First, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires North Highland to provide periodic reports containing the Salesforce and pricing-tool data necessary for the seller representative to identify and notify North Highland of potential Qualifying Projects before Stage 3 RFP submissions, though not real-time pipeline access. Second, the definition of "Qualifying Project" is governed solely by the plain text of the purchase agreement—whether a project "primarily (based on revenue) involves the delivery of technology or data analytics services"—and North Highland cannot apply extra-contractual carve-outs or geographic/client exclusions. Third, the mutual-agreement requirement is a procedural verification mechanism to confirm that a project meets the revenue-based criterion, not a substantive veto allowing North Highland to withhold agreement based on operational considerations like capacity or skill sets. Fourth, the court denied without prejudice Winton's request for relief regarding separate business unit records, finding that he abandoned this expedited claim at his deposition. The court granted specific performance requiring North Highland to implement a biweekly reporting schedule with supplemental disclosures for time-sensitive projects.

This is a First Amendment challenge to Lafayette County, Mississippi's Facility Use Policy governing access to the courthouse grounds. A University of Mississippi professor sought to host a nighttime art projection event but was denied a permit due to the county's nighttime curfew provision.

1. Whether amendments to the Policy rendered the case moot
2. Whether the nighttime curfew provision violates the First Amendment as an unreasonable time, place, and manner restriction
3. Whether the plaintiff has standing to bring facial challenges to six provisions of the Policy, including challenges based on overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
4. Whether the remaining five provisions (five-or-more rule, advance notice requirement, sheriff fees, insurance-and-indemnification, and denial of proposed usage) chill protected speech

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's permanent injunction against enforcement of the curfew provision. The court found that even under intermediate scrutiny, the curfew was not narrowly tailored to serve the county's public safety interest because: (1) the county presented no evidence that safety concerns extended to the courthouse grounds specifically; (2) the blanket ban applied every day and all nighttime hours despite evidence that nighttime activity varies; and (3) the regulation burdened substantially more speech than necessary. The court reversed the district court's standing dismissal, holding that Rash has standing to bring a facial overbreadth challenge to the curfew provision (though not a vagueness challenge, since his conduct is clearly proscribed) and standing to bring pre-enforcement facial challenges to the five remaining provisions based on their chilling effect on his intended future speech. The case was remanded for the plaintiff to demonstrate that unconstitutional applications of the policy substantially outweigh constitutional ones.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction order in a trade secrets misappropriation case. UEC Holdings and United Electric sued former Vice President Steven Hatcher and Kent Power for allegedly misappropriating confidential pricing and rate information, and the district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring Kent Power to cease work on a contract with Louisville Gas & Electric and permitting forensic examination of the defendants' electronic devices.

1. Whether the plaintiffs established irreparable harm sufficient to enjoin Kent Power from performing transmission work for LG&E, a service that United Electric cannot perform
2. Whether the forensic examination provisions of the preliminary injunction order are narrowly tailored to protect the defendants' confidential information, trade secrets, and private personal information
3. The proper standard for preliminary injunctions in trade secrets cases under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and Kentucky Uniform Trade Secrets Act (KUTSA)

The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's preliminary injunction order on two grounds. First, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm regarding the requirement that Kent Power cease work on the LG&E transmission contract. The record showed no evidence of actual or imminent competitive injury—Kent Power had not taken any business from United Electric, and its two attempts to obtain distribution work from LG&E were unsuccessful. The court distinguished cases involving ongoing misuse of trade secrets in production processes, finding that the plaintiffs did not allege Kent Power was continuously using misappropriated information. Second, the court found that paragraphs 4(b)-(d) of the order, requiring forensic imaging of all the defendants' devices and data sources, were overbroad and not narrowly tailored. The order lacked sufficient protections for the defendants' own trade secrets, confidential business information, and private employee data. The court noted that while the parties had reached an oral agreement "in principle" on forensic safeguards, the plaintiffs refused to reduce these protections to writing, leaving the defendants without adequate recourse. The court emphasized that forensic imaging inherently raises privacy and confidentiality concerns and must be narrowly tailored to prevent exposure of unrelated confidential information.

This case involves a dispute between Consumers Concrete Corp. and the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund regarding the calculation of withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA). Consumers partially withdrew from the multiemployer pension plan in 2017 and completely withdrew in 2019, and the parties disagreed about when a credit for the prior partial withdrawal liability should be applied in calculating the complete withdrawal liability.

1. Whether a credit for prior partial withdrawal liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(1) should be applied at step two of the four-step withdrawal liability calculation process in 29 U.S.C. § 1381(b)(1), or after all four steps are completed
2. The proper interpretation of the term "withdrawal liability" and how it differs from "allocable amount of unfunded vested benefits"
3. Whether § 1386(b)(1) operates in a forward-looking manner (applying to future withdrawals) or backward-looking manner (applying to the current withdrawal being calculated)
4. The significance of the twenty-year payment cap in 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1)(B) and its relationship to the timing of the credit application

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and held that the credit for prior partial withdrawal liability should be applied after the employer's complete withdrawal liability is fully calculated using all four steps of § 1381(b)(1), including the twenty-year payment limitation in § 1399(c)(1)(B), rather than at step two. The court's reasoning rested on several key points: (1) "Withdrawal liability" is defined by statute as the amount resulting from the four-step process, which is distinct from the "allocable amount of unfunded vested benefits"; (2) Step two's language "in the case of a partial withdrawal" applies only when an employer is undertaking a partial withdrawal, not when calculating a complete withdrawal for an employer with a prior partial withdrawal; (3) § 1386(b)(1) is forward-looking in nature, designed to record a credit for future withdrawals, not to apply credits from prior withdrawals; (4) Other statutory provisions contemplate modifications to withdrawal liability after the four-step calculation, making it consistent to apply the credit after all steps are completed; and (5) The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's longstanding interpretation supports applying the credit to the fully-adjusted withdrawal liability amount. The practical effect of this ruling is that Consumers' complete withdrawal liability could potentially be reduced to zero by the prior partial withdrawal credit, rather than requiring payment of approximately $9.3 million over twenty years as the Fund argued.

This case involves a dispute between Consumers Concrete Corp. and the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund regarding the calculation of withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA). Specifically, the parties disagreed about when a credit for a prior partial withdrawal should be applied in calculating the employer's complete withdrawal liability.

1. Whether a credit for prior partial withdrawal liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(1) should be applied at step two of the four-step withdrawal liability calculation process or after all four steps are completed
2. The proper interpretation of "withdrawal liability" as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1381(b)(1) and whether it encompasses only the allocable amount of unfunded vested benefits or includes all adjustments through the four-step process
3. The meaning and scope of step two's condition precedent—"in the case of a partial withdrawal"—and whether it applies only to partial withdrawals or also to complete withdrawals preceded by prior partial withdrawals
4. Whether the PBGC's regulatory interpretation and longstanding position on the timing of the credit should guide the court's statutory construction

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and held that the partial withdrawal liability credit under § 1386(b)(1) must be applied after the employer's complete withdrawal liability is fully calculated using all four steps of § 1381(b)(1), including the twenty-year payment limitation in § 1399(c)(1)(B), rather than at step two as the Fund argued. The court reasoned that: (1) "withdrawal liability" as defined in § 1381(b)(1) refers to the final amount after all four adjustments, not intermediate calculations; (2) the statutory language distinguishes between "withdrawal liability" and "allocable amount of unfunded vested benefits," which are distinct concepts; (3) step two's phrase "in the case of a partial withdrawal" applies only when an employer is undertaking a partial withdrawal itself, not when a complete withdrawal follows a prior partial withdrawal; (4) § 1386(b)(1) is forward-looking, recording the partial withdrawal liability for application to subsequent withdrawals, not backward-looking to apply credits during the current withdrawal calculation; and (5) the PBGC's longstanding regulatory interpretation, which has consistently held that the credit applies to the fully-adjusted withdrawal liability amount, supports this construction and reflects the statute's purpose of preventing employers from being charged twice for the same unfunded vested benefits.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a wrongful termination claim brought by Martin Heimbigner, a former CFO, against his indirect employer Edgewater Services, LLC and two of its executives. The Ninth Circuit certified two unsettled questions of Washington state law to the Washington Supreme Court rather than deciding the case on its own.

1. Whether Washington law recognizes common-law wrongful termination claims against indirect employers (i.e., employers who did not directly employ the plaintiff but exercised significant control over the employment relationship).
2. Whether Washington law recognizes common-law wrongful termination claims against individuals such as officers, managers, or supervisors (as opposed to only against the corporate employer entity).

The Ninth Circuit did not resolve the case on the merits. Instead, it certified both questions to the Washington Supreme Court, finding that: (1) the local law of Washington has not been clearly determined on these issues, as the Washington Supreme Court has never addressed them and the only relevant Court of Appeals decision (Awana v. Port of Seattle) left the questions open; (2) these questions involve important public policy ramifications with broad application warranting consideration by the state's highest court; and (3) federal district courts have disagreed on how Washington law should be interpreted. The court stayed proceedings pending the Washington Supreme Court's decision on whether to accept the certification and answer the questions.

This is an appeal concerning the enforcement of international arbitral awards under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). The Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic sought to enforce arbitral awards against John Baldwin, Shawn Scott, and their corporations, asserting an alter-ego theory to hold liable parties who did not participate in the original arbitration proceedings.

1. Whether a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 203 to enforce foreign arbitral awards against parties not named as debtors in the awards based on an alter-ego corporate veil-piercing theory
2. Whether 9 U.S.C. § 207's language limiting actions to be brought "as against any other party to the arbitration" restricts the district court's jurisdiction to named award-debtors only
3. Whether a district court sitting in secondary-country jurisdiction under the New York Convention may evaluate an alter-ego theory in a single recognition-and-enforcement proceeding, or whether such claims must be brought in a separate action
4. Whether the Ninth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order dismissing a petition to enforce foreign arbitral awards

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and held that: (1) the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under § 203 over the petition to enforce the foreign arbitral awards against Baldwin and Bridge Capital because the awards arose out of a legal relationship that was commercial in nature and not entirely domestic in scope; (2) § 207's language limiting actions to "any other party to the arbitration" is not a jurisdictional requirement but rather a procedural limitation on when and by whom such actions may be brought, and does not restrict jurisdiction to named award-debtors; (3) when a district court sits in secondary-country jurisdiction over foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention, it must consider all merits issues, including alter-ego theories, in a single recognition-and-enforcement proceeding, not in separate actions; (4) the district court's order should have been styled as a denial of a petition to enforce rather than a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and therefore the Ninth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction under § 16(a)(1)(D); and (5) the pre-New York Convention precedent in Orion Shipping, which prohibited consideration of alter-ego theories in confirmation proceedings, was inapplicable because the New York Convention deliberately consolidated the recognition-and-enforcement process into a single proceeding, eliminating the two-step approach that existed under the Geneva Convention.

This is an appeal of a class action lawsuit brought by transgender women inmates against Oregon Department of Corrections officials, challenging their housing placement policies under the Eighth Amendment. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring individualized assessments and presumptive placement of transgender women inmates in the state's women's prison, which the defendants appealed.

1. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that defendants applied a "default presumption" of placing transgender women inmates in men's prisons without individualized assessments
2. Whether plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial risk of harm and deliberate indifference by defendants sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation
3. Whether the class was properly certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, specifically regarding commonality of claims
4. Whether the preliminary injunction satisfied the four-factor Winter test for extraordinary relief

The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and decertified the class. The court held that: (1) the district court clearly erred in inferring a "default presumption" from statistical outcomes alone, as the record showed defendants conducted individualized case-by-case assessments considering medical history, mental health, safety, and inmate preferences; (2) plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial risk of harm, relying on stale nationwide statistics from 2007-2012 rather than current Oregon-specific data; (3) the class was improperly certified because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate commonality—different officials made different decisions for different inmates based on individual circumstances, not pursuant to a uniform systemic policy; and (4) the remaining Winter factors weighed against the injunction, as it would disrupt state prison administration and public safety by potentially transferring over 100 inmates, including those convicted of violent crimes, to the only women's prison in Oregon.

This is an immigration appeal in which Natalia Golban, a native of the former Soviet Union and citizen of Moldova, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision affirming an Immigration Judge's denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

1. Whether substantial evidence supports an adverse credibility determination as grounds for denying asylum and withholding of removal
2. Whether Golban exhausted her due process arguments before the agency as required for appellate review

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. First, the court held that substantial evidence supported the agency's adverse credibility finding based on Golban's demeanor, the inherent implausibility of her account, and inconsistencies between her testimony and other record evidence (specifically a letter from her mother). The agency provided specific and cogent reasons for the credibility determination, and the court afforded deference to the Immigration Judge's assessment of demeanor and credibility cues. Second, the court found that Golban failed to exhaust her due process arguments by not raising them in her appeal to the BIA, which bars appellate review of those claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).

This is a criminal appeal in which the United States challenges a district court's suppression of evidence obtained from a search of the defendant's cloud storage account. The defendant was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography after law enforcement executed a warrant based on a tip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).

1. Whether Detective Osborn's affidavit in support of the search warrant contained sufficient indicia of probable cause to justify reliance on the warrant under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
2. Whether the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable
3. Whether Detective Osborn reasonably relied on the search warrant issued by the state court judge
4. Whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when law enforcement acts on a warrant based on an NCMEC CyberTip

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's suppression order and held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. The court concluded that although the affidavit did not establish actual probable cause, it contained sufficient indicia of probable cause to render Detective Osborn's reliance on the resulting warrant reasonable. The court found that the affidavit provided adequate supporting facts and circumstances, including: (1) the CyberTip went through two layers of review by Synchronoss and NCMEC; (2) Synchronoss was obligated to generate the tip only upon obtaining "actual knowledge" of child pornography; (3) NCMEC is a congressionally-established, reliable source that regularly informs police of potential child pornography; (4) Detective Osborn was an experienced detective with extensive training and prior experience investigating NCMEC CyberTips; and (5) the affidavit was reviewed and approved by a police department legal advisor before submission to the judge. The court reasoned that while the affidavit could have been more detailed, it was not so bare-bones as to provide "no hint" of why police believed incriminating evidence would be found, and that it was objectively reasonable for Detective Osborn to rely on a warrant approved by both a lawyer and a neutral magistrate.

This is a municipal governance case in which a City Council member challenges a Council resolution that would remove him from office based on his post-election change in political party affiliation. The plaintiff, James Spadola, an at-large member elected as a Republican, changed his voter registration to Democrat after taking office, prompting the Council to attempt to vacate his seat.

1. Whether the City Council exceeded its authority under the Wilmington Charter by removing a duly elected at-large member based on a post-election change in political party affiliation
2. Whether the Charter's nomination cap provision (limiting each party to three nominees for four at-large seats) and its vacancy-filling provisions create an implied continuing qualification that members must maintain their political party affiliation throughout their term
3. Whether the Council's action violates the plaintiff's constitutional right to freedom of association (not reached by the court)

The Court of Chancery ruled in favor of Spadola and granted his motion for summary judgment. The court held that the Congo Resolution is void as an ultra vires (unauthorized) act exceeding the Council's authority under the Charter. The court's reasoning proceeded as follows:

1. Charter Structure and Plain Language: The court found that Section 2-103 of the Charter explicitly establishes all qualifications for holding office (both gating qualifications at the time of election and continuing qualifications during the term), while Section 2-101 governs only the election process and vacancy-filling procedures. The Charter expressly designates continuing qualifications using language such as "during the term," "shall remain," and "shall cease to possess," but Section 2-101 contains no such language indicating a continuing party affiliation requirement.
2. Expressio Unius Canon: By affirmatively designating certain continuing qualifications in Section 2-103, the Charter's drafters impliedly intended to exclude other continuing qualifications. The absence of express language in Section 2-101 creating a post-election party-switching prohibition must be interpreted as an intentional omission.
3. Availability of Clear Formulation: The court noted that post-election party-switching prohibitions are well-known and easy to formulate expressly, as demonstrated by the Hackett Resolution (which proposed amending the Charter to explicitly prohibit such switches). The drafters could have easily included such language if they intended it, but did not.
4. Purpose vs. Means: While Section 2-101's purpose is to promote minority-party representation, the Charter achieves this through election procedures and vacancy-filling rules, not through restrictions on individual members' freedom to change party affiliation after taking office.
5. Precedent from Teller v. Jennings: The court relied on a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision holding that election provisions designed to encourage minority representation do not create post-election party-switching prohibitions. The court noted that the Wilmington Charter's drafters were likely aware of this decision, as they based their charter on the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter.
6. Qualifications Met: Spadola continues to meet all express qualifications for office: he is a U.S. citizen, over 25 years old, a qualified elector, does not hold other city employment, and has not violated any express Charter prohibition or been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
7. Permanent Injunction: The court granted permanent injunctive relief preventing implementation of the Congo Resolution, finding that Spadola demonstrated success on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm from losing his seat and ability to represent constituents, and that the balance of equities favored him.

This is a federal criminal appeal challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits individuals convicted of felonies punishable by more than one year imprisonment from possessing firearms. Jason Levasseur, convicted of felon-in-possession of a firearm, argues the statute violates the Second Amendment as applied to him.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to Levasseur, who was convicted of methamphetamine possession (a non-violent felony)
2. Whether individuals with felony convictions fall within "the people" protected by the Second Amendment
3. Whether the government can disarm individuals based on a "special danger of misusing firearms" without evidence of prior violence or specific threats of future violence
4. Whether historical analogues (disarmament of Loyalists, Catholics, Native Americans, and African Americans) support the constitutionality of categorical felon disarmament statutes
5. Whether as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are permissible post-Bruen and post-Rahimi

The First Circuit affirmed Levasseur's conviction and the district court's rejection of his Second Amendment challenge. The court's reasoning:

1. Step One (Bruen Framework): The court assumed without deciding that Levasseur qualifies as "the people" protected by the Second Amendment, invoking the principle of constitutional avoidance to bypass this contentious issue since the government prevailed at step two.
2. Step Two (Historical Tradition): The government met its burden of demonstrating that § 922(g)(1) is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court identified historical analogues showing that colonial and early American legislatures disarmed groups deemed dangerous to public safety, including Loyalists, Catholics, and political dissidents—not solely based on violent criminal history but on perceived danger to public order and stability.
3. Dangerousness Standard: The court rejected Levasseur's narrow definition of "dangerousness" (requiring prior violence or specific threats). Instead, the court held that historical tradition permits disarming individuals who pose a "special danger of misusing firearms" based on their status, even without evidence of prior violence. The court found Levasseur's methamphetamine possession conviction sufficient to establish such dangerousness, noting the well-documented connection between drug transactions and firearms.
4. Levasseur's Inadequate Arguments: The court found Levasseur failed to meaningfully engage with the district court's dangerousness analysis. He focused narrowly on surety and "going armed" laws (which the district court did not rely upon) rather than addressing the historical analogues actually used. His argument that methamphetamine possession is "non-violent" did not refute the district court's reasoning that such a conviction places him in a category of people posing special danger of firearm misuse.
5. Permanence of Disarmament: The court noted that § 922(g)(1) may not impose lifetime disarmament, as civil rights restoration under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) could restore Second Amendment rights, though Levasseur did not engage with this provision.

This is an employment discrimination case brought by two Black firefighters employed by the Springfield Fire Department who alleged racial and religious discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B. After the defendants prevailed at trial, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court made multiple errors in jury instructions and handling of trial procedures that misled the jury.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to answer a jury question regarding the timing of Blake's placement on a promotional eligibility list
2. Whether the court erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction clarifying that Civil Service Commission decisions did not address the plaintiffs' hostile work environment claims
3. Whether the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the social media posts at issue were not protected by the First Amendment and by allowing defendants to assert First Amendment considerations
4. Whether the court's jury instruction on employer vicarious liability under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B properly distinguished between strict liability for supervisory harassment and negligence standards for coworker harassment

The First Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in favor of the defendants on all counts. The court found no abuse of discretion or plain error in any of the trial court's rulings. Regarding the jury question, the court reasonably relied on its notes and instructed the jury to rely on their collective memory, which is standard practice. On the Civil Service decisions, the court's instruction adequately conveyed that the jury should independently determine whether discipline was retaliatory, accomplishing the plaintiffs' goal without requiring the specific language they proposed. On the First Amendment issue, the court's handling aligned with what the plaintiffs themselves conceded would be appropriate—allowing defendants to explain First Amendment concerns in their thought process without instructing the jury that the posts were constitutionally protected. On vicarious liability, although the court made a technical error in one sentence by referencing supervisor knowledge rather than employer knowledge regarding non-supervisory employees, the instructions as a whole properly distinguished between strict liability for supervisors with actual authority over the plaintiff and negligence standards for coworkers, and did not mislead the jury or impose additional burdens on the plaintiffs.

This is an appeal of a district court's grant of summary judgment to multiple states and organizations challenging the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's issuance of a Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) allocating $1.3 billion for transitional housing and supportive services under the Continuum of Care program without conducting notice and comment procedures.

1. Whether HUD was required to engage in notice and comment rulemaking procedures prior to issuing the NOFO under 42 U.S.C. § 11386b(d)
2. Whether the $1.3 billion set-aside constitutes a "bonus or other incentive" subject to notice and comment requirements under the applicable statute
3. Whether HUD is entitled to a stay pending appeal based on likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm

The court granted HUD's motion for a stay pending appeal. The court concluded that HUD demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits in arguing that the set-aside does not constitute a "bonus or other incentive" under § 11386b(d), and therefore was not subject to notice and comment requirements. The court further found that HUD would suffer irreparable injury without a stay because the agency must distribute the Continuum of Care funds by December 1, 2026, and inability to implement the NOFO timely would create funding gaps. Accordingly, the stay was granted to allow HUD to proceed with the funding distribution pending the outcome of the appeal.

This is an appeal of a district court order granting summary judgment to multiple states and organizations challenging the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's issuance of a Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) that set aside $1.3 billion for transitional housing and supportive service projects without conducting notice and comment procedures. The appellate court addresses HUD's motion for a stay pending appeal.

1. Whether HUD was required to engage in notice and comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act before issuing the NOFO with a $1.3 billion set-aside for specific housing projects under the Continuum of Care program
2. Whether the set-aside constitutes a "bonus or other incentive" under 42 U.S.C. § 11386b(d), which would trigger notice and comment requirements
3. Whether HUD is entitled to a stay pending appeal under the standard established in Nken v. Holder

The court granted HUD's motion for a stay pending appeal. The court concluded that HUD demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its argument that the set-aside does not constitute a "bonus or other incentive" under § 11386b(d), and therefore was not subject to notice and comment requirements. The court further found that HUD would suffer irreparable injury without a stay because the agency must distribute the Continuum of Care funds by December 1, 2026, and inability to implement the NOFO in a timely manner would create funding gaps. Accordingly, the stay was granted to allow HUD to proceed with the funding distribution pending the outcome of the appeal.

This is a Fourth Amendment civil rights case in which Kyle Beatty challenged police officers' warrantless strip search conducted incident to his arrest for marijuana possession. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals addresses whether strip searches fall within the scope of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine and whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

1. Whether the initial stop and first two searches of Beatty were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether strip searches are authorized under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine without a warrant or exigent circumstances
3. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity despite the unconstitutional strip search
4. Whether Beatty's First Amendment retaliation claim is viable

The court affirmed summary judgment for the officers on all claims. The court held:

1. The initial stop and first two searches were reasonable—the stop was supported by probable cause based on marijuana evidence, the first pat-down was consensual, and the second search was a lawful search incident to arrest.
2. Strip searches exceed the scope of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine outside the jail/prison context. Officers must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to believe a strip search will reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence, unless the arrestee consents or exigent circumstances exist. The court applied the analytical framework from Riley v. California, balancing the government's interests (officer safety and evidence preservation) against the arrestee's significant privacy interests in intimate body areas, and found the privacy interests weighty.
3. Although the strip search violated the Fourth Amendment, the officers are shielded by qualified immunity because this right was not clearly established at the time of the search—neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit had directly addressed strip searches incident to arrest outside institutional settings.
4. The First Amendment retaliation claim also fails because the initial stop and arrest were supported by probable cause, and any retaliation claim based on the strip search is barred by qualified immunity, as no clearly established right exists to remain silent during police searches.

This is an appeal of a child welfare case in which parents challenged the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) for violating their Fourth Amendment rights through warrantless home entry and their due process rights through emergency removal of their children without court authorization. The District Court dismissed all claims based on qualified immunity.

1. Whether DCPP caseworker Ash violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the home without a warrant based on an uncorroborated report that a caregiver appeared "upset and agitated"
2. Whether DCPP Defendants violated substantive due process rights by removing children without court authorization when there was no objectively reasonable belief of imminent danger
3. Whether DCPP Defendants violated procedural due process rights by removing children without pre-removal judicial authorization
4. Whether these constitutional rights were "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violations for qualified immunity purposes

The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against Ash and remanded for further proceedings, holding that: (1) the Complaint plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation because the warrantless entry was based on insufficient evidence of imminent danger, and (2) the right was clearly established by Good v. Dauphin County Social Services, which established since 1987 that warrantless home entries require consent, a warrant, or exigent circumstances. However, the court affirmed dismissal of the substantive and procedural due process claims based on qualified immunity, concluding that while the Complaint plausibly alleged violations, the specific right at issue—freedom from emergency removal based on the particular circumstances presented (a caregiver with an unknown criminal charge, past depression symptoms, and home conditions like pest infestation)—was not clearly established at the time of the removals, so the defendants lacked fair warning their conduct was unconstitutional.

This is an appeal of a bankruptcy court's sanction against HCRE Partners (now NexPoint Real Estate Partners) for filing a baseless claim and litigating it in bad faith during Highland Capital Management's Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether the bankruptcy court properly invoked its inherent power to sanction HCRE and whether the sanction amount was appropriate.

1. Whether a bankruptcy court has inherent power to sanction litigants for bad faith conduct and abuse of the bankruptcy process
2. The appropriate standard of review for inherent-power sanctions in bankruptcy court (clear and convincing evidence standard versus clear error standard)
3. Whether clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that HCRE filed its proof of claim in bad faith
4. Whether clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that HCRE litigated its claim in bad faith through frivolous opposition to counsel disqualification and suspicious timing of a withdrawal motion
5. Whether the sanction amount was causally related to HCRE's sanctionable conduct

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's sanction of $825,940.55 against HCRE. The court held that:

1. Bankruptcy courts possess inherent power to sanction parties for bad faith conduct and abuse of the bankruptcy process as a critical safeguard
2. The proper standard of review for inherent-power sanctions requires clear and convincing evidence of bad faith, reviewed de novo for legal sufficiency without deference to the bankruptcy court's factual findings
3. Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that HCRE filed its proof of claim in bad faith because: (a) Dondero failed to investigate the claim before filing it under penalty of perjury; (b) both Dondero and McGraner admitted at trial that they knew the claim was baseless; (c) the Amended LLC Agreement comported with their expectations when signed; and (d) the real motive was to shield SE Multifamily's assets from Highland's creditors
4. Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that HCRE litigated in bad faith through: (a) frivolously opposing Wick Phillips's disqualification by misrepresenting the firm's role in the transaction, which McGraner later admitted was false; and (b) attempting to withdraw the claim with suspicious timing (two days before key depositions) while seeking to preserve the substance for a future forum, then failing to address the bankruptcy court's legitimate concerns
5. The sanction amount was causally related to HCRE's conduct because HCRE's failure to propose appropriate withdrawal language caused the denial of its withdrawal motion, and the subsequent litigation costs were necessary to obtain final judgment that would preclude HCRE from relitigating the claim in any forum

This is an interlocutory appeal in a class action brought by programmers against GitHub, Microsoft, and OpenAI under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), alleging that GitHub Copilot and Codex—AI tools trained on millions of software projects—reproduced their copyrighted code without attribution. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the DMCA claims.

1. Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring a DMCA claim based on allegations of substantial risk of injury from future code reproduction without attribution
2. Whether plaintiffs adequately stated a claim under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b) of the DMCA, which prohibits the removal or alteration of copyright management information (CMI)
3. Whether the DMCA's prohibition on removing or altering CMI applies to AI-generated outputs that are new works rather than copies of existing works with CMI removed
4. Whether plaintiffs forfeited an "input theory" of DMCA liability based on CMI removal during the training stage

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the DMCA claims. The panel held:

1. Standing: Plaintiffs have Article III standing because they plausibly alleged a substantial risk of injury. The complaint provided sufficient factual support—including academic research on large language models, GitHub's duplicate-detection feature, and specific examples of Copilot reproducing plaintiffs' code verbatim—to make the risk of harm plausible at the pleading stage.
2. Input Theory Forfeited: Plaintiffs forfeited any "input theory" claim based on CMI removal during training because they failed to clearly assert or preserve this theory in district court proceedings, despite the court's explicit statements that the complaint was not about training.
3. Output Theory Fails on the Merits: Plaintiffs did not state a claim under § 1202(b) because their allegations show that Copilot creates new works through a probabilistic process rather than copying existing works and removing CMI. The statute's language—"remove or alter"—requires an affirmative act with respect to CMI already connected to an existing work. One who creates a new work and fails to include CMI cannot be said to have "removed" or "altered" anything. While the court acknowledged that substantial reproduction of an existing work without CMI may serve as circumstantial evidence of CMI removal, plaintiffs alleged only that Copilot's output was substantially similar to or a variation of their code, not that CMI was removed from copies of their existing works. The court rejected the notion that the DMCA should be interpreted to transform ordinary copyright infringement claims into DMCA claims with enhanced statutory damages.

This interlocutory appeal addresses whether Kalshi's "event contracts" offered on tribal lands constitute illegal class III gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Two federally recognized tribes, Blue Lake Rancheria and Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians, sued Kalshi Inc. and Robinhood Markets to enjoin the sale of sports event contracts on their lands, arguing these contracts are functionally sports bets that violate IGRA and tribal gaming ordinances.

1. Whether Kalshi's sports event contracts constitute "class III gaming activities" under IGRA
2. Whether the contracts are "located on Indian lands" when users enter into them from tribal territory
3. Whether Kalshi's contracts violate the Tribes' secretarial procedures and gaming ordinances
4. Whether the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) displaces IGRA's application
5. Whether the Commodity Exchange Act's (CEA) exclusive jurisdiction over derivatives trading preempts IGRA
6. Whether Kalshi's advertisement that "Sports Betting [Is] Legal in all 50 States on Kalshi" constitutes actionable misrepresentation under the Lanham Act

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction in part and affirmed in part. The court held that the Tribes are likely to succeed on their IGRA claims because: (1) Kalshi's sports event contracts constitute class III gaming under IGRA's residual definition, as they functionally operate as sports bets involving consideration, chance, and prizes; (2) the contracts are "located on Indian lands" when users enter into them from tribal territory, even if Kalshi's infrastructure is located elsewhere; and (3) the contracts violate the Tribes' secretarial procedures because those procedures incorporate the Tribes' gaming ordinances, which prohibit all gaming except as expressly authorized by the Tribe. The court rejected Kalshi's arguments that UIGEA or the CEA's exclusive jurisdiction displace IGRA, finding that IGRA and UIGEA are complementary statutes and that the CEA addresses derivatives regulation while IGRA separately governs gaming on Indian lands. The court affirmed the district court's rejection of the Lanham Act claim, holding that statements about the legality of Kalshi's products constitute non-actionable opinion rather than factual misrepresentation. The case was remanded for consideration of the remaining preliminary injunction factors.

This is a criminal appeal in which Louis Mendonsa challenges his 292-month sentence for possessing and distributing child pornography. The central issue is whether a sentencing enhancement for defendants who "engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor" can include the defendant's prior sexual abuse convictions from over 30 years earlier.

1. Whether U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5)'s pattern enhancement unambiguously applies only to conduct related to the offense of conviction, or whether it can encompass prior sexual abuse conduct unrelated to the current offense
2. Whether, under the Kisor v. Wilkie framework, the district court properly deferred to the Sentencing Guidelines commentary interpreting the pattern enhancement
3. Whether the categorical approach applies to prior state convictions when determining if they qualify as "sexual abuse or exploitation" under the enhancement
4. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding at least two separate instances of qualifying sexual abuse based on the underlying facts of prior convictions
5. Whether the district court abused its discretion by relying on hearsay evidence (police reports and charging documents) from the prior state proceedings

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Mendonsa's sentence. The court held:

1. Ambiguity and Deference: The court found that § 2G2.2(b)(5) is genuinely ambiguous regarding whether the pattern enhancement reaches conduct outside the offense of conviction. The plain text contains no express temporal or offense-related limitation, and the structure, history, and purpose of the guideline do not unambiguously limit it to offense-related conduct. Therefore, under Kisor, the court properly deferred to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation in the Guidelines commentary, which explicitly states the enhancement applies "whether or not the abuse or exploitation . . . occurred during the course of the offense." The commentary's interpretation is reasonable, represents the Commission's official position, implicates its substantive expertise, and reflects its fair and considered judgment.
2. Categorical Approach Does Not Apply: The categorical approach—which restricts courts to examining only the statutory definition and fact of conviction—does not apply to § 2G2.2(b)(5) because the enhancement focuses on a defendant's conduct rather than prior convictions. The commentary defines the enhancement in terms of "conduct described in" specified federal statutes, and the definition of "pattern of activity" expressly extends to instances of abuse regardless of whether they resulted in a conviction.
3. Factual Findings: Because the categorical approach does not apply, the district court was entitled to examine the underlying facts of Mendonsa's 1993 state convictions. The court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Mendonsa committed at least two separate instances of qualifying sexual abuse. The police reports and charging documents described multiple incidents of sexual contact with one victim, including acts separated by intervening events over several hours, as well as conduct involving at least one other victim.
4. Hearsay Evidence: The district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on hearsay evidence (police reports, charging documents, and court records) from the state proceedings. These documents possessed sufficient indicia of reliability because the victims' accounts in the police reports largely corresponded to the charges on which Mendonsa was convicted. The passage of time and the investigator's original purpose did not render the evidence unreliable for sentencing purposes.

This is an appeal concerning supplemental jurisdiction in a civil rights case where a plaintiff sued Walmart and an employee for federal civil rights violations and various state law claims arising from an alleged wrongful arrest and detention. After the plaintiff abandoned his federal claims, the district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over some state law claims while declining jurisdiction over others.

1. Whether a district court abuses its discretion by exercising supplemental jurisdiction over some state law claims while declining jurisdiction over others after dismissing all federal claims (the "split exercise" of jurisdiction issue)
2. Whether the district court properly applied the supplemental jurisdiction factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
3. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim based on the "favorable termination" element under Georgia law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. First, the court held that district courts do not abuse their discretion by exercising supplemental jurisdiction over some state law claims while declining jurisdiction over others. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument for a per se rule requiring an all-or-nothing approach, finding that: (1) the statutory text of § 1367 contemplates claim-by-claim assessment through its use of singular and plural terminology; (2) supplemental jurisdiction is a "doctrine of flexibility" requiring case-specific balancing of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity; and (3) sister circuits unanimously permit claim-by-claim determinations. The district court properly retained jurisdiction over the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims (which presented straightforward legal questions) while declining jurisdiction over the assault and battery claims (which were fact-intensive and credibility-dependent). Second, the court reversed the summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, holding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding whether the shoplifting charge was terminated favorably to the plaintiff. The evidence—including Mueller's testimony and declaration that the nolle pros was independent of his plea agreement, and the trial judge's failure to document any connection between the charges—was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude the charge was voluntarily abandoned rather than compromised.

This is a stockholder class action challenging a $48.25 per share take-private merger of Alteryx, Inc. by funds affiliated with Insight Venture Management and Clearlake Capital Group. Plaintiffs alleged breach of fiduciary duty claims against board members, the controlling stockholder, and the chief legal officer, as well as an aiding and abetting claim against Insight.

1. Whether the merger was subject to the entire fairness standard ab initio based on controller conflicts
2. Whether Corwin cleansing applied—i.e., whether the merger was approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of disinterested stockholders
3. Whether the proxy statement contained material disclosure deficiencies regarding alleged conflicts of interest of directors Joshi and Maudlin, Chief Legal Officer Lal, and financial advisors Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
4. Whether the stockholder vote was coerced
5. Whether the aiding and abetting claim against Insight could survive dismissal of the underlying fiduciary duty claims

The court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that: (1) the merger was not a controller-conflicted transaction because controlling stockholder Stoecker did not stand on both sides of the deal and received the same pro rata consideration as other stockholders, without any special benefits; (2) Corwin cleansing was available because the stockholder vote was fully informed and uncoerced; (3) all alleged disclosure deficiencies were immaterial as a matter of law—specifically, Joshi's role as Senior Advisor to Insight was not material to her independence, Maudlin's service on Insight-affiliated boards was adequately disclosed, Lal's personal relationships with Clearlake were not material given his lack of involvement in the deal process, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley's preliminary valuations did not create a concurrent conflict requiring disclosure; (4) plaintiffs failed to adequately allege coercion; and (5) the aiding and abetting claim failed because the underlying fiduciary duty claims were dismissed. The court emphasized that under Corwin, a fully informed and uncoerced stockholder vote is outcome-determinative and insulates the transaction from attack except on grounds of waste, which plaintiffs did not plead.

This case involves a challenge to a Wilmington City Council resolution that sought to remove Council Member James Spadola from his at-large seat based on his post-election switch from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. Spadola sued to void the resolution, arguing it exceeded the Council's authority under the City Charter.

1. Whether the City Council has authority under the Charter to remove an elected member based on a post-election change in political party affiliation
2. Whether Charter Section 2-101 (governing elections and vacancies) and Section 2-103 (establishing qualifications for office) together create an implied prohibition on post-election party-switching for at-large members
3. Whether the Council's interpretation of these provisions is consistent with the Charter's plain language and structure

The court granted Spadola's motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined the Council from implementing the removal resolution. The court held that the Congo Resolution exceeds the Council's authority under the Charter because: (1) Charter Section 2-103 expressly establishes all qualifications for holding office—both gating qualifications (citizenship, age, residency, etc.) and continuing qualifications (maintaining those qualifications throughout the term). Spadola meets all express qualifications and has not violated any express Charter prohibition. (2) Charter Section 2-101 addresses election procedures and vacancy-filling, not qualifications for office. It imposes party-based restrictions on nominations (no party may nominate more than three candidates for four at-large seats) to promote minority-party representation, but contains no language establishing continuing party-affiliation requirements. (3) The Charter's plain language and structure do not support implying a post-election party-switching prohibition. Section 2-103 expressly designates continuing qualifications using specific language ("during," "remain," "shall cease"), while Section 2-101 contains no such language. Under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, this omission indicates the legislature did not intend to create such a prohibition. (4) Post-election party-switching prohibitions are well-known and easy to formulate expressly (as demonstrated by the Hackett Resolution), yet the drafters did not include one. The court also noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Teller v. Jennings (1963)—decided before the Charter was ratified—held that election provisions encouraging minority representation do not prohibit post-election party-switching, and the Wilmington drafters were likely aware of this precedent. (5) While Section 2-101's purpose is to promote minority-party representation, this purpose is accomplished through election restrictions, not through continuing qualifications on individual members' freedom of association. The court did not reach Spadola's constitutional arguments regarding freedom of association because he prevailed on the statutory interpretation issue.

This is an appeal in a case between Matthew McDonald and the United States of America, with an errata sheet issued by the First Circuit Court of Appeals correcting a typographical error in the court's opinion.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this errata sheet, which only documents a correction to the original opinion issued on August 28, 2026.

The court issued an errata sheet amending the opinion by correcting a grammatical error on page 11, line 11, changing the word "decide" to "decided." The substantive ruling and reasoning are not provided in this errata document.

This is an appeal in a civil rights case involving students and parents challenging decisions made by school officials regarding athletic participation and related disciplinary matters at Bow High School in New Hampshire.

The opinion addresses claims against school administrators, the school district, and other officials in both their official and individual capacities, involving questions of constitutional rights, qualified immunity, and the scope of school authority over student athletes.

The court issued an opinion on August 26, 2026, which was subsequently amended by errata sheet to correct typographical errors (replacing "Anthony" with "Kyle" on page 8, line 8, and "Fellers's" with "Foote's" on page 20, line 10). The full substantive ruling and reasoning are not detailed in this excerpt, which consists primarily of the case caption and errata corrections.

This is a civil contract dispute involving a lottery winner ("John Doe") who sought to enforce a non-disclosure agreement against the mother of his child ("Sara Smith") for allegedly disclosing details of his $1.35 billion lottery win. The case primarily concerns whether the trial should be closed to the public and whether the parties should be permitted to proceed under pseudonyms.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to close the trial to the public based on the common-law right of public access to judicial proceedings.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to proceed under pseudonyms throughout the trial, given the strong presumption against pseudonyms in civil litigation and the four paradigms established in Doe v. MIT.
3. Whether the plaintiff's privacy interests, contractual rights, and concerns about his daughter's safety outweigh the public's right to access and transparency in judicial proceedings.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of both motions. The court held that:

1. Trial Closure: The presumptive common-law right of public access to civil trials is a fundamental principle that cannot be overcome merely by a litigant's desire for privacy, even when involving sensitive financial and family matters. The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments based on constitutional contractual privacy rights (citing overruled Lochner-era precedent), misapplication of the Kravetz balancing test, and claims that the decision was based on his wealth. The court emphasized that allowing privacy to trump public access would transform courts into "publicly funded forums for private litigation, unaccountable to the public itself."
2. Pseudonyms: The strong presumption against pseudonyms in civil litigation was not rebutted. The court analyzed the case against the four MIT paradigms: (1) the plaintiff failed to demonstrate "unusually severe" harm from disclosure, as his rationale could apply to many wealthy individuals; (2) while the innocent non-party daughter could be protected by using initials, the plaintiff provided no evidence that revealing his identity would jeopardize her privacy; (3) no chilling effect on future litigants existed because the plaintiff's situation was "of his own making"—he could have included a confidential arbitration clause in his NDA; and (4) the fourth paradigm was inapplicable. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that he faced an impossible choice between his right to sue and his right to privacy, noting that "just because Doe has a right to sue does not mean he has a right to sue anonymously."
3. Reasoning: The court emphasized the paramount importance of judicial transparency and public access as essential to maintaining public confidence in the courts and preventing judicial mischief. The court noted that the plaintiff's dilemma was self-created, as his NDA lacked provisions for confidential dispute resolution. The court also rejected the notion that wealth alone justifies restricting public access, citing the judicial oath to "do equal right to the poor and to the rich."

This is a criminal appeal in which Davone Desean Walker appealed his conviction from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order vacating and amending its previously filed opinion.

The specific legal issues addressed in the underlying opinion are not detailed in this order, as the order itself is procedural in nature, addressing only the amendment of the court's September 1, 2026 opinion.

The Court vacated its original opinion filed on September 1, 2026, and directed the Clerk to file an amended opinion that adds a footnote to the original decision. The Court noted that because the amendment does not affect the judgment, the deadline for filing a petition for rehearing remains unchanged from the original opinion date.

This is an appeal by Lake Austin shoreline property owners challenging the City of Austin's 2019 ordinance that declared their properties were within the city's full-purpose jurisdiction and subject to full taxation. The case involves disputes over jurisdictional status, taxation, and municipal services.

1. Whether the case is moot following the passage of Texas Senate Bill 1844, which provides a statutory disannexation mechanism
2. Whether Pullman abstention is appropriate—specifically, whether the homeowners' federal Equal Protection Clause claim depends on resolving an uncertain question of Texas law regarding the meaning and effect of a 1986 ordinance
3. Whether the district court properly abstained from deciding the federal constitutional claim pending state court resolution of state law issues

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case. The court held: (1) the case is not moot because S.B. 1844 does not provide automatic disannexation or tax refunds, and some homeowners' disannexation requests remain rejected, preserving their concrete interest in the validity of the 2019 ordinance; and (2) Pullman abstention was improper because the homeowners' federal Equal Protection Clause claim—that Austin taxes them as full-purpose residents while denying them corresponding services—does not depend on resolving the disputed meaning of the 1986 ordinance under Texas law. The court reasoned that whether Texas law required service provision is distinct from whether the Fourteenth Amendment permits taxation without services, and therefore the uncertain state law question cannot eliminate or materially alter the federal constitutional claim. The court remanded for the district court to address the city's remaining grounds for dismissal (political-question doctrine, Burford abstention, and Rule 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim) in the first instance.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal by a Texas death-row inmate seeking a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge his capital murder conviction. The petitioner raises two constitutional claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to admit juvenile mental health records as business records, and involuntariness of his recorded confession.

1. Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the Sixth Amendment for failing to move juvenile Texas Youth Commission (TYC) records into evidence under the business-records hearsay exception during capital sentencing.
2. Whether the trial court violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting a recorded confession that was allegedly involuntary due to the petitioner's ingestion of Rohypnol and resulting impaired mental state.
3. Whether procedural defects in raising these claims—specifically, raising new legal theories in reply briefs and objections rather than in the original petition—bar appellate review.
4. Whether new evidence (a codefendant's declaration and an updated expert report on false confessions) renders a previously exhausted claim unexhausted and subject to de novo review rather than AEDPA deference.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, DENIED the petitioner's application for a certificate of appealability on both claims. Majority Opinion (Judges Stewart and Higginson): The court held that the petitioner failed to meet the threshold requirement for a COA under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), which requires showing that "reasonable jurists could debate" the district court's resolution of the constitutional claims. On Claim 1 (ineffective assistance), the court found that the petitioner presented an entirely new legal theory—that counsel was ignorant of the business-records hearsay exception—for the first time in his reply brief to the state's answer, rather than in his original petition. The district court properly declined to consider this late-raised theory without leave to amend. The petitioner failed to challenge this procedural ruling on appeal or show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable. On Claim 4(H) (involuntary confession), the court found that the petitioner similarly raised a new exhaustion theory for the first time in his objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, presenting new evidence (a codefendant's declaration and an updated expert report) that he argued rendered the claim unexhausted. Issues raised for the first time in objections to a magistrate judge's report are not properly before the district court, and the petitioner failed to seek leave to amend. Therefore, the court would not address this new theory on appeal. Dissenting Opinion (Judge Haynes): Judge Haynes argued that the COA standard is a low threshold inquiry, not a full merits analysis, and that in capital cases, doubts should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. He contended that reasonable jurists could debate both claims: On Claim 1, he argued that reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's procedural ruling denying relief under Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler, which allow consideration of unexhausted claims when state habeas counsel was ineffective. The evidence showed that state habeas counsel inexplicably failed to present trial counsel's evidentiary error, and a similarly situated codefendant received relief for the same failure. On Claim 4(H), he argued that the new evidence—particularly the codefendant's sworn declaration that he, not the petitioner, was "Lenny" and committed the actions the petitioner confessed to, combined with the expert report showing the petitioner's vulnerability to false confession—casts serious doubt on the confession's veracity and should warrant a COA, potentially opening the Schlup actual innocence gateway.

