Opinions

This is a bankruptcy appeal involving Alecto Healthcare Services, LLC, a healthcare holding company that filed for Chapter 11 reorganization under Subchapter V (small business reorganization) following the COVID-19 pandemic. The Reed Creditors, former employees with a judgment against Alecto, appealed the bankruptcy court's approval of Alecto's Subchapter V eligibility and confirmation of a reorganization plan that settled potential fraudulent transfer claims against company insiders for $25,000.

1. Whether the LHP Debt (a contingent claim from a 2014 transaction) was liquidated and noncontingent as of the petition date, which would have disqualified Alecto from Subchapter V relief (requiring less than $7.5 million in liquidated, noncontingent debt)
2. Whether the bankruptcy court properly approved the settlement of potential fraudulent transfer claims against Alecto's insiders under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019
3. Whether the appeal was moot (either constitutionally or equitably)

The Third Circuit affirmed both the Designation Order (allowing Subchapter V proceedings) and the Confirmation Order (approving the reorganization plan). The court held: (1) the LHP Debt was contingent and unliquidated because it required a written demand for payment that had not been made before the petition date, and the monthly amounts due fluctuated and were not readily calculable; (2) the bankruptcy court properly approved the settlement by applying the "Martin factors" test, finding low probability of success on the fraudulent transfer claims based on unrebutted evidence of Alecto's solvency at the time of the challenged transaction, and considering the complexity and expense of litigation; and (3) the appeal was not moot because the statute of limitations on fraudulent transfer claims under California law could potentially be tolled under the "adverse domination" doctrine, and Subchapter V bankruptcies lack the complexity warranting equitable mootness.

This is a federal drug trafficking appeal in which the defendant challenges his sentence as a career offender based on prior state-law drug convictions. The defendant argues that the career-offender guideline is invalid because the Sentencing Commission lacked authority to include state-law convictions as predicates, and alternatively contends his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

1. Whether the Sentencing Commission had statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) to include state-law drug convictions as career-offender predicates, or whether the statute limits the guideline to federal drug convictions only
2. Whether the district court committed procedural error by declining to consider a proposed amendment to the career-offender guideline that would have limited it to federal priors
3. Whether the defendant's 188-month sentence is substantively unreasonable despite being within the Guidelines range

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence on all grounds. First, the court held that the phrase "described in" federal drug statutes in § 994(h) encompasses state-law offenses that criminalize conduct similar to federal offenses, based on the statute's plain text and consistent congressional usage in comparable statutes. The court rejected deference to the Sentencing Commission under the new framework established by Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, instead conducting independent statutory interpretation. Second, the court found no procedural error because the district court exhaustively considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the nature and severity of the offense, the defendant's history and characteristics, and the need for deterrence and public safety. Third, the court rejected the substantive-reasonableness challenge, noting that within-Guidelines sentences receive a presumption of reasonableness and that courts should not amend the Guidelines based on crime statistics or the Commission's policy recommendations. The court emphasized that changing the Guidelines is the Commission's responsibility, not the courts'.

This is an immigration appeal in which a Guatemalan national seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision affirming the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, his applications for withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection, and his motion to terminate or remand removal proceedings.

1. Whether evidence obtained during Perez-Hernandez's arrest should be suppressed based on alleged Fourth Amendment (racial profiling), Fifth Amendment (coercion and lack of Miranda warnings), and regulatory violations
2. Whether Perez-Hernandez's notice to appear was defective under claims-processing rules, warranting termination or remand of proceedings
3. Whether Perez-Hernandez established a nexus between alleged persecution and membership in a protected social group for purposes of withholding of removal
4. Whether Perez-Hernandez demonstrated a likelihood of torture if removed to Guatemala for purposes of CAT relief

The court denied Perez-Hernandez's petition on all grounds. (1) The Fourth Amendment claim failed because the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Perez-Hernandez based on witnessing him litter, and Perez-Hernandez did not establish a prima facie case of racial profiling. The Fifth Amendment and regulatory claims failed because the failure to provide Miranda warnings does not render statements inadmissible in civil deportation proceedings, and Perez-Hernandez did not establish coercion. (2) The motion to terminate or remand was properly denied as untimely because Perez-Hernandez failed to raise his claims-processing objection before the close of proceedings before the immigration judge, and he forfeited the objection. (3) The withholding of removal claim failed because Perez-Hernandez did not establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and membership in a protected social group; the evidence showed his great uncle targeted him for personal reasons in a land dispute, not because of his social status or political views. (4) The CAT claim failed because Perez-Hernandez did not demonstrate that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon return to Guatemala, particularly given that his family had relocated within Guatemala without apparent harm.

This is an appeal of five consolidated cases involving parents of premature infants who developed necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) after being fed cow's milk-based infant formula. The central issue is whether a federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction over cases that were removed from Pennsylvania state court based on a novel theory of "fraudulent joinder" of a non-diverse defendant (Pennsylvania Hospital).

1. Whether a plaintiff's lack of demonstrated intent to pursue claims against a non-diverse defendant, as evidenced by litigation conduct and strategy, constitutes "fraudulent joinder" sufficient to establish federal diversity jurisdiction.
2. Whether the district court properly applied the "law of the case" doctrine in reconsidering its earlier ruling that plaintiffs had a reasonable possibility of success against the non-diverse defendant.
3. Whether removal was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) and whether the "voluntary/involuntary rule" prevented removal after the hospital defendant was dismissed.
4. The proper scope and definition of "fraudulent joinder" under federal diversity jurisdiction law.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the motion to remand and remanded the cases for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. Fraudulent joinder can be established in only two ways: (1) where a plaintiff makes false allegations about jurisdictional facts, or (2) where the plaintiff has no reasonable chance of success against the non-diverse defendant, taking all facts and law in the plaintiff's favor. The district court's novel approach—examining the plaintiff's subjective intent and litigation conduct to determine if they genuinely intended to pursue the claims—is not a valid basis for finding fraudulent joinder.
2. The district court erred in finding fraudulent joinder based on the plaintiffs' limited discovery efforts (one deposition), delayed pursuit of discovery, and alleged lack of good faith intent. Such an inquiry into litigation strategy and plaintiff motivation exceeds the established methodology for assessing fraudulent joinder and intrudes improperly into the domain of state courts.
3. The Supreme Court's early twentieth-century precedents and the consistent approach of all federal circuits recognize that a plaintiff's motive for joining a defendant is immaterial to the fraudulent joinder analysis. The plaintiff has an absolute right to enforce joint liability against multiple defendants regardless of motive.
4. The defendants' proposed approach would require extensive federal court investigation into state court litigation practices and plaintiff litigation choices, creating uncertainty about how much litigation activity is necessary to avoid removal. This would constitute an impermissible amendment of the diversity statute rather than interpretation of it, which is Congress's responsibility.
5. The district court's application of the "law of the case" doctrine was not an abuse of discretion, as it correctly distinguished between the different standards applicable in the preliminary objection phase versus the fraudulent joinder analysis.

This is an appeal of five consolidated cases involving parents of premature infants who developed necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) after being fed cow's milk-based infant formula. The central issue is whether a federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction over cases that were removed from Pennsylvania state court based on a novel theory of "fraudulent joinder" of a non-diverse defendant (Pennsylvania Hospital).

1. Whether a plaintiff's failure to demonstrate genuine intent to pursue claims against a non-diverse defendant, as evidenced by litigation conduct and discovery efforts, constitutes fraudulent joinder under federal diversity jurisdiction doctrine
2. Whether the district court properly applied the "law of the case" doctrine in reconsidering its earlier ruling that plaintiffs had a reasonable possibility of success against the non-diverse defendant
3. Whether removal was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) and whether the "voluntary/involuntary rule" applied to prevent removal
4. The proper scope and methodology for determining fraudulent joinder in the context of federal diversity jurisdiction

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of remand and held that the district court's theory of fraudulent joinder was inconsistent with established federal law. The court established that fraudulent joinder can be found in only two circumstances: (1) where a plaintiff has made false allegations regarding jurisdictional facts, or (2) where the plaintiff has no reasonable chance of success against the non-diverse defendant, taking all facts and law in the plaintiff's favor. The court rejected the district court's novel approach of examining the plaintiffs' litigation conduct, discovery efforts, and subjective intent to determine whether they genuinely intended to pursue claims against Pennsylvania Hospital. The court reasoned that such an inquiry intrudes into the proper domain of state courts, exceeds the established methodology for assessing fraudulent joinder, and would require extensive investigations into plaintiffs' litigation strategies and state court customs—a task better suited for Congress than the courts. The court emphasized that the plaintiff's motive for joining a defendant is immaterial under established Supreme Court precedent dating back to the early twentieth century, and that plaintiffs have a right to choose a state forum by properly joining a non-diverse defendant. The court concluded that any needed amendments to the diversity jurisdiction statute are a matter for Congress, not judicial interpretation.

This is a consolidated appeal of five product liability cases involving parents and their premature infants who allegedly developed necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) after being fed cow's milk-based infant formula products manufactured by Abbott Laboratories and Mead Johnson & Company. The central issue is whether the district court properly exercised federal jurisdiction over cases that were removed from Pennsylvania state court despite the presence of a non-diverse defendant (Pennsylvania Hospital).

1. Whether a plaintiff's failure to demonstrate sufficient intent to pursue claims against a non-diverse defendant, as evidenced by litigation conduct and discovery efforts, constitutes fraudulent joinder under federal diversity jurisdiction doctrine.
2. Whether the fraudulent joinder doctrine extends beyond its two traditionally recognized categories: (a) misrepresentation of jurisdictional facts, and (b) claims with no reasonable chance of success on the merits.
3. Whether the district court properly applied the "law of the case" doctrine in declining to revisit its earlier ruling on fraudulent joinder.
4. Whether removal was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) and the voluntary/involuntary rule governing dismissal of non-diverse defendants.

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of remand and held that the district court erred in finding fraudulent joinder based on the plaintiffs' alleged lack of intent to pursue claims against Pennsylvania Hospital. The court established that fraudulent joinder can be established in only two ways: (1) where the plaintiff has misrepresented jurisdictional facts, or (2) where the plaintiff has no reasonable chance of success against the non-diverse defendant, taking all facts and law in the plaintiff's favor. The court rejected the district court's novel approach of examining the plaintiffs' litigation strategy, discovery efforts, and intensity of prosecution as a basis for finding fraudulent joinder. The court reasoned that such an inquiry would intrude improperly into state court proceedings, require extensive investigation into plaintiff intent, create uncertainty about how much litigation activity is necessary to avoid removal, and potentially lead to multiple removal attempts and satellite litigation. The court emphasized that the fraudulent joinder doctrine must be narrowly construed to respect the constitutional principles underlying diversity jurisdiction, including deference to congressional authority over federal court jurisdiction and protection of plaintiffs' choice of forum. The court noted that if the current statutory scheme is inadequate to address modern complex litigation, remedial measures are the province of Congress, not the courts. The cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, with a note that the removability of two New Jersey plaintiffs under the forum-defendant rule should be reconsidered by the district court on remand.

This is a consolidated appeal of five product liability cases involving parents and their premature infants who allegedly developed necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) after being fed cow's milk-based infant formula manufactured by Abbott Laboratories and Mead Johnson & Company. The central issue is whether the district court properly exercised federal diversity jurisdiction over cases that included a non-diverse defendant (Pennsylvania Hospital) based on a theory of fraudulent joinder.

1. Whether a plaintiff's failure to demonstrate genuine intent to pursue claims against a non-diverse defendant, as evidenced by limited litigation activity and discovery efforts, constitutes fraudulent joinder under federal diversity jurisdiction doctrine.
2. Whether the district court properly applied the fraudulent joinder standard when the plaintiffs had pleaded potentially viable claims against the non-diverse defendant and had not misrepresented jurisdictional facts.
3. Whether the removal of the case was timely and proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) and the voluntary/involuntary rule.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the motion to remand and held that the district court erred in finding fraudulent joinder. The court established that fraudulent joinder can be found in only two circumstances: (1) when a plaintiff misrepresents jurisdictional facts to support joinder of a non-diverse defendant, or (2) when the plaintiff has no reasonable chance of success against the non-diverse defendant after resolving all factual and legal issues in the plaintiff's favor. The court rejected the district court's novel approach of examining the plaintiffs' subjective intent and litigation strategy to determine whether they genuinely intended to pursue claims against Pennsylvania Hospital. The court reasoned that such an inquiry improperly intrudes into state court proceedings, exceeds the established methodology for assessing fraudulent joinder, and lacks support in Supreme Court precedent or the decisions of other circuit courts. The court emphasized that plaintiff's choice of forum and motivation for joining defendants are generally immaterial to the fraudulent joinder analysis, and that Congress, not the courts, should address any inadequacies in the current diversity jurisdiction statute.

This is a consolidated appeal of five product liability cases involving parents and their premature infants who allegedly developed necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) after being fed cow's milk-based infant formula products manufactured by Abbott Laboratories and Mead Johnson & Company. The central issue is whether the district court properly exercised federal jurisdiction over cases that were removed from Pennsylvania state court despite the presence of a non-diverse defendant (Pennsylvania Hospital).

1. Whether a plaintiff's failure to demonstrate "real or good faith intent" to pursue claims against a non-diverse defendant constitutes fraudulent joinder under federal diversity jurisdiction doctrine
2. Whether the district court properly applied the fraudulent joinder standard based on the plaintiffs' litigation conduct, including limited discovery efforts and alleged statements regarding appeal intentions
3. Whether the district court's novel interpretation of fraudulent joinder is consistent with established Supreme Court and circuit court precedent
4. Whether the removal was timely and whether the "voluntary/involuntary rule" applied to prevent removal

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of remand and held that the district court's application of the fraudulent joinder doctrine was erroneous and inconsistent with established law. The court ruled that fraudulent joinder can be established in only two ways: (1) where the plaintiff has made false allegations regarding jurisdictional facts, or (2) where the plaintiff has no reasonable chance of success against the non-diverse defendant, taking all facts and law in the plaintiff's favor. The court rejected the district court's novel approach of finding fraudulent joinder based on the plaintiffs' subjective intent and litigation strategy, emphasizing that a plaintiff's motives in joining a defendant are immaterial to the fraudulent joinder analysis. The court reasoned that the district court's approach would require extensive judicial inquiry into state court litigation practices and plaintiff conduct, creating uncertainty about how much litigation activity is necessary to avoid removal. The court noted that such a significant departure from established diversity jurisdiction principles would require congressional action, not judicial interpretation. The court also emphasized that diversity jurisdiction doctrine protects a plaintiff's choice of forum and that the complete diversity requirement should be narrowly construed. Accordingly, the cases were remanded to state court, with a note that the district court should address on remand the separate jurisdictional issues regarding the two plaintiffs who were New Jersey citizens.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges his sentence enhancement for firearm possession as a prohibited person. The defendant argues that his prior convictions under California Penal Code § 273.5 (domestic violence battery) should not qualify as "crimes of violence" under federal sentencing guidelines.

1. Whether convictions under California Penal Code § 273.5 (domestic violence battery) categorically qualify as federal "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) and the "elements clause"
2. What mens rea (mental state) requirement is necessary for an offense to qualify as a crime of violence under the Supreme Court's decision in Borden v. United States and the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Gomez
3. Whether the mens rea requirement must apply to the initial act of force or to the direction of force at another person
4. Whether prior Ninth Circuit precedent holding § 273.5 to be a categorical crime of violence should be overruled as irreconcilable with Borden and Gomez

The court vacated Lopez's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The panel held that convictions under California Penal Code § 273.5 do not categorically qualify as federal crimes of violence. The court reasoned that under Borden and Gomez, a crime of violence requires a mens rea greater than recklessness as to the use of force directed at another person—meaning the defendant must intend or know that the force is directed at another. Section 273.5, as a general intent crime, requires only that the defendant intend to commit the assaultive act itself; it does not require that the defendant intend or know that the use of force is directed at another person. Therefore, § 273.5 does not satisfy the federal crime of violence definition. The court overruled its prior precedent holding § 273.5 to be a categorical crime of violence, finding such precedent clearly irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's and Ninth Circuit's recent decisions. The district court erred in applying the sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), and the case was remanded for resentencing without this enhancement.

This is an insurance coverage dispute in which the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints appeals a district court's grant of summary judgment to two insurers who refused to pay defense and settlement costs arising from a sexual abuse case. The church argues that ambiguous policy provisions defining "occurrence" should be interpreted in its favor to provide coverage.

1. Whether the insurance policies' definitions of "occurrence" are ambiguous or unambiguous
2. Whether the church's negligence in failing to prevent Michael Jensen's sexual abuse of multiple victims constitutes one "occurrence" or multiple separate "occurrences" under the policies
3. Whether Utah law requires ambiguous insurance policy provisions to be interpreted in favor of coverage
4. Whether the district court properly applied the rule against reading ambiguous provisions in favor of the insured when the meaning of "occurrence" could shift depending on the insured's interests

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the insurers. The court held that the policies' definitions of "occurrence" are ambiguous because both the insurers' interpretation (multiple occurrences—one per victim) and the church's interpretation (one occurrence encompassing all victims' exposure to the same dangerous conditions) are plausible readings of the policy language. Under Utah law, ambiguous insurance provisions must be interpreted in favor of coverage. The court rejected the insurers' argument based on Lee v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., finding it inapplicable because that case involved a dispute between two insurers rather than between an insurer and an insured. The court also rejected concerns about "shifting meanings" of "occurrence," reasoning that insurance drafters can avoid ambiguity by clarifying their policy language. The court declined to address alternative grounds for affirmance that the district court had not ruled upon, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in a First Amendment and Due Process challenge to Oklahoma's Riot Statute. Six activists prosecuted for inciting a riot during 2020 racial justice protests challenged the constitutionality of the statute on its face as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.

1. Whether Oklahoma Statutes title 21, section 1311 (the Riot Statute) is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment because it allegedly criminalizes protected speech without a sufficient mens rea requirement
2. Whether the Riot Statute is unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause for failing to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct
3. What mens rea element, if any, the Riot Statute requires under Oklahoma law, particularly whether it requires the "recklessness" standard established in Counterman v. Colorado (2023)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, rejecting both the overbreadth and vagueness challenges. The court held:

1. Overbreadth: Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the Riot Statute's unconstitutional applications substantially outweigh its lawful applications. The statute has a plainly legitimate sweep covering non-speech conduct (use of force or violence), and plaintiffs offered only speculative hypotheticals rather than realistic examples of unconstitutional applications. The court noted the statute has existed for 116 years without documented improper prosecutions of protected speech.
2. Vagueness: The presence of a mens rea requirement of "willfulness" (as established by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals through certification) mitigates any vagueness concerns and provides adequate notice to ordinary citizens. The court applied the principle that a general scienter provision applies to all material elements of a statute, and rejected plaintiffs' argument that the willfulness standard fails to meet Counterman's recklessness requirement, noting that question was not necessary to decide in this preliminary injunction context.
3. The court certified questions to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to clarify the mens rea requirements under state law, and relied on those answers in concluding the statute was constitutional as construed.

This is a breach of contract case involving a coal mining lease dispute between Wildcat Coal LLC (lessor) and Bridger Coal Company (lessee) regarding the calculation of royalty payments owed under a Wyoming coal mining lease. The dispute centers on the definition of "Adjoining Lands" and whether a contractual protest period bars recalculation of royalties paid over three decades.

1. Whether a thirty-six-month protest provision in the lease bars recalculation of royalty payments made between 1986 and 2015
2. Whether Bridger accumulated production credits from overpayments that could offset advance royalty obligations for 2016-2020
3. Whether "Adjoining Lands" includes both publicly and privately leased lands, as well as underground mining operations
4. Whether non-contiguous sections of a BLM lease qualify as "Adjoining Lands" if the lease itself contains some contiguous land

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held: (1) The thirty-six-month protest provision bars Wildcat from challenging royalty calculations for 1986-2015, preventing recalculation of those historical payments; (2) Bridger may apply accumulated production credits from overpayments prior to 2016 against its 2016-2020 advance royalty obligation; (3) "Adjoining Lands" includes both publicly and privately leased lands, as well as surface and underground mining operations, based on the plain language of Recital 3 defining "Adjoining Lands" as "any contiguous leases or permits acquired hereafter"; and (4) All lands covered by the BLM Lease, including non-contiguous Sections 26 and 34, qualify as "Adjoining Lands" because the lease itself contains some geographically contiguous land, and the contract refers to "contiguous leases" not "contiguous lands." The court reversed the district court's sua sponte order requiring recalculation of all royalties since 1986 and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the protest period limitation.

This is a federal criminal appeal challenging a sentencing enhancement applied to a defendant convicted of unlawful firearm possession. James Mims broke into a truck, stole a pistol and other items, and was subsequently convicted of firearm possession offenses. The district court enhanced his sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) for possessing the firearm "in connection with another felony offense" (the burglary).

1. Whether the sentencing enhancement for firearm possession "in connection with another felony offense" applies when the firearm is obtained as the object of that felony (burglary), rather than used in connection with a separate felony.
2. Whether the enhancement requires the firearm to be obtained through "generic burglary" as defined under the categorical approach, or whether it applies to all burglary offenses.
3. Whether the enhancement applies when the firearm is possessed after the burglary is technically completed, or whether it must be possessed during the commission of the felony.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentencing enhancement. The court held that: (1) A firearm obtained through a felony is possessed "in connection with another felony offense" when it facilitates or has the potential to facilitate that same felony; (2) Mims's stolen firearm had the potential to facilitate his burglary by enabling his escape or preventing intervention, satisfying the enhancement requirement; (3) The Guidelines do not require a separate, additional felony or restrict the enhancement to "generic burglary"—instead, they apply a general facilitation standard to all qualifying felonies; (4) The timing of possession relative to the completion of the burglary is irrelevant because the firearm theft constitutes part of the same course of conduct as the burglary under relevant conduct principles; and (5) The 2006 amendment to the Guidelines Application Notes was specifically designed to resolve a circuit split and clarify that the enhancement applies to firearms obtained through burglary even without additional felonious conduct, as long as the firearm had potential to facilitate that burglary.

This is a direct criminal appeal in which Preston Campbell challenges his conviction for assaulting a federal officer (Deputy U.S. Marshal O'Connor) using a deadly or dangerous weapon (a knife). Campbell was arrested after fleeing from deputies who attempted to apprehend him on outstanding warrants at a Dollar General store in Oklahoma.

1. Whether Campbell waived appellate review of the district court's pretrial ruling that five of his prior convictions could be used to impeach his testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) by choosing not to testify at trial
2. Whether testimony regarding Deputy Reed's foot injury from barbed wire and a police dog's injury during a later search was relevant and admissible
3. Whether there was sufficient evidence that Campbell "used" the knife as a deadly or dangerous weapon during the assault on Deputy O'Connor
4. Whether the prosecutor committed plain error during closing argument by emphasizing Campbell's "wrong" decision to flee from police
5. Whether cumulative error warranted reversal of the conviction

The Tenth Circuit affirmed Campbell's conviction on all grounds. The court held that:

1. Campbell waived review of the Rule 609(a)(1) ruling under the precedent of Luce v. United States because he did not testify at trial, making it impossible for the appellate court to determine whether the probative value of the prior convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect
2. Testimony about Deputy Reed's foot injury was relevant as intrinsic or res gestae evidence directly connected to the assault and explaining how Campbell escaped, but testimony about the police dog's later injury was irrelevant and an abuse of discretion; however, this error was harmless
3. Sufficient evidence supported the conviction that Campbell used the knife, including body camera video showing Campbell holding the knife and making a stabbing motion toward Deputy O'Connor, and the deputy's testimony describing a "textbook" grip and stabbing motion
4. The prosecutor's closing arguments were not plainly improper; the remarks about Campbell making "wrong" decisions were directly relevant to the charged offense of fleeing from federal officers engaged in official duties, and Campbell failed to show the comments affected his substantial rights
5. No cumulative error warranted reversal because the only error found (admission of police dog testimony) was harmless

This is a criminal appeal in which Christopher Meier challenges his sentencing for conspiracy to distribute child pornography and five counts of distributing child pornography. The central issue is whether the district court properly applied the Production Cross Reference provision of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which requires calculating offense levels under the production statute rather than the distribution statute when certain conditions are met.

1. Whether the district court properly applied the Production Cross Reference under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1), which requires use of the production statute (§ 2G2.1) if the offense involved production of child pornography and the resulting offense level is higher.
2. Whether the district court clearly erred by failing to apply the seven-level enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(3)(E) for distribution of child pornography to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity, which would have resulted in an equal or higher offense level under the distribution statute and defeated application of the Production Cross Reference.
3. Whether the district court made the necessary factual findings to trigger the (b)(3)(E) enhancement based on its adoption of the presentence investigation report and government briefing.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and sentence. The court held that Meier failed to satisfy the second prong of the plain-error standard because the district court did not make the factual findings necessary to trigger the (b)(3)(E) enhancement. Specifically, the court found that while the district court adopted the presentence investigation report and government briefing, those documents did not contain clear findings that Meier distributed material depicting sexual exploitation of a minor to a minor victim. The victim accounts were either uncertain about the age of the "bait girl" or did not definitively establish that the encounter described was the one underlying Meier's recording. Therefore, it was not clear or obvious error for the district court to refrain from applying the (b)(3)(E) enhancement and instead apply the Production Cross Reference, resulting in the higher offense level and Guidelines range.

This appeal involves two consolidated toxic tort cases in which plaintiffs alleged that Lockheed Martin's mishandling of volatile organic compounds at its Orlando facility caused neurological diseases in workers and nearby residents. The central issue is whether the district court properly excluded the plaintiffs' expert testimony on general causation and granted summary judgment in favor of Lockheed Martin.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Daniel Kantor's epidemiological expert opinion based on his failure to adequately explain and apply his "weight of the evidence" methodology and properly evaluate the Bradford Hill factors.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Ronald Kendall's general causation opinion, which relied on other experts' reports and failed to conduct a proper background risk assessment.
3. Whether summary judgment was appropriate based on the exclusion of the plaintiffs' only general causation experts.
4. The proper standards for evaluating expert reliability under Daubert when experts use the "weight of the evidence" methodology and Bradford Hill factors in epidemiological analysis.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of both experts and the resulting summary judgment in favor of Lockheed Martin. The court held that:

1. Dr. Kantor's testimony was unreliable because: (a) he failed to adequately explain his weight of the evidence methodology, including how he selected, categorized, and weighed studies; and (b) he provided only cursory and superficial analysis of the Bradford Hill factors, applying them to only one study despite relying on numerous studies in his analysis.
2. Dr. Kendall's testimony was unreliable because: (a) his first opinion merely adopted other experts' conclusions without explaining his own methodology, constituting impermissible "ipse dixit"; and (b) his second opinion was not a proper background risk assessment, as it compared mortality rates in different zip codes rather than comparing disease rates between exposed and unexposed populations, and failed to establish actual exposure levels.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment because, without reliable general causation testimony from Kantor and Kendall, the plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence to proceed with their toxic tort claims.
4. District courts have broad discretion in evaluating expert reliability and may require experts applying the weight of the evidence methodology to adequately explain their process and thoroughly evaluate the Bradford Hill factors.

This case involves a petition for review of the Environmental Protection Agency's "Project Emissions Accounting" rule, which allows regulated entities to offset emissions increases with decreases from the same project when determining whether a modification to a stationary source requires a New Source Review permit under the Clean Air Act. Environmental groups challenged the rule as contrary to law and arbitrary or capricious.

1. Whether the Project Emissions Accounting rule, which permits project-level netting of emissions increases and decreases at Step One of the NSR analysis, is consistent with the Clean Air Act's definition of "modification"
2. Whether the rule's failure to require strict contemporaneity between emissions increases and decreases violates the substantial contemporaneity requirement established in Alabama Power
3. Whether the rule is arbitrary or capricious because it allows entities to circumvent NSR by bundling unrelated activities into a single "project"
4. Whether the EPA's existing recordkeeping requirements are adequate to ensure compliance with NSR under the project-emissions-accounting framework
5. Whether the Chenery doctrine prevents review of the rule on grounds other than those initially invoked by the EPA

The court denied the petitions for review and upheld the Project Emissions Accounting rule. The court's reasoning included:

1. Statutory Consistency: The rule does not assign inconsistent meanings to "modification" because a modification is defined as a change causing a net, source-wide emissions increase. The rule simply identifies scenarios that do not fit this definition—including when a project itself does not increase emissions or when offsetting decreases ensure no net increase.
2. Statutory Language: The rule does not "excise 'any'" from the statutory definition because the Act requires NSR for changes that increase emissions at the source level, not the project level. If a project's emissions increases are offset by decreases, the source's overall emissions are not increased.
3. Contemporaneity: While the court acknowledged concerns about the rule's failure to establish a temporal boundary for offsetting decreases, it held the rule is not facially invalid. The court noted that Alabama Power and New York established that offsetting decreases need only be "substantially contemporaneous," not strictly contemporaneous. However, the court reserved judgment on as-applied challenges regarding specific "delayed-decrease projects."
4. Circumvention Concerns: The court rejected arguments that the rule allows circumvention through bundling unrelated activities. Entities remain bound by the statutory definition of "modification" and the regulatory definition of "project," and are subject to compliance and enforcement proceedings. The EPA's non-binding interpretive rule adopting a "substantially related" test for aggregation, while not binding, provides adequate guidance and allows needed flexibility.
5. Recordkeeping: The court found the EPA's explanation adequate regarding existing recordkeeping requirements. The EPA reasonably determined that existing regulations, combined with civil penalties and criminal liability, strike an appropriate balance between compliance and avoiding unnecessary burdens. The court rejected the requirement for "perfect NSR compliance."
6. Chenery Doctrine: The court held that even if the Chenery doctrine applied, it would not prevent review on the ground that the rule is consistent with the best meaning of the Clean Air Act, as the EPA had offered this as an alternative basis for the rule.

This case involves a petition for review of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's denial of a whistleblower award application. Stephen M. Jennions sought a monetary award for allegedly providing information that led to the CFTC's successful enforcement action against five banks for manipulating foreign exchange benchmark rates.

1. Whether Jennions provided "original information" that was "sufficiently specific, credible, and timely" to cause the CFTC to commence an investigation under 17 C.F.R. § 165.2(i)(1)
2. Whether the information Jennions provided directly led to the successful enforcement action against the five banks, or whether the Bloomberg article was the actual catalyst for the investigation
3. Whether the CFTC's Office of General Counsel improperly influenced the Claims Review Staff in denying Jennions's application in violation of Commission regulations

The Court of Appeals affirmed the CFTC's denial of Jennions's whistleblower award application. The court held that: (1) the Bloomberg article, not Jennions's information, prompted the CFTC's investigation; (2) Jennions's information was not sufficiently specific or credible to trigger the investigation, as it consisted only of a vague reference in the article to the UK FCA's awareness of "allegations" rather than actionable details; (3) Jennions failed to provide information directly to the CFTC as required by the regulations; and (4) Jennions's allegations of undue influence by the Office of General Counsel were entirely speculative and unsupported by evidence in the record, and he failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice that would affect the outcome of his application. The court emphasized that the whistleblower program is designed to incentivize direct submissions of high-quality, reliable, and specific information to the Commission.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case addressing motions for continued confidential treatment of documents in a settled dispute between Intel Corporation and NVIDIA Corporation over licensing rights for chipset technologies. The parties sought to extend the confidentiality of various documents beyond the standard three-year period following the case's dismissal.

1. Whether Intel's internal evaluations of licenses and proprietary business strategies warrant continued confidential treatment
2. Whether Intel's confidential technical information, including references to unreleased products, should remain sealed
3. Whether specific allegations regarding Intel's business strategies and customer identities should be protected from disclosure
4. Whether NVIDIA's trade secrets and product development efforts qualify for continued protection
5. Whether NVIDIA's confidential negotiations and third-party negotiation information should remain sealed
6. Whether the identities of NVIDIA employees assigned to proprietary projects warrant confidential treatment
7. Whether confidential third-party customer information and statements should remain protected
8. The proper balance between the public's right of access to court records and the particularized harm from disclosure of sensitive commercial information

The Court GRANTED both Intel's and NVIDIA's motions for continued confidential treatment. The Court applied the standard under Court of Chancery Rule 5.1(h), which requires that the "particularized harm from public disclosure clearly outweigh the public interest in access to Court records." The Court found that:

1. The public interest was diminished because the case settled before trial and the Court did not issue a merits decision, and the sealed documents did not influence the Court's limited rulings
2. The public filings sufficiently described the dispute's nature, so continued redaction would not obscure public understanding
3. Intel's internal licensing evaluations and business strategies qualified for protection because disclosure would disadvantage Intel in future negotiations, supported by particularized affidavit evidence
4. Intel's confidential technical information and unreleased product details warranted protection as trade secrets and proprietary information that competitors could exploit
5. While the general allegation that Intel "steered" customers away from NVIDIA was already public, specific customer identities and incident details qualified for protection as trade secrets that could cause particularized harm to business relationships
6. NVIDIA's trade secrets and product development strategies warranted protection because disclosure could allow competitors to adjust strategy without equivalent research costs
7. NVIDIA's confidential negotiations and specific contractual terms qualified for protection because disclosure could affect leverage in future licensing negotiations and harm third parties' negotiation positions
8. Employee identities warranted protection because disclosure could facilitate targeted recruitment by competitors and provide insight into NVIDIA's management practices
9. Confidential third-party customer information and statements warranted protection because disclosure would damage NVIDIA's reputation as a trustworthy industry participant and harm customers' relationships with Intel

This is an errata sheet from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit correcting a typographical error in a previously issued opinion in a criminal case involving the United States as appellee and Rey David Fulcar as the defendant-appellant.

The document does not address substantive legal issues, as it is solely an errata sheet correcting a clerical error in the court's opinion.

The Court amended its July 6, 2026 opinion by correcting a word on page 19, line 14, replacing "perpetuated" with "perpetrated". No substantive ruling or reasoning is provided in this errata sheet.