This is an appeal of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulation of methylene chloride (MC) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Industry petitioners challenged the EPA's determination that MC poses unreasonable risks and the resulting rule that prohibits or severely restricts most uses of MC, while the Sierra Club challenged the rule for not going far enough to protect vulnerable populations.

1. Whether the EPA had legal authority to issue a "whole chemical" risk determination rather than separate determinations for each condition of use as required by the TSCA
2. Whether the EPA properly considered personal protective equipment (PPE) use as a "condition of use" in its risk evaluation
3. Whether the EPA's interpretation of "unreasonable risk" improperly incorporated a precautionary principle rather than allowing for some level of acceptable risk
4. Whether the EPA's methodological approach to determining unreasonable risk—including its reliance on specific studies and uncertainty factors—was supported by substantial evidence
5. Whether the EPA's decision to largely prohibit MC uses was "to the extent necessary" to eliminate unreasonable risk, or whether less restrictive alternatives were required
6. Whether the EPA adequately addressed risks to fenceline communities, genetically susceptible populations, and ozone depletion

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Industry Petitioners' petition for review, vacated the EPA's methylene chloride rule and associated risk determination, denied the Sierra Club's petition for review, and remanded the case to the EPA for further proceedings. The court's reasoning included:

1. Whole Chemical Determination: The court held that the TSCA requires the EPA to issue separate risk determinations for each condition of use, not a single "whole chemical" determination. The statutory language, EPA's own procedural rules, and the statute's repeated references to "conditions of use" all support this requirement. The EPA lacked legal authority to abandon the use-by-use analysis.
2. PPE Assumption: The court found that the EPA violated the TSCA by assuming workers do not wear PPE. PPE use is a critical "condition of use" that must be considered in the risk evaluation. The EPA's reversal of its prior assumption—which had been based on OSHA requirements and reasonably available information—was arbitrary and capricious and lacked substantial evidence.
3. Unreasonable Risk Standard: The court determined that "unreasonable risk" does not incorporate a precautionary principle requiring the elimination of virtually all risk. The TSCA is not a zero-risk statute. The EPA's approach was overly conservative and more closely approximated a precautionary standard than the statutory "unreasonable risk" requirement.
4. Acute Exposure Limits: The court found the EPA's 16 ppm fifteen-minute acute exposure limit (compared to OSHA's 125 ppm standard) was not supported by substantial evidence. The EPA relied exclusively on the Putz study involving only twelve humans who experienced minimal impairment (7% reduction in peripheral vision). The EPA failed to adequately consider other relevant studies (Winneke and Soden) showing workers exposed to much higher concentrations without serious health effects. The EPA's application of uncertainty factors was excessively conservative.
5. Chronic Exposure Limits: The court held that the EPA's 2 ppm eight-hour chronic exposure limit (compared to OSHA's 25 ppm standard) was unsupported by substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious. The EPA improperly relied exclusively on a single rat study (Nitschke study) while discounting three "acceptable" human epidemiological studies showing workers chronically exposed to MC at levels 240 times higher than EPA's limit with no serious liver complications. The EPA failed to respond to significant comments, including expert analysis by Dr. Borak, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
6. Regulation "To the Extent Necessary": The court found the EPA misconceived its role in two ways. First, the EPA's justification for a near-complete prohibition—based on uncertainty about whether companies could comply with the exposure limits and speculation about potential non-compliance—was unauthorized. The EPA can only regulate "to the extent necessary" to eliminate actual, identified unreasonable risk, not speculative risks. Second, the EPA failed to adequately consider technically and economically feasible alternatives to MC, improperly focusing only on whether alternatives performed the same function and ignoring the higher costs, lower productivity, and adverse environmental consequences of alternatives.
7. Sierra Club's Fenceline Communities Claim: The court held that the EPA did not violate the TSCA by excluding air and water exposure pathways from its risk evaluation scope. The EPA has discretion to exclude exposure pathways when the science or methodology is not sufficiently developed, particularly given statutory deadlines and the requirement to use "reasonably available information" and "best available science." The FAM was a screening-level assessment, not a finalized methodology.
8. Sierra Club's Genetic Susceptibility Claim: The court found the EPA adequately addressed risks to genetically susceptible populations by relying on conservative estimates based on the 95th percentile of the population. The TSCA does not require the EPA to adopt the Clean Air Act's rigid 1-in-1-million cancer risk standard.
9. Sierra Club's Ozone Depletion Claim: The court held that the Sierra Club lacked Article III standing to challenge EPA's failure to evaluate ozone depletion risks. The causal chain from inadequate MC regulation to ozone depletion to increased cancer risk was too attenuated and speculative. Additionally, the EPA has consistently found that MC is not an ozone-depleting substance, so the Sierra Club could not show that a procedural remedy would result in a different substantive outcome.

This case involves petitions for review of the EPA's methylene chloride (MC) regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Industry petitioners challenged the EPA's determination that MC poses unreasonable risk to human health and the resulting rule that prohibits most uses of MC, while the Sierra Club argued the rule did not go far enough to protect vulnerable populations.

1. Whether the EPA had authority to issue a "whole chemical" risk determination rather than separate determinations for each condition of use
2. Whether the EPA properly considered personal protective equipment (PPE) use as a "condition of use" in its risk evaluation
3. Whether the EPA's interpretation of "unreasonable risk" improperly incorporated a precautionary principle rather than allowing for some level of acceptable risk
4. Whether the EPA's acute and chronic exposure limits were supported by substantial evidence
5. Whether the EPA properly considered less restrictive alternatives and economic consequences when choosing to largely prohibit MC rather than adopt modest exposure limits
6. Whether the EPA adequately addressed risks to fenceline communities, genetically susceptible populations, and ozone depletion

The Fifth Circuit GRANTED the Industry Petitioners' petition for review, VACATED the EPA's MC Rule and associated risk determination, DENIED the Sierra Club's petition for review, and REMANDED to EPA for proceedings consistent with the opinion. Reasoning: The court found multiple legal and factual errors in the EPA's regulation:

1. Whole Chemical Determination: The TSCA requires EPA to issue separate risk determinations for each "condition of use," not a blanket "whole chemical" determination. The statute's text, structure, and EPA's own procedural rules clearly mandated use-by-use analysis. EPA lacked authority to change this approach without notice and comment.
2. PPE Assumption: The EPA violated the TSCA by abandoning its prior assumption that workers use PPE as required by OSHA standards. PPE use is a critical "condition of use" that must be considered in the risk evaluation phase, not deferred to the risk management phase. The EPA's speculation that workers might not comply with OSHA requirements lacked evidentiary support.
3. Unreasonable Risk Standard: The EPA improperly treated "unreasonable risk" as equivalent to a precautionary principle requiring near-zero risk. The TSCA does not authorize a zero-risk standard; "unreasonable" means risk that exceeds the bounds of reason or moderation. The EPA's approach mirrored statutes with explicit precautionary language, which TSCA lacks.
4. Acute Exposure Limit (16 ppm): The EPA's fifteen-minute acute exposure limit of 16 ppm—approximately one-eighth of OSHA's 125 ppm standard—was not supported by substantial evidence. The EPA relied exclusively on the Putz study involving only twelve humans exposed to 195 ppm, who experienced only minor temporary vision impairment. The EPA improperly discounted the Winneke study (participants exposed to 500 ppm with minimal effects) and ignored the Soden study (workers exposed to 475 ppm for 8 hours daily over 10+ years with no adverse effects). The EPA applied excessive uncertainty factors (multiplying by 30) to achieve an unrealistically low limit.
5. Chronic Exposure Limit (2 ppm): The EPA's eight-hour chronic exposure limit of 2 ppm—over ten times lower than OSHA's 25 ppm standard—was unsupported by substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious. The EPA relied exclusively on a single rat study (Nitschke study) showing liver lesions at 500 ppm but no effects at 200 ppm. The EPA improperly excluded three "acceptable" human epidemiological studies showing workers exposed to 475 ppm for over 10 years experienced no serious liver complications. The court found it improper to rely solely on a rat study while completely discarding human data, citing precedent from Gulf South Insulation v. CPSC.
6. Regulation "To the Extent Necessary": Even if the risk determination had been sound, the EPA's near-total prohibition of MC was not justified. The EPA cannot ban a chemical based on uncertainty about compliance; it must regulate only "to the extent necessary" to eliminate identified unreasonable risk. The EPA improperly shifted the burden to regulated entities to prove compliance rather than bearing its own burden to demonstrate that less restrictive measures would not adequately address unreasonable risk. The EPA also failed to adequately consider technically and economically feasible alternatives, ignoring comments that no viable substitutes exist for many MC uses and failing to account for higher costs and lower productivity of alternatives.
7. Sierra Club's Fenceline Communities Challenge: The EPA did not violate TSCA by excluding air and water exposure pathways from its risk evaluation scope when the methodology for assessing such risks was not sufficiently developed. The TSCA allows EPA to exclude exposure pathways when it lacks adequate methodology, particularly given statutory deadlines. The FAM was a screening-level assessment, not a final risk determination.
8. Sierra Club's Genetic Susceptibility Challenge: The EPA adequately addressed risks to genetically susceptible populations by using conservative estimates based on the 95th percentile of the population. The TSCA does not require EPA to adopt the Clean Air Act's rigid 1-in-1-million cancer risk standard.
9. Sierra Club's Ozone Depletion Challenge: The Sierra Club lacked Article III standing because the causal chain connecting inadequate MC regulation to ozone depletion to increased cancer risk was too attenuated and speculative. Moreover, EPA has consistently found MC is not an ozone-depleting substance, so the Sierra Club could not show that a procedural right was connected to a substantive result.

This is a criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of transmitting threats in interstate commerce against members of Congress. The defendant challenges a supervised release condition that broadly prohibits him from contacting any member of Congress for one year.

1. Whether a one-year blanket ban on all contact with any member of Congress violates 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), which requires that supervised release conditions involve "no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary"
2. Whether the broad no-contact condition unconstitutionally burdens the defendant's First Amendment rights to free speech and petition Congress
3. Whether the district court committed plain error by imposing an overly broad condition when the defendant failed to object at sentencing

The court AFFIRMED the supervised release condition, though it acknowledged the condition was overly broad and in error. The majority held that while the district court erred in imposing a blanket ban on contact with all members of Congress (which could have been narrowed by limiting the manner of contact, the specific members contacted, or the substance of communications), the error was not "obvious or clear" under the demanding plain error standard applicable when a defendant fails to object at sentencing. The court reasoned that no binding precedent directly addressed whether such a condition violates § 3583(d)(2) in the context of threats to members of Congress, and therefore the law was "subject to reasonable dispute," precluding reversal. The majority emphasized that while some form of no-contact restriction was appropriate to protect the public and deter future threats, the condition should have included mechanisms such as limiting contact to specific members previously threatened, restricting only certain methods of communication, or allowing contact with probation officer approval for legitimate purposes like inquiries about veteran benefits. Judge Murphy's concurrence agreed that the lack of binding precedent made plain error review fatal to the defendant's claim but expressed concern about deciding the broader constitutional question.

This is a federal habeas corpus case involving a defendant's application to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his convictions and set aside his sentence. The defendant challenges whether his motion is properly classified as "second or successive" after the district court previously vacated one of his convictions and issued an amended judgment.

1. Whether a § 2255 motion challenging an amended judgment (created after the district court vacated the original judgment and corrected the sentence) constitutes a "second or successive" motion requiring appellate certification under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)
2. Whether the distinction between a full resentencing and a sentence correction affects the analysis of whether a new judgment has been created
3. Whether reassignment to a different district judge is warranted based on the delay in transferring the motion to the appellate court

The court granted the motion to remand. The court held that Augustin's motion is not "second or successive" because it challenges an amended judgment, not the original judgment. When the district court vacated the original judgment and issued an amended judgment reflecting a reduced sentence, a new judgment was created. Under Supreme Court precedent, a motion challenging a new judgment does not require appellate certification and may be filed as of right. The court reasoned that "second or successive" is a term of art based on which judgment is being challenged, not merely the chronological order of filings. The court also held that whether the district court corrected the sentence or conducted a full resentencing is irrelevant—the previous judgment becomes void ab initio, and the intervening judgment is new and challengeable in the first instance. The court denied reassignment to a different judge, finding that the two-year delay, while notable, did not warrant the extraordinary remedy of reassignment, particularly given ongoing postconviction litigation and the judge's decade-long involvement with the case.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of qualified immunity to four Anchorage police officers who shot and killed Kristopher Handy during a domestic disturbance response. The relatives of the deceased brought suit alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and deprivation of due process rights to familial association.

1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal of an order denying qualified immunity when raised via motion to dismiss rather than motion for summary judgment
2. Whether the officers violated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights by using deadly force against an armed suspect who posed an immediate threat
3. Whether the unlawfulness of the officers' conduct was "clearly established" at the time of the incident
4. Whether an officer must wait for a suspect to point a gun directly at them before using deadly force in self-defense

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order denying qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to the officers. The court held that: (1) it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal regardless of whether defendants filed a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion; (2) viewing the totality of circumstances in light most favorable to plaintiffs, Handy posed an immediate lethal threat to the officers, making their use of deadly force objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and (3) even if a constitutional violation occurred, the right was not "clearly established" at the time such that every reasonable officer would understand their conduct was unlawful. The court emphasized that officers need not wait for a suspect to aim a weapon at them before using force, and that the relevant analysis considers the totality of circumstances rather than focusing solely on the moment of threat. The court distinguished the cases cited by the district court (George, Lopez, Nehad, Hughes, Hayes, and Curnow) as factually distinguishable, noting that Handy was suspected of a violent crime, was armed with a shotgun, had awaited the officers' arrival while armed, refused orders to drop his weapon, advanced toward the officers while belligerent, and could fire the shotgun from the hip.

This is an environmental law case challenging the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a Clean Water Act permit for Denver Water's Moffat System Collection Project, which involves raising the Gross Dam to increase water storage capacity. Environmental groups sued alleging violations of the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act based on deficiencies in the Corps's fourteen-year permitting review process.

1. Whether the Corps violated the Clean Water Act by failing to clearly demonstrate that Denver Water's proposed project was the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative (LEDPA)
2. Whether the Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act by inadequately analyzing project alternatives and environmental impacts
3. Whether the case is moot because the dam construction is substantially complete
4. Whether the Corps properly defined the project's "overall project purposes" to include multiple related goals rather than a single general purpose
5. Whether the Corps's cost methodology for comparing alternatives was reasonable
6. Whether the Corps adequately considered climate change's effects on the project's feasibility

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and ruled in favor of the Corps and Denver Water. The court held that: (1) the case is not moot because a remand could result in partial relief through additional mitigation measures; (2) the Corps properly interpreted the Clean Water Act regulations to allow definition of a project's "overall project purposes" to include multiple related purposes, not just a single general purpose; (3) the Corps's cost methodology using a 50% multiplier to estimate contingent costs was reasonable and adequately explained, particularly given the early stage of the alternatives analysis when detailed information was unavailable; and (4) the Corps's decision not to quantitatively model climate change's effects on stream flows was reasonable given the scientific uncertainty and lack of accepted methodology for correlating temperature changes to specific stream flow changes. The court emphasized the high level of deference owed to agency expertise in technical and scientific judgments and found that the Corps took a "hard look" at the relevant factors and reached meaningful conclusions based on the record.

This is a breach of contract case in which NVR, Inc. is sued by Osprey Point Preserve, LLC (OPP) for allegedly failing to construct sidewalks in compliance with Sussex County Code requirements under Section 3(g) of a Lot Purchase Agreement. The court addresses whether NVR's breach resulted in damages owed to OPP.

1. Whether NVR breached Section 3(g) of the Lot Purchase Agreement by constructing sidewalks that did not comply with Sussex County Code standards (requiring sidewalk cross slopes between 1% and 2%)
2. Whether OPP suffered compensable damages from any such breach
3. Whether OPP's performance bond with the County was at risk due to the sidewalk defects
4. Whether OPP faced potential civil liability to homeowners or third parties due to the allegedly non-compliant sidewalks

The court found that NVR breached Section 3(g) of the Lot Purchase Agreement because certain sidewalks constructed by NVR had cross slopes outside the required 1-2% range. However, the court ruled in favor of NVR on damages because OPP failed to prove it suffered any harm. The court reasoned that: (1) Sussex County's engineer confirmed the sidewalks were "generally acceptable" and agreed to release OPP's performance bond, eliminating any risk to that bond; (2) NVR committed to reconstruct any sidewalk the County rejects, further reducing risk; and (3) NVR acknowledged it holds liability for construction defects, not OPP, so OPP faces no liability exposure. The court declined to hold a second trial on damages, finding it would be unfair to NVR and unduly burdensome to the court.

This is a Delaware Chancery Court case involving a stockholder removal action under Section 225 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Gregory Freiberg, a board member and investor in Xonar Technology Inc., challenges his removal from the board, alleging that the stockholder consents executed to remove him were invalid because the company's capitalization table was inaccurate and did not reflect a true majority vote.

1. Whether written stockholder consents executed by additional stockholders (the McFaddens) on January 27, 2026, can be aggregated with consents executed on January 5, 2026, to satisfy the majority vote requirement for director removal under Section 228 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
2. Whether the methodology for calculating Freiberg's share ownership should result in him holding 15% of the company's fully diluted equity as of January 5, 2026.
3. Whether the scope of a Section 225 proceeding should be limited to the validity of the director removal or expanded to include broader discovery into the company's capitalization table and related governance issues.

The court entered judgment for Xonar Technology Inc., finding that Freiberg failed to prove that the McFadden Consents should be excluded from the tally of stockholder votes. The court rejected all three of Freiberg's theories for excluding the later-executed consents:

1. Closed-Meeting Theory Rejected: The court held that stockholder written consents operate "in lieu of" a meeting, not analogously to a meeting. Section 228 explicitly permits consents to be executed on different dates within a 60-day window and aggregated to satisfy the majority requirement. Xonar's provision of notice on January 6 did not "close" the consent period; rather, the consents became effective only upon delivery of the final consent needed for a majority on January 27.
2. Retroactivity Challenge Rejected: The court found that the McFadden Consents were not backdated. Although the January 5 Consents specified "Effective Date: January 5, 2026," the McFadden Consents left the date blank. Under Section 228, the effective date of stockholder action taken by multiple consents is the date the last consent toward a majority was delivered, which was January 27. Therefore, there was no improper retroactive application.
3. Fiduciary-Breach Contention Rejected: The court held that Freiberg failed to prove that any Xonar fiduciary made a materially misleading statement or material omission when soliciting the McFaddens' consents. The McFaddens received notice of Freiberg's removal and the pending litigation, and they did not identify any material information that would have altered their decision. The court also rejected Freiberg's claim that the McFaddens were improperly induced through bribery, finding no evidence that Hufschmid's communications about potential future benefits constituted improper inducement.

This is a Fourth Amendment case involving a drug trafficking prosecution where the defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence obtained during a warrantless entry into his apartment. The defendant argues that police exceeded the scope of their authorized warrant when they conducted a "hit-and-hold" operation to secure a package of drugs in an apartment other than the one specified in the original search warrant.

1. Whether the exclusionary rule applies when police conduct an unlawful search based on an officer's mistaken interpretation of a judicial order
2. Whether Trooper Montz's entry into Apartment 1 (rather than the authorized Apartment 2) constituted gross negligence, recklessness, or deliberate misconduct sufficient to trigger the exclusionary rule
3. Whether police officers should be held to the same legal interpretation standards as lawyers when reading judicial orders

The court AFFIRMED the District Court's denial of the suppression motion and the conviction. The court assumed the search was unlawful but held that the exclusionary rule does not apply because Trooper Montz's conduct constituted at most isolated negligence, not the deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent misconduct required to trigger suppression. The court reasoned that: (1) the exclusionary rule is a deterrent for future misconduct, not a remedy for past wrongs, and applies only when police conduct is sufficiently culpable to warrant deterrence; (2) Montz reasonably believed the tracker order authorized the hit-and-hold because the order incorporated his affidavit "for all purposes," and his affidavit had requested permission to enter secondary locations; (3) police officers should not be held to the same strict legal interpretation standards as lawyers; and (4) Montz's mistake was understandable and isolated, unlike cases involving patently unconstitutional conduct or reckless disregard for the law.

This is a criminal appeal in which Peter Villa Cordova appealed his conviction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The Fifth Circuit initially issued a panel opinion on May 20, 2026, but subsequently granted a petition for rehearing en banc.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this order, as the document is solely a procedural order granting rehearing en banc rather than a substantive opinion on the merits.

The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for rehearing en banc after a majority of circuit judges in regular active service voted in favor. The panel opinion dated May 20, 2026, was vacated, and the case was ordered to be reheard by the full court en banc with oral argument on a date to be determined. The Clerk was directed to establish a supplemental briefing schedule for the parties.

This is an insurance coverage dispute where Megalomedia, a television production company, sought coverage for bodily injury claims arising from its show "My 600-lb Life" under a general liability policy issued by Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company. Philadelphia refused to defend Megalomedia, citing a policy exclusion for "reality shows," and the court must determine whether this exclusion applies to the show.

1. Whether the term "reality show" in the insurance policy exclusion is ambiguous and, if so, whether it must be construed in favor of the insured under Texas law
2. Whether Megalomedia forfeited its ambiguity argument by failing to raise it in the district court and instead arguing the opposite position
3. Whether Megalomedia's fraudulent inducement claim against Philadelphia has merit, given that Megalomedia knew the policy excluded reality shows and consistently represented My 600-lb Life as a reality show
4. The proper application of the "party presentation" principle—specifically, whether parties can change their legal arguments on appeal when they have taken contrary positions in the district court

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Philadelphia. The majority held that:

1. Forfeiture of Ambiguity Argument: Megalomedia forfeited its argument that "reality show" is ambiguous because it failed to raise this argument in the district court. Instead, Megalomedia repeatedly argued that My 600-lb Life was a "reality show" but that the exclusion did not actually exclude reality shows from coverage. On appeal, Megalomedia reversed this position 180 degrees, arguing that My 600-lb Life is not a reality show. The court held that parties cannot "pirouette" and change their fundamental position on appeal, citing the party presentation principle.
2. Rejection of Fraud Claims: The district court's findings rejecting Megalomedia's fraudulent inducement claim were affirmed. The evidence showed that Megalomedia knew the policy excluded reality shows and consistently acted on that basis—removing My 600-lb Life's production costs from insurance estimates for three consecutive years and obtaining alternate insurance for reality shows while representing My 600-lb Life as a reality show to other insurers.
3. Party Presentation Principle: The majority emphasized that under established precedent, parties cannot raise entirely new arguments on appeal that contradict their prior positions, as this violates the party presentation principle and wastes judicial resources. The court noted that while parties can "enlarge" or develop arguments they previously raised, they cannot completely reverse course.
4. Merits Not Reached: Because Megalomedia forfeited the ambiguity argument, the court did not address whether "reality show" would actually be ambiguous on the merits. However, the majority noted that Megalomedia itself had no difficulty understanding the term when it repeatedly described My 600-lb Life as a reality show in its district court filings.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Chance York challenges his 120-month sentence for possessing, receiving, and distributing child pornography. York argues both that the district court erred in calculating his guidelines range and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

1. Whether the district court properly applied the "75:1 Rule" from the sentencing guidelines commentary, which converts each video of child pornography into 75 images for purposes of calculating offense level enhancements.
2. Whether the district court committed procedural error in calculating the guidelines range and considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
3. Whether the sentencing judge impermissibly expressed views about child pornography producers when the defendant was convicted only of possession and distribution.
4. Whether the 120-month sentence is substantively unreasonable as below-guidelines.

The court affirmed York's 120-month sentence. The court held that: (1) the district court properly applied the 75:1 Rule under binding Sixth Circuit precedent in United States v. Phillips, converting York's 63 videos into 4,824 images and applying a five-level enhancement; (2) the district court properly calculated the guidelines range (151-188 months) and sufficiently considered all § 3553(a) factors, including York's lack of criminal history, advanced degrees, and acceptance of responsibility, balanced against the extremely serious nature of the offenses involving abuse of infants and toddlers; (3) the sentencing judge's comments comparing producers to possessors/distributors were proper contextual remarks about the nature and seriousness of the offense and actually benefited York by supporting a below-guidelines sentence; and (4) the 120-month sentence is presumed reasonable as a below-guidelines sentence, and York failed to rebut that presumption, as the court properly weighed the sentencing factors and the sentence tracked closely to the 109-month average for similarly situated defendants.

This is an appeal involving the American Academy of Pediatrics' challenge to Florida's Attorney General's enforcement of state law claims. The case became moot when the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its complaint in the district court, which had previously issued a preliminary injunction blocking the state enforcement action.

1. Whether the case remains justiciable or has become moot due to the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal
2. The proper scope and application of the "bad-faith exception" to Younger abstention doctrine, which permits federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings in extraordinary circumstances
3. The balance between federalism principles (respecting state sovereignty and state courts) and protection of First Amendment rights against allegedly bad-faith state prosecution
4. Whether the district court properly invoked the bad-faith exception to justify its preliminary injunction against the Florida Attorney General

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the case dismissed as moot and remanded to the district court to vacate the preliminary injunction. The court held that once the injunction is vacated, there will no longer be an appealable order. However, the court was deeply divided on the underlying merits. The majority and concurring opinions acknowledged the mootness but declined to address the bad-faith exception question in detail. Judge Scudder's partial dissent argued that the court should have taken the opportunity to vacate the injunction and explain why it should never have been issued, emphasizing that the bad-faith exception to Younger abstention is extraordinarily narrow—applied only once by the Supreme Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister—and that the district court's injunction represented a serious federalism violation. The concurring opinions by Judges Hamilton and Kolar recognized the tension between federalism and First Amendment protection but agreed the case was moot and declined to resolve the underlying constitutional questions without a live controversy.

This case involves a church's constitutional challenge to Washington's Reproductive Parity Act of 2018 and the state's conscience statute. Cedar Park Assembly of God, which objects on religious grounds to abortion and certain contraceptives, challenged these laws as violations of the Free Exercise Clause and church autonomy doctrine, arguing they require the church to provide, pay for, or facilitate access to abortion coverage for its employees.

1. Whether Cedar Park has Article III standing to challenge the laws based on alleged indirect facilitation of abortion access
2. Whether the challenged laws burden Cedar Park's free exercise of religion by coercing it to provide, pay for, or facilitate access to abortion coverage
3. Whether the laws are neutral and generally applicable, or whether they target religious conduct
4. Whether the laws violate the church autonomy doctrine

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Washington state defendants on all claims. The court held: (1) Cedar Park has Article III standing based on the commonsense economic reality that making abortion services more affordable would increase employee access, following the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond Alternative Energy; (2) while assuming without deciding that the laws burden Cedar Park's religious exercise regarding indirect facilitation of abortion, the laws are neutral and generally applicable because they do not target religious conduct, contain no religious gerrymander, and apply equally to religious and secular objections; (3) because the laws are neutral and generally applicable, only rational basis review applies, which Cedar Park concedes the laws satisfy; (4) the laws do not violate the church autonomy doctrine because they regulate health insurance carriers, not employment at the church itself or internal church governance. The court emphasized that Washington's conscience statute already permits employers to purchase abortion-excluding health plans, that multiple carriers offer such plans, and that Cedar Park had opportunities to purchase comparable abortion-excluding plans but chose not to do so.

This case involves a church's constitutional challenge to Washington's Reproductive Parity Act of 2018 and the state's conscience statute. Cedar Park Assembly of God, which objects on religious grounds to abortion and certain contraceptives, challenged these laws as violating the Free Exercise Clause and church autonomy doctrine, claiming the laws require it to provide, pay for, or facilitate access to abortion coverage for its employees.

1. Whether Cedar Park has Article III standing to challenge the laws based on indirect facilitation of abortion access
2. Whether the challenged laws burden Cedar Park's free exercise of religion by requiring it to provide, pay for, or facilitate access to abortion coverage
3. Whether the laws are neutral and generally applicable, or whether they target religious conduct
4. Whether the laws violate the church autonomy doctrine

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the state defendants on all claims. The court held: (1) Cedar Park has standing based on the indirect facilitation theory that making abortion more affordable would increase employee access; (2) while assuming without deciding that the laws burden Cedar Park's religious exercise, the laws are neutral and generally applicable, thus requiring only rational basis review which Cedar Park concedes the laws satisfy; (3) the laws do not violate the church autonomy doctrine because they regulate insurance carriers, not church employment or internal governance; and (4) Cedar Park's free exercise claim fails because the conscience statute permits employers to purchase abortion-excluding health plans, and Cedar Park had opportunities to do so but chose not to. The court reasoned that the Parity Act regulates health carriers, not employers directly, and the conscience statute provides adequate protections allowing carriers to offer abortion-excluding plans while ensuring enrollees receive coverage through other means. The court rejected Cedar Park's theories that it would be coerced into providing direct coverage, paying indirectly for services, or facilitating access, finding the laws neutral in purpose and operation with no evidence of hostility toward religion.

This is an immigration law case involving judicial review of a denial of NM-1 status (a special immigration status for long-term residents of the Northern Mariana Islands) by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The court addresses whether a statutory jurisdiction-stripping provision bars judicial review of USCIS decisions made under delegated authority from the Secretary of Homeland Security.

1. Whether 48 U.S.C. § 1806(e)(6)(D), which bars judicial review of "any decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security" on NM-1 applications, applies to decisions made by USCIS acting under delegated authority from the Secretary
2. Whether a decision by a delegate (USCIS) constitutes a decision of the delegator (the Secretary) for purposes of a jurisdiction-stripping statute
3. Whether the presumption in favor of reviewability of agency action applies when a statute is clear and unambiguous

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the jurisdiction-stripping provision in 48 U.S.C. § 1806(e)(6)(D) bars judicial review of USCIS decisions denying NM-1 status applications, even though those decisions are made by USCIS rather than the Secretary personally. The court reasoned that: (1) as a basic principle of administrative law, a decision by a delegate is functionally a decision by the delegator; (2) if USCIS decisions count as Secretary decisions for purposes of granting adjudicatory authority, they must also count as Secretary decisions for purposes of barring judicial review; (3) Congress, legislating against the backdrop of existing law, would have understood it was barring review of decisions the Secretary had long delegated to USCIS; (4) similar jurisdiction-stripping provisions in immigration law have been consistently interpreted by the Supreme Court and all courts of appeals (except the Federal Circuit) to apply to USCIS decisions; and (5) the statute is clear and unambiguous, so the presumption in favor of reviewability does not apply.

This is a criminal appeal of a conviction for improper entry into the United States as a non-citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). The defendant challenges the magistrate judge's denial of discovery requests regarding government witnesses' involvement in an offensive Facebook group and the admission of hearsay evidence in removal documents.

1. Whether the magistrate judge abused her discretion by denying the defendant's requests for Brady v. Maryland and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 discovery regarding government witnesses' membership and activity in the "I'm 10-15" Facebook group, where Border Patrol agents shared offensive material including jokes about migrant deaths and racist/sexist slurs.
2. Whether removal documents and written warnings containing multiple layers of hearsay statements were properly admitted under the public records exception to prove the defendant's non-citizenship status.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction and conditionally vacated it, remanding for further proceedings. The court held:

1. Brady and Rule 16 Violation: The magistrate judge abused her discretion by denying discovery requests. When a defendant shows the government may possess undisclosed Brady or Rule 16 evidence and requests further discovery, courts must require the government to review and disclose such material. The government's contradictory representations about witness involvement in the Facebook group indicated it possessed relevant information. Because the government failed to disclose this evidence, prejudice analysis was impossible, requiring remand to determine whether the undisclosed evidence might have altered the verdict.
2. Hearsay Error: The magistrate judge abused her discretion by admitting removal documents and written warnings to prove alienage without examining whether specific hearsay statements within them were admissible. While deportation documents are generally admissible under the public records exception, documents containing multiple layers of hearsay require that each statement fall under a hearsay exception. The government failed to show the documents were prepared by persons with firsthand knowledge of the removal orders or findings of illegal reentry. This error was not harmless because, without these documents and with potentially tainted witness testimony, minimal evidence of citizenship status would remain.

This is a products liability and consumer protection class action brought by insurance companies as subrogees against Korean vehicle manufacturers Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Corporation for defectively designed vehicles lacking engine immobilizers that were vulnerable to theft. The central issue is whether the foreign manufacturers are subject to personal jurisdiction in California.

1. Whether foreign manufacturers have sufficient minimum contacts with California to establish specific personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
2. Whether the manufacturers purposefully directed their activities toward California or purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting activities there
3. Whether plaintiffs' claims arise out of or relate to the manufacturers' California-related contacts
4. Whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable under the circumstances
5. The proper treatment of contradicted allegations at the motion to dismiss stage when defendants submit declarations opposing plaintiffs' allegations

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that the Korean entities are subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California based on the following reasoning:

First Element (Purposeful Availment/Direction): The court concluded that plaintiffs plausibly alleged purposeful availment and direction through two key contacts: (1) the Korean entities sent thousands of shipments of vehicles through California ports as shippers of record, demonstrating deliberate contact with the forum state, and (2) the Korean entities designed vehicles without engine immobilizers specifically for the U.S. market. The court rejected the defendants' characterization of this as mere stream-of-commerce activity, holding that as shippers of record, the Korean entities controlled where vehicles were shipped. The court also held that "differential targeting" or forum-specific focus is not required; sufficiently deliberate contacts that expressly aim wrongful conduct at a forum state satisfy the test even if the defendant cultivates a nationwide audience.

Second Element (Arises Out of or Relates To): The court found that plaintiffs adequately alleged their claims arose out of the Korean entities' California contacts because plaintiffs' injuries were caused by products the Korean entities shipped to California. With over 70% of the manufacturers' U.S. shipments going through California ports, it is reasonable to infer that many allegedly defective vehicles were shipped to California ports before causing injuries there, making the shipments a but-for cause of plaintiffs' claims. The court noted that defendants forfeited any challenge regarding whether the analysis differs for state-law claims involving out-of-state injuries.

Third Element (Reasonableness): The court shifted the burden to defendants to present a compelling case that jurisdiction would be unreasonable. However, because the district court did not address reasonableness and the parties did not brief the issue on appeal, the court remanded for the district court to resolve this factor in the first instance using the seven-factor test for assessing reasonableness.

Preliminary Matter: The court held that the district court correctly ignored plaintiffs' contradicted and unsupported allegations when defendants submitted declarations expressly contradicting them, because plaintiffs failed to submit their own declarations in response to contest the defendants' factual assertions.

This is an immigration law case involving U-visa petitioners who challenged the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Director's handling of their visa petitions under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The petitioners, who had received either "bona fide" determinations or been placed on a waiting list, sued claiming USCIS unlawfully withheld or delayed considering them for waiting list placement and advance parole to travel internationally.

1. Whether granting advance parole to waitlisted U-visa petitioners is discretionary or mandatory under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2)
2. Whether waitlisted petitioners (WLD Plaintiffs) have standing to challenge USCIS's withholding of advance parole
3. Whether courts have statutory jurisdiction under the APA to compel discretionary agency action
4. Whether "bona fide" determination petitioners (BFD Plaintiffs) have standing to challenge USCIS's failure to consider them for waiting list placement
5. Whether the loss of opportunity to pursue a discretionary benefit constitutes a cognizable injury-in-fact for Article III standing

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Parole is Discretionary: The regulation stating "USCIS will grant deferred action or parole" to waitlisted petitioners grants USCIS discretion, not a mandatory duty. The word "or" indicates separate alternatives, not a requirement to grant both. The court rejected arguments based on the word "while" in the regulation, finding that USCIS's grant of deferred action while a petitioner is in the United States satisfies the regulation even if parole is not granted.
2. WLD Plaintiffs' Claims Dismissed: Although waitlisted petitioners have Article III standing to challenge the withholding of advance parole, the court lacks statutory jurisdiction under the APA because: (a) the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary agency action under § 706(1), and (b) the claim challenging arbitrary and capricious denial of parole under § 706(2) does not challenge final agency action since there is no evidence of actual parole denials.
3. BFD Plaintiffs' Parole-Related Injury Rejected: The district court correctly found that BFD plaintiffs lack standing based on their claimed injury regarding inability to obtain parole, since undisputed evidence showed waitlisted and bona fide petitioners are in the same position regarding parole eligibility.
4. Remand for Alternative Injury Theories: The court reversed the summary judgment dismissal and remanded because the district court failed to address the BFD Plaintiffs' alternative injury-in-fact arguments, including: (a) that the BFD process delays adjudication of eligibility and risks loss of evidence compared to the waiting list process, (b) that unlawful presence accrues under the BFD process but not the waiting list process, and (c) that the BFD process is based on policy rather than regulation and is therefore subject to rescission.

Concurrence and Dissent: Judge Bea concurred in affirming the dismissal of claims seeking to compel advance parole but dissented from the remand of the BFD Plaintiffs' claim. Judge Bea argued that regardless of standing, the BFD Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed for lack of statutory jurisdiction because there is no statutory provision or regulation requiring USCIS to adjudicate waiting-list eligibility for every U-visa petitioner. The regulation only requires placement of "eligible petitioners" on the waiting list, and BFD petitioners have not been deemed eligible. Judge Bea also noted that allowing such claims would improperly require courts to superintend USCIS's resource allocation and priorities.

This is a criminal appeal in which James Troiano challenges the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Troiano argues that nonretroactive changes to the Sentencing Guidelines enacted after his 2006 sentencing constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting a sentence reduction.

1. Whether the Sentencing Commission has statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) to prohibit courts from considering nonretroactive Guidelines amendments as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reduction.
2. Whether the § 1B1.13 Policy Statement validly bars consideration of nonretroactive Guidelines amendments.
3. Whether the Policy Statement prohibits consideration of the combined effect of multiple nonretroactive amendments or only single amendments.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Troiano's compassionate release motion. The court held that: (1) the Sentencing Commission acted within its statutory authority under § 994(t) when it defined "extraordinary and compelling reasons" by excluding nonretroactive Guidelines amendments; (2) the § 1B1.13 Policy Statement is valid and binding on district courts; and (3) the Policy Statement bars consideration of any nonretroactive amendments, whether considered alone or in combination. The court reasoned that Congress's delegation of authority to the Commission to "describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons" includes the power to define the term by both inclusion and exclusion. The court also noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Rutherford v. United States established that disparities created by nonretroactive changes are neither "extraordinary" nor "compelling" as a matter of law, and the court applied standard rules of statutory interpretation to conclude that references to "an amendment" in the Policy Statement encompass multiple amendments.

This is a Fourth Amendment appeal challenging a pat-down search conducted during a police stop. Garryn Jackson was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition after officers discovered a gun during the pat-down, and he appeals on the grounds that the initial stop lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

1. Whether police had reasonable suspicion to stop the SUV based on the circumstances observed
2. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that three to four people stood around the SUV
3. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Mr. Jackson made furtive movements before the stop
4. Whether body-camera footage contradicted the officers' testimony about observing furtive movements
5. Whether the totality of circumstances supported reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress and upheld the conviction. The court held that:

1. The district court did not clearly err in finding that three to four people stood around the SUV, as it properly exercised its discretion to credit Officer Moran's testimony despite inconsistencies with Officer Hurd's written statements
2. The district court did not clearly err in finding furtive movements before the stop, as both officers testified they observed movements when entering the parking lot, and the court properly assessed credibility despite inconsistencies with written statements
3. Body-camera footage did not demonstrate clear error because the human eye can observe more than what cameras capture, and the footage was grainy; additionally, the officers could have viewed the SUV at an angle when entering the lot, preventing the front seats and headrests from blocking their sight line
4. Reasonable suspicion existed based on the totality of circumstances: (1) the location's reputation as a high-crime area with drug dealing; (2) the time of incident at 1:50 a.m.; (3) the SUV's reverse parking, consistent with drug dealer behavior; (4) the presence of three to four people around the SUV who quickly dispersed when police arrived; and (5) Mr. Jackson's furtive movements
5. Because the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the subsequent pat-down was therefore lawful

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a capital murder conviction from a second trial. George Martin, a former Alabama State Trooper, was convicted of murdering his wife for pecuniary gain after the state's egregious prosecutorial misconduct (Brady violations) in his first trial necessitated a retrial nearly two decades later.

1. Whether Martin's claims were procedurally defaulted in state court
2. Whether a trial court preclusion order violated Martin's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights by preventing cross-examination regarding the state's prior prosecutorial misconduct
3. Whether the preclusion order violated Martin's constitutional right to present a complete defense
4. Whether the state presented sufficient evidence to prove murder for pecuniary gain, the aggravating factor required for the capital murder conviction

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on all claims. The court found: (1) Martin did not procedurally default his claims and the state waived its exhaustion defense regarding the sufficiency claim; (2) the Confrontation Clause claim was reviewed de novo (not under AEDPA deference) because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not adjudicate it on the merits, but the preclusion order did not violate the Confrontation Clause because Martin was able to meaningfully cross-examine witnesses about investigative failures and bias through other permissible lines of questioning; (3) the complete defense claim was reviewed under AEDPA deference and the trial court's reasonable restrictions on evidence were constitutional because Martin was able to present the essence of his defense regarding investigative flaws; and (4) the sufficiency of the evidence claim, reviewed under AEDPA deference, was not unreasonably applied because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could have found Martin guilty of murder for pecuniary gain based on the circumstantial evidence presented, despite the weakness of the pecuniary gain evidence.

This is an appeal of a Court of Chancery decision approving a $32 million class action settlement in a stockholder derivative suit challenging the fairness of Emisphere Technologies' merger with Novo Nordisk. IsZo Capital LP, a major shareholder excluded from the lead plaintiff role, objected to the settlement's approval without granting it an opt-out right to pursue its own claims.

1. Whether the Court of Chancery properly certified the class action under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) without providing opt-out rights to objecting shareholders
2. Whether the discretionary opt-out standard established in In re Celera Corp. Shareholder Litigation should be revisited or "revitalized" given that no discretionary opt-outs have been granted in the thirteen years since that decision
3. Whether the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes requires opt-out rights in (b)(2) class actions involving monetary damages
4. Whether, under the existing Celera framework, the Court of Chancery abused its discretion in denying IsZo's request for a discretionary opt-out right

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision, holding:

1. The Celera framework remains valid and was properly applied. The fact that no discretionary opt-outs have been granted since Celera does not indicate the decision was incorrectly decided; rather, it reflects that trial courts have properly balanced the equities and found unique circumstances absent.
2. IsZo's invitation to "revisit" Celera is declined. The lack of subsequent opt-outs does not demonstrate that Celera's protections are illusory, but rather that the "unique circumstances" standard has been appropriately applied.
3. Wal-Mart does not support IsZo's position. Unlike the employment discrimination claims in Wal-Mart requiring individualized determinations of each plaintiff's damages, breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims in a single-transaction merger involve homogenous rights and interests where all shareholders suffer the same per-share injury and receive uniform per-share recovery.
4. The application of the Celera framework provides constitutionally sufficient due process. IsZo received full discovery, briefed its objection, was heard at length, and had its request thoughtfully considered on the merits.
5. The Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in denying IsZo's opt-out request. The trial court found that: (a) the lead plaintiffs vigorously pursued the litigation; (b) IsZo failed to cite documentary evidence supporting its claim that plaintiffs left value on the table; (c) IsZo's valuation theories were unsupported by the record; (d) the settlement provided substantial monetary recovery after impressive efforts by class counsel; and (e) granting an opt-out would place the recovery at risk. These findings distinguish this case from the unique circumstances in Celera.

This is a procedural decision in which the Delaware Court of Chancery refuses defendants' application to certify a post-trial decision for interlocutory appeal. The underlying case involves a dispute over whether a company's board properly rejected a stockholder's director nomination notice under the company's advance notice bylaws.

1. Whether the post-trial decision meets the "substantial issue" requirement for interlocutory appeal certification under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42(b)(i)
2. Whether the benefits of interlocutory review outweigh its costs under Rule 42(b)(iii), specifically considering: (a) whether the opinion involves a question of law resolved for the first time in Delaware; (b) whether interlocutory review would terminate the litigation; and (c) whether considerations of justice favor immediate appellate review
3. Whether the court's interpretation of the term "participant" in the bylaws constitutes a novel legal issue
4. Whether a board may raise new theories of contractual noncompliance at trial that were not stated in its original rejection letter

The court refused the application for interlocutory appeal certification. While the court found that the substantial issue requirement was met, it held that the benefits of interlocutory review do not outweigh its costs. Specifically: (1) the opinion's interpretation of "participant" is not a question of first impression because it merely applied settled principles of contract interpretation to previously uninterpreted contract language, and the mere application of long-held precedent to new facts does not warrant interlocutory appeal; (2) the rule requiring a board to identify contractual deficiencies in its contemporaneous rejection letter is not novel—it is consistent with established Delaware law that a board's defensive action must rise or fall on what directors knew and considered when acting, and prevents advance notice bylaws from functioning as post-hoc litigation "tripwires"; (3) interlocutory review would not terminate the litigation because multiple other claims remain pending; and (4) allowing the October 14 election to proceed with ATG's nominees on the ballot does not constitute irreparable harm to stockholders or the board, as the Opinion merely validates the nomination notice and leaves the election outcome to stockholders, and Delaware law provides a statutory remedy to resolve disputed elections after the fact.