This is a criminal appeal in which Joan Rosado Maldonado challenges her conviction in a case brought by the United States. The First Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion on July 6, 2026, and subsequently issued an errata sheet to correct docket number citations.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this errata sheet, which only addresses technical corrections to the court's opinion.

The court issued an errata sheet correcting citation errors in its original opinion. Specifically, two references to docket "No. 25-1524" were corrected to "No. 24-1524" on page 8, footnote 2, and page 9, line 11. These corrections appear to be administrative in nature, addressing clerical errors in the opinion rather than substantive changes to the court's ruling.

This is a products liability case brought by Crystal Czerno on behalf of herself and her minor child C.L. against General Electric Company and other defendants. The case involves claims related to allegedly defective or harmful products manufactured by the defendants.

The opinion text provided does not contain substantive discussion of the legal issues, as only an errata sheet correcting a typographical error is included in the excerpt.

No ruling on the merits is presented in this excerpt. The document is limited to an errata sheet issued on July 14, 2026, which corrects a minor typographical error in the original opinion by replacing "district" with "district court" on page 25, footnote 10, line 4.

This is an immigration petition case before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit involving petitioner Prakash Dhoj Rana and respondent Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General. The case involves a correction to a previously issued opinion.

The specific legal issues are not detailed in this errata sheet, which only addresses a typographical correction to the court's opinion.

The Court issued an errata sheet amending its July 23, 2026 opinion by correcting a grammatical error on page 13, footnote 4, line 2, changing "noncitizens'" (possessive plural) to "noncitizen's" (possessive singular). This is a procedural correction to clarify the court's previously issued decision.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant was convicted of drug-trafficking and firearm offenses and sought to represent himself at sentencing. The district court denied his request on the ground that it was untimely, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether this denial violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.

1. Whether a defendant's request to represent himself at sentencing made after trial but before sentencing is subject to the timeliness requirement that applies to requests made during trial
2. Whether the district court properly applied the timeliness requirement when the defendant made his request approximately four to five months after trial but long before sentencing was scheduled
3. Whether the improper denial of a request for self-representation constitutes harmless error

The court vacated the judgment and remanded for resentencing. The court held that: (1) a request for self-representation at sentencing made after trial but before sentencing is not subject to the district court's discretion based on timeliness if the criteria for self-representation are otherwise met; (2) the timeliness requirement that applies to requests made during trial does not apply to requests made between trial and sentencing, as there is typically sufficient time to address such requests without disrupting the sentencing proceeding; (3) the district court's finding that the defendant's request was "thoroughly untimely" when made four to five months after trial but long before sentencing was scheduled constituted legal error; and (4) the improper denial of the right to self-representation cannot be harmless error and therefore requires resentencing with a full Faretta hearing.

This is a criminal appeal involving a felon in possession of a firearm conviction where the defendant challenges his sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The central issue is whether the district court properly allowed the government to propose a new ACCA predicate offense at sentencing that had not been included in the presentence report and was not timely objected to by the government.

1. Whether the government forfeited its right to invoke the defendant's appeal waiver by filing substantive responses to the defendant's briefs before raising the waiver defense
2. Whether the district court erred under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 and United States v. Hodge by allowing the government to propose a new ACCA predicate offense at sentencing without timely objecting to the presentence report
3. Whether any Rule 32 procedural error was harmless

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement. The majority held that: (1) the government forfeited its appeal waiver argument by failing to raise it in its first responsive filing; (2) the government violated Rule 32 by proposing a new ACCA predicate at sentencing without timely objecting to the presentence report, and the government's explanation did not constitute "good cause" to excuse this violation; and (3) the procedural error was not harmless because the defendant received a substantially longer sentence (188 months versus a maximum of 10 years) as a result of the untimely predicate. The majority reasoned that Rule 32's 14-day objection deadline applies equally to all parties, and allowing the government to introduce new predicates after an adverse ruling would undermine the rule's purpose of requiring diligent efforts to raise issues at the proper time and would unfairly surprise the defendant's sentencing strategy. Judge Agee dissented, arguing that the district court had discretion to excuse the government's failure for "good cause" and that any error was harmless because the defendant received a continuance and full opportunity to respond before sentencing.

This is an immigration law case involving two naturalized U.S. citizens who obtained legal status through the Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) program and sought to petition for their noncitizen mothers to receive immigration benefits. The case addresses whether a statutory exclusion clause that bars parents of SIJ recipients from obtaining immigration benefits based on parentage is valid under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee.

1. Whether the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) bars parents of SIJ recipients from ever receiving immigration benefits based on parentage, regardless of whether the parent was the one who abused, neglected, or abandoned the child.
2. Whether USCIS's implementing regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(i) faithfully interprets and carries out the statutory exclusion clause.
3. Whether the exclusion clause violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by treating naturalized citizens whose status traces to SIJ classification differently from other naturalized citizens when petitioning for parents.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in favor of USCIS on both claims. On the APA challenge, the court held that the plain text of the exclusion clause unambiguously bars all natural parents of SIJ recipients from receiving immigration benefits based on parentage, regardless of whether they were the abusive or abandoning parent. The court applied the last-antecedent rule of statutory construction and determined that the phrase "shall thereafter" creates a permanent bar. The court rejected the plaintiffs' narrower interpretation as creating superfluities in the statute and producing absurd results inconsistent with Congress's protective purpose in creating the SIJ program. The court found USCIS's regulation consistent with this statutory interpretation. On the equal protection challenge, the court first determined that plaintiffs had demonstrated differential treatment—naturalized citizens whose status traces to SIJ classification cannot petition for parents, while other naturalized citizens can. However, the court applied rational basis review (the appropriate standard for immigration classifications involving unadmitted aliens) and found the exclusion clause survives this highly deferential review. The court identified a legitimate governmental purpose: protecting children from abuse, neglect, or abandonment by preventing abusive or abandoning parents from obtaining immigration benefits. The court held that plaintiffs failed to negate every conceivable rational basis for the classification, particularly given Congress's broad power over immigration matters.

This is an appeal of a Medicare hospice reimbursement case in which a hospice provider (In Home Health) challenges an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision denying coverage for 104 hospice claims and finding the provider liable for repayment. The case involves the interpretation of Medicare's "safe harbor" provision that protects providers from liability when they reasonably believed Medicare would cover services.

1. Whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that certain hospice services did not meet Medicare coverage requirements under Local Coverage Determination (LCD) 33393, which sets forth clinical standards for determining terminal illness.
2. Whether the ALJ properly applied the Medicare safe harbor provision under 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp, which protects providers from repayment liability if they "did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know" that Medicare would not cover the services.
3. The proper legal standard for determining when a hospice provider qualifies for the safe harbor, particularly when interpreting ambiguous or multi-factor Medicare notices like LCD 33393.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ's coverage determination that substantial evidence supported the denial of 104 claims under LCD 33393, but vacated and remanded the case regarding the safe harbor analysis. The court held that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard to the safe harbor provision. Rather than asking whether In Home merely knew of LCD 33393's existence, the ALJ should have asked whether In Home could reasonably have interpreted LCD 33393 as covering the disputed claims. The court reasoned that because LCD 33393 is a multi-factor, fact-intensive standard with inherent ambiguities and flexibility, a provider acting in good faith could reasonably disagree about its application to particular patients. The court found that the ALJ's approach—imputing knowledge of the LCD to all providers and treating it as a bright-line rule—effectively eliminated the safe harbor protection. The court remanded for the ALJ to conduct a proper reasonableness inquiry, examining whether In Home could have reasonably believed, based on the LCD and other relevant notices, that the disputed claims satisfied Medicare's coverage requirements.

This is an appeal in a civil rights case arising from a contentious divorce and custody dispute between Holly Hooven and Jesse Hooven (a police officer). Holly sought federal court injunctive relief to stay a state court contempt order that held her in contempt for disclosing Jesse's residential address in federal court filings, and she also appealed the dismissal of her Monell municipal liability claim against the City of Cincinnati.

1. Whether the district court properly abstained from ruling on Holly's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction under the Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine
2. Whether the preliminary injunction issue was moot
3. Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded federal court review
4. Whether Holly could appeal the dismissal of her Monell claim against the City of Cincinnati as part of a final order

The court affirmed the district court's abstention order and dismissed Holly's appeal of the Monell claim dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically:

1. Mootness: Although the challenged actions (the $250 fine and address redaction) were completed before appeal, the court found the case not moot under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception because the underlying state court order remains in place and Holly could reasonably expect to face contempt again if she re-discloses the address.
2. Younger Abstention: The court held that Younger abstention was properly applied because: (a) the case fell within the third NOPSI category involving pending civil proceedings with orders uniquely furthering state courts' judicial functions (specifically, state court contempt proceedings); (b) all three Middlesex factors were satisfied—there was an ongoing state judicial proceeding, Ohio has an important interest in contempt proceedings and domestic relations matters, and state courts provided an adequate forum to raise constitutional claims; and (c) none of the three exceptions to Younger abstention applied, as Holly failed to demonstrate the contempt order was flagrantly unconstitutional.
3. Monell Claim: The court dismissed Holly's appeal of the Monell claim dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the dismissal order was not final. The district court's abstention order on the injunctive relief issue did not render the Monell dismissal final, as Holly's underlying Section 1983 and Monell claims remained pending and in discovery. The district court also declined to certify the dismissal as final under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which was the only mechanism available for an interlocutory appeal of the Monell claim.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Steven Dorfman, the CEO of a telemarketing company that sold limited indemnity healthcare insurance plans, was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud for directing employees to use deceptive sales scripts to mislead customers about plan benefits. Dorfman appeals his conviction on multiple grounds.

1. Whether the jury instruction on "scheme to defraud" correctly stated the law by allowing conviction based on misleading and deceptive statements rather than expressly false statements
2. Whether the district court erred by admitting and providing to the jury a two-hour training video (Exhibit 10) that was never discussed at trial or shown to the jury during proceedings
3. Whether the government constructively amended the indictment by presenting evidence of a scheme to defraud regulators in addition to the charged scheme to defraud customers
4. Whether a specific unanimity instruction was required when the government allegedly presented evidence of multiple schemes

The Court of Appeals affirmed Dorfman's conviction on all counts. The court held that: (1) the jury instruction correctly stated the law—the wire and mail fraud statutes do not require express falsity and encompass misleading statements, half-truths, and omissions, as supported by the statutory language distinguishing between "false" and "fraudulent" and the common-law meaning of fraud; (2) Exhibit 10 was properly admitted in evidence through stipulation and defense counsel's failure to object, and while providing it to the jury during deliberations without trial presentation raised constitutional concerns, Dorfman failed to demonstrate plain error or that it affected the trial outcome given the cumulative nature of the evidence and the presence of exculpatory statements in the video; and (3) the government did not present a second scheme—evidence of concealment from regulators was properly introduced to establish Dorfman's knowledge and consciousness of guilt regarding the customer fraud scheme charged in the indictment, therefore no constructive amendment occurred and no unanimity instruction was necessary.

This is an appeal of a class action wage and hour lawsuit brought by an employee against her healthcare employer challenging the calculation of overtime compensation and holiday pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Wisconsin law. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, and the employee appeals.

1. Whether the employer's overtime compensation methodology, which calculates the regular rate by dividing total remuneration (including shift and weekend differentials) by total hours worked, and then adds 0.5 times the regular rate for overtime hours, complies with 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) and Wisconsin law.
2. Whether the employer properly excluded holiday pay premiums from regular rate calculations under 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(6) and Wisconsin law.
3. Whether the employee's alternative methodology—which segregates the first 40 hours from overtime hours and applies a 1.5 multiplier to overtime hours—is the correct interpretation of the FLSA.

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer. The court held that:

1. Overtime Compensation: The employer's methodology complies with the FLSA. The court adopted the Department of Labor's aggregate approach, which calculates the regular rate by dividing total remuneration by total hours worked, then adds 0.5 times the regular rate multiplied by overtime hours. This ensures employees receive at least 1.5 times their regular rate for overtime hours. The employee's proposed methodology of segregating non-overtime from overtime hours would create pay discrepancies between employees working the same hours, particularly those with shift differentials, and is not required by the FLSA or Wisconsin law.
2. Holiday Pay: The employer properly excluded holiday pay premiums from regular rate calculations. Under 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(6), holiday premiums can be excluded if they equal at least 1.5 times the bona fide rate for like work on non-overtime days. The court rejected the employee's argument that holiday pay should be included in regular rate calculations, finding that doing so would create a "pyramiding" problem where overtime premiums would need to be recalculated infinitely. The court also found that Wisconsin law, which lacks specific guidance on this issue, should be interpreted consistently with the FLSA to avoid absurd results.
3. Statutory Interpretation: The court reasoned that the FLSA's text requires overtime compensation "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate," which Froedtert's methodology satisfies. The court gave substantial weight to the DOL's longstanding interpretation and noted that Congress was likely aware of this interpretation when it amended the FLSA.

This case involves a correctional officer, Stanley L. Felton, who was terminated by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections after disclosing information about an upcoming facility search to his incarcerated son during a phone call. Felton and his son appealed their dismissal and summary judgment, claiming violations of First Amendment free speech protections and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.

1. Whether Felton's statement to his son about an upcoming shakedown constituted protected speech under the First Amendment
2. Whether Felton's termination violated his First Amendment rights through retaliation
3. Whether Felton received constitutionally adequate procedural due process before and after his termination
4. Whether the entire proceeding was tainted by bias against Felton
5. Whether Kalafi, the incarcerated son, had standing to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim based on his father's termination

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decisions, ruling in favor of the Department of Corrections on all claims. The court held that: (1) Felton's statement about the shakedown was not protected speech because it addressed only a matter of private concern—his personal frustration about potential work inconvenience—rather than a matter of public concern, and the statement was made in a purely private conversation with his son; (2) even if the broader phone conversation touched on public concerns like inmate safety and racial diversity, the specific statement for which Felton was fired was not protected, and DOC did not retaliate based on the protected portions; (3) Felton received adequate pre-termination process through written notice of charges and a pre-disciplinary meeting where he could respond; (4) Felton received adequate post-termination process through a three-step administrative appeals procedure, and his failure to pursue these available remedies for over two years did not constitute a due process violation; (5) Felton failed to establish bias with specific evidence of prejudgment; and (6) Kalafi lacked standing to bring a First Amendment claim based on his father's termination, as the underlying speech was not protected and Kalafi did not adequately explain how his father's termination constituted a deprivation giving rise to Kalafi's own constitutional claim.

This is a consumer protection class action appeal concerning whether Chobani's "sugar free" yogurt containing allulose (a naturally occurring sweetener) violates federal food labeling regulations and state consumer protection laws. The central issue is whether allulose qualifies as a "sugar" under federal law, which determines whether state-law deceptive marketing claims are preempted by federal food labeling standards.

1. Whether allulose is a "sugar" under the federal regulation defining "Total Sugars" as "the sum of all free mono- and disaccharides" (21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(6)(ii))
2. Whether state consumer protection claims are expressly preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act when they seek to enforce identical federal labeling requirements
3. Whether the FDA's Allulose Guidance (announcing enforcement discretion not to enforce sugar labeling requirements for allulose) is entitled to deference as an interpretation of the regulation
4. Whether the Francos plausibly alleged consumer deception based on the "sugar free" label despite the product containing allulose

The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal. The court held that: (1) allulose is a sugar under 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(6)(ii) because the regulation defines total sugars as all free mono- and disaccharides, and the parenthetical listing glucose, fructose, lactose, and sucrose is merely a non-exhaustive list of examples, not a limitation based on physiological characteristics; (2) the Allulose Guidance was not entitled to deference because it announced an enforcement discretion policy rather than an interpretation of the regulation, and the regulation itself is unambiguous; (3) because allulose is a sugar under federal law, Chobani's labeling violated federal requirements, and the Francos' state-law claims seeking to enforce identical federal standards are not preempted; and (4) the Francos plausibly alleged consumer deception by alleging that consumers were misled by an absolute promise of "sugar free" when the product contained four grams of allulose per serving, a question of fact that cannot be resolved at the pleading stage.

This is a criminal appeal in which James Patterson challenges his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Patterson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on three prior violent felony convictions, and he appeals both the constitutional validity of his sentencing and whether his prior Oregon convictions qualify as violent felonies.

1. Whether the district court violated Patterson's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey by determining (rather than submitting to a jury) that Patterson's prior offenses occurred on different occasions, as required by ACCA.
2. Whether Patterson's prior Oregon convictions for third-degree assault and strangulation constitute "violent felonies" under ACCA's definition.
3. Whether Oregon's third-degree assault statute is overbroad because it potentially allows conviction based on accomplice liability without proof of intentional or knowing conduct, or because it does not require knowledge of the injury caused.
4. Whether Oregon's strangulation statute qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Patterson's sentence. The court held:

1. Apprendi Violation - Harmless Error: Following the Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. United States (2024), the district court violated Apprendi by itself determining that Patterson's prior offenses occurred on different occasions rather than submitting this question to a jury. However, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the record contained overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that Patterson's offenses were committed on different occasions—his 1996 assault conviction and 2014 and 2017 strangulation convictions were separated by years, with no evidence suggesting they shared a common scheme or purpose.
2. Third-Degree Assault as Violent Felony: Patterson's Oregon third-degree assault conviction qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA. The court rejected Patterson's overbreadth arguments: (a) Patterson was convicted as a principal, not an accomplice, as established by his charging documents and plea agreement; (b) Oregon accomplice liability requires proof of intentional or knowing conduct; (c) the statute does not require knowledge of the injury result, only awareness of the assaultive nature of conduct; and (d) the "extensively intertwined" doctrine applies only to conduct that directly and immediately causes injury, which necessarily involves violent physical force.
3. Strangulation as Violent Felony: Oregon's strangulation offense qualifies as a violent felony because it requires knowingly impeding normal breathing or blood circulation, which constitutes use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury under ACCA's definition.

This is a criminal appeal in which Mark William Anten was convicted of transmitting threats to injure another in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) after sending a series of escalating emails to FBI agents in which he declared himself the "UNABOMBER" and stated he would "UNABOMB THE LOS ANGELES FBI HQ." Anten appealed, challenging the jury instructions and the district court's response to a jury question.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires both an objective threat element and a subjective mental state element, and if so, whether the jury instructions adequately conveyed the objective element
2. Whether the district court invaded the jury's province by responding to a jury note asking which exhibits were referenced in the indictment

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Anten's conviction on both grounds. First, the court held that § 875(c) requires both an objective threat element and a subjective mental state element. The objective element requires that a statement constitute a "true threat"—a serious expression conveying intent to commit unlawful violence—as judged through the eyes of a reasonable person, not the speaker's or victim's perspective. The subjective element requires proof of recklessness (conscious disregard of a substantial risk that the communication would be viewed as threatening). Although the jury instructions could have been clearer by explicitly mentioning the "reasonable person" standard, the court found they adequately covered the objective element by instructing the jury to consider the circumstances, context, language, and reaction of recipients. Second, the court held the district court did not err in responding to the jury's question about which exhibits were referenced in the indictment, as this was merely a factual clarification akin to reading the indictment to the jury and did not constitute improper fact-finding.

This is an appeal of a whistleblower retaliation case in which David Krzesni, a Project Director for a school district grant, alleged he was unlawfully terminated in retaliation for disclosing the school district's misuse of federal grant funds for an unauthorized Hawaii trip. Krzesni brought claims under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Washington state wrongful discharge law.

1. Whether Krzesni made a "protected disclosure" under 41 U.S.C. § 4712 of the NDAA, which requires that a disclosure contain information the employee reasonably believes is evidence of misconduct, with "reasonably believes" interpreted as an objective standard
2. Whether any protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the adverse employment action (non-renewal of contract)
3. Whether non-renewal of a contract constitutes "discharge" under Washington state wrongful discharge law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on both claims. The court held that to establish a prima facie NDAA whistleblower claim, an employee must show: (1) covered employee status, (2) communication to a qualified person, (3) a protected disclosure, and (4) an adverse employment action as reprisal for the disclosure. The court concluded that Krzesni failed to make a protected disclosure because: (a) his description of the Hawaii trip in the Annual Performance Report contained no explicit or implicit suggestion of misconduct and affirmatively justified the trip as furthering grant objectives; (b) his rhetorical question "So this is how we do things?" conveyed no information relating to misconduct; and (c) while a call with the federal grant contact on May 8 might have constituted a protected disclosure, the school district had already decided not to renew his contract on May 1, before the disclosure occurred, so the adverse action could not have been taken in reprisal for it. The court also affirmed dismissal of the state law wrongful discharge claim because under Washington law, the tort applies only to discharges, not contract non-renewals.

This case involves a federal preemption challenge to Colorado's Congestion Impact Fee, a $3 per day fee on all short-term vehicle rentals enacted in 2024. The American Car Rental Association (ACRA) argues the fee violates the Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA), a federal statute that prohibits states from levying certain taxes and fees on airport businesses.

1. Whether Colorado's Congestion Impact Fee is preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d)(2)(A)(v), which prohibits states from levying or collecting a tax, fee, or charge "upon any business located at a commercial service airport" that is "not generally imposed on sales or services" by that state.
2. Whether the fee is imposed on car rental businesses or on consumers who rent vehicles.
3. Whether the fee qualifies for the statutory carveout for taxes and fees "generally imposed on sales or services."

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment that the fee is not preempted by the AHTA, but on different grounds. The majority held that Colorado imposes the Congestion Impact Fee on consumers (vehicle renters), not on car rental businesses. Because the AHTA's preemptive language explicitly limits its prohibition to fees imposed "upon any business located at a commercial service airport," and the Colorado fee is imposed on consumers rather than businesses, the AHTA does not apply. The court reasoned that the statutory language "fee payers" refers to consumers who benefit from the transportation infrastructure projects funded by the fee revenue, and that car rental companies and car sharing programs merely collect and remit the fee on behalf of consumers, similar to how sales taxes operate. The dissent argued the fee should be preempted because it is assessed and exacted directly from car rental companies without any legal obligation for them to pass it to customers, and because it applies exclusively to one service rather than being "generally imposed on sales or services."

This is a defamation appeal arising from a three-part Netflix documentary series about the troubled-teen industry, in which filmmaker Katherine Kubler featured Narvin Lichfield, an operator of boarding schools for troubled teens. Lichfield sued Kubler and Netflix for defamation based on statements and visual juxtapositions in the documentary, and the district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim.

1. Whether three specific segments of the documentary are capable of sustaining defamatory meaning under Utah law and the First Amendment
2. Whether statements in the documentary constitute non-actionable opinion or protected speech
3. Whether omission of exculpatory facts (that criminal charges were dismissed) renders otherwise true statements materially false and defamatory
4. Whether state anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal diversity actions and whether the district court properly awarded attorney's fees
5. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to amend his complaint

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on all grounds. The court held that none of the three challenged segments were capable of defamatory meaning as a matter of law. First, the phrase "get away with murder" used in conjunction with a photo of Lichfield and a newspaper headline about a teen's death was found to be non-actionable idiomatic expression and rhetorical hyperbole when viewed in context. Second, the segment discussing Lichfield's arrest in Costa Rica without mentioning the subsequent dismissal of charges was found to be substantially true under the material falsity doctrine, as the omission of exculpatory facts does not render true statements defamatory so long as the "gist" and "sting" of the statement can be justified. Third, Kubler's statements at the karaoke bar accusing Lichfield of abusing children, conning parents, and getting away with crimes were found to be protected opinion and evaluative hyperbole rather than provably false factual assertions, given the broad and malleable meanings of terms like "abuse" and "conned," the personal and subjective nature of Kubler's narrative as an admitted "amateur gumshoe" seeking "revenge," and the overall context of the documentary as a personal advocacy piece rather than objective journalism. The court also found Lichfield's anti-SLAPP arguments waived under the invited error doctrine and rejected his request for leave to amend. The court additionally addressed the plaintiff's counsel's use of fabricated legal citations in the opening brief, cautioning against reliance on generative artificial intelligence without proper verification.

This is an appeal of a summary judgment dismissal in a Fair Housing Act (FHA) case where a tenant sought to hold her landlord vicariously liable for sexual assault committed by the landlord's maintenance worker employee. The tenant invoked the aided-by-agency exception to traditional vicarious liability doctrine, arguing the employee's position aided him in committing the assault.

1. Whether the aided-by-agency exception to vicarious liability applies to Fair Housing Act claims
2. The proper framework and requirements for applying the aided-by-agency exception in the housing context
3. Whether the employee's position as a maintenance worker aided him in committing the alleged rape
4. Whether the district court properly granted sua sponte summary judgment against the employee without providing notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)
5. Whether the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim

The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of both the landlord and the employee. The court held that: (1) the aided-by-agency exception does apply to FHA claims, but it is a narrow exception requiring either that an employee exercise significant authority over the victim or possess a special privilege/access not available to the public that the employee actually uses to commit the tort; (2) the tenant failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact satisfying the exception because the maintenance worker had no meaningful authority over the tenant and did not use his master key (his only special privilege) on the day of the alleged assault—he entered the building and apartment without needing it; (3) the district court's failure to provide notice before granting sua sponte summary judgment against the employee was harmless because the tenant suffered no prejudice and failed to properly raise a prejudice argument until her reply brief; and (4) the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state sexual assault claim once all federal claims were dismissed.

This is an advancement action in which Jefferies LLC, a member of Mountain State Energy Holdings, LLC, seeks mandatory advancement of legal fees for defending a civil lawsuit brought by another member, Trilogy Portfolio Company, LLC. The lawsuit alleges that Jefferies and its client made misrepresentations to induce Trilogy to refrain from exercising contractual rights in connection with share acquisitions.

1. Whether Jefferies, as a member of Mountain State, is entitled to mandatory advancement of legal fees under Section 7.2(b) of the LLC Agreement
2. Whether the good-faith requirement in Section 7.2(a) (the indemnification provision) extends to Section 7.2(b) (the advancement provision)
3. Whether advancement is limited only to members serving in managerial capacities
4. Whether the underlying lawsuit "arises out of or in connection with" the affairs of Mountain State or Jefferies's responsibilities under the LLC Agreement
5. Whether Jefferies is barred from advancement based on unclean hands or estoppel
6. Whether Jefferies is entitled to fees-on-fees and prejudgment interest

The court granted Jefferies's motion for summary judgment and denied Mountain State's cross-motion. The court held that:

1. Mandatory Advancement Right Exists: Section 7.2(b) creates a mandatory advancement obligation for members defending suits arising out of or in connection with the company's affairs or the member's responsibilities under the LLC Agreement.
2. Good-Faith Requirement Does Not Apply to Advancement: The good-faith condition in Section 7.2(a) does not extend to Section 7.2(b). Imposing such a requirement would effectively bar advancement and obstruct its purpose as prompt credit extension not predicated on ultimate indemnification entitlement.
3. No Managerial Capacity Limitation: Section 7.2(b) extends advancement to members unconditionally and is not limited to those serving in managerial capacities. The plain language of the provision contains no such restriction.
4. Underlying Proceeding Touches on Company Affairs: The lawsuit arises out of or in connection with Mountain State's affairs because it involves misrepresentations made to induce Mountain State to execute and amend confidentiality agreements, and relates to the Board's deliberation process in negotiating these agreements.
5. Underlying Proceeding Touches on Member's Responsibilities: The lawsuit directly implicates Jefferies's responsibilities as a "ROFO Transferring Holder" under Section 9.5(a) of the LLC Agreement, as Trilogy seeks declarations regarding Jefferies's obligations to comply with right-of-first-offer requirements.
6. Unclean Hands and Estoppel Defenses Rejected: Unclean hands does not apply because the misconduct complained of relates to a separate contract, not the advancement process itself. Estoppel was not properly asserted.
7. Fees-on-Fees and Interest Awarded: Jefferies is entitled to fees-on-fees for its success on the merits and prejudgment interest at the legal rate. However, interest accrues only after Mountain State has had a commercially reasonable period (ten days) following any future advancement demand to provide the requested funds.

This case involves a dispute between minority stockholder Ashok Mayya and controlling shareholder LG Electronics (LGE) regarding management decisions and liquidity rights in Alphonso Inc., a digital advertising technology company. The court addresses whether Mayya's fiduciary duty claims must be arbitrated and whether LGE is subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware.

1. Whether Mayya's fiduciary duty claims are subject to arbitration under arbitration clauses in the Series A Agreement and Stockholders' Agreement (SHA)
2. Whether a corporation has the authority to agree in advance to arbitrate fiduciary duty claims outside of Delaware prior to the enactment of DGCL § 122(18)
3. Whether LGE implicitly consented to personal jurisdiction in Delaware courts through the Charter Forum Selection Clause
4. The proper standard for determining whether parties delegated arbitrability questions to an arbitrator

The court denied both Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and LGE's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Regarding arbitration, the court held that under pre-August 1, 2024 Delaware law (when this action commenced on March 30, 2023), corporations lacked authority to route fiduciary duty claims outside Delaware through contractual arbitration clauses. Only charter or bylaw provisions under DGCL § 115 could accomplish such routing. Since DGCL § 122(18)—which would have authorized stockholder agreements to route internal affairs claims to non-Delaware forums—did not apply retroactively to pending cases, Alphonso could not validly agree to arbitrate Mayya's fiduciary duty claims in the Series A Agreement or SHA. Therefore, the Charter Forum Selection Clause controls, requiring resolution in Delaware courts. The court noted that this conclusion rested on lack of corporate authority rather than the arbitration clauses being wholly groundless, and thus the court retained power to decide arbitrability despite delegation language in the arbitration agreements. Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court found that Mayya made a prima facie showing that LGE implicitly consented to Delaware jurisdiction by causing Alphonso to adopt and maintain the Charter Forum Selection Clause. The court identified two categories of relevant facts: (1) the forum selection clause's intent to funnel fiduciary duty claims into Delaware courts, evidenced by the clause's broad language and its adoption contemporaneously with LGE's investment transaction; and (2) LGE's influence over the process, demonstrated by LGE's proposal and drafting of the charter amendment, the amendment being a condition of LGE's investment, and LGE's subsequent control through its majority board appointments. The existence of arbitration clauses in other agreements did not overcome this prima facie showing because those clauses could not legally capture Mayya's claims.

This is an appeal of a district court decision in which 23 states and the District of Columbia challenged an executive order directing federal agencies to implement new citizenship verification and mail-in ballot procedures for federal elections. The appellate court denied the federal government's and intervenor states' motions to stay the district court's injunction pending appeal.

1. Whether the plaintiff states have Article III standing to challenge the executive order based on: (a) present injury from mandatory compliance planning and costs; (b) certainly impending pocketbook injuries from required ballot envelope redesigns; and (c) credible threats of criminal prosecution against state officials
2. Whether the plaintiff states' claims are ripe for judicial review or are premature
3. Whether the President exceeded constitutional authority under the Elections Clause, Electors Clause, and Tenth Amendment's anti-commandeering doctrine by directing changes to state election administration
4. Whether the four-factor Nken test for granting a stay pending appeal favors the government

The court denied the government's and intervenor states' motions to stay the district court's injunction. The majority held that the government failed to make a "strong showing" that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its standing and ripeness arguments on appeal. The court found that the plaintiff states suffered concrete, particularized injuries sufficient to establish Article III standing: (1) present injury from mandatory compliance planning and resource diversion required by the executive order's compressed timelines; (2) certainly impending pocketbook injuries because nearly half the plaintiff states had already purchased non-compliant mail-ballot envelopes and would incur costs to replace them; and (3) credible threats of criminal prosecution against state officials who issue ballots to voters not on federal citizenship lists, despite those lists being necessarily incomplete. The court rejected the government's reliance on Clapper v. Amnesty International and Trump v. New York as inapplicable given the executive order's explicit targeting of the plaintiff states and the imminent nature of the September and November 2026 elections. The court also found that the remaining Nken factors—irreparable injury, substantial injury to other parties, and public interest—did not favor a stay, as the government failed to demonstrate irreparable harm while the plaintiff states faced multiple harms including disenfranchisement of eligible voters. A concurring opinion by Judge Dunlap would have granted the stay in part, finding that the plaintiff states lacked standing to challenge Section 2(a) (compilation of citizenship lists) but had standing to challenge Sections 2(b) and 3 of the executive order.

This is an administrative law case in which twenty states challenged a presidential proclamation requiring a $100,000 payment to accompany all H-1B visa petitions. The states sought to vacate the policy as violating the Administrative Procedure Act and exceeding executive authority, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment.

1. Whether the executive branch exceeded its statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a) in imposing the $100,000 payment requirement without clear congressional delegation, particularly in light of the Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co. clear-statement requirement for revenue-raising authority.
2. Whether the policy constitutes "final agency action" reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704, or merely implements a presidential directive.
3. Whether the defendants satisfied the four-factor test under Nken v. Holder for obtaining a stay pending appeal, particularly the critical "likelihood of success on the merits" factor.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the defendants' motion to stay the district court's order vacating the policy. The court held that the defendants failed to make a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal. Specifically, the court found that: (1) under Skinner, Congress must speak clearly when delegating discretionary authority to impose financial burdens characterized as fees or taxes; (2) neither § 1182(f) nor § 1185(a) contains an explicit reference to payment requirements, and Congress's pattern of explicitly authorizing fees in the Immigration and Nationality Act suggests the President lacked clear authority here; (3) the word "restriction" in § 1182(f), while broad, does not plainly include the power to impose a tax, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court's recent analysis in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump; (4) the defendants' argument that the policy is not "final agency action" contradicts their own assertion that the policy causes irreparable harm; and (5) the defendants failed to adequately address the remaining Nken factors regarding substantial injury to the plaintiffs and the public interest. The court emphasized that the first two Nken factors are most critical, and the defendants' failure on the likelihood-of-success factor was dispositive.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a defendant convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and money laundering in connection with a scheme to defraud the Municipality of Mayagüez and its municipal enterprise. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions and appeals the district court's denial of his motion for sentence reduction.

1. Whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally participated in a single wire fraud conspiracy to defraud Mayagüez and MEDI, specifically addressing whether the evidence established the requisite elements of common goal, interdependence, and overlap among conspirators.
2. Whether the defendant's derivative wire fraud and money laundering convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, given the sufficiency of the conspiracy conviction.
3. Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

The court affirmed the defendant's convictions on all counts. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence challenge, the court found that: (1) the evidence established a common goal among conspirators to defraud Mayagüez and MEDI; (2) interdependence was satisfied because the defendant's success in receiving illicit funds depended on the continued existence of the fraud scheme, and his efforts to convince auditors that the transactions were legal were advantageous to the scheme by preventing discovery; and (3) overlap was satisfied through García's pervasive involvement as the "hub" or "core" conspirator, combined with evidence that the defendant knew about and agreed to join the overarching conspiracy, including his timely incorporation of U.A., receipt of payments from TEGA shortly after the $9 million transfer, fabrication of invoices at García's direction, and participation in meetings with other conspirators. The court rejected the defendant's prejudicial variance argument, finding no variance existed. The court dismissed the defendant's sentence reduction appeal without prejudice, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the defendant failed to file a notice of appeal from the district court's order denying the § 3582(c)(2) motion.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of constitutional claims as moot. Reynaldo Cruz challenged the withholding of union dues for political and ideological purposes from his pay at the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, alleging violations of his First Amendment rights.

1. Whether Cruz's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief became moot after the defendant union deposited the full amount of compensatory damages sought with the court and the employer ceased the challenged conduct
2. Whether Cruz's interest in obtaining "prevailing party" attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 prevents his claims from being moot
3. Whether a party's interest in recouping attorney's fees creates a sufficient stake in the outcome to prevent mootness of an otherwise resolved controversy

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims as moot. The court held that even though Cruz qualified as a "prevailing party" entitled to attorney's fees, a party's interest in recouping attorney's fees does not create a sufficient stake in the outcome to resuscitate an otherwise moot controversy. Because the challenged conduct had ceased, the union had deposited the full amount of damages sought with the court, and the prevailing party issue did not bear on mootness, all of Cruz's claims were properly dismissed as moot.

This is an appeal by demonstrators challenging a "buffer zone" order issued by a Massachusetts Superior Court judge that prohibited protests within 200 feet of a courthouse during Karen Read's murder trial. The demonstrators sought injunctive and declaratory relief on First Amendment and due process grounds, but the case became moot when the trial ended and the buffer zone order automatically expired.

1. Whether the appeal is moot because the buffer zone order has expired and no longer affects the demonstrators' conduct
2. Whether the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine applies to preserve the case for review
3. Whether the buffer zone order violated the First Amendment and due process rights of the demonstrators
4. What remedy is appropriate when a case becomes moot during appeal

The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the appeal is moot and vacated the district court's partial denial of the preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that: (1) the buffer zone order expired automatically when the jury returned its verdict on June 18, 2025, making injunctive relief unavailable; (2) declaratory relief is also moot because the demonstrators' injuries are no longer immediate or real; (3) the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception does not apply because while the demonstrators satisfied the first prong (the order's duration was too short to litigate), they failed to satisfy the second prong by failing to show a reasonable expectation they would be subject to another buffer zone order in the future—their argument rested on speculation about hypothetical future trials and buffer zones rather than concrete evidence; and (4) the appropriate remedy is to vacate only the portion of the district court's decision that was appealed (the partial denial of the preliminary injunction) while leaving the partial grant of the preliminary injunction intact, as the defendants did not cross-appeal that portion.

This is an immigration law case in which two naturalized U.S. citizens who obtained legal status through the Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) program challenge USCIS's denial of their noncitizen mothers' applications for immigration benefits based on their parent-child relationship. The plaintiffs argue that USCIS misinterpreted the statutory exclusion clause and that the exclusion violates equal protection rights.

1. Whether the plain language of the SIJ exclusion clause in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) bars parents of SIJ recipients from receiving immigration benefits based on parentage, regardless of whether the parent was the one who abused, neglected, or abandoned the child.
2. Whether USCIS's implementing regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(i) faithfully interprets the statutory exclusion clause.
3. Whether the exclusion clause violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause when applied to naturalized citizens who received SIJ status.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on all issues. First, the court held that the plain text of the exclusion clause creates a permanent bar preventing parents of SIJ recipients from obtaining immigration benefits based on parentage, regardless of whether the parent was abusive, neglectful, or abandoning. The phrase "shall thereafter" establishes a mandatory and permanent prohibition. The court rejected the plaintiffs' narrow interpretation that would limit the clause only to noncitizens at the time of application, finding such an interpretation would render the statute superfluous and produce absurd results contrary to Congress's protective intent. Second, the court found that USCIS's regulation is consistent with and faithfully implements the statutory language, noting that the distinction between "petitioner" in the regulation and "alien" in the statute is merely semantic. The court rejected the argument that the 2008 amendments created a distinction based on parental conduct, finding no clear congressional intent to make such a distinction. Third, on the equal protection claim, the court acknowledged that plaintiffs demonstrated differential treatment—as SIJ-derived citizens, they cannot petition for parents while other citizens can—but held that this distinction survives rational basis review because Congress has a legitimate interest in protecting abused, neglected, and abandoned children by preventing their abusers from obtaining immigration benefits through the SIJ program. The court emphasized that rational basis review is highly deferential and that Congress has broad power over immigration matters.

This case involves consolidated pre-enforcement challenges to Texas House Bill 18 ("H.B. 18"), which regulates social media platforms' handling of content accessible to minors. Two groups of plaintiffs—industry organizations (CCIA and NetChoice) and students/advocates (SEAT)—challenged various provisions of the law on constitutional and preemption grounds.

1. Whether the SEAT plaintiffs have standing to challenge H.B. 18's monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements in a pre-enforcement challenge where the law regulates third-party digital service providers rather than the plaintiffs directly
2. Whether H.B. 18's monitoring and filtering requirement is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1))
3. Whether H.B. 18's various provisions violate the First Amendment (not reached by the court)
4. Whether the SEAT plaintiffs' challenge to the age-verification requirement is foreclosed by recent Supreme Court precedent

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a mixed decision:

1. Standing (SEAT Plaintiffs): The court held that the SEAT plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements. The court found that because H.B. 18 regulates third-party digital service providers rather than the plaintiffs directly, the plaintiffs must show that regulated platforms "will likely react in predictable ways" to the law and that this reaction poses a "substantial risk" of censoring the plaintiffs' speech. The court concluded the SEAT plaintiffs failed to make this clear showing, and their alleged chill on speech was too subjective to constitute an injury in fact. The court also found that the SEAT plaintiffs' listening-based harms lacked the required "concrete, specific connection" to speakers.
2. Age-Verification Requirement (SEAT Plaintiffs): The court vacated the district court's injunction regarding the age-verification requirement, finding that the SEAT plaintiffs' challenge is now foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton (2025), which held that a materially similar age-verification requirement for pornographic websites was constitutional.
3. Monitoring and Filtering Requirement (CCIA Plaintiffs): The court affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the CCIA plaintiffs, holding that H.B. 18's monitoring and filtering requirement is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The court reasoned that the requirement would hold digital service providers liable for their decisions regarding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter third-party content—actions that are quintessentially related to a publisher's role. The court distinguished this from the age-verification requirement (which filters audiences rather than content) and found that the monitoring and filtering requirement necessarily requires internet companies to monitor, alter, or remove third-party content, triggering Section 230 preemption. The court rejected arguments that the requirement merely imposes statutory obligations rather than liability for harm, noting that allowing states to re-encode tort law as statutory obligations would effectively nullify Section 230's protections.
4. Constitutional Issues: The court declined to reach the First Amendment challenges to H.B. 18, as the preemption holding was sufficient to support the preliminary injunction.

This case involves consolidated pre-enforcement challenges to Texas House Bill 18 ("H.B. 18"), the Securing Children Online through Parental Empowerment Act, which regulates social media platforms' handling of content accessible to minors. Two groups of plaintiffs—technology industry associations (CCIA and NetChoice) and individual Texans and advocacy groups (SEAT plaintiffs)—challenged various provisions of the law, and the district court granted preliminary injunctions against several requirements.

1. Whether the SEAT plaintiffs have standing to challenge H.B. 18's monitoring and filtering, targeted advertising, and unlawful advertising requirements in a pre-enforcement challenge when the law directly regulates third-party digital service providers rather than the plaintiffs themselves
2. Whether H.B. 18's monitoring and filtering requirement is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which provides broad immunity to interactive computer service providers from liability based on third-party content
3. Whether H.B. 18's age-verification requirement survives First Amendment scrutiny

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a mixed decision:

1. Standing (SEAT Plaintiffs): The court held that the SEAT plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to clearly show that there is a substantial risk that digital service providers will likely react to H.B. 18 in predictable ways that would cause concrete, imminent injury to the plaintiffs' speech or listening rights. The court emphasized that where a law regulates third parties rather than the plaintiffs directly, plaintiffs must demonstrate that regulated parties "will likely react in predictable ways" and that this reaction poses a "substantial risk" of harm. The SEAT plaintiffs' allegations were too speculative and based on subjective fears of censorship rather than objective evidence of likely harm. The court also noted that listening-based claims require "a concrete, specific connection to the speaker," which the SEAT plaintiffs failed to establish.
2. Age-Verification Requirement (SEAT Plaintiffs): The court vacated the district court's preliminary injunction regarding the age-verification requirement, finding that the SEAT plaintiffs' challenge is now foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton (2025), which held that a materially similar age-verification requirement for pornographic websites was constitutional under intermediate scrutiny.
3. Preemption (CCIA and NetChoice): The court affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction against H.B. 18's monitoring and filtering requirement, holding that it is preempted by Section 230 of the CDA. The court reasoned that: (a) Section 230 provides broad immunity from claims "stemming from [DSPs'] publication of information created by third parties"; (b) the monitoring and filtering requirement imposes duties that "would necessarily require an internet company to monitor, alter, or remove third-party content"; (c) actions to enforce this requirement are claims stemming from DSPs' actions as publishers; and (d) the requirement treats DSPs as publishers subject to state-set publication standards, which is precisely what Section 230 prohibits. The court distinguished this from the age-verification requirement upheld in Free Speech Coalition, noting that "publishers do not filter audiences; they filter content," and H.B. 18's requirement is fundamentally about filtering content.
4. Constitutional Issues: The court declined to reach the constitutional First Amendment issues presented, as the preemption analysis was dispositive.

Result: The court AFFIRMED the preliminary injunction as to CCIA and NetChoice (regarding the monitoring and filtering requirement) but VACATED the preliminary injunction as to the SEAT plaintiffs and REMANDED for further proceedings.

Concurrence/Dissent: Circuit Judge James C. Ho concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the monitoring and filtering requirement should not be preempted by Section 230 because it regulates the platforms' own curation decisions (first-party speech) rather than their publication of third-party content. He contended that under recent Supreme Court precedent (Moody v. NetChoice) and circuit precedent (A.B. v. Salesforce), curation constitutes the platforms' own speech and is therefore not subject to Section 230 preemption.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Rishad Williams challenges his conviction and 100-month sentence for being a felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Williams pleaded guilty unconditionally to two counts after initially rejecting a plea offer and having a firearm discovered during a search of his girlfriend's home.

1. Whether Williams's unconditional guilty plea preserved his right to appeal pre-plea constitutional claims under the Second and Fourth Amendments
2. Whether Williams received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney allegedly failed to communicate the government's initial plea offer
3. Whether the district court properly applied a four-level sentencing enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on Williams's alleged use of a firearm in connection with felonious assault

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Williams's conviction and sentence. The court held that: (1) Williams's unconditional guilty plea without a written agreement waived his pre-plea Second and Fourth Amendment challenges, as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) requires a defendant to reserve specific issues in writing with government and court consent—the district court's general statement that Williams was "not waiving any of [his] appellate rights" was insufficient to create a conditional plea; (2) Williams's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on alleged failure to communicate the plea offer is not cognizable on direct appeal but must be raised on collateral review, as the record was not adequately developed with testimony from counsel or an evidentiary hearing; and (3) the district court did not clearly err in applying the sentencing enhancement because substantial evidence supported its finding that Williams threatened Amaya with the firearm, including her initial statements to police, body camera footage, DNA evidence, visible bruising, and text messages—Amaya's later affidavit recanting her statements was properly found less reliable given inconsistencies and her incentive to retract.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in which Christopher Hemwall, a state prisoner convicted of sexual assault, challenges the dismissal of his petition for failing to comply with the one-year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Hemwall seeks equitable tolling of the deadline based on his attorney's personal health difficulties and his attorney's child's medical problems.

1. Whether the one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) can be equitably tolled based on an attorney's personal health difficulties.
2. Whether an attorney's health problems can constitute "extraordinary circumstances" sufficient to justify equitable tolling.
3. Whether a causal connection exists between the attorney's personal difficulties and the late filing of the habeas petition.
4. Whether the district court properly declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on Hemwall's equitable tolling request.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hemwall's habeas petition. The court held that even assuming the attorney's health difficulties could qualify as extraordinary circumstances, Hemwall failed to establish the required causal connection between those circumstances and the late filing. The court found that the attorney continued to accept new cases and practice law during the relevant period, had several weeks available to file even if completely incapacitated for five months, and could have easily filed a protective petition by reformatting his already-completed state court motion. The court concluded that the late filing resulted from the attorney's decision to prioritize other cases rather than from the health difficulties, constituting "garden variety claim of excusable neglect" insufficient to overcome the statute of limitations. The court also rejected Hemwall's arguments that the district court applied an overly restrictive standard, that equitable tolling should be based on interests of justice, and that an evidentiary hearing was necessary.

This is a criminal appeal in which Dr. Barnett K. Fung, a podiatrist, challenges his conviction for knowingly and intentionally dispensing opioids outside the usual course of professional practice and without legitimate medical purpose in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). The jury convicted him on one count involving a prescription to an undercover DEA agent but acquitted him on 73 other counts.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting lay witness testimony from a pharmacist under Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 403
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Dr. Fung's motion for a mistrial based on expert testimony regarding a patient's addiction
3. Whether sufficient evidence supported the jury's guilty verdict on Count Seven
4. Whether the district court adequately considered the appropriate factors when imposing a $50,000 fine at sentencing

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held: (1) the pharmacist's testimony was properly admitted as lay witness testimony because it was based on personal knowledge and factual observations rather than specialized expertise; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial motion because the objectionable statement was inadvertent, isolated, and ambiguous, and the jury acquitted Dr. Fung on all counts related to that patient; (3) substantial evidence supported the conviction, including video evidence of the undercover visit, expert testimony that the prescription lacked legitimate medical purpose, and evidence of Dr. Fung's knowledge that his prescribing practices were problematic; and (4) the district court properly imposed the $50,000 fine by adopting the PSR's financial findings showing Dr. Fung had the means to pay and by considering relevant sentencing factors including the seriousness of the offense, deterrence, and the opioid pandemic context.

This is a products liability case arising from the death of a premature infant, RaiLee Mar, who died from necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) after being fed Abbott Laboratories' cow's-milk-based infant formula. The mother appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on her failure-to-warn claim, arguing that Abbott should have provided a stronger warning about the formula's association with NEC.

1. Whether Abbott had a duty to warn about the dangers of its formula in relation to NEC in premature infants
2. Whether an alternative warning label proposed by the plaintiff would have prevented the infant's death (causation in fact)
3. Whether the plaintiff could introduce "newly discovered evidence" via a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration when the witnesses were available during discovery
4. Whether counterfactual inferences about what would have happened with a different warning are sufficiently grounded in the record to survive summary judgment

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. Under West Virginia law, a failure-to-warn claim requires proof that a different warning would have "made a difference" in preventing the injury. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish this causation element because: (1) the treating physicians already knew of the association between formula and NEC, making it speculative that a different warning would have prompted them to establish a donor milk program; (2) the hospital's policy against sharing untested, unpasteurized breast milk was based on disease transmission concerns unrelated to Abbott's warning; (3) the plaintiff did not read Abbott's original warning, so it cannot be inferred how she would have responded to an alternative warning; and (4) the inferences required to support the plaintiff's arguments were too speculative and not sufficiently grounded in the record evidence. The court also upheld the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion because the witnesses were available during discovery and therefore not "newly discovered evidence."

This is an employment discrimination case in which Mimi Weiss appealed the dismissal of her Title VII and California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims against The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (TPMG) for failure to accommodate her religious beliefs regarding a COVID-19 vaccine mandate. TPMG initially approved Weiss's religious exemption request but later revoked it after she declined to fully answer supplemental questions about the sincerity of her beliefs, leading to her termination.

1. Whether Weiss adequately notified TPMG of the conflict between her religious beliefs and the vaccine mandate to satisfy the notice requirement for a prima facie failure-to-accommodate-religion claim under Title VII and FEHA
2. Whether the notice requirement and sincerity inquiry are separate legal standards, and whether an employer may use the notice requirement to probe the sincerity of an employee's religious beliefs
3. How much information an employee must provide to put an employer on notice of an actual religious conflict with an employment requirement

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case. The court held that Weiss satisfied the notice requirement for a prima facie failure-to-accommodate-religion claim. The court established that an employee need only provide "enough information about her religious needs to permit the employer to understand the existence of a conflict" between those needs and the employer's expectations. Applying this standard, the court found that Weiss's initial religious exemption request—in which she identified herself as a Christian Jew and cited specific religious doctrines prohibiting her from receiving the vaccine—provided sufficient notice of her religious conflict with the mandate. The court reasoned that TPMG's own initial approval of her exemption demonstrated that TPMG understood she was asserting a genuine religious objection. The court further held that the notice requirement and the sincerity inquiry are separate legal standards, and that employers cannot use the notice requirement as a means to delve into whether an employee's religion actually mandates adherence to the asserted beliefs. The district court erred by conflating these distinct inquiries and using the notice requirement to assess the sincerity of Weiss's beliefs rather than merely determining whether TPMG had sufficient information to understand the existence of a conflict.

This is a civil rights case in which a law school student who reported being raped sued police officers and the City of Lawrence after being investigated and charged with filing a false report. The charges were eventually dismissed, and the plaintiff brought federal civil rights claims and state law claims against the officers and city.

1. Whether the plaintiff adequately alleged a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the police officers
2. Whether the plaintiff adequately alleged a conspiracy claim under §§ 1983 and 1985(3)
3. Whether the plaintiff demonstrated good cause to amend her complaint to add a Fourth Amendment claim after the scheduling order deadline
4. Whether the plaintiff established an equal protection violation under the Fourteenth Amendment
5. Whether the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals largely affirmed the district court's dismissals. The court held that:

1. Malicious Prosecution: The plaintiff failed to adequately allege that the officers caused her prosecution. Although the officer prepared an affidavit supporting the charges, the affidavit was materially accurate regarding the rape allegation and the plaintiff's statements about pursuing charges. The plaintiff did not establish that the officer knowingly or recklessly included false statements or material omissions that would vitiate probable cause.
2. Conspiracy: The plaintiff failed to allege more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy. The factual allegations showed only that officers agreed to conduct lawful investigative activities, which is insufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy.
3. Amendment: The plaintiff did not demonstrate good cause to amend her complaint more than a year after the scheduling order deadline. Although she claimed to have learned of the full scope of the phone search during a July 2023 deposition, she waited five months to move for amendment without adequate explanation for the delay.
4. Equal Protection: The plaintiff failed to show that she was similarly situated to Thompson in all relevant respects, as they were accused of different offenses and had different roles in the investigation. She also failed to produce sufficient evidence of gender-based discrimination by the police department.
5. Supplemental Jurisdiction: The court reversed the grant of summary judgment on state law claims and remanded for the district court to consider whether it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, as the Supreme Court encourages dismissal or remand of state claims when all federal claims have been disposed of before trial.

This is a bankruptcy appeal concerning whether a creditor must demonstrate it has the legal right to enforce a claim based on promissory notes and mortgages. Cloud 9 Properties, LLC filed proofs of claim against sale proceeds from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, but the evidence showed Cloud 9 did not own the underlying promissory notes at the time it filed the claims.

1. Whether a party filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy must demonstrate ownership of the underlying debt instrument (promissory note) at the time the claim is filed
2. Whether Florida's requirements for enforcing a note through foreclosure action apply equally to enforcing a note through a bankruptcy claim
3. Whether equity considerations in bankruptcy allow a court to overlook the requirement that a claimant own the note when the mortgages and notes genuinely exist
4. Whether the failure to provide evidence of ownership constitutes a proper basis for disallowing a claim

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that a creditor must own or hold a promissory note at the time it files a claim in bankruptcy to enforce it. The court reasoned that under Florida law, a party must be the owner or holder of a note to foreclose on the attached property, and this requirement extends to bankruptcy claims. Cloud 9's proofs of claim lacked evidence that Cloud 9 owned the notes on the filing date (April 28, 2021)—the evidence showed Cloud 9 did not acquire the notes until March 14, 2023. Because Cloud 9 failed to provide evidence of ownership when INXS VII properly objected, the claims were properly disallowed. The court rejected equitable arguments, noting that bankruptcy courts cannot substitute underlying state law governing creditor entitlements and that Cloud 9 was not a legitimate claimant since it had no legal connection to the notes at the time of filing.

This case involves a retaliation claim brought by Sergeant Jannease Johnson, a 28-year veteran of the D.C. Department of Corrections, who was terminated after sharing confidential emails with union attorneys and giving a press interview about COVID-19 prison conditions. Johnson asserts violations of her First Amendment rights and the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act, while defendants claim qualified immunity.

1. Whether Johnson's First Amendment rights were violated when she was fired for disclosing confidential emails to union attorneys regarding COVID-19 safety concerns at the D.C. Jail
2. Whether Johnson's First Amendment rights were violated when she was fired for granting a press interview to WUSA 9 about prison conditions during the pandemic
3. Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based on the application of the four-part Pickering test for government employee speech
4. Whether the right to speak on matters of public concern without retaliation was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations

The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court's denial of qualified immunity. Regarding the email disclosures: The court held that defendants did not violate Johnson's First Amendment rights if they fired her for sharing confidential emails with union attorneys. The government's strong interest in maintaining confidentiality policies and protecting the privacy of health information outweighed Johnson's interest in disclosing the specific confidential details, particularly since she could have raised the same safety concerns without naming affected individuals. The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on this claim. Regarding the WUSA 9 interview: The court held that Johnson may be able to demonstrate a First Amendment violation based on her termination for the press interview. The defendants conceded that Johnson spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern and failed to identify any government interest that would outweigh her speech rights. The court found that a material factual dispute exists regarding whether Deputy Director Patten was motivated by retaliation for the interview, and that the right to speak without retaliation on matters of public concern was clearly established. Therefore, Patten is not entitled to qualified immunity if she fired Johnson based on the interview. The case was remanded for trial on whether Johnson can prove Patten's retaliatory motive and whether Patten would have made the same decision absent the protected speech.

This case involves a petition for review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders denying American Whitewater's motion to intervene out of time in a hydroelectric license surrender proceeding. American Whitewater, a river conservation organization, sought to intervene nearly nine months after the intervention deadline to advocate for dam removal on the Niangua River in Missouri.

1. Whether FERC misinterpreted the plain text of Rule 214 by conflating the mandatory "good cause" requirement under subsection (b)(3) with the discretionary "good cause" factor under subsection (d)(1)(i)
2. Whether FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by inconsistently applying its late-intervention precedent, particularly the strict standard announced in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.
3. Whether American Whitewater has standing to challenge the intervention denial and whether the case is moot following FERC's approval of the license surrender

The court held that: (1) FERC did not misinterpret Rule 214's plain text—the Commission may rely solely on the good-cause factor under (d)(1)(i) to determine whether a movant established good cause under (b)(3) without considering other (d)(1) factors; (2) American Whitewater has standing and the case is not moot because the license remains in effect pending decommissioning completion; and (3) most significantly, FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying rehearing by inconsistently applying its late-intervention precedent without reasoned explanation. The court found that FERC has granted late intervention in other cases despite movants' failure to show good cause or with much longer delays, yet denied American Whitewater's motion without explaining why it was treated differently. The court vacated the orders and remanded for FERC to reconsider the intervention motion and provide a reasoned explanation consistent with its precedent, emphasizing that agencies must treat similarly situated parties similarly under fundamental administrative law principles.

This is an administrative law case in which Adsync Technologies, Inc. petitions for review of a Federal Aviation Administration decision, with Adacel Systems, Inc. intervening in the matter.

The specific legal issues addressed in this case are not available, as the opinion has been filed under seal and is not available to the public.

The court's ruling and reasoning cannot be determined from the information provided, as the full opinion text under seal has not been disclosed to the public.

This case involves shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac challenging the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) adoption of the "Net Worth Sweep" in 2012, which dramatically altered dividend payments to the Treasury and eliminated the possibility of shareholder dividends. The shareholders brought a contract claim alleging the FHFA violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a jury awarded $812 million in damages including prejudgment interest.

1. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Collins v. Yellen foreclosed the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim as a matter of law
2. Whether the implied covenant claim could apply when the shareholder agreements contained no "gap" for the covenant to fill
3. Whether the implied covenant claim constituted an impermissible claim for anticipatory breach
4. Whether the plaintiffs adequately proved damages caused by the Net Worth Sweep
5. Whether shareholders who purchased shares after the Third Amendment announcement had standing to bring the implied covenant claim
6. Whether plaintiffs could seek restitution or reliance damages instead of expectation damages

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the shareholders. The court held: (1) Collins v. Yellen did not foreclose the implied covenant claim because Collins involved only a statutory claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, not a contract claim for damages. The reasonableness analysis in Collins (whether the FHFA acted within its statutory authority) differs from the implied covenant analysis (whether the FHFA acted consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations). (2) The implied covenant applies despite the Recovery Act's broad grant of discretionary authority to the FHFA. Under Delaware and Virginia law, when a contract grants one party sole discretion, the implied covenant still applies to prevent arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of that discretion. The Recovery Act's "best interests" language does not eliminate the implied covenant but rather provides the context for assessing reasonable expectations. (3) The implied covenant claim is not an impermissible claim for anticipatory breach. The implied covenant imposes an ongoing obligation to act in good faith, and violation of that obligation constitutes a present breach, not a future one. The fact that the breach has future effects does not transform it into anticipatory breach. (4) The plaintiffs adequately proved damages under the "lost-value theory," demonstrating that the Net Worth Sweep caused the $1.6 billion drop in share value on August 17, 2012. The jury could reasonably conclude that subsequent share price increases resulted from other contemporaneous events, that the harm persists today, and that the Net Worth Sweep (rather than the portfolio-reduction requirement) caused the decline. (5) Post-Third Amendment purchasers had contractual standing to bring the implied covenant claim because, under both Delaware and Virginia law, rights that "inhere in the security itself" travel with the shares. The implied covenant claim bears a close relationship to the stock because the Net Worth Sweep eliminated dividend rights that constituted valuable attributes of the shares. (6) The plaintiffs could not seek restitution or reliance damages. Section 4617(f) bars equitable relief that would restrain or affect the FHFA's exercise of its authority as conservator. Granting rescission would require unwinding the shareholder contracts and reorienting the capital structure, which would violate § 4617(f). Additionally, reliance damages of $48 billion—30 times the ascertainable expectation damages of $1.6 billion—are not available under Delaware and Virginia law, which prefer expectation damages as the standard remedy in contract cases.

This is an antitrust case in which PhantomALERT, a traffic app developer, appealed the dismissal of its complaint alleging that Apple violated federal and state antitrust laws by tying the iPhone to the App Store and monopolizing the market for app access. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to adequately plead relevant product markets, and PhantomALERT appealed.

1. Whether the district court's dismissal order was final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
2. Whether PhantomALERT adequately pleaded a relevant product market for "access to apps on the iPhone" to support its unlawful tying and monopolization claims under Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2
3. Whether PhantomALERT adequately pleaded a relevant product market for "access to Covid-19-related tracing apps" to support its monopolization claim
4. Whether a single-brand aftermarket can be established based on customer "lock-in" and what showing is required to define such a market

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held:

1. The district court's order was final and appealable because it dismissed the complaint and denied leave to amend based on futility, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.
2. PhantomALERT failed to plausibly allege a relevant product market for "access to apps on the iPhone." The amended complaint lacked allegations regarding the hypothetical monopolist test, Brown Shoe factors, or availability of substitutes (such as web browsers). Even assuming a single-brand aftermarket theory applies, the complaint did not show that the App Store lacks reasonable substitutes.
3. PhantomALERT failed to plausibly allege a relevant product market for "access to Covid-19-related tracing apps." The complaint was imprecise and self-contradictory, conflating a market for "access" to such apps with a market for the apps themselves. The bare assertion that Covid-19 apps are not substitutable for other apps constituted only a conclusory label without factual support.
4. PhantomALERT forfeited an alternative "foremarket power" theory by not raising it before the district court and attempting to switch theories on appeal.
5. Because the Sherman Act claims failed due to inadequate market definition, the California Cartwright Act claim (which depends on the Sherman Act allegations) and the California Unfair Competition Law claim also failed.
6. The dismissal was without prejudice, allowing PhantomALERT to file a separate action if it could cure the deficiencies and clear any other limitations to suit.

This is an appeal of a Court of Chancery decision in an advancement action where the plaintiff Arif Ahmed sought advancement of legal fees from his employer, JP Morgan Chase & Co. and J.P. Morgan Securities LLC. The Delaware Supreme Court addresses whether to grant interlocutory review of the lower court's denial of the defendants' certification applications.

1. Whether J.P. Morgan timely filed its application for certification of an interlocutory appeal from the Chancellor's June 10, 2026 decision on the merits of the advancement claim
2. Whether good cause existed to extend the deadline for filing the certification application
3. Whether the Implementing Order (establishing the protocol for submission of invoices) constituted a substantial issue of material importance warranting interlocutory review
4. Whether allowing interlocutory appeals of implementing orders would result in duplicative applications and multiple appeals of collateral matters

The Delaware Supreme Court refused the interlocutory appeal. The Court agreed with the Chancellor's analysis on all grounds: (1) J.P. Morgan's first application for certification was untimely, filed three days after the June 22, 2026 deadline, with no good cause shown for extension; (2) the second application concerning the Implementing Order involved a collateral matter that did not resolve a substantial issue of material importance; and (3) allowing interlocutory appeals of implementing orders would improperly permit multiple, duplicative applications and give applicants "two bites of the apple." The Court emphasized that applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and the Chancellor properly exercised that discretion in denying both applications.

This is a post-closing stockholder derivative action challenging a merger in which Bain Capital acquired Envestnet, Inc. for $63.15 per share. Plaintiffs alleged that the board of directors breached fiduciary duties by approving the merger after engaging conflicted financial advisors and failing to conduct an adequate sales process, and that Morgan Stanley aided and abetted those breaches.

1. Whether the Corwin doctrine applies—specifically, whether the merger was approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of disinterested stockholders, which would invoke the business judgment rule and preclude judicial second-guessing of the transaction
2. Whether the proxy statement contained material omissions regarding Morgan Stanley's conflicts with Bain, Paul Weiss's concurrent representations, and the hypothetical value of competing bids
3. Whether the board breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty by acting in bad faith in approving the merger and conducting the sales process
4. Whether Morgan Stanley aided and abetted any breach of fiduciary duty by the directors

The court granted defendants' motions to dismiss in their entirety. First, the court held that Corwin cleansing applied because the merger was approved by 75.3% of disinterested stockholders in a fully informed vote. The proxy adequately disclosed all material information regarding Morgan Stanley's conflicts with Bain (including fees and concurrent engagements), Paul Weiss's representations, and competing bids. The court found that plaintiffs' arguments about omitted details were either immaterial as a matter of law or failed to establish that reasonable stockholders would have considered them important in deciding how to vote. Second, even if Corwin did not apply, the court held that the complaint failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because: (1) an exculpatory charter provision shielded the directors from duty of care claims, leaving only a difficult bad faith standard; (2) plaintiffs failed to allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that the independent directors intentionally withheld material disclosures or acted in bad faith in conducting the sales process; and (3) the board's decision to retain experienced advisors, engage with multiple bidders over several months, and negotiate a premium price was entirely consistent with good faith fiduciary conduct. Third, the aiding and abetting claim against Morgan Stanley failed because plaintiffs did not allege that Morgan Stanley knew the directors were breaching a duty or that Morgan Stanley knowingly participated in any breach; Morgan Stanley fully disclosed its conflicts, had no clear incentive to favor Bain over other bidders with whom it had similar relationships, and took no action without board direction or approval.

This is a condominium dispute case in which a unit owner challenged the homeowners association's enforcement action regarding unauthorized window replacement in his unit. The case involves claims of breach of fiduciary duty, violations of condominium governing documents, and the association's counterclaim for injunctive relief and fees.