This is a books and records action under Delaware law where the Court of Chancery reviews exceptions filed by defendant HIR Holdings LP to an Implementing Order that governs the inspection of partnership books and records by former limited partners Neil Luthra and Vann Avedisian.

1. Whether Paragraph 7(f) of the Implementing Order properly implements the Final Report's ruling regarding access to confidential internal communications related to capital account reporting and tax matters.
2. Whether Paragraph 12 of the Implementing Order's definition of "Confidential" information is consistent with the Final Report's authorization to redact "sensitive" information.
3. The proper scope of access to confidential, proprietary, or sensitive information under the limited partnership agreement, particularly whether such information must be produced only when provided to other non-employee, non-founder members.

The Court sustained the defendant's exceptions. The Court found that Paragraph 7(f) improperly required production of confidential internal communications beyond what the Final Report authorized, and therefore must be stricken. The Court also found that Paragraph 12's narrow definition of "Confidential" requiring "concrete competitive harm" was inconsistent with the Final Report's broader authorization to redact "sensitive" information. The Court ordered the parties to submit a revised implementing order consistent with these rulings.

This is an advancement action in which a former director, officer, and employee of Theorem Technology, Inc. seeks to compel the company to advance his legal fees and expenses incurred in defending against an arbitration claim brought by Pagaya Technologies Ltd. (which acquired Theorem) alleging breach of restrictive covenants in the merger agreement. The plaintiff also seeks advancement for counterclaims he asserted in the arbitration.

1. Whether the arbitration claim against Edmundson was brought "by reason of the fact" of his corporate status with Theorem, thereby triggering his right to advancement under Delaware law and the company's governing instruments.
2. Whether Edmundson is entitled to advancement for his counterclaims in the arbitration, specifically a breach of contract counterclaim and a fraudulent inducement counterclaim, under the Roven test for compulsory counterclaims.
3. Whether Edmundson is entitled to fees on fees and prejudgment interest in connection with the advancement dispute.

The court granted Edmundson's motion for summary judgment on entitlement to advancement. The court held:

1. Arbitration Claim: Edmundson is entitled to advancement for defending the arbitration claim because it is asserted "by reason of the fact" of his corporate status. The court found a requisite nexus between the claim and his pre-separation responsibilities because: (a) the breach of the restrictive covenant necessarily depends on Edmundson's prior contact with or responsibility for Theorem's customers during his tenure as an officer and director; and (b) the claim implicitly alleges Edmundson used confidential, proprietary information learned pre-separation when making the prohibited communications to clients. The court rejected Theorem's argument that Edmundson agreed to the restrictive covenant only in his personal capacity as a stockholder, finding no clear expression of intent to limit the capacity in which he was obligated.
2. Breach of Contract Counterclaim: Edmundson is entitled to advancement for this counterclaim because it satisfies both prongs of the Roven test for compulsory counterclaims. First, there is a logical relationship between the counterclaim and the arbitration claim because both involve Edmundson's employment, termination, and the same investor relationships and disputed issues regarding Pagaya's conduct. Second, success on the counterclaim could produce an offsetting damages award, which satisfies Roven's requirement that the counterclaim be "advanced to defeat, or offset" the affirmative claims. The court interpreted "offset" broadly and rejected Theorem's argument that it must be limited to the doctrine of recoupment.
3. Fraudulent Inducement Counterclaim: Edmundson is not entitled to advancement for this counterclaim because it fails the first prong of the Roven test. There is no logical relationship between the fraudulent inducement counterclaim (which concerns alleged pre-contractual fraud by Pagaya in inducing the merger agreement) and the arbitration claim (which concerns post-termination conduct by Edmundson). The facts and issues are temporally and substantively distinct with no overlapping operative facts.
4. Fees on Fees and Interest: Edmundson is entitled to fees on fees to the extent of his success on the advancement suit, as this is the default rule in Delaware and is required by the Indemnification Agreement. Edmundson is also entitled to prejudgment interest at the legal rate, computed from the date of his demand for advancement.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case in which a stockholder and former officer of HerdDogg, Inc. seeks appointment of a receiver for the corporation and moves to disqualify opposing counsel. The petitioner alleges that the respondent's counsel has conflicts of interest under Delaware Lawyer's Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.7 and 3.7 that warrant disqualification.

1. Whether a non-client litigant has standing to seek disqualification of opposing counsel based on alleged conflicts of interest under DLRPC Rule 1.7(a) (concurrent conflicts of interest)
2. Whether a non-client litigant has standing to seek disqualification based on alleged violations of DLRPC Rule 3.7 (lawyer as witness)
3. Whether counsel's receipt of a SAFE (Simple Agreement for Future Equity) from the client creates a disqualifying conflict of interest
4. Whether the petitioner's motion is being used as a tactical litigation maneuver rather than a good faith challenge to counsel's fitness

The court denied the petitioner's motion for disqualification. The magistrate held that: (1) a non-client litigant seeking to disqualify opposing counsel must prove by clear and convincing evidence both the existence of a conflict and that the conflict prejudices the fairness of the proceedings; (2) the petitioner failed to meet this burden regarding Rule 1.7, as she is not a client of the firm, was never represented by it, and the firm's financial interest in the client does not materially limit its representation; (3) the petitioner failed to establish a Rule 3.7 violation, as there is no showing that any attorney must testify or that any testimony would prejudice the petitioner; (4) even if technical rule violations existed, trial courts lack independent jurisdiction to enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct when the conduct does not prejudice the fairness of proceedings; and (5) the petitioner's litigation conduct in this case and the parallel Colorado Litigation suggests the motion is being used as a tactical delay mechanism rather than a good faith effort to address legitimate conflicts. The court noted that the petitioner's strategy of seeking expedited relief, then seeking delays, pursuing multiple third-party discovery subpoenas, and attempting to disqualify opposing counsel while the motion to dismiss is pending raises concerns about abuse of process.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction in consolidated cases challenging a new United States Postal Service rule regulating mail-in voting for the November 3, 2026 federal election. Voter advocacy organizations and states sought to enjoin enforcement of the rule, which would require voter-specific barcodes on ballot envelopes and impose various compliance burdens on states, arguing it violates the Constitution and would cause widespread voter disenfranchisement.

1. Whether the Postal Service has constitutional authority under the Elections Clause to regulate the manner of holding federal elections without explicit congressional authorization
2. Whether general postal regulatory statutes constitute sufficient congressional delegation of authority over election administration
3. Whether the appellee organizations have standing to challenge the rule, specifically whether they have organizational standing beyond mere issue advocacy
4. Whether the preliminary injunction should be stayed pending appeal, considering likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest

The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the motions to stay the preliminary injunction. The court held that: (1) the Final Rule likely violates the Elections Clause because it regulates the manner of holding federal elections, which the Constitution assigns exclusively to the States and Congress, not executive agencies acting without congressional authorization; (2) general postal regulatory authority does not constitute the "specific congressional action" necessary to delegate constitutionally assigned electoral tasks to the Postal Service; (3) the appellee organizations have organizational standing because the Final Rule directly interferes with their core services (voter registration, education, and translation services) rather than merely requiring them to spend money on advocacy; and (4) appellants failed to demonstrate they are likely to succeed on the merits or that the balance of equities favors a stay, particularly given the district court's detailed findings that implementation would cause widespread disenfranchisement of millions of voters with no demonstrated fraud problem, and appellants presented no countervailing evidence disputing these findings.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of a new United States Postal Service rule regulating mail-in voting for the November 3, 2026 federal election. The case involves multiple consolidated appeals from federal officials, states, and voting rights organizations challenging the district court's decision to enjoin portions of the rule.

1. Whether the Postal Service has constitutional authority under the Elections Clause to promulgate rules regulating the manner of holding federal elections
2. Whether general statutory grants of authority to the Postal Service to manage postal operations constitute sufficient congressional authorization for election-related regulations
3. Whether the appellee organizations have standing to challenge the rule, specifically whether they have organizational standing beyond mere issue advocacy
4. Whether a stay of the preliminary injunction should be granted pending appeal

The court denied all motions for a stay of the preliminary injunction. The court held that appellants failed to demonstrate entitlement to a stay because: (1) they did not make a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, as the Final Rule likely violates the Elections Clause by regulating the manner of holding elections without specific congressional authorization—general postal authority statutes do not constitute sufficient delegation of this constitutionally assigned power; (2) appellants failed to show irreparable harm, as the district court found the rule could not be implemented before the election anyway; (3) the balance of equities strongly favors the appellees, as implementation would cause widespread disenfranchisement of millions of voters with minimal anti-fraud benefit; and (4) the appellee organizations have proper organizational standing because the rule directly interferes with their core services (voter registration, education, and translation services) rather than merely requiring them to spend money on advocacy, distinguishing this case from cases involving pure issue advocacy.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of a new United States Postal Service rule regulating mail-in voting for the November 3, 2026 federal election. The First Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether to stay the preliminary injunction that prevented the rule from taking effect, with various federal officials, agencies, and states seeking to overturn the district court's decision.

1. Whether the Postal Service had constitutional authority under the Elections Clause to promulgate a rule regulating the manner of holding federal elections
2. Whether general statutory grants of authority to the Postal Service to manage postal operations constituted sufficient congressional authorization for the Final Rule
3. Whether the appellee organizations had standing to challenge the rule, specifically whether they had organizational standing beyond mere issue advocacy
4. Whether the preliminary injunction should be stayed pending appeal, considering the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest

The court denied the motions to stay the preliminary injunction. The court held that: (1) the Final Rule is likely unconstitutional because the Elections Clause assigns authority to regulate the manner of holding elections to the States and Congress, not to executive agencies like the Postal Service without explicit congressional authorization; (2) general postal management statutes do not constitute sufficient congressional delegation of constitutionally-assigned electoral duties; (3) the appellee organizations have organizational standing because the Final Rule directly interferes with their core services (voter registration, education, and translation services) rather than merely requiring them to engage in issue advocacy; and (4) appellants failed to demonstrate they are likely to succeed on the merits or that the balance of equities favors a stay, particularly given the district court's findings that the rule could not be implemented before the election without causing widespread disenfranchisement of millions of voters and chaos in state election administration, with no evidence of actual voter fraud to justify such harm.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of a new United States Postal Service rule regulating mail-in voting for the November 3, 2026 federal election. The case involves multiple consolidated appeals from federal officials, states, and voting rights organizations challenging the district court's decision to enjoin portions of the rule.

1. Whether the Postal Service has constitutional and statutory authority to promulgate regulations governing the manner of holding federal elections
2. Whether the Final Rule violates the Elections Clause of the Constitution, which assigns authority over election procedures to the States and Congress
3. Whether general postal service statutes provide sufficient congressional authorization for the Final Rule
4. Whether the appellee organizations have standing to challenge the rule, specifically whether they have organizational standing beyond mere issue advocacy
5. Whether the preliminary injunction satisfies the requirements for injunctive relief (likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest)

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction and denied appellants' motions for a stay. The court held:

1. The Final Rule is likely unconstitutional under the Elections Clause because it regulates the manner of holding elections, which the Constitution assigns exclusively to the States and Congress, not to executive agencies like the Postal Service without explicit congressional authorization.
2. General postal service statutes do not provide sufficient congressional authorization for the Final Rule, as Congress historically has been explicit when delegating Elections Clause authority, and general grants of postal authority constitute an insufficient "wafer-thin reed" upon which to delegate constitutionally assigned electoral tasks.
3. The appellee organizations have organizational standing because the Final Rule directly interferes with their core services—voter registration drives, translation of election materials, and voter education—beyond mere issue advocacy. The organizations must update educational materials, recruit additional volunteers, and pause planned activities due to the rule's implementation.
4. Appellants failed to demonstrate entitlement to a stay because: (a) they did not make a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits; (b) the district court's finding that the Final Rule could not be presently implemented undermines claims of irreparable harm; and (c) the balance of equities strongly favors the appellee organizations and the public interest, as implementation would likely result in widespread disenfranchisement of millions of voters with no demonstrated evidence of impending fraud.

This is a civil rights case brought by Tracey Edwards, an incarcerated pregnant woman at a North Carolina correctional facility, against prison and medical officials alleging Eighth Amendment violations for shackling her during labor and delivery and denying her medication-assisted opioid treatment (MOUD) after giving birth, as well as disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act.

1. Whether shackling a pregnant offender during labor and postpartum recovery violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
2. Whether denial of MOUD to a prisoner with opioid use disorder (OUD) after pregnancy constitutes deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment
3. Whether qualified immunity protects prison officials who shackled Edwards despite clear DAC policies prohibiting such restraints
4. Whether Edwards has viable disability discrimination claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act based on her OUD diagnosis

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings:

1. Shackling Claim: The court held that shackling a pregnant offender during labor and immediately postpartum without clear evidence of security or flight risk violates the Eighth Amendment and constitutes an objectively serious harm. The court found genuine disputes of fact regarding whether Warden Witherspoon and four officers (Brodie, Lynch, Williams, and Ragano) acted with deliberate indifference. The court vacated qualified immunity for these five defendants, finding that the risk of harm was obvious and the defendants were on notice of the illegality of their conduct through DAC policies and training. The court affirmed summary judgment for three other officers (Dixon, Gill, and Brown) who monitored Edwards after active labor had ended.
2. MOUD Denial Claim: The court held that Edwards' OUD diagnosis constitutes a serious medical need and found genuine disputes of fact as to whether medical directors Amos and Alexander were deliberately indifferent when they enforced a blanket policy denying MOUD to all non-pregnant offenders. The court found that simply following prison policy does not shield officials from constitutional liability when they fail to make individualized medical assessments. The court vacated summary judgment for Amos and Alexander but affirmed it for Junker, who was primarily responsible for mental health rather than OUD policy.
3. Clearly Established Right: The court held that the right to receive adequate medical care and be free from deliberate indifference to known medical needs has been clearly established since 1976, and therefore officials cannot claim qualified immunity. The court rejected defendants' attempts to define the constitutional right with excessive specificity, which would effectively grant absolute immunity.
4. ADA and RA Claims: The court vacated and remanded the disability discrimination claims, finding that the district court misinterpreted Edwards' claims by focusing on pregnancy discrimination rather than disability discrimination based on her OUD diagnosis. The court recognized that OUD is now considered a disability under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

This is an immigration law case involving two noncitizens detained without bond hearings after the government changed its interpretation of federal detention statutes in July 2025. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addresses whether noncitizens present in the United States without lawful admission must be detained under a mandatory detention statute (Section 1225) or may be released on bond under a discretionary detention statute (Section 1226).

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention of "applicants for admission" who are "seeking admission," applies to noncitizens already present in the United States without lawful admission
2. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows discretionary detention and bond hearings, applies to such noncitizens instead
3. Whether the phrase "seeking admission" in Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires an additional element beyond being an "applicant for admission"
4. Whether the government's new statutory construction raises constitutional due process concerns

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief, holding that Section 1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens like Lopez Garcia and Rivera who are present in the United States without lawful admission. The court reasoned that: (1) the plain text of Section 1226(a) unambiguously applies to noncitizens detained within the country; (2) Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is ambiguous because it requires an alien to be both an "applicant for admission" and "seeking admission," and the phrase "seeking admission" modifies the general category to apply only to those actively pursuing lawful entry at borders; (3) the canon against surplusage requires giving meaning to the phrase "seeking admission" rather than treating it as redundant; (4) the statute's structure creates four graduated detention categories, with Section 1225 applying only to those recently arriving and actively seeking entry; (5) the longstanding, universal interpretation by all three branches of government for thirty years treated Section 1226 as applying to noncitizens already in the country; (6) the government's interpretation would mandate detention of millions without clear statutory language, violating the "elephants in mouseholes" canon; and (7) constitutional avoidance principles require interpreting the ambiguous statute to avoid serious due process concerns for millions of noncitizens with deep community ties. The court rejected the government's reliance on legislative history and emphasized that Congress would not have enacted such a historically unprecedented mass detention scheme without greater clarity. Judge Rushing dissented, arguing that "applicant for admission" and "seeking admission" are synonymous terms and that Section 1225(a)(1)'s deeming provision treats all noncitizens without lawful admission as applicants for admission, thereby subjecting them to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).

This is a breach of contract case where Hello Farms, a Michigan marijuana grower, sued GR Vending and CURA MI for refusing to purchase marijuana under an output contract. The central issue is whether federal courts can enforce a contract for the sale of marijuana despite its legalization under Michigan state law, given that marijuana remains illegal under federal law as a Schedule I controlled substance.

1. Whether federal courts can enforce a contract to sell marijuana when the underlying conduct violates the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), despite state legalization
2. Whether the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment (RFA), which restricts DOJ funding for prosecuting certain medical marijuana offenses, changes federal policy regarding contract enforcement for marijuana transactions
3. Whether the April 2026 rescheduling of medical marijuana to Schedule III affects the enforceability of a contract made before that change
4. Whether the contract should be classified as limited to medical marijuana or encompassing both medical and recreational marijuana
5. Whether Jackson Purchase balancing test applies to determine enforceability of contracts involving federal crimes

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the contract is unenforceable under federal law. The court's reasoning:

1. Contract Classification: The contract was not limited to medical marijuana. The contract explicitly required marijuana to meet "recreational cannabis testing requirements," and GR Vending held both medical and recreational licenses, allowing it to transfer marijuana between inventories. Therefore, the contract encompassed both medical and recreational marijuana sales.
2. Federal Illegality Doctrine: Federal courts have a duty to refuse enforcement of contracts that violate explicit and well-defined federal policies. The CSA makes marijuana distribution a felony with severe penalties (up to life imprisonment and fines up to $50 million). Enforcing Hello Farms's claim for damages would enforce the parties' agreement to commit federal crimes—specifically, possession with intent to distribute and distribution of a controlled substance.
3. RFA Does Not Legalize Marijuana: The Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment only restricts DOJ funding for prosecuting certain medical marijuana offenses; it does not legalize, decriminalize, or provide immunity from prosecution for marijuana offenses. The conduct remains criminal despite the RFA's funding restrictions. The RFA's effect is limited both substantively and temporally.
4. April 2026 Rescheduling Irrelevant: The rescheduling of medical marijuana to Schedule III does not retroactively validate a contract made in 2020. Under general contract law principles, an agreement illegal when made cannot be validated by subsequent changes in law. Additionally, the rescheduling still requires DEA registration and FDA approval, so the transaction would remain illegal without compliance.
5. Jackson Purchase Balancing Inapplicable: The court rejected application of the Jackson Purchase balancing test, which would weigh parties' interests against the illegality. The Supreme Court in Kaiser Steel established a categorical rule: if enforcing a judgment would enforce the precise conduct made unlawful by explicit federal policy, courts cannot enforce the contract. This rule does not permit balancing. Moreover, even if balancing applied, it would not apply to agreements to commit serious crimes with severe penalties.
6. Money Transfer Not Dispositive: The fact that enforcement would involve only a money transfer does not make the contract enforceable. The long-established rule is that courts cannot lend aid to realize the fruits of an illegal agreement, regardless of whether the judgment commands unlawful conduct or merely transfers money.
7. Public Policy Considerations: Federal law, not state law, governs the enforceability question under the Supremacy Clause. Congress has explicitly criminalized marijuana distribution through the CSA and has declined to legalize it despite considering legislation to do so. Reduced federal enforcement priorities and public acceptance of marijuana do not change the law itself.

This is an appeal of a summary judgment ruling in a prisoner civil rights case involving the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion requirement. Danyale Tubbs challenged the rejection of a book sent to him while incarcerated, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but the district court dismissed his case for failing to exhaust administrative remedies within the required timeframe.

1. Whether Tubbs properly exhausted his administrative remedies under the PLRA by filing his Step I grievance within the required five-business-day timeframe under Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) policy
2. Whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding when Tubbs received notice of the final decision concerning his mail rejection, which determines when the time period for filing his grievance began to run
3. Whether the defendant (Payton) met her burden of proof on summary judgment to establish that Tubbs failed to exhaust, given that exhaustion is an affirmative defense
4. Whether the "sham affidavit" doctrine should apply to strike Tubbs's declaration regarding when he received the hearing report

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Payton failed to carry her burden of proving that no genuine dispute exists regarding when Tubbs received the signed hearing report and learned the final resolution of his mail rejection claim
2. A material fact exists as to when Tubbs understood the outcome of the administrative hearing—specifically, whether he learned of the final decision on April 5, 2022 (as Payton argued) or on May 9, 2022 (as Tubbs claimed when he filed his grievance)
3. Tubbs's sworn affidavit, standing alone, creates a genuine dispute of material fact that forecloses summary judgment on exhaustion, and the sham affidavit doctrine does not apply because Tubbs's declaration is consistent with his prior statements in his grievances and does not contradict prior sworn testimony
4. Corroborating evidence supports Tubbs's version, including: (1) both his Step I and Step II grievances listing May 9, 2022 as the "Date of Incident"; (2) his Step II grievance explicitly stating he "didn't receive the response or hearing report until" May 9, 2022; (3) the existence of two different versions of the hearing report (one signed and referencing a "second hearing," one unsigned), suggesting the report may have been supplemented after April 5; and (4) MDOC's failure to produce evidence of when a hearing prior to April 5 occurred
5. The district court erred in requiring Tubbs to explicitly state in his complaint that he did not receive the report until May 9, since under the PLRA, inmates are not required to plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints—that burden falls on the defendant
6. When viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Tubbs and drawing all inferences in his favor, at least one genuine dispute exists as to the material fact of when the clock began to run on Tubbs's time to exhaust his administrative remedies

This is a Title VII employment discrimination case in which Yousef Ismail, a Middle Eastern mail carrier for the United States Postal Service, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims of race and national origin discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment stemming from his removal from the workplace following a heated altercation with his supervisor in February 2022.

1. Whether Ismail established a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework by identifying a similarly situated employee outside his protected class who received more favorable treatment
2. Whether the Postal Service's emergency placement and removal of Ismail was attributable to his race or national origin rather than his conduct during the altercation
3. Whether Ismail demonstrated a but-for causal connection between his protected EEO complaints and the adverse employment action to support a retaliation claim
4. Whether Ismail's work environment was hostile based on his protected class status
5. Whether the district court properly enforced Local Rule 56.1 by deeming facts admitted when Ismail failed to properly oppose the Postal Service's statement of facts

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Postal Service on all claims. The court held that:

1. Ismail failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not present sufficient evidence that Deborah Eckler, the proposed comparator, engaged in substantially comparable conduct and received more favorable treatment. Ismail had no firsthand knowledge of Eckler's alleged confrontation with Calabrese and no evidence she faced no discipline.
2. Even viewing the record holistically, no reasonable jury could conclude that Calabrese's actions were motivated by Ismail's race or national origin rather than his heated altercation on the workroom floor.
3. Ismail failed to establish causation for his retaliation claim because the three-year gap between his 2018 EEO complaint (closed by January 2019) and the February 2022 incident was too great to raise a reasonable inference of retaliation. His union grievances about overtime and timekeeping errors, rather than discrimination, could not form the basis of a Title VII retaliation claim.
4. Even assuming the hostile work environment conduct was severe and humiliating, Ismail presented no evidence that Calabrese's actions were motivated by his race or national origin.
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing Local Rule 56.1 and deeming facts admitted, as the court actually reviewed the union steward's deposition transcript that Ismail had attached and even requested the full deposition transcript from the Postal Service to better assess Ismail's claims.

This is a class action case brought by enlisted military servicemembers against USAA insurance companies, alleging that the defendants violated California Insurance Code provisions by charging higher rates to lower-ranking servicemembers than to higher-ranking officers. The Ninth Circuit certified novel questions of California state law to the California Supreme Court rather than deciding the case itself.

1. Whether California Insurance Code section 1861.16(b)—which requires insurers in a group with common ownership to offer the lowest available "good driver" discount rates—prohibits USAA from charging different rates based on military rank, or whether section 11628(f)(1)—which exempts military-focused insurers from certain Insurance Code requirements—permits such differential pricing.
2. Whether section 11628(f)(1) constitutes an invalid legislative amendment to Proposition 103 under the Amwest standard, which requires that amendments further Proposition 103's purposes.
3. Whether California Insurance Code sections 1860.1 and 1860.2 establish a filed-rate doctrine that limits plaintiffs' ability to recover damages under unfair business practice laws, and if so, whether this doctrine differs from the standard applied to public utilities under Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co.
4. Whether a filed-rate doctrine, if it exists, would preclude liability even where challenges do not center on the appropriateness of rates themselves.

The Ninth Circuit certified two complex questions to the California Supreme Court rather than resolving the appeal itself. The court found that: (1) no controlling California precedent answers whether section 11628(f)(1) exempts military-focused insurers from section 1861.16(b)'s requirement to offer the lowest available rates, and whether such an exemption would violate Proposition 103's amendment restrictions; and (2) California Courts of Appeal have split on whether a filed-rate doctrine applies to insurance, what its standard should be, and whether it would bar claims not centered on rate appropriateness. The court concluded these novel and complex questions of state law involving conflicting policies are better suited for resolution by the California Supreme Court in the first instance. The case is stayed pending the California Supreme Court's decision on certification.

This is a civil rights case in which a law school student who alleged she was raped sued police officers and the City of Lawrence after being investigated and charged with filing a false report. The case involves claims of malicious prosecution, conspiracy, equal protection violations, and state law claims arising from the officers' investigation and the subsequent criminal charges against the plaintiff.

1. Whether the plaintiff adequately alleged that police officers caused her malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by preparing a probable cause affidavit containing false statements or material omissions
2. Whether the plaintiff adequately alleged a conspiracy under §§ 1983 and 1985(3) to violate her constitutional rights
3. Whether the plaintiff demonstrated good cause to amend her complaint to add a Fourth Amendment claim more than one year after the scheduling order deadline
4. Whether the plaintiff established an equal protection violation by showing she was treated differently from similarly situated individuals based on gender discrimination
5. Whether the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals largely affirmed the district court's dismissals and summary judgment rulings. The court held that: (1) the malicious prosecution claim failed because the plaintiff did not adequately allege that the officers caused the prosecution—the affidavit was materially correct and the chain of causation was broken by the judge's probable cause finding at the preliminary hearing; (2) the conspiracy claim failed because the plaintiff alleged only that officers agreed to conduct lawful investigative activities, which is insufficient; (3) the plaintiff did not demonstrate good cause to amend her complaint because she waited five months after learning of the phone search to move for amendment, failing to show diligence; and (4) the equal protection claim failed because the plaintiff did not show she was similarly situated to Thompson in all relevant respects and failed to produce evidence of gender discrimination by the specific defendants. However, the court reversed and remanded the state law claims, holding that the district court ordinarily should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims after all federal claims were disposed of before trial, consistent with principles of comity and federalism.

This is an appeal of an interlocutory order in a dispute between Fairstead Capital Management LLC and FCM Affordable LLC against William Blodgett concerning the cancellation of carried interest rights following his employment termination. The case involves claims under both an employment agreement (resolved through arbitration) and LLC operating agreements (litigated in the Court of Chancery).

1. Whether the Court of Chancery properly held that Blodgett did not breach the LLC agreements governing the Fairstead entities
2. Whether the LLC agreements permitted Fairstead to cancel Blodgett's carried interest rights
3. Whether interlocutory appeal is warranted before the damages phase is completed

The Delaware Supreme Court refused the interlocutory appeal. The court agreed with the Court of Chancery's determination that exceptional circumstances do not exist to warrant interlocutory review under Supreme Court Rule 42(b). The court reasoned that the case is entering the damages phase and can be resolved promptly through final judgment, making the potential benefits of interlocutory review outweighed by the inefficiency, disruption, and costs of an intermediate appeal. The underlying Court of Chancery decision held that Blodgett was entitled to summary judgment because he did not take any action as a member that could support a breach of the LLC agreements, and that the LLC agreements did not permit cancellation of the Interests.

This is an appeal of an interlocutory order in a dispute between Trellis Software, Inc. and ClearList Holdings LLC regarding whether claims arising from their business agreements should proceed in arbitration or in Delaware courts. The Court of Chancery stayed litigation in favor of arbitration, and Trellis sought interlocutory review of that decision.

1. Whether an exclusive forum selection clause in the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (AOA) requiring Delaware courts to hear disputes arising from the operating agreement and related transactions applies to claims that ClearList brought in arbitration under the Services Agreement.
2. Whether the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated substantive arbitrability questions to the arbitrator.
3. Whether the Court of Chancery's decision to stay proceedings in favor of arbitration meets the strict standards for interlocutory appeal under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42.

The Delaware Supreme Court refused the interlocutory appeal. The Court agreed with the Court of Chancery's conclusion that the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated substantive arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, and therefore the arbitration should proceed. The Court held that exceptional circumstances do not exist to warrant interlocutory review, as the decision merely deferred litigation in favor of arbitration. The Court determined that the potential benefits of interlocutory review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and costs caused by an interlocutory appeal, and that the strict standards for certification under Rule 42(b) were not met.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Court of Chancery to conduct a limited evidentiary hearing regarding the identification, tracing, and distribution of a Fidelity Individual POD/TOD account in connection with a trust dispute. The petition arises from a prior Court of Chancery action involving removal of a co-trustee and an accounting of trust assets.

1. Whether the petitioner satisfied the three-part test for issuance of a writ of mandamus: (i) a clear right to performance of a duty; (ii) no other adequate remedy available; and (iii) arbitrary failure or refusal by the trial court to perform its duty
2. Whether a writ of mandamus may be used to relitigate issues that were or could have been argued below or on appeal
3. Whether the petitioner had adequate alternative remedies available

The Delaware Supreme Court granted the respondents' motions to dismiss and dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. The Court held that no basis existed for issuance of the writ because: (1) the trial court did not arbitrarily fail or refuse to perform its duty, as the Fidelity account had already been adjudicated in the Final Order; and (2) the petitioner had adequate alternative remedies available, including the ability to appeal or file a new action in the Court of Chancery to enforce the terms of the Final Order. The Court emphasized that a petition for mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal and that the petitioner was attempting to relitigate issues that were or could have been raised below.

This is a Delaware corporate governance dispute involving a nonstock, nonprofit corporation that operates tourist trains. The plaintiff, a former member, seeks to compel an annual meeting to elect directors, challenge the validity of a prior director election, and contest the termination of his membership and amendments to the corporation's bylaws.

1. Whether the plaintiff has standing to bring claims under Delaware General Corporation Law Sections 215(d) and 225(a) after his membership was terminated by the board of directors
2. Whether the board resolution terminating the plaintiff's membership was valid and effective
3. Whether the directors who adopted the termination resolution were validly elected at the 2025 Annual Meeting
4. Whether the termination of membership was inequitable or undertaken in bad faith
5. Whether the corporation's bylaws amendments were valid and enforceable

The court granted the corporation's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The court held that: (1) Under DGCL Sections 215(d) and 225(a), only members can bring claims to compel annual meetings or challenge director elections, and the plaintiff is no longer a member; (2) The board's March 2026 resolution terminating the plaintiff's membership was valid because it complied with the corporation's bylaws, which authorized the board to terminate membership with or without cause after providing 30 days' written notice; (3) The plaintiff's challenges to the validity of the 2025 Annual Meeting failed because the complaint did not adequately allege defects in the meeting's conduct, notice, electorate, or quorum under either the 2010 or 2020 bylaws; (4) The plaintiff's inequitable conduct argument failed because membership in a nonstock corporation is a privilege, not a property right, and the board complied with its own bylaws procedures; and (5) The timing of the termination did not support a bad faith inference because no viable claims were pending when the board acted. Accordingly, the amended complaint was dismissed in its entirety.

This is a criminal appeal in which Isaac Martinez-Chavez, convicted of possessing firearms as a felon and possessing an unregistered short-barreled rifle, challenges his conviction on two grounds: improper prosecutorial closing arguments and the district court's refusal to give an adverse-inference instruction based on the government's failure to preserve dispatch recordings.

1. Whether the prosecutor's closing arguments—specifically calling a defense witness a "liar" and praising law enforcement officers—were improper and prejudicially affected the defendant's right to a fair trial
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse inference from the government's failure to preserve recordings of the arresting officer's radio calls to dispatch

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that: (1) while the government conceded that two closing remarks were improper—calling the witness a "liar" and appealing to the jury based on the importance of the case to law enforcement—these remarks were harmless error because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and not dependent on the credibility of the witness or the officers; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing an adverse-inference instruction because Martinez-Chavez failed to show that the government knew the dispatch recordings were relevant to a trial issue before they were automatically deleted under the department's six-month retention policy, and he failed to show willful conduct by the government in their destruction.

This case involves a doctoral student at the University of Mississippi who challenged his demotion to provisional status and loss of graduate assistantship, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and breach of contract. The student claimed retaliation for objecting to changes in his mentoring arrangement and for his brother's complaints about disability accommodations.

1. Whether sovereign immunity bars claims against the University and officials in their official capacities
2. Whether the student plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation based on his objections to mentorship changes and his association with his brother
3. Whether the student plausibly alleged Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violations based on race and national origin discrimination
4. Whether the student's procedural and substantive due process rights were violated in connection with his provisional status and loss of assistantship
5. Whether qualified immunity protects the individual faculty defendants
6. Whether the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over state contract claims

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with one modification. The court held that:

1. Sovereign immunity bars claims against the University and Huang in her official capacity, and these dismissals must be without prejudice (jurisdictional correction)
2. The retaliation claim fails because the student cannot plausibly allege that protected activity caused the challenged academic decisions—the co-mentorship was assigned before he objected, and the provisional status resulted from his repeated refusal to complete a mandatory requirement
3. The Equal Protection claim fails because the student identifies no similarly situated student treated differently and points to no discriminatory statements, policies, or patterns
4. The due process claim fails because the student received adequate notice and opportunity to comply with program requirements; academic decisions receive less stringent procedural protections than disciplinary sanctions; and the student had no property interest in renewal of his assistantship under Mississippi law
5. Qualified immunity independently protects the faculty defendants because no clearly established law prohibited the conduct at issue
6. The district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining contract claims
7. Consolidation of the brothers' cases and dismissal of preliminary relief motions as moot were proper

This is an appeal of a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants who claimed statutory immunity under Louisiana's Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (LHSEADA). The Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding the scope of immunity protections for out-of-state emergency workers.

1. Whether an employee of an out-of-state city working under an emergency assistance agreement with a Louisiana municipality qualifies as a "representative" of Louisiana or its political subdivisions under LHSEADA immunity provisions.
2. Whether commuting from a recovery site to lodging constitutes "emergency preparedness and recovery activities" under LHSEADA.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that Kevin Worrell, an employee of the City of Wilson, North Carolina, would not be considered a "representative" of any Louisiana governmental entity for purposes of LHSEADA immunity. Because this failure alone disqualified him from immunity under the statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court declined to address the second certified question regarding commuting activities.

This is an asbestos-exposure tort case in which General Electric removed a state-court action to federal court under the federal-officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442), claiming a government-contractor defense based on the plaintiff's alleged exposure to GE equipment during military service. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, and GE appealed.

1. Whether federal jurisdiction under § 1442 is frozen at the moment of removal or whether it follows from the amended complaint when a plaintiff disclaims all claims arising from federal conduct.
2. Whether GE has a colorable government-contractor defense when the plaintiff has expressly disclaimed any claims arising from exposure to GE products during military service and limited all claims to civilian employment exposure.
3. Whether a plaintiff's disclaimer of federal claims is effective to defeat federal-officer removal, or whether such disclaimers constitute "artful pleading" when the defendant's federal and non-federal conduct are allegedly intertwined.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's remand to state court. The court held that: (1) following the Supreme Court's decision in Royal Canin, federal jurisdiction follows from the amended complaint in removed cases, including those removed under § 1442, so that when a plaintiff amends the complaint to disclaim all federal claims, the federal court loses jurisdiction; (2) GE has no colorable government-contractor defense because the plaintiff has disclaimed all claims arising from or relating to GE's federal conduct, limiting liability to GE's civilian business operations; and (3) the plaintiff's disclaimer is effective and not merely "artful pleading" because the claims are clearly separable by time and location from any federal conduct, and state courts routinely handle apportionment of asbestos-exposure injuries from multiple sources without requiring adjudication of federal-contractor defenses.

This is an insurance coverage dispute arising from the death of a seven-year-old child who died after being physically restrained by behavioral care workers at a facility operated by Seven Counties Services, Inc. The insurers denied coverage for the wrongful death claim, and the case involves interpretation of insurance policy exclusions under Kentucky law.

1. Whether the physical restraint (kneeling cradle hold) used on the child constituted a "professional service" that falls within the insurance policy's exclusion from coverage
2. Whether the restraint was emergency services intervention (ESI) or assault, and whether that distinction affects coverage
3. The proper definition of "professional services" under Kentucky insurance law
4. Whether the insurers had a duty to defend versus a duty to indemnify Seven Counties
5. Whether other available insurance (Hanover policy) affected the insurers' coverage obligations

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the insurers on the duty to indemnify. The court held that:

1. The physical restraint used on the child was a "professional service" under Kentucky law, placing it within the insurance policy's professional services exclusion and relieving the insurers of their indemnification duty
2. Under Kentucky law, a "professional service" requires: (a) specialized learning or training (not necessarily a license or degree); (b) an exercise of judgment rather than a rote or routine task; and (c) regulation by the state. The court rejected Seven Counties' argument that only licensed professionals can render professional services
3. The care workers received 40 hours of specialized training in emergency procedures, physical restraints, de-escalation techniques, and safety protocols mandated by Kentucky regulations, demonstrating the restraint required professional training
4. The restraint was not a simple manual task but required judgment in responding to an evolving behavioral emergency, distinguishing it from purely mechanical acts like raising bed rails
5. Kentucky's extensive regulation of ESI restraints at behavioral care facilities further supported the conclusion that the act was professional in nature
6. Seven Counties' argument that the restraint constituted assault rather than ESI failed because the relevant question was whether the workers exercised professional training in performing the restraint, not whether they complied with all ESI regulations
7. The court declined to adopt Seven Counties' alternative arguments based on Kentucky's malpractice statute definition of professional services or the professional services definition in a different part of the insurance policy

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Kevin Lackey, whose 1993 criminal convictions were vacated due to defects in evidence, sued investigating officers for fabricating evidence, malicious prosecution, and suppressing exculpatory evidence. The district court granted the officers qualified immunity, and the appellate court affirmed.

1. Whether officers violated Lackey's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by fabricating evidence regarding the assailant's race and a handgun description
2. Whether officers violated Lackey's Fourth Amendment rights by fabricating evidence used to establish probable cause for his arrest and charges
3. Whether officers maliciously prosecuted Lackey without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment
4. Whether officers violated Brady v. Maryland by suppressing exculpatory evidence regarding the feasibility of the break-in and other facts undermining the prosecution's theory
5. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity despite these allegations

The court affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to all four officers. The court held:

1. Fourteenth Amendment fabrication claim: Even assuming the officers fabricated the assailant's race description, Lackey could not show the fabricated evidence likely affected the jury's verdict because Cynthia (the victim's mother) testified about the race description independently, and Lackey himself believed S.S.'s father (a black man) committed the assault. The handgun evidence had no impact on the jury because Officer Smith did not testify about it at trial, the prosecution did not charge a gun crime, and such evidence was unnecessary for conviction.
2. Fourth Amendment fabrication claim: Probable cause existed to arrest and charge Lackey based on the totality of circumstances, including S.S.'s detailed description of the assailant (slim, young, with facial hair, wearing yellow pants and black gym shoes), the canine tracking from S.S.'s backyard to Lackey's front porch, Lackey's proximity to the victim's home, and Lackey's matching appearance. Even if the race description was fabricated, probable cause remained based on other corroborating evidence.
3. Malicious prosecution claim: The claim necessarily failed because probable cause supported the criminal charges against Lackey.
4. Brady suppression claim: The officers did not violate Brady because they provided the prosecutor with photographs of the home, window, bedroom, and Lackey's shoes, as well as reports containing information about the dog and sleeping sisters. Lackey had access to the essential facts and bore the responsibility for characterizing the evidence, not the officers. The officers had no duty to build Lackey's defense or explain the weight to give evidence. Additionally, Lackey forfeited his argument regarding S.S.'s father by failing to allege it in his complaint.

This is an antitrust case involving college football players challenging the NCAA's Five-Year Rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The NCAA appealed preliminary injunctions that allowed two players to compete in the 2025 college football season, but the court dismissed the appeals as moot because the season had concluded and the players' eligibility had expired.

1. Whether the NCAA's appeals of expired preliminary injunctions are moot under Article III's case-or-controversy requirement
2. Whether the mootness exception for disputes "capable of repetition yet evading review" applies when a defendant-appellant faces potential future lawsuits from other nonparty plaintiffs
3. Whether the capable-of-repetition doctrine focuses on the specific parties to the action or extends to future litigation involving different parties

The Ninth Circuit dismissed the NCAA's appeals as moot and vacated the district court orders. The court held that: (1) the preliminary injunctions had expired by their own terms once the 2025 college football season concluded, making the appeals moot because no effective relief could be granted to the NCAA; and (2) the NCAA failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the capable-of-repetition exception applied. The court reasoned that the capable-of-repetition doctrine requires a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again, focusing on the specific parties before the court. The NCAA's argument that it would face similar lawsuits from other plaintiffs in the future was insufficient because the doctrine does not extend to potential future controversies between a defendant and nonparty plaintiffs. The court distinguished cases the NCAA cited (A.D. v. Hawaii Department of Education and Where Do We Go Berkeley) as inapplicable because those involved circumstances where plaintiffs' injuries would necessarily recur in the same case or where the plaintiff would inevitably age out of protection before appellate review.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a lawsuit challenging Washington State's Energy Code as preempted by federal law. The plaintiffs, a coalition of individuals, corporations, nonprofits, and unions, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials, but the case was dismissed on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds.

1. Whether individual members of the Washington State Building Code Council have sufficient "connection with enforcement" of the Energy Code to overcome sovereign immunity under the Ex parte Young exception
2. Whether the Washington Attorney General has a sufficiently unique role in enforcing the Energy Code beyond his generalized duty to enforce state law
3. Whether promulgation of a regulation by state officials constitutes "enforcement" of that regulation for purposes of the Ex parte Young doctrine
4. Whether non-binding advisory opinions issued by the Council to local officials demonstrate a connection with enforcement

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds. The court held that neither the Building Code Council members nor the Attorney General have the requisite connection with enforcement of the Energy Code under Ex parte Young. Specifically, the court ruled that: (1) promulgation of a regulation, standing alone, does not constitute enforcement of that regulation; (2) the Council's non-binding advisory opinions to local officials do not establish a sufficient connection with enforcement, particularly where state law expressly delegates enforcement power to local governments; and (3) the Attorney General's only potential role would be a generalized duty to enforce state law, which is insufficient under Ex parte Young. The court reasoned that promulgation and enforcement are distinct functions, and immunity turns on an official's function rather than their formal location within state government. Judge Bumatay's concurrence argued that the prior precedent of Mecinas v. Hobbs was wrongly decided and cannot be reconciled with foundational principles of state sovereign immunity.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a products liability lawsuit arising from a 2022 helicopter crash involving a Huntington Beach Police Department aircraft. The central issue is whether the General Aviation Revitalization Act's (GARA) 18-year statute of repose bars the plaintiffs' claims against the helicopter manufacturer.

1. Whether GARA's definition of "general aviation aircraft" applies to government-owned aircraft, or whether there is an implied exception for "public aircraft"
2. Whether the Federal Aviation Act's definition of "public aircraft" is incorporated into GARA
3. Whether prior Ninth Circuit precedent (Estate of Kennedy) and Second Circuit precedent (Jones v. Goodrich) support an exemption for public aircraft under GARA

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that GARA's 18-year statute of repose applies to the Huntington Beach Police helicopter and bars the plaintiffs' claims. The court ruled that: (1) GARA's express statutory definition of "general aviation aircraft" based on three specific requirements (type/airworthiness certification, fewer than 20 passenger seats, and non-engagement in scheduled passenger operations) unambiguously covers government-owned aircraft, and dictionary or industry definitions cannot override the statutory text; (2) the Federal Aviation Act's definition of "public aircraft" is not incorporated into GARA because GARA expressly incorporates only specific terms from the FAAct, and Congress is presumed to have intentionally omitted the "public aircraft" definition; (3) the different purposes and scopes of the two statutes—the FAAct regulates civil air transportation while GARA protects aircraft manufacturers—confirm that full incorporation was not intended; and (4) prior cases Kennedy and Jones do not support a "public aircraft" exception because they did not directly address whether GARA covers public aircraft. The court emphasized that when statutory language is plain and unambiguous, courts must enforce it according to its terms without resort to legislative history or external definitions.

This is an antitrust case under Section 1 of the Sherman Act in which a college baseball player, Noah Blythe, challenged the NCAA's Five-Year Rule, which limits collegiate athletes to four seasons of eligibility within five years of college enrollment. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's preliminary injunction that had allowed Blythe to compete in the 2026 season.