1. Whether the plaintiff violated the condominium's code of regulations by installing windows without prior written approval from the council
2. Whether the association breached fiduciary duties owed to unit owners through its enforcement actions and conduct at the annual election meeting
3. Whether the association's property manager owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiff and breached them
4. Whether the plaintiff committed trespass on common elements by installing unauthorized windows
5. Whether the fines imposed on the plaintiff were valid and reasonable under the Delaware Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
6. Whether the association is entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs

The Court of Chancery modified the Magistrate's Final Report as follows:

1. Window Violation: The plaintiff violated the code of regulations by installing windows without written council approval. The association's interpretation requiring prior written approval was reasonable and supported by consistent past practice and the plaintiff's own prior acknowledgment of this requirement. A permanent injunction requiring replacement of the nonconforming windows was properly entered.
2. Fiduciary Duty Claims: The association did not breach fiduciary duties because the association itself does not owe fiduciary duties—only council members do. The council members were not named as defendants, which alone defeats the fiduciary duty claim. Even if properly named, the record does not support findings of breach. The council's conduct at the election (omitting plaintiff's name from proxy forms, using an inspector of elections, and counting ballots) did not interfere with plaintiff's franchise rights, as he received 17.57% of votes and was able to campaign and create his own proxy. The council's enforcement actions were within its business judgment and did not constitute bad faith or gross negligence.
3. Mastriana Claims: The property manager did not owe fiduciary duties to the plaintiff in its arm's-length commercial relationship with the association. The aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy claims fail because no underlying breach of fiduciary duty was established.
4. Trespass Counterclaim: The plaintiff did not commit trespass because he is a tenant in common with ownership rights over the common elements. One tenant in common cannot maintain a trespass action against a co-tenant except under peculiar circumstances. While the plaintiff breached the code of regulations, this does not constitute trespass.
5. Fines: Fines imposed after June 27, 2023 (when plaintiff received notice and an opportunity to be heard) are authorized under the DUCIOA. The association must supplement the record with an affidavit detailing all fines imposed after that date so the court can determine if they are reasonable.
6. Attorneys' Fees: The declaration does not provide for fee-shifting. The council lacked authority to unilaterally adopt a resolution changing the contractual relationship between unit owners regarding fees. Under Section 81-417(a) of the DUCIOA, the court has discretion to award fees in "appropriate cases" where a party acts unreasonably or in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The association must submit an affidavit detailing its court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees for the court's determination of whether this is an appropriate case for fee-shifting.

This is an immigration appeal case in which a Nepalese national seeks review of a removal order after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an immigration judge's denial of his asylum application. The central issue is whether the immigration judge was required to conduct a competency evaluation when the petitioner presented evidence of mental health issues affecting his ability to participate in removal proceedings.

1. Whether the record contained sufficient "indicia of incompetency" requiring the immigration judge to conduct a competency inquiry under the BIA's precedent in Matter of M-A-M-
2. Whether a mental health evaluation report stating that a noncitizen's "ability to assist his own attorney and the Immigration Court is compromised" constitutes an indicium of incompetency
3. Whether the immigration judge's credibility determination can substitute for a required competency determination
4. Whether representation by counsel eliminates the immigration judge's affirmative duty to inquire into competency when indicia are present

The First Circuit granted the petitioner's petition and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the record compelled a finding that indicia of incompetency were present, requiring the immigration judge to conduct a competency inquiry under Matter of M-A-M-. Specifically, the court found that: (1) the petitioner's history of head trauma resulting in loss of consciousness, (2) his testimony showing confusion and memory issues during the hearing, and (3) a licensed psychologist's report concluding his "ability to assist his own attorney and the Immigration Court is compromised" all constituted indicia of incompetency. The court reasoned that once such indicia are present, the immigration judge has an affirmative duty—regardless of whether counsel raises the issue—to inquire further into competency, make an explicit finding, and articulate reasoning for that finding. The court rejected the government's arguments that the petitioner's positive demeanor, representation by counsel, or the immigration judge's credibility determination could substitute for this required competency analysis. The court emphasized that competency is a distinct and antecedent question from credibility, and that procedural safeguards may apply if incompetency is found.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a state murder conviction on Double Jeopardy grounds and for ineffective assistance of counsel. Stanford Williams was tried three times for a 1993 murder, and the Commonwealth appeals the District Court's grant of habeas relief ordering his release.

1. Whether Williams's third trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause when a mistrial was declared at the second trial
2. Whether the state court's factual finding that Williams (through his counsel) requested the mistrial at the second trial was unreasonable under AEDPA's clear and convincing evidence standard
3. Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise a Double Jeopardy argument at the third trial
4. Whether the mistrial was granted with the defendant's consent or was required by manifest necessity

The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's grant of habeas relief. The court held that: (1) applying AEDPA deference to state court factual findings, Williams presented insufficient clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state court's finding that defense counsel Elash requested a mistrial at the second trial; (2) although the trial transcript was ambiguous regarding what relief Elash sought, ambiguities must be viewed in light supporting the state court's conclusion absent clear and convincing evidence of unreasonableness; (3) the fact that Elash stated he could not continue representing Williams because he would need to testify as a witness, combined with his acknowledgment at the PCRA hearing that he discussed the possibility of a mistrial with the court, reasonably supported the state court's finding that he requested one; and (4) because the Double Jeopardy claim lacked merit, counsel could not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise it. The court emphasized the high deference required under AEDPA and the importance of comity in federal habeas review.

This is a federal appellate case challenging the government's detention and removal proceedings against Dr. Badar Khan Suri, a foreign exchange scholar detained based on his and his wife's social media posts criticizing the Gaza war. The case addresses whether federal district courts have habeas jurisdiction to review constitutional challenges to immigration detention when the government rapidly transfers detainees across multiple states and jurisdictions.

1. Whether the Eastern District of Virginia had habeas jurisdiction over Suri's petition when he was detained outside that district at the time of filing
2. Whether the "unknown custodian exception" and Justice Kennedy's exception from Rumsfeld v. Padilla apply to allow habeas jurisdiction in the district from which the petitioner was removed
3. Whether the district court properly refused to transfer the case to Louisiana or Texas
4. Whether three provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(5)) strip federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas challenges to immigration detention
5. Whether the government's rapid, secretive transfers of Suri across multiple detention centers constituted improper forum-shopping to evade judicial review

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in full, holding that:

1. Habeas Jurisdiction Proper: The Eastern District of Virginia had proper habeas jurisdiction because both the "unknown custodian exception" and Justice Kennedy's exception from Padilla applied. Suri's location and immediate custodian were genuinely unknown to his counsel when the petition was filed, as he was rapidly moved through multiple states without notification, and the government's NTA listed a false Texas address while Suri was actually being flown to Louisiana.
2. No Abuse of Discretion in Refusing Transfer: The district court properly exercised its discretion by refusing to transfer the case to Louisiana or Texas. Virginia was the only logical venue because: (a) Suri was arrested, originally detained, and resided there; (b) forcing him to litigate far from his lawyers and family would meaningfully impair his representation; (c) there was no prejudice to the government in litigating in Virginia; and (d) Suri had strong connections to Virginia but not to Louisiana or Texas.
3. INA Provisions Do Not Strip Jurisdiction: None of the three INA provisions cited by the government divested the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction:
   • Section 1252(g): This provision narrowly bars jurisdiction only over challenges to the government's decision to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." Suri's detention challenge is legally separate from the decision to commence removal proceedings. Detention and removal are governed by different statutory provisions and justified on different grounds. The government routinely initiates removal without detaining individuals. Section 1252(g) does not speak to detention at all.
   • Section 1252(b)(9): This provision applies only to judicial review of final orders of removal. Suri is not seeking review of a removal order but rather challenging his present detention. The statute's plain language and structure limit it to removal proceedings. The court rejected the government's reliance on Jennings v. Rodriguez, finding that case did not comprehensively interpret § 1252(b)(9) and did not abrogate circuit precedent.
   • Section 1252(a)(5): The court found this provision similarly inapplicable to detention challenges independent of removal orders.
4. Reasoning on Jurisdiction-Stripping: The court emphasized that: (a) there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action; (b) Congress explicitly stated it did not intend to preclude habeas review over detention challenges independent of removal orders; (c) the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected attempts to use removal-focused provisions to foreclose detention challenges; (d) allowing the government's interpretation would render detention claims "effectively unreviewable" and would be "absurd"; (e) immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals lack jurisdiction to decide constitutional claims, so if district courts cannot hear them, they would be entirely foreclosed; and (f) Suri's due process and First Amendment retaliation claims are independent of his removability and arise from the government's decision to detain him, not its decision to seek removal.
5. Factual Findings on Government Conduct: The court adopted the district court's uncontested factual findings that the government deliberately engaged in forum-shopping and rapid transfers to make it difficult for counsel to file a habeas petition. The government's stated reason (bedspace concerns) was contradicted by evidence that Suri was transferred to facilities with worse conditions. The government's NTA listed a false Texas address as Suri's residence to manipulate which immigration court would have jurisdiction, despite knowing Suri was not in Texas when the NTA was issued.
6. All Writs Act: The district court properly invoked the All Writs Act to preserve its jurisdiction by prohibiting Suri's removal pending resolution of his habeas petition.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Trayvon Murphy challenges his sentencing on multiple counts including firearms conspiracy, drug trafficking conspiracy, and Hobbs Act robbery. Murphy appeals the district court's application of sentencing guidelines, particularly the use of a first-degree murder cross-reference that dramatically increased his sentence.

1. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding Murphy aided and abetted a murder based on co-defendant Alexander's testimony
2. Whether the district court clearly erred in calculating Murphy's heroin quantity at 100 grams
3. Whether Murphy was entitled to a mitigating role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2
4. Whether the first-degree murder cross-reference under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(B) properly applied when the specific .223 rifle used in the murder was not cited in the offense of conviction
5. Whether a heightened burden of proof should apply at sentencing when a cross-reference dramatically increases the Guidelines range

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's findings regarding Murphy's involvement in the murder, the drug quantity calculation, and the denial of a mitigating role adjustment. However, the court reversed the application of the first-degree murder cross-reference and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the cross-reference under § 2K2.1(c)(1)(B) requires that the specific firearm used in the related offense must be "cited in the offense of conviction"—meaning it must be identified in the charging instrument (indictment or information). The court reasoned that "offense of conviction" is narrower than "offense" and excludes relevant conduct. Since Murphy's superseding indictment did not specifically identify the .223 rifle used in Gooden's murder, the cross-reference was inapplicable, even though Alexander's credible testimony established Murphy's involvement. The court rejected the government's argument that sentencing courts may rely on additional factfinding beyond the charging document. The court also rejected Murphy's argument for a heightened burden of proof, holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies at sentencing regardless of the magnitude of sentence increase.

This is a criminal appeal challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms. Talanzo Debrow appeals his conviction for firearm possession by a convicted felon, arguing that the statute violates the Second Amendment as applied to him based on his predicate conviction for aggravated criminal damage to property.

1. Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant whose sole disqualifying conviction is for aggravated criminal damage to property under Louisiana law
2. Whether the government must demonstrate a historical tradition supporting permanent disarmament of persons with criminal histories analogous to the defendant's predicate offense, as required by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen
3. Whether courts may look beyond a defendant's predicate conviction to assess underlying conduct and dangerousness when evaluating as-applied Second Amendment challenges
4. Whether going-armed laws provide a valid historical analogue to justify disarming someone convicted of a property crime with a foreseeability element

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying Debrow's motion to dismiss and remanded for reconsideration. The majority held that the government failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a historical tradition supporting permanent disarmament of persons with criminal histories analogous to Debrow's. The court rejected the government's approach of looking beyond the predicate conviction to underlying facts, finding this would violate due process by failing to provide adequate notice to defendants. The court also found that going-armed laws cannot be stretched to cover property crimes requiring only foreseeability of harm, as this would constitute an improper expansion of historical precedent. The court emphasized that the government bears a "heavy burden" under Bruen to establish historical justification, which it failed to meet with minimal discussion. Judge Haynes dissented, arguing that the predicate felony itself—requiring proof that human life might be endangered—demonstrates a clear threat of violence sufficient to justify disarmament under historical going-armed laws.

This is a Title VII employment discrimination case in which Debra Pratt, an HR manager at Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry (WAF), sued for sex discrimination, pay discrimination, and retaliation after being terminated. Pratt alleged she was fired in retaliation for reporting complaints of harassment and discrimination at the company.

1. Whether Pratt presented sufficient evidence of sex discrimination under Title VII to survive summary judgment, including whether evidence of a discriminatory workplace culture and sexist comments by non-decisionmakers can support a discrimination claim
2. Whether Pratt engaged in protected activity by reporting harassment and discrimination, and whether there was a causal connection between her protected activity and her termination for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim
3. Whether Pratt established a valid pay discrimination claim by identifying a similarly situated male comparator who was paid more
4. Whether the district court properly applied summary judgment standards in discrimination cases and whether it improperly resolved factual disputes about the employer's motives

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Pratt's sex discrimination and retaliation claims, finding that a reasonable jury could find in her favor on both claims. The court affirmed summary judgment on the pay discrimination claim.

Reasoning on Sex Discrimination: The court held that viewing all evidence holistically and in the light most favorable to Pratt, a reasonable jury could infer sex discrimination based on three categories of circumstantial evidence: (1) ambiguous or suggestive comments and conduct reflecting a sexist workplace culture where women were treated as secretaries and subjected to sexually degrading epithets, and where the decision-maker (Jacobs) failed to address these complaints; (2) dishonest employer justifications for termination, including that Pratt was the only woman reviewed in the Utech report but the only one punished despite receiving similar negative feedback as male managers who received bonuses; and (3) better treatment of similarly situated male employees (Boyd and Behnke) who received negative feedback but were not disciplined or fired. The court rejected the notion that evidence of workplace culture and non-decisionmakers' conduct cannot be considered, emphasizing that Title VII requires examining whether a statutorily proscribed factor caused the discharge, and that circumstantial evidence is sufficient.

Reasoning on Retaliation: The court found that Pratt engaged in protected activity by reporting conduct she reasonably and honestly believed was prohibited by Title VII, including sexual harassment, race discrimination, and sex discrimination. The court rejected the district court's heightened standard requiring HR employees to show "personal" opposition or "active support" of other employees' rights. The court found a sufficient causal connection between Pratt's protected activity and her termination based on suspicious timing (fired one week after complaining about retaliation in March 2019, and three months after raising retaliation concerns in December 2018), combined with evidence of pretext in WAF's stated reasons for termination.

Reasoning on Pay Discrimination: The court affirmed summary judgment on the pay discrimination claim, finding the record too undeveloped to determine whether Emery Coonen was a sufficiently similar comparator to Pratt. The court noted that neither party provided evidence regarding similar workplace standards, qualifications, or credentials, particularly regarding environmental health and safety experience.

This is an appeal of a federal firearms conviction where the defendant challenges the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement based on a prior state sexual battery conviction. The defendant argues that his Indiana sexual battery conviction should not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

1. Whether Indiana Code § 35-42-4-8(a)(2) (sexual battery involving nonconsensual touching when the victim is unaware) constitutes a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)
2. Whether the offense qualifies as a "forcible sex offense" as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)
3. The proper definition of "forcible sex offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines when the Guidelines do not provide an explicit definition
4. Whether the categorical approach to evaluating prior convictions was properly applied

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing enhancement. The court held that Indiana's sexual battery statute, specifically subsection (a)(2), constitutes a "forcible sex offense" and therefore a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines. The court reasoned that: (1) "forcible" under § 4B1.2(e)(1) means nonconsensual sexual conduct; (2) the ordinary meaning of "sex offense" refers to criminal offenses involving unlawful sexual conduct; (3) Indiana's sexual battery statute, which prohibits touching of intimate body parts when the victim is unaware, necessarily involves nonconsensual conduct since an unaware person cannot provide valid consent; and (4) this interpretation aligns with sister circuit precedent interpreting identical language in other Guidelines provisions. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the Guidelines definition should be limited by reference to federal child sexual abuse statutes, finding that such a limitation would contradict the Sentencing Commission's stated intent.

This is an Eighth Amendment civil rights case brought by an incarcerated individual with paranoid schizophrenia against a prison psychiatrist and deputy warden for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical and safety needs. The plaintiff suffered severe self-inflicted injuries after receiving emergency psychotropic medication without adequate follow-up care and while under suicide watch with inadequate monitoring.

1. Whether a psychiatrist violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide post-medication assessment and follow-up care after administering emergency psychotropic medication to an inmate in psychiatric crisis.
2. Whether a deputy warden violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to enforce a two-hour shift policy for suicide watch companions despite knowledge of systematic noncompliance with the policy.
3. Whether the defendants' alleged deliberate indifference actually caused the plaintiff's injuries, including the causation requirement and the doctrine of superseding cause.

The court affirmed summary judgment for both defendants. As to Dr. Rippetoe, the court held that while failure to follow post-medication monitoring procedures may constitute negligence, the plaintiff failed to present evidence that "no minimally competent" physician would have acted as Dr. Rippetoe did, which is the standard required to prove deliberate indifference. The court noted that failure to follow "best practices" is insufficient. As to Deputy Warden Pretorius, although the court found evidence that she knew of systematic noncompliance with the two-hour suicide companion policy, summary judgment was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to establish proximate causation. The court determined that the suicide companion's (Fox's) refusal to stand while on duty constituted a superseding intervening cause that severed any liability on the part of Deputy Warden Pretorius, as Fox would have been able to observe the plaintiff's self-harm within two hours of starting his shift had he simply stood as instructed.

This is an immigration law case involving a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision regarding whether a state felony conviction for fourth-degree assault constitutes a deportable "crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment" under federal immigration law. Roberto Diaz-Boyzo, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of assaulting his wife in the immediate presence of their minor children.

1. Whether Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.160(3)(c) is divisible despite being overbroad with respect to the federal offense definition
2. Whether a conviction for fourth-degree assault committed in the immediate presence of a minor child matches the federal definition of "a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)
3. Whether the statute requires sufficient mens rea (mental state) to constitute child endangerment

The court denied the petition for review and affirmed the BIA's decision that Diaz-Boyzo is removable. The court held that: (1) Oregon's fourth-degree assault statute is divisible because it lists alternative aggravating factors that constitute separate elements the jury must unanimously find; (2) using the modified categorical approach, Diaz-Boyzo's conviction under § 163.160(3)(c) matches the federal definition of child abuse because committing an assault in the immediate presence of a child places the child in real danger of bodily or mental harm; and (3) the statute satisfies the required mens rea of at least criminal negligence through Oregon's general culpability statute, which imputes a minimum culpable mental state to elements lacking an express mens rea requirement.

This is a criminal appeal involving Fourth Amendment warrantless search protections for a state early-release supervisee. The government appealed the district court's suppression of drugs and ammunition found during searches of a trailer and pickup truck, arguing the searches were valid under the parolee exception to the warrant requirement.

1. Whether officers had probable cause to believe that Binisio Nicolas Pereda resided in or controlled a trailer located near his girlfriend's parents' home, where the search was authorized under his post-release supervision conditions permitting warrantless searches of his "residence" or "property under [his] control"
2. Whether officers had probable cause to believe Pereda owned or controlled a white Ford F-150 pickup truck parked next to the trailer
3. The proper standard for determining probable cause in parolee residence searches and whether the Howard factors from United States v. Howard constitute binding requirements or merely guiding principles
4. Whether a trailer that functions as a residence can be searched under the "property under control" provision when probable cause as to residence has not been established

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's suppression order and held that the searches were constitutional. The majority opinion, written by Judge Bumatay, concluded:

1. Trailer as Residence: Officers had probable cause to believe Pereda resided in the trailer based on the totality of circumstances, including: (1) GPS data showing Pereda consistently stayed at the Goleta address for three months, including overnight; (2) prior probation officer home visits at the Goleta address; (3) the girlfriend's mother stating Pereda was "in the trailer"; (4) physical observations showing the trailer had residential characteristics (extension cord connection, propped on stilts); and (5) Pereda's voice heard from inside and his exit with his partially clothed girlfriend. The court rejected the district court's "divide-and-conquer" analysis that isolated individual facts and emphasized that probable cause requires only a "fair probability" based on totality of circumstances, not metaphysical certainty.
2. Trailer as Property Under Control: Alternatively, the trailer search was valid as a search of property under Pereda's control because: (1) the trailer qualifies as a vehicle under California law despite being stationary; (2) Pereda exhibited a sufficiently strong connection to the trailer through three months of presence there, including overnight stays, hearing his voice inside, and watching him exit with his girlfriend—stronger evidence than required by precedent.
3. Pickup Truck: Officers had probable cause to believe Pereda owned or controlled the white Ford F-150 based on: (1) Detective Amjadi's prior observations of Pereda driving a similar truck approximately five times, including on the same street; (2) knowledge that Pereda had a Ford F-150 registered to him; (3) the truck's proximity directly in front of the trailer's door; and (4) observing Pereda exit the trailer. The court rejected the argument that additional investigative steps (license plate check, registration verification, asking whose truck it was) were required.
4. Probable Cause Standard: The majority held that probable cause in parolee cases applies the same well-established standard used throughout criminal law—a totality of circumstances test requiring only a "fair probability" that would lead a reasonable and prudent person to act. The Howard factors from United States v. Howard are merely guiding patterns, not binding checklist requirements. Courts cannot use a "divide-and-conquer" analysis examining facts in isolation but must consider the "whole picture."

This is an appeal concerning the scope of immunity provided by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act for COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers. The plaintiff, who suffered injuries from an experimental AstraZeneca vaccine during a clinical trial, sued for breach of contract after the company refused to provide promised compensation and medical care, and the central issue is whether PREP Act immunity extends to contract-based claims or only tort claims.

1. Whether the Tenth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of a district court's denial of PREP Act immunity under the collateral-order doctrine
2. Whether the PREP Act's immunity provision, which shields covered persons from "all claims for loss," extends to breach-of-contract claims or only tort claims
3. Whether the statutory definition of "loss" is limited to tort-based injuries or encompasses all types of losses regardless of the legal theory
4. Whether the causation requirement in the PREP Act is satisfied when a vaccine injury is a but-for cause of damages sought in a breach-of-contract claim
5. Whether AstraZeneca waived its PREP Act immunity through promises made in the informed-consent form

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the PREP Act provides immunity from breach-of-contract claims. The court's reasoning includes:

1. Jurisdiction: The court has jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine because the PREP Act contains a rare statutory provision explicitly granting immunity from suit, which Congress recognized as sufficiently important to justify immediate interlocutory appeal.
2. Plain Language: The PREP Act's text immunizes "all claims for loss" without distinguishing between tort and contract claims. The statute defines "loss" as "any type of loss," which courts interpret expansively. The immunity is limited only by the causation requirement, not by the type of legal claim.
3. Rejection of Canons: The court rejected Dressen's arguments based on ejusdem generis, expressio unius, noscitur a sociis, presumption against surplusage, and structural arguments, finding they were misapplied or did not overcome the plain language of the statute.
4. Legislative Comparison: Congress knew how to exclude contract claims from immunity (as it did in the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act passed two months earlier) but chose not to do so in the PREP Act.
5. Absurdity: It is not absurd to extend immunity to contract claims given the PREP Act's purpose of encouraging development of medical countermeasures during public health emergencies by protecting manufacturers from financial ruin through litigation.
6. Constitutional Avoidance: The constitutional-avoidance doctrine does not apply because the statute is unambiguous, and extending immunity to contract claims does not raise a substantial Taking Clause violation because Congress has the power to limit liability and adjust economic burdens.
7. Causation: The vaccine administration satisfies the but-for causation requirement because Dressen would have no claim for breach of contract absent the vaccine-related injuries, even though the breach of promise is also a but-for cause. Multiple but-for causes can exist simultaneously.
8. Waiver: The court remanded to the district court to determine whether PREP Act immunity can be waived and whether AstraZeneca waived it through the promises in the informed-consent form.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction in a case brought under the Helms-Burton Act by U.S. nationals claiming that foreign defendants trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government. The plaintiffs sought to hold two British corporations—Imperial Brands and WPP—liable for marketing Cuban cigars produced at a confiscated tobacco factory.

1. Whether the Helms-Burton Act expressly or impliedly authorizes personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(C)
2. Whether personal jurisdiction exists over the defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, which held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment's minimum contacts standard
3. What constitutional standard governs the exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal courts over foreign defendants under the Fifth Amendment
4. Whether subjecting the defendants to jurisdiction would be reasonable under the Fifth Amendment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that: (1) the Helms-Burton Act does not expressly or impliedly authorize personal jurisdiction, so Rule 4(k)(1)(C) does not apply; and (2) under Rule 4(k)(2), while the Fifth Amendment permits a more flexible jurisdictional inquiry than the Fourteenth Amendment, it still imposes a "reasonableness" requirement. Applying a reasonableness test based on three factors—burden on the defendant, interests of the forum state, and plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief—the court concluded that subjecting WPP and Imperial to jurisdiction would be unreasonable because: (a) the Helms-Burton Act provided neither company with clear notice they could be sued in U.S. courts; (b) neither company engaged in conduct related to the trafficking claims that had a meaningful relationship to the United States; (c) neither company had significant presence in the United States; and (d) U.K. law prohibited these companies from complying with or defending against Helms-Burton Act claims without government authorization.

This is a civil rights case in which the estate of Raymond Marshall Carrin, who died from Hepatitis C complications while in federal custody, sued federal prison officials for allegedly violating his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate medical treatment. The case addresses whether a Bivens implied cause of action for damages is available against federal officials in the prison medical care context.

1. Whether Carrin's Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims arise in a "new context" that is meaningfully different from the three recognized Bivens cases (Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, Davis v. Passman, and Carlson v. Green)
2. Whether "special factors" counsel against expanding the Bivens remedy to Carrin's claims, specifically whether the existence of the Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) serves as an alternative remedial structure that precludes a Bivens action
3. Whether the estate's inability to access the ARP after Carrin's death should affect the analysis of whether the ARP constitutes a special factor

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Carrin's complaint. The court held that: (1) Carrin's Fifth Amendment claims present a new Bivens context because they involve a different constitutional right than the three recognized Bivens cases; (2) Carrin's Eighth Amendment claims also arise in a new context because they involve a disease progressing over one year requiring multiple emergency visits and long-term treatment, distinguishable from Carlson's single-day acute medical emergency; (3) at the second step of the Bivens analysis, the existence of the ARP—a congressionally authorized alternative remedial structure—constitutes a special factor that counsels against expanding Bivens remedies, regardless of whether the ARP is as effective as a Bivens remedy or whether the estate can access it after Carrin's death; and (4) because Carrin had over a year to pursue the ARP but did not do so, the ARP provides sufficient reason to deny the Bivens remedy. The court emphasized that under current Supreme Court precedent, the mere existence of any alternative remedy believed by Congress or the Executive to be sufficient to address the alleged harm is enough to preclude a Bivens action, and courts cannot second-guess the adequacy or effectiveness of such alternatives.

This is an appeal from a Court of Chancery decision involving a property dispute between two sets of parties concerning an easement over real property. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's judgment regarding the width and scope of an express easement.

The primary legal issue addressed is the width and extent of an express easement over Lot 5, specifically whether a portion of a "jughandle" (likely a reference to a road or access feature) falls within the boundaries of the express easement.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment in its entirety. The Court determined that the width of the express easement over Lot 5 is 25.04 feet, and that the portion of the jughandle falling within those 25.04 feet is included in the express easement. The Court found the lower court's Post-Trial Memorandum Opinion and Final Order to be well-reasoned and supported by the trial evidence.

This is a breach of contract case involving a Restrictive Covenant Agreement between Regal Rexnord Corporation and WEG Electric Corporation regarding the use of the MARATHON trademark. Regal seeks leave to file a motion for partial summary judgment, alleging that WEG breached the agreement by rebranding products in violation of trademark use restrictions.

1. Whether WEG breached Section 2.2 of the Restrictive Covenant Agreement by using the MARATHON trademark in the promotion, marketing, or sale of products other than those specifically sold under the trademark as of the closing date
2. Whether summary judgment is appropriate before discovery has concluded on disputed factual issues regarding product rebranding and the scope of the agreement's coverage
3. Whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant leave to file a summary judgment motion when doing so would not conserve litigant and judicial resources

The court denied Regal's request for leave to file a motion for partial summary judgment. The court reasoned that summary judgment is discretionary and should not be granted where there are triable issues of fact or where a more thorough exploration of the facts is needed to properly apply the law. Here, the parties dispute factual issues regarding whether products were previously branded and whether the agreement covered the allegedly rebranded products. Additionally, discovery has not yet concluded. The court determined that deploying summary judgment resources in this case would not conserve litigant or judicial resources, as the motion would require extensive judicial effort to resolve disputed factual matters that would be better developed through continued discovery and trial.

This is a post-trial decision in a Delaware Chancery Court case involving a dispute between co-founders of Destiny XYZ Inc., a Delaware corporation providing public market access to private technology companies. The controlling shareholder executed a reverse-forward stock split to cash out his co-founder's substantial minority equity interest, and the co-founder sued for breach of fiduciary duty and violation of Delaware law regarding fair value payment.

1. Whether the controlling shareholder (Prasad) breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to the minority shareholder (Ramadurgam) by approving a reverse-forward stock split that cashed out the minority shareholder's equity
2. Whether the two newly-appointed directors (Kumar and Licona) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the transaction without adequate inquiry or deliberation
3. Whether the transaction satisfied the "entire fairness" standard of review, requiring defendants to prove both fair dealing and fair price
4. Whether the company violated Delaware Code Section 155 by failing to pay fair value for the cashed-out fractional interests

The court found that defendants failed to carry their burden of proving entire fairness. The transaction was neither the product of fair dealing nor fair price. Regarding fair dealing, the court found that: (1) Prasad initiated and timed the transaction solely to eliminate his co-founder before Tech100's public listing could provide market evidence of value; (2) there was no negotiation—Prasad leveraged his control position to eliminate Ramadurgam as retribution for proposing independent directors; (3) the reverse-forward stock split structure was designed to avoid stockholder notice obligations and appraisal rights; (4) disclosure was grossly inadequate, with no agenda provided and the 69-page valuation report given only 15 minutes of review; and (5) Kumar and Licona were appointed three days before the meeting and approved the transaction without asking any meaningful questions, serving as "rubber stamps" for Prasad's predetermined scheme. Regarding fair price, the court found that the HCA valuation report was unreliable because: (1) it was prepared for Prasad's personal counsel, not the company, creating a conflict of interest; (2) HCA relied entirely on information supplied by Prasad, who had the strongest incentive to support the lowest valuation; (3) HCA's treatment of Tech100 shares improperly excluded the promotional value of the share giveaway program and applied an unjustified 15% discount to NAV despite Destiny's business thesis that Tech100 would trade at a premium; (4) HCA's treatment of SAFEs as dollar-for-dollar debt claims was improper, leaving minimal value for Destiny's asset management business and prospects; and (5) HCA's removal of a 20% control premium from its valuation schedule after meeting with Prasad and his counsel appeared to be a change made to benefit the controller. The court concluded that Prasad breached his duty of loyalty as a controlling shareholder, and Kumar and Licona breached their fiduciary duties as directors by consciously disregarding their responsibilities and acting in bad faith. The court ordered a restitutionary remedy restoring the plaintiff and controller to their respective proportionate equity positions prior to the disloyal conduct, and imposed fee-shifting under the bad faith exception to the American Rule due to the defendants' egregious pre-litigation conduct.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving three high-ranking members of the Almighty Vice Lord Nation (AVLN) gang who were convicted of racketeering conspiracy, drug trafficking conspiracies, and related offenses following a four-week trial. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, raising multiple constitutional and evidentiary challenges.

1. Whether evidence obtained through Title III wiretaps satisfied the statutory necessity requirement
2. Whether Facebook search warrants were unconstitutionally overbroad under the Fourth Amendment
3. Whether a cell phone search warrant lacked proper temporal limitations
4. Whether surreptitious recordings of statements in police vans violated Fourth Amendment rights
5. Whether a prison mail policy violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
6. Whether limitations on cross-examination of a confidential informant violated the Confrontation Clause
7. Whether sufficient evidence supported convictions for drug conspiracy and RICO conspiracy
8. Whether the sentencing court properly applied a dangerous weapon enhancement in light of an acquittal on the related firearms charge

The court affirmed all convictions but vacated Fordham's sentence and remanded for resentencing. Specifically:

1. Wiretap Evidence: The Murff wiretap application satisfied Title III's necessity requirement because the investigation was not an initial step, traditional techniques proved inadequate given the AVLN's code of silence and compartmentalized structure, and the application provided case-specific support. Fordham and Reid forfeited challenges to other wiretaps by failing to raise them with sufficient specificity in their pretrial motions.
2. Facebook Warrants: The two-step Facebook search warrants were not unconstitutionally overbroad because the defendants failed to identify any trial evidence that fell outside the temporal and subject-matter limitations imposed at step two of the warrants, thus suffering no prejudice.
3. Cell Phone Search: Reid's cell phone search warrant was not overbroad because courts may authorize seizure of electronic devices for off-site forensic search when probable cause exists, given the difficulty of knowing ex ante where relevant evidence may be stored.
4. Van Statements: Reid forfeited his Fourth Amendment challenge to the surreptitious recordings by failing to file a pretrial suppression motion, and the court declined to review the fact-intensive privacy expectation issue on plain error review.
5. Prison Mail Policy: Murff's Sixth Amendment challenge to the mail policy failed because he did not show an actual intrusion into his attorney-client relationship—only potential intrusions he sought to avoid. The policy itself prohibited officers from reading legal mail.
6. Confrontation Clause: The district court's limitation on Fordham's cross-examination of the confidential informant regarding pre-2013 convictions did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the jury had sufficient evidence about the informant's criminal history, incentives to cooperate, and bias through other testimony and evidence.
7. Sufficiency of Evidence for Drug Conspiracy: Sufficient evidence supported Fordham's conviction because testimony established an agreement to distribute drugs through the AVLN's organizational structure, with family discounts, shared suppliers, and coordinated shipments, plus evidence of Fordham's leadership role and four direct drug sales to a confidential informant.
8. Sufficiency of Evidence for RICO Conspiracy: Sufficient evidence supported the RICO conspiracy conviction based on Fordham's status as Supreme Elite of Michigan, his involvement in the AVLN's drug trafficking, and numerous predicate acts by AVLN members.
9. Sentencing: The court vacated Fordham's sentence and remanded for resentencing because the district court failed to adequately address Fordham's non-frivolous written objection to the dangerous weapon enhancement under the newly effective acquitted-conduct amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court must reconsider whether the firearms enhancement applies given Fordham's acquittal on the firearm possession charge.

This is a takings clause challenge to Chicago's Keep Chicago Renting Ordinance, which requires new owners of foreclosed rental properties to negotiate in good faith with existing tenants and pay a $10,600 relocation assistance fee if tenants decline to renew their leases. BBLI Edison, which acquired a foreclosed building, argues the ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation.

1. Whether the relocation assistance fee requirement constitutes a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
2. Whether the ordinance constitutes a regulatory taking that overbundens the owner's use of the property under the Penn Central balancing test
3. Whether the ordinance violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by conditioning a benefit on the surrender of property rights

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the ordinance does not violate the Takings Clause on any theory. First, the court found no per se physical taking because the ordinance regulates the landlord-tenant relationship, which states have broad authority to regulate without triggering takings liability. The relocation fee is analogous to permissible rent control regulations that transfer wealth without constituting physical takings. Second, under the Penn Central regulatory takings test, all three factors favored Chicago: BBLI failed to allege economic infeasibility; BBLI acquired the property after the ordinance was enacted, so it could not claim interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations; and the ordinance regulates a relationship over which government has broad regulatory power. Third, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not apply because the ordinance directly mandates a fee rather than conditioning a permit or benefit, and even if applied, the city's interest in keeping residents housed provided an essential nexus and the fee bore rough proportionality to that interest.

This is an immigration case concerning whether a noncitizen's child who turns 21 during the pendency of the parent's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals can still qualify as a "child" for purposes of cancellation of removal eligibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

1. Whether a child's age for purposes of determining "qualifying relative" status under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) should be fixed as of the immigration judge's decision date or assessed on a continuing basis through the agency's final adjudication
2. Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that the petitioner failed to establish "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his remaining qualifying relatives was supported by substantial evidence
3. Whether the petitioner's due process rights were violated by the BIA's three-year delay in deciding his appeal

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that: (1) Under § 1229b(b)(1)(D), qualifying relatives must be assessed on a "continuing basis," meaning eligibility depends on the facts existing at the time of the agency's final adjudication. If no appeal is taken, the immigration judge's decision is final; if an appeal is taken, the BIA's decision is final. Therefore, a child who turns 21 during the pendency of an appeal to the BIA ceases to be a qualifying relative and cannot support the parent's eligibility for cancellation of removal. The court reasoned that the statute's conditional language ("would result") requires prediction based on the most current information available at the time of decision, consistent with ordinary understanding of how predictions should be made. The court also noted that Congress expressly fixed ages in other provisions (such as the Child Status Protection Act) when it wanted to protect against aging out, and its failure to do so here was intentional. (2) Substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination that the petitioner's removal would not cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his remaining qualifying relatives, as the record showed his family members were employed, could maintain relationships through visits, and his mother's medical care would not be meaningfully impaired. (3) The due process claim was foreclosed by prior precedent requiring "very unusual circumstances" to establish a procedural due process violation based on agency delay.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving charges of producing child sexual abuse material. Gray Edward Rivera was convicted of two counts of producing sexually explicit conduct of a minor and one count of attempted production, based on evidence that he hid cameras in his girlfriend's minor daughter's bedroom to secretly record her undressing.

1. Whether testimony from another victim (G.V.O.) regarding a prior incident of sexual abuse was so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial, despite going beyond what was disclosed in the government's notice of similar-act evidence.
2. Whether G.V.O.'s entire testimony should have been struck as unreliable and uncorroborated.
3. Whether the recorded images constituted "sexually explicit conduct" under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8), or merely depicted innocent nudity during the process of changing clothes.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Rivera's convictions on all counts. The court held:

1. Mistrial Denial Proper: G.V.O.'s testimony, even the portion that exceeded the government's notice, did not substantially prejudice the trial outcome. The strong independent evidence of guilt (hidden cameras, recordings, curated explicit images), combined with three curative jury instructions, adequately mitigated any prejudice. The improper testimony was "spontaneous and singular" and incremental to other properly admitted inflammatory evidence.
2. Testimony Not Properly Stricken Entirely: Similar-act evidence under Rules 404(b) and 414 does not require corroboration. G.V.O.'s inconsistencies reflected trauma and language barriers rather than willful perjury. The stricken line of testimony merely built upon uncontested allegations rather than contradicting them.
3. Sufficient Evidence of "Sexually Explicit Conduct": Following precedent in United States v. Holmes, the court held that "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" can be established by examining the intent and actions of the producer, not whether the child's conduct was inherently sexual. The court found sufficient evidence based on: (1) placement of cameras in the bedroom where undressing was likely; (2) positioning toward the dresser containing undergarments; (3) extensive curation and retention of explicit still frames and video footage; and (4) evidence of remote camera manipulation. The images need not depict a sexual act to constitute "sexually explicit conduct."

This is an appeal by Summit Healthcare Operating Partnership, L.P. from a judgment entered by the Delaware Court of Chancery in a dispute with Best Years, LLC. The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the lower court's decision on appeal.

The opinion does not specify the particular legal issues addressed, as the court affirmed the lower court's judgment based on its prior Post-Trial Rulings and Final Order without detailing the substantive claims or defenses at issue.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The court found the lower court's decision to be correct based on the reasoning set forth in the Post-Trial Rulings dated April 10, 2026, and the Final Order and Judgment dated May 6, 2026, without providing additional analysis or commentary in this appellate order.

This is an appeal of a dismissal in a Second Amendment and constitutional challenge to Massachusetts's 2024 assault weapons ban. Gino Mario Recchia, III, and his gun store, Mass Armament, LLC, challenged provisions of the law as facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, dormant Commerce Clause, and Equal Protection Clause.

1. Whether Massachusetts's prohibition on the sale, possession, and transfer of "assault-style firearms" violates the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
2. Whether the law violates the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce
3. Whether the law violates the Equal Protection Clause by treating in-state firearms dealers differently than out-of-state sellers

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. On the Second Amendment claim, the court was bound by its prior decision in Capen v. Campbell, which upheld the predecessor assault weapons ban as consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court rejected Recchia's argument that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to possess military-equivalent weapons, citing District of Columbia v. Heller. On the dormant Commerce Clause claim, the court held that Recchia failed to allege discrimination favoring in-state manufacturers or a substantial burden on interstate commerce; a state may exercise sovereign authority to exclude articles it deems prejudicial to its citizens' interests. On the Equal Protection claim, the court applied rational basis review and held that states may reach different conclusions about permissible firearms sales within their jurisdiction without violating equal protection, and that the right to earn a living is not a fundamental right.

This is an appeal of a class certification order in a RICO pharmaceutical fraud case brought by third-party payors (TPPs) against GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) for misrepresenting the cardiovascular risks and benefits of the diabetes drug Avandia. The TPPs claim GSK's fraud caused physicians to prescribe more Avandia than cheaper alternatives, resulting in increased reimbursement costs for the TPPs.

1. Whether a motions panel may limit the scope of review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) in class certification appeals
2. Whether the proposed class is ascertainable—specifically, whether there is sufficient evidence to identify which TPPs reimbursed members for Avandia
3. Whether common issues predominate on the causation element of the RICO claim, particularly whether TPPs can prove causation through statistical evidence rather than individual reliance proof
4. What type and rigor of statistical evidence is required to prove causation (as opposed to mere correlation) in pharmaceutical fraud RICO class actions

1. Scope of Review: The court held that under Rule 23(f), a motions panel may limit the scope of appellate review to selected issues, analogous to the discretion available under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
2. Ascertainability: The court affirmed that the proposed class is ascertainable. The District Court properly found that class membership can be determined through a combination of objective records (drug purchase records, pharmaceutical databases) and verified affidavits from potential members, which does not constitute impermissible "say-so" or create mini-trials.
3. Predominance on Causation: The court vacated the District Court's class certification, holding that the Plans have not yet satisfied the predominance requirement on causation. The court rejected the District Court's reasoning in two respects:
   • The court held that evidence of a common scheme to defraud alone does not warrant an inference of class-wide reliance. Such an inference is only appropriate in narrow circumstances—specifically when the decision at issue is essentially one-dimensional and the alleged misrepresentation would be "essentially determinative" for each class member. Prescribing decisions are multifactorial and thus do not meet this standard.
   • The court found that GSK's internal marketing studies cannot serve as adequate statistical evidence because they do not isolate the causal effect of GSK's allegedly fraudulent cardiovascular messaging from its marketing generally.
   • The court rejected the Plans' alternative theory based on the post-Nissen study decline in prescriptions, finding that evidence of correlation (prescriptions fell after the truth was exposed) is insufficient to prove causation without rigorous statistical analysis.
4. Standard for Statistical Evidence of Causation: The court held that TPPs in pharmaceutical fraud RICO actions may prove but-for causation through class-wide statistical evidence, but only if that evidence is sufficiently rigorous to distinguish causation from correlation. The court aligned with the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits in holding that statistical evidence such as a regression analysis—which can isolate the causal significance of the defendant's conduct and rule out competing explanations—may satisfy the predominance requirement. However, mere correlation, even when combined with circumstantial evidence, is insufficient. The Plans' current evidence does not meet this standard because they lack a valid regression analysis or comparable statistical method to prove causation.
5. Remand: The court vacated the class certification and remanded to the District Court to: (1) resolve all disputes relevant to class certification that it had not fully addressed, particularly whether GSK's internal marketing studies can isolate the effects of fraudulent marketing; and (2) consider whether other evidence, such as the McGuire report or additional discovery, might satisfy the causation standard under the clarified legal framework.

This is an appeal of a Title IX sex discrimination claim and state-law contract claims brought by a male Princeton University student who was suspended for two years following disciplinary proceedings for alleged physical assault against two female students. The student challenges the District Court's dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim.

1. Whether the student stated a plausible Title IX claim for sex discrimination by alleging both background indicia of sex discrimination (institutional pressure to favor female complainants) and circumstantial evidence of bias in his specific disciplinary proceedings
2. Whether the student stated a plausible breach-of-contract claim by alleging Princeton failed to follow its own established procedures requiring proof by "clear and persuasive" evidence and fundamentally fair procedures
3. Whether the student stated a plausible claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by alleging Princeton conducted an unfair investigation and hearing with evasive and arbitrary conduct
4. Whether procedural irregularities in disciplinary proceedings, including imbalanced investigations, gender-based credibility determinations, and decisions against the weight of evidence, can support an inference of sex discrimination

The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal and remanded all three claims for further proceedings. The court held that the student's allegations were sufficient to state plausible claims under the "total mix of information" standard established in prior precedent.

Reasoning:

1. Title IX Claim: The court found the student adequately alleged both background indicia of sex discrimination (internal and external pressure on Princeton to rigorously pursue male-against-female assault allegations) and circumstantial evidence of bias in his specific proceeding (imbalanced investigation and hearing, gender-based credibility determinations, prejudgment by decision-makers, and a decision against the weight of evidence). The court rejected Princeton's argument that the student failed to specifically tie the alleged bias to gender, holding that at the motion to dismiss stage, alternative explanations for the procedural irregularities are not fatal to the claim.
2. Breach of Contract Claim: The court held that under New Jersey law, universities must follow their own established procedures and ensure those procedures are fundamentally fair. The student adequately alleged that Princeton failed to apply its own "clear and persuasive" evidence standard by: (1) disregarding exculpatory evidence from key witnesses; (2) failing to consider the evidence with a neutral gaze, as evidenced by prejudgment and extremely limited deliberations; and (3) making skewed credibility determinations by characterizing inconsistent complainant accounts as "consistent" while discrediting the male respondent and sole eyewitness.
3. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: The court found the student stated a plausible claim by alleging Princeton engaged in "subterfuges and evasions" (e.g., excluding character witnesses for the respondent while asking character questions of complainants) and exercised its discretion arbitrarily and capriciously (e.g., subjecting the student to a discriminatory process, disregarding exculpatory evidence, and construing all discrepancies in favor of the complainants). The court rejected Princeton's argument that this claim was duplicative of the breach-of-contract claim, holding that factual overlap is not fatal at the pleading stage.

This is an appeal of a criminal conviction arising from a gun trafficking ring involving over 130 firearms across West Virginia and Pennsylvania. Bisheem Jones, a leader of the trafficking operation, was convicted of multiple offenses including conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, and he appeals both his conviction and sentence.

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Jones's conviction for conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, specifically whether the government proved an agreement between Jones and co-conspirators to funnel proceeds from firearm sales back into the trafficking scheme to promote further illegal activity
2. Whether the district court properly applied three Sentencing Guidelines enhancements: (a) a four-level enhancement for firearms with obliterated or illegible serial numbers; (b) a four-level enhancement for trafficking in firearms; and (c) an eight-level enhancement for offenses involving more than one hundred firearms

The court vacated Jones's conviction for conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on that count. The court held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that Jones and a co-conspirator agreed to funnel proceeds from completed firearm sales back into the scheme to promote further trafficking. Text messages between Jones and co-conspirator Woodard showed only a dispute over dividing proceeds for personal use, not an agreement to reinvest proceeds. Electronic transfers to straw purchasers and bank deposits, while showing Jones used proceeds to fund purchases, did not prove an agreement with any co-conspirator to do so. The court distinguished between operating an unlawful enterprise (which was proven) and using its proceeds to promote future unlawful activity (which was not proven). The court affirmed all three Sentencing Guidelines enhancements, finding no clear error in the district court's factual findings supporting their application. The case was remanded for resentencing on the remaining convictions.

This is a consolidated appeal of two defendants convicted of defrauding the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Michael Fullerton pleaded guilty to eleven counts including conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and identity theft, while Tiffany Fullerton was convicted at trial of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering. Together with two co-conspirators, they fraudulently obtained over $3 million in PPP funds through six fraudulent loan applications.

1. Whether Michael's sentencing enhancements for sophisticated means, sophisticated laundering, leadership of a conspiracy with five or more participants, and obstruction of justice by perjury were properly applied
2. Whether Tiffany was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence from Michael's presentence investigation report
3. Whether Tiffany's sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice by suborning Michael's perjury was properly applied
4. Whether the district court correctly calculated Tiffany's intended-loss amount by including the Starx loan
5. Whether Tiffany's judgment contained a clerical error regarding her wire fraud conviction

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Michael's and Tiffany's sentences and the denial of Tiffany's motion for a new trial, but remanded for correction of a clerical error in Tiffany's judgment. Regarding Michael's enhancements: (1) The sophisticated-means enhancement was properly applied because Michael used multiple shell companies, forged documents, stole identities, and created fictitious entities to conceal the fraud, making detection more difficult. (2) The sophisticated-laundering enhancement was properly applied based on separate conduct from the sophisticated-means enhancement, including multiple layers of transactions moving funds through various accounts. (3) The leadership enhancement was properly applied because Tiffany Gaines, who falsified business records, qualified as a fifth participant in the conspiracy, meeting the five-or-more-participant requirement. (4) The obstruction-of-justice enhancement for perjury was properly applied because Michael gave demonstrably false testimony about Tiffany's knowledge of the fraud, and his testimony was willful as part of a plan to take responsibility. Regarding Tiffany's challenges: (1) The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her new-trial motion because evidence that Michael had previously defrauded his ex-wife without her knowledge would not have probably produced an acquittal, as substantial independent evidence established Tiffany's knowing participation in the conspiracy. Additionally, Tiffany could have discovered this evidence through due diligence and failed to preserve her admissibility argument. (2) The obstruction-of-justice enhancement for suborning Michael's perjury was properly applied because Tiffany knew Michael intended to take the fall, had extensive conversations with him about testimony, and her counsel asked specific questions designed to elicit his exonerating lies. (3) The inclusion of the Starx loan in the intended-loss calculation was not clear error because the PSR reliably found that Tiffany joined the conspiracy in April 2020 when the Starx loan was submitted, and she presented no rebuttal evidence to contradict this finding. (4) The court remanded for correction of a clerical error in Tiffany's judgment, which incorrectly stated she was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud when she was actually acquitted of that charge.

This is a consolidated appeal of two defendants, Michael and Tiffany Fullerton, who were convicted of defrauding the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) by submitting fraudulent loan applications and laundering the proceeds. Michael pleaded guilty to eleven counts and received a 286-month sentence, while Tiffany went to trial, was convicted of conspiracy charges, and received a 108-month sentence.

1. Whether Michael's sentencing enhancements for sophisticated means, sophisticated laundering, leadership of a conspiracy with five or more participants, and obstruction of justice by perjury were properly applied
2. Whether Tiffany was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence regarding Michael's prior fraud involving his ex-wife
3. Whether Tiffany's sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice by suborning Michael's perjury was properly applied
4. Whether Tiffany's intended-loss calculation correctly included the Starx PPP loan that preceded her alleged involvement in the conspiracy
5. Whether Tiffany's judgment contained a clerical error regarding her wire fraud conviction

The Fifth Circuit affirmed both sentences and the denial of Tiffany's motion for a new trial, but remanded for correction of a clerical error in Tiffany's judgment. Specifically:

1. Michael's Enhancements: All four enhancements were upheld. The sophisticated-means enhancement applied because Michael used defunct shell companies, forged documents, stole identities, and created fictitious entities to conceal the fraud. The sophisticated-laundering enhancement was separately supported by layered transactions moving funds through multiple accounts. The leadership enhancement was proper because Gaines, who falsified business records, qualified as a fifth participant in the conspiracy. The obstruction enhancement was valid because Michael gave demonstrably false testimony about Tiffany's knowledge of the fraud, which was material to the offense elements and willfully done as part of his plan to take responsibility.
2. Tiffany's New Trial Motion: The motion was properly denied because the newly discovered evidence about Michael's prior fraud with his ex-wife would not have produced an acquittal. The evidence merely bolstered Tiffany's innocent-dupe theory already presented at trial but failed to address the considerable evidence of her actual involvement, including her presence on fraudulent applications, knowledge of PPP funds in her accounts, participation in money laundering transactions, and involvement in recruiting Robles to the scheme.
3. Tiffany's Obstruction Enhancement: The enhancement for suborning Michael's perjury was properly applied. Although suborning perjury requires more than mere knowledge that a witness will lie, a defendant can suborn perjury by inducing counsel to call a witness known to lie. Here, Tiffany had hours of conversations with Michael about what questions her attorneys should ask him, and the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly showed she procured his false testimony.
4. Tiffany's Intended-Loss Calculation: The inclusion of the Starx loan in the intended-loss amount was proper under plain-error review. The PSR reliably found that Tiffany joined the conspiracy in April 2020 when the Starx loan was submitted, and she presented no rebuttal evidence. Her management role at Georgetown and central role in the conspiracy supported the inference that she participated from the conspiracy's inception.
5. Clerical Error: The judgment was remanded for correction because it incorrectly stated Tiffany was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud when she was actually acquitted of that charge.

This is a criminal appeal in which the United States challenges a district court's dismissal of a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), predicated on the defendant's conviction for transporting illegal aliens. The defendant argued the disarmament provision violated the Second Amendment as applied to him.

1. Whether disarming a convicted alien smuggler under § 922(g)(1) is consistent with the Second Amendment;
2. Whether alien smuggling under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) constitutes an "inherently dangerous felony" that permits lifetime disarmament under historical Second Amendment tradition;
3. Whether the government may raise new legal theories on appeal to defend the constitutionality of a criminal statute.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and held that lifetime disarmament based on a § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) conviction is consistent with the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that alien smuggling is an inherently dangerous felony, similar to drug trafficking, which the court had previously upheld as a basis for disarmament under § 922(g)(1). The court noted that alien smuggling is often controlled by drug cartels, results in violence and death, and involves exploitation of smuggled aliens. The court also found that the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches all recognize alien trafficking as inherently dangerous, and Congress has responded by disarming convicted alien traffickers. The court therefore concluded that disarming Palomares does not violate the Second Amendment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case involves a petition for review of an OSHA citation against ExxonMobil for failing to record an employee's work-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on mandatory injury and illness forms following a major refinery explosion. The central issue is whether OSHA has statutory authority to require employers to record work-related mental illnesses.

1. Whether the term "illnesses" in 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2) grants OSHA authority to require employers to record work-related mental illnesses, or whether it is limited to physical ailments.
2. Whether OSHA exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the rule at 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5(b)(2)(ix) requiring the recording of work-related mental illnesses.
3. The proper standard for reviewing agency statutory interpretation under the Loper Light framework requiring courts to independently determine whether an agency acted within its statutory authority.

The Fifth Circuit granted ExxonMobil's petition, vacated the OSHA citation and penalty, and invalidated the rule requiring recording of work-related mental illnesses. The court held that the best reading of § 657(c)(2) limits "illnesses" to physical, not mental, ailments based on: (1) statutory context showing "injuries" and "illnesses" should be read similarly and the exclusion of "minor injuries" refers to physical harms; (2) the larger recordkeeping framework in § 657(c) focusing on physical workplace dangers; (3) contemporaneous dictionary definitions of "illness" that do not expressly contemplate non-physical conditions; and (4) the principle that specific statutory delegations govern general congressional purposes. The court rejected OSHA's reliance on legislative history and the Act's general purpose, finding that the specific rulemaking authority granted does not encompass mental illness recording requirements.

This is an appeal by the American Association of Nurse Anesthesiology challenging the dismissal of its lawsuit seeking to compel the Secretary of Health and Human Services to enforce the Affordable Care Act's nondiscrimination provision against private insurers who allegedly pay nurse anesthetists less than physician anesthesiologists for the same services.

1. Whether the Association has Article III standing to sue, specifically whether it has associational standing on behalf of its members
2. Whether the Association's members can establish an injury in fact caused by the defendants' conduct
3. Whether the Association can demonstrate causation—whether HHS's failure to enforce the ACA's nondiscrimination provision caused private insurers to implement lower reimbursement rates
4. Whether the Association can show redressability—whether a favorable court judgment would likely remedy the alleged injury
5. Whether complete government abdication of enforcement responsibilities can support Article III standing

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of standing. The majority held that the Association lacks standing because: (1) it cannot establish causation—the causal chain between HHS's inaction and the insurers' reimbursement decisions is too speculative, particularly because insurers had over a decade of nonenforcement before changing their policies, and because states (not HHS) have primary enforcement authority; and (2) it cannot establish redressability—even if a court ordered HHS to enforce the provision, it is speculative whether the Secretary would investigate, what penalties he would impose, and how insurers would respond. The majority reasoned that when a plaintiff challenges government inaction rather than regulation of the plaintiff itself, standing is substantially more difficult to establish and cannot rest on speculation. The court noted that while government inaction can sometimes cause third-party reactions in predictable ways, this differs from affirmative government action with coercive effects. The concurring opinion agreed the Association lacks standing but would have based the decision on the Association's failure to establish complete abdication of enforcement responsibilities, and would have analyzed causation and redressability differently, finding them potentially satisfiable if complete abdication were shown.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which a plaintiff alleges that a police officer used excessive force by slamming him to the ground and punching him twice during an encounter on his front porch, without warning or arrest notification. The appeal addresses whether the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.

1. Whether the officer's alleged conduct—slamming the plaintiff into a gate and punching him twice without warning or arrest notification—violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights against excessive force.
2. Whether the officer's right to use such force was "clearly established" under existing caselaw, such that the officer had fair notice that his conduct was unlawful.
3. The appropriate standard for determining when caselaw clearly establishes that physical force by police is excessive, particularly when the suspect poses no threat and is not resisting arrest.

The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Officer Willis. The court held that: (1) the alleged facts—that Willis used physical force against Steger on his front porch without warning, without arrest notification, when Steger posed no imminent threat, was not resisting, and had committed only a minor offense—would constitute a violation of Steger's Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) existing Sixth Circuit precedent clearly established that suspects who are not resisting arrest have a constitutional right to be free from physical force by police officers. The court reasoned that the relevant caselaw put "beyond debate" that the use of any physical force under these circumstances was excessive, making it unlawful for Willis to claim qualified immunity. The court rejected Willis's argument that only cases involving specific types of force (such as pepper spray) would provide fair notice, holding instead that the illegality at issue concerned any physical force, not its calibration.

This is a criminal appeal in which Angelica Mendoza Rubio, a licensed Mexican accountant, challenges her 60-month sentence for conspiracy to commit money laundering involving over $5.1 million in fraud proceeds. Mendoza Rubio appeals both the application of a sentencing enhancement based on her managerial role and the district court's consideration of sentencing disparities with her coconspirators.

1. Whether the district court properly applied a three-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) for Mendoza Rubio's role as a manager or supervisor in the money laundering conspiracy.
2. Whether the district court procedurally erred by failing to adequately consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between Mendoza Rubio and her coconspirators under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
3. Whether Mendoza Rubio's 60-month sentence was substantively unreasonable compared to the sentences imposed on her coconspirators.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that: (1) the three-level manager/supervisor enhancement was properly applied because the record clearly supported that Mendoza Rubio exercised control over her coconspirators by orchestrating and coordinating their activities, directing when Bitcoin purchases should occur, monitoring cash pickups and deposits, and serving as the sole point of contact with clients—roles that went beyond mere "middleman" status; (2) the district court did not procedurally err in considering sentencing disparities because a below-guidelines sentence necessarily reflects consideration of the § 3553(a)(6) factor, and explicit discussion is not required; and (3) Mendoza Rubio's 60-month sentence was substantively reasonable despite being on the higher end compared to coconspirators' sentences, because her unique role as an accountant providing legitimacy to transactions and her critical coordination of the scheme distinguished her culpability from other participants, and the sentence remained within the binding plea agreement range and below the guidelines range.

This is a Fourth Amendment civil rights case in which Charles Friend appeals the grant of summary judgment against him in his lawsuit challenging his arrest for domestic battery. Friend was acquitted at trial but subsequently sued the arresting officers and the City of Decatur under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

1. Whether the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Friend for domestic battery based on the victim's statements, visible injuries, and history of domestic altercations, despite inconsistencies in the victim's account and evidence suggesting the victim may have been intoxicated.
2. Whether the warrantless arrest inside Friend's mother's home violated the Fourth Amendment, or whether the officers' entry was justified by consent from Friend and his mother.
3. Whether Officer Mahan's conditional statement that they would "hash this out, get you on your way" if there was "no reason to arrest" constituted a material misrepresentation that vitiated consent to entry.
4. Whether the City of Decatur is liable under Monell for a municipal policy or custom that violated Friend's rights.

The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that: (1) Officer Mahan had probable cause to arrest Friend based on the victim's credible statements to multiple parties, visible injuries consistent with being beaten, and documented history of domestic violence between the parties—the victim's inconsistencies and possible intoxication do not negate probable cause, as credibility assessment is for courts and juries, not officers, and domestic violence victims frequently recant statements; (2) the warrantless arrest was constitutional because Friend and his mother voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into the home; (3) Officer Mahan's conditional statement was not an outright or material lie under the Hadley standard because it was phrased conditionally and did not constitute fraud; and (4) without an underlying constitutional violation, the Monell claim against the City necessarily fails.

This is a civil rights case brought by two photojournalists who were injured by foam baton rounds deployed by law enforcement officers during a protest at the Kenosha County Courthouse in August 2020. The photojournalists sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment excessive force claims against the officers.

1. Whether the officers violated the First Amendment by intentionally targeting the photojournalists in retaliation for their protected press activity
2. Whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force against the photojournalists, specifically whether an intentional use of force that strikes an unintended target constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment
3. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity

The court affirmed summary judgment for the officers on both claims. On the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court found no evidence that the officers intentionally targeted the photojournalists because of their protected activity. The photojournalists were standing near legitimate targets (violent protesters launching fireworks), and the officers deployed only a limited number of rounds at threatening protesters. Discrepancies in the officers' use-of-force reports were insufficient to show animus. On the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, the court declined to definitively resolve whether intentional force that strikes an unintended target constitutes a seizure, but held that qualified immunity applied because it was not clearly established law in 2020 that an officer who intentionally deploys less-than-lethal munitions during a protest seizes an unintended target within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

This is a criminal appeal challenging a sentence imposed after a jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy to commit robbery but acquitted him of the underlying robbery counts. The defendant argues the district court improperly applied a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement without making the required findings under the reasonable-doubt standard.

1. Whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(d), which treats a single conspiracy conviction involving multiple offenses as separate conspiracy convictions for sentencing purposes, requires the district court to make express factual findings that the defendant conspired to commit each object offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the district court satisfied the reasonable-doubt standard when it applied the § 1B1.2(d) enhancement despite expressing confusion about the trial testimony and failing to clearly state whether it found the defendant conspired to commit each robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Whether harmless error review applies when a district court fails to make necessary findings at sentencing.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Bridges's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the district court erred by applying the § 1B1.2(d) enhancement without making the necessary findings under the reasonable-doubt standard. Although the court acknowledged it need not require "magic words," it found that the district court failed to make any clear finding—explicit or implicit—that Bridges conspired to commit either robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the district court expressed confusion about the evidence and equivocally discussed the testimony before simply concluding that § 1B1.2(d) applies. The court rejected the government's argument for clear error review, noting that such deferential review cannot cure a failure to make necessary findings. The court also found that the government waived harmless error review by failing to argue it on appeal, and even if the waiver were overlooked, the error could not be deemed harmless because the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming and the district court gave no assurance it would impose the same sentence without the enhancement.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant, Attila Colar, was convicted on 44 federal counts related to an alleged Paycheck Protection Program fraud scheme and obstruction of justice. Colar challenges his conviction based on the district court's failure to adequately investigate and remove a biased alternate juror who expressed strong prejudice against Colar's race-and-religion-based defense theory.

1. Whether an alternate juror's statements expressing actual bias against the defendant raised a colorable claim of juror bias requiring investigation
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by deferring investigation of the bias claim until the alternate juror was needed for the regular jury panel
3. Whether the district court's belated investigation adequately established that the juror could set aside his expressed bias and remain impartial
4. Whether the participation of a biased juror in the verdict constitutes structural error requiring reversal

The Ninth Circuit vacated Colar's convictions and reversed for a new trial. The court held that: (1) Juror 48's statements raised a colorable claim of actual bias because he prejudged the case's merits, dismissed the defense as lacking substance, and stated he could not remove the defendant's statements from his mind; (2) the district court abused its discretion by failing to promptly investigate the bias claim when it arose on Friday and instead deferring investigation until Wednesday when the juror was needed for the regular panel—the juror's status as an alternate did not permit deferral of the investigation obligation; (3) the belated investigation was inadequate because it occurred after the juror had heard evidence, did not ask whether recurrence of the defense theme would retrigger his emotional reaction, and did not unequivocally establish that the juror had reassessed his prior conclusions rather than merely calmed his emotions; and (4) the participation of a biased juror in rendering a guilty verdict constitutes structural error requiring reversal without harmless error analysis, entitling the defendant to a new trial.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant, Attila Colar, was convicted on 44 federal counts related to Paycheck Protection Program fraud and obstruction of justice. Colar challenges his conviction based on the district court's failure to adequately investigate and remove a biased alternate juror who expressed actual bias against Colar's race-and-religion-based defense theory.

1. Whether an alternate juror's statements expressing strong negative reactions to the defendant's defense theory constituted a "colorable claim" of actual juror bias requiring investigation
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by deferring investigation of the juror's bias until the juror was needed for the regular jury panel, rather than investigating promptly when the bias was first expressed
3. Whether the district court's belated investigation adequately established that the juror could set aside his bias and remain impartial despite the recurring nature of the defense theme throughout trial
4. Whether the participation of a biased juror in the verdict constitutes structural error requiring reversal without harmless error analysis

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Colar's convictions and reversed the district court's judgment, remanding for a new trial. The court held that: (1) Juror 48's statements raised a colorable claim of actual bias because he prejudged the case's merits, dismissed the defense as lacking substance, and stated he could not remove the defendant's statements from his head; (2) the district court abused its discretion by failing to promptly investigate the bias claim when it arose on Friday and instead deferring investigation until Wednesday when the juror was needed for the regular panel—the juror's status as an alternate did not permit deferral of investigation; (3) the belated investigation after the juror had heard evidence was inadequate because it did not unequivocally establish that the juror could set aside his bias or that recurring exposure to the defense theme would not retrigger his emotional reaction; and (4) the participation of a biased juror in the verdict constitutes structural error violating the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, requiring reversal without harmless error analysis. The court emphasized that district courts have discretion over the form of bias investigations but not whether to conduct them once a colorable claim arises, and that doubts about juror impartiality must be resolved against the juror.

This is an appeal of a Section 1983 civil rights action brought by former employees of the Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families who were terminated after their requests for religious exemptions and accommodations from a COVID-19 vaccination mandate were denied. The employees challenged the constitutionality of the vaccination policy and the agency's accommodation decisions.

1. Whether the employees plausibly alleged personal involvement by the individual defendants (agency officials) in constitutional violations of their free exercise, equal protection, and procedural due process rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
2. Whether the employees' claims for prospective injunctive relief against officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
3. Whether the district court properly denied leave to amend the complaint
4. Whether the COVID-19 vaccination mandate was neutral and generally applicable under free exercise doctrine

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. The court held that: (1) the employees failed to plausibly allege that any of the three individual officials personally participated in the accommodation decisions or created a discriminatory policy, as the officials' internal communications did not demonstrate religious animus but rather an intent to comply with legal obligations, and the accommodation statistics did not support a discrimination theory; (2) claims for prospective injunctive relief against officials in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the Governor's vaccination proclamation had been rescinded in October 2023, months before the lawsuit was filed, eliminating any ongoing violation; and (3) the district court properly denied leave to amend because the amended complaint failed to cure the identified deficiencies and further amendment would be futile.

This is a First Amendment free speech case in which a licensed clinical social worker employed as an Education Specialist challenged IMESD's directive prohibiting him from displaying three children's books in his school offices, alleging the directive violated his constitutional rights. The books addressed gender identity themes, and IMESD classified the display as a "bias incident" under its anti-discrimination policy.