1. Whether the NCAA's Five-Year Rule is a commercial restraint subject to Sherman Act scrutiny, or whether it qualifies as a noncommercial eligibility rule immune from antitrust review
2. Whether Blythe demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his Sherman Act claim by establishing: (a) proper definition of the relevant market; and (b) substantial anticompetitive effects in that market
3. Whether the preliminary injunction factors were satisfied to warrant extraordinary relief

The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The court held that: (1) the Five-Year Rule is a commercial restraint subject to Sherman Act scrutiny, following the Supreme Court's reasoning in NCAA v. Alston and joining the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in this conclusion; however, (2) Blythe failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because he presented insufficient evidence on two critical points. First, the district court erred in defining the relevant market as the "Division I collegiate baseball labor market" without adequate evidentiary support, relying instead on precedent from different sports (football and basketball) without analyzing current market realities specific to baseball. Second, Blythe failed to prove substantial anticompetitive effects in the market, offering only evidence of his personal exclusion rather than demonstrating how the rule harms competition in the market as a whole or depresses athlete compensation. The court reasoned that under the Sherman Act's rule of reason analysis, a plaintiff must conduct a fact-specific assessment of market power and structure, and Blythe's sparse evidentiary showing fell far short of this requirement. Judge Bennett concurred in the result but disagreed with reaching the commercial restraint issue, arguing it was unnecessary to decide the appeal.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a products liability lawsuit arising from a 2022 helicopter crash involving a Huntington Beach Police Department aircraft manufactured by Boeing. The plaintiffs argued that the General Aviation Revitalization Act's (GARA) 18-year statute of repose should not apply to government-owned aircraft, but the court disagreed.

1. Whether GARA's statute of repose, which bars lawsuits against aircraft manufacturers 18 years after manufacture, applies to government-owned helicopters or only to privately-owned "general aviation aircraft"
2. Whether GARA's definition of "general aviation aircraft" incorporates the Federal Aviation Act's (FAAct) definition of "public aircraft," which excludes government-owned aircraft
3. Whether prior case law (Estate of Kennedy and Jones) established that GARA excludes public aircraft from its coverage

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that GARA's 18-year statute of repose applies to the government-owned helicopter and bars the plaintiffs' lawsuit. The court reasoned that: (1) GARA expressly defines "general aviation aircraft" based on three objective criteria—possession of a type or airworthiness certificate, seating capacity of fewer than 20 passengers, and non-engagement in scheduled passenger operations—and the helicopter met all three requirements regardless of government ownership; (2) the plain statutory text contains no "public aircraft" exception, and courts must follow explicit statutory definitions even if they differ from ordinary meaning; (3) GARA does not incorporate the FAAct's "public aircraft" definition because GARA expressly incorporates only specific terms from the FAAct, and Congress is presumed to act intentionally when including language in one section but omitting it in another; (4) the different purposes of the two statutes (GARA protects aircraft manufacturers generally, while the FAAct regulates civil air transportation) confirm they should not be read together; and (5) prior cases Kennedy and Jones did not directly address whether GARA covers public aircraft and thus do not support the plaintiffs' position.

This is an antitrust case involving college football players challenging the NCAA's Five-Year Rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The NCAA appealed preliminary injunctions that allowed two players to compete in the 2025 college football season, but the court dismissed the appeals as moot because the season had concluded and the players' eligibility had expired.

1. Whether the NCAA's appeals of expired preliminary injunctions are moot under Article III's case-or-controversy requirement
2. Whether the mootness exception for disputes "capable of repetition yet evading review" applies when a defendant-appellant faces potential future lawsuits by other nonparty plaintiffs
3. Whether the capable-of-repetition doctrine focuses on the specific parties to the action or can be satisfied by demonstrating likelihood of future litigation with different parties

The Ninth Circuit dismissed the NCAA's appeals as moot. The court held that: (1) the preliminary injunctions had expired by their own terms once the 2025 college football season concluded, making any relief to the NCAA ineffective; (2) the NCAA failed to meet its burden to demonstrate the capable-of-repetition exception applied because that doctrine requires a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again, not merely that the defendant will face similar lawsuits from different plaintiffs; and (3) the capable-of-repetition inquiry is party-specific and focuses on whether the named plaintiffs will again suffer the alleged injury, not whether other nonparty plaintiffs might bring future suits. The court distinguished prior cases cited by the NCAA and vacated the district court orders pursuant to Munsingwear vacatur.

This consolidated appeal arises from lawsuits brought by survivors and families of victims of the November 2022 Club Q mass shooting in Colorado Springs. Plaintiffs sued El Paso County officials under a state-created-danger theory for failing to enforce Colorado's Red Flag Law, and sued Club Q defendants under premises liability and negligence theories for inadequate security measures.

1. Whether plaintiffs plausibly alleged a substantive due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against county defendants based on a state-created-danger theory
2. Whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over state-law claims against Club Q defendants
3. Whether plaintiffs plausibly alleged causation under the Colorado Premises Liability Act (CPLA)
4. Whether the CPLA provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs' negligence and wrongful-death claims against Club Q defendants

The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. (1) § 1983 Claims: The court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' due process claims against county defendants. Although the county's adoption of ERPO policies constituted more than mere inaction, the policies did not satisfy the affirmative-conduct requirement because they: (a) created an indefinite risk rather than an immediate threat of harm, and (b) affected the general public rather than placing plaintiffs specifically at risk. Plaintiffs' allegations of inaction regarding Aldrich specifically did not meet the affirmative-conduct precondition. (2) Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: The court held the district court had supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) over state-law claims against Club Q defendants because all claims arose from a common nucleus of operative fact—the Club Q shooting and surrounding events. Although the court erred by not explicitly addressing jurisdiction under § 1367(a) before declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), this error was harmless because jurisdiction existed. (3) CPLA Claims: The court affirmed dismissal of CPLA claims, holding that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege causation. The 2022 amendment to the CPLA, which rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's Wagner decision, requires courts to consider whether a third-party criminal act was the predominant cause of harm. The court concluded that under the amendment and Wagner's facts, the mass shooter's actions were undoubtedly the predominant cause of plaintiffs' injuries, making Club Q's security failures not a substantial factor in causing the harm. (4) Negligence and Wrongful-Death Claims: The court reversed the district court's denial of the Club Q Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the CPLA provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs' injuries occurring on the property due to its conditions or circumstances. Because plaintiffs' negligence and wrongful-death claims arose from the property's security and safety conditions, the CPLA preempted these claims, and they should have been dismissed.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Mason Anthony Wilson was convicted of child abuse and child neglect in Indian country after his two-month-old daughter was found with severe unexplained injuries while in his sole care. Wilson challenges his convictions on multiple grounds, including claims regarding expert testimony, lay witness testimony, and prosecutorial misconduct.

1. Whether a child abuse and neglect specialist's medical diagnosis of "child abuse" and "child neglect" improperly invades the jury's province by using terms identical to the legal charges
2. Whether expert testimony regarding parental expectations to seek medical care for injuries invades the jury's province or comments on the defendant's mens rea
3. Whether expert testimony comparing the victim's injuries to innocent explanations constitutes improper commentary on the defendant's credibility
4. Whether lay witnesses (a child welfare specialist and police sergeant) improperly testified as experts regarding patterns of child abuser behavior
5. Whether lay witnesses improperly commented on the defendant's credibility by testifying about inconsistent statements
6. Whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred through characterization of defense arguments as "stupid," references to "justice" and "accountability," and statements implying facts beyond the evidence
7. Whether cumulative error warrants reversal

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED Wilson's convictions on all counts. The court's reasoning included:

1. Medical Diagnoses: The expert's diagnosis of "child abuse" and "child neglect" was permissible because it diagnosed the victim's condition rather than concluding Wilson committed abuse, leaving perpetrator identification to the jury. Additionally, the medical diagnosis of neglect required only failure to provide medical attention, while the criminal conviction required a finding of willfulness or malice—an element the expert did not address, requiring the jury to make an additional inference.
2. Parental Expectations Testimony: The testimony did not invade the jury's province because knowledge of what injuries require medical attention is not within common jury knowledge, particularly for rare injuries like cheek bruises on two-month-olds. The testimony was relevant to establishing medical neglect and the expert was qualified as a child abuse specialist to address what medical attention should be sought.
3. Credibility Commentary: Dr. Beeson's testimony explaining why injuries were inconsistent with innocent explanations did not improperly comment on credibility; rather, it explained her diagnosis and rebutted innocent explanations. Courts consistently permit medical experts to summarize evidence and express opinions on consistency with allegations.
4. Lay Witness Expert Testimony: While testimony by Poffel and Springer regarding patterns of child abuser behavior may have crossed the line into expert testimony, any error was harmless because Dr. Beeson, admitted as an expert, provided substantially similar testimony. Additionally, Poffel's testimony that changing stories indicates dishonesty constitutes common knowledge within the jury's province, not specialized knowledge.
5. Credibility of Lay Witnesses: Testimony about Wilson's inconsistent statements was not improper character evidence under Rule 608, but rather historical evidence of contradiction. The witnesses testified to specific conduct (changing stories) at the time, not to Wilson's general character for truthfulness.
6. Prosecutorial Misconduct: The prosecution's characterization of defense arguments as "a stupid story" was unwise but not prosecutorial misconduct, as colorful language describing arguments is less concerning than language describing defendants. References to "justice" and "accountability" were permissible and analogous to language previously approved by the court. The prosecution's closing argument describing how Wilson "yanked on her legs, or squeezed her chest, or pinched her ears" was a reasonable inference from circumstantial evidence and did not distort the record, as the prosecution is entitled to latitude in drawing inferences during closing arguments.
7. Cumulative Error: Because no error was identified in the individual claims, cumulative error analysis necessarily failed.

This case involves a constitutional challenge to Oklahoma's H.B. 1775, subsection B, which prohibits K-12 public school employees from teaching or requiring the teaching of eight specified concepts related to race and sex discrimination. The plaintiffs challenged the statute as unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment and as violating students' First Amendment right to receive information.

1. Whether Oklahoma H.B. 1775, subsection B is unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, specifically regarding: (a) the terms "require" and "make part of a course"; and (b) the eight prohibited concepts, particularly concepts (c) and (d) which use the terms "treatment" and "treat"
2. Whether the statute violates students' First Amendment right to receive information
3. Whether the district court properly granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of portions of the statute
4. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the First Amendment claims

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their vagueness claims. The majority interpreted subsection B as prohibiting school employees from teaching the eight prohibited concepts as correct principles or requiring teachers to do so. Under this interpretation, the court found that: (1) the term "make part of a course" is not vague because it means to teach concepts as correct principles; (2) the term "require" is not vague as it specifies how administrators could make concepts part of a course; and (3) none of the eight prohibited concepts, including concepts (c) and (d), are vague because they use plain language expressing discriminatory principles about race or sex. The court reasoned that teachers would not violate the statute by discussing historical events, social theories, or current events unless they explicitly taught the prohibited concepts as correct. The court also dismissed the First Amendment right-to-receive-information claims for lack of appellate jurisdiction, as those claims were decided in a separate order that had not been appealed. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant, Mitchel Crow, challenges his conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, arguing that the government violated pretrial disclosure requirements by failing to provide adequate notice of rebuttal expert testimony before trial.

1. Whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 requires the government to disclose rebuttal expert testimony when the defendant presents new expert opinions at trial that were not included in the defendant's pretrial expert disclosure
2. Whether the 2022 amendments to Rule 16 requiring disclosure of rebuttal testimony apply to this pending case
3. Whether the government's duty to disclose rebuttal testimony is triggered when a defendant's expert witness testifies to opinions not previously disclosed in the expert's written report

The court affirmed the convictions. The court held that Rule 16 does not require pretrial disclosure of rebuttal testimony when the defendant's expert witness presents new opinions at trial that were not timely disclosed before trial. Specifically, the court found that: (1) the defendant's expert, Dr. Kushida, disclosed only an opinion about consistency with sexsomnia in his pretrial report, but testified at trial about new opinions regarding malingering that were not previously disclosed; (2) because the defendant failed to timely disclose Dr. Kushida's opinions about malingering, Rule 16 did not require the government to disclose before trial how its rebuttal expert, Dr. Bornemann, would counter those undisclosed opinions; and (3) the government cannot be expected to disclose how it will respond to expert opinions that the defendant itself has not revealed. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the rebuttal opinions addressed only matters in the original report or that the government had "opened the door" to malingering testimony.

This is a criminal appeal in which Rodney Brown challenges his convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, as well as his 324-month sentence. Brown raises two constitutional issues for the first time on appeal: a Confrontation Clause challenge to DNA expert testimony and an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to his sentencing.

1. Whether allowing a DNA analyst to testify violated the Confrontation Clause when the analyst did not personally conduct the underlying lab testing or write the lab report, but instead reviewed and independently analyzed the DNA profiles generated by other lab personnel.
2. Whether the district court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by applying a 2023 version of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual that reclassified Hobbs Act robbery as a crime of violence, when the offense occurred in March 2023, prior to the amendment's effective date of November 1, 2023.

The court affirmed Brown's convictions but vacated and remanded his sentence for resentencing. On the Confrontation Clause issue, the court found no plain error in allowing the DNA analyst's testimony. The analyst's testimony was distinguishable from the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Arizona because the analyst had personally reviewed and independently analyzed the DNA profiles, rather than merely acting as a surrogate relaying another analyst's conclusions. The analyst also testified generally about the lab's standard procedures rather than specifically about the testing performed in Brown's case. On the Ex Post Facto Clause issue, the court agreed with both Brown and the government that the district court plainly erred by using the 2023 Guidelines Manual, which provided a higher sentencing range than the 2021 version in effect when the offense occurred. The court remanded for resentencing under the correct 2021 Guidelines Manual.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which a defendant convicted of felon-in-possession of a firearm challenges both the constitutionality of the statute and the legality of the police stop that led to discovery of the weapon. The Eleventh Circuit addresses whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment and whether officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant based on his possession of a concealed firearm.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms, violates the Second Amendment under the standard established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen.
2. Whether police officers had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct a Terry stop of the defendant based on his possession of a concealed firearm under Florida law.
3. Whether the 2015 amendment to Florida's concealed-carry statute, which made non-licensure an element of the offense rather than an affirmative defense, affects the reasonable suspicion analysis.
4. Whether evidence obtained during an allegedly unlawful seizure should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.

The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds, holding that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment and that prior precedent in United States v. Rozier remains valid after Bruen. However, the court vacated the conviction and reversed the denial of the suppression motion on Fourth Amendment grounds. The court held that:

1. Following Florida's 2015 amendment to its concealed-carry statute, mere possession of a concealed firearm does not, standing alone, create reasonable suspicion of a violation of Florida's concealed-carry law because such possession is now presumptively lawful.
2. The totality of the circumstances—Joseph's presence in a high-crime area, proximity to a house linked to drug dealing and a prior homicide, and possession of a gun—did not establish reasonable suspicion because Joseph was merely engaging in ordinary activities (visiting a house, getting a haircut, walking down the street) and there was no evidence of his personal involvement in criminal activity.
3. The officers' seizure of Joseph violated the Fourth Amendment because they lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion, even if the stop was characterized as a Terry stop rather than a full arrest.
4. The firearm and other evidence obtained during the unlawful seizure must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule because suppression would appreciably deter similar illegal seizures.

This is an appeal of a Securities and Exchange Commission decision denying a whistleblower award to John Doe, who reported information about a foreign bribery scheme to a journalist and the Department of Justice before eventually submitting it to the SEC over a year later. The case addresses whether a whistleblower must submit information directly to the SEC that actually assists the agency's investigation to qualify for an award, or whether being the original source of information that eventually leads to enforcement action is sufficient.

1. Whether the SEC whistleblower statute requires that information "provided to the Commission" must "lead to" a successful enforcement action, or whether it is sufficient that the whistleblower's original information (received by the SEC through third parties) led to the enforcement action
2. Whether a whistleblower must satisfy both the "original information" and "led to" requirements simultaneously or whether they are independent requirements
3. Whether the SEC's implementing regulations, particularly the 120-day lookback provision and the distinction between Rules 21F-4(c)(1) and 21F-4(c)(2), support an award to a whistleblower whose submission did not materially assist the agency's investigation
4. The proper interpretation of the phrase "that led to" in the whistleblower statute and whether it requires a causal connection between the information submitted to the SEC and the successful enforcement action

The majority (Judges Pan and Childs) affirmed the SEC's denial of Doe's whistleblower award. The court held that under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1), a whistleblower must satisfy two distinct requirements: (1) voluntarily provide original information to the Commission, and (2) show that the information provided to the Commission "led to" a successful enforcement action. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute requires the information "provided to the Commission" to be the information that "led to" the successful enforcement. Because Doe waited over a year to submit his information to the SEC, by which time the Commission had already obtained the same information from news articles and the DOJ and had developed its case without his assistance, his submission did not "lead to" the successful enforcement action. The court rejected Doe's argument that being the original source of information received by the SEC through third parties was sufficient, finding this conflated the separate "original information" and "led to" requirements. The court emphasized that Congress's core objective was to incentivize people to report violations directly to the SEC so the agency could use the information to enforce securities laws effectively. Judge Henderson dissented, arguing that the statute requires only that the whistleblower's "original information" (not necessarily the submission itself) led to the successful enforcement action, and that Doe satisfied this requirement because his original information ultimately led to the SEC's enforcement action, even though the SEC learned of it through intermediaries before Doe submitted his formal disclosure.

This is a books and records inspection action brought by a limited partner against a limited partnership and its general partner. The plaintiff sought access to documents related to the sale of the partnership's primary asset, a commercial warehouse in Baltimore, Maryland.

1. Whether the Magistrate erred by applying the statutory "necessary and essential" standard from Delaware's Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act to limit a contractual inspection right that was broader than the statutory default.
2. Whether the plaintiff's inspection rights were limited to the scope of his pre-suit demand or could be expanded to include additional categories first sought in the complaint.
3. Whether the General Partner, Special Partner, and individual principal were proper defendants to the books and records claim.
4. Whether the defendants' conduct constituted bad faith warranting an award of attorneys' fees.

The Court of Chancery sustained most of the plaintiff's exceptions. The court held that: (1) Section 6.2(a) of the Partnership Agreement expanded the statutory "necessary and essential" limitation by granting partners broad access to company books and records upon prior notice, without conditioning inspection on a stated purpose or limiting it to necessary and essential records; (2) the plaintiff is bound by the scope of his November 11 pre-suit demand and is entitled to all records responsive to those five categories, not just the purchase agreement and term sheets; (3) the General Partner is a proper defendant to both the statutory and contractual inspection claims, but the Special Partner and individual principal Nir Kriel are not proper defendants; and (4) the defendants' resistance to pre-closing inspection, while aggressive, did not constitute bad faith sufficient to warrant fee shifting under Delaware's American Rule. The court emphasized that freedom of contract is paramount in the alternative entity context and that courts must enforce partnership agreements as written.

This is a breach of contract case involving royalties owed to Dr. Luigi Warren, a co-inventor of an mRNA reprogramming technology licensed to Moderna. The dispute centers on whether the Immune Disease Institute (IDI) policy or the Children's Hospital policy governs Dr. Warren's royalty entitlements after IDI merged into Children's Hospital.

1. Whether the IDI royalty-sharing policy constituted a binding implied contract term in Dr. Warren's employment agreement under Massachusetts law
2. Whether IDI retained the right to retroactively amend the royalty provisions to apply the Children's Hospital policy to inventions already completed under the IDI policy
3. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment and denied Dr. Warren's motion to amend his complaint as futile

The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding: (1) whether a reasonable employee could have believed the IDI policy's royalty provision was a binding contractual obligation, considering factors such as the policy's language regarding "fair and equitable allocation," IDI's retention of amendment rights limited to fulfilling policy purposes, the Participation Agreement requiring employee assent, and evidence of policy distribution; and (2) whether IDI's discretion to amend the policy extended to retroactive modifications affecting already-completed work. The court reasoned that IDI and Children's Hospital's own communications years later representing that the IDI policy governed Dr. Warren's invention could evidence how they interpreted the policy's amendment scope, creating a factual question precluding summary judgment.

This case involves environmental organizations challenging a Water Quality Certification issued by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) for Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company's proposed Northeast Supply Enhancement Project (NESE), which would expand an interstate natural gas pipeline system, including construction of a new pipeline segment beneath Raritan Bay that would require dredging. The petitioners argue that NJDEP arbitrarily reversed its earlier denial, improperly deferred material monitoring requirements, failed to adequately explain compliance with water quality standards, and denied the public meaningful opportunity to comment.

1. Whether NJDEP arbitrarily reversed its 2019 denial of the Water Quality Certification when approving the 2025 application
2. Whether NJDEP unlawfully deferred material monitoring and adaptive management requirements to post-certification plans without requiring NJDEP approval before dredging could begin
3. Whether NJDEP adequately explained how the project would comply with New Jersey's water quality standards, specifically regarding: (a) the 500-foot modeling boundary and predicted 4,4'–DDE concentrations; (b) reliance on turbidity monitoring rather than direct monitoring of toxic contaminants; and (c) impacts to shellfish habitat
4. Whether NJDEP provided the public adequate opportunity to comment on revised technical materials submitted during the review process

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petitions, vacated the Water Quality Certification, and remanded for further proceedings. The court's reasoning:

1. Reversal Claim: The court rejected the claim that NJDEP arbitrarily reversed its 2019 denial, finding that the 2025 application was materially different from the 2019 application because it included additional contaminant modeling and technical materials that Transco had developed in response to NJDEP's 2019 concerns.
2. Deferred Monitoring and Adaptive Management: The court held that NJDEP acted arbitrarily and capriciously by issuing the certification before Transco finalized its Water Quality Monitoring Plan and Adaptive Management Plan without making NJDEP approval of these plans a prerequisite to dredging. The certification used permissive language ("for review" rather than "approval") and contained no deadline for submitting the Adaptive Management Plan or requirement that NJDEP approve it before dredging began. This contrasted with other conditions in the certification that explicitly required NJDEP approval before specified work could proceed. The court distinguished this case from prior precedent (Riverkeeper cases) where construction remained contingent on subsequent agency approval.
3. Inadequate Explanation of Compliance: The court found three deficiencies in NJDEP's explanation:
   • 500-Foot Boundary and 4,4'–DDE: NJDEP failed to adequately explain why the 500-foot boundary was the relevant limit for contaminant review or how predicted 4,4'–DDE concentrations (which exceeded New Jersey's human-health criterion at 500 feet) supported certification. The court noted that NJDEP did not recalculate predicted 4,4'–DDE concentrations under the final reduced dredging conditions and did not clearly explain whether New Jersey law permits short-term exceedances.
   • Turbidity Monitoring: Although the New Dredging Rule gave NJDEP discretion in selecting monitoring parameters, NJDEP failed to explain how monitoring turbidity alone assures compliance with standards for toxic contaminants like 4,4'–DDE, PCBs, and mercury. The court held that if turbidity monitoring was intended as a proxy for toxic contaminant monitoring, NJDEP had to explicitly say so and explain why.
   • Shellfish Findings: NJDEP mischaracterized the conclusions of the New Jersey Marine Resources Administration (MRA) regarding impacts to surf clams. NJDEP attributed to the MRA a finding that surf clam populations would recover within one to three years, but the MRA memorandum never made that finding and instead noted that surf clams are particularly sensitive to turbidity and sediment impacts, unlike hard clams.
4. Public Participation: The court declined to decide the public participation claims because it was vacating the certification on other grounds, but noted that on remand NJDEP would have the opportunity to cure any potential defects in public notice procedures.

This is a constitutional challenge to New Jersey's A1765 statute, which subjects gun industry members to civil liability for conduct deemed a "public nuisance." The National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF) appeals the district court's decision to abstain from reaching the merits of the case under the Younger abstention doctrine, despite finding that NSSF had standing to bring its constitutional claims.

1. Whether NSSF has Article III standing to challenge A1765 after the state commenced enforcement actions against gun industry members, including two NSSF members (Glock and Sig Sauer)
2. Whether Younger abstention applies to bar federal court review when the federal plaintiff (NSSF) is not a party to the ongoing state enforcement actions but seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the statute being enforced against its members
3. Whether A1765 is preempted by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) and violates the Interstate Commerce Clause, First Amendment, and Second Amendment
4. Whether the "identical-party requirement" for Younger abstention can be satisfied through an associational relationship between the federal plaintiff and state-court defendants

The Third Circuit reversed the district court's abstention order. The court held that: (1) NSSF has Article III standing to challenge A1765 because New Jersey's six enforcement actions against gun industry members, including two NSSF members, demonstrate a substantial and imminent risk of enforcement against NSSF's members for otherwise lawful commerce; (2) Younger abstention does not apply because NSSF is not a party to the state enforcement actions against Glock and Sig Sauer, and the "identical-party requirement" is not satisfied by a mere associational relationship; (3) the collateral effect that a successful federal constitutional challenge would have on pending state enforcement actions does not constitute the direct interference that Younger contemplates; and (4) applying Younger in this context would create an impermissible Catch-22, as associations would face dismissal for lack of standing if they sued before enforcement actions commenced and dismissal under Younger if they sued after, effectively eliminating associational lawsuits challenging state regulations. The court emphasized that standing and abstention are separate, non-jurisdictional inquiries that should not be conflated, and that the Supreme Court's exception to the identical-party requirement (for entities with ownership, control, or management relationships) does not extend to mere associational relationships.

This is an appeal concerning whether a magistrate judge's referral should be vacated due to an undisclosed close personal friendship between the judge and opposing counsel that was discovered after a $125 million judgment was entered. The case involves a contractual dispute between IFG Port Holdings and the Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District regarding dredging permits for a grain terminal project.

1. Whether a party's consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction is valid when the judge failed to fully disclose a close personal relationship with opposing counsel
2. Whether "actual knowledge" or "constructive knowledge" is the appropriate standard for determining whether a party's consent to a magistrate judge referral was knowing and voluntary
3. Whether consent to magistrate judge adjudication, which waives the constitutional right to Article III adjudication, should be treated like other waivers of fundamental rights (guilty pleas, jury trial waivers)
4. Whether the Port's post-judgment discovery of the Monk-Kay friendship constitutes extraordinary circumstances warranting vacation of the referral

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the district court's decision to vacate the magistrate judge referral. The majority held that:

1. Judge Kay and counsel William Monk had a close, personal, multifaceted friendship spanning nearly forty years, which was substantially undisclosed (Judge Kay disclosed only that Monk's daughter was her law clerk)
2. The Port discovered the true extent of this friendship only after judgment through investigation of Judge Kay's Facebook page
3. For consent to a magistrate judge referral to be "knowing," a party must have ACTUAL knowledge of the nature and extent of any judicial conflicts before judgment—not merely constructive knowledge
4. The actual knowledge standard is required because consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction waives the constitutional right to Article III adjudication, a fundamental right that must be treated consistently with other fundamental rights waivers (guilty pleas, jury trial waivers)
5. A constructive knowledge standard would improperly presume waiver of a fundamental constitutional right without full understanding, which violates the principle that "every reasonable presumption against waiver" must be indulged
6. Litigants should be able to rely on judges to comply with ethical duties to disclose conflicts; it is improper to require parties to investigate judges' private affairs to protect constitutional rights

This is a civil rights case in which Luther Poynter, a civil contemnor detained at Barren County Detention Center, sued the county and jailer after two inmates attacked him, causing permanent injuries. Poynter alleged the jail violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights through deliberate indifference to his safety by failing to properly classify violent inmates before housing them with him.

1. Whether the subjective standard from Farmer v. Brennan (requiring proof that a jailer subjectively knew of a substantial risk of serious harm) or an objective standard from Kingsley v. Hendrickson (requiring only that a risk be objectively serious and obvious) governs Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims by pretrial detainees and civil contemnors challenging conditions of confinement.
2. Whether the circuit's prior decision in Brawner v. Scott County, which adopted an objective-only standard for such claims, should be overruled.
3. Whether Poynter's case was a proper vehicle for reconsidering this legal standard given the party-presentation principle.
4. Whether the same deliberate-indifference framework applies to all detainees (pretrial detainees, civil contemnors, juveniles) or whether different standards apply based on the reason for detention.

The en banc court (9-7 majority) held that Farmer's subjective standard continues to control Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims brought by detainees who have not been convicted of a crime. The majority reasoned that: (1) the Due Process Clause's text requires a "deliberate decision" or deprivation by government officials, which necessitates a subjective element; (2) Kingsley's objective standard applies only to excessive-force claims, not conditions-of-confinement claims, as Kingsley itself expressly limited its holding to excessive force; (3) the distinction between affirmative acts (excessive force) and failures to act (deliberate indifference) justifies different standards—it is difficult to infer punitive intent from inaction without proof of what the official knew; (4) an objective-only standard would collapse into negligence, which all parties agree is insufficient for constitutional liability; and (5) Farmer's subjective requirement serves as an important gatekeeping mechanism distinguishing constitutional violations from normal jail administration. The court vacated the district court's summary judgment order and remanded for reconsideration under the proper Farmer standard. The dissent (7 judges) argued that Brawner was correctly decided, that the case was an improper vehicle for overruling it since the County forfeited the issue, and that Kingsley's reasoning logically extends to conditions-of-confinement claims.

This case involves a petition for review of a National Labor Relations Board order requiring American Backflow & Fire Prevention, Inc. to bargain in good faith with a union. The company allegedly breached a settlement agreement by withdrawing recognition of the union without proper legal justification.

1. Whether American Backflow breached its settlement agreement with the union by withdrawing recognition and refusing to bargain in good faith
2. Whether the Board properly granted a default judgment motion without a hearing
3. Whether an employer may withdraw recognition of a union based on decertification petitions, and what constitutes an objective basis for such withdrawal
4. Whether denying a hearing violates the National Labor Relations Act and due process rights

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied American Backflow's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application to enforce its order. The court held that: (1) substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that American Backflow breached the settlement agreement by withdrawing union recognition without an objective basis; (2) American Backflow's general denial that it breached the agreement, without specific refutation of the union's detailed account, was insufficient to create a material issue of fact warranting a hearing; (3) the Board properly applied precedent requiring more than conclusory assertions to contest a default judgment motion; and (4) American Backflow waived its statutory and due process arguments by failing to raise them before the Board, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).

This is a labor law case in which the National Labor Relations Board ordered American Backflow & Fire Prevention, Inc. to bargain in good faith with a union after the company withdrew recognition of the union in breach of a prior settlement agreement. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the Board's decision to grant a default judgment motion against the company.

1. Whether American Backflow breached its settlement agreement with the union by withdrawing recognition and refusing to bargain in good faith
2. Whether the Board properly granted a default judgment motion without holding a hearing
3. Whether American Backflow's general denial of wrongdoing was sufficient to create a material issue of fact warranting a hearing
4. Whether an employer may withdraw union recognition based on decertification petitions, and whether the petitions cited by American Backflow were valid
5. Whether denial of a hearing violates the National Labor Relations Act and due process rights

The court denied American Backflow's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application to enforce its order. The court held that: (1) substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that American Backflow breached the settlement agreement by withdrawing recognition without a lawful basis; (2) American Backflow's conclusory assertion that its withdrawal was "lawful" constituted only a general denial insufficient to contest the default judgment motion, consistent with Board precedent requiring specific refutation of detailed breach allegations; (3) the decertification petitions American Backflow relied upon were either dated before the certification period ended or were tainted by the company's unfair labor practices, making them invalid grounds for withdrawal; and (4) American Backflow forfeited its arguments regarding the right to a hearing and due process by failing to raise them before the Board, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).

This is an appeal of a summary judgment decision in a disability discrimination case involving a student with depression and anxiety who was denied reenrollment in a public school district. E.W., a transfer student, was denied reenrollment after accumulating ten out-of-school suspension days and eighteen absences during her eighth-grade year, and she challenged the denial as disability-based discrimination under Title IX, the ADA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

1. Whether the school's denial of reenrollment constituted discrimination based on disability under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
2. Whether the school failed to reasonably accommodate E.W.'s disability, specifically by refusing to hold a manifestation-determination meeting before denying reenrollment
3. Whether the school retaliated against E.W. and her parents for requesting disability accommodations
4. Whether E.W.'s Title IX sex discrimination claim was properly waived for failure to include it in the statement of claims
5. The proper intent standard for disability discrimination claims in schools following the Supreme Court's decision in A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school on all claims. The court held:

1. Title IX Claim: The claim was properly waived because plaintiffs failed to include it in their statement of claims as required by the district court's local rules, and the court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing strict compliance.
2. Reasonable Accommodation: The school reasonably accommodated E.W.'s disability through a comprehensive Section 504 Plan and Safety Plan that provided frequent class breaks, a "hot pass" to see counselors, testing accommodations, access to the nurse's office, and email access to request meetings with school counselors and therapists. The court rejected the argument that the school was required to hold a manifestation-determination meeting (a procedure from the IDEA statute, not the ADA or Section 504) before denying reenrollment. Critically, the court found that E.W.'s ten out-of-school suspension days alone justified the denial of reenrollment under the school's Transfer Policy and Indiana law, regardless of whether her absences were disability-related.
3. Retaliation Claim: Although E.W. and her parents engaged in protected activity by requesting disability accommodations, they failed to establish that the school's reenrollment denial was retaliatory. The temporal proximity between the May requests for a manifestation-determination meeting and the June 7 denial letter was insufficient to prove causation, particularly given that the school had warned parents about E.W.'s behavior and absences months earlier. Additionally, plaintiffs failed to show pretext because the undisputed evidence of ten suspension days independently justified the denial under the school's policy and state law.

This is an immigration appeal case in which Maria Angelica Gonzalez Perez and her four children seek judicial review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision affirming the denial of their asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection claims. The petitioners fled Mexico after receiving extortion threats from the Knights Templar cartel.

1. Whether Perez suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of membership in a particular social group
2. Whether the Mexican government was unable or unwilling to protect Perez from cartel threats
3. Whether Perez could relocate internally within Mexico to avoid harm
4. Whether Perez faces a substantial risk of torture if returned to Mexico
5. Whether Perez exhausted her administrative remedies by presenting adequately developed arguments to the Board of Immigration Appeals

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for review on the grounds that Perez failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Although the Immigration Judge found Perez's testimony credible, the court held that Perez made only cursory and underdeveloped arguments in her appeal to the Board, failing to articulate her particular social group, confront the IJ's findings that the cartel was motivated solely by extortion rather than persecution based on a protected ground, or address the possibility of internal relocation. The court determined that exhaustion requires presenting specific arguments with sufficient detail to put the Board on notice and provide it an opportunity to address the merits. Because Perez forfeited these essential arguments through inadequate development, she deprived the Board of the opportunity to review them and therefore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Consequently, the court could not consider her claims on the merits.

This is an appeal concerning whether plaintiffs stated a claim against state officials in their official or personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sued individual Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) employees for allegedly failing to provide timely residential placements for children who were wrongfully detained after court-ordered release, violating their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

1. Whether the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against individual DCFS defendants are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as official-capacity suits against the state
2. Whether the Martin test—a Fourth Circuit test designed for statutory claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Telephone Consumer Protection Act—should apply to determine the nature of § 1983 constitutional claims
3. What indicia courts should use to distinguish between personal-capacity suits (seeking money damages from officials' personal assets) and official-capacity suits (seeking relief against the governmental entity) in § 1983 actions
4. Whether a plaintiff's desire for deterrent effect or policy change converts a personal-capacity suit into an official-capacity suit

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. The Martin test is inapplicable to § 1983 constitutional claims and should not have been applied by the district court. The Fourth Circuit itself has repeatedly refused to apply the Martin factors to § 1983 claims because doing so would undermine § 1983's purpose of deterring state actors from violating federal constitutional rights.
2. The plaintiffs stated personal-capacity claims not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit personal-capacity suits seeking money damages from state officials' personal assets under § 1983.
3. Multiple factors indicated personal-capacity claims: (a) the complaint sought only compensatory and punitive damages with no injunctive relief; (b) the plaintiffs named both current and former DCFS employees, and former employees can only be sued in personal capacities; (c) the complaint alleged personal involvement by individual defendants in constitutional violations without reference to governmental policies or customs; and (d) the defendants did not move to substitute successors, indicating their understanding that they were sued personally.
4. A plaintiff's desire for deterrent effect or policy change does not convert a personal-capacity suit into an official-capacity suit. The deterrent effect is inherent to § 1983 and operates as intended when plaintiffs sue officials in their personal capacities. Similarly, voluntary state indemnification of officials does not transform a personal-capacity suit into an official-capacity one.
5. The court must look primarily to the relief sought in the complaint. Money damages can be recovered only in personal-capacity suits, so a complaint seeking compensatory and punitive damages indicates an intent to sue officers in their personal capacities.

This is a premises liability case arising from a tubing accident at a Wisconsin resort. Eric Stupak was seriously injured when he fell off a tube slide at Mont du Lac resort after the slide was closed but left in an unsafe condition, and he sued the resort for negligence under Wisconsin tort law.

1. Whether Stupak was a trespasser or an invitee on the closed tube slides, which determines the standard of care owed by the resort
2. Whether Mont du Lac acted recklessly toward Stupak as a trespasser, satisfying the higher liability standard for trespassers under Wisconsin law
3. Whether Stupak assumed the inherent risk of tubing as an alternative basis for summary judgment
4. Whether Mont du Lac's actions were the proximate cause of Stupak's injuries

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for trial. The court agreed that Stupak was a trespasser as a matter of law because the manager's statement "I'm not going to say anything" did not constitute express or implied permission to use the closed slides. However, the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude Mont du Lac acted recklessly by: (1) deflating the protective bumpers; (2) leaving tubes accessible; (3) failing to properly display a "Ride Closed" sign or erect a barrier; and (4) making a statement that could be interpreted as tacitly encouraging use of the slides despite their closed status. The court reasoned that this combination of dangerous conditions and the manager's ambiguous response created a substantial risk of serious bodily harm. The court remanded for the district court to address Mont du Lac's alternative arguments regarding assumption of risk and proximate causation.

This is an immigration case in which Jose Margarito Perez appeals the denial of his application for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA based on the persecutor bar, which makes certain immigration relief unavailable to individuals who have assisted in or otherwise participated in persecution on account of protected characteristics. The central issue is whether the persecutor bar contains an implied duress defense.

1. Whether the persecutor bar in immigration law contains an implied duress defense that would allow individuals who were coerced or under duress to claim relief from deportation
2. What weight to give to the Attorney General's interpretation of the persecutor bar following the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Light Enterprises v. Raimondo, which eliminated Chevron deference
3. Whether the plain language of the persecutor bar—which uses the terms "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated"—requires voluntariness as an element
4. Whether international refugee law and the Charming Betsy canon require recognition of a duress defense
5. Whether Perez's membership in and service with the Atonal Battalion, an elite counterinsurgency unit with documented human rights abuses, raised the persecutor bar

The Ninth Circuit denied Perez's petition and held that the persecutor bar contains no implied duress defense. The court reasoned as follows:

1. Standard of Review: Following Loper Light, the court exercises independent judgment in interpreting the statute and accords the Attorney General's interpretation only limited weight under Skidmore, not Chevron deference. The court gave limited weight to the Attorney General's position because of inconsistent interpretations between Negusie I (recognizing a narrow duress defense) and Negusie II (rejecting any duress exception), without adequate rational explanation for the change.
2. Plain Language Analysis: The ordinary meanings of "assisted" and "otherwise participated" at the time of enactment encompass a range of conduct, including involuntary or unintended actions. An applicant who involuntarily contributed effort to persecution intended by another may nonetheless have "assisted" in persecution. The four verbs—"ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated"—reflect Congress's effort to capture a range of conduct regardless of voluntariness.
3. Statutory Structure: Congress's deliberate inclusion of the term "voluntarily" in neighboring provisions of the INA (such as Section 1158(c)(2)(D) regarding voluntary return to one's country, Section 1229c regarding voluntary departure, and Section 1424 regarding involuntary party membership) but omission of such language from the persecutor bar indicates that Congress intentionally did not include a voluntariness requirement. This disparate inclusion or exclusion is presumed intentional.
4. International Law: While the court acknowledged that international refugee law and the statutory history suggest a duress defense may be sensible, it concluded that international materials do not require such a defense. The Protocol is not self-executing, the UN Handbook is merely a useful interpretive aid but not binding, and the Charming Betsy canon does not warrant a different conclusion when a duress defense would be inconsistent with the statute's plain text.
5. Application to Perez: The government's evidence of Perez's ties to the Atonal Battalion, combined with evidence of widespread human rights abuses by that unit, was sufficient to raise the inference of persecution. Perez failed to rebut the bar, particularly in light of the unchallenged adverse credibility determination by the Immigration Judge. The court did not need to address what specific conduct constitutes assistance or participation in persecution because Perez's credibility was not challenged on appeal.
6. Caveat: The court noted that the absence of a duress defense does not relieve immigration judges of their responsibility to conduct sufficiently particularized evaluations to determine an applicant's actual responsibility for persecution committed by others, and that mere acquiescence or membership is insufficient to trigger the bar.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Allen Gessen challenges his conviction for murder-for-hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958. Gessen agreed to pay $50,000 to an undercover FBI agent posing as a crime broker to arrange the murder of Priscilla Chigariro, the mother of his children, during a custody dispute.

1. Whether the murder-for-hire statute requires proof of a quid pro quo agreement between the defendant and a person who actually intends to commit the murder, or whether an agreement with an intermediary (such as an undercover agent) suffices
2. Whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's findings that Gessen intended to have Chigariro murdered (rather than merely deported) and that he intended the murder to be committed in exchange for pecuniary value
3. Whether venue was proper in the Northern District of California for a continuing offense that spanned multiple states and time periods
4. Whether the district court properly rejected Gessen's proposed jury instructions on the elements of murder-for-hire and on venue

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Gessen's conviction on all grounds:

1. Jury Instruction on Murder-for-Hire Elements: The court rejected Gessen's proposed instruction requiring proof of a quid pro quo agreement with a person who understood they would personally commit the murder. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1958 contains no such requirement—the statute says nothing about the intent of the other party to the transaction. Proof of an actual agreement is not necessary; the government need only show the defendant acted with the requisite intent when using interstate commerce facilities.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence—Intent: The court held that a rational jury could conclude Gessen intended to have Chigariro murdered, not deported. The recorded conversations showed Gessen sought a "cheaper" and "more permanent" solution than deportation, expressed concern about the children not being present, discussed making it appear random, and provided detailed surveillance information about Chigariro. These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supported the jury's finding of murderous intent.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence—Pecuniary Value: The court held sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that Gessen intended the murder to be committed in exchange for $50,000. Gessen gave Rizzo a $2,000 gold coin as a down payment, wired approximately $23,000 to a San Francisco bank account, and agreed to pay the remaining balance after the murder's completion.
4. Venue: The court held that murder-for-hire may be charged as a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). Because the grand jury charged Gessen with a continuing offense spanning from June 2 to July 26, 2022, across multiple states and involving multiple uses of interstate commerce facilities, venue was proper in any district where the crime was begun, continued, or completed. The Northern District of California was proper venue because Gessen sent Signal messages from a San Francisco FBI office phone and wired $23,000 to a San Francisco bank account in furtherance of the murder plot. The court rejected Gessen's argument that the offense was complete after a single use of an interstate commerce facility, finding this contradicted the charging of a continuing offense.
5. Venue Instruction: The court held the district court properly rejected Gessen's proposed venue instruction defining the offense as complete after a single use of an interstate commerce facility, as this was contrary to law. The given instruction adequately covered Gessen's defense theory by requiring acts "in furtherance of" the crime, allowing him to argue that later acts did not further an already-completed offense.

This is an appeal of a summary judgment decision in a case brought by an incarcerated individual at Salinas Valley State Prison alleging that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to reasonably accommodate his disabilities, specifically by terminating his access to incontinence supplies for nearly five months.

1. Whether the plaintiff qualifies as a "qualified individual with a disability" under Title II of the ADA based on his spinal condition and incontinence
2. Whether the plaintiff was denied meaningful access to CDCR's toileting and hygiene services by reason of his disability
3. Whether the denial of incontinence supplies was "by reason of" the plaintiff's disability as required by Title II
4. Whether CDCR acted with deliberate indifference in denying and delaying reinstatement of incontinence supplies
5. Whether a public entity can be excused from providing reasonable accommodations solely because it determined the accommodation is not medically necessary
6. Whether the plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief for a permanent accommodation order

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment on the ADA claim and remanded for trial. The court held:

1. A reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA based on his spinal condition, incontinence, or both, as these are physical impairments that substantially limit major life activities such as bowel and bladder function, mobility, and self-care.
2. A jury could find that the plaintiff was denied meaningful access to CDCR's toileting and hygiene services because he needed adult diapers to relieve himself hygienically and with dignity. The court rejected CDCR's narrow interpretation that merely providing physical access to toilets and showers satisfies the ADA, holding that meaningful access may require reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, and provision of auxiliary aids and services.
3. A jury could conclude the denial was "by reason of" the plaintiff's disability because it was his disabilities that made it harder for him to enjoy the benefits of CDCR's toileting and hygiene services without diapers. Discriminatory intent is not necessary to satisfy this element.
4. Sufficient evidence exists to create a triable issue regarding whether CDCR acted with deliberate indifference, based on: (a) the abrupt termination of a previously approved accommodation without examining the plaintiff; (b) ignoring and summarily rejecting repeated requests for reinstatement over one month; (c) repeatedly denying the requested accommodation without investigating its reasonableness and feasibility; and (d) the delay in reinstatement even after a medical diagnosis was made.
5. A public entity is not excused from its obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation solely because it determined the accommodation is not medically necessary or indicated. The ADA creates a framework of disability and accommodation that is not directly linked to the medical system or limited to medical accommodation programs. Medical judgments can evince deliberate indifference under the ADA.
6. The court remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether the plaintiff has standing to seek an injunction ordering CDCR to grant a permanent accommodation order, as this requires factual development regarding the nature and duration of the current temporary order and the risk of future termination.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a motion to vacate a criminal conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which Nancy Martin challenges her guilty pleas to bank fraud and tax fraud on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining phase.

1. Whether Martin's trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to advise her of a potential defense to the bank fraud charge—specifically, that the bank fraud statute requires proof of a false statement to a bank, and that merely writing valid checks against her employer's account may not constitute such a statement under the Supreme Court's interpretation in Loughrin v. United States.
2. Whether Martin's trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to advise her that the tax fraud statute requires proof of "willfulness" (i.e., specific intent to violate a known legal duty), and whether counsel's on-the-record statement that willfulness was not required constituted deficient performance.
3. Whether Martin suffered prejudice from any deficient performance—that is, whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of Martin's § 2255 motion and remanded for further proceedings on both counts.

Bank Fraud Count: The court held that Martin presented a sufficiently strong argument that a viable defense theory was available at the time of her guilty plea. Under Loughrin v. United States and related precedent, the bank fraud statute requires proof that a false statement was the means by which the defendant induced the bank to part with its money. The court concluded that Martin's theory—that merely writing valid checks against her employer's account does not constitute a false statement to the bank—was sufficiently foreshadowed in existing case law that a diligent defense attorney should have discovered and considered it. Although the court did not definitively rule that Martin's legal theory was correct, it found that counsel's failure to disclose this credible defense could constitute deficient performance. The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine: (1) whether counsel considered this defense; (2) whether she discussed it with Martin; and (3) whether this would have affected Martin's decision to go to trial (prejudice).

Tax Fraud Count: The court agreed with the district court that counsel's performance was deficient—counsel told Martin on the record that the government need not prove willfulness, which was incorrect as a matter of law. However, the court found that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in analyzing prejudice. The district court improperly placed the burden on Martin to show a "good faith belief" that she was not violating the law, when in fact the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Martin acted willfully (i.e., with knowledge of her legal duty to report income and intentional violation of that duty). The court remanded for the district court to reconsider prejudice under the correct legal standard, conducting a holistic inquiry into whether there is a reasonable probability that Martin would not have pleaded guilty had she received effective counsel's advice about the willfulness requirement.

Reasoning: The court applied the two-prong Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. For the bank fraud count, the court emphasized that counsel has a duty to conduct reasonable investigations and research relevant law, and that an attorney may perform deficiently by failing to disclose a credible defense even if that defense may ultimately be a losing argument. The court noted that heightened deference to counsel's strategic decisions is not appropriate where a failure to disclose a defense does not reflect sound professional judgment. For the tax fraud count, the court stressed that willfulness is an element of the crime that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the prejudice analysis must consider this heightened burden and whether Martin would rationally have rejected the plea bargain had she known of this defense.

This is a criminal appeal in which George Ostertag challenges his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, arguing that the search of his vehicle—initiated by a narcotics-detection dog's deployment during a traffic stop—violated the Fourth Amendment, and that the underlying statute violates the Second Amendment.

1. Whether a narcotics-detection dog's open-air sniff of the exterior of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop constitutes a Fourth Amendment search;
2. Whether a narcotics-detection dog's physical contact with a vehicle while sniffing constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, and if so, whether probable cause existed to justify it;
3. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms, violates the Second Amendment on its face or as applied to non-violent offenders.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held: (1) the open-air sniff by the narcotics-detection dog did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because it did not compromise any legitimate expectation of privacy—a sniff reveals only the presence of an odor, which is several inferential steps removed from revealing lawful activity or sensitive information, and the sniff is limited in scope, duration, and intrusiveness; (2) even assuming the dog's physical contact with the vehicle combined with sniffing constituted a search, probable cause existed to justify it based on the dog's positive alert behavior before making physical contact; and (3) binding Tenth Circuit precedent in Vincent v. Bondi forecloses Ostertag's Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1), as the statute may constitutionally be applied to non-violent felons, and therefore survives both facial and as-applied challenges.

This case involves a First Amendment challenge to a public library's policies restricting free speech activities, specifically the display of signs and protesting. Justin Spiehs sued the Lawrence, Kansas public library and its staff after being repeatedly asked to remove signs and leave the library, claiming violations of his free speech, equal protection, due process, and retaliation rights.

1. Whether Spiehs had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against library policies
2. Whether the library's restrictions on displaying signs and protesting constitute content-based or content-neutral speech restrictions
3. Whether the policies are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest in maintaining a quiet environment for reading and study
4. Whether Spiehs received equal protection and was treated differently from similarly situated patrons
5. Whether Spiehs was deprived of procedural due process in his library suspension
6. Whether Spiehs engaged in constitutionally protected activity supporting a retaliation claim

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. The court held:

1. Standing: Spiehs lacked standing for declaratory and injunctive relief because he failed to show subjective deterrence—he stated his intent to return to the library and engage in the same conduct, demonstrating he was not chilled from speaking.
2. First Amendment—Content Neutrality: The library's policies on free speech and behavior were content-neutral because they prohibited all displays of signs and protesting regardless of the message's content. The policies were justified by the library's purpose of maintaining a quiet environment for reading and study, not by discriminating against particular viewpoints.
3. Narrow Tailoring: The restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve the significant governmental interest in preserving the library's character as a quiet place for reading, writing, and contemplation. Although the policies restricted some speech, they did not ban all speech—patrons could still read, wear expressive clothing, post messages on bulletin boards, and reserve rooms for free speech activities.
4. Ample Alternative Channels: Sufficient alternative channels of communication remained available, including protesting outside the library and various forms of expression permitted inside.
5. Equal Protection: Spiehs was not similarly situated to other patrons. In the November 2024 incident, staff did not see Eravi displaying anything; in the December 2024 incident, Eravi wore his flag as a scarf rather than displaying it as a sign, which the policy did not address.
6. Due Process and Retaliation: Spiehs waived his due process claim by omitting it from the final pretrial order. The retaliation claim failed because Spiehs did not engage in constitutionally protected activity—his sign displays violated valid, narrowly tailored restrictions.

This is an employment discrimination case in which Gina Latture, a Black woman, sued Priority Life Care, LLC for wrongful termination, tortious interference with business relations, and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, including claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. Latture was terminated after seven months of employment as Director of Sales and Marketing, allegedly for insubordination and unprofessionalism.

1. Whether Latture stated a valid claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy under District of Columbia law
2. Whether Latture stated a valid claim for tortious interference with business relations
3. Whether Latture presented sufficient evidence of racial discrimination in her termination under Title VII
4. Whether Latture presented sufficient evidence of retaliation under Title VII for opposing discriminatory practices
5. Whether Latture's hostile work environment claim was timely filed and sufficiently severe or pervasive

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of all claims. Specifically:

1. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy: Dismissed because Latture failed to plead a specific violation of public policy. The court held that sweeping references to "District of Columbia law" and "Medicare and Medicaid laws" lack the specificity required under D.C. law, which demands that an employee identify a specific statute or regulation they were instructed to violate.
2. Tortious Interference with Business Relations: Dismissed because Latture failed to sufficiently plead the requisite elements of knowledge and intent. The complaint did not allege that Jernigan and Pierson knew of her Maple Heights employment offer, were present at the Medicaid provider meeting, or specify what disparaging comments were made.
3. Racial Discrimination: Summary judgment affirmed because the alleged racist comments, while egregious, were not direct evidence of discrimination in the termination decision. The court found that under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Latture failed to establish that PLC's stated reason for termination (insubordination and unprofessionalism on August 9, 2021) was pretextual. The Performance Improvement Plan was based on legitimate performance deficiencies, and Latture herself was uncertain whether race influenced her placement on the PIP.
4. Retaliation: Summary judgment affirmed because Latture could not establish that her termination was motivated by her objection to Jernigan's racial slur. The decision-maker (Gerardot) had no knowledge of Latture's objection, which Latture disclosed only to Jernigan. Additionally, the temporal gap of approximately three months between the objection (January-April 2021) and the PIP (July 6, 2021) was insufficient to establish causation.
5. Hostile Work Environment: Summary judgment affirmed on the alternative ground that the claim was untimely. Under Title VII's 300-day filing period, Latture's May 26, 2022 EEOC charge only covered conduct on or after July 30, 2021. The discriminatory comments occurred before July 30, 2021, and the August 10-12 communications concerned only performance and conduct, not race.

This case involves a challenge to the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Data-Exchange Procedure, which allowed the IRS to disclose confidential taxpayer information to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for immigration enforcement purposes. Taxpayer advocacy groups sued to enjoin the procedure, arguing it violated federal tax confidentiality laws and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

1. Whether the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Data-Exchange Procedure
2. Whether the Data-Exchange Procedure constitutes final agency action reviewable under the APA
3. Whether the Internal Revenue Code's civil and criminal penalty provisions preclude APA review
4. Whether the Data-Exchange Procedure violates 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2), which strictly regulates disclosure of tax return information to federal agencies
5. Whether preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate under the Winter factors

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order staying the Data-Exchange Procedure and preliminarily enjoining further disclosures without court notice. The court held:

1. Standing: The Center for Taxpayer Rights has standing because the procedure directly interferes with its core mission of representing low-income taxpayers, causing concrete harm including reduced client engagement and diverted resources.
2. Final Agency Action: The Data-Exchange Procedure is final agency action reviewable under the APA because it marks the consummation of the IRS's decision-making process, has been implemented to process over 47,000 records, binds IRS officials, and represents a dramatic departure from prior individualized review procedures.
3. No Preclusion: The Internal Revenue Code's civil and criminal penalty provisions do not preclude APA review because they provide only "doubtful and limited relief" inadequate to remedy the harm and do not offer the same type of relief as APA review.
4. Violation of Law: The Data-Exchange Procedure violates § 6103(i)(2) in multiple ways: (a) it does not require ICE to provide an actual taxpayer address, accepting any five or nine digits instead; (b) it fails to ensure disclosures go only to officers "personally and directly engaged" in specific criminal investigations, as ICE listed the same point of contact for 1.28 million requests; and (c) it does not require ICE to provide a "specific reason" for relevance as statutorily mandated.
5. Preliminary Relief: All Winter factors support preliminary injunctive relief: plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits; they face irreparable harm because the procedure undermines their ability to serve time-sensitive client needs with no opportunity for do-overs; the balance of equities favors plaintiffs because there is a substantial public interest in agencies following federal law; and the scope of relief is appropriate because narrower relief cannot redress plaintiffs' injuries without incidentally benefitting nonparties.

This is a derivative action brought by Ken McAllister, a member of Elevatus Brand Partners LLC, against Joe Lewis for allegedly aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The court addresses whether McAllister's claims against Lewis comply with Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, which governs derivative shareholder/member litigation.

1. Whether McAllister's claims are derivative in nature and therefore subject to Rule 23.1 requirements
2. Whether McAllister was required to make a pre-suit demand on the Company's board/manager before pursuing derivative claims
3. Whether demand was properly excused based on allegations of futility
4. Whether the appointment of a liquidating trustee as sole manager affected the demand requirement when Lewis was added as a defendant after the trustee's appointment
5. Whether the Braddock framework for amended complaints applies when a new defendant is added after a change in management

The court granted Joe Lewis's motion to dismiss with prejudice. The court held that: (1) McAllister's claims are derivative because the alleged harm (misappropriation of Company funds and diversion of business opportunities) was suffered by the Company, not McAllister individually; (2) Rule 23.1 required McAllister to make a pre-suit demand on the Company's board/manager or plead with particularity facts excusing demand; (3) McAllister made no demand and failed to adequately plead demand futility; (4) when a liquidating trustee was appointed as sole manager in October 2024, the prior demand excusal arguments based on 50/50 manager deadlock became moot; (5) because Lewis was not named as a defendant until July 2025—nine months after the trustee's appointment—the claims against Lewis were not "validly in litigation" under the Braddock framework and thus required a new demand on the liquidating trustee; (6) McAllister made no such demand and offered no particularized futility allegations directed at the neutral, court-appointed trustee; and (7) the court declined to create a "practicality exception" based on service of process, as this would effectively swallow Rule 23.1. Dismissal was with prejudice because McAllister had pleaded multiple times and amended rather than answered Lewis's first motion to dismiss.

This is an appeal of a First Amendment free speech case in which Justin Spiehs challenged a public library's policies restricting the display of signs and other expressive conduct inside the library. Spiehs sued the City of Lawrence, Kansas and library employees after being told to remove signs or leave the library on multiple occasions.

1. Whether Spiehs had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief challenging library policies
2. Whether the library's restrictions on signs and expressive conduct violated the First Amendment as applied to a designated public forum
3. Whether the restrictions were content-neutral or content-based discrimination
4. Whether the restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest
5. Whether Spiehs was denied equal protection by differential enforcement of the policies
6. Whether Spiehs was deprived of procedural due process
7. Whether Spiehs suffered retaliation for protected speech

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. The court held:

1. Standing: Spiehs lacked standing for declaratory and injunctive relief because he failed to show subjective deterrence—he stated he intended to return to the library and continue the same conduct.
2. First Amendment - Content Neutrality: The library's policies prohibiting signs and protesting were content-neutral on their face and in purpose. The policies were designed to preserve the library's quiet environment for reading and study, not to suppress particular messages. The court rejected Spiehs's argument that prohibiting "protesting" inherently targets negative speech.
3. As-Applied Content Discrimination: The court found no content-based discrimination in the enforcement incidents. For example, when Spiehs wore a shirt with an expressive message but was only stopped when he displayed a sign, this showed the policy targeted the display method, not the message. A blank poster was prohibited regardless of content.
4. Narrow Tailoring: The restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve the significant governmental interest in maintaining the library as a quiet place for reading and study. Although the library didn't ban all speech, it restricted only disruptive forms like holding signs and protesting. Ample alternative channels remained, including wearing expressive clothing, posting on bulletin boards, protesting outside, and reserving rooms for speech.
5. Equal Protection: Spiehs was not similarly situated to others treated more favorably. Staff did not see Spiehs's companion displaying signs in one incident, and in another incident, the companion wore a flag as a scarf rather than displaying it as a sign, which the policy did not address.
6. Procedural Due Process and Retaliation: Spiehs waived the due process claim by omitting it from the final pretrial order. The retaliation claim failed because Spiehs's conduct was not constitutionally protected given the valid restrictions on his speech.

This is an appeal of a district court order granting injunctive and declaratory relief that enjoined New Hampshire House Bill 1569's elimination of qualified voter affidavits (QVAs) and challenged voter affidavits (CVAs) as methods for proving voter eligibility. The appellants sought a stay of the injunction pending appeal.

1. Whether the defendants-appellants demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal
2. Whether the defendants-appellants established irreparable harm from denial of the stay
3. Whether the balance of equities and public interest favors granting a stay pending appeal
4. The justiciability of the underlying voting rights dispute

The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the motion for a stay pending appeal. Even assuming the defendants-appellants could demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the court found they failed to establish irreparable harm. The court emphasized the defendants-appellants' lack of diligence in seeking the stay—waiting three weeks after the district court's May 28, 2026 order to seek relief from the district court, and another two weeks before appealing to the circuit court, without requesting expedited briefing despite two impending elections. The court noted that the state had immediately reinstated the QVAs and CVAs following the injunction, undermining claims of irreparable harm. Additionally, the court found the public interest weighed against a stay, as eligible voters had relied on the Secretary of State's representation that QVAs would be available for the upcoming elections, and a stay could prevent voters from participating without the newly required documentation.

This is a civil tax enforcement case in which the United States appeals a district court judgment upholding a $2.9 million penalty against Richard Rund for willfully failing to report multiple foreign bank accounts on required FBAR (Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts) filings over several years. Rund challenges both the willfulness finding and the constitutionality of the penalty under the Excessive Fines Clause.

1. Whether Rund's failure to file accurate FBARs for foreign accounts constituted "willful" violations under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5), which includes both knowing and reckless violations under the Fourth Circuit's standard established in United States v. Horowitz
2. Whether summary judgment was appropriate on the willfulness issue, or whether genuine disputes of material fact precluded such judgment
3. Whether the $2.9 million civil penalty violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment as grossly disproportional to the gravity of Rund's offenses

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects. On willfulness, the court held that Rund's FBAR violations were willful as a matter of law. Applying the Horowitz standard for recklessness, the court found that Rund: (1) clearly ought to have known there was a grave risk that accurate FBARs were not being filed, and (2) was in a position to find out for certain very easily. The evidence showed that Rund had actual knowledge of FBAR requirements from prior filings, received notices on tax returns and FBAR forms, worked with tax professionals whom he failed to consult about his foreign accounts, and in several instances deliberately structured his business relationships to avoid U.S. taxes. The court rejected Rund's arguments that his ADHD and other personal hardships created genuine disputes of material fact, noting that he successfully filed complete FBARs in other years and continued working with tax professionals throughout the relevant period. On the Excessive Fines Clause, the court assumed arguendo that civil FBAR penalties are subject to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines, but found the penalty constitutional under the "gross disproportionality" standard. The court considered: (1) the nature and extent of the offense—over 40 willful violations across more than a dozen accounts over eight years, not mere negligence; (2) the harm caused—substantial underreporting of foreign income and tax revenue loss to the Government; (3) the correlation between account size and both the Government's loss and the defendant's incentive to violate; and (4) the penalty as a percentage of the statutory maximum—approximately 30% of the maximum authorized penalty and only 14-16% of account balances per violation, far less than the 50% maximum Congress authorized per account. The court distinguished the case from Bajakajian (where a single currency reporting violation resulted in 100% forfeiture) and found the penalty proportional to Rund's specific wrongdoing.

This is an appeal of a National Labor Relations Board decision finding that Starbucks violated the National Labor Relations Act by making statements to employees that threatened reprisal for union activities and created an impression of surveillance. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the Board's determinations regarding statements made by Starbucks managers at a Wichita, Kansas store during 2022.

1. Whether statements made by store managers regarding loss of benefits if employees unionized constituted unlawful threats of reprisal under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
2. Whether a manager's statement linking store hour reductions to union pressure constituted an unlawful threat of reprisal
3. Whether a manager's statement about closing the hiring portal due to unionization efforts constituted an unlawful threat of reprisal
4. Whether the managers' statements about union activity created an unlawful impression of surveillance under Section 8(a)(1)
5. The proper burden of proof allocation when an employer claims statements were fact-based predictions rather than threats

The court granted enforcement of the Board's decision only as to the threat of reprisal claim regarding loss of benefits. The court found that Manager Neri's statement to employee Cuellar-Serafini that benefits "could not be guaranteed" if she engaged in organizing lacked the necessary context about the collective bargaining process and objective facts to qualify as a lawful predictive statement, and a reasonable employee could interpret it as a threat of retaliatory action. The court denied enforcement on the other three claims: (1) the store hours statement, finding the ALJ mischaracterized Neri's remark as linking hours to union activity when she actually said she was trying to "relieve pressure the Union had on people," and a reasonable shift supervisor would not find this coercive given the documented staffing shortages; (2) the hiring portal statement, finding it too attenuated from current employees' terms and conditions of employment and lacking coercive context; and (3) the surveillance impression claim, finding the Board failed to grapple with evidence that union discussions occurred in the workplace, that discussing unionization in the first PDC meetings after organizing began was not "out of the ordinary," and that Neri's general awareness statements did not create the type of coercive surveillance impression required under Fifth Circuit precedent.

This is a civil rights case brought by Jackson, Mississippi residents against the City and its officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of substantive due process rights arising from exposure to lead-contaminated drinking water and false statements by city officials about water safety. The Fifth Circuit en banc affirmed the district court's dismissal of the constitutional claims.

1. Whether plaintiffs have a cognizable substantive due process right to be free from exposure to contaminated water caused by public officials' acts or omissions
2. Whether plaintiffs have a cognizable substantive due process right to truthful information from public officials about water contamination
3. Whether these alleged rights are "deeply rooted in [the] Nation's history and tradition" as required by Supreme Court precedent
4. Whether city officials are entitled to qualified immunity even if such rights existed
5. Whether the state-created danger doctrine provides an alternative basis for liability

The en banc majority (10 judges) affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, holding that neither alleged right is cognizable under the Due Process Clause. The court reasoned that: (1) the Constitution does not guarantee clean water or competent municipal services; (2) exposure to contaminated water does not implicate the right to bodily integrity, which applies to direct physical intrusions like forced surgery or assault, not indirect harm from water mismanagement; (3) no historical tradition supports a constitutional right to truthful information from public officials during public health crises; and (4) even if such rights existed, they were not clearly established, warranting qualified immunity. The court emphasized that while the plaintiffs' injuries are serious, the Constitution does not provide a remedy for every governmental wrong—plaintiffs may pursue tort claims, elect new officials, or petition legislatures. The court noted that state and federal agencies have already undertaken regulatory action to address the water crisis. A dissenting opinion (5 judges) argued that plaintiffs plausibly alleged violations of the well-established right to bodily integrity and that the state-created danger doctrine—adopted by ten other circuits—should be recognized, at minimum entitling plaintiffs to discovery.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges his guilty plea and conviction for possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of controlled substances under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The defendant had agreed to plead guilty and enter a rehabilitation program in exchange for dismissal of charges, but was removed from the program after fleeing a traffic stop, and subsequently sought to withdraw his plea arguing the statute is unconstitutional.

1. Whether the defendant's appeal waiver bars his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(3) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hunter v. United States, which recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to appeal waivers
2. Whether conviction under an allegedly unconstitutional statute constitutes egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute
3. Whether the defendant's Second Amendment, Fifth Amendment vagueness, and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(3) are "obvious" errors that no reasonable judge could make
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that:

1. Although the Supreme Court's Hunter I decision recognized a miscarriage-of-justice exception to appeal waivers, the exception sets a "high bar" requiring that the error be both "obvious" (not one a reasonable judge could make) and "of the type that would undermine public confidence in the judiciary"
2. The defendant's Second Amendment challenge is not obvious because controlling precedent recognizes that § 922(g)(3) may be constitutional as applied to presently intoxicated persons, and the defendant's facts (daily marijuana use) present a reasonably debatable constitutional question rather than an obvious error
3. The defendant's Commerce Clause and vagueness challenges are not obvious because the court has consistently upheld other portions of § 922(g) and rejected similar vagueness challenges
4. The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Hemani, while potentially pointing in the defendant's direction, expressly left open key questions and therefore does not establish that the error was obvious
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, as the defendant delayed nine months before filing and offered no meaningful rebuttal to the government's prejudice argument

This is an appeal of a medical resident's termination from an anesthesiology residency program at Augusta University. Dr. Lesley Williams challenged her dismissal on multiple grounds, including sex discrimination, retaliation, disability discrimination, whistleblower protection violations, due process violations, and breach of contract.

1. Whether Williams was subjected to sex discrimination in violation of Title IX
2. Whether Williams experienced unlawful retaliation under Title IX, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act for engaging in protected activity
3. Whether Williams's termination violated the Georgia Whistleblower Act
4. Whether the fitness-for-duty evaluation and medical testing violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
5. Whether Williams was denied procedural due process in her termination
6. Whether the university breached its employment contract with Williams

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of Regents on all claims. The court found that: (1) Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under either the McDonnell Douglas framework or the "convincing mosaic" standard, as male comparators engaged in materially different misconduct; (2) Williams could not prove retaliation because the university articulated legitimate, well-documented reasons for its actions (patient safety, professionalism, and clinical competence concerns) that were not pretextual; (3) Williams did not report the alleged ACGME work log violation to her supervisor as required by the Georgia Whistleblower Act; (4) the fitness-for-duty evaluation and simulation testing were job-related and consistent with business necessity, and Williams failed to establish she was a qualified individual requiring accommodations; (5) Williams received adequate process through multiple warning letters, committee hearings, and appeals, satisfying the "careful and deliberate" standard for academic dismissals; and (6) the university substantially complied with its contractual obligations regarding disciplinary procedures.

This is an appeal of an administrative law case involving Vertex Pharmaceuticals' challenge to a Department of Health and Human Services advisory opinion regarding a fertility support program for patients taking a gene therapy drug. Vertex sought judicial review of HHS's determination that the program would violate federal healthcare fraud statutes and challenged the timing regulations governing advisory opinion issuance.

1. Whether Vertex's Fertility Support Program violates the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by offering up to $70,000 in fertility services to induce patients to purchase Casgevy, a gene therapy treatment
2. Whether the program violates the Beneficiary Inducement Statute (BIS) and whether it qualifies for the "Promotes Access to Care Exception"
3. Whether HHS's advisory opinion regulations unlawfully extend the statutory 60-day deadline for issuing advisory opinions through tolling provisions and delayed acceptance procedures
4. Whether Vertex has standing to challenge the timing regulations after the advisory opinion was issued

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. On the AKS claim, the court affirmed HHS's determination that the program violates the statute. The court held that "induce" and "remuneration" in the AKS carry their ordinary meanings—to influence and valuable compensation respectively—not narrower criminal law meanings. The $70,000 in fertility support constitutes remuneration intended to induce patients to choose Casgevy. On the BIS claim, the court reversed and found HHS's determination arbitrary and capricious. Although the program implicates the BIS, HHS failed to reasonably explain why the program does not qualify for the "Promotes Access to Care Exception." HHS merely stated it lacked data without explaining what data was needed or why Vertex's detailed evidence was insufficient. On the timing regulations, the court reversed the district court's dismissal and held that Vertex has standing to challenge the regulations as an ongoing policy affecting future advisory opinion requests. The court ruled that HHS's regulatory provisions allowing a 10-day delay before the 60-day clock starts and permitting tolling of the deadline violate the statute. Congress mandated a 60-day deadline beginning from receipt of the request, and HHS lacks authority to circumvent this deadline through regulatory procedures.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving a dispute over director advancement of legal fees in Yhangry Inc. The magistrate addresses the procedural propriety of exceptions filed to two prior orders regarding intervention and advancement of counsel fees.

1. Whether a non-party director (Zhang) has the right to intervene in an advancement action to ensure independent review of advancement invoices by separate counsel
2. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to advancement of legal fees and under what conditions
3. Whether exceptions to the magistrate's orders denying intervention and granting a Fitracks order (governing advancement procedures) are timely and procedurally proper

The magistrate concluded that Zhang's exceptions to both orders are premature and untimely because neither order constitutes a Final Report, and the exceptions are also improper because neither order is a Draft Report. Under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 144, exceptions may only be taken to a Draft Report or after a Final Report. The magistrate further recommended that the exceptions not be heard despite these procedural deficiencies. The court denied Zhang's motion to intervene, finding that experienced company counsel could independently assess advancement invoices while remaining subject to court supervision and an approved advancement process. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for a Fitracks order governing the advancement of legal fees, with modifications to ensure fairness given the company's potentially limited funds.

This is an appeal of a Social Security Administration decision denying supplemental security income (SSI) benefits to Brandy Calhoun, a 23-year-old applicant claiming disability due to multiple physical and mental impairments. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Calhoun retained the residual functional capacity to perform light, unskilled work available in significant numbers in the national economy, and therefore was not disabled.

1. Whether the ALJ adequately evaluated the psychological consultative examiner's (Dr. Broman-Fulks's) opinion regarding Calhoun's mental impairments, particularly his assessment of severe agoraphobia and limitations in social interaction and stress tolerance
2. Whether the ALJ built an adequate "accurate and logical bridge" from the medical record evidence to her residual functional capacity (RFC) finding that Calhoun could stand and walk for six hours per workday, when state-agency physicians opined she could only do so for four hours
3. Whether the ALJ properly classified Calhoun as having "at least a high school education" for purposes of the vocational analysis, given her receipt of special education services and reported limitations in reading and math
4. Whether the ALJ adequately addressed Calhoun's ability to work on a "regular and continuing basis" given her agoraphobia and monthly migraines

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ's decision and the district court's judgment in favor of the Commissioner. The majority held:

1. Medical Opinion Evaluation: The ALJ adequately evaluated Dr. Broman-Fulks's opinion under the applicable regulatory standards. The ALJ permissibly found his opinion less persuasive than the state-agency psychologists' assessments because: (a) his severity assessment rested on Calhoun's self-described history rather than objective clinical findings; (b) the longitudinal treatment record documented normal mental status and managed symptoms inconsistent with his severe impairment findings; and (c) the reviewing psychologists' moderate limitation findings were more consistent with the overall evidence. The ALJ's decision to credit reviewing psychologists' assessments over a single, less-supported examination is a familiar exercise of the ALJ's authority to resolve conflicting medical evidence.
2. Standing-and-Walking RFC Finding: Although the court acknowledged this presented a "closer question" and that the ALJ may not have adequately explained departing upward from the four-hour standing-and-walking limitation opined by state-agency physicians, any error was harmless. The vocational expert identified jobs (mail clerk, router, and marker) that existed in significant numbers and could be performed even with the more restrictive four-hour limitation. Because the ALJ's step-five analysis relied on occupations consistent with the four-hour limitation, the six-hour finding was not necessary to the disability determination, and remand would serve no purpose.
3. Educational Classification: The ALJ properly treated Calhoun as having at least a high school education. Regulations make completed grade level the default measure unless contradicted by other evidence. Calhoun's evidence did not require disregarding her high school completion; her special education services and academic weaknesses were adequately accounted for by restricting her RFC to unskilled, routine, repetitive work at a non-production pace, which the medical opinions supported.
4. Ability to Work Regularly: The ALJ's RFC finding implicitly contains a conclusion that Calhoun can work on a regular and continuing basis, and this finding is supported by substantial evidence from the longitudinal treatment record, examination findings, and consultant opinions.

This is an insurance coverage dispute following Hurricane Ida involving a commercial property insurance policy with multiple domestic and foreign insurers. The case addresses whether arbitration clauses in the policy are enforceable against domestic insurers under Louisiana law and whether litigation against domestic insurers should be stayed pending arbitration with foreign insurers.

1. Whether arbitration clauses in insurance contracts with domestic insurers are enforceable under Louisiana law, which prohibits such clauses
2. Whether the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards supersedes Louisiana law for foreign insurers
3. Whether equitable estoppel can be used to compel arbitration despite Louisiana's statutory prohibition
4. Whether litigation against domestic insurers should be stayed pending arbitration against foreign insurers under the Waste Management factors
5. Whether the policy contains a single arbitration agreement or separate bilateral agreements between the insured and each insurer

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court held that: (1) the policy contains separate bilateral agreements between the insured and each individual insurer based on the Contract Allocation Endorsement; (2) Louisiana law prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance contracts with domestic insurers, and this prohibition is not superseded by the Convention for domestic insurers; (3) equitable estoppel cannot be used to circumvent Louisiana's statutory prohibition on arbitration in insurance contracts; (4) arbitration with foreign insurers remains enforceable under the Convention; and (5) the district court abused its discretion by lifting the stay of litigation against domestic insurers without considering the Waste Management factors for whether a stay is appropriate pending arbitration with foreign insurers. The court remanded for the district court to reconsider whether a stay should be imposed against the domestic insurers, applying the Waste Management factors, which require: (1) the arbitrated and litigated disputes involve the same operative facts; (2) the claims are inherently inseparable; and (3) the litigation has a critical impact on the arbitration.

This is an appeal from a bench trial in which the district court awarded Michael Ramirez only nominal damages for the City of Texas City's violation of his procedural due process rights in demolishing his house. The central issue is whether the district court erred in denying Ramirez's right to a jury trial despite his repeated requests for one throughout the litigation.

1. Whether Ramirez properly invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial through his Certificate of Interested Parties filed after removal to federal court, or alternatively, whether the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 39(b) motion for a jury trial
2. Whether the district court properly limited damages to nominal damages when the City violated Ramirez's procedural due process rights but the property was determined to be a public nuisance
3. Whether Ramirez qualified as a "prevailing party" entitled to attorney's fees despite receiving only nominal damages

The Fifth Circuit VACATED and REMANDED the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Ramirez's Rule 39(b) motion for a jury trial. Applying the five-factor Daniel test, the court found that all factors favored Ramirez: (1) the case involved quintessential jury issues regarding whether the property constituted a public nuisance; (2) the court had scheduled the case for jury trial two months in advance, so no disruption occurred; (3) any prejudice would be to Ramirez, not the City, which had ample notice through multiple filings and the joint case management plan; (4) Ramirez's consistent requests for a jury trial throughout litigation negated any delay; and (5) Ramirez's belief that his initial jury demand was sufficient constituted a compelling reason for any procedural deficiency. The court emphasized that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial is fundamental and requires favorable treatment of Rule 39(b) motions absent "strong and compelling reasons" to deny them. On the damages issue, the court held that while takings damages are unavailable for property that is a nuisance, the question of whether Ramirez can recover compensatory damages for procedural due process violations must be determined by a jury on remand, as such damages may flow from the City's failure to follow proper procedures if Ramirez could have saved his personal property with proper notice. The court declined to address the attorney's fees issue, leaving all matters for resolution on remand.

This case involves an appeal of a National Labor Relations Board order finding that VNS Federal Services, LLC violated the National Labor Relations Act by terminating an employee, Israel Bo Sword, in retaliation for his complaint that the company violated the collective bargaining agreement. The court reviewed whether the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the remedial order was appropriate.

1. Whether an employee's complaint about an alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes protected "concerted activity" under the Interboro doctrine, even if the employee's interpretation of the agreement is incorrect, as long as the invocation is honest and reasonable
2. Whether the employer discharged the employee based on animus toward the employee's protected concerted activity
3. Whether the employer's stated justification for the discharge (lack of work) was pretextual
4. Whether the Board abused its discretion in imposing a remedial order including reinstatement and backpay, or whether such challenges should be deferred to the compliance stage

The Sixth Circuit granted the NLRB's petition for enforcement in full. The court held that: (1) substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Sword engaged in protected concerted activity by honestly and reasonably invoking his rights under the collective bargaining agreement when he complained about Dillow's 40-hour guarantee, even though the agreement did not actually prohibit such arrangements; (2) substantial evidence supported the finding that VNS discharged Sword based on animus toward his protected activity, as evidenced by the timing of the discharge, statements by management expressing displeasure with Sword's complaint, and the abrupt reversal of the plan to recall employees; (3) substantial evidence supported the finding that VNS's stated justification of "lack of work" was pretextual, given that VNS hired new operators and had existing operators work overtime after Sword's discharge; and (4) the court declined to address VNS's challenges to the remedial order at the liability stage, deferring such issues to the compliance proceedings in accordance with established Board and court practice, noting that the Supreme Court has approved this procedure of ordering conventional remedies of reinstatement and backpay while leaving specific calculations to compliance proceedings.

This is a disability insurance contract interpretation case in which a dentist sought benefits after becoming unable to work due to hip and back injuries, but his insurer denied benefits after learning he was earning income from part-time teaching and professional association work. The central dispute concerns whether the plaintiff's income-generating activities constituted "gainful occupation" under the policy's definition of "total disability."

1. Whether the term "gainful occupation" in the disability insurance policy is ambiguous
2. Whether the policy qualifies as a "general" disability policy (requiring inability to perform any job for which qualified) or an "occupational" disability policy (requiring inability to perform only the regular job)
3. Whether the plaintiff's part-time teaching and professional association work, generating $67,000-$70,000 annually after disability, constituted "gainful occupation" under the policy
4. Whether the insurer acted in bad faith in denying benefits under the Illinois Insurance Code

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Paul Revere Life Insurance Company. The court held that: (1) the term "gainful occupation" is unambiguous and means work from which a person can earn a reasonably substantial income or livelihood; (2) the policy is a "general" disability policy requiring the insured to be unable to perform any job for which qualified, not merely the regular occupation; (3) the undisputed facts show the plaintiff earned $67,000-$70,000 annually from his non-clinical work, which constitutes a reasonable living and therefore gainful employment; (4) the plaintiff failed to meet the policy's definition of "total disability" because he was engaged in gainful occupation; and (5) absent a breach of contract, the bad faith claim under the Illinois Insurance Code necessarily fails. The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the policy was occupational rather than general, and that "gainful occupation" should be defined as earning at least 60% of pre-disability earnings.

This is a Clean Water Act citizen suit brought by environmental organizations against Corona Clay Company for alleged stormwater permit violations related to industrial clay-recycling activities near Temescal Creek in California. The case involves multiple trials and appeals spanning several years, with intervening changes in Supreme Court precedent affecting the legal standards applicable to the dispute.

1. Whether the requirement that a Clean Water Act violation involve "waters of the United States" is a subject-matter jurisdiction requirement or a merits question
2. Whether Temescal Creek constitutes a "water of the United States" under the Clean Water Act, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Sackett v. EPA (2023), which narrowed the definition from prior precedent
3. Whether Corona is entitled to a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 based on an intervening change in law, despite having conceded during trial that Temescal Creek was a water of the United States
4. Whether Corona's failure to challenge Temescal Creek's status as a water of the United States earlier should be excused based on the intervening Sackett decision

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of Corona's motion for a new trial and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court's reasoning:

1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: The court affirmed the district court's denial of Corona's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that whether a case involves "waters of the United States" is a merits question, not a jurisdictional requirement. The statutory text of the Clean Water Act does not strongly signal that involvement of waters of the United States is necessary for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The court distinguished between "jurisdiction" in the regulatory sense (referring to the EPA's and Corps' authority over certain waters) and subject-matter jurisdiction (the court's power to hear the case). A colorable allegation that the defendant violated the Clean Water Act is sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction.
2. New Trial Under Rule 59: The court reversed the district court's denial of Corona's motion for a new trial. Although Corona did not dispute Temescal Creek's status as a water of the United States during either trial, the court held that an intervening change in law can warrant a new trial on a previously unlitigated issue when: (a) the change in law announces a substantial departure from the previous rule; (b) the party raises the issue at the earliest procedural opportunity; and (c) the court retains jurisdiction. These circumstances were present here because:
   • Before Sackett, the law under United States v. Moses established that seasonally intermittent tributaries of navigable waters were themselves waters of the United States, making it futile for Corona to challenge Temescal Creek's status
   • Sackett substantially departed from this precedent by adopting the Rapanos plurality's narrower test requiring "relatively permanent" waterbodies and rejecting Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" approach
   • Corona raised the issue immediately after Sackett was decided
   • The district court retained jurisdiction
   • Corona's admission that Temescal Creek was a water of the United States was contingent on the law existing at the time and was a legal conclusion, not a factual admission (Corona disputed that Temescal Creek was a "permanent, long-standing water feature")
3. Remand: The court remanded for further proceedings rather than amending the judgment because Sackett broadened the scope of factual findings relevant to determining what constitutes a water of the United States, and the court could not determine in the first instance whether Temescal Creek satisfies the new standard. The district court may consider limiting the scope of further proceedings to the question of whether Temescal Creek is a water of the United States under Sackett.

This is an Appointments Clause challenge to the constitutionality of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council's structure and authority under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Commercial fishermen challenged a rule reducing catch limits for gag grouper, arguing that Council members were improperly appointed and wielded unconstitutional authority in violation of separation of powers principles.

1. Whether the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the rule based on alleged constitutional defects in the Council's appointment and removal structure, even though those defects did not directly affect the rule at issue
2. Whether Council members are "officers of the United States" exercising "significant authority" under the Appointments Clause, requiring appointment by the President and Senate confirmation
3. Whether the Council's veto powers over certain Secretary actions constitute significant federal authority that triggers Appointments Clause requirements
4. What remedy is appropriate when a constitutional defect is identified in a statute—whether to vacate the challenged rule or to sever only the unconstitutional provisions

The Eleventh Circuit held that: (1) the plaintiffs have standing to bring their Appointments Clause challenge despite the constitutional defect not affecting the specific rule at issue; (2) Council members do exercise significant authority through the Council's veto powers, making them officers subject to Appointments Clause requirements; (3) however, the appropriate remedy is to declare the veto provisions invalid and unenforceable, not to vacate the gag grouper rule itself; and (4) because the gag grouper rule was promulgated through the Council's advisory proposal function (not its veto powers), and the Secretary independently adopted it, the rule was not tainted by the constitutional defect and should not be vacated. The court remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the government rather than for the plaintiffs, as the plaintiffs received no relief from their claims.

This is an errata sheet for a First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion issued on August 11, 2026, in a case involving petitioner Ishmael Koigor Bangs against the Attorney General. The document corrects minor typographical errors in the original opinion.

The document does not address substantive legal issues, as it is merely an errata sheet containing corrections to the original opinion text.

The Court amended its prior opinion by making the following corrections:

1. On page 3, line 14: replaced "employ" with "employment"
2. On page 4, line 13: replaced "years" with "years'"

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Matthew Frazier challenges his conviction for possession of child pornography and his sentence, raising two issues: whether the district court erred in failing to order a second competency hearing and whether it erred in imposing a full-time employment requirement as a condition of supervised release.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing when Frazier reported experiencing ongoing auditory and visual hallucinations at the jury trial waiver hearing, despite having been found competent approximately one year earlier.
2. Whether the district court committed plain error in imposing a full-time employment condition (30+ hours per week) as part of supervised release when the court had recognized at sentencing that Frazier was unable to maintain employment due to his disability.

The court affirmed the district court's decision on both issues. Regarding competency: The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a second competency hearing. Although Frazier reported ongoing hallucinations, the evidence showed he could distinguish hallucinations from reality, his attorney (who had requested the first competency evaluation) believed his decision-making remained at the same level as when previously found competent, and the judge conducted a thorough colloquy demonstrating Frazier's rational understanding of his waiver of jury trial rights. Mental illness alone does not establish incompetency, and there was no evidence of a change in condition that called into question the prior competency determination. Regarding the employment condition: The court held that the district court did not commit plain error. Although Frazier argued the condition was inconsistent with the court's recognition of his inability to work, the condition included alternative requirements (10 hours of community service per week or job skills training) if full-time employment could not be obtained within 90 days. The court reasoned that Frazier's current incapability did not necessarily mean he would remain incapable after ten years of imprisonment and treatment, and he could seek modification of conditions upon release if necessary.

This is a civil asset forfeiture case in which the United States sought to recover approximately $1.2 million in funds held in Liechtenstein bank accounts belonging to Younes Nasri, a Canadian citizen and alleged fugitive charged with racketeering and drug conspiracy related to selling encrypted phones to criminals. The central issue is whether a federal district court can exercise in rem jurisdiction over foreign property without establishing control or constructive control over that property.

1. Whether a district court can exercise in rem jurisdiction over foreign assets under 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(2) without establishing actual or constructive control over the property
2. Whether such exercise of jurisdiction violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
3. Whether the fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2466, applies to strike Nasri's claim of innocent ownership
4. Whether Nasri forfeited his jurisdictional arguments by failing to raise them initially, and whether the party presentation principle bars review
5. Whether the case is justiciable under Article III given the lack of control over the defendant property

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order and remanded the case. The majority held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires a federal court to establish control or constructive control over property before exercising in rem jurisdiction in a civil forfeiture action. The court rejected the government's argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(2) permits jurisdiction over foreign property without such control, finding that this would violate fundamental due process principles rooted in historical in rem jurisdiction requirements. The court reasoned that: (1) historically, in rem jurisdiction required seizure or constructive control of property; (2) prior Ninth Circuit cases interpreting § 1355 engaged only in statutory analysis without addressing constitutional requirements; (3) the Due Process Clause requires control or constructive control to ensure proper notice to interested parties and to prevent unbounded exercise of jurisdiction; and (4) applying the Supreme Court's more flexible jurisdictional standard from Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization does not change this result because the civil forfeiture statute is a broad, general statute unlike the narrow, foreign-affairs-focused statute in Fuld. The court remanded for the district court to determine whether it has control or constructive control over the assets, using the Second Circuit's Meza standard as guidance—examining whether there is a restraining order issued at federal request, foreign court approval, and general cooperation from foreign authorities such that the foreign government acts as an agent of the United States. Judge Bybee's concurrence emphasized Article III justiciability concerns, arguing the case is premature and nonjusticiable without seizure or control of the property. Judge Bennett's dissent argued the majority's holding overrides Congress's judgment, interferes with foreign affairs, and contradicts binding precedent.

This is a civil rights case in which six nonbinary individuals challenged Puerto Rico's birth certificate policy that permits transgender binary individuals to change their gender marker to align with their identity but does not provide an option for nonbinary individuals to select an "X" gender marker. The plaintiffs alleged the policy violated their Equal Protection and Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and First Amendment rights.

1. Whether Puerto Rico's birth certificate policy, which allows binary transgender individuals to change their gender marker but does not permit nonbinary individuals to select an "X" marker, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
2. What level of scrutiny applies to the challenged classification between binary and nonbinary transgender individuals
3. Whether the policy satisfies rational basis review under the standards established in United States v. Skrmetti

The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court held that Puerto Rico's Birth Certificate Policy withstands rational basis review and therefore does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that Puerto Rico has a legitimate interest in protecting privacy rights, and the distinction between allowing binary transgender individuals to update their gender markers (as required by the prior Arroyo González decision based on privacy concerns) while not permitting nonbinary individuals to do so is rationally related to that legitimate interest. The court emphasized that under the forgiving rational basis standard, a classification need only be supported by any "fairly conceivable set of facts" that could ground a rational relationship to a legitimate government goal, and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate no such rational basis exists.

This is a criminal appeal in which Diego Edgardo Aleman-Lozano, a nonimmigrant visa holder, challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(B), which prohibits nonimmigrant visa holders from possessing firearms. Aleman-Lozano argues the statute violates the Second Amendment.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(B) violates the Second Amendment as applied to nonimmigrant visa holders
2. Whether nonimmigrant visa holders are part of "the people" protected by the Second Amendment under the Bruen framework
3. Whether the firearm possession restriction is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation

The Third Circuit affirmed Aleman-Lozano's conviction, holding that § 922(g)(5)(B) does not violate the Second Amendment. The majority assumed without deciding that at least some nonimmigrant visa holders are among "the people" protected by the Second Amendment, invoking principles of constitutional avoidance and judicial restraint. Proceeding to Bruen Step Two, the court found substantial historical support for disarming those with presumptive allegiance to a foreign sovereign. The court traced a historical tradition from English common law through the Revolutionary period of disarming individuals considered disloyal to the sovereign unless they swore an oath of allegiance. The court concluded that § 922(g)(5)(B) addresses the same allegiance concern as these historical laws and burdens the right in the same manner—by disarming noncitizens until they complete naturalization and swear an oath of allegiance to the United States. Therefore, the statute is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Judge Phipps concurred in the judgment but argued the facial challenge should fail at Bruen Step One because at least some nonimmigrant visa holders (such as C-1 transit visa holders) are not part of "the people."