1. Whether an employee's display of books in school offices constitutes government speech or personal speech protected by the First Amendment
2. Whether speech occurring in a school setting while students are present falls within an employee's official duties under the Garcetti standard
3. Whether Kennedy v. Bremerton School District altered the analysis of public employee speech in K-12 schools
4. If the speech is personal expression, whether it addresses a matter of public concern and whether any government interest in regulating the speech outweighs the employee's First Amendment rights under Pickering balancing

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The majority held that Theis's speech fell outside First Amendment protection because it constituted government speech made pursuant to his official duties. The court reasoned that: (1) Theis's speech occurred within the scope of his professional role in school offices where he met with students; (2) the speech "owed its existence" to his position as the school "hired" his speech by placing him in a position to speak to students as an authority figure; and (3) speech directed at students within a school setting "in a capacity one might reasonably view as official" is undertaken as part of official duties. The majority distinguished Kennedy v. Bremerton, noting that Coach Kennedy's prayer was a brief, private observance undertaken when he was "off the clock" and not engaged in official duties, whereas Theis was actively performing his core professional responsibilities. Because the speech was government speech outside First Amendment coverage, the court did not apply Pickering balancing. Judge VanDyke's dissent argued that Theis's office decorations were personal expression similar to colleagues' pride flags and political posters, that Kennedy established some employee expression remains personal even when observed by students, and that under proper Pickering analysis, the speech should be protected because it addressed a matter of public concern with no evidence of actual disruption to school operations.

This is a First Amendment free speech case in which a licensed clinical social worker employed as an Education Specialist challenged IMESD's directive to remove three children's books from his office displays. The books addressed gender identity themes, and IMESD classified the displays as "bias incidents" under its anti-discrimination policy.

1. Whether Theis's display of books in his school offices constituted personal expression protected by the First Amendment or government speech subject to employer control
2. Whether Theis spoke "pursuant to his official duties" under the Garcetti standard
3. Whether Kennedy v. Bremerton School District altered the analysis of public employee speech in K-12 schools
4. Whether, if Theis's speech was personal expression on a matter of public concern, IMESD's interests in efficient operations outweighed his First Amendment rights under Pickering balancing

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The majority held that Theis's speech fell outside First Amendment protection because: (1) the book displays occurred in his offices where he met with students as part of his assigned duties; (2) the displays were visible to students during evaluations and meetings; (3) Theis spoke in a capacity reasonably viewed as official; and (4) his speech "owed its existence" to his position as an Education Specialist hired to interact with students. The majority distinguished Kennedy v. Bremerton, noting that Coach Kennedy's prayer was a brief, private moment detached from his official duties, whereas Theis's displays occurred during the course of his core professional responsibilities. Because Theis's speech constituted government speech outside the First Amendment's ambit, the court did not apply Pickering balancing. Judge VanDyke's dissent argued that Kennedy established that not all employee expression observed by students is automatically government speech, that Theis's office decorations were personal expression like colleagues' pride flags and political posters, and that even if the speech was personal, it addressed a matter of public concern with no evidence of actual disruption, thus warranting First Amendment protection under Pickering.

This is a First Amendment free speech case in which Justin Spiehs challenged the Lawrence, Kansas public library's policies restricting the display of signs and other expressive activities inside the library. Spiehs sought damages and injunctive relief after library staff enforced these policies against him on multiple occasions.

1. Whether Spiehs had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief challenging library policies
2. Whether the library's free speech and behavior policies violated the First Amendment as facially content-discriminatory or as applied in a content-discriminatory manner
3. Whether the policies were narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest in maintaining a quiet environment for reading and study
4. Whether Spiehs was denied equal protection by differential enforcement of the policies
5. Whether Spiehs was deprived of procedural due process in his library suspension
6. Whether Spiehs suffered retaliation for constitutionally protected activity

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. The court held:

1. Standing: Spiehs lacked standing for declaratory and injunctive relief because he failed to demonstrate subjective deterrence—he stated his intent to continue the same conduct—and therefore did not suffer a continuing injury or immediate threat of injury.
2. First Amendment—Content Neutrality: The library's policies were content-neutral on their face because they prohibited all displays of signs regardless of content and were justified by the library's purpose of maintaining a quiet environment for reading and study, not by any desire to suppress particular messages.
3. First Amendment—As Applied: The policies were applied in a content-neutral manner. The November 26, 2024 incident involved enforcement against sign-holding, not the message on the sign. The December 1, 2024 incident involved a blank poster, which Spiehs himself acknowledged showed content-neutral enforcement. The December 9, 2024 flag incident was waived and, alternatively, did not show discrimination because Eravi wore his flag as a scarf rather than displaying it as a sign.
4. Narrow Tailoring: The policies were narrowly tailored to serve the significant governmental interest in preserving the library's character as a quiet place for reading and study. Although the policies restricted sign-holding and protesting, they did not ban all speech—patrons could still read, wear expressive clothing, post messages on community bulletin boards, and reserve rooms for free speech activities. Ample alternative channels of communication remained available outside and inside the library.
5. Equal Protection: Spiehs was not similarly situated to others treated more favorably. In the November 25, 2024 incident, staff did not see Eravi displaying anything, making them not similarly situated. In the December 9, 2024 incident, Eravi wore his flag as a scarf rather than displaying it as a sign, and the policy did not address clothing, so they were not similarly situated.
6. Due Process: The procedural due process claim was waived because it was omitted from the final pretrial order.
7. Retaliation: The retaliation claim failed because Spiehs did not engage in constitutionally protected activity—his sign displays violated the library's lawful, narrowly tailored policies.

This is an appeal of a bad faith insurance claim arising from a patient's death following liposuction surgery. The insured surgery center's father sued for malpractice, and the case involves whether the insurer (Prime Insurance) breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to settle the claim or adequately explain policy terms.

1. Whether an insurer has a duty to explain insurance policy terms absent ambiguity or fraud
2. Whether the insurer acted in bad faith by failing to offer the full policy limit in April 2013
3. Whether the insurer breached its duty by failing to advise the insured that it could contribute its own funds toward settlement
4. Whether the insurer acted in bad faith by imposing conditions on the tender of the policy limit

The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Prime Insurance. The court held that:

1. Under Utah law, insurers are not ordinarily required to explain policy terms absent ambiguity or evidence of fraud. Prime Insurance did not act in bad faith by failing to explain the policy terms, and in fact had provided explanations in a memo and binder.
2. Prime Insurance did not act unreasonably by waiting for the medical examiner's report before offering the policy limit, as no definite settlement offer had been made and the medical findings were pending.
3. Prime Insurance had no duty to advise the insured that it could contribute its own funds toward settlement, as this fell outside the scope of the bargained-for benefits of the insurance contract.
4. Prime Insurance's request for "full and final settlement" did not constitute bad faith, as the insured provided no evidence he would have accepted the policy limit even without this condition.

This is a product liability case arising from a tractor accident where the plaintiff was injured after dismounting a moving tractor. The central issue is whether the manufacturer had a duty to warn the plaintiff about the dangers of dismounting a moving tractor, which the manufacturer argues was an open and obvious hazard.

1. Whether dismounting a moving tractor constitutes an open and obvious danger that relieves a manufacturer of its duty to warn under Kansas product liability law
2. Whether the tractor's manual adequately warned of the specific operation of the electronic parking brake
3. Whether the open and obvious danger exception applies when a product has novel or sophisticated features
4. Whether the question of open and obvious danger is a legal question for the court or a factual question for the jury

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant manufacturer. The court held that: (1) dismounting a moving tractor is an open and obvious danger as a matter of law that any reasonable person would recognize; (2) manufacturers have no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers under Kansas law; (3) the tractor's manual adequately warned against dismounting while in motion and the parking brake's purpose was to keep a stationary tractor in place, not to stop a moving one; (4) the plaintiff's own witnesses testified that one would have to be "suicidal" to step off a moving tractor, supporting the obviousness of the danger; and (5) whether a danger is open and obvious is a legal question for the court when evidence points clearly in one direction, not a factual question for the jury. The court reasoned that a reasonable operator would understand the commonsense danger of exiting a vehicle in motion and stopping in front of it, regardless of the tractor's sophisticated features.

This is a federal criminal appeal concerning whether a district court properly complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), which requires courts to verify that a defendant and his attorney have read and discussed the presentence investigation report (PSR) before sentencing. The defendant was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 180 months imprisonment.

1. Whether the defendant adequately preserved his Rule 32(i)(1)(A) challenge for appeal when he stated during allocution that his counsel never reviewed the PSR with him, despite counsel's affirmative response to the court's question about reviewing the PSR
2. Whether the district court violated Rule 32(i)(1)(A) by failing to follow up on the defendant's assertion that he had not reviewed and discussed the PSR with counsel
3. Whether any Rule 32(i)(1)(A) violation was harmless error or required resentencing

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that: (1) the defendant adequately preserved the issue for appeal by raising it during allocution, rejecting the government's argument that plain-error review applied; (2) the district court violated Rule 32(i)(1)(A) because when a defendant expressly states he did not review the PSR with counsel, the court must follow up to verify compliance, rather than relying solely on counsel's affirmative response; and (3) the error was not harmless because the defendant identified multiple factual inaccuracies in the PSR (including claims about his identity as "X," the assault on the officer, and his employment at Sonic) that would have affected his sentence if he had been able to challenge them after reviewing the PSR with counsel. The court reasoned that Rule 32 protects a defendant's due process right to be sentenced on accurate information, and the government failed to demonstrate the error was harmless.

This case involves a challenge to the National Labor Relations Board's "successor bar" rule, which prohibits challenges to an incumbent union's representation status for up to one year after a business changes ownership. The Hospital Menonita de Guayama challenged this rule as inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act, and the court reconsidered the issue following the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron deference.

1. Whether the NLRB's successor bar rule violates Section 7 of the NLRA, which guarantees employees the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
2. Whether the successor bar violates Section 9(a) of the NLRA, which requires that the exclusive bargaining representative be designated by a majority of employees
3. Whether Loper Bright's elimination of Chevron deference requires courts to independently assess whether the successor bar falls within the Board's statutory authority
4. Whether the Board has policymaking authority to suspend the Act's protections for employee freedom of choice and majority rule in collective bargaining

The court granted the Hospital's petition for review and denied the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. The majority held that the successor bar is inconsistent with the NLRA and that the Board lacks statutory authority to impose it. The court reasoned that: (1) following Loper Bright, courts must independently interpret statutes without deferring to agency interpretations of their own authority; (2) the successor bar violates Sections 7 and 9 by requiring successor employers to recognize and bargain with incumbent unions regardless of majority support; (3) Congress's provision of only one time bar against representation challenges (the one-year bar following certification) indicates the Board cannot create additional exceptions; (4) the Board's policy justifications—including promoting industrial stability and saving litigation time—cannot overcome the lack of statutory authority; and (5) the Hospital was entitled to present evidence that the union lacked majority support as a defense to unfair labor practice charges. The dissent argued that the original panel's decision rested on the NLRA's grant of policymaking discretion to the Board, not on Chevron deference, and therefore should not have been reconsidered on remand.

This is a federal sex trafficking case involving the conviction of Willis Pierre Lewis and Brittany Jones for trafficking two underage girls (ages 15 and 17) into commercial sex work over approximately three weeks in spring 2019. Lewis was sentenced to life imprisonment and Jones to 168 months, and both appealed their convictions and sentences.

1. Whether the trial evidence supported a single conspiracy as charged in the indictment or multiple conspiracies, creating a prejudicial variance
2. Whether the district court erred in admitting two allegedly prejudicial testimonial statements (testimony about Lewis's possession of a gun and gang affiliation)
3. Whether the district court erred in excluding jailhouse call recordings that defense counsel sought to use as impeachment evidence
4. Whether the district court gave an erroneous jury instruction regarding the definition of "reckless disregard" for sex trafficking charges
5. Whether Lewis's life sentence was procedurally reasonable and adequately explained
6. Whether Jones received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding cellphone-tracking data and text message evidence

The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of both Lewis and Jones on all counts. The court rejected their variance argument, finding that the evidence supported a single conspiracy involving both defendants, as Jones participated in introducing and transporting the victims to Lewis and shared a common goal with him. The court found any evidentiary errors regarding the gun and gang testimony to be harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Lewis's violence and coercion. Although the court agreed the district court erred in excluding the jailhouse call recordings, it rejected Lewis's appeal on that issue because he failed to create an adequate record for appellate review. The court rejected Lewis's jury instruction argument under the plain-error standard, finding no prejudice since Lewis himself perpetrated the coercive conduct and could not have merely "recklessly disregarded" it. The court rejected Jones's ineffective assistance claims, finding her counsel's decisions regarding cellphone-tracking data and text messages were reasonable and not prejudicial. However, the court vacated Lewis's sentence as procedurally unreasonable, finding that the district court failed to make necessary factual findings to support three sentencing enhancements and failed to adequately explain its rejection of mitigating factors Lewis raised for a downward variance. The case was remanded for resentencing.

This case involves petitions for review of the Federal Aviation Administration's approval of a runway extension and new terminal construction project at Tweed New Haven Airport in Connecticut. Environmental group Save the Sound and the Town of East Haven challenged the FAA's decision to prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA) rather than a more detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), alleging multiple violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

1. Whether the FAA impermissibly "segmented" the project by excluding proposed taxiway upgrades from its environmental review
2. Whether the FAA failed to consider "reasonably foreseeable environmental effects," including cumulative effects from future projects
3. Whether the FAA's enplanement (passenger boarding) projections were adequately supported and disclosed, and whether the agency reasonably concluded the project would not increase overall passenger demand
4. Whether the FAA adequately analyzed environmental effects related to flooding, stormwater runoff, and impacts to wetlands

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petitions for review and upheld the FAA's approval. The court held that:

1. Project Segmentation: The FAA reasonably defined the project scope to include only the runway extension and terminal construction, excluding the taxiway upgrades. The taxiway project was temporally remote (not planned for five years), had substantial independent utility, and was not required for safety compliance.
2. Reasonably Foreseeable Effects: The FAA properly declined to analyze the preliminary taxiway project as a cumulative effect because it lacked sufficient information about its scope and timing. The court rejected the petitioners' argument that a five-year planning horizon was arbitrary, distinguishing the case from Northern Plains Resource Council and noting the project would be completed within three years.
3. Enplanement Projections: The FAA's passenger projections were reasonably supported and adequately disclosed. The agency properly relied on current data from Avelo rather than outdated Master Plan projections, and reasonably concluded that increased runway capacity would not increase overall passenger demand (passengers would simply fly on fewer, fuller flights). The court afforded substantial deference to the FAA's predictive judgments and rejected the petitioners' reliance on general statements from unrelated judicial decisions.
4. Flooding and Wetlands: The FAA adequately analyzed environmental effects by detailing mitigation measures including floodplain creation, stormwater detention systems, infiltration measures, and wetland offset programs. The agency reasonably concluded the project would have minimal impacts on flooding and wetlands, and properly exercised its discretion in determining how far to analyze indirect environmental effects.

The court emphasized that NEPA is a purely procedural statute requiring only that agencies disclose environmental effects and reasonably explain their decisions, not that they reach any particular substantive outcome. Applying the Supreme Court's recent guidance in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County (2025), the court stressed that judicial review of NEPA compliance must be highly deferential and that agencies have broad discretion in technical and predictive matters within their expertise.

This is an administrative law case challenging the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 2024 revision to its Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) for nuclear power plant license renewals. Environmental advocacy groups petitioned for review, arguing the Commission inadequately addressed how aging reactor components and climate change affect the risk of severe accidents involving reactor-core damage.

1. Whether the NRC reasonably determined that environmental impacts from severe accidents during extended plant operation are "small" under NEPA
2. Whether the NRC adequately considered the effects of long-term aging and degradation of reactor components on accident risk
3. Whether the NRC adequately considered the effects of climate change in increasing external hazards (storms, flooding) to reactors
4. Whether the NRC could generically dispense with plant-specific Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs) analysis without accounting for aging and climate-related risks
5. Whether the petitioners had standing to challenge the GEIS

The court denied the petition for review and upheld the NRC's 2024 GEIS revision. The court found:

1. Standing: The Environmental Groups satisfied associational standing requirements, as members residing near nuclear facilities faced injury from severe-accident risks.
2. Aging Effects: The NRC reasonably addressed aging risks by relying on enforceable regulatory requirements (10 C.F.R. Part 54 and the Maintenance Rule) specifically designed to manage aging, combined with extensive forward-looking analysis of severe-accident risks. The court distinguished this from the flawed analysis in New York I because the NRC conducted actual environmental analysis rather than merely pointing to compliance programs as a substitute.
3. Climate Change: The NRC reasonably declined to conduct detailed climate-change modeling because: (a) its analysis already identified seismic and fire events as the primary external hazards, with storms contributing minimally; (b) the analysis included a greater-than-10,000 percent safety margin that could account for uncertainties including climate impacts; (c) existing safety regulations require plants to withstand natural phenomena; and (d) the NRC would revisit the GEIS every 10 years and evaluate new information in plant-specific proceedings.
4. SAMAs: The NRC's decision not to require repeated SAMA analyses for plants that previously completed them was reasonable, as it rested on the same reasonable treatment of aging and climate factors.
5. Procedural Safeguards: The court noted that the generic "small" determination does not permanently bar site-specific consideration, as mechanisms exist for waiver petitions, intervention in individual proceedings, and disclosure of new and significant information.

This case involves petitions for review of an FCC order that establishes a new regulatory framework for the 4.9 GHz spectrum band reserved for public safety organizations. The order authorizes a Band Manager to transfer unused spectrum in this band to FirstNet, a federal entity operating a nationwide public-safety broadband network in the 700 MHz band.

1. Whether the petitioners have Article III standing to challenge the FCC order
2. Whether the Spectrum Act of 2012 limits FirstNet's authority to the 700 MHz band only
3. Whether the FCC was required to use competitive bidding to select the Band Manager under Communications Act section 309(j)
4. Whether the FCC exceeded its authority over federal entities by authorizing spectrum transfer to FirstNet
5. Whether the order violates an FCC regulation requiring federal licensees to obtain approval from state and local government licensees to use the 4.9 GHz band
6. Whether the order is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act

The court dismissed the petitions filed by the Public Safety Spectrum Alliance and Public Safety Broadband Technology Association for lack of Article III standing because they failed to submit timely affidavits from identified members proving specific injuries. The court denied the remaining petitions on the merits in part and dismissed them as unripe in part. Specifically, the court held: (1) the Spectrum Act does not limit FirstNet to the 700 MHz band, as Congress granted FirstNet broad authority to build and operate a nationwide network using evolving technologies; (2) the FCC properly invoked the rule of construction in section 309(j)(6)(E) to avoid competitive bidding, as the Band Manager selection was not a typical application of the competitive bidding requirement; (3) the claim that the FCC exceeded its authority over federal entities is unripe because the actual spectrum transfer has not yet occurred and would require NTIA approval; (4) the FCC regulation requiring federal licensee approval applies only to inter-governmental agreements and does not prohibit the Band Manager from transferring spectrum to FirstNet; and (5) the order is not arbitrary because the FCC adequately considered reliance interests of incumbent licensees, had substantial evidence of chronic underutilization, reasonably deferred certain procedural decisions, and properly relied on the presumption of regularity regarding NTIA's oversight of FirstNet.

This case involves the criminal prosecution of Peter K. Navarro, a former Trump administration aide, for contempt of Congress after he refused to comply with a subpoena from the House Select Committee investigating the January 6th Capitol attack. Navarro claimed that former President Trump had invoked executive privilege to shield him from the subpoena, but the court found no valid invocation of privilege had occurred.

1. Whether a federal court has authority to determine whether executive privilege has been properly invoked by a president or his designee
2. What requirements must be satisfied for a valid invocation of executive privilege
3. Whether executive privilege was actually invoked by former President Trump for Navarro's subpoena
4. Whether a good-faith mistaken belief that executive privilege applies constitutes a defense to contempt of Congress charges under 2 U.S.C. § 192
5. Whether executive privilege could shield information that Navarro had publicly disclosed in his published book and interviews

The Court of Appeals affirmed Navarro's conviction on both counts of contempt of Congress. The court held that:

1. Federal courts have the authority and duty to determine whether executive privilege has been properly invoked, consistent with separation of powers principles
2. Executive privilege must be invoked by the President or an official authorized by the President; it does not arise automatically or by implication
3. The district court did not clearly err in finding that former President Trump never invoked executive privilege for Navarro's subpoena. The evidence showed Navarro asserted the privilege unilaterally before consulting the President, and the alleged three-minute phone call with Trump was unsupported by documentation or detail
4. Even if privilege had been invoked, it would not have excused Navarro's categorical default because much of the subpoenaed information concerned his public statements and writings made in a private capacity after leaving government, which are not protected by executive privilege
5. A defendant's good-faith mistaken belief that executive privilege applies is not a defense to willful contempt of Congress. Section 192 requires only that the defendant deliberately and intentionally default on the subpoena, regardless of his subjective belief about whether he was legally required to comply

This is an administrative law case in which Thrivent Financial challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission's denial of its petition for rulemaking to amend or abrogate certain Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration rules that conflict with Thrivent's preferred arbitration procedures. Thrivent argued that FINRA's rules violated the Federal Arbitration Act's policy favoring arbitration agreements.

1. Whether the SEC's three-paragraph denial letter was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act for failing to provide reasoned explanation
2. Whether agencies must grant all rulemaking petitions that challenge the legal validity of existing regulations
3. Whether the court should vacate FINRA's arbitration rules or mandate that the SEC grant Thrivent's rulemaking petition
4. Whether FINRA Rules 2268, 12200, and 12204 conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act

The Court of Appeals granted Thrivent's petition in part and remanded to the SEC for reconsideration. The court held that the SEC's denial was arbitrary and capricious because it provided only boilerplate, conclusory statements about resource constraints and regulatory priorities that could apply to any rulemaking petition, without addressing the specific content of Thrivent's petition or providing reasoned analysis. However, the court rejected Thrivent's argument that agencies must grant all rulemaking petitions challenging the legal validity of existing rules, finding no such mandatory grant rule exists in precedent. The court also rejected Thrivent's requests to vacate FINRA's rules outright or to mandate that the SEC grant the rulemaking petition, instead remanding for the SEC to provide a reasoned reconsideration. The court noted the SEC has multiple options available, including granting the petition, issuing a waiver, or using its authority under Section 78o(o) to preserve FINRA's rules if warranted in the public interest.

This case involves a dispute over whether pharmaceutical manufacturers can unilaterally implement post-purchase rebate models under Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act, which requires manufacturers to sell drugs at reduced prices to eligible healthcare providers. Four manufacturers proposed switching from upfront discounts to rebate models in 2024, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) required their approval before implementation.

1. Whether Section 340B permits rebate mechanisms at all, or only upfront discounts
2. Whether the Secretary must affirmatively approve rebate models before manufacturers may implement them
3. Whether any requirement for Secretarial approval must be explicit in the Pharmaceutical Pricing Agreements between the Secretary and manufacturers
4. Whether the Secretary's decision to require preapproval was arbitrary and capricious

The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Secretary. The court held that: (1) Section 340B's plain language permits rebate mechanisms, as the statute explicitly references "any rebate or discount, as provided by the Secretary"; (2) the phrase "as provided by the Secretary" imposes a preapproval requirement, meaning manufacturers cannot unilaterally implement rebate models without Secretarial approval; (3) the Secretary need not provide for rebate mechanisms exclusively through Pharmaceutical Pricing Agreements—guidance and other regulatory vehicles suffice; and (4) the Secretary properly required the manufacturers to await approval while studying their proposals, as it is undisputed that the Secretary has never authorized rebate mechanisms encompassing the manufacturers' proposed models. The court reasoned that the statute places the Secretary in control of the 340B program, and allowing manufacturers to unilaterally impose rebate models would improperly shift administrative control to the manufacturers rather than the Secretary.

This case involves the enforcement of an international arbitration award issued by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the Washington Convention. The central issue is whether Titan Consortium's petition to enforce a $320 million arbitral award against Argentina was timely filed, which depends on determining the applicable statute of limitations for enforcing Washington Convention awards under federal law.

1. What statute of limitations applies to enforcement actions for Washington Convention arbitral awards under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, which creates a cause of action but contains no express limitations period?
2. Whether the three-year limitations period from the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 207) applies to Washington Convention awards, despite § 1650a's explicit statement that the FAA "shall not apply" to such awards.
3. Whether D.C. Code § 15-101's twelve-year limitations period for enforcing money judgments is the appropriate analogue, or whether D.C.'s three-year catchall statute of limitations should apply instead.
4. Whether the differences between the Washington Convention and the New York Convention support different limitations periods for their respective arbitral awards.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that D.C. Code § 15-101's twelve-year statute of limitations for enforcing money judgments is the appropriate limitations period to borrow for Washington Convention award enforcement actions under § 1650a, making Titan's petition timely.

Reasoning:

The court applied the longstanding principle that when a federal statute creates a cause of action but lacks a statute of limitations, courts must "borrow" the most analogous limitations period from state law. The court rejected Argentina's arguments for three reasons:

1. D.C. Code § 15-101 is the closest analogue: Section 1650a requires that Washington Convention awards be enforced with the same "full faith and credit" as state court judgments. D.C. Code § 15-101 governs enforcement of money judgments and provides the closest parallel because: (a) it covers the same type of "pecuniary obligations" as § 1650a; (b) it reflects the full faith and credit principle embedded in § 1650a; and (c) it limits judicial review to pro forma enforcement, consistent with § 1650a's requirement that courts merely "enforce" awards rather than substantively review them.
2. The Federal Arbitration Act does not apply: Section 1650a explicitly states that "The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) shall not apply to enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to the [Washington] convention." This express statutory directive is dispositive. Moreover, Congress deliberately linked § 207 of the FAA to the New York Convention, not the Washington Convention. The two conventions differ fundamentally: the New York Convention permits courts to review awards on procedural and substantive grounds (Article V), while the Washington Convention provides for mandatory internal review by an Annulment Committee and forbids district court review. Adopting § 207's three-year period would undermine the Washington Convention's framework and contradict Congress's intent.
3. The D.C. Arbitration Act is not suitable: D.C. Code § 16-4425 lacks its own statute of limitations, and the D.C. Arbitration Act permits substantive judicial review of awards (similar to the FAA), which is inconsistent with § 1650a's enforcement-only mandate. Applying the D.C. catchall three-year statute of limitations would create the same problems as the FAA approach.

The court also rejected Argentina's policy arguments for uniformity, noting that Congress deliberately omitted a uniform federal limitations period from § 1650a and instead directed that enforcement follow the varied schemes of multiple jurisdictions. The court further noted that a three-year period would be impractical given that the Centre's Annulment Committee review process typically takes 28 months, leaving little time for filing enforcement actions. The twelve-year period is not an outlier—thirteen states have twenty-year or longer periods, and twenty-one states have ten to fifteen-year periods. Finally, the court noted that the District of Columbia is often the only available venue for Washington Convention enforcement actions, making it appropriate to apply D.C. law.

This is an appeal of a Court of Chancery decision dismissing an adverse possession claim and enjoining the appellant from future filings without court certification and leave. Paula Smith sought to claim ownership of a property through adverse possession against Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), but failed to meet the statutory requirements for such a claim.

1. Whether Smith stated a valid claim for adverse possession under Delaware law, which requires possession of property in an open, notorious, hostile, and exclusive manner for twenty years
2. Whether the Court of Chancery properly dismissed Smith's complaint for failure to state a claim
3. Whether the Court of Chancery abused its discretion in denying Smith's repeated motions to reopen the case
4. Whether the Court of Chancery properly enjoined Smith from future filings without compliance with Delaware Code Title 10, Section 8803(e) certifications

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment. The court found no reversible error in the dismissal because Smith's own allegations established that she first took possession of the property on February 4, 2020, which was insufficient to satisfy the twenty-year possession requirement for adverse possession. The court also upheld the injunction against future filings, finding that Smith's persistent and repeated filings asserting frivolous positions that had been rejected multiple times constituted an abuse of the judicial process. The court determined that Smith's right to petition the courts does not extend to repeatedly relitigating claims that lack legal merit, and that the requirement for Section 8803(e) certifications on future filings was appropriate.

This is a breach of contract case where the plaintiff sought specific performance and attorneys' fees for the defendant's alleged improper cancellation of a stock purchase. The primary claims became moot when the defendant transferred the disputed shares, leaving only the plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees.

1. Whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining fee dispute, or whether the parties' arbitration clause requires the dispute to be resolved through arbitration
2. Whether the arbitration clause contains "clear and unmistakable evidence" that the parties intended to delegate substantive arbitrability questions to an arbitrator rather than retain them for court determination
3. Whether the cleanup doctrine allows the court to retain jurisdiction over the attorneys' fees request despite the arbitration clause

The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss in favor of arbitration. The court held that Section 7 of the Purchase Agreement contains clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to delegate substantive arbitrability to an arbitrator based on two factors: (1) the agreement incorporates JAMS arbitration rules, which empower arbitrators to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability issues; and (2) the agreement generally provides for arbitration of all disputes with only a narrow carveout for injunctive relief. The court rejected the plaintiff's cleanup doctrine argument, concluding that because the parties delegated arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, the court lacks the power to decide whether the fee dispute is arbitrable or whether fee-shifting is appropriate. The arbitrator must resolve both the threshold arbitrability issue and the merits of the fee request.

This is a wrongful death and negligence case arising from a fatal fire in a paint-mixing room at a military depot. Survivors and estates of deceased workers sued the pump manufacturer, Carlisle Fluid Technologies, claiming it failed to provide adequate safety training on the hazards of flammable paint thinners, despite having superior knowledge of the equipment's dangers.

1. Whether a pump manufacturer that provided minimal operational training on newly installed equipment owed a broader tort duty to provide comprehensive safety training to workers at the customer's facility
2. Whether a contracting party's superior knowledge of product hazards expands its tort duty beyond the scope of its contractual undertaking
3. Whether general warnings and instruction manuals create additional safety training obligations
4. The proper application of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A regarding when a service provider owes tort duties to third parties

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Carlisle, holding that the manufacturer owed no tort duty to provide comprehensive safety training. The court reasoned that under Pennsylvania law and the Restatement of Torts, a service provider's tort duty extends only as far as its actual undertaking. Carlisle undertook only to sell, install pumps, and provide basic operational training—not to assume the depot's responsibility for comprehensive workplace safety training. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that Carlisle's superior knowledge of hazards or inclusion of safety manuals expanded its duties beyond what was explicitly undertaken. The court found that none of the three circumstances under § 324A applied: Carlisle did not negligently increase the risk of harm through faulty installation, did not assume the depot's pre-existing safety duty, and the workers could not reasonably rely on Carlisle for general safety training when it only promised operational instruction. The court emphasized that tort law limits liability to those with actual duties, and promising to perform a service creates only those duties that are promised.

This is an employment discrimination appeal in which an employee terminated for sleeping on the job challenged her firing under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), and Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer.

1. Whether an employee must affirmatively notify her employer of a disability and request reasonable accommodation before the employer has a duty to accommodate under the ADA and PHRA
2. Whether an employee must provide advance notice of intent to take medical leave under the FMLA
3. Whether an employer may enforce neutral workplace conduct rules even when misconduct stems from a disability
4. Whether the timing of a disability disclosure (at the moment of disciplinary confrontation) affects whether an employer had fair notice of a disability-related need
5. Whether attorney misconduct in submitting a motion with misquotations warrants sanctions

The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer. The court held that: (1) employees must affirmatively disclose their disability and clearly request accommodation or leave; mere vague statements do not trigger an employer's duty to accommodate, particularly when the need for accommodation is not obvious from visible or known facts; (2) Hileman's first disclosure of her diabetes occurred only when confronted about sleeping on duty, and she never requested accommodation or leave; (3) even if her statement could qualify as an accommodation request, the ADA does not require employers to excuse misconduct, and sleeping on duty violated a neutral workplace policy; (4) Hileman presented no evidence that the employer's stated reason for termination (misconduct) was pretextual or discriminatory; and (5) an employee cannot save her job by belatedly disclosing a disability when already facing termination for misconduct. Additionally, the court sanctioned appellant's counsel, Joshua P. Ward, in the amount of $14,636.50 for submitting a motion containing misquotations, finding this part of a pattern of misconduct.

This is an insurance coverage dispute in which Covington Specialty Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment that its commercial general liability policy did not cover a lawsuit filed by professional models against Omega Restaurant & Bar, LLC for misappropriation of their likenesses. The underlying models' lawsuit was settled after Covington filed its declaratory relief action but before the district court ruled.

1. Whether Covington's declaratory relief action became moot when the underlying lawsuit between the models and Omega was settled and dismissed with prejudice.
2. Whether the insurance policy covers claims for misappropriation of likeness and injury to professional reputation arising from unauthorized posting of models' images on the nightclub's website and social media.
3. Whether Covington had a duty to defend and/or indemnify Omega under the policy's coverage for "personal and advertising injuries."

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court without reaching the merits. Although the district court had granted summary judgment to Covington and found no duty to defend or indemnify, the appellate court determined that the mootness question—raised for the first time on appeal by Covington—required factual development by the district court in the first instance. The court reasoned that because the record was undeveloped regarding whether a live case or controversy remained (including whether Covington abandoned its defense and whether any cognizable interest remained at stake), the district court should address the jurisdictional mootness issue before the appellate court could proceed to the merits of Omega's arguments.

This is a securities fraud class action in which shareholders of Boeing allege the company and its officers violated the Securities Exchange Act by making false and misleading statements about safety, artificially inflating the stock price. The case involves whether the district court properly certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

1. Whether plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Comcast Corp. v. Behrend by presenting a damages methodology that is (a) specific and committed rather than merely a menu of options, (b) demonstrable on a class-wide basis, (c) consistent with their theory of liability, and (d) non-speculative
2. Whether plaintiffs adequately identified their theory of liability with sufficient specificity to allow comparison with their damages methodology
3. Whether the district court conducted the rigorous analysis required by Comcast before certifying the class
4. Whether a damages methodology presented after class certification can cure deficiencies in the certification record

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's class certification order. The court held that plaintiffs failed to satisfy Comcast's requirements in multiple ways. First, plaintiffs provided only a generic legal description of damages (the "out-of-pocket" method) rather than a specific, committed methodology explaining how artificial inflation would be calculated on each day of the class period. Second, plaintiffs failed to identify their theory of liability beyond generic securities fraud principles applicable to all Section 10(b) cases, making it impossible to compare the damages methodology to the liability theory as Comcast requires. Third, the district court failed to conduct the rigorous analysis Comcast mandates, instead accepting an inadequate damages methodology and characterizing the liability theory at an inappropriately high level of generality. Finally, even Coffman's merits report submitted after certification was inconsistent with plaintiffs' allegations, as it assumed a constant-percentage inflation despite plaintiffs alleging 40 different misstatements of varying types over three years. The court emphasized that Comcast requires plaintiffs to frontload specific methodologies before certification, not defer commitments until after certification is granted.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges his drug trafficking conviction on the grounds that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by partially closing the courtroom during a witness's testimony. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addresses whether the partial closure was justified and whether it constitutes structural error requiring automatic reversal.

1. Whether a partial courtroom closure implicates the Sixth Amendment's Public Trial Clause or is too trivial to warrant constitutional protection
2. Whether violations of the public trial right constitute structural error requiring automatic reversal
3. What standard applies to partial courtroom closures versus total closures
4. Whether the district court's partial closure satisfied the modified Waller test for partial closures, specifically: (a) whether a substantial reason justified the closure; (b) whether the closure was no broader than necessary; (c) whether the court considered reasonable alternatives; and (d) whether the court made adequate findings to support the closure

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction in a 2-1 decision. The majority held that: (1) the closure was not trivial and therefore implicated the Sixth Amendment; (2) violations of the public trial right are structural errors requiring automatic reversal if violated; (3) a less demanding test applies to partial closures than to total closures, requiring a "substantial reason" rather than an "overriding interest"; and (4) the district court's partial closure satisfied all four factors of the modified Waller test. The court found that preventing witness intimidation and maintaining order constituted a substantial reason, the closure was tailored to exclude only those potentially responsible for intimidation while allowing the defendant's family to remain, the court considered both total and partial closure alternatives, and the court made sufficient findings through its colloquy with counsel and the marshals. Judge Richardson dissented, arguing that the closure failed all four Waller prongs because: (1) the record did not establish that intimidation was a real and present threat; (2) the closure was broader than necessary given the single unidentified spectator allegedly involved; (3) the court failed to consider non-closure alternatives such as admonishing the gallery or stationing a marshal; and (4) the court made no adequate findings to support the closure.

This is a First Amendment religious freedom case in which Lindsay Dyda, who holds a sincerely held religious belief preventing her from obtaining a Social Security Number (SSN), challenged Michigan's denial of her Commercial Learner's Permit application based on federal regulations requiring an SSN. The case became moot after federal regulators issued guidance clarifying that applicants with religious exemptions could waive the SSN requirement.

1. Whether Dyda's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot given the defendants' voluntary compliance with new federal guidance
2. Whether the defendants' change in policy constitutes genuine course correction or temporary litigation avoidance under the voluntary cessation doctrine
3. Whether Josette Tabor, a help desk worker, is entitled to qualified immunity for enforcing the SSN requirement
4. Whether a clearly established constitutional right to be free from religious discrimination in accessing public benefits was violated by the SSN requirement

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on two grounds. First, the court held that Dyda's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot because: (1) no live controversy remains—the defendants no longer require an SSN and are systematically implementing policy changes to comply with the new federal guidance; (2) the defendants' voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct was genuine, as evidenced by the timing of their response to the September 2025 FMCSA guidance letter and their sustained efforts to comply with federal law that predated the litigation; and (3) granting the requested relief would lack practical effect since the defendants are no longer engaging in the conduct Dyda sought to enjoin. Second, the court held that Tabor is entitled to qualified immunity because Dyda failed to identify a clearly established constitutional right that Tabor violated. The court reasoned that while the Free Exercise Clause protects against religious discrimination in accessing public benefits, the SSN requirement was facially neutral and generally applicable to all CLP applicants. The court found Bowen v. Roy—which upheld an SSN requirement in a federal nutrition assistance program against a Free Exercise Clause challenge—analogous and controlling. The court concluded that a reasonable official could understand from Bowen that enforcing a neutral, generally applicable SSN requirement does not violate clearly established law, and therefore Tabor's enforcement of the requirement reflected a reasonable but mistaken judgment about an open legal question, precisely the type of conduct qualified immunity is designed to protect.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal in which Jeffrey Hineman challenges his Wisconsin conviction for first-degree child sexual assault, arguing that the prosecution suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Seventh Circuit reviews whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court's rejection of these claims constituted an unreasonable application of federal law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

1. Whether the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose a March 2015 Child Protective Services (CPS) report that stated no information was given that Hineman had touched the victim or forced the victim to touch him
2. Whether the withheld CPS report was "material" to the outcome of trial under the Brady materiality standard, particularly where the defendant possessed a police report containing nearly identical language
3. Whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington when his attorney failed to obtain the CPS report
4. Whether the state court's application of Brady and Strickland precedents was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under AEDPA's demanding standard

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief and denied Hineman's petition. The court held:

1. Brady Claim: The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasonably concluded the CPS report was not material because it was cumulative impeachment evidence. Although the CPS report was favorable and suppressed, it contained nearly identical language to the police report already in the defendant's possession ("no specific information was given on if [Hineman] touched [SJS]"). The court reasoned that Brady does not require the prosecution to ensure the defense uses disclosed evidence advantageously, and the defendant's failure to use the police report to impeach the investigator's testimony was not the prosecution's responsibility. A fair-minded jurist could agree the evidence was merely cumulative and would not have changed the trial outcome, particularly given the strength of the victim's testimony and the credibility issues with Hineman's testimony.
2. Materiality Analysis: The court rejected the argument that the state court was required to expressly walk through all trial evidence to conclude the CPS report was immaterial. AEDPA does not impose mandatory opinion-writing standards on state courts, and the totality of circumstances supported the state court's conclusion. The case turned on credibility—a nine-year-old victim versus an adult defendant—and the State presented ample evidence explaining the victim's inconsistent disclosures, including expert testimony on common patterns in child sexual assault disclosures.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Strickland prejudice standard and Brady materiality standard are identical. Since the CPS report was not material under Brady, counsel's failure to obtain it could not have been prejudicial. Additionally, the April and May CPS reports that Hineman argued should have been obtained were not clearly erroneous findings by the state court, as they added nothing new to the picture and the trial evidence already showed investigative focus on Hineman and the adults' assumptions about his involvement.
4. AEDPA Deference: The court emphasized that under AEDPA's demanding standard, federal courts must give state courts the "benefit of the doubt" and may only grant habeas relief when a state court decision is "so lacking in justification that there was an error beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." The state court's decision was reasonable and did not constitute an extreme malfunction in the criminal justice system.

This is a criminal appeal in which Andrew Boltz challenges his conviction for sexually exploiting a 16-year-old minor (A.S.) through online grooming and solicitation of sexually explicit photographs. Boltz appeals multiple evidentiary rulings made by the district court during his trial.

1. Whether the district court properly excluded evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 (rape shield law) regarding sexually explicit photos and videos the victim sent to other men
2. Whether the district court properly admitted evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) of Boltz's prior grooming and sexual exploitation of another minor (M.C.) to establish his identity as the person messaging the victim
3. Whether testimony from the victim's mother regarding the victim's personality and vulnerability was properly admitted
4. Whether the government violated due process by failing to preserve certain Snapchat messages

The Seventh Circuit affirmed all of the district court's evidentiary rulings. First, the court held that evidence of the victim's sexually explicit communications with other men was properly excluded under Rule 412 because: (1) Boltz failed to comply with Rule 412's procedural requirements by not filing a pre-trial motion; (2) the evidence was not "central" to his defense because it did not negate the government's proof that Boltz induced the victim to produce explicit material; and (3) even if constitutional concerns existed, the evidence was irrelevant to the required elements of the crime. Second, the court upheld admission of the prior grooming evidence under Rule 404(b) because Boltz raised an identity defense (claiming he was not the one messaging the victim), and the distinctive pattern of grooming tactics—meeting minors on Omegle, moving to Snapchat, using similar manipulation phrases, and exchanging explicit photos—was probative of his identity rather than merely showing propensity. The evidence was not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 because it was highly probative and the videos were sanitized of extraneous inflammatory content. Third, the victim's mother's testimony about the victim's social isolation, vulnerability, and susceptibility to enticement was properly admitted as probative of the "induced or enticed" element of the statutory offense. Finally, the court found no due process violation regarding lost Snapchat messages because the government acted in good faith to preserve evidence and Boltz conceded he could not demonstrate bad faith by the government.

This is an appeal of a supervised release revocation sentence in which the defendant argues the district court impermissibly considered retributive factors when imposing a 24-month prison sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirms the sentence, finding that the court's remarks focused on forward-looking deterrence and rehabilitation rather than retribution for the underlying offense.

1. Whether a district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) by impermissibly considering retributive factors under § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release, following the Supreme Court's decision in Esteras v. United States (2025)
2. Whether specific statements by the district court—regarding "consequences," "sending a message," and holding the defendant "accountable"—constituted impermissible retribution for the underlying crime versus permissible sanctioning of breach of court-ordered conditions
3. The proper standard of review for sentencing errors not raised by the defendant at the district court level, and the interpretation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(a)

The court affirmed the sentence. The majority held that under Esteras, courts may not consider retributive factors in revocation proceedings but may consider deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. A holistic review of the district court's remarks demonstrated the court focused on forward-looking rehabilitation and deterrence, not retribution for the underlying methamphetamine offense. The court's statements about "consequences" and "accountability" referred to the defendant's violations of supervised release conditions and breach of the court's trust, not punishment for the original crime. The court properly sanctioned the defendant's failure to comply with court-ordered treatment despite being given a second opportunity.

In a concurrence, Judge Taibleson addressed the standard of review issue, arguing that the Seventh Circuit has misinterpreted Rule 51(a) for decades. He contended that Rule 51(a) only eliminates the formal "exception" procedure and does not excuse defendants from raising arguments in the district court. He advocated for the circuit to adopt normal issue-preservation requirements, requiring litigants to inform the court of their objections or face plain-error review, consistent with Supreme Court precedent and other circuits.

This is an ERISA benefits case involving a dispute over whether a power of attorney validly authorized an agent to execute a spousal waiver of retirement plan survivor benefits on behalf of the participant's surviving spouse. The plaintiffs sought to enforce a 2019 beneficiary designation form that was rejected by the plan administrator and recordkeeper.

1. Whether Wisconsin Statute § 244.41(1)(f), requiring an express grant of authority to waive spousal rights to a joint and survivor annuity, or § 244.51(2)(i), allowing such actions under a general grant of authority, applies to the power of attorney at issue
2. Whether the 2019 beneficiary designation form constituted a valid waiver of the surviving spouse's rights under ERISA § 1055
3. Whether the plan administrator and recordkeeper breached fiduciary duties under ERISA by rejecting the 2019 form
4. Whether a state-law negligence claim against the recordkeeper is preempted by ERISA
5. Whether to certify a question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court regarding the scope of power of attorney authority

The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. The court held that Wisconsin Statute § 244.41(1)(f) applies because the retirement plan benefits at issue were in the form of a joint and survivor annuity (the default form under the plans). This statute requires an express and specific grant of authority in the power of attorney for an agent to waive spousal rights to such benefits. The power of attorney here granted only general authority to name or change beneficiaries, not the specific authority to waive spousal survivor annuity rights. Therefore, the 2019 spousal waiver was invalid under Wisconsin law. The court declined to address whether the waiver would separately satisfy ERISA's requirements since it failed under state law. The court also rejected the breach of fiduciary duty claim, finding the plan administrator acted lawfully, and held that the negligence claim was preempted by ERISA as it involved a central matter of plan administration. Finally, the court denied the motion to certify a question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, finding the proposed question misstated the issue and that the case-specific determination was unsuitable for certification.

This is a wire fraud case in which Giulio Palma was convicted of defrauding investors who pooled approximately $6 million for a luxury Italian real estate investment venture. Palma misappropriated around $2 million of investor funds for personal use while falsely representing that he would not be compensated until properties were acquired.

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish a scheme to defraud, including whether Palma made material misrepresentations or omissions about the use of investor funds
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Palma's intent to defraud the investors
3. Whether Palma's claimed entitlement to a 7.5% commission provided a valid defense to the fraud charges
4. Whether the investors' alleged lack of due diligence or receipt of tax benefits negated the fraud

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Palma's conviction on six counts of wire fraud. The court found ample evidence supporting the jury's verdict on both elements of wire fraud. Regarding the scheme to defraud, the court held that Palma made material misrepresentations and omissions by concealing his personal use of investor funds while repeatedly telling investors he was working without compensation and would only be paid after property acquisition. The court rejected Palma's reliance on United States v. Weimert, distinguishing it because Palma kept investors in the dark about a key fact—his misuse of their money. Regarding intent to defraud, the court found that Palma's pattern of misleading investors and causing his accountant to mischaracterize personal expenditures as business expenses demonstrated fraudulent intent. The court rejected Palma's good faith defense based on a claimed 7.5% commission, finding no evidence that such a commission was contingent on anything other than actual property acquisition, which never occurred. The court also rejected arguments that investor negligence or tax benefits negated the fraud.

This is a Title IX appeal in which Isabelle Arana sued the University of Wisconsin-Madison after being sexually assaulted by fellow student Quintez Cephus. Arana challenges the University's decision to readmit Cephus following his criminal acquittal and the University's refusal to provide additional safety measures beyond a no-contact order.

1. Whether the University was "deliberately indifferent" to known sexual harassment under Title IX, which requires a school's response to be "clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances"
2. Whether a no-contact order, standing alone, constitutes a reasonable response to sexual assault allegations
3. Whether evidence of improper motivations (pressure from donors and public) for readmitting the accused student is relevant to the deliberate indifference analysis
4. Whether a school can be held liable for student-on-student harassment when the victim takes self-protective measures that prevent further contact
5. Unresolved questions about Title IX's scope: whether schools must exercise control over the context where harassment occurs, whether a single instance of harassment is actionable, and what "subjecting" a student to harassment means

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the University. The majority held that the University was not deliberately indifferent to Arana's sexual assault because: (1) it responded promptly to her report by separating her from Cephus with a no-contact order, providing academic accommodations, investigating thoroughly, and imposing discipline including expulsion; (2) the University's decision to readmit Cephus after his criminal acquittal, while based partly on new evidence, did not constitute deliberate indifference when considered alongside the maintained no-contact order; (3) evidence that donors and public pressure influenced the readmission decision is merely one fact to consider in the overall response analysis and is not dispositive in an indirect discrimination claim; and (4) the University's refusal to implement additional safety measures beyond the no-contact order was reasonable absent specific threats, and Arana was not entitled to demand particular remedial measures. The majority emphasized that schools are entitled to flexibility in responding to harassment, that responses need not be perfect, and that the high bar for Title IX liability requires deliberate indifference—a standard approaching intentional wrongdoing, not mere negligence. The dissent argued that a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference based on: Blank's inadequate explanation for overturning the assault finding, evidence of improper motivations, Cephus's prior violation of the no-contact order and disciplinary history suggesting it would be ineffective, and Arana's reasonable belief the University would not enforce the order, leading her to take self-protective measures that compromised her education.

This is an immigration asylum case in which the Ninth Circuit reviews the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of asylum and withholding of removal for Olga Garcia Demetrio and her three minor children, who fled Mexico after being targeted by a criminal organization. The court addresses whether age-based particular social groups (PSGs) are legally cognizable for asylum purposes and whether the BIA applied the correct standard of review to Garcia's claims.

1. Whether age is a sufficiently immutable characteristic to support a cognizable particular social group (PSG) for asylum purposes, specifically regarding Garcia's proposed PSG of "mothers of adolescent children living in Mexico"
2. Whether the BIA properly applied the immutability requirement in light of its own precedent in Matter of S-E-G-
3. Whether the BIA applied the correct standard of review (de novo versus clear error) when evaluating the nexus between Garcia's persecution and her membership in the PSG of "single women targeted by criminal groups in Mexico"

The Ninth Circuit granted Garcia's petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA. The court held that:

1. Age-based PSGs are "immutable" as a matter of law because asylum applicants cannot alter their age to escape persecution, even though age changes over time. The relevant age is the applicant's age at the time persecution occurred or is feared to occur in the future.
2. The BIA erred in holding that Garcia's PSG lacked immutability, as this contradicted the BIA's own precedent in Matter of S-E-G-, which recognized that while age is mutable, the mutability of age is not within one's control and age-based PSGs can be cognizable.
3. PSGs defined by an immutable relationship to a young or adolescent child are also immutable, so Garcia's status as a mother of adolescent children is immutable.
4. The BIA erred by applying the clear error standard of review rather than de novo review to the immigration judge's nexus determination regarding Garcia's gender-based PSG, requiring remand for proper application of the correct legal standard.

This is a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) case in which a consumer sued a debt collector for negligently failing to investigate his dispute of a delinquent rental debt that was incurred through identity fraud by his daughter. The central issue is whether a consumer must prove the disputed information was actually inaccurate to succeed on an unreasonable investigation claim under the FCRA.

1. Whether inaccuracy is a prima facie element that a consumer must prove to establish a negligent failure to investigate claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA
2. What standard should be used to determine whether disputed information qualifies as "inaccurate" under the FCRA
3. Whether Ward's claim of identity theft by his daughter constitutes objectively and readily verifiable inaccurate information

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and entered judgment for the defendant (NCS). The court held that: (1) inaccuracy is a required prima facie element of a § 1681s-2(b) unreasonable investigation claim; (2) reported information is actionably "inaccurate" only if it is "objectively and readily verifiable" by the furnisher as containing a mistake or error—not based solely on consumer allegations; and (3) Ward failed to meet this standard because his identity theft dispute was not objectively and readily verifiable. The court reasoned that determining whether Ward was an unknowing victim of his daughter's fraud or was complicit in the scheme required subjective credibility determinations and resolution of unsettled legal questions, which furnishers are not qualified to undertake. The objective evidence available to NCS (true copies of Ward's identification, his correct address, and his daughter's contact information) actually suggested Ward was connected to the debt, making the information not inaccurate under the applicable standard.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving a police officer convicted of sexually assaulting a civilian under color of law and falsifying records by deactivating his body camera and dashboard camera during the assault. The defendant challenges the district court's denial of a continuance, the applicability of the federal records falsification statute, and the length of his sentence.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a continuance filed by newly retained counsel less than three weeks before trial
2. Whether manually deactivating recording devices constitutes falsification of records under 18 U.S.C. § 1519
3. Whether the 480-month sentence imposed is substantively unreasonable under the sentencing guidelines

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence on all counts. On the continuance issue, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Applying a four-factor test, the court found that while a continuance would have been useful, the defendant was not diligent in seeking it (having waited six months before informing the court of his intent to hire private counsel and then waiting five more days to request a continuance), the inconvenience to the court was substantial given the court's unusually full calendar due to recent McGirt litigation, and the defendant failed to show material prejudice from the denial. On the § 1519 falsification issue, the court held that the defendant's knowing and intentional deactivation of his recording devices constituted falsification of official law enforcement records. The court reasoned that when a person creates an official record that purports to convey an accurate picture of events, they can be liable for falsifying that record if they knowingly create it in incomplete form with intent to convey a false representation. The court distinguished between passive failure to record (which would not violate § 1519) and affirmative deactivation of already-operating devices to prevent documentation of criminal conduct. The court found this interpretation consistent with precedent from other circuits involving omissions from police reports and with the court's own precedent regarding false entries in bank records. On sentencing, the court held that the 480-month sentence was substantively reasonable. The court emphasized substantial deference to the district court's sentencing decision and noted that the defendant's disagreement with how the court balanced the sentencing factors does not establish abuse of discretion. The court further noted that the particularly serious nature of abuse of official power by a public official typically justifies higher sentences.

This is an employment discrimination case in which Hua Jiang, a middle-aged Chinese national, challenged the City of Tulsa's hiring decision for a water-treatment plant superintendent position, alleging discrimination based on race, age, and national origin. The case involves a petition for rehearing en banc after the panel affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City.

1. Whether the district court properly applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in granting summary judgment to the City
2. Whether Jiang established pretext for discrimination when the City hired a younger, white applicant without the required bachelor's degree, contrary to the original job posting
3. Whether the McDonnell Douglas framework, particularly its focus on pretext, is appropriately applied at the summary judgment stage and whether it conflicts with the summary judgment standard requiring courts to view facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant

The petition for rehearing en banc was DENIED. The majority affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City, holding that Jiang failed to establish pretext under McDonnell Douglas. However, four judges (Hartz, Tymkovich, Bacharach, and Eid) would have granted the petition. Judge Eid's dissent argues that the majority improperly focused on pretext analysis rather than applying the summary judgment standard, which requires viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Eid contends that when both parties have met their burden of production at the third step of McDonnell Douglas, the question of whether discrimination occurred is a factual question for the jury, not a legal question for the court. Eid further argues that the Supreme Court's guidance in U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens directs courts to be more flexible in evaluating pretext and to proceed directly to the question of intentional discrimination, treating it like any other disputed question of fact in civil litigation.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving a dispute between co-founders of FilmPort, Inc., an AI film production company. Ekaterina Tchernavskikh sued Peter Accetturo and others for wrongful termination, loss of equity, and breach of alleged agreements regarding her ownership stake and board position, asserting both derivative claims on behalf of FilmPort and individual claims for damages.

1. Whether Plaintiff has standing to assert derivative claims on behalf of FilmPort based on continuous stock ownership
2. Whether Plaintiff adequately pleaded director status under Delaware corporate law (de jure and de facto)
3. Whether Plaintiff retained stockholder status despite the company's alleged exercise of a repurchase option under the Restricted Stock Purchase Agreement (RSPA)
4. Whether Plaintiff stated valid individual claims for breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, declaratory relief, and conversion

The Court GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART Defendants' motion to dismiss. Specifically:

1. Derivative Standing: The Court found that while Plaintiff failed to adequately plead director status (neither de jure nor de facto), she sufficiently pleaded stockholder status by alleging her original 30% equity interest was not subject to the RSPA's repurchase provisions. This allegation, accepted as true at the pleading stage, was sufficient to establish derivative standing.
2. Director Status: The Court rejected Plaintiff's director status claim, finding that Delaware law distinguishes between managerial authority (which Plaintiff exercised as CEO) and board authority. The Complaint lacked allegations of formal board appointment, board votes, or board participation required for either de jure or de facto director status.
3. Stockholder Status: The Court found Plaintiff adequately pleaded continued stockholder status because she alleged her original 30% equity existed independently of the RSPA and therefore was not subject to repurchase upon termination. The conflicting interpretations of the RSPA presented factual questions inappropriate for resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
4. Breach of Contract (DISMISSED): The Court granted the motion to dismiss this claim because Mr. Accetturo contracted on behalf of FilmPort as its sole director, not in his individual capacity. Officers of a corporation are not personally liable for corporate contracts unless they purport to bind themselves individually.
5. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation (DISMISSED): The Court granted the motion to dismiss because Plaintiff's own allegations and evidence (the RSPA, capitalization table, and written communications) confirmed that the representations she claimed were false were actually true. Since Plaintiff's theory depends on the truth of those representations, she cannot plausibly plead the threshold element of false statements required for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
6. Declaratory Relief (SURVIVED): The Court found Plaintiff stated a valid claim for declaratory relief because an actual controversy existed regarding her director status, the validity of her termination, and the validity of the stock repurchase, with real and adverse interests between the parties.
7. Conversion (SURVIVED): The Court found Plaintiff adequately pleaded conversion because she alleged ownership of shares and that Defendants wrongfully exercised dominion over them through repurchase without authority. The viability of the conversion claim turns on ownership rather than intent, and disputed factual questions regarding the RSPA's scope precluded dismissal as a matter of law.
8. Leave to Amend: The Court denied leave to amend with prejudice because Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint before her reply brief and did not demonstrate good cause for dismissal with prejudice to be unjust.

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery decision addressing a defendants' second application for certification of an interlocutory appeal in an advancement rights dispute. The court denies the application, finding that the defendants are attempting to appeal an implementing order rather than a substantive ruling on the merits.

1. Whether an implementing order that executes a prior ruling on advancement rights constitutes a "substantial issue" suitable for interlocutory appeal
2. Whether defendants can file successive interlocutory appeal applications with identical arguments directed at different orders
3. Whether implementing orders are "collateral matters" outside the scope of interlocutory review

The court denied the defendants' second application for certification of an interlocutory appeal. The court reasoned that the Implementing Order is a collateral matter that does not decide a main question of law relating to the merits of the case. Rather, it merely implements the prior Final Report and Letter Decision's substantive ruling on entitlement to advancement rights using the Fitracks framework. The court also found that allowing successive interlocutory appeals of implementing orders with repeated arguments would improperly give applicants "two bites of the apple" and therefore cannot be permitted. The court cited Jafar v. Vatican Challenge 2017, LLC as instructive precedent establishing that implementing orders are collateral to the underlying substantive issues and do not support interlocutory review.

This is a breach of fiduciary duty case in which a Delaware limited liability company seeks to hold a minority member (holding 7% interest) liable for alleged misconduct. The court addresses whether a passive, non-managing minority member can owe fiduciary duties to the company based on a theory of "transaction-specific control."

1. Whether a passive, minority member of a manager-managed LLC owes fiduciary duties to the company
2. Whether a minority member can be deemed a "controlling member" based on functional control or "transaction-specific control" over particular business matters
3. Whether manipulation of information flow and involvement in specific transactions can impose fiduciary duties on a minority member lacking structural authority

The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The court held that Tharp owed no fiduciary duties to Ruby Hollow because: (1) in a manager-managed LLC, only managers and managing members owe default fiduciary duties; passive members do not; (2) Tharp, as a 7% minority member with no structural governance rights, lacked the "formidable voting and managerial power" necessary to be treated as a controlling member; (3) the "transaction-specific control" theory does not apply where a member has no structural or functional authority over corporate decision-making; and (4) Tharp's active involvement in business matters and concealment of communications do not transform a passive minority member into a fiduciary. The court reasoned that any obligations Tharp owed were contractual in nature, governed by the LLC Agreement and consulting agreement, not fiduciary duties imposed by law.

This is a breach of contract and implied covenant case arising from a dealer agreement between Rhode Island Truck Center, LLC (RITC), a truck dealership, and Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, a truck manufacturer. RITC sued Daimler after Daimler appointed a competing dealer (ATGR) in RITC's designated sales territory, claiming breach of the dealer agreement and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

1. Whether Daimler breached the Dealer Agreement by appointing a new dealer in RITC's Area of Responsibility when the agreement permitted such appointment only when Daimler determined in its "sole discretion" that such addition was "warranted"
2. Whether the term "warranted" in the Appointment Provision requires Daimler to base its decision on market conditions within RITC's specific territory or permits broader business justifications
3. Whether Daimler breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by using its discretionary authority as a pretext to execute a consolidation scheme designed to eliminate RITC
4. Whether Daimler violated the implied covenant by falsely assuring RITC that the competing dealer would not serve the same market while knowing RITC was making substantial capital investments

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Daimler on both claims.

On the Breach of Contract Claim: The court held that the Dealer Agreement's Appointment Provision unambiguously grants Daimler "sole discretion" to appoint new dealers when it determines such appointment is "warranted." While "warranted" requires Daimler to have a reason (not arbitrary action), that reason need not be based on market conditions within RITC's specific territory. Instead, the reason must relate to the Dealer Agreement's broader objectives of establishing a nationwide dealer network and maximizing sales and customer satisfaction. The court found that Daimler's decision to appoint ATGR was based on legitimate business reasons—specifically, RITC's poor performance in meeting its sales and service obligations—which are consistent with the Dealer Agreement's objectives. The court rejected RITC's argument that Daimler needed to conduct market studies or follow specific procedures, noting that "sole discretion" affords Daimler substantial leeway so long as it does not violate express or implied terms. The consolidation plan, even if motivated by efficiency concerns, did not constitute a breach because it was tied to improving dealer performance and customer satisfaction.

On the Implied Covenant Claim: The court held that Daimler did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. First, the consolidation plan did not unfairly interfere with the Dealer Agreement's objectives because it was designed to optimize dealer operations and improve sales and customer satisfaction. Moreover, RITC retained its nonexclusive right to sell Freightliner trucks in Bristol County despite ATGR's appointment, and the parties expressly contemplated that possibility when they granted RITC only a "nonexclusive" right and gave Daimler "sole discretion." Second, regarding RITC's claim about false assurances regarding ATGR's future sales, the court held that the implied covenant cannot impose rights and duties not grounded in the Dealer Agreement. The Dealer Agreement did not require Daimler to provide information or assurances about other dealers in the network, so Daimler's alleged false assurance did not breach any contractual obligation.

This is a bankruptcy appeal concerning whether creditors' liens on Chester, Pennsylvania's revenue streams survive the city's Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing. The court addresses whether the liens are statutory liens exempt from bankruptcy discharge, whether the revenues constitute special revenues, and whether the creditors have rights to proceeds that survive bankruptcy.

1. Whether creditors' liens on pledged revenues (from a casino, trash incinerator, and gaming operations) are "statutory liens" that survive bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 552(a), or "consensual liens" that are cut off by bankruptcy filing
2. Whether the Slot Machine Revenues and Table Game Revenues constitute "special revenues" or "special excise taxes" that are exempt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 902(2)(B) and 928(a)
3. Whether creditors' security interests extend to "proceeds" of pledged revenues under 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)
4. Whether excess funds remaining in the Revenue Fund after creditor payments must be transferred to Chester under the Trust Indenture
5. Whether creditors have rights to pre-petition accruals that had not yet been paid out at the bankruptcy filing date

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court on three issues and remanded on two:

1. Statutory Liens (Affirmed): The court held that the creditors' liens are consensual liens, not statutory liens, because although authorized by city ordinances, the liens depend on the operative language in the Contribution Agreement and Trust Indenture to have effect. The ordinances alone do not create enforceable liens; they merely authorize the city to execute the agreements that actually create the liens. Therefore, Section 552(a) applies to cut off these liens on post-petition property.
2. Special Revenues (Affirmed): The Slot Machine Revenues and Table Game Revenues do not constitute special excise taxes but rather are fees paid for specific privileges (operating slot machines and table games) not shared by the general public. Under both Pennsylvania law and federal bankruptcy law, these are fees, not taxes, so they do not qualify for the special revenue exception under §§ 902(2)(B) and 928(a).
3. Disputed Excess Funds (Affirmed): The Trust Indenture Section 5.02(e) clearly mandates that excess funds in the Revenue Fund be transferred to Chester once the pledged revenues satisfy the city's bond obligations. The plain language of the contract controls, and there is no valid condition precedent requiring Chester to specify an account before receiving the funds.
4. Proceeds (Remanded): The court remanded for reconsideration of whether the creditors' security interests extend to proceeds. The Contribution Agreement language ("security interest in and to all such Revenues") appears similar to language in prior cases denying proceeds rights, while the Trust Indenture's Granting Clause ("security interest in all of the right, title and interest of the City in and to the Revenues") appears to contemplate a separate right to payment from which proceeds could derive. The Bankruptcy Court must determine whether these differing formulations convey distinct collateral and whether any proceeds would be indeterminate at the bankruptcy filing date.
5. Pre-Petition Accruals (Remanded): The court remanded for the Bankruptcy Court to address whether creditors have rights to the $1,360,845.07 in revenues that had accrued by the petition date but had not yet been paid out.

This is a consolidated Second Amendment case in which gun owners and advocacy groups challenged New Jersey's ban on "assault firearms" (including semi-automatic rifles) and restrictions on "large capacity ammunition magazines" (LCMs) capable of holding more than 10 rounds. The court addressed whether these state laws violate the Second Amendment under the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.

1. Whether semi-automatic rifles, specifically the Colt AR-15 and similar semi-automatic rifles, are protected by the Second Amendment's plain text
2. Whether New Jersey's de facto ban on semi-automatic rifles is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation
3. Whether large capacity ammunition magazines (LCMs) are "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment
4. Whether restrictions on LCMs are consistent with historical firearm regulation traditions
5. Whether the LCM Provisions constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
6. At which step of the Bruen framework the "in common use" analysis should occur

1. Assault Firearm Provisions - Semi-Automatic Rifles: The court MODIFIED the District Court's order and held that New Jersey's ban on semi-automatic rifles violates the Second Amendment. While the District Court limited its ruling to the Colt AR-15, the Third Circuit expanded this to cover all semi-automatic rifles because: (a) at step one, semi-automatic rifles are "Arms" within the plain text of the Second Amendment; (b) at step two, the regulation fails because it imposes a de facto ban on an entire class of weapons in common use for lawful purposes (approximately 24 million AR-15s and similar rifles in circulation), and there is no historical analogue supporting such a broad prohibition; (c) the regulation addresses the longstanding societal problem of weapons misuse, but the Founders did not adopt similar bans despite having the opportunity, making this a "straightforward" historical inquiry under Bruen; and (d) New Jersey's proposed historical analogues (gunpowder storage laws, Bowie knife restrictions, etc.) are not relevantly similar in their "why" (purpose) or "how" (mechanism) to the modern ban.
2. Large Capacity Ammunition Magazines: The court REVERSED the District Court's order and held that the LCM Provisions violate the Second Amendment because: (a) at step one, magazines—including those holding more than 10 rounds—are "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment's plain text, as they are necessary to operate many firearms and facilitate armed self-defense; (b) the capacity of a magazine does not determine whether it receives constitutional protection; (c) at step two, New Jersey failed to demonstrate that the LCM Provisions are consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation; and (d) the court addressed "common use" at step two (not step one) of the Bruen framework, finding that semi-automatic rifles are in common use for lawful purposes including self-defense, hunting, target shooting, and pest control.
3. Fifth Amendment Takings Clause: The court did not address the Takings Clause challenge because the LCM Provisions violate the Second Amendment, making the Takings Clause analysis unnecessary.
4. Scope of Review: The court rejected the District Court's limitation of the assault firearm analysis to only the Colt AR-15, finding that the record supported a ruling on all semi-automatic rifles. However, the court remanded for further proceedings on semi-automatic pistols, shotguns, and other weapons covered by the Assault Firearm Provisions due to insufficient record development on those categories.
5. Framework Issues: The court clarified that "in common use" analysis belongs at Bruen's second step (historical tradition analysis), not the first step (textual analysis), because common use is not part of the Second Amendment's text and logically fits within the "how" and "why" analysis of historical analogues. The court also rejected arguments that semi-automatic rifles implicate "unprecedented societal concerns" requiring a more nuanced historical approach, finding instead that the case presents a straightforward historical inquiry because the societal concern (weapons misuse) has persisted since the 18th century and the Founders could have adopted similar bans but did not.