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless entry into his apartment. A state trooper conducted a "hit-and-hold" operation (securing a package without a search warrant) in Apartment 1, though the original warrant authorized entry only into Apartment 2, and the defendant argues the evidence should be excluded as fruit of an unlawful search.

1. Whether the exclusionary rule applies when police conduct an unlawful search based on an isolated mistake rather than deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent misconduct
2. Whether Trooper Montz's reliance on incorporation language in the tracker order to authorize entry into Apartment 1 constituted gross negligence warranting suppression
3. Whether police officers should be held to the same legal interpretation standards as lawyers when reading judicial orders

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of the suppression motion and the conviction. The court held that while Trooper Montz's warrantless entry into Apartment 1 was unlawful, the exclusionary rule does not apply because his conduct amounted to at most isolated negligence rather than the deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent misconduct required to trigger suppression. The court reasoned that Montz reasonably relied on incorporation language in the tracker order that referenced his affidavit requesting permission to enter secondary locations, and that police officers should not be held to the same strict legal interpretation standards as lawyers. The court emphasized that suppression is a deterrent for future misconduct, not a remedy for past wrongs, and that excluding reliable evidence carries substantial social costs that are not justified when officers make understandable mistakes.

This is an immigration removal appeal in which a lawful permanent resident challenges a 2011 removal order based on a 1997 narcotics conviction. The petitioner seeks to reopen or reconsider the removal order based on a 2023 Second Circuit decision interpreting the New York statute underlying his conviction, arguing the decision undermines the basis for his removal.

1. Whether a change in law constitutes a valid basis for a statutory motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)
2. Whether equitable tolling applies to cure the time bar on a statutory motion for reconsideration under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)
3. Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of a sua sponte motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)
4. Whether the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Minter constitutes an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for review and dismissed the challenge to the sua sponte reopening denial. The court held:

1. Changes in law are not a basis for statutory motions to reopen. The plain language of § 1229a(c)(7) requires "new facts" and "evidentiary material," which judicial decisions do not constitute. The statutory scheme distinguishes between motions to reopen (for new facts) and motions for reconsideration (for legal errors), with different time limits reflecting Congress's intent to preclude changes in law from reopening motions.
2. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was time-barred (filed 13 years after the removal order, well beyond the 30-day deadline), and equitable tolling was not appropriate. The court found that a subsequent judicial opinion interpreting long-standing statutes does not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting equitable tolling, particularly where the petitioner could have raised the same legal arguments prior to the decision. The court emphasized that permitting tolling based on new case law would undermine finality and contradict the statutory scheme.
3. The court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of the sua sponte motion to reopen because such motions are committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA. The limited exception permitting remand only applies when the BIA relies on an incorrect legal premise, which did not occur here. The BIA properly determined that new case law does not constitute a "fundamental change" in law warranting sua sponte relief.

This is an employment discrimination case in which Delsonya Wilkins-Bailey, a Black woman, challenged her termination by Essity Professional Hygiene North America for refusing to comply with the company's COVID-19 vaccination policy. Wilkins-Bailey brought claims for religious discrimination (failure to accommodate) and race discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981.

1. Whether Wilkins-Bailey's sincere religious beliefs opposing COVID-19 vaccination are "religious in nature" under Title VII, specifically whether her "body is a temple" belief constitutes an essential part of her religious faith that conflicts with the vaccination requirement
2. Whether Wilkins-Bailey's beliefs constitute a religious obligation to refuse vaccination or merely a personal choice/preference that Title VII does not protect
3. Whether Wilkins-Bailey established a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing differential treatment compared to similarly situated white employees
4. Whether Essity's stated reason for denying Wilkins-Bailey's religious accommodation request (that her objections were "secular" rather than "religious") was pretextual for racial discrimination

Religious Discrimination Claim (Reversed and Remanded): The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the religious discrimination claim. The majority held that Wilkins-Bailey's beliefs are "religious in nature" under Title VII because: (1) she connected her vaccine refusal to her belief that her body is God's temple and that protecting it is "God's law"; (2) she grounded her beliefs in Biblical teachings, prayer, and guidance from the Holy Spirit; and (3) courts must not dissect religious beliefs or require them to be articulated with legal precision. The court rejected the argument that beliefs individually discerned through prayer and meditation are merely "personal choices" unprotected by Title VII, noting that many religions permit adherents to interpret teachings individually. The court emphasized that sincere religious beliefs need not be logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others, and that mixed religious and secular motives do not defeat Title VII protection. The court remanded for the district court to determine whether Essity could demonstrate undue hardship in accommodating Wilkins-Bailey's beliefs.

Race Discrimination Claim (Affirmed): The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the race discrimination claim. Although the court found that Wilkins-Bailey established a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing that seven white employees received approved religious accommodations for similar body-as-a-temple and fetal cell objections while her request was denied, the court concluded that Essity provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason: it viewed the white employees' requests as stating "religious" reasons while viewing Wilkins-Bailey's as stating "secular" reasons. The court found no pretext for racial discrimination because: (1) Essity denied numerous other accommodation requests phrased similarly to Wilkins-Bailey's across racial lines; (2) Essity's statistical evidence showed it approved 29.08% of white employees' requests, 42.86% of non-white employees' requests, and 33.33% of Black employees' requests, showing no pattern of racial discrimination; and (3) Essity's misclassification of Wilkins-Bailey's objections as secular rather than religious did not itself demonstrate racial animus. The court noted that Title VII forbids discrimination on racial grounds, not unwise personnel decisions.

Dissent (Judge Floyd): Judge Floyd would have affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the religious discrimination claim. The dissent argued that: (1) the majority improperly applied the motion to dismiss plausibility standard at the summary judgment stage, lowering Wilkins-Bailey's evidentiary burden; (2) Wilkins-Bailey's contradictory deposition testimony was insufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that her religious beliefs were connected to her vaccine refusal; (3) Wilkins-Bailey's own testimony established that vaccination was a "personal decision" for her, not a religious obligation; and (4) the majority's approach creates floodgates concerns by allowing any employee to invoke religious language to transform personal preferences into protected religious beliefs, citing hypothetical examples of employees citing Bible verses to justify refusing to work before noon, refusing to follow alcohol policies, or refusing to work with disabled colleagues.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in which Michael Kevin Adams challenges his state conviction for capital murder, arguing that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for intentionally causing his former fiancée's death in the course of committing retaliation. The Fifth Circuit affirms the district court's denial of habeas relief.

1. Whether the state court's affirmation of Adams's conviction for capital murder involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
2. Whether sufficient evidence supported Adams's conviction under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, which requires that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
3. Whether AEDPA's deferential standard applies to sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, or whether such claims are exempt from AEDPA's relitigation bar
4. Whether circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a murder conviction

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, holding that Adams failed to meet the "exceedingly high hurdle" required to overturn his conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. The court reasoned as follows:

1. AEDPA's Demanding Standard: Under AEDPA, a state prisoner must show that the state court's decision "involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law," meaning the state court was "so wrong that the error was 'well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" The court emphasized that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.
2. Jackson's Deferential Standard: Under Jackson v. Virginia, sufficiency review requires viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and asking whether any rational juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts must presume the jury resolved conflicts in favor of the prosecution and cannot reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. This standard is "so demanding" that a defendant "faces a nearly insurmountable hurdle."
3. Combined Effect: When AEDPA and Jackson are combined, a habeas petitioner must show that every rational jurist would agree that every rational juror would not have found the defendant guilty. The court noted that "if a single reasonable jurist would think that a reasonable juror could have convicted the petitioner, then relief is foreclosed."
4. Circumstantial Evidence Sufficiency: The Supreme Court has never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, even when proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. Therefore, a state court can lawfully affirm a conviction resting solely on circumstantial evidence.
5. Application to Adams's Case: The state court of appeals conducted a thorough analysis and cited fifteen pieces of evidence pointing to Adams's guilt, including: DNA placing him at the crime scene; repeated death threats; stalking behavior; items similar to those used in the prior assault appearing on the victim's porch; erratic phone use; lack of confirmed alibi; photographs of firearms similar to the murder weapon; and a screw possibly from a firearm found in his truck. The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict meant the state court's decision was not objectively unreasonable.
6. Rejection of Adams's Arguments: The court rejected Adams's factual arguments as mere "evidentiary quibbles" that second-guessed the jury's inferences regarding touch DNA, photographs, the screw, and cellphone use—all matters within the jury's sole province. The court also rejected Adams's legal argument that AEDPA never applies to Jackson claims, noting that nothing in AEDPA's text excepts sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims and that numerous Supreme Court decisions have reversed courts of appeals for failing to give proper deference to state-court decisions in factual-sufficiency challenges.

This is an interlocutory appeal in a criminal case where a defendant charged with making threats and stalking challenges a district court order requiring him to undergo a psychiatric evaluation to determine his competence to stand trial. The defendant argues the evaluation order violates his privacy rights and that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the evaluation.

1. Whether the Tenth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of a psychiatric evaluation order under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) when the defendant is already in pretrial detention
2. Whether such an evaluation order qualifies for immediate appeal under the collateral-order doctrine
3. Whether an already-detained defendant's interest in avoiding a psychiatric evaluation outweighs the public interest in prompt trials

The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit held that psychiatric evaluation orders for already-detained defendants do not satisfy the collateral-order doctrine's requirement that an order resolve an "important issue" separate from the merits. The court reasoned that when a defendant is already detained, his interest in avoiding the intrusion of a competency evaluation is outweighed by society's compelling interest in speedy trials, efficient administration of justice, and the preservation of evidence and witness testimony. The court distinguished its precedent in United States v. Deters (which allowed appeals of evaluation orders) because that case involved an undetained defendant whose bail would be effectively revoked by commitment to a mental health facility. The court also rejected arguments based on Sell v. United States, noting that the district court's order directed only evaluation, not forced medical treatment. Therefore, the court declined to extend the collateral-order doctrine to this new category of orders and dismissed without addressing the merits of Bayne's arguments.

This is an appeal concerning the jurisdictional authority of federal district courts to review and vacate court-martial convictions on collateral review. Robert Bergdahl, an Army soldier convicted of desertion and misbehavior before the enemy, sought to have his court-martial conviction vacated in federal district court based on alleged due process violations and undisclosed judicial bias.

1. Whether Article III district courts possess jurisdiction on collateral review to vacate court-martial judgments
2. Whether the distinction between direct appellate review and collateral review limits district court authority over military court judgments
3. Whether Bergdahl's claims fall within recognized narrow exceptions to the general prohibition on collateral review of court-martial convictions (habeas corpus, Tucker Act claims for back pay, or military correction-of-records proceedings)
4. Whether federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides an independent basis for district courts to vacate military judgments

The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that Article III district courts lack authority on collateral review to vacate court-martial judgments. The court reasoned that: (1) the longstanding principle established in Schlesinger v. Councilman prohibits district courts from directly reviewing court-martial determinations; (2) collateral relief must operate on the consequences of a judgment rather than the judgment itself; (3) Bergdahl's request to have his conviction expunged and all rights restored constitutes direct appellate review rather than permissible collateral attack; (4) Bergdahl did not seek relief under one of the three narrow recognized exceptions to collateral review restrictions (habeas corpus, Tucker Act claims, or military correction-of-records review); and (5) while federal question jurisdiction may support a proper collateral challenge, it confers only original jurisdiction and does not authorize district courts to vacate military judgments themselves. The authority to vacate court-martial judgments belongs exclusively to tribunals exercising direct appellate review within the military justice system.

This is a civil rights case brought by incarcerated individuals challenging the Delaware Department of Correction's failure to provide decontamination after exposure to oleoresin capsicum (OC), a chemical agent derived from chili peppers. The plaintiffs allege that the absence of decontamination violates the Cruel Punishment Clause of the Delaware Constitution.

1. Whether the plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief based on a reasonable apprehension of future harm
2. Whether the dispute over decontamination is ripe for adjudication
3. Whether a private right of action exists under the Cruel Punishment Clause to seek declaratory or injunctive relief
4. Whether the Cruel Punishment Clause has meaning independent of the Eighth Amendment
5. Whether the Cruel Punishment Clause incorporates a "Cruel Intent Requirement" (deliberate indifference) or requires only a cruel effect
6. Whether the adoption of a new decontamination policy renders the litigation moot
7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction barring OC use pending trial
8. Whether an interlocutory appeal should be certified before final judgment

The court denied the defendant's application for interlocutory appeal, though it analyzed the merits of the underlying issues. On the substantive claims:

1. The court rejected the defendant's standing and ripeness arguments, holding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of future harm and that a ripe dispute existed.
2. The court held that a private right of action exists under the Cruel Punishment Clause enabling plaintiffs to seek declaratory or injunctive relief, rejecting the defendant's argument that no such right exists.
3. The court held that the Cruel Punishment Clause can have meaning independent of the Eighth Amendment and does not incorporate a Cruel Intent Requirement—it requires only a cruel effect, not deliberate indifference.
4. The court rejected the mootness argument, finding that the defendant's newly adopted decontamination policy did not moot the case.
5. The court denied the preliminary injunction motion because, although the plaintiffs established irreparable harm and a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the balance of hardships weighed against granting the broad relief requested (a complete ban on OC use), since OC and handcuffs are essential tools for maintaining prison safety.
6. Regarding interlocutory appeal: The application from the Threshold Opinion was untimely (filed 25 days late). While the Private Right Argument and Same Meaning Argument satisfied the substantial-issue and material-importance requirements for certification, the court recommended against certification because: (a) the case is scheduled for expedited trial in December 2026; (b) discovery is largely complete and trial will focus on expert testimony; (c) only narrow relief is available (declaratory judgment and targeted mandatory injunction, not a blanket OC ban); and (d) the case may be resolved through settlement, mooting the need for appeal. The court concluded that appellate review after final judgment would be more efficient and just than a two-track proceeding.

This case involves a challenge to the federal government's project to demolish and rebuild the East Wing of the White House, which includes constructing a new ballroom above ground and a military installation below ground. The National Trust for Historic Preservation sought to enjoin the above-ground construction, and the Supreme Court considered whether to stay the lower courts' injunction pending the government's appeal.

1. Whether the National Trust for Historic Preservation has Article III standing to challenge the White House East Wing project based on the aesthetic injury to one of its members who objects to the design of the proposed ballroom
2. Whether the district court's preliminary injunction should be stayed pending the government's petition for certiorari
3. Whether the government likely exceeded its authority in undertaking the project without express congressional authorization

The Supreme Court granted the government's application for a stay of the district court's injunction. The majority held that the Trust likely lacks Article III standing because the injury claimed by its member—aesthetic offense at the ballroom's design—constitutes mere disagreement or distaste rather than a concrete and particularized injury required by Article III. The Court reasoned that allowing standing based solely on aesthetic offense would eliminate meaningful limits on who could sue, as virtually any government action offends someone's sensibilities. The Court also found that the government would suffer irreparable harm from the injunction, including national security concerns and construction delays, which substantially outweigh the Trust's claimed aesthetic injury. Chief Justice Roberts dissented, arguing that Hoagland's injury as a dedicated historic preservationist viewing a distinctive building like the White House is sufficiently concrete and particularized, and that the distinction from environmental standing cases does not hold up.

This is a First Amendment challenge to New Jersey's requirement that physicians obtain a state medical license before providing telemedicine services to patients located in New Jersey. Out-of-state physicians and their patients challenged the licensing requirement as an unconstitutional speech restriction, along with dormant Commerce Clause, Privileges and Immunities Clause, and substantive due process claims.

1. Whether New Jersey's telemedicine licensing requirement constitutes a content-based restriction on speech subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment
2. Whether, if content-based, the restriction is justified by the long historical tradition of medical licensing laws
3. What level of constitutional scrutiny applies to content-based speech restrictions with robust historical pedigrees
4. Whether the law violates the dormant Commerce Clause
5. Whether the law violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause
6. Whether a parent has Article III standing to challenge the law based on substantive due process rights

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that:

1. First Amendment: While New Jersey's telemedicine law is a content-based speech restriction (because it prohibits specific medical speech like diagnoses and treatment recommendations without a license), it does not violate the First Amendment. The court reasoned that medical licensing laws have a robust historical pedigree dating back to 1518 in England and have been consistently applied in America for over a century as content-based restrictions. This long tradition suggests that strict scrutiny is inappropriate. Under intermediate scrutiny, the law survives because New Jersey has an important interest in protecting patient health and safety, and the burdens on out-of-state physicians (streamlined application process, modest fees, administrative tasks) are not substantially more burdensome than necessary to achieve that interest.
2. Dormant Commerce Clause: The law does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it applies equally to in-state and out-of-state physicians and does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Any burden on interstate commerce is not clearly excessive in relation to New Jersey's legitimate local interest in protecting patient health.
3. Privileges and Immunities Clause: The law does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it does not discriminate against non-residents; all physicians, regardless of residence, must obtain a New Jersey license to practice telemedicine with New Jersey patients.
4. Substantive Due Process: Michael Abell lacks Article III standing to bring a substantive due process claim because his alleged injury is too speculative and conjectural. The possibility that his son might need a future telemedicine consultation with Dr. MacDonald is not sufficiently imminent or certain to establish standing. The court dismissed this claim without prejudice.

This is a products liability appeal involving a plaintiff injured when her 2002 Ford Explorer's airbags allegedly deployed spontaneously, causing her to lose control and crash. The plaintiff sued Ford under a "malfunction theory" that permits inference of a defect based on circumstantial evidence rather than proof of a specific defect.

1. Whether the "malfunction theory" under Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability applies when the allegedly defective product is available for inspection, rather than lost or destroyed
2. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of a defect at the time of sale
3. Whether the age, prior repairs, and extended use of the vehicle undermine any inference that a defect originated with the manufacturer

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Ford. The court held that: (1) the malfunction theory does not apply when an allegedly defective product remains available for inspection, as the doctrine's purpose is to assist plaintiffs lacking access to evidence through no fault of their own; (2) even if the malfunction theory applied, Coates's evidence was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the 14-year-old vehicle with over 93,000 miles of use, multiple owners, and extensive prior repairs and accidents made it speculative rather than probable that any defect originated at the time of Ford's sale; and (3) the plaintiff's failure to pursue recommended further inspection of the restraint control module (RCM) and frontal accelerometer sensor undermined her claim to have been deprived of evidence through no fault of her own.

This is an employment discrimination case in which Delsonya Wilkins-Bailey challenged her termination by Essity Professional Hygiene North America for refusing to comply with the company's COVID-19 vaccination policy. Wilkins-Bailey brought claims for religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as race discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1981.

1. Whether Wilkins-Bailey's stated religious beliefs opposing COVID-19 vaccination—specifically her belief that her body is a temple of God—are "religious in nature" under Title VII, or whether they constitute merely personal or secular preferences
2. Whether a sincere religious belief that permits individual discernment or interpretation (rather than imposing an absolute mandate) qualifies as an "essential part of a religious faith" protected by Title VII
3. Whether Wilkins-Bailey established a prima facie case of race discrimination by demonstrating differential treatment compared to similarly situated white employees who received religious accommodations
4. Whether Essity's stated nondiscriminatory reason for denying Wilkins-Bailey's accommodation request (that her objections were "secular" rather than "religious") constitutes pretext for racial discrimination

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The majority (Judges Hudson and Agee) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the religious discrimination claim, finding that Wilkins-Bailey stated a prima facie case of religious discrimination. The court held that: (1) Wilkins-Bailey's beliefs connecting her body-as-a-temple theology to vaccine refusal are "religious in nature" under Title VII; (2) religious beliefs need not impose absolute mandates but can involve personal discernment or interpretation and still be protected; (3) a claimant's mixed religious and secular motivations do not disqualify the claim; and (4) courts must not dissect religious beliefs or question their plausibility at summary judgment. The court remanded for the district court to determine whether Essity could demonstrate undue hardship in accommodating Wilkins-Bailey's beliefs. However, the majority affirmed summary judgment on the race discrimination claims. The court found that although Wilkins-Bailey established a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing seven white employees received religious accommodations while her request was denied, Essity's nondiscriminatory reason—that it viewed the white employees' requests as "religious" while viewing Wilkins-Bailey's as "secular"—was sufficient to defeat pretext. The court noted that Essity's statistical evidence showed it denied accommodations across racial lines using the same "religious versus secular" distinction, and that Essity's misclassification of Wilkins-Bailey's beliefs as secular did not itself demonstrate racial animus. Judge Floyd dissented in part, arguing that Wilkins-Bailey failed to meet her evidentiary burden at summary judgment to establish a nexus between her religious beliefs and her refusal to be vaccinated. The dissent contended that Wilkins-Bailey's contradictory deposition testimony—in which she characterized vaccination as a "personal decision" left to her individual discernment—was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact that her religious beliefs actually required her to refuse vaccination. The dissent warned that the majority's low evidentiary bar would create a "floodgates" problem by allowing any plaintiff to reach a jury merely by cloaking personal decisions in religious language.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Naum Morgovsky challenged his conviction for conspiracy to export defense articles without a license in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and two counts of money laundering, by filing a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Morgovsky was sentenced to nine years in prison after pleading guilty to smuggling components for night-vision and thermal-vision rifle scopes to Russia and laundering the proceeds.

1. Whether the State Department exceeded its statutory authority under the AECA by promulgating 22 C.F.R. § 127.1(a)(4), which criminalizes conspiracies to export defense articles without a license, and whether counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this regulation.
2. Whether Morgovsky's counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty to money-laundering counts without adequately informing him that those counts were predicated on unlicensed exportation rather than conspiracy to export.
3. Whether Morgovsky's § 2255 motion was timely filed and whether equitable tolling applies to excuse the late filing.
4. Whether the court should expand the certificate of appealability to include Morgovsky's uncertified claims of actual innocence.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Morgovsky's § 2255 motion on the following grounds:

1. Conspiracy Regulation Authority: The court held that the AECA's delegation of authority to "control" the export of defense articles and to "promulgate regulations" for their import and export authorized the State Department to issue the regulation criminalizing conspiracies to violate export restrictions. The court extended its prior precedent in United States v. Gurrola-Garcia (1976), which upheld the executive's authority to criminalize attempts to export arms, to also encompass conspiracies. The word "control" has a broad meaning that encompasses preventing inchoate offenses, and allowing prosecution only after completed exports would render the statutory scheme ineffectual. Therefore, counsel was not deficient in declining to raise this non-meritorious argument.
2. Money Laundering Plea: The court held that Morgovsky's claim was foreclosed by the factual record. The indictment clearly alleged that the money-laundering counts were predicated on "exportation of defense articles without first obtaining an export license," Morgovsky entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea and stated he "fully understood" the charges, and he cannot now obtain relief by claiming without new evidence that he did not understand the charges.
3. Actual Innocence Claims: The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include two uncertified actual innocence claims, as Morgovsky failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. The court rejected both claims on the merits: the conspiracy regulation argument failed for the reasons stated above, and the nondelegation doctrine argument had already been rejected on direct appeal.
4. Timeliness (Concurrence): Judge Forrest's concurrence argued that the motion was untimely filed (eight days after the one-year statutory deadline) and that Morgovsky failed to establish equitable tolling. His misunderstanding of the certiorari denial date, ordinary prison limitations, and logistical difficulties do not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting tolling, and the record showed he had opportunities to file timely before entering prison.

This is an ERISA pension benefits case in which the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her claim for her deceased sister's pension benefits. The plaintiff contended that her sister substantially complied with the pension plan's requirements for electing a lump sum distribution and designating the plaintiff as beneficiary before dying of cancer.

1. Whether the state law doctrine of substantial compliance is available under ERISA for benefit elections, or only for beneficiary designation changes
2. Whether Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan nullified the doctrine of substantial compliance under ERISA
3. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged that the decedent substantially complied with the plan's requirements under California law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. The court held that: (1) the doctrine of substantial compliance is available under ERISA for benefit elections, consistent with its prior application to beneficiary designations in Becker v. Williams; (2) Kennedy did not nullify substantial compliance doctrine because Kennedy involved an attempted beneficiary designation inconsistent with plan terms, whereas substantial compliance applies where a participant attempts to effectuate intent through the plan's designated mechanism; and (3) the complaint plausibly alleged that the decedent substantially complied with the plan's requirements under California law, as she completed and submitted the required election form while hospitalized with terminal cancer and died three days later, doing "all that could reasonably be required" under the circumstances.

This is an immigration law case in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the validity of the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule (the "Rule"), which restricts asylum eligibility for non-Mexican asylum seekers who entered the United States between ports of entry between May 11, 2023, and May 11, 2025. The court also addressed whether the agency properly applied the mixed motives framework in analyzing the petitioners' asylum claims.

1. Whether the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule is consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), which provides that any noncitizen who arrives in the United States—"whether or not at a designated port of arrival"—may apply for asylum
2. Whether the Rule's structure as a rebuttable presumption with exceptions, rather than a categorical ban, saves its validity
3. Whether the Rule's exceptions are legally valid and practically available to asylum seekers
4. Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals properly applied the complete mixed motives framework in determining whether the petitioners established a nexus to a protected ground for persecution
5. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) bars judicial review of the Rule's validity

The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings. The majority held that: (1) the Rule is inconsistent with the asylum statute because it restricts asylum eligibility based on manner of entry, which directly conflicts with § 1158(a)'s guarantee that noncitizens may seek asylum irrespective of how they entered the country; (2) the Rule's framing as a rebuttable presumption with exceptions does not cure this fundamental statutory conflict, as each exception is either legally invalid or practically unavailable; (3) § 1252(f) does not apply because the asylum statute is not among the provisions it covers, and the petitioners sought relief in their individual case rather than on a class-wide basis; and (4) the BIA committed legal error by failing to apply the court's complete mixed motives framework, which requires consideration of whether the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant but-for the applicant's membership in the protected social group, in addition to whether the protected ground alone would have motivated the persecution. The court reaffirmed its prior holdings in East Bay I and East Bay II that regulations restricting asylum eligibility based on manner of entry or requiring asylum seekers to be denied protection in transit countries are inconsistent with the asylum statute.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which a member of the Puerto Rico Police Department's Drug Unit was convicted of accepting a bribe under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) after he agreed to help a woman he arrested avoid a criminal conviction in exchange for sex. The defendant appeals his conviction on sufficiency of evidence and Fifth Amendment grounds.

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence that the value of the government "business" or "transaction" (helping the victim avoid a criminal conviction) met the statutory minimum of $5,000 required for conviction under § 666(a)(1)(B)
2. Whether the prosecution improperly commented on the defendant's failure to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination

The court affirmed the conviction on both grounds. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the court held that a reasonable jury could conclude the value of avoiding the criminal conviction exceeded $5,000 based on: (1) the victim's subjective valuation that she would pay over $10,000 to avoid a conviction; (2) her concerns about career advancement as a nurse; (3) objective costs she incurred including approximately $8,300 in legal fees, fines, and bonds; and (4) lost wages from missed work. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that costs were artificially inflated or that his anticipation of costs should limit liability. Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the court found no clear or obvious error because the prosecution's rebuttal argument emphasized affirmative evidence presented at trial (testimony from the victim and a corroborating witness) rather than commenting on the defendant's silence.

This is an immigration detention case in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addresses whether two noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection years ago can be mandatorily detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), or whether they must be detained under § 1226(a), which permits discretionary release on bond. The court holds that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens actively seeking admission at the border, not those already present in the country for extended periods.

1. Whether § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory detention provision applies to noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection years ago and are now detained in the country's interior, or whether § 1226(a)'s discretionary detention scheme applies instead
2. Whether the phrase "seeking admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A) has independent meaning distinct from "applicant for admission," and what that meaning is
3. Whether mandatory detention of noncitizens without bond hearings violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
4. Whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) eliminated the distinction between mandatory detention for arriving noncitizens and discretionary detention for those already present

The court affirmed the district courts' orders releasing the petitioners. The majority held that:

1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens already present in the United States who entered without inspection. The statute requires both that an individual be an "applicant for admission" AND be "seeking admission." While the petitioners qualify as "applicants for admission" under § 1225(a)(1) because they are present in the United States without having been lawfully admitted, they are not "seeking admission" because "seeking" in its ordinary meaning requires present or ongoing action to gain lawful entry. The petitioners took no affirmative action to seek admission; they simply remained in the country after unlawful entry.
2. The statutory scheme distinguishes between § 1225(b), which governs noncitizens arriving at or seeking admission to the United States and mandates detention, and § 1226(a), which governs noncitizens already within the country and permits discretionary release on bond. This distinction is supported by the statutes' titles, headings, the Supreme Court's description in Jennings v. Rodriguez, and the broader statutory context. IIRIRA did not eliminate this distinction; it only equalized procedural rights in removal proceedings.
3. The government's interpretation would render the phrase "seeking admission" superfluous, violating the cardinal principle of statutory construction that no clause should be void or insignificant. The use of the indefinite article "an" before "alien seeking admission" further indicates that this phrase refers to a different category than "applicant for admission."
4. The petitioners' detention without bond hearings violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test, the court found that: (a) the petitioners have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding physical restraint; (b) the absence of a neutral decisionmaker to assess dangerousness or flight risk presents a high risk of erroneous deprivation; and (c) the government's interest in detention does not outweigh these factors, particularly where the petitioners are non-criminal individuals with decades of residence in the United States and established community ties. The entry fiction doctrine from DHS v. Thuraissigiam does not apply to noncitizens who have lived in the country for years and established connections.

This is a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the family of Alberto Pena, who died while in custody at Starr County Jail in Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that county officers and jail staff were deliberately indifferent to Pena's serious medical needs, including head injuries sustained during arrest and while in custody, and that the county maintained a policy of inadequate medical monitoring.

1. Whether arresting deputies violated clearly established law by failing to inform jail authorities of Pena's head strikes and possible unconsciousness during transport
2. Whether day-shift jail officers violated clearly established law by failing to seek medical care for Pena despite his repeated head strikes, apparent unconsciousness, and high intoxication
3. Whether night-shift officers violated clearly established law by failing to provide medical care despite Pena's alleged signs of distress, including difficulty breathing and discoloration
4. Whether the night-shift supervisor was liable for failure to supervise based on inadequate observation checks
5. Whether Starr County maintained an official policy or custom of deliberate indifference to detainees' medical needs

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for all defendants. The court held that:

1. Arresting Deputies (Cervantes and Garcia): Entitled to qualified immunity. Although the deputies knew Pena was intoxicated and observed him striking his head three times in the patrol car, the court found that existing precedent (particularly Dyer v. Houston and Thompson v. Upshur County) did not clearly establish that failure to seek medical care or inform jail authorities was unlawful under these circumstances. Those cases involved more extreme erratic behavior consistent with drug-induced psychosis or delirium tremens, whereas Pena's behavior was more consistent with ordinary intoxication.
2. Day-Shift Officers (Sgt. Lopez and Officer Garza): Entitled to qualified immunity. Although the court acknowledged this was a closer question because officers observed more erratic behavior (fourteen head strikes, possible unconsciousness, rocking, and aggressive behavior), the court found that clearly established law did not prohibit their failure to seek medical care. The officers' conduct did not rise to the level of the "delusional detainee" scenarios in Dyer and Thompson, and reasonable officers could have concluded Pena's symptoms did not constitute a medical emergency.
3. Night-Shift Officers (Juarez and Suarez): Entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that even accepting Edgar Pena's testimony that his cousin showed signs of distress and complained of breathing difficulties, this did not clearly establish a violation. The court distinguished Sims v. Griffin, which involved more dramatic indicators of medical crisis (drug ingestion, repeated vomiting, steady deterioration), and noted that Pena was also yelling during the relevant period, making his condition ambiguous.
4. Supervisory Liability (Sgt. Garza): No material fact dispute. The Penas failed to establish a pattern of similar violations necessary for supervisory liability. A single nineteen-minute gap in observation checks, even if it violated state standards, did not constitute a constitutional violation or demonstrate deliberate indifference to a pattern of risks.
5. Municipal Liability (Starr County): No material fact dispute. The Penas failed to establish either an official policy or a de facto custom of deliberate indifference. Their allegations of inadequate training on identifying head injuries and medical distress were too general and not tied to a specific pattern of similar violations. The court noted that officers had received some first aid and medical training, and the Penas did not show why such training was obviously insufficient.
6. Wrongful Death and Survival Claims: Failed because they required an underlying constitutional violation, which the court found did not exist.

This case involves a dispute between parents of Annie M., a five-year-old child with Down syndrome, and the Aledo Independent School District (AISD) regarding whether the parents' partial consent to an initial evaluation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was sufficient to trigger the school district's obligation to evaluate and provide special education services. The parents refused to consent to formal cognitive assessments (WPPSI and ECAD tests) while consenting only to informal assessments (DAYC-2), and the school district refused to proceed with a partial evaluation.

1. Whether parents may provide "partial consent" to a proposed full and individual initial evaluation (FIE) under IDEA, consenting to some assessments while rejecting others
2. Whether the formal cognitive assessments (WPPSI and ECAD) were appropriately included in Annie's FIE despite her Down syndrome diagnosis
3. Whether the school district made "reasonable efforts" to obtain informed parental consent
4. Whether the school district violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by refusing to remove the formal cognitive assessments from the proposed evaluation
5. Whether an IDEA claim failure precludes a duplicative ADA claim

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AISD on both the IDEA and ADA claims. The court held:

1. Validity of Proposed FIE: The formal cognitive assessments (WPPSI and ECAD) were appropriately included in Annie's FIE. The court found no clear error in the hearing officer's findings that these assessments were not inappropriate for a three-year-old and that Down syndrome does not render standardized formal cognitive measures inappropriate for evaluation purposes.
2. Partial Consent Doctrine Rejected: The IDEA does not permit parents to provide "partial" or selective consent to a validly proposed FIE. The court reasoned that: (a) the statute's text requires parents' "consent" to a proposed FIE without explicitly allowing partial consent; (b) the IDEA's structure places the responsibility for designing the FIE on the school district, not parents; and (c) the evidentiary record showed that evaluators cannot determine which specific assessments are needed until they interact with the child, making it impossible to guarantee that informal assessments alone would suffice.
3. Reasonable Efforts Standard Met: AISD made reasonable efforts to obtain informed parental consent through multiple communications, generation of a revised notice addressing the parents' concerns, in-person meetings, and offers to allow parental observation of the evaluation process.
4. IDEA Claim Failure: Because the parents never consented to the validly proposed FIE, AISD's obligation to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) was never triggered, and therefore AISD did not violate the IDEA.
5. ADA Claim Failure: The court affirmed the ADA claim dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the resolution of the IDEA claim in the school district's favor precludes the parents' duplicative ADA claim due to substantial overlap in remedies between the two statutes.

This is an appeal concerning whether a plaintiff can sue a corporation's wholly owned subsidiary after unsuccessfully suing the parent corporation on the same employment discrimination claims. The subsidiary moved to dismiss based on claim preclusion, arguing it was a privy to the parent company and therefore bound by the prior judgment.

1. Whether the doctrine of claim preclusion bars a plaintiff from suing a subsidiary when the parent company was the defendant in a prior lawsuit involving the same facts
2. Whether a parent-subsidiary relationship constitutes "privity" under the six exceptions to non-party preclusion established in Taylor v. Sturgell
3. Whether the subsidiary exercised sufficient control over the prior litigation to be bound by its outcome
4. Whether the parent company adequately represented the subsidiary's interests in the prior litigation
5. Whether issue preclusion could bar the entire suit based on the prior determination that the parent company was not the plaintiff's employer

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. The court held that none of the six Taylor exceptions to non-party preclusion applied. First, the pre-existing substantive legal relationship exception did not apply because parent-subsidiary relationships do not create identical property interests like traditional common-law privity relationships (such as inheritance or succession). Additionally, the alleged employment discrimination claims do not relate to any property interests between the companies. Second, the control exception failed because the facts showed coordination between the companies rather than the subsidiary controlling the parent's litigation. Third, the adequate-representation exception did not apply because there were no special procedures to protect the subsidiary's interests and no evidence that the parent was litigating in a representative capacity. The court rejected the district court's use of a "close and significant relationship" test, finding it inconsistent with Taylor's framework. The court declined to address the subsidiary's newly raised issue preclusion argument, leaving that for the district court to consider in the first instance.

This is a Fourth Amendment appeal challenging the lawfulness of a warrantless vehicle search and the validity of a handcuffing during an investigatory stop. The defendant, Michael C. Hoffpowier, was arrested for stalking and subsequently charged with possession of an unregistered firearm silencer after officers searched his vehicle and discovered two firearms.

1. Whether the handcuffing of Hoffpowier constituted an unlawful arrest or a lawful investigatory detention based on reasonable suspicion and flight risk
2. Whether officers had a reasonable belief that evidence of stalking would be found in Hoffpowier's vehicle, thereby justifying a warrantless search incident to arrest
3. Whether binoculars and a gun magazine found in plain view provided sufficient nexus to the stalking charge to justify the vehicle search

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The court held that:

1. The handcuffing was a lawful investigatory detention, not an arrest, because: (a) Officer Collins had reasonable suspicion that a crime (stalking) was afoot based on information from Detective Talbot and dispatcher call notes; (b) Collins reasonably believed Hoffpowier was a flight risk based on the call notes stating "SUBJ WILL FLEE IF HE SEES OFCRS," the vehicle moving in reverse as officers approached, and Hoffpowier's non-compliance with commands; and (c) the use of handcuffs was reasonable force under these circumstances.
2. It was reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of stalking based on the binoculars alone. The court found a sufficient nexus because: (a) the binoculars were positioned on the center console within easy reach of the driver; (b) they were discovered shortly after Hoffpowier had driven near B.H.'s workplace; (c) binoculars in a Kroger parking lot were unlikely to have an innocent purpose like bird watching; and (d) finding one instrumentality of a crime justifies belief that additional related evidence exists in the vehicle.
3. The gun magazine's relevance was not dispositive because the binoculars alone provided sufficient justification for the search.

This is an appeal of a biometric privacy case under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) in which a customer of Charles Schwab challenges whether Nuance Communications, which provides voice-ID authentication services, obtained proper written consent and maintained required data retention schedules. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to Nuance, finding it exempt from BIPA as a financial institution affiliate.

1. Whether Nuance Communications qualifies for the financial institution exemption under BIPA §25(c) when it provides voice-ID authentication services to a federally-regulated broker-dealer.
2. Whether the plaintiff has standing to bring claims based on data retention and deletion schedules when no data breach or injury has occurred.
3. Whether the §25(c) exemption constitutes an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in an answer or can be raised on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
4. Whether the district court properly used Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(c) to grant judgment on the pleadings.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that: (1) Nuance qualifies for the §25(c) financial institution exemption because the Federal Reserve has determined that authenticating the identity of persons conducting financial transactions is an activity closely related to banking; (2) the plaintiff has standing under §15(b) of BIPA regarding data collection but lacks standing regarding data retention schedules absent actual injury; (3) §25(c) is a statutory exception rather than an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) and may be raised on a motion to dismiss even before an answer is filed; and (4) although the district court should have technically used Rule 12(c) instead of Rule 12(b)(6), remand would be futile since the parties fully joined issue on the meaning of §25(c) with no factual disputes requiring trial.

This is a legal malpractice case in which Amanda Sima sued her former attorneys at Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff LLP and attorney Justin Barker for their representation in a matter involving alleged theft of her spill-proof cup lid design by a company owned by Novolex Holdings. Sima alleged that Barker had a conflict of interest because he was simultaneously negotiating to join Nelson Mullins, the outside counsel for Novolex, and that this conflict caused her to lose viable claims against Novolex due to expired statutes of limitations.

1. Whether Sima adequately pleaded the elements of a legal malpractice claim under Ohio law, specifically whether she demonstrated causation between Barker's alleged misconduct and resulting harm
2. Whether Sima's underlying claims against Novolex were viable and whether Barker's conduct caused her to lose the ability to pursue them due to expired statutes of limitations
3. Whether Sima suffered compensable harm in the form of a lost retainer payment or emotional distress
4. Whether Benesch could be held vicariously liable for Barker's conduct

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Sima's complaint for failure to state a claim. Although the court acknowledged being "troubled by Barker's conduct," it held that Sima failed to adequately plead causation—the third element required for a legal malpractice claim under Ohio law. Specifically, the court found that: (1) Sima's underlying claims against Novolex for unfair business practices, unjust enrichment, and trade secret misappropriation were already time-barred when she retained Barker in October 2022, so his misconduct could not have caused her to lose viable claims; (2) her remaining unjust enrichment claim under Ohio law had nearly two years remaining after Barker terminated representation in April 2023, providing ample time to pursue the claim, so there was no plausible causal connection between his conduct and her inability to file timely claims; (3) the $20,000 retainer was paid before Barker began work, so his misconduct did not cause that loss; and (4) her emotional distress claim failed because the alleged conduct, while ethically questionable, did not rise to the level of being "utterly intolerable in a civilized community" as required under Ohio law. The court also rejected vicarious liability against Benesch because Sima failed to state a malpractice claim against Barker.

This is a Robinson-Patman Act case involving wholesale distributors who sued a manufacturer for allegedly offering discriminatory pricing to a competing warehouse retailer. The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed liability and damages, but the dissent argues the panel improperly eliminated the statutory requirement that plaintiffs prove substantial competitive injury.

1. Whether secondary-line plaintiffs under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act must prove that price discrimination substantially impaired their ability to compete, or whether proof of "some" lost sales is sufficient
2. The proper interpretation of the word "substantially" in Section 2(a) and whether it modifies all three forms of prohibited competitive injury or only the first
3. Whether the panel's jury instructions, which required only a finding of "some sales" displacement, correctly stated the law
4. The appropriate standard for competitive injury in secondary-line Robinson-Patman Act cases

The court denied rehearing en banc, allowing the panel's affirmance of liability to stand. However, the dissenting judges (Forrest and VanDyke) argued that the panel erred by eliminating the substantiality requirement. The dissenters contended that: (1) the statutory text of Section 2(a), properly read under ordinary grammar rules, requires that "substantially" modify all three forms of prohibited injury, not just the first; (2) Supreme Court precedent in Volvo Trucks v. Reeder-Simco GMC and the Second Circuit's decision in Cash & Henderson Drugs v. Johnson & Johnson both require proof of substantial competitive injury; (3) decades of antitrust treatises and law review articles uniformly recognize a substantiality requirement; and (4) the panel's approach creates a circuit split and allows liability based on trivial competitive effects, contrary to established antitrust policy. The dissenters argued this would make the Ninth Circuit "the premier destination for plaintiffs eager to secure millions of dollars in treble damages and attorney fees based on technical violations."

This is a Robinson-Patman Act case involving wholesale distributors who sued a manufacturer for allegedly offering discriminatory pricing on eye drops to a competing warehouse retailer. The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed liability and damages, but the dissent argues the panel improperly eliminated the statutory requirement that plaintiffs prove substantial competitive injury.

1. Whether Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act requires a secondary-line plaintiff to prove that price discrimination had a "substantial" effect on the plaintiff's ability to compete, or whether proof of "some" lost sales is sufficient for liability.
2. The proper interpretation of the word "substantially" in Section 2(a) and whether it modifies all three prohibited effects of price discrimination or only the first.
3. Whether the panel's jury instructions, which required only proof of "some sales" displacement rather than substantial competitive injury, were consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.
4. The appropriate standard for secondary-line competitive injury under the Robinson-Patman Act and its alignment with broader antitrust policy.

The court denied rehearing en banc, allowing the panel's decision to stand. However, the dissenting judges (Forrest and VanDyke) argued that the panel erred by affirming jury instructions that eliminated the substantiality requirement. The dissenters contended that: (1) statutory text, Supreme Court precedent in Volvo, and circuit court decisions all require proof of substantial competitive injury; (2) the word "substantially" grammatically modifies all three forms of prohibited injury under Section 2(a), not just the first; (3) decades of antitrust treatises and law review articles recognize substantiality as a requirement; and (4) the panel's approach contradicts the consensus view in antitrust law and creates a circuit split. The dissenters argued that without a substantiality requirement, distributors can recover millions in treble damages and attorney fees based on trivial competitive effects, contrary to the Supreme Court's instruction to interpret the Robinson-Patman Act consistently with broader antitrust policies that discourage judicial price-setting and favor interbrand competition.

This is a Robinson-Patman Act price discrimination case in which wholesale distributors of Clear Eyes eye drops sued the manufacturer for offering lower prices to Costco. The panel affirmed liability and vacated the attorney's fees award for recalculation, but the dissent argues the panel improperly eliminated the requirement that plaintiffs prove substantial competitive injury.