This is an immigration law case concerning whether Alejandra Montesinos Cisneros, a Salvadoran national, was "admitted in any status" under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) when she returned to the United States on December 14, 1994, under the Executive's Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) program. The case addresses her eligibility for cancellation of removal after she was convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.

1. Whether Cisneros was "admitted" when she returned to the United States on December 14, 1994, despite holding only DED status (an immigration officer stamped her passport "Admitted" but handwrote "DED until Dec. 30, 1994")
2. Whether DED constitutes an immigration "status" as required by § 1229b(a)(2)
3. Whether "in any status" includes only lawful statuses or also encompasses unlawful statuses or the absence of status
4. Whether the phrase "in any status" requires membership in a congressionally-defined immigration classification

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Cisneros's petition for review, holding that she was not "admitted in any status" on December 14, 1994, and therefore is ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(a)(2). The majority (Judges Richardson and Agee) reasoned as follows:

1. Definition of "Status": The court held that "status" under the INA denotes membership in a legislatively-defined immigration classification. Status is a positive-law construct that carries legal entitlements the government must recognize, not merely a description of an alien's legal condition. The court traced this meaning to the dictionary definitions available when Congress enacted the INA in 1952.
2. DED is Not a Status: The court concluded that DED is not an immigration status but rather discretionary executive forbearance—a decision not to enforce the law against an alien with no entitlement to be in the United States. DED is grounded in the President's foreign relations power, not in any INA provision. Beneficiaries of DED remain in the country only at the government's sufferance with no statutory entitlement, and their presence is "terminable at the mere will" of the executive.
3. Rejection of "Unlawful Status" Argument: The court rejected Cisneros's argument that "in any status" includes unlawful statuses. The court reasoned that "unlawful status" presupposes the existence of a recognized status that was either unlawfully obtained or violated. An alien with no INA-recognized status cannot hold an "unlawful status"—the absence of status is not itself a status. The court distinguished between "status" (a legal classification) and "presence" (a fact about location), noting that Congress used "unlawful presence" elsewhere in the INA when referring to aliens remaining without authorization.
4. Statutory Construction: The court emphasized that the phrase "in any status" must have meaning; if it included anyone admitted regardless of status, the phrase would be superfluous. The court noted that other INA provisions like § 1255(a) require only "inspected and admitted" without mentioning status, showing Congress knew how to omit the status requirement when it chose to do so.
5. Historical Context: The court traced the history of § 1229b(a)(2) back to former § 212(c), which required "lawful unrelinquished domicile." Under all competing interpretations of that predecessor provision, the alien needed a lawful immigration status at some point. Congress enacted § 1229b(a)(2) in 1996 to reconcile competing interpretations, not to abandon the lawful-status-upon-entry requirement.
6. Statutory Structure: The court noted that § 1229b creates a two-track system: subsection (a) for those admitted in a status (requiring 7 years continuous residence after admission in any status), and subsection (b) for those not admitted in any status (requiring 10 years continuous physical presence and other demanding criteria). Allowing aliens with no status to qualify under subsection (a) would create arbitrary distinctions based on whether they happened to pass through a port of entry.

1. Cisneros was clearly "admitted" when the immigration officer stamped her passport "Admitted," and the officer's clear intent should not be second-guessed.
2. "Status" is not defined in the INA and should be interpreted broadly to include both lawful and unlawful statuses, consistent with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' reasoning in Tula Rubio v. Lynch and Saldivar v. Sessions.
3. The word "any" has an expansive meaning that encompasses all states or conditions a noncitizen may possess, and Congress knew how to require "lawful status" when it intended to do so (as it did in § 1229b(a)(1)).
4. Cisneros was admitted in "unlawful status" because her TPS had expired and she held no lawful status at the time of admission, which satisfies the statutory requirement.

This is a wrongful death products liability case arising from burn injuries sustained when the decedent's clothing allegedly ignited from a propane tank top heater. The plaintiff asserts a design defect claim, arguing the heater lacked an adequate guard or feasible alternative design to prevent clothing ignition when users came too close to the heater.

1. Whether adequate product warnings preclude a design defect claim as a matter of South Carolina law
2. Whether the district court properly excluded the plaintiff's human factors expert witness on reliability grounds under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert standards
3. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on the design defect claim based on the adequacy of the heater's warnings

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals:

1. Certified the question to the Supreme Court of South Carolina regarding whether adequate warnings preclude design defect claims. The court found that while Hickerson v. Yamaha Motor Corp. had predicted that adequate warnings preclude design defect liability under South Carolina law, the Supreme Court of South Carolina had not definitively answered this question. The court noted that Branham v. Ford Motor Co., a Supreme Court of South Carolina decision adopting the risk-utility test for design defects and indicating the court may consider modern developments in products liability law, created sufficient uncertainty to warrant certification. The court reasoned that modern products liability law treats design defects and warning defects as distinct theories, and the Restatement (Third) explicitly rejects the notion that warnings substitute for safe design.
2. Affirmed the exclusion of the expert witness (Dr. Nancy Grugle). The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding her opinions on reliability grounds. The expert lacked sufficient product-specific facts about the heater's operation (never inspected it in person, only saw it via videoconference, never felt its radiant heat), did not conduct user perception testing to validate her warning recommendations, failed to test whether existing warnings were understood or whether her proposed warnings would be more effective, and did not ground her opinions in comparable products, industry practice, or product-specific standards. The court found these omissions created an analytical gap between her general human factors principles and her specific conclusions about warning adequacy.
3. Deferred ruling on summary judgment pending the Supreme Court of South Carolina's response to the certified question. The court held that because the district court's summary judgment ruling depended entirely on the state law rule regarding whether adequate warnings preclude design defect claims, and because the Supreme Court of South Carolina's answer to the certified question may determine the outcome, the court would not rule on the summary judgment issue until receiving guidance from the state's highest court.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a state court's declaration of mistrial on double jeopardy grounds. Keith Allen Wood was retried after the trial court declared a mistrial following his opening statement, which referenced evidence the court had previously ruled inadmissible. Wood argues the mistrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because it lacked "manifest necessity."

1. Whether the trial court's declaration of mistrial was supported by "manifest necessity" as required by the Double Jeopardy Clause when a defendant objects to the mistrial
2. Whether the state court's interpretation of pretrial evidentiary orders—specifically whether Wood's opening statement violated those orders—constitutes an unreasonable factual determination reviewable under AEDPA
3. Whether the state court's application of the manifest necessity standard to the facts of this case was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, particularly Arizona v. Washington
4. Whether the trial court was required to consider alternatives to declaring a mistrial before granting the mistrial

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief and remanded with instructions to deny Wood's petition. The court held:

1. State Law Evidentiary Questions: The court declined to review the state court's interpretation of the pretrial evidentiary orders excluding the Stroud video interview and Aspenleiter counseling records, as these are state law questions not subject to federal habeas review absent a constitutional violation. Wood did not argue that excluding this evidence violated his constitutional rights.
2. Not Contrary to Clearly Established Law: The state court's decision was not contrary to Arizona v. Washington. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia did not focus solely on which party was at fault; rather, it referenced the pretrial evidentiary rulings as the core reason for the mistrial. This matched Washington's approval of a mistrial granted because defense counsel made improper remarks during opening statements.
3. Not an Unreasonable Application: Under AEDPA's "double-deference standard," the state court's application of the manifest necessity standard was not objectively unreasonable. The court applied a two-layer deference: (1) deference to the state court's decision under AEDPA, and (2) deference to the trial judge's discretion in declaring a mistrial. The trial court explicitly considered and rejected alternatives to declaring a mistrial, and Washington does not impose a mandatory requirement to consider alternatives.
4. Rejection of Circuit Court Standards: The court rejected reliance on United States v. Sloan's three-factor test for sound discretion, holding that circuit court decisions do not constitute "clearly established Federal law" under AEDPA § 2254(d)(1). Only Supreme Court holdings can establish such law.
5. Conclusion: While the court acknowledged that the issue might be closer on direct appeal, within the confines of AEDPA review, the state court's decision was reasonable and not subject to federal habeas relief.

This is an appeal of a personal injury lawsuit dismissal that was remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration of whether the plaintiff's omission of a claim from his bankruptcy schedule was inadvertent or intentional.

Whether the district court properly analyzed whether the plaintiff's failure to disclose a personal injury lawsuit in his bankruptcy schedule was the result of inadvertence or mistake, and whether the court's inquiry was improperly narrow in assessing only the plaintiff's knowledge of underlying facts and potential motive to conceal.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal and denial of the motion for reconsideration. However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Fifth Circuit had artificially narrowed its inquiry by limiting its analysis to whether the plaintiff had knowledge of facts or motive to conceal, rather than conducting a broader examination of whether the omission resulted from inadvertence or mistake. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion, with the appellate court expressing no view on what proceedings should be conducted or decisions made on remand.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Jennifer Thompson, a Godley city councilwoman and critic of the mayor, challenged her arrest for allegedly tampering with a government record. Thompson sued the City of Godley and several officials, alleging violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with her arrest minutes before a city council meeting where she planned to vote against the mayor's preferred appointees.

1. Whether Thompson adequately pleaded a Fourth Amendment Franks false arrest claim based on alleged misstatements in the warrant affidavit, requiring interpretation of Texas Penal Code § 37.10(a)(1) (tampering with a government record statute) and whether the document Thompson edited constituted a "government record"
2. Whether Thompson adequately pleaded a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim and whether the absence of probable cause defeats qualified immunity
3. Whether Thompson adequately pleaded municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, requiring identification of an official policy and causal connection to the constitutional violation
4. Whether Thompson adequately pleaded a fabrication claim based on deliberately false evidence used to obtain the arrest warrant
5. Whether malicious prosecution claims were properly forfeited on appeal

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of several claims and remanded for further proceedings:

1. Franks Claim: The court reversed the dismissal of Thompson's Fourth Amendment Franks false arrest claim against Officers Arbuthnot and Templer. The court held that the document Thompson edited—a courtesy copy of the agenda in her email inbox—was not a "government record" under Texas law because it was not "belonging to, received by, or kept by government for information." The court reasoned that not every copy of a government record is itself a government record, and that the courtesy copy had only informational salience to Thompson, not legal salience. Stripping away the alleged false statements from the affidavit (references to the "original" agenda, assertions of "forgery," and claims that the document was a "government document"), the affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the crime charged. The court affirmed dismissal of the Franks claim against Mayor McGehee and Interim Police Chief Cantrell, as they were outside the scope of Franks liability.
2. First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest Claim: The court reversed the dismissal of Thompson's First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims against all individual defendants. Because Thompson adequately pleaded the absence of probable cause, the Mt. Healthy test applied rather than the Nieves exception. Thompson plausibly alleged that retaliation for protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in her arrest, including allegations that defendants were aware of her disfavored speech, that the arrest was timed to prevent her from voting at the city council meeting, and that supervisors directed the arrest to punish her speech.
3. Monell Municipal Liability: The court reversed the dismissal of Thompson's Monell claims against the City. Thompson adequately pleaded a municipal custom and practice of using the police department to target persons engaging in disfavored speech, with specific facts including prior retaliation against other citizens and council members, threats made to Thompson, and notice to city policymakers. The court did not decide which specific policymaker promulgated the policy but found sufficient pleading that a statutorily-authorized policymaker did so, and that the policy served as the moving force behind Thompson's arrest.
4. Fabrication Claim: The court reversed the dismissal of Thompson's abuse of process claim, construing it as a fabrication claim based on a freestanding due process right not to have officials deliberately fabricate evidence. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether Thompson adequately pleaded this claim against both individual defendants and the City.
5. Malicious Prosecution Claims: The court found Thompson's malicious prosecution claims forfeited because she did not meaningfully brief them on appeal.

This is an appeal concerning whether a preliminary injunction granted by the district court should remain in effect after a factual change in circumstances. The case involves a union's challenge to a Louisiana Board of Ethics declaratory opinion that prohibited the union from paying for legal counsel for members appearing before a civil service board while a union officer served on that board.

1. Whether the case became moot when Craig Burkett, the union officer whose service on the Civil Service Board triggered the ethics conflict, resigned from the board
2. Whether Article III jurisdiction exists when there is no longer a live case or controversy
3. Whether the voluntary-cessation exception to mootness applies
4. Whether the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness applies

The Fifth Circuit held that the case became entirely moot upon Burkett's resignation from the Civil Service Board. The court found that neither party retained a legally cognizable interest in the outcome because: (1) the union was no longer subject to the ethics ruling's restrictions, and (2) there was no ongoing threat of enforcement. The court rejected the voluntary-cessation exception because Burkett's resignation was his own independent decision, not a voluntary cessation by the union as a party to the suit, and because Louisiana (the state) agreed the case was moot and had no interest in enforcing the ethics ruling against the union. The court also rejected the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception because there was no reasonable expectation that the union would again have an officer serve on the board. Accordingly, the court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges a restitution order issued under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) following his guilty plea to robbery. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviews whether the district court had statutory authority to award restitution for the victim's mental anguish and lost income when the victim suffered no physical bodily injury.

1. Whether the MVRA authorizes restitution for mental anguish standing alone, without accompanying bodily injury
2. Whether the MVRA authorizes restitution for lost income in the absence of bodily injury to the victim
3. Whether an appeal waiver bars challenges to the district court's authority to order restitution
4. The appropriate standard of review when a district court sua sponte raises and resolves a legal issue regarding sentencing without objection from the defendant
5. Whether the district court conducted a proper proximate cause analysis

The Fifth Circuit vacated the restitution award. The court held that:

1. Mental Anguish: The MVRA does not authorize restitution for mental anguish alone. The statute's plain language limits restitution to specific categories: property return, medical expenses and lost income for bodily injury, funeral expenses, and prosecution costs. Mental anguish does not fit within any of these categories. The court applied de novo review because the district court sua sponte raised and resolved this purely legal question, making preservation rules inapplicable.
2. Lost Income: The MVRA does not authorize restitution for lost income absent bodily injury. The statute explicitly conditions lost income restitution on an "offense resulting in bodily injury." Using dictionary definitions and statutory context, the court concluded "bodily injury" refers to physical injury to the body, not purely psychological harm. The court rejected the government's argument that psychiatric and psychological care provisions sweep in mental injuries, finding instead that such care is only compensable when necessitated by an underlying bodily injury. The court applied plain error review and found the error plain despite it being a question of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, noting overwhelming out-of-circuit authority supporting this interpretation and the unambiguous statutory language.
3. Appeal Waiver: Although Kirkwood signed an appeal waiver, it does not bar challenges to whether the district court exceeded its statutory authority to order restitution, as such challenges fall within the "exceeds the statutory maximum" exception to appeal waivers.

This is an employment discrimination case in which an EMT challenged her termination as unlawful retaliation under Title VII and Ohio civil rights law. The plaintiff claimed her firing was retaliatory after she complained about sexual harassment and misconduct by a coworker.

1. Whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity under Title VII when she showed nude and sexually explicit images of coworkers to other employees at work
2. Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
3. Whether an employee's protected activity (complaining about harassment) shields her from termination based on unprotected conduct (displaying explicit images)
4. The scope of Title VII protection for employee conduct and its limits when employees violate legitimate employer rules

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer. The court held that displaying nude and sexually explicit images of coworkers while on duty was not protected activity under Title VII. Although the plaintiff may have had a right to complain about the coworker's alleged sexual harassment, Title VII does not protect an employee who needlessly and gratuitously shares explicit images of coworkers. The court reasoned that when an employee engages in both protected and unprotected conduct, she cannot use the protected conduct to shield herself from termination based on the unprotected conduct. The court noted that the images were unnecessary to substantiate a harassment complaint, that displaying them made the workplace uncomfortable, and that the employer reasonably expected exemplary behavior from employees while on duty. The court also emphasized that even though the images were posted online, coworkers should not be subjected to viewing them in the workplace.

This is a civil rights case arising from a 2019 traffic stop in which Officer Terrance Stuckey arrested Naya Abbey on felony charges that were dismissed three years later after prosecutors disclosed dispatch tapes contradicting the officer's testimony. Abbey and her minor son D.H. sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth Amendment violations and a Brady violation based on the delayed disclosure of exculpatory evidence.

1. Whether Abbey's Fourth Amendment claims against Officer Stuckey were barred by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations, specifically whether the limitations period accrued on the date of the traffic stop (August 2019) or the date of disclosure of the dispatch tapes (August 2022)
2. Whether Metro violated Brady v. Maryland by withholding dispatch tapes for three years before trial dismissal
3. Whether the district court properly dismissed D.H.'s Fourth Amendment claims against Stuckey sua sponte without notice

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. On the statute of limitations issue, the majority held that Abbey's Fourth Amendment claims accrued on the date of the traffic stop in August 2019, not when she received the dispatch tapes in August 2022. Under both the "occurrence" rule and the "discovery" rule, Abbey knew of her injury and its cause on the date of arrest. The court reasoned that the discovery rule does not delay accrual until a plaintiff knows of the "legal wrong" (lack of probable cause), only until she knows of the "actual injury" (the arrest, search, or force itself). Abbey should have recognized the need to investigate her claims based on her own knowledge of the events, so her claims filed in April 2023 were time-barred. On Brady, the court held that no Brady violation occurred because Brady protects a "trial-related" right, and Abbey never stood trial—prosecutors dismissed her charges before trial. Regarding D.H.'s claims, the court reversed the district court's sua sponte dismissal, finding it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss D.H.'s claims against Stuckey without notice or opportunity to respond, especially since Tennessee law tolls the statute of limitations for minors until age 18, making D.H.'s claims likely timely. Judge Cole concurred in the judgment but expressed concerns about the discovery rule analysis and noted that equitable tolling or malicious prosecution claims might have been available. Judge Clay dissented, arguing that Abbey's claims should not be time-barred because the discovery rule should delay accrual until Abbey knew that Stuckey lacked probable cause, which she could not know until receiving the dispatch tapes, and that the government's three-year concealment of exculpatory evidence should toll the statute of limitations.

This is a civil rights case brought by Jacqueline Agee, an Illinois police officer, and her son John against three Indiana police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs allege that the officers intentionally pursued baseless criminal charges against them based on animus toward Jacqueline's status as an out-of-state law enforcement officer.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add class-of-one equal protection claims without providing an opportunity to do so
2. Whether the proposed class-of-one equal protection claims are legally futile based on the existence of probable cause for the charges
3. Whether plaintiffs adequately pleaded intentional differential treatment based on Jacqueline's status as an Illinois police officer
4. Procedural issues regarding the timing and proper treatment of post-judgment motions to amend under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend to assert class-of-one equal protection claims. The court held that: (1) plaintiffs are entitled to at least one opportunity to amend their complaint after dismissal, and the district court abused its discretion by denying this without explanation; (2) the proposed equal protection claims are not legally futile because probable cause is not established with certainty on the face of the complaint—particularly regarding Jacqueline's citation for "knowingly permitting" a discharge when no discharge was actually alleged to have occurred; (3) plaintiffs adequately pleaded intentional differential treatment and personal animus based on specific derogatory statements attributed to the officers about Illinois police officers; and (4) a class-of-one claim is not defeated merely because the plaintiff alleges a specific basis for the defendant's animus, as "law enforcement officer" is not a protected class. The court affirmed dismissal of the malicious prosecution, false arrest, and failure-to-intervene claims, and modified the dismissal of the state indemnification claim to dismissal without prejudice. The case was remanded for plaintiffs to proceed with their class-of-one equal protection claims.

This is a civil rights case in which Jacqueline Agee, an Illinois police officer, and her son John challenge the constitutionality of criminal charges and citations brought against them by three Indiana police officers. The plaintiffs allege the officers pursued baseless charges out of personal animus toward Jacqueline because of her status as an out-of-state law enforcement officer.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add class-of-one equal protection claims without providing an opportunity to cure deficiencies in the original pleading
2. Whether the proposed equal protection claims are legally futile based on the existence of probable cause for the charges against John and Jacqueline
3. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the equal protection claims
4. Whether a class-of-one equal protection claim can be pursued when the plaintiff alleges a specific basis for the defendant's animus (status as an out-of-state law enforcement officer)

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend and held that the plaintiffs' proposed class-of-one equal protection claims are not legally futile. The court reasoned as follows:

1. Amendment Standard: Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), district courts should freely grant leave to amend complaints, and this is especially important after an initial dismissal. The court must apply a rigorous standard of review when denying amendment based on futility, reviewing de novo the legal sufficiency of the proposed amended complaint.
2. Class-of-One Equal Protection Claim: A plaintiff may state a class-of-one equal protection claim by alleging intentional differential treatment from similarly situated persons with no rational basis for the difference. The plaintiff need not identify a specific comparator and need not belong to a protected class.
3. Probable Cause as to John: The complaint does not establish to a certainty that probable cause existed for the intimidation charge against John. While a reasonable officer might have concluded John was the suspect, critical facts are missing from the complaint, including the distance between John and the alleged victims, any statements John made, and descriptions of the airsoft gun beyond its color. These missing facts are relevant to whether the airsoft gun constituted a "deadly weapon" under Indiana law. Therefore, the claim is not futile.
4. Probable Cause as to Jacqueline: The citation alleged Jacqueline "knowingly permitted" John to discharge a pellet gun, but no witness reported a discharge. The officers' inference that a discharge occurred based on targets in the backyard and John's admissions to working on the gun is mere conjecture. Additionally, the ordinance prohibits both discharging and aiming a pellet gun, but the citation specifically charged discharge with knowledge and permission. On the facts alleged, probable cause was not established as a matter of law.
5. Specific Animus as Basis for Class-of-One Claim: Plaintiffs did not plead themselves out of a class-of-one claim by alleging a specific basis for the officers' animus (Jacqueline's status as an Illinois police officer). The class-of-one theory does not require that the basis for differential treatment be unrelated to any identifiable characteristic; it only requires that the plaintiff not belong to a traditionally protected class.
6. Qualified Immunity: The limited record does not establish qualified immunity as a matter of law, as it depends on the totality of what the officers knew about the incident and Jacqueline's involvement.
7. Other Claims: The court affirmed dismissal of the malicious prosecution, false arrest, and failure-to-intervene claims (which plaintiffs did not address on appeal), affirmed denial of leave to amend for the abuse-of-process claim (which plaintiffs indicated was duplicative), and affirmed dismissal of claims against the town of St. John for failure to allege a municipal custom or policy. The state-law indemnification claim was dismissed without prejudice as not yet ripe.

This is an ERISA fiduciary duty case in which a shareholder in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) challenged the sale of Segerdahl Corporation to a private equity firm for $265 million, alleging that the ESOP trustees and board members breached their fiduciary obligations by approving the sale for less than the company's true value. The district court found for the defendants on all claims, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

1. Whether the individual defendants (board members and executives) were fiduciaries of the ESOP subject to ERISA duties
2. Whether defendants breached their fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty by: (a) marketing the company only to financial buyers and excluding strategic buyers; (b) resuming negotiations with ICV after it lowered its bid; (c) disclosing Segerdahl's 2015 valuation to ICV; (d) allegedly revealing to ICV that it was the only remaining bidder; and (e) GreatBanc's failure to independently negotiate the sale price
3. Whether the sale constituted a prohibited transaction under ERISA § 1106 due to conflicts of interest
4. Whether plaintiff proved damages resulting from any fiduciary breach

The court affirmed the district court's judgment for defendants on all claims. The court held:

1. Standard of Review: The district court properly applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to review the defendants' fiduciary decisions, as established in Armstrong v. LaSalle Bank. This deferential standard applies to ERISA trustees' discretionary decisions absent a conflict of interest, consistent with trust law principles.
2. Fiduciary Breaches: The court found no clear error in the district court's rejection of all five fiduciary breach theories. Specifically: (a) excluding strategic buyers was justified by legitimate business concerns about competitive harm and the financial inability of competitors to complete the transaction; (b) resuming negotiations with ICV was consistent with maximizing the sale price, as defendants aggressively negotiated for higher bids; (c) disclosing the 2015 valuation was reasonable to demonstrate Segerdahl's growth trajectory; (d) there was no evidence of a leak to ICV about being the sole bidder—ICV independently determined this through its own diligence; and (e) GreatBanc fulfilled its fiduciary obligations by conducting its own investigation, relying on independent advisors (JP Morgan, Stout, and Drinker), and memorializing its reasoning.
3. Prohibited Transactions: The court rejected Rush's § 1106(b) claim against Schneider, finding no clear error in the district court's determination that ICV (not Schneider) required her to maintain equity in the post-sale company. The court also rejected Rush's § 1106(a)(1) claim against GreatBanc, holding that: (a) an intent requirement applies to such claims; (b) even if Schneider's post-sale investment constituted a prohibited transaction, defendants established the "adequate consideration" affirmative defense by proving the sale price reflected fair market value and was determined in good faith; and (c) allowing ESOP officers to maintain post-sale equity is consistent with ERISA's purposes, as buyers expect and prefer such arrangements.
4. Damages: The court found no clear error in the district court's determination that the $265 million sale price represented fair market value. The court rejected plaintiff's expert valuation of $19-44 million in damages because it relied on a hypothetical buyer rather than actual market evidence. The court also rejected plaintiff's uncorroborated testimony about a $320 million offer from Quad/Graphics and found that defendants did market the sale-leaseback, 338(h)(10) tax election, and Wolf Road litigation settlement to ICV, which simply did not value them as highly as plaintiff believed they should be.

This is a criminal appeal case in which the defendant Robert Carter filed a notice of appeal one week late from the denial of his compassionate release motion. The government moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, and the court addressed whether the appeal must be dismissed or whether the district court should first consider whether to grant an extension of time under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(4).

1. Whether the plain text of Rule 4(b)(4) requires a defendant to file a motion to obtain an extension of time to appeal in criminal cases, or whether the district court may extend the deadline without a motion.
2. Whether the docketing of an untimely notice of appeal by the clerk constitutes an implicit extension of the appeal deadline.
3. Whether the court of appeals should dismiss an untimely criminal appeal before the district court has had an opportunity to consider whether to grant an extension of time based on good cause or excusable neglect.
4. The distinction between the procedural requirements for extensions in criminal cases under Rule 4(b)(4) versus civil cases under Rule 4(a)(5).

The court held that: (1) Rule 4(b)(4)'s plain text does not require a defendant to file a motion to obtain an extension of time in criminal cases, as it permits extensions "with or without motion"; (2) the docketing of an untimely notice of appeal does not implicitly extend the deadline, and an extension requires an affirmative finding of good cause or excusable neglect by the district judge; (3) when a notice of appeal is filed within the 30-day extension window of Rule 4(b)(4), the court of appeals should not dismiss the appeal until the district court has made a finding on whether an extension is justified, even absent a motion from the appellant; and (4) the court will suspend its proceedings and remand to the district court to determine whether Carter's one-week delay constitutes good cause or excusable neglect warranting an extension. The court reasoned that Rule 4(b)(4) differs significantly from its civil counterpart by not requiring a motion, and that this interpretation aligns with the consensus of other circuits and recognizes that many criminal appellants are pro se prisoners unfamiliar with procedural requirements.

This is a labor law case involving the confirmation of an arbitration award against hotel management entities for violating a collective bargaining agreement by operating a migrant housing facility without using union employees. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviews the district court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.

1. Whether non-signatory parties (Allegiant, Polselli, and Social Club) could be bound by an arbitration award when only Elmar signed the agreement to assume the collective bargaining agreement
2. Whether the arbitrator had authority to determine that the Inn was operating as a "hotel" within the meaning of the CBA and that multiple entities constituted a "single employer"
3. Whether the arbitrator could find NLRA violations against parties not specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge
4. Whether the Employers received adequate notice and due process, including whether drawing an adverse inference from Karcho's failure to testify was improper
5. Whether the Award violated public policy by "piercing the corporate veil" to hold non-signatories liable

The court affirmed the arbitration award. The court held that:

1. Non-signatory parties who participate in arbitration without reserving the right to challenge arbitrability cannot later argue they were not bound by the arbitrator's decision. Here, all Employers participated with shared counsel and never explicitly objected to arbitrability.
2. The arbitrator's determinations that the Inn was operating as a "hotel" and that the entities constituted a "single employer" drew their essence from the CBA. The arbitrator interpreted the CBA's broad definition of "Employer" and the agreement's references to hotel operations, which is within an arbitrator's proper scope. Even if the inquiry exceeded the CBA's scope, the parties expressly submitted these issues to arbitration by arguing them extensively without objecting to the arbitrator's authority.
3. The arbitrator had authority to find NLRA violations against all parties because they were all determined to be "Employers" under the CBA.
4. The Employers received adequate notice and due process. The grievances and NLRB charge were addressed to or named the relevant parties and their representatives, and all parties appeared at the hearings with counsel. The adverse inference from Karcho's failure to testify was not the sole basis for the arbitrator's decision but merely one factor among many.
5. The Award did not violate public policy. The arbitrator did not improperly pierce the corporate veil but rather properly interpreted the CBA's definition of "Employer" to encompass the related entities under Polselli's control.

This is a criminal appeal in which the defendant challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a computer search. The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction for producing child pornography, holding that officers violated the Fourth Amendment by continuing to search after probable cause dissipated, and that suppression of the evidence is the appropriate remedy.

1. Whether the second search warrant's "dominion and control" provision was overbroad and insufficiently particular under the Fourth Amendment's specificity requirement
2. Whether probable cause dissipated when officers discovered a surveillance video showing consensual sexual conduct, contradicting the rape allegations that formed the basis for the warrant
3. Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when officers continue searching after probable cause dissipates
4. Whether the plain view doctrine independently justified seizure of the child pornography evidence
5. Whether suppression is the appropriate remedy despite the heinous nature of the underlying crime

The court reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence. The majority held: (1) Although probable cause existed when the second warrant was issued, the dominion and control provision was overbroad and insufficiently particular because it lacked temporal limitations and allowed unlimited discretion to search files from any time period; (2) Probable cause dissipated when officers discovered the surveillance video showing the alleged rape was consensual, directly contradicting the victim's account of forcible compulsion; (3) Under binding precedent, no reasonable officer would continue searching after probable cause dissipated, and the officers' continued search was not undertaken in good faith; (4) The plain view doctrine does not apply because officers were not lawfully searching when they found the child pornography evidence; and (5) Suppression is the appropriate remedy because the deterrent effect is significant and outweighs the social cost, given the officers' deliberate disregard for Fourth Amendment rights in continuing to search after exculpatory evidence emerged. Judge Sung dissented, arguing that no precedent required officers to stop executing the warrant and report to the magistrate, that probable cause did not completely dissipate, and that suppression was unwarranted.

This is a civil rights case in which a mother sued school officials on behalf of her Black son who experienced severe racial harassment and bullying by his schoolmates over a five-year period. The plaintiff alleges that school officials violated the student's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights through deliberate indifference to the racial harassment despite multiple reports from the mother.

1. Whether school officials are entitled to qualified immunity on a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim based on deliberate indifference to peer-on-peer racial harassment
2. Whether it was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct that a school official's deliberate indifference to racial harassment would violate the Equal Protection Clause
3. Whether the complaint adequately alleged the personal participation of school board members in the alleged equal protection violation

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The court held that: (1) the complaint plausibly alleged an equal protection violation through deliberate indifference to racial harassment, satisfying the first prong of the qualified immunity test; (2) it was clearly established law at the time of the alleged conduct that school officials' deliberate indifference to racial harassment violates the Equal Protection Clause, based on the court's precedents in Ryan v. City of Shawnee (1993) and Murrell v. School District No. 1, Denver (1999), as well as consensus authority from other circuits; and (3) the complaint adequately alleged the personal participation of the school board members by identifying them as recipients of the April 2022 complaint email and reading the allegations in context throughout the complaint. The court reasoned that while the Equal Protection Clause requires specificity in some contexts, it provides relatively straightforward and discernible standards, and a general constitutional rule can clearly establish law if it applies with obvious clarity to the specific conduct at issue, even without a factually identical precedent.

This is an employment discrimination appeal involving a school district principal who was demoted to assistant principal. Linda Maccagnan sued Cherry Creek School District and individual defendants alleging violations of her constitutional and statutory rights, including procedural due process, First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, Equal Pay Act, and Title IX claims.

1. Whether Maccagnan had a protected property interest in continued employment as principal under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
2. Whether the school district's salary adjustment based on relevant experience constituted unlawful pay discrimination under the Equal Pay Act
3. Whether Maccagnan was subjected to disparate treatment based on gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX
4. Whether evidence of a similarly-situated male comparator (Ryan Langdon) was properly excluded at trial
5. Whether Dr. Roybal's notes from staff meetings were properly admitted as evidence
6. Whether sufficient evidence supported a jury verdict on disparate treatment and sex stereotyping claims

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on all claims. The court held:

1. Procedural Due Process: Maccagnan lacked a protected property interest in continued employment as principal because Colorado law (TECDA) does not provide tenure protections for administrators, and Cherry Creek's practice of offering year-to-year contracts did not create an implied promise of continued employment.
2. Equal Pay Act: Although the district court erred in requiring Maccagnan to prove pretext