1. Whether Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act requires a secondary-line plaintiff to prove that price discrimination substantially impaired their ability to compete, or whether proof of "some" lost sales is sufficient
2. The proper interpretation of the word "substantially" in Section 2(a) and whether it modifies only the first prohibited effect ("lessen competition") or all three effects ("lessen competition," "tend to create a monopoly," and "injure, destroy, or prevent competition")
3. Whether the district court properly excluded a substantiality requirement from jury instructions
4. The appropriate standard for awarding attorney's fees in Robinson-Patman Act cases

The panel affirmed the district court's judgment finding the manufacturer liable for price discrimination and upheld jury instructions that did not require proof of substantial competitive injury—requiring only evidence of "some" lost sales. The panel reasoned that the disjunctive "or" separating Section 2(a)'s prohibited effects meant "substantially" modifies only the first clause and not the phrase "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition." The panel vacated and remanded the attorney's fees award for recalculation. However, the dissent (Judges Forrest and VanDyke) argued this interpretation contradicts Supreme Court precedent in Volvo Trucks, which established that secondary-line plaintiffs must prove substantial competitive injury. The dissent emphasized that statutory text, Supreme Court authority, circuit court precedent, and decades of antitrust scholarship uniformly recognize a substantiality requirement, and that the panel's approach creates a circuit split and invites trivial claims based on minimal sales displacement.

This is an immigration case in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of Alfredo Parada Calderon's motion to reopen removal proceedings to submit additional evidence supporting his claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Parada, a Salvadoran national facing deportation, sought to present new evidence regarding torture risks in El Salvador under the country's "State of Exception."

1. Whether the BIA improperly imposed a "quantitative evidence" requirement for CAT protection, contrary to regulations requiring consideration of "all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture"
2. Whether the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to Parada's three expert reports regarding torture conditions in Salvadoran prisons
3. Whether Parada established a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his CAT application in a reopened proceeding based on his individualized risk of torture
4. Whether evidence submitted in the motion to reopen was material and unavailable at the time of the original hearing

The majority held that the BIA erred in two respects. First, the BIA improperly imposed a "quantitative evidence" requirement by dismissing Parada's evidence as merely "anecdotal" and stating that quantitative evidence was required under CAT. The court found this requirement fundamentally misunderstands CAT's implementing regulations, which mandate consideration of "all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture" and do not elevate statistical evidence above other forms of evidence. The court noted that requiring quantitative evidence is particularly problematic in repressive regimes like El Salvador, where governments suppress and manipulate torture data. Second, the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to Parada's three expert reports—two were not discussed at all, and the third was dismissed based on the erroneous quantitative evidence requirement. The court found that the expert reports, supported by hundreds of pages of country conditions evidence documenting widespread torture in Salvadoran prisons (including beatings, starvation, electric shocks, sexual assaults, and extrajudicial killings), were "highly probative or potentially dispositive" and demanded more than passing reference. The court concluded that the record compelled the finding that Parada established a reasonable likelihood of showing he would more likely than not be tortured if removed to El Salvador, based on his individualized circumstances including his gang affiliations, tattoos, criminal history, and the current State of Exception conditions. The court granted Parada's petition for review and remanded with instructions to grant his motion to reopen and conduct a full merits hearing on his CAT application. Judge Bea dissented, arguing that the BIA merely quoted applicable precedent from Benedicto v. Garland regarding the evidentiary weight of anecdotal versus quantitative evidence, did not impose a quantitative requirement, and properly considered all evidence before reasonably concluding Parada failed to establish prima facie eligibility for CAT protection.

This is an appeal of a district court's post-judgment order in a royalty underpayment class action settlement dispute. The Fischers appealed a show-cause order requiring them to either cease violating a settlement injunction or demonstrate cause for their violation, but the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

1. Whether the district court's show-cause order was a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
2. Whether the order qualified for appellate review under the collateral-order doctrine
3. Whether the order modified an injunction and thus was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
4. Whether the Fischers faced "jurisdictional purgatory" that would make the order effectively unreviewable if not appealed immediately

The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction on all three grounds. The court held that: (1) a post-judgment civil contempt order is final only when the district court makes a contempt finding and imposes a specific, unavoidable sanction—neither of which occurred here, as the order merely gave the Fischers a choice to comply or show cause; (2) the collateral-order doctrine does not apply because show-cause orders do not resolve issues separate from the merits of the post-judgment proceeding and are reviewable once they ripen into final orders with contempt findings and sanctions; and (3) the order did not grossly or blatantly misinterpret the underlying settlement injunction, so it did not trigger jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1). The court rejected the Fischers' argument about "jurisdictional purgatory," noting that contempt is an acceptable method of securing appellate review and the Fischers had a clear path to challenge the order while preserving their state-court claims.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Sasha Cronick sued two Colorado Springs police officers for unlawfully arresting and searching her in a motel parking lot in 2018. A jury found against Cronick at trial, but she appealed on grounds of evidentiary and instructional errors.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by admitting more than twenty video clips from Cronick's unrelated "copwatch" videos showing her berating police officers and security guards
2. Whether adverse-inference jury instructions that told the jury to presume Cronick "regularly records police officers" and "engages in behavior that is disruptive to police business" improperly invited propensity reasoning and violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1)
3. Whether the district court properly imposed a monetary sanction of approximately $18,000 against Cronick and her lawyers for discovery violations related to deleted social media content and videos

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment for the officers and remanded for retrial, but affirmed the monetary sanction. The court held that admitting the post-incident copwatch videos was a clear abuse of discretion under Rule 403. Although the videos had minimal probative value regarding Cronick's emotional damages claim, they posed tremendous risk of unfair prejudice by: (1) inviting improper propensity reasoning (suggesting that because Cronick disrupted police in other encounters, she did so here); (2) tempting the jury to rule against an "unsympathetic plaintiff" irrespective of liability; and (3) presenting colorful, memorable details that distracted from the actual legal issues. The court rejected the officers' theories that the videos contradicted Cronick's testimony, showed a pattern of behavior, or impeached her credibility for truthfulness. The court also held that the adverse-inference instruction telling the jury that Cronick "regularly records police officers" and "engages in behavior that is disruptive to police business" was improper because it invited forbidden propensity reasoning by suggesting Cronick disrupted police at other times, so she did it here too. This instruction interfered with the jury's accurate understanding of the relevant factual issues. The court found these errors substantially affected Cronick's substantial rights because: (1) the trial was short (less than three days), making repeated references to unfairly prejudicial evidence especially influential; (2) the video clips dominated the trial and were emphasized in closing argument; (3) this was a close case where Cronick's version was not blatantly contradicted by video evidence; and (4) the jury needed to focus on whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Cronick, not on her general character. However, the court affirmed the monetary sanction, finding that Cronick willfully violated the discovery order by failing to produce deleted social media content and videos. The court rejected Cronick's arguments that: (1) the materials were irrelevant (they included statements about the arrest at issue); (2) it was her husband's fault (the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous); (3) the sanction violated attorney-client privilege (lawyers had options including withdrawal or limited disclosure); (4) she lacked due process (she received notice and opportunity to brief); and (5) the court failed to consider her indigency (she failed to present evidence of inability to pay).

This is a federal criminal appeal concerning the proper sentencing procedure when a district court revokes a defendant's probation. Malachi Moon Seals pleaded guilty to threatening members of Congress and was initially sentenced to five years of probation despite a guideline range of 33-41 months imprisonment. After violating his probation conditions within days, the court revoked his probation and resentenced him to 36 months imprisonment.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) requires courts to consider Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines (for probation violations) or Chapter 5 (for the underlying offense) when resentencing after probation revocation
2. Whether the disjunctive "or" in § 3553(a)(4) creates a choice between subparagraph (A) and (B), or whether both must be applied
3. Whether the prior precedent in United States v. Moore I, which established a two-step sentencing procedure, correctly interprets the 1994 statutory amendments to §§ 3565(a)(2) and 3553(a)(4)(B)
4. Whether legislative history regarding the "Smith fix" and the intent of Chairman Wilkins and Senator Thurmond should guide interpretation of the statutory text

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Moon Seals's sentence and rejected the two-step framework established in Moore I in favor of a one-step sentencing procedure. The majority held that:

1. When resentencing a defendant after revoking probation, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(B) requires courts to use Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines as the starting point, not Chapter 5
2. The disjunctive "or" in § 3553(a)(4) means courts must choose between subparagraph (A) and (B) based on the context—for probation violations, subparagraph (B) applies because it is the more specific provision addressing violations of probation or supervised release
3. Chapter 5's recommended sentence range should be considered only when deciding whether to vary upward from the Chapter 7 range, not as a separate sentencing step
4. The statutory text, legislative evolution (Congress changed "impose any other sentence available at the time of initial sentencing" to "resentence the defendant under subchapter A"), and consistency with other circuits' approaches all support this one-step framework
5. The district court erred by rejecting Chapter 7's recommended range and instead using Chapter 5's range as its starting point

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Reginald Smith challenges his conviction for felon-in-possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposed a mandatory 15-year minimum based on three prior state cocaine-related felony convictions.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to Smith
2. Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause
3. Whether Smith's three Florida cocaine convictions qualify as "serious drug offense[s]" under ACCA
4. Whether the district court violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments under Erlinger v. United States by applying ACCA without a jury finding that Smith's predicate offenses occurred on different occasions
5. Whether the district court incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines by classifying Smith's cocaine-trafficking conviction as a "controlled substance offense"

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Smith's conviction and sentence on all grounds. The court held: (1) § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment because felons are categorically disqualified from Second Amendment protections, and it does not violate the Commerce Clause because it contains an express jurisdictional element and Smith's shotgun traveled in interstate commerce; (2) Smith invited any error regarding the classification of his cocaine convictions as ACCA predicates by expressly acknowledging at sentencing that the ACCA designation was correct under existing law, thereby waiving his right to challenge it on appeal; (3) although the district court plainly erred under Erlinger by failing to require a jury finding on the different-occasions element, the error did not affect Smith's substantial rights because his predicate offenses occurred a week apart (July 14 and July 20, 1993, and July 15, 2001), making it virtually impossible for a jury to find they occurred on the same occasion; and (4) any error in calculating Smith's base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines was harmless because the ACCA-enhanced base offense level of 33 was higher than the level that would have applied under the non-ACCA calculation.

This is a criminal appeal in an international drug-smuggling conspiracy case. Cesar Gomez Almonte was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States and sentenced to 184 months imprisonment, and he appeals on three constitutional grounds.

1. Whether an eighteen-month delay between indictment and arrest violated Almonte's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial under the four-factor Barker v. Wingo balancing test
2. Whether venue was proper in the District of Columbia under 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (the "high seas" venue statute) for a conspiracy that was formed abroad but targeted Miami in the Southern District of Florida
3. Whether Almonte waived his right to challenge venue by declining to argue for venue in the Eastern District of Virginia when the district court expressly invited him to do so
4. Whether the district court violated Almonte's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury when three jurors expressed concerns about defense counsel's aggressive behavior but stated they could remain impartial

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on all three grounds:

1. Speedy Trial Claim: The court rejected the speedy trial claim under the Barker balancing test. Although the eighteen-month pre-arrest delay exceeded the one-year threshold for presumptively prejudicial delay, the other factors weighed against Almonte: (1) the government had a good-faith investigative reason for the delay (protecting an ongoing investigation of co-conspirators); (2) Almonte waited over eight months after arraignment to assert his speedy trial right; and (3) Almonte failed to demonstrate specific prejudice to his defense, offering only abstract references to faded memories and eroded evidence.
2. Venue Challenge (Florida): The court upheld venue in D.C. under § 3238 because the charged conspiracy was "committed" abroad (in the Dominican Republic) when the agreement was formed. The fact that the conspiracy targeted Miami and involved overt acts by co-conspirators in Florida did not render D.C. venue improper, as venue may be proper in multiple districts.
3. Venue Challenge (Virginia) and Waiver: The court found that Almonte waived his objection to D.C. venue in favor of the Eastern District of Virginia by declining to raise that argument when the district court expressly invited him to do so during trial. Instead, Almonte repeatedly argued for venue in Florida. This constituted an affirmative waiver of his right to challenge venue, and allowing him to raise the Virginia argument after trial would have permitted him to "hide in the weeds" with a waivable objection only to spring it after an unfavorable verdict.
4. Impartial Jury Claim: The court upheld the district court's denial of mistrial and new trial motions. The district court properly followed established procedures by conducting individual voir dire of the three jurors who expressed concerns about defense counsel's aggressive behavior. All three jurors affirmed their ability to decide the case impartially, and the trial judge's personal observations of their demeanor supported the conclusion that they could set aside their feelings about counsel. The court had broad discretion in determining the scope of voir dire and was entitled to rely on jurors' testimony regarding their impartiality.

This is a Delaware corporate governance case involving a proxy contest where an activist investor (ATG Capital) sought to nominate a full slate of director candidates to replace Empery Digital's board. The board rejected the nomination notice, claiming deficiencies in disclosure requirements, but the court found the rejection violated the stockholders' fundamental voting rights.

1. Whether ATG's nomination notice complied with Empery's advance notice bylaws, specifically regarding: (a) the failure to disclose Tice Brown as a "participant" in the proxy solicitation; and (b) the failure to disclose ATG's short position in Bitcoin exchange-traded funds
2. Whether the board's rejection of the nomination notice breached its fiduciary duties under Delaware law's "twice-tested" framework for actions affecting the stockholder franchise
3. Whether the board should reopen the nomination window following Empery's post-deadline announcement of a strategic pivot to AI data-center investments

The court ruled in favor of ATG on the core electoral dispute. First, on the contractual analysis, the court found that ATG's nomination notice complied with the bylaws: (1) Tice Brown did not qualify as a "participant" under the bylaws' incorporation of Schedule 14A definitions because he neither financed nor directly participated in ATG's proxy solicitation, and the bylaw lacked any requirement to disclose general coordination or agreements regarding securities purchases; and (2) the bylaws did not require disclosure of commodity hedges or short positions in unrelated Bitcoin ETFs, as they only specifically required disclosure of derivatives in Empery's own stock. The court emphasized that advance notice bylaws serve information-gathering and disclosure functions but do not authorize boards to exclude candidates based on disagreement with their business plans. On the equitable analysis, the court applied enhanced scrutiny under Unocal and found the board failed the second prong. Although the board had some reasonable basis for concern about ATG's and Brown's apparent plans to liquidate Empery's Bitcoin, rejection of the nomination was a disproportionate response. The board could have disclosed its concerns to stockholders and advocated against the slate through the electoral process rather than removing it from the ballot entirely. The court noted that directors cannot justify defensive actions on grounds that they "know what is in the best interests of stockholders" and that the board's concerns about ATG's economic misalignment were arguments for the electorate, not grounds for disenfranchisement. Regarding the nomination reopening claim, the court declined to reopen the nomination window following the data-center transaction announcement, distinguishing the case from Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enterprises. The court found that because ATG's valid slate will stand for election, stockholders will have a meaningful choice and will not be disenfranchised, so reopening was not necessary to ensure electoral fairness. The court entered judgment for ATG, declaring its nomination notice valid and permitting its nominees to stand for election at the annual meeting.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant, Kyle Lamar West, who pleaded guilty to serious crimes including sexual assault of children and child pornography production, challenges his sentence despite having signed an appeal waiver as part of his plea agreement. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether the appeal waiver should be enforced and whether the defendant can proceed with his appeal.

1. Whether parties in criminal cases can contract away the court's jurisdiction through appeal waivers
2. Whether a miscarriage of justice exception applies to appeal waivers that would prevent enforcement
3. Whether the district court's restitution order complies with applicable law under Paroline v. United States
4. Whether an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in the plea agreement

The court carried the government's motion to dismiss the appeal with the case to allow full briefing and granted the government's alternative motion for a 30-day extension to file its brief. The majority opinion, through Judge Higginson's concurrence, indicates the court will defer final resolution of the appeal waiver issue pending full adversarial briefing, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hunter v. United States (2026) confirming that appeal waivers are unenforceable when they would result in a miscarriage of justice. The court noted that on remand, the district court increased restitution from $6,000 to $372,200, representing a substantial increase based on proper application of Paroline. Judge Oldham dissented, arguing the appeal waiver should be enforced and the proceedings should end, characterizing the defendant's second appeal as frivolous.

This is a copyright infringement case where Emmerich Newspapers sued Particle Media (operator of NewsBreak, a news aggregator) for allegedly infringing its display rights by framing and displaying Emmerich articles, and for violating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) by removing Emmerich's URLs. The Fifth Circuit addressed whether the "server test" is the proper standard for evaluating display right infringement and whether URLs can constitute copyright management information (CMI).

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit's "server test"—which holds that a party cannot infringe the display right if it does not store content on its own server—is the proper standard under the Copyright Act's plain language for evaluating infringement of the exclusive right to publicly display copyrighted works.
2. Whether URLs can constitute "copyright management information" (CMI) protected under the DMCA, and if so, whether intentional removal of URLs violates the DMCA.

The Fifth Circuit rejected the server test as the proper standard but reached a similar practical result through different statutory reasoning. The court held that:

1. Display Right Standard: Rather than focusing on where content is "fixed" (the server test's approach), the court emphasized the statutory requirement that a work be "transmitted" to the public. The court adopted a "transmit requirement" standard, holding that a party infringes the display right only if it transmits the copyrighted work to the public. Since Particle merely directed users' browsers to request content from Emmerich's servers (without itself transmitting the content), Particle did not infringe Emmerich's display rights. The court reasoned that only the copyright owner (Emmerich) actually transmits the content, and the embedder merely provides a connection, analogous to a switchboard operator. This approach is grounded in the statutory definitions of "display," "show," "transmit," and "publicly," and is supported by the court's precedent requiring "volitional conduct" for direct infringement liability.
2. CMI and URLs: The court held that while URLs are not categorically excluded from being CMI, they present significant obstacles to qualifying as such. URLs primarily function as locational references rather than identifying information about copyrighted works. For a URL to constitute CMI, it would need to clearly convey the statutory characteristics required (such as the work's title or copyright owner's name). The court identified several factors that would need to be satisfied, including whether the domain name corresponds to the copyright owner, whether the copyright covers the website as a whole or specific pages, whether the URL is sufficiently stable, and whether the URL clearly communicates information about the copyrighted work. The court declined to foreclose the possibility that certain URLs could qualify as CMI in circumstances not presented in this case, but found that Emmerich's URLs did not meet the threshold as a matter of law.
3. Remand: The court remanded the case for the district court to conduct a fact-specific inquiry regarding whether Emmerich's specific URLs contain the hallmarks of CMI and, if so, whether their removal was done intentionally in violation of the DMCA.

This case involves consolidated appeals from multiple lawsuits arising from a surgeon's performance of hundreds of unnecessary and harmful surgeries. The plaintiffs seek to enforce medical malpractice judgments against the surgeon's malpractice insurer (MedPro) and bring direct tort claims against MedPro for its conduct during litigation and denial of coverage.

1. Whether an insurance policy exclusion for damages "in consequence of" intentional torts (fraud) bars coverage when a surgeon fraudulently induced patients into unnecessary surgeries that caused harm.
2. Whether patients can bring direct claims against an insurer for bad faith conduct, including fraud, when they are not parties to the insurance contract.
3. The proper causation standard for applying insurance policy exclusions for intentional conduct versus negligence.
4. Whether claim preclusion bars plaintiffs from bringing claims previously dismissed in an earlier lawsuit.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims on the following grounds:

1. Enforcement Claims: The court held that the insurance policy exclusion for damages "in consequence of" intentional torts applies when damages directly stem from and are inseparable from the surgeon's fraud. Under Ohio law, the exclusion bars coverage for damages directly stemming from fraud but allows coverage for independent damages from negligence. The court established that "in consequence of" requires a stricter causation standard than mere but-for or tort proximate causation—it requires damages that directly stem and are inseparable from the excluded conduct. For three plaintiffs (Adams, Bender, and Potts), the harm was inseparable from the fraudulent inducement into unnecessary surgery, so coverage was excluded. For the fourth plaintiff (McCann), her only outstanding damages were explicitly allocated to fraud by the jury, so coverage was similarly excluded.
2. Direct Claims: The court held that third-party claimants (patients not party to the insurance contract) cannot bring bad faith claims against an insurer under Ohio law—only the insured can do so. While the plaintiffs alleged various torts including fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy, the court found these claims either: (a) impermissibly attempted to circumvent the ban on third-party bad faith claims by relabeling bad faith allegations as fraud; (b) failed to plead the required elements of a freestanding tort; or (c) were barred by claim preclusion from a prior lawsuit. The court acknowledged that MedPro's conduct as alleged was "reprehensible," but declined to create new causes of action beyond existing Ohio law.
3. Claim Preclusion: The court upheld the application of claim preclusion, finding that plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims in a prior lawsuit (Aaron v. Medical Protective Co.) and that the dismissal with prejudice in that case operated as a final judgment on the merits. The court allowed plaintiffs to plead claims based on post-2018 conduct not available in the prior suit.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving seven members or associates of the Clarksville, Tennessee chapter of the Mongols Motorcycle Club who were convicted on multiple counts including RICO conspiracy, murder, kidnapping, drug trafficking, and violent crimes in aid of racketeering. The defendants appeal their convictions and sentences, which ranged from 210 months to life imprisonment plus consecutive terms.

1. Sufficiency of evidence for RICO conspiracy convictions, including whether the Clarksville Mongols constituted a criminal enterprise and whether defendants knowingly joined the conspiracy
2. Sufficiency of evidence for convictions related to the kidnapping and murder of Stephen Cole
3. Sufficiency of evidence for drug conspiracy and money-laundering conspiracy convictions
4. Sufficiency of evidence for convictions related to an attempted drug purchase involving prescription Oxymorphone pills
5. Sufficiency of evidence for kidnapping charges related to the abduction of Sharon Priess
6. Sufficiency of evidence for violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR) charges
7. Propriety of empaneling a semi-anonymous jury
8. Admissibility of expert testimony regarding outlaw motorcycle gangs
9. Admissibility of prejudicial evidence including bar fight evidence and unredacted text messages
10. Whether a three-week delay between direct examination and cross-examination of a key witness violated defendants' Confrontation Clause rights
11. Whether trial delays caused by COVID-19 warranted a mistrial
12. Whether joint trial of multiple defendants caused undue prejudice requiring severance

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED all convictions and sentences. Key holdings include:

1. RICO Conspiracy: Sufficient evidence supported convictions. The Clarksville Mongols existed as a criminal enterprise beginning in March 2015 with a common purpose to sell drugs, protect territory through violence, and establish themselves as the outlaw motorcycle club in Clarksville. Defendants agreed to found and operate this enterprise, and late-joining members could be held responsible for prior acts.
2. Cole Murder: Sufficient evidence supported Meyerholz's convictions for kidnapping and murder. Testimony placed him at the abduction and murder scene, and his admissions to involvement were corroborated by multiple witnesses, despite competing credibility assessments.
3. Drug Conspiracy: Sufficient evidence supported Hern's and Stanley's convictions. Cell phone records, testimony from drug dealers, and evidence of drug transactions established their knowing participation in the conspiracy.
4. Oxymorphone Counts: Sufficient evidence supported Santiago's convictions. He participated in the conspiracy by providing a loaded firearm and his car for the drug purchase, and substantial steps toward the attempted drug purchase were taken before the robbery occurred.
5. Inconsistent Verdicts: The court declined to overturn Santiago's conviction based on allegedly inconsistent verdicts with a co-defendant, noting that juries may acquit based on lenity and that sufficiency-of-the-evidence review provides protection against jury irrationality.
6. Priess Kidnapping: Sufficient evidence supported kidnapping convictions. The Clarksville Mongols benefited from kidnapping Priess because it allowed them to learn what happened to their deceased sponsor and explain it to the national organization, satisfying the "benefit" requirement of the kidnapping statute.
7. VICAR Charges: Sufficient evidence supported convictions for violent crimes in aid of racketeering. Humiston's shooting of Finley was motivated by maintaining his position in the Mongols, and Boylston's murder of Cole was committed to maintain his position and status within the organization.
8. Semi-Anonymous Jury: The district court did not abuse its discretion. The court properly considered the dangerous nature of the Mongols organization, the serious charges involved, and took precautions to protect defendants' rights including conducting extensive voir dire and providing neutral justification to jurors. The jury was only semi-anonymous, allowing counsel to know jurors' identities.
9. Expert Testimony: The district court properly admitted expert testimony from a 28-year ATF agent regarding outlaw motorcycle gangs and the Mongols organization generally. The expert was well-qualified, the testimony was relevant to organized crime cases, and the expert was appropriately limited to matters outside his personal knowledge of the Clarksville chapter.
10. Prejudicial Evidence: Any error in admitting unredacted text messages containing offensive language was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against Frazier, the jury's careful parsing of verdicts on related counts, and jury instructions to resist bias.
11. Confrontation Clause - Trial Delay: The three-week delay between direct examination and cross-examination of witness Humiston did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Defendants received a full and fair opportunity for effective cross-examination, which successfully exposed infirmities in the witness's testimony. The delay arose from competing constitutional concerns (protecting defendants' right to be present) and public health needs, not prosecutorial gamesmanship.
12. Mistrial - Trial Delays: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying mistrial motions. COVID-19 caused the delays, which were unavoidable and not unusual. The court took appropriate measures to prevent prejudice, and defendants failed to show actual prejudice. A 38-day trial over three and a half months with COVID-related delays does not constitute grounds for the drastic remedy of mistrial.
13. Severance: The district court properly denied severance. Meyerholz failed to meet his heavy burden of showing specific and compelling prejudice from the joint trial that could only be rectified by separate trials. Evidence of other defendants' crimes did not confuse or prejudice the jury against Meyerholz.

This is a healthcare fraud case in which Carrie Musselman, a chiropractor who expanded her practice to offer medical services, was convicted of defrauding Medicare through improper billing practices, including billing services under physicians' names, misusing medical device codes, and billing allergy drops under injection codes. Musselman appeals her conviction on two grounds: that a juror's outside research created prejudicial error, and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the "ostrich instruction" regarding knowledge of fraud.

1. Whether the jury foreperson's outside research on how to be a good foreperson, which included an article discussing majority verdicts, created presumptively prejudicial error requiring a new trial under the framework established in Remmer v. United States.
2. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the "ostrich instruction"—which allows conviction based on deliberate avoidance of knowledge rather than actual knowledge—given the evidence presented at trial.
3. Whether the evidence supported a finding that Musselman deliberately avoided learning about the fraudulent billing practices, as opposed to merely being negligent or indifferent.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction on both grounds.

1. Juror's Outside Research: The court held that even assuming the Remmer presumption of prejudice applied, the government adequately rebutted it. The district court reasonably concluded the article had no prejudicial effect because: (a) the concerning portion about majority verdicts was not included in the document brought into the jury room; (b) the foreperson's notes emphasized keeping talking until agreement, consistent with unanimity requirements; (c) the foreperson's only recollection of the articles related to organization and charting, suggesting minimal influence of majority vote concepts; (d) jurors were attentive throughout trial; (e) each juror individually confirmed their verdict; and (f) the article was unrelated to the case facts. The court also noted that Musselman waived her right to further inquiry by expressly asking the trial court not to conduct additional inquiries.
2. Ostrich Instruction: The court held the instruction was proper because: (a) Musselman claimed lack of guilty knowledge at trial, satisfying the first requirement; and (b) the government presented sufficient evidence of psychological avoidance. The court found multiple red flags that Musselman, as a business owner and experienced chiropractor with heightened obligations to inquire, should have investigated: documents showing improper billing under physicians' names, warnings from consultants about "Incident To" requirements, knowledge that one provider was barred from Medicare billing, employee concerns about abnormally high neurostimulator reimbursement rates, and warnings against billing for allergy drops. The court reasoned that Musselman failed to ask natural and obvious questions and relied on obviously unreliable sources (device manufacturers with financial incentives) while ignoring available reliable sources. The fact that Musselman took some inquiries did not shield her from the instruction because she avoided taking steps that would have produced real answers. The court emphasized that the line between avoidance and mere negligence is thin but deferred to the district court's discretion in this close case.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action antitrust case. Metroplex Communications, a local news outlet, sued Meta Platforms alleging unfair competition and deceptive trade practices based on Meta's allegedly inflated advertising metrics, and Meta sought to enforce an arbitration clause from its Facebook advertising terms of service that Metroplex had previously agreed to when purchasing ads.

1. Whether Metroplex's unfair competition and deceptive trade practices claims fall within the scope of Meta's arbitration clause covering "any claim, cause of action, or dispute that arises out of or relates to any access or use of the Meta Products for business or commercial purposes"
2. Whether a broad arbitration clause can encompass claims unrelated to the underlying contract between the parties
3. Whether accepting Meta's interpretation would create an absurd result by requiring any party that ever advertised on Facebook to arbitrate any tangentially related claims

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Meta's motion to compel arbitration. Although the arbitration clause is facially broad, the court held that Metroplex's claims do not fall within its scope because they lack a sufficient nexus to the underlying contract. The court reasoned that Metroplex's claims concern Meta's public representations and anticompetitive conduct directed at competitors, not Metroplex's own limited and "purely coincidental" use of Meta's ad services. The court rejected Meta's expansive interpretation as creating an absurd result that would require anyone who ever purchased Facebook ads to arbitrate any claim tangentially related to Meta's advertising business. The court declined to adopt an interpretation that would transform a commercial terms agreement into a sweeping waiver of judicial recourse and noted that arbitration agreements must be treated like all other contracts without a presumption in favor of arbitration.

This is a bankruptcy appeal involving creditors' attempt to prevent discharge of a judgment debt owed by Chapter 7 debtors under two different statutory exceptions to discharge. The creditors appealed the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's ruling that one exception (§ 523(a)(7)) did not apply to a portion of the debt, while the case was remanded for trial on another exception (§ 523(a)(6)).

1. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) to hear an appeal of an interlocutory district court order in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding
2. Whether an order resolving one statutory exception to discharge can be treated as a "final" order when other exceptions remain to be decided
3. Whether the proper scope of a "discrete dispute" in a dischargeability adversary proceeding is an individual legal issue or the entire adversary proceeding
4. Whether the "pure legal issue" exception to finality survives post-Bullard bankruptcy jurisprudence

The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that:

1. The proper scope of the discrete dispute is the entire adversary proceeding to determine dischargeability, not individual legal issues or statutory exceptions within that proceeding, as indicated by Bankruptcy Rule 7001(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I)
2. Because the district court remanded the case for further fact-finding on the § 523(a)(6) exception, the dischargeability proceeding was not final, and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction over the separate § 523(a)(7) issue
3. Applying the four-factor Landmark Fence test (avoiding piecemeal litigation, judicial efficiency, preserving the bankruptcy court's fact-finding role, and preventing irreparable harm), the district court's order was not final because: (a) there was a strong possibility of a second appeal due to the remaining § 523(a)(6) controversy; (b) the remand required significant fact-finding on a central issue, not a mechanical task; (c) the bankruptcy court's fact-finding role was best preserved by allowing the remand to proceed; and (d) delaying review caused no irreparable harm
4. The "pure legal issue" exception to finality is no longer valid under post-Bullard precedent, overruling the reasoning in In re Century Centre Partners to the extent it suggested individual legal issues could be treated as separate proceedings

This is a constitutional challenge to California Penal Code Section 26806, which requires all federally licensed firearms dealers (FFLs) to maintain digital video and audio recording systems on their business premises. The plaintiffs, including FFLs, gun rights organizations, and private citizens, challenged the statute as violating the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.

1. Whether Section 26806 violates the Fourth Amendment by constituting an unreasonable search, either through the mere act of recording or through authorization of warrantless compliance inspections of home-based FFLs
2. Whether Section 26806 constitutes an unconstitutional taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment, either as a per se physical taking or as a regulatory taking
3. Whether Section 26806 violates the First Amendment through overbreadth, infringement on the right to anonymity, infringement on the right to free association, or by chilling protected speech

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that: (1) Plaintiffs failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim because they alleged no physical intrusion or government access to recordings, and the statute does not transform FFLs into state actors; the dissent's theory regarding compliance inspections was rejected because Section 26806 does not authorize inspections and, even if it did, would be facially valid under New York v. Burger; (2) Plaintiffs failed to state a Fifth Amendment claim because the statute does not effect a per se physical taking (FFLs retain ownership and control of equipment) and does not constitute a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test (reasonable investment-backed expectations are limited in a highly regulated industry, economic impact is not unreasonable, and the government action promotes the common good); and (3) Plaintiffs failed to state a First Amendment claim because their overbreadth challenge fails (the statute does not regulate speech), their anonymity and free association theories fail (the statute mandates no disclosure of identity or membership), and their speech-chilling theory fails (they alleged only speculative fear of future government misuse without concrete allegations of harm or adverse action).

This is a criminal appeal in which Jaime Valdez challenges his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Valdez appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a police stop, frisk, and search of his duffel bag.

1. Whether the initial police stop of Valdez was supported by reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether the pat-down frisk was lawful
3. Whether the search of the duffel bag was lawful
4. Whether the district court had authority to reconsider and reverse its earlier suppression ruling after receiving supplemental exhibits from the government
5. Whether evidence would have been inevitably discovered through lawful means

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The court held that: (1) the stop was lawful because the deputies had reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances, including Valdez throwing a duffel bag over a stranger's fence while fleeing someone, retrieving it the next morning, loitering in a high-crime area for hours, and exhibiting nervous behavior while reaching into the bag; (2) regarding the frisk and duffel bag search, the court applied the inevitable discovery exception, finding that evidence would have been inevitably discovered through a lawful search incident to arrest once deputies discovered Valdez had three outstanding felony warrants; and (3) the district court had authority to reconsider its interlocutory suppression ruling before final judgment and did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering based on supplemental exhibits, as courts may correct their own errors while they retain jurisdiction and the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct, not prosecutorial or judicial oversight.

This is a breach of contract case in which an asset manager (Meteora) seeks to enforce its rights under agreements governing a side deal entered into to facilitate a merger between a private company and a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC). After the merger closed, the surviving company failed to comply with its obligations to register and remove transfer restrictions from shares held by Meteora.

1. Whether the Company breached its obligations under the Subscription Agreement by failing to register the Subscribed Shares and later failing to make them available for resale under Rule 144
2. Whether Meteora is entitled to a decree of specific performance requiring the Company to remove transfer restrictions from the Subscribed Shares
3. Whether the Company's affirmative defenses warrant discovery or defeat summary judgment
4. The proper interpretation of the Forward Agreement and Subscription Agreement regarding registration requirements, the Early Termination Option, and the Settlement Amount calculation

The court granted Meteora's motion for summary judgment. The court held that:

1. Breach of Subscription Agreement: The Company breached both the Registration Obligation (by failing to file a registration statement for the Subscribed Shares by October 20, 2023, and obtain effectiveness by December 19, 2023) and the Restriction Obligation (by failing to remove transfer restrictions from the Subscribed Shares after they became eligible for resale under Rule 144 on September 26, 2024). The plain language of the Subscription Agreement imposed clear, time-based deadlines that the Company did not meet.
2. Specific Performance: The court granted a decree of specific performance requiring the Company to remove transfer restrictions on the Subscribed Shares. The court found that: (a) Meteora lacks an adequate remedy at law because the shares are unique equity interests with uncertain value; (b) the Subscription Agreement contains an explicit provision for specific performance, which sophisticated parties bargained for at arm's length and which Delaware courts respect; (c) the parties contractually stipulated to irreparable harm in the event of breach; and (d) the balance of equities favors specific performance.
3. Affirmative Defenses and Rule 56(d): The court rejected the Company's request for discovery under Rule 56(d), finding that: (a) the Transaction Agreements are unambiguous as a matter of law, so no discovery is needed to interpret them; (b) the Company's affirmative defenses are conclusory and fail on their face; (c) several defenses (laches, ripeness, jurisdiction, venue, and failure to establish damages) fail as a matter of law; and (d) the New York court's dismissal of similar claims supports rejection of the Company's defenses.
4. Contract Interpretation: The court applied Delaware law principles requiring that contracts be interpreted according to their plain meaning, that all provisions be given effect, and that the instrument be read as a whole. The court found no ambiguity in the registration deadlines or the restriction removal obligations, and rejected the Company's arguments that: (a) conflicting obligations existed between the two agreements; (b) email was not sufficient notice; (c) a 30-day cure period applied; (d) Meteora waived its rights; or (e) the Company's failure to request information from Meteora excused its breach.

This is a constitutional challenge to the Drug Price Negotiation Program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which authorizes the federal government to negotiate prices for certain high-cost drugs under Medicare. Pharmaceutical industry groups challenge the program on grounds that it violates the nondelegation doctrine, the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

1. Whether the IRA violates the nondelegation doctrine by failing to provide sufficient guidance (an "intelligible principle") to HHS in implementing the drug pricing program, and whether the combination of broad delegation with preclusion of judicial review and notice-and-comment rulemaking compounds any constitutional violation.
2. Whether the excise tax imposed on manufacturers who refuse to negotiate violates the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, and whether the Anti-Injunction Act bars judicial review of this claim.
3. Whether the Program deprives manufacturers, providers, and patients of constitutionally protected property or liberty interests without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Government on all claims. The court held:

1. Nondelegation Doctrine: The IRA provides sufficient guidance through detailed statutory provisions defining the program's terminology, establishing negotiation procedures, providing price ceiling formulas (40-75% of baseline depending on drug approval length), and requiring HHS to consider nine specific factors. The statute sets both a ceiling and a floor for prices, similar to the "sufficient" standard upheld in Consumers' Research. The preclusion of judicial review and lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking do not compound the delegation to create a constitutional violation, as these features do not operate on the same constitutional axis and the delegation is independently valid.
2. Excessive Fines Clause: Although the court found it had jurisdiction to consider the claim (rejecting the Anti-Injunction Act bar because no manufacturer could afford a refund suit given the escalating tax rates reaching 95%), the excise tax does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause on the merits. The Clause applies only to punishment for criminal or quasi-criminal conduct, and the IRA's tax lacks any connection to criminality—manufacturers become subject to it through lawful choices about Medicare sales, not criminal conduct.
3. Due Process Clause: Manufacturers lack a protected property interest in selling drugs to Medicare beneficiaries at preferred prices because: (1) the government has unrestricted power to set prices for goods it purchases; (2) participation in Medicare is voluntary; (3) patent rights do not confer a right to sell at a particular price; and (4) economic hardship does not constitute legal compulsion. Providers lack a protected interest in reimbursement beyond what the law provides, and patients have no protected liberty interest in access to particular prescription drugs.

This is a class action settlement approval case involving allegations that Google violated users' privacy rights by tracking their location and storing data even after users disabled the "Location History" feature. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's approval of a $62 million settlement that provided injunctive relief and distributed remaining settlement funds through cy pres (charitable) recipients rather than direct payments to class members.

1. Whether the district court properly applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) factors in determining the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate
2. Whether the district court improperly applied a presumption of settlement validity
3. Whether cy pres-only distributions are permissible under Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii)
4. Whether direct distribution of settlement funds to class members was feasible
5. Whether the selected cy pres recipients satisfied the substantial nexus test and served class interests
6. Whether the settlement exceeded the district court's Article III authority

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's settlement approval on the following grounds:

1. The district court properly considered all enumerated factors under revised Rule 23(e)(2), including the effectiveness of the distribution method, and did not abuse its discretion
2. The district court satisfied Rule 23(e) requirements by holding a fairness hearing, weighing objections, and considering relevant factors without improperly presuming settlement validity
3. Cy pres-only distributions are permissible; the court rejected the argument that Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii)'s plain language always requires rejection of cy pres-only settlements
4. Direct distribution was infeasible because: (a) the pro rata recovery per class member would be approximately 25 cents before fees and costs; (b) Google's data practices made it impossible to reliably identify class members; and (c) a claims process would be prohibitively expensive and could not be verified
5. The cy pres recipients satisfied the substantial nexus test by demonstrating commitment to data privacy protection, which addressed the underlying class interests; geographic and ideological challenges to specific recipients failed
6. The Article III challenge was forfeited because objectors failed to raise it in the district court

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case brought by Gina Russo, a physician's assistant, against her former employer New Hampshire Neurospine Institute and Dr. Uri Ahn. Russo alleged sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and New Hampshire state law after being terminated from her eleven-year position.

1. Whether Russo established a prima facie case of sex discrimination and whether the Institute's stated reason for termination (Ahn's ultimatum based on perceived disrespect) was pretextual
2. Whether Russo's termination was motivated by gender-based stereotyping, animus, or disparate treatment compared to male colleagues
3. Whether the Institute retaliated against Russo after she complained of sex discrimination in a demand letter
4. Whether the acceleration of Russo's termination and withdrawal of an independent contractor opportunity constituted materially adverse actions
5. Whether there was a causal connection between Russo's protected conduct (discrimination complaint) and the adverse actions taken against her

The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claims but reversed and remanded on the retaliation claim. On discrimination, the court found that although Ahn was difficult with employees of both genders and had multiple negative interactions with Russo, there was no evidence his views were rooted in gender bias rather than personal antipathy. The court rejected Russo's arguments based on stereotyping, animus, comparators to male colleagues, inconsistencies, and discriminatory atmosphere, concluding no reasonable factfinder could infer sex discrimination. However, on retaliation, the court found direct evidence of retaliatory animus in Talbot-Kleeman's statement that Russo was "done" because she was "making allegations that are unacceptable." The court held that: (1) accelerating Russo's termination during the transition period constituted a materially adverse action that could dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination; (2) withdrawing the independent contractor opportunity was also an adverse action; and (3) Russo presented sufficient evidence that the Demand Letter complaining of sex discrimination was the but-for cause of these adverse actions, as the Institute's claim that Russo ended negotiations was contradicted by evidence showing she remained willing to negotiate. The case was remanded for trial on the retaliation claim.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a motion for return of seized property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). The Government seized the domain name waronfakes.com, allegedly purchased in violation of international money laundering statutes and with intent to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and the appellants sought its return.

1. Whether the appellants have Article III standing to bring a Rule 41(g) motion for return of the seized domain, specifically whether they have a cognizable ownership or possessory interest in the domain and whether their claim is redressable.
2. Whether the appellants are lawfully entitled to possess the domain given that ANO Dialog (the entity with an interest in the domain) is on the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) blocked persons list pursuant to Executive Order 14024, which freezes all property of designated persons.
3. Whether IEEPA's statutory exception for "information or informational materials" or OFAC General License No. 25 permits transfer of the domain to the appellants.
4. Whether the Government's retention of the domain is reasonable absent an indictment or forfeiture motion for over twenty months.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for return of property. The court held:

1. Standing: The appellants have Article III standing because they demonstrated a possessory interest in the domain (Timofey V was the registrant at the time of seizure), and the claim is redressable as a matter of law separate from the merits question of lawful entitlement.
2. Lawful Entitlement: The appellants failed to establish they are lawfully entitled to possess the domain because ANO Dialog is on the OFAC blocked persons list, and Timofey V is ANO Dialog's employee. Under OFAC sanctions, all property of blocked persons is frozen and cannot be transferred without an OFAC license, which the appellants have not obtained. The court rejected the appellants' argument that the designation occurred after the seizure, holding that the relevant timeframe for a Rule 41(g) motion is when the motion is filed, not when the seizure occurred.
3. Forfeited Arguments: The appellants' arguments regarding IEEPA's "information or informational materials" exception and OFAC General License No. 25 were forfeited because they were not raised in the district court. The appellants had raised First Amendment arguments instead, which involve different legal standards and facts.
4. Reasonableness: While the court expressed concern about the Government's indefinite retention of the domain without indictment or forfeiture motion for over twenty months, it found the retention was not "arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable" because the appellants were not lawfully entitled to the property when they filed the motion. The court noted that future applications for OFAC licenses or de-listing would be relevant to reasonableness in subsequent proceedings.

This is a criminal appeal in which Markel Trevon Smith challenges his conviction for unlawful possession of a machinegun and his 57-month sentence. Smith was arrested after police recovered multiple firearms from his vehicle, including a Glock pistol with a machinegun-conversion device that had three serial numbers, two of which were modified.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits possession of machineguns, violates the Second Amendment to the Constitution.
2. Whether the district court properly applied the four-level serial number enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(i) when only two of three serial numbers on the firearm were modified, leaving one serial number legible and the firearm traceable.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith's conviction but reversed and vacated his sentence for resentencing. The court held:

1. Second Amendment Challenge: The court rejected Smith's facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(o), holding that machineguns are not in common use for lawful purposes and therefore fall outside Second Amendment protection as "dangerous and unusual" weapons.
2. Serial Number Enhancement: The court held that the serial number enhancement applies only when a firearm is rendered completely untraceable. Because Smith's firearm had one fully legible serial number ("AGGE159") that could be used to trace the weapon, the enhancement should not have been applied. The court reasoned that "original information" refers to the unique sequence of digits identifying the firearm, and if that information remains legible on any part of the firearm, the enhancement does not apply. The court adopted the narrower "naked eye" test endorsed by the Sentencing Commission's 2024 amendment and rejected the broader "less legible" test previously used by the Fourth Circuit. The Government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a firearm is untraceable for the enhancement to apply.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which the United States challenges a district court's dismissal of an indictment charging Raymond Luna with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), based on a prior drug possession conviction. The district court held that applying § 922(g)(1) to Luna violated the Second Amendment.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the Government's motion for reconsideration that sought to introduce evidence of the facts underlying Luna's predicate drug possession conviction (specifically, that the quantity of drugs suggested trafficking rather than simple possession).
2. Whether a predicate felony conviction for simple drug possession is sufficient to support a § 922(g)(1) conviction under the Second Amendment.
3. Whether courts may consider the underlying facts and conduct of a predicate conviction when determining if it justifies disarmament under § 922(g)(1).
4. The proper reconciliation of conflicting Fifth Circuit precedents regarding what evidence may be considered in § 922(g)(1) cases.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the indictment. The majority held that: (1) the Government forfeited its argument by failing to adequately brief the abuse of discretion claim in its opening brief; (2) the court should not take judicial notice of documents available to the district court but not presented to it; (3) under precedent established in United States v. Hembree, a simple drug possession conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) conviction; and (4) the Government's alternative arguments based on drug trafficking statutes and Luna's status under indictment for firearm possession all fail under existing Fifth Circuit precedent. The majority reasoned that § 922(g)(1) requires consideration only of qualifying predicate convictions, and Luna's sole predicate—simple possession—is insufficient as a matter of law. Judge Willett's concurrence provided an extensive analysis reconciling seemingly conflicting precedents by distinguishing between (1) which convictions qualify for consideration (Diaz/Kimble line of cases) and (2) what facts about those convictions may be examined (Contreras/Morgan line of cases), establishing a two-step framework for future application.

This is an appeal of a pretrial detention order in a federal criminal case involving a church leader charged with forced labor, conspiracy to commit forced labor, and money laundering conspiracy. The defendant appeals the district court's orders denying his motions to revoke his pretrial detention and to reopen his detention hearing.

1. Whether the appeal was timely filed or time-barred under Local Rule 7.1(h) and whether a motion for reconsideration tolled the appeal deadline
2. Whether the district court properly applied the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) in determining that no conditions could reasonably assure community safety
3. Whether pretrial detention violates the First Amendment when charges involve conduct occurring within religious facilities
4. Whether the government's proffer regarding physical violence was sufficiently specific and contextualized
5. Whether conditions of release could adequately address dangers posed by the defendant's possession of sexually explicit material and threats to disclose it
6. Whether a co-defendant's release on conditions is relevant to the defendant's detention determination

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order denying the defendant's motion to revoke his pretrial detention. The court held that: (1) the appeal was timely because the motion for reconsideration under Local Rule 7.1(h)(2) tolled the appeal deadline for interlocutory orders; (2) the § 3142(g) factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offenses (forced labor involving coercion, violence, sexual exploitation, and control over workers' lives), the weight of evidence, and the danger posed to the community, all supported detention; (3) the First Amendment does not shield criminal conduct from prosecution or detention merely because it occurred within religious facilities or was motivated by religious beliefs; (4) the government's proffer regarding violence was sufficiently specific and detailed for the district court to accept; (5) conditions of release could not adequately protect victims and community members given the defendant's demonstrated pattern of using others to carry out threats and coercion; and (6) a co-defendant's release is not a relevant factor in detention hearings under § 3142(g).

This is a federal criminal appeal challenging the dismissal of a possession charge against Steven Anderegg, who was accused of producing, distributing, and possessing AI-generated images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct using Stable Diffusion software. The district court dismissed the possession charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1), finding it unconstitutional as applied to the defendant based on First Amendment protections for private possession of obscene materials in the home.

1. Whether the First Amendment right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of one's home (established in Stanley v. Georgia) extends to obscene virtual child sexual abuse material (CSAM).
2. Whether the government's compelling interest in protecting actual children from sexual exploitation and abuse (recognized in Ferber and Osborne v. Ohio) applies to virtual CSAM that does not depict actual children.
3. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, which struck down prohibitions on virtual CSAM, controls the analysis of a statute limited to obscene virtual CSAM.
4. Whether the interstate commerce requirement in § 1466A(d)(4) distinguishes this case from Stanley's protection of in-home possession.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the possession charge, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Anderegg. The court reasoned as follows:

1. Anderegg's circumstances fall within Stanley's protection because he is accused of possessing obscene materials in his home, and the interstate commerce requirement does not change this fundamental fact. The court rejected the government's argument that Stanley applies only to obscene materials involving adults, finding that Stanley's holding is predicated on the location (the home) rather than the content of the materials.
2. Although Ferber and Osborne permit the government to prohibit possession of CSAM depicting actual children based on compelling interests in protecting child victims, those cases do not apply here because Anderegg's images do not depict actual children.
3. All of the government's arguments for removing virtual CSAM from Stanley's protection—including that virtual CSAM can be used to groom minors, that it normalizes sexual activity with children, that it reduces the market for actual CSAM, and that technological advances make it difficult to distinguish virtual from actual CSAM—were expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition.
4. Although the court expressed concerns about applying Free Speech Coalition in light of significant advances in AI technology since 2002, it is bound by Supreme Court precedent and cannot redraw the lines established by Stanley and Free Speech Coalition. The court noted that only the Supreme Court has the authority to overrule its own decisions.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges his murder and firearm convictions based on the admission of a witness's prior testimony at trial. The defendant argues that admitting the prior testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses because the government failed to demonstrate the witness was unavailable despite reasonable, good-faith efforts to locate him.

1. Whether the admission of a witness's prior testimonial statements from a preliminary hearing violates the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause when the witness is absent from trial
2. Whether the government made reasonable, good-faith efforts to locate the witness before resorting to prior testimony
3. What standard applies to determine whether a witness is "unavailable" for Confrontation Clause purposes

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions. The court held that the government made reasonable, good-faith efforts to locate witness William Lozer and therefore satisfied the Confrontation Clause requirement that a witness be unavailable before prior testimony may be admitted. The court applied a fact-specific analysis considering: (1) the importance of the witness; (2) the seriousness of the crime; (3) whether the witness had special reason to favor the prosecution; and (4) whether the government made the same efforts it would have made without access to prior testimony. The court found that despite extensive efforts by multiple law enforcement agencies—including contacting Lozer's family, his attorney, attempting to locate him at known addresses, contacting Tinker Air Force Base, and reaching out to homeless shelters—the government was unable to locate Lozer, who was transient, homeless, and had not been seen by family or counsel in months. The court rejected the defendant's suggestions for additional efforts as unlikely to succeed and noted that the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every possible means of locating a witness.

This is an appeal in a case involving plaintiffs Schrade Jones and Carter Gilliam against the United States of America and the Tennessee Valley Authority, heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this order, as the document is a procedural order addressing the rehearing of the appeal rather than a substantive opinion on the merits.

The court granted the petition for rehearing en banc. A majority of the judges in active service on the Eleventh Circuit voted in favor of rehearing the appeal before the full court sitting en banc. As a result, the panel's previous opinion was vacated, and the case will be reheard by the entire court rather than by a three-judge panel.

This is an administrative law case challenging the National Marine Fisheries Service's regulation of South Atlantic red snapper fishing under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Commercial fishers and buyers appeal the district court's dismissal of their challenge to Amendment 43 of the Fishery Management Plan, which establishes annual catch limits based solely on fish landings without directly restricting "dead discards" (fish that die after being caught and discarded).

1. Whether the Service's landings-only annual catch limit violates 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15), which requires fishery management plans to "establish a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits . . . at a level such that overfishing does not occur"
2. Whether the case became moot when the Service promulgated Amendment 59, which updated the numerical catch limits but maintained the same landings-only measurement approach
3. Whether the 30-day filing deadline in 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1) is jurisdictional, given that appellants filed their challenge more than 30 days after Amendment 43's promulgation
4. Whether an annual catch limit that restricts only landings can adequately account for dead discards and prevent overfishing as required by statute

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Service on all grounds. First, the Court rejected the mootness argument, holding that Amendment 59 did not moot the case because it injured appellants in the same fundamental way as Amendment 43 by continuing to impose a landings-only annual catch limit without directly restricting dead discards. Second, the Court declined to address the timeliness issue, finding that the 30-day deadline in § 1855(f)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional requirement, and therefore the Court could proceed to the merits. Third, on the merits, the Court held that the Service's landings-only annual catch limit does not violate § 1853(a)(15). The Court's reasoning was controlled by its prior decision in A.P. Bell Fish Co. v. Raimondo, which established that the Magnuson-Stevens Act does not require annual catch limits to directly restrict bycatch (which includes dead discards). The Court explained that landings-only limits can indirectly account for all sources of mortality, including dead discards, through the interrelated reference points of the overfishing limit, acceptable biological catch, and annual catch limit. The Court rejected appellants' argument that a landings-only limit is conceptually incapable of preventing overfishing, finding that A.P. Bell's reasoning fully applied to the annual catch limit context and foreclosed appellants' claims.

This is an appeal of a Delaware Court of Chancery decision dismissing a shareholder class action complaint. The plaintiff brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment against a SPAC and its officers, alleging they disseminated a misleading proxy statement to stockholders.

1. Whether the plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment were barred by the three-year statute of limitations
2. Whether the plaintiff was on inquiry notice when the allegedly misleading proxy statement was disseminated
3. Whether the deficiencies in the proxy were observable on their face, triggering inquiry notice obligations
4. Whether the plaintiff's characterization of claims as based on affirmative misstatements rather than omissions affects the statute of limitations analysis

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff's claims accrued on March 11, 2021, when Collective Growth Corp. disseminated the proxy statement to stockholders. Because the plaintiff did not file suit until March 28, 2024—after the three-year statute of limitations expired—the claims were time-barred. The court reasoned that the deficiencies in the proxy were observable on its face, placing the plaintiff on inquiry notice from the date of issuance. The court rejected the plaintiff's distinction between affirmative misstatements and omissions, finding that the proxy contained all facts underlying the plaintiff's net-cash-per-share theory, and any reasonable inquiry would have led to discovery of remaining information with ample time to file suit before the limitations period expired.

This is a civil contempt appeal in which Juan Carlos Reynoso challenges a district court order holding him in contempt for failing to comply with a seizure warrant requiring the transfer of Bitcoin to a government-controlled wallet within 24 hours. Reynoso appeals the denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing before the contempt finding was issued.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Reynoso's request for an evidentiary hearing in civil contempt proceedings
2. Whether there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the four requirements for civil contempt: (1) notice of the order; (2) clarity and lack of ambiguity in the order; (3) ability to comply; and (4) violation of the order
3. Whether service of the seizure warrant on Reynoso's attorney constituted sufficient notice to Reynoso
4. Whether Reynoso had the ability to comply with the warrant and whether intent to avoid compliance is relevant to the compliance analysis

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's civil contempt order. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the evidentiary hearing because the record disclosed no genuine dispute of material fact regarding any of the four requirements for civil contempt. Specifically: (1) Reynoso's attorney agreed to accept service and received the warrant on January 31, 2025, satisfying the notice requirement; (2) the warrant was clear and unambiguous in its terms; (3) an FBI Special Agent's declaration established Reynoso's ownership and control over the cryptocurrency, and Reynoso failed to produce any evidence disputing this or establishing inability to comply; and (4) the transfers of Bitcoin from the wallet after service constituted a violation. The court noted that Reynoso made only conclusory assertions about disputed facts without identifying specific evidence in the record or evidence he would present at a hearing. The court further held that Reynoso bore the burden of production in establishing inability to comply and failed to meet that burden.

This is an interlocutory appeal in a putative class action brought by two foreign nationals against a car rental company for allegedly misrepresenting supplemental liability insurance coverage. The central issue is whether the rental company waived its right to compel arbitration by litigating the case for approximately eighteen months before moving to compel arbitration.

1. Whether the arbitration clause contained in the rental jacket was binding on the plaintiffs under the rule established in Bacon v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., which requires that customers be on notice of the arbitration clause when signing the rental agreement.
2. Whether the defendants impliedly waived their right to compel arbitration by filing a motion to dismiss, litigating through discovery, and only then moving to compel arbitration approximately eighteen months into the litigation.
3. Whether the plaintiffs' claims fall within the small-claims exception to the arbitration clause.

The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration and remanded for further consideration. The court held that the defendants did not impliedly waive their right to arbitration. The court reasoned that: (1) the defendants expressly reserved their arbitration right in their answer and in subsequent filings; (2) under the Bacon rule, the complaint's allegations did not provide an adequate basis to move to compel arbitration without factual development; (3) the defendants needed discovery, particularly the depositions of the plaintiffs, to establish a factual basis for the arbitration defense; (4) the defendants moved to compel arbitration within a reasonably prompt time (approximately two months) after obtaining the necessary factual information through depositions; and (5) the defendants' conduct was consistent with developing a factual record needed for the motion rather than demonstrating an intentional relinquishment of their arbitration rights. The court emphasized that implied waiver requires intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, and that a party need not move to compel arbitration before having a meaningful opportunity to investigate facts related to arbitrability.

This is a disability discrimination case in which a quadriplegic woman challenged the closure of her foster parent application by Michigan state officials and a private licensing agency, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Equal Protection Clause.

1. Whether categorically precluding individuals with severe physical disabilities from being foster parents violates the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, which require individualized assessment and reasonable accommodation
2. Whether Metcalf's proposed accommodation—relying on a network of formal and informal aides to provide physical care for foster children—was reasonable under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
3. Whether Michigan's foster care licensing statutes facially discriminate against people with disabilities
4. Whether the defendants violated Metcalf's Equal Protection rights by discriminating based on disability

The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. While the court acknowledged that categorical exclusion of individuals with disabilities may violate the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, it held that Metcalf's proposed accommodation was unreasonable because: (1) she had not secured dedicated, reliable assistance to meet foster children's physical needs; her formal aides were restricted by insurance to assisting only Metcalf, and her informal network of over twenty friends and family members provided no concrete assurance of consistent care; and (2) allowing such an unstructured arrangement would fundamentally alter the foster care licensing scheme designed to ensure child safety. The court rejected the defendants' argument that her aides would need separate licensure but found that Metcalf's "patchwork" of assistance was insufficient. The court also rejected her facial challenges to Michigan law, finding the statutes were not discriminatory in all applications since Michigan had issued licenses to other disabled individuals. Finally, the court upheld summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim, finding that while Metcalf suffered disparate treatment based on disability, it was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of ensuring safe homes for foster children. The court noted that Metcalf could reapply with a more comprehensive third-party assistance plan.

This is an appeal concerning whether a federal district court properly abstained from hearing a tenured law professor's constitutional challenge to his placement on administrative leave during a university investigation into his speech critical of Israel. The plaintiff argues the district court erred in applying Younger abstention doctrine because the university's investigation does not constitute an ongoing state proceeding.

1. Whether Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine applies to a university's preliminary disciplinary investigation into alleged policy violations by a tenured faculty member
2. Whether a university's internal investigatory process, as opposed to a formal disciplinary proceeding, qualifies as an "ongoing" state proceeding for purposes of Younger abstention
3. Whether the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges within the university's disciplinary process

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's abstention decision and remanded the case for consideration of the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. The court held that Younger abstention was inappropriate because the university's disciplinary proceedings against Woodcock remained in a preliminary investigatory stage with no formal proceeding or formal complaint filed. The court reasoned that abstention requires an "ongoing" state proceeding, and a preliminary investigation—even one involving temporary reassignment of duties—does not satisfy this requirement. The court distinguished the case from its prior decision in Doe v. University of Kentucky, which involved formal Title IX hearings already underway, emphasizing that here the university had not yet determined whether a formal hearing would even be necessary.

This is a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case in which a researcher sought disclosure of a House Appropriations Committee Report held by the National Security Agency. The court addressed whether a document created by Congress and later transmitted to a federal agency becomes an "agency record" subject to disclosure under FOIA.

1. Whether a document originally created by Congress and later transmitted to a federal agency becomes an "agency record" subject to mandatory disclosure under FOIA
2. What standard should apply to determine when congressional documents held by agencies are subject to FOIA's disclosure requirements
3. Whether Congress's explicit markings on a document indicating it should not be released without authorization demonstrate an intent to retain control over the document
4. Whether an agency's internal use of a congressional document consistent with confidentiality restrictions converts it into an agency record

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the NSA, holding that the House Appropriations Committee Report is not an agency record subject to FOIA disclosure. The court adopted the D.C. Circuit's test, which provides that a document prepared by Congress and provided to an agency is not subject to FOIA when Congress manifests a clear intent to control the document. The court found that Congress clearly manifested such intent through: (1) the prominent "NOT FOR RELEASE UNLESS AND UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY COMMITTEE" banner affixed to the report; (2) the TOP SECRET classification markings; and (3) the NSA's consistent treatment of the document as controlled by Congress, including limiting its disclosure and never releasing it publicly. The court reasoned that allowing FOIA requests to agencies to circumvent Congress's exclusion from FOIA would create an impermissible "end run" around Congress's constitutional prerogatives and would force Congress to choose between its oversight authority and its ability to maintain document confidentiality. The court emphasized that the proper recourse for obtaining the document is to petition Congress directly, not to seek it through FOIA requests to agencies.

This is a criminal appeal involving a felon in possession of ammunition conviction. Fernando Aguilera challenges both the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during his seizure and his sentence, arguing the district court improperly denied him a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

1. Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to seize Aguilera based on reports of gunshots outside a bar and eyewitness descriptions
2. Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in denying Aguilera a two-level sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)
3. Whether the district court improperly considered Aguilera's constitutionally protected conduct (motion to suppress, motions to dismiss, and decision to go to trial) in denying the acceptance of responsibility reduction
4. Whether any sentencing error was harmless

The court affirmed Aguilera's conviction and the denial of his motion to suppress, but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. On the suppression issue, the court held that officers had reasonable suspicion to seize Aguilera based on: (1) eyewitness reports of a Hispanic male in a blue jacket firing a gun; (2) Officer Hurtado's visual identification of a person matching that description; (3) the suspect's flight when ordered to stop; (4) the suspect's proximity to where he was last seen; and (5) a witness confirming Aguilera was hiding behind the fence. The court rejected Aguilera's arguments that the description was too general, that flight was provoked, or that officers failed to confirm his appearance before seizing him. On sentencing, the court held that the district court misapprehended the law regarding the acceptance of responsibility reduction. The court found that the district court either believed a defendant must unconditionally plead guilty to qualify for the reduction, or improperly considered Aguilera's constitutionally protected conduct (his suppression motion, dismissal motions, and decision to go to trial to preserve these issues for appeal) against him. The court emphasized that a defendant's decision to go to trial does not automatically preclude the reduction, particularly when the defendant goes to trial to preserve constitutional challenges unrelated to factual guilt. The court found the error was not harmless because the district court analyzed only the incorrect 51-63 month range and did not conduct a separate analysis of the correct 41-51 month range that would have applied with the reduction, and the probation officer's recommended sentence of 41 months was at the low end of the lower range, suggesting a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Keith Miller was convicted of two counts of attempted credit-union robbery by intimidation, one count of credit-union robbery by intimidation, and one count of bank robbery by intimidation under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Miller challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions, arguing that his demand notes were polite and non-threatening and therefore insufficient to establish the "intimidation" element required by the statute.

1. Whether presenting a demand note to a bank teller constitutes "intimidation" under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) when the note contains no explicit threats of violence
2. Whether the politeness or courtesy of a demand note negates the intimidation element
3. Whether intimidation requires proof that a teller actually felt fear, or whether an objective standard applies based on what an ordinary person in the teller's position would reasonably infer
4. Whether a demand for money alone, without additional threatening conduct, is sufficient to establish intimidation in the context of bank robbery

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Miller's convictions on all counts. The court held that in the context of a suspected bank robbery, an individual's demand for cash from a teller—whether verbal or written, threatening or polite—provides sufficient evidentiary grounds to support a jury's finding of intimidation under § 2113(a). The court reasoned that: (1) intimidation means "to make fearful or to put into fear" and is assessed objectively based on whether an ordinary person in the teller's position could reasonably infer a threat of bodily harm; (2) a demand for money in a bank robbery context carries an implicit threat that non-compliance may result in harm; (3) bank tellers cannot fully evaluate the actual risk they face in the split-second they receive such demands; (4) standard bank protocol instructs tellers to comply with robbery demands to protect employee safety, reflecting the assumption that non-compliance carries potential for violence; and (5) politeness or courtesy in making the demand does not negate the intimidation element. The court adopted the reasoning from United States v. Gilmore and other circuit precedents supporting this broad interpretation of intimidation in bank robbery cases.

This is an appeal of a Court of Chancery decision regarding attorney fees and costs awarded to Brian Jones in a books-and-records action brought under Delaware Code Title 8, Section 220 against FON Holdings, LLC. FON Holdings challenges the lower court's determination that Jones was the prevailing party entitled to recover fees under a contractual fee-shifting provision.

1. Whether Brian Jones qualified as the "prevailing party" in a books-and-records action under 8 Del. C. § 220
2. Whether the Court of Chancery properly awarded attorney fees and costs to Jones under a contractual fee-shifting provision
3. The appropriate standard of review for determining prevailing party status in such actions

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment. The court held that the lower court's determination that Jones was the prevailing party is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, and the court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's decision. Accordingly, the award of attorney fees and costs to Jones under the contractual fee-shifting provision was proper and upheld.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving allegations of corporate asset diversion and potential loan forgiveness. Plaintiff Polyxeni Liederman-Molokotos, a 50% equity owner and director of Bramley Investment Limited, accuses defendant Diane Vardakas Molokotos of abusing her position to improperly transfer company assets to Kovac Corporation, a trust-owned entity.

1. Whether defendant Diane Vardakas Molokotos abused her position as Bramley's sole officer to divert assets to Kovac Corporation
2. Whether a $681,315 debt allegedly owed by Kovac to Bramley actually existed
3. Whether any such debt was improperly forgiven
4. Whether defendant engaged in calculated destruction of evidence in 2023 to avoid liability in separate Trust litigation
5. Whether summary judgment is appropriate at the current stage of discovery

The court denied defendant's request for leave to file a motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that material facts remain genuinely in dispute, including: (1) whether the $681,315 was ever actually transferred from Bramley to Kovac; (2) if transferred, whether it constituted a loan or gift; and (3) if a loan, whether it was forgiven. The court emphasized that summary judgment is discretionary and should be denied when more thorough exploration of facts is needed to properly apply the law. The court also noted that the motion was premature, as defendant had only recently produced documents (May 13, 2026) and identified deponents (June 2, 2026), with depositions not yet commenced.

This case involves Fourth Amendment and state law claims brought by residents and the owner of a sober home in Massachusetts against police officers who entered the property on three separate occasions between October 2019 and January 2020 to respond to overdoses and execute arrest warrants. The plaintiffs alleged unlawful searches and seizures, while the defendants claimed their actions were justified under exceptions to the warrant requirement.

1. Whether warrantless police entries into a sober home to respond to overdose emergencies violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
2. Whether police officers lawfully seized residents for questioning during these entries
3. Whether the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement justified the officers' entries and searches
4. Whether the consent exception to the warrant requirement applied to the officers' conduct
5. Whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions
6. Whether a civil conspiracy claim could proceed based on alleged underlying torts

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to all defendants on all claims. The court held that: (1) Officer Curtis's October 2019 entry and search were justified under the emergency aid exception, and any questioning of residents was objectively reasonable; (2) the December 2019 entries were justified by an arrest warrant and emergency circumstances, and the plaintiffs failed to establish that the named detectives were responsible for any alleged unlawful searches or seizures; (3) Detective Carpenter's January 2020 entry was justified because an emergency still existed when he arrived and residents had consented to the initial entry by Officer Martin, and his questioning of a resident was objectively reasonable under the circumstances; (4) the plaintiffs failed to develop meaningful arguments challenging the district court's analysis and waived several claims through inadequate briefing; and (5) the civil conspiracy claim failed because the plaintiffs did not establish any underlying tort. The court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on objective reasonableness of officers' conduct, not their subjective motivations, and that the plaintiffs bore the burden of presenting specific facts creating genuine disputes of material fact to survive summary judgment.

This is a criminal appeal in which the government challenges a district court's order granting a new trial to Philip Epps, who was convicted of drug trafficking and firearm offenses. The new trial was granted based on allegedly coercive jury instructions given when the jury reported being deadlocked during deliberations.

1. Whether the district court's supplemental jury instruction telling a deadlocked jury that they "have to" reach a unanimous verdict constituted an incorrect statement of law and was unduly coercive.
2. Whether the defendant forfeited or waived his right to challenge the instruction by not objecting before the jury retired to deliberate.
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in granting a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 based on the flawed instruction.
4. The appropriate standard of review for jury instruction errors raised in post-trial motions versus on appeal.

The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's order granting a new trial. The court held that while the supplemental instruction contained an incorrect statement of law (instructing the jury it "has to" reach a verdict rather than "has to try"), the instruction was not unduly coercive when reviewed in full context and alongside the complete jury charge. The court found that: (1) the defendant's failure to object constituted a forfeiture rather than an invited error, triggering plain error review; (2) the supplemental instruction, when considered with the earlier correct instructions on unanimity and the repeated reminders to base the verdict solely on evidence, did not cause the jury to reach a verdict for reasons other than the evidence presented; (3) the minimal coercive content was mitigated by strong accompanying warnings and reminders; and (4) the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, making any potential prejudice from the instruction insignificant. Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion in granting a new trial under Rule 33's interest-of-justice standard.

This is an appeal in a criminal case where the defendant challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(B), a federal statute that criminalizes distributing information about explosives when the speaker knows a recipient intends to use it for a federal crime of violence. The Fourth Circuit panel upheld the statute, and the defendant petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was denied.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(B) is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment because it restricts a broad category of speech (information "pertaining in part" to explosives) with an insufficient mens rea requirement (mere knowledge rather than intent)
2. Whether a "knowledge" requirement, coupled with a "specific person" requirement, adequately narrows the statute to survive First Amendment scrutiny
3. Whether the prohibited speech falls within the narrow category of "speech integral to criminal conduct" that receives no First Amendment protection
4. Whether the statute impermissibly restricts the dissemination of publicly available information
5. Whether a companion provision (§ 842(p)(2)(A)) requiring intent rather than knowledge renders the challenged provision superfluous and unconstitutional

The court denied the petition for rehearing en banc by a vote of 12-3. The majority (Chief Judge Diaz and Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Agee, Wynn, Thacker, Harris, Richardson, Quattlebaum, Rushing, Heytens, and Berner) voted to deny rehearing. However, Judge Gregory's dissenting statement argues that the statute should be struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad. Judge Gregory's dissent reasons that: (1) the statute's substantive prohibition is "gallingly broad," criminalizing basic information about chemistry, physics, and mathematics that merely "pertains in part" to explosives; (2) the "knowledge" mens rea requirement is insufficient under Supreme Court precedent (particularly Reno v. ACLU), which requires specific intent to forfeit First Amendment protection; (3) the statute improperly expands the "speech integral to criminal conduct" exception beyond its historical scope of speech that is itself the vehicle of a crime; (4) the statute restricts publicly available information without a compelling government interest; and (5) a companion provision (§ 842(p)(2)(A)) requiring intent instead of knowledge encompasses all constitutionally valid applications, leaving the challenged provision with no legitimate purpose. Judge Gregory would have granted rehearing en banc and struck down the statute as overbroad.

This is a copyright and Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) case involving an architecture firm's claims against homebuilders for unauthorized use of architectural designs and technical drawings. The case also presents a threshold jurisdictional question regarding whether a district court properly dismissed only some of the plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).

1. Whether the district court's partial dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction
2. Whether 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) of the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (AWCPA) applies to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural (PGS) works or only to architectural works
3. Whether floorplans and digital renderings constitute "pictorial representations" within the meaning of § 120(a)
4. Whether § 120(a)'s protection applies to pictorial representations created before the building was constructed
5. Whether § 120(a) is an affirmative defense or an element of the copyright infringement claim
6. Whether the DMCA prohibits failure to include copyright management information (CMI) on newly created works, or only the removal or alteration of existing CMI
7. Whether private parties can contractually bind courts to a particular interpretation of federal statutes

1. Jurisdiction: The court has appellate jurisdiction despite the district court's improper partial dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). Although Rule 41(a)(2) permits dismissal only of "an action" (not individual claims), an erroneous Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal order is not a nullity that deprives appellate jurisdiction. Unlike Rule 41(a)(1) dismissals, which occur automatically by operation of the rule, Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals require a court order. An erroneous court order still constitutes a valid order for jurisdictional purposes and can be reviewed on appeal.
2. Copyright Infringement - PGS Works: The district court erred in applying § 120(a) to PGS works. Section 120(a) limits only "[t]he copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed" and says nothing about PGS works. The statute's plain text and heading ("Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works") indicate that § 120(a) applies only to architectural works under § 102(a)(8), not to PGS works protected under § 102(a)(5).
3. Copyright Infringement - Pictorial Representations: Floorplans and digital renderings constitute "pictorial representations" within the meaning of § 120(a). The ordinary meaning of "pictorial representations" clearly covers these items, as they are images that depict the architectural works. The court rejected the Eighth Circuit's narrower interpretation limiting "pictorial representations" to works created for artistic purposes, finding that the statutory context and broader copyright law support a broader definition encompassing functional, technical representations as well.
4. Copyright Infringement - Pre-Construction Images: Section 120(a)'s temporal limitation depends on when the infringing act (making, distributing, or publicly displaying the pictorial representation) occurred, not when the pictorial representation was created. The court vacated the dismissal because the complaint did not clearly allege when the infringing acts occurred, and § 120(a) is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by defendants, not an element of the plaintiff's cause of action.
5. DMCA Claims: The court affirmed the dismissal of the DMCA claims. Section 1202(b) prohibits the removal or alteration of CMI, not the failure to include CMI in newly created works. The words "remove" and "alter" both presuppose that the CMI was present before the alleged violation. Since the floorplans and digital renderings never contained KFA's CMI to begin with, no CMI was "removed" or "altered." The court rejected KFA's argument that the License Agreements could bind the defendants to a particular interpretation of the DMCA, holding that parties cannot stipulate to the meaning of federal statutes.

This is a First Amendment challenge to a municipal resolution restricting flags that can be displayed on city-owned flagpoles. Two members of the Human Relations Commission sued the City of Hamtramck after the city council passed a resolution limiting flagpole displays to the American flag, state flag, city flag, POW flag, and flags of nations representing the city's international character, effectively prohibiting the Pride flag that had previously been displayed.

1. Whether the city flagpoles constitute a forum for private speech or government speech, and if private speech, whether the resolution's restrictions violate the Free Speech Clause
2. Whether the resolution violates the Establishment Clause by being enacted with the purpose of advancing religion
3. Whether the resolution violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against LGBTQ+ individuals

The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. The majority held that: (1) the flagpoles constitute a forum for government speech after the resolution's passage, as the city implemented a tightly controlled, closed-list system of flag selection similar to policies endorsed in Shurtleff v. City of Boston, and therefore the free-speech claim fails because the First Amendment imposes no limits on government speech; (2) the Establishment Clause claim fails because the resolution's stated secular purpose of maintaining government neutrality and reserving flagpoles for government speech is not a sham, and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the resolution's primary purpose was to advance religion based on isolated legislative statements; and (3) the Equal Protection claim was forfeited because the plaintiffs failed to adequately develop it in the district court. Judge Thapar concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to argue that the majority should have applied the historical-practices test from Kennedy v. Bremerton School District rather than relying on the secular-purpose requirement from pre-Lemon cases, as the Supreme Court has abandoned the Lemon test entirely.

This is an administrative law case challenging a Final Rule enacted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) that expanded the definition of firearm "frames" and "receivers" under the Gun Control Act to cover partially complete components, commonly known as "ghost gun" parts. The State of California and the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence challenged Example 4 of the Final Rule, arguing it failed to regulate certain early-stage receivers that should be covered.

1. Whether the plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge Example 4 of the ATF's Final Rule
2. Whether Example 4 violates the Administrative Procedure Act as "not in accordance with law"
3. Whether Example 4 is "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act
4. Whether plaintiffs can establish the requisite causal link between Example 4 and their claimed injuries

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of standing. The court held that California and the Giffords Law Center failed to establish Article III standing because they did not adequately demonstrate that Example 4 caused their asserted injuries. Specifically, the court found that plaintiffs' evidence did not establish the requisite causal link between Example 4 and their claimed injuries because: (1) California's evidence addressed ghost guns generally rather than the specific unfinished receivers subject to Example 4; (2) most of California's documented expenditures predated the Final Rule's enactment; (3) post-Final Rule data from Los Angeles County actually showed a decrease in ghost guns recovered, contradicting plaintiffs' theory; and (4) both plaintiffs' arguments rested on speculation about how independent third parties would react to the regulation, which the court found impermissible under Article III standing doctrine. The court emphasized that plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by spending money in response to speculative fears of future unlawful conduct by third parties.

This is an employment discrimination case involving five employees of the Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife who sought religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The employees sued for failure to reasonably accommodate their religious beliefs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).

1. Whether an employer satisfies its Title VII obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs by offering only a reassignment process with limited prospects of success, without proposing a specific alternative position or arrangement
2. Whether the burden shifts to the employer to propose a concrete reasonable accommodation that eliminates the religious conflict, or whether merely engaging in an "interactive process" satisfies the employer's duties
3. What constitutes "good faith efforts" to accommodate religious beliefs under Title VII
4. Whether the employees forfeited their federal constitutional claims by failing to seek reinstatement in their original complaint
5. Whether the district court properly excluded expert testimony and issued a protective order limiting depositions

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment in part and affirmed in part. The court held that:

1. Title VII Reasonable Accommodation Standard: Title VII requires an employer to propose a specific reasonable accommodation (such as an alternative position or arrangement) that eliminates the conflict between an employee's religious beliefs and their current job. Once an employee makes a prima facie showing of religious discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to prove it made good faith efforts to accommodate the employee's religious beliefs in a manner that reasonably preserves the employee's employment status, including compensation and other conditions of employment.
2. Reassignment Process Insufficient: The court rejected the Department's argument that merely offering a reassignment process with limited prospects (only 14% success rate historically) constituted a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law. The court found the Department's offer was "nothing more than an opportunity for reassignment, couched in language that made success appear unlikely" and therefore could not satisfy Title VII requirements. The court distinguished this case from out-of-circuit precedents where employers offered concrete transfer options or specific alternative positions.
3. Employee Cooperation Duty: An employee's duty to cooperate in the accommodation process only arises after the employer has proposed a specific reasonable accommodation. Because the Department failed to propose an actual accommodation, the employees' failure to complete the reassignment process did not constitute a breach of any duty to cooperate.
4. Factual Issues for Jury: The court concluded there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Department offered a reasonable accommodation, making summary judgment improper. The case was remanded for trial on the Title VII claims for three employees (Anderson, DeBoer, and Frady) and on the WLAD claims for all five employees.
5. Procedural Bars: The court affirmed summary judgment against two employees (Cherry and Lopez) on their Title VII claims because they failed to meet procedural requirements—Cherry failed to exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC, and Lopez failed to sue within 90 days of receiving her right-to-sue letter.
6. Constitutional Claims: The court affirmed dismissal of federal constitutional claims (Free Exercise Clause, Due Process, Equal Protection) because the employees forfeited their argument that sovereign immunity did not bar their claims by failing to seek reinstatement in their original complaint. The court also affirmed dismissal of state constitutional claims because Washington law does not provide a private right of action for damages under the state constitutional right to privacy.
7. Discovery Matters: The court affirmed the district court's exclusion of three expert witnesses under the Daubert standard and the issuance of a protective order limiting a 30(b)(6) deposition with 31 topics and 450 subtopics, finding no abuse of discretion.

This is a criminal appeal in which Felix Cisneros, Jr., a former Department of Homeland Security special agent convicted of bribery, money laundering, and tax fraud, challenges his resentencing. The central issue is whether a sentencing enhancement for bribery involving a public official in a "high-level decision-making or sensitive position" applies to Cisneros as a law enforcement officer.

1. Whether U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3)'s text is ambiguous regarding whether a "sensitive position" must also be "high-level" for the enhancement to apply
2. Whether the term "sensitive position" is ambiguous and whether a rank-and-file law enforcement officer qualifies as holding such a position
3. Whether Application Note 4 to § 2C1.1 provides a reasonable interpretation of the guideline warranting deference
4. Whether the district court adequately explained its sentencing decision under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and addressed Cisneros' arguments for a downward variance

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Cisneros' 85-month sentence. The court held that: (1) § 2C1.1(b)(3)'s text is genuinely ambiguous as to whether "sensitive position" must also be "high-level," and Application Note 4's separate listing of examples for each category reasonably interprets the guideline to mean a position need not be "high-level"; (2) the term "sensitive position" is ambiguous, but Application Note 4 reasonably interprets it to include law enforcement officers based on the special public trust they exercise in vital areas vulnerable to corruption (trials, elections, and criminal investigations); (3) Cisneros, as a law enforcement officer with arrest authority and the ability to initiate immigration parole requests, held a "sensitive position" and the enhancement was properly applied; and (4) the district court adequately explained its sentencing decision where the record and prior appeal made its reasoning clear, and Cisneros' minimal new arguments regarding changed circumstances (good behavior and a new letter of support) did not require specific discussion.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in a capital murder case where Ronnie Fuston challenges his death sentence conviction for the 2012 murder of Michael Rhodes. Fuston argues his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on second-degree murder and by denying an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim.

1. Whether the trial court violated Fuston's due process rights under Beck v. Alabama by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder in a capital case
2. Whether the trial court violated Fuston's Eighth Amendment rights under Atkins v. Virginia by denying an evidentiary hearing on intellectual disability when Fuston presented multiple IQ scores (59, 69, 75, and 81), including one above Oklahoma's statutory threshold of 76
3. Whether Atkins and its progeny clearly establish that a defendant with mixed IQ scores must receive an Atkins hearing under the AEDPA standard of review

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Fuston's habeas petition on both grounds. The court held:

1. Beck Claim: The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) did not unreasonably apply Beck because the evidence at trial would not have permitted a rational juror to find Fuston guilty of second-degree murder while acquitting him of first-degree murder. The OCCA reasonably determined that Fuston presented no evidence supporting a finding that he lacked premeditated intent to kill, particularly given uncontroverted evidence that he shot Rhodes four times after seeing him move. The court rejected Fuston's speculative inferences that his shooting was reflexive or that he fired blindly without knowing Rhodes was present.
2. Atkins Claim: Atkins and its progeny (Hall v. Florida, Moore v. Texas, and Brumfield v. Cain) do not clearly establish that a defendant presenting multiple IQ scores—some above and some below 70—is entitled to an Atkins hearing. While Hall established that a single IQ score within the standard error of measurement (SEM) of 70 cannot be conclusive, the Supreme Court has not clearly established how courts should evaluate multiple IQ scores where one falls well above 70 (adjusted for SEM). The court noted that the Supreme Court itself recently declined to provide guidance on this issue in Hamm v. Smith. Therefore, the OCCA did not unreasonably apply clearly established law when it relied on Oklahoma's statute treating an IQ score of 76 or above as conclusive evidence of non-disability.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in a capital murder case where Wakilii Brown was convicted of murdering his girlfriend Cherea Jemison and her mother Dotty in Alabama. Brown challenges the trial court's admission of his statement to his aunt that he "hurt them girls," arguing it violated his federal due process rights.

1. Whether the admission of Brown's statement to his aunt (relayed through investigator testimony) violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
2. Whether any error in admitting the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California
3. Whether the state appellate court unreasonably applied federal law or made unreasonable factual determinations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
4. Whether the admission of the statement had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury verdict under the Brecht standard

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief on all grounds. The court held: (1) admitting Brown's statement did not violate due process because the statement was not a crucial, critical, and highly significant factor in the conviction—it was isolated, ambiguous, used only for impeachment, and constituted less than one percent of the trial evidence; (2) the state appellate court did not unreasonably apply Chapman because the overwhelming evidence of guilt (including eyewitness testimony from Brown's daughter, fingerprint evidence, circumstantial evidence of theft and flight, and consciousness of guilt) would have supported conviction regardless of the statement; (3) the state appellate court's factual determinations were reasonable because harmlessness is a legal question, not a factual one; and (4) the statement had no substantial and injurious effect on the verdict because the evidence against Brown was overwhelming and independent of the statement, the statement was barely mentioned in closing arguments, and jurors were instructed not to consider it as substantive evidence.

This is an appeal by an incarcerated plaintiff challenging the dismissal of his civil rights complaint alleging unsafe prison conditions. The case involves the application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's "three-strikes" provision and whether the plaintiff adequately alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury to qualify for an exception to the filing fee requirements.

1. Whether a prisoner with three prior dismissed lawsuits can proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) by demonstrating imminent danger of serious physical injury
2. Whether supplemental factual allegations presented in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation should be considered when evaluating the imminent danger exception
3. Whether a pro se prisoner's right to amend a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) was properly denied
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to liberally construe pro se filings and provide an opportunity to amend the complaint

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to liberally construe Wilson's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The court reasoned that Wilson's objections, which included supplemental factual allegations about threats from a fellow inmate and explicit requests for leave to amend, should have been treated either as a supplement to the complaint or as a motion to amend. The court found that Wilson's additional allegations—that an inmate who had previously assaulted him was freely roaming the prison and making violent threats—sufficiently demonstrated imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing, satisfying the exception to the three-strikes bar. The court emphasized that pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their filings and should not be held to strict procedural formalities, particularly when they explicitly request leave to amend and present supplemental factual allegations.

This is an immigration law case in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether a petitioner's Florida conviction for robbery by sudden snatching qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act, which would render him ineligible for cancellation of removal and subject to deportation.

1. Whether Florida's robbery by sudden snatching statute (FLA. STAT. § 812.131(1)) constitutes a "theft offense" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), thereby qualifying as an "aggravated felony"
2. Whether the statute is "divisible" such that the modified categorical approach applies, or whether the categorical approach governs
3. Whether the statute's intent element (allowing deprivation of either "victim or owner") is broader than generic theft's intent element
4. Whether the statute's allowance for temporary deprivations makes it broader than generic theft
5. Whether the statute's lack of express "without consent" language makes it broader than generic theft

The court affirmed the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision and denied the petitioner's petition for review. The court held that Florida robbery by sudden snatching qualifies as an aggravated felony theft offense under the INA. The court reasoned that: (1) the statute is not divisible, so the categorical approach applies; (2) the statute's intent element is not broader than generic theft because both require intent to deprive someone with a superior possessory interest, not necessarily the title owner; (3) generic theft includes temporary deprivations, so the statute's allowance for temporary takings does not make it overbroad; and (4) the lack of express "without consent" language is not fatal because Florida law inherently requires nonconsensual takings under the statute. Therefore, the petitioner's conviction rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal and subject to deportation.

This is a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession statute, which prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms. The defendant, Garrick Richardson, was convicted of violating this statute while under supervised probation for a prior felony conviction.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment under the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen
2. Whether there is a historical tradition of disarming felons that supports the constitutionality of the statute
3. Whether the statute is constitutional as applied to individuals still serving non-custodial sentences (supervised probation/release) versus lifetime disarmament of all felons
4. What facts may be considered in as-applied challenges to gun restrictions

The court affirmed Richardson's conviction and held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to defendants who remain under non-custodial supervision (such as probation or supervised release) at the time of their firearm possession offense. The court's reasoning: (1) At the Founding, there was a widespread historical tradition of temporarily disarming felons while they served their criminal sentences through forfeiture laws; (2) Section 922(g)(1), as applied to individuals still under supervision, shares the same core justifications as historical disarmament provisions—deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation; (3) The burden imposed by the statute on individuals still serving sentences is comparable to historical forfeiture provisions; (4) It makes no constitutional difference whether the sentence is custodial (imprisonment) or non-custodial (probation/supervised release), as both serve similar purposes including protecting monitoring officers and deterring crime; (5) The "greater-includes-the-lesser" principle supports that if disarmament during incarceration is constitutional, then disarmament during supervised release is also constitutional. The court declined to address whether the statute is constitutional as applied to felons who have completed their sentences, limiting its holding to those still under active supervision.

This case involves two consolidated appeals concerning whether untimely notices of appeal filed by pro se litigants should be construed to include motions to extend or reopen the time to appeal under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) and (6). David J. Rudometkin sued the Secretary of the Army under the Freedom of Information Act, and Evangelistic Godson sued Johns Hopkins Medicine and a doctor for alleged mistreatment.

1. Whether a pro se notice of appeal filed after the deadline can be construed as including a motion to extend or reopen the time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6)
2. What standard should apply to determine whether a pro se filing should be recharacterized as a motion despite its stated title
3. Whether the district court's failure to construe a pro se notice as including such a motion is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion
4. Whether Rudometkin's and Godson's specific filings met the applicable standard

The court held that a pro se notice of appeal should be construed as including a Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motion if it can reasonably be read as recognizing that the appeal is late, providing reasons for that lateness, and requesting relief. The court reviews such determinations de novo. Applying this standard, the court found that Rudometkin's notice of appeal met the standard because it explicitly stated he had not received notice of the order and requested an extension under the applicable rules. The court remanded Rudometkin's case to the district court to rule on the merits of his motions. Conversely, Godson's notice of appeal did not meet the standard because, although it contained a statement about learning of the judgment while in Washington, D.C., this statement was buried among numerous grievances and could not reasonably be read as acknowledging the appeal's untimeliness or requesting relief. The court dismissed Godson's appeal for lack of jurisdiction as untimely.

This case involves two consolidated appeals concerning whether untimely notices of appeal filed by pro se litigants should be construed to include motions to extend or reopen the time to appeal under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) and (6). David J. Rudometkin sued the Secretary of the Army under the Freedom of Information Act, and Evangelistic Godson sued Johns Hopkins Medicine and a doctor for alleged medical mistreatment, with both appellants missing their appeal deadlines.

1. Whether a pro se notice of appeal filed after the deadline can be construed as including a motion to extend or reopen the time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6)
2. What standard should apply to determine when a notice of appeal should be recharacterized as a motion for relief from the appeal deadline
3. Whether pro se filings should receive liberal construction in the context of appellate procedure
4. The appropriate standard of review for a district court's failure to construe a pro se notice of appeal as including a Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motion

The court held that a pro se notice of appeal should be construed as including a Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motion if it can reasonably be read as: (1) recognizing that the appeal is late; (2) providing reasons for that lateness; and (3) requesting extra time to appeal. The court applied de novo review to this determination. Rudometkin's notice of appeal met this standard because it explicitly stated he had not received notice of the court's order and only learned of it through a third party, and he expressly requested relief under Rules 4(a)(5) and (6). The court remanded Rudometkin's case to the district court to rule on the merits of his motions. Godson's notice of appeal did not meet the standard because, although it contained a statement about learning of the judgment while in Washington, D.C., this statement was buried among numerous grievances and could not reasonably be read as acknowledging the appeal's untimeliness or requesting relief. The court dismissed Godson's appeal for lack of jurisdiction as untimely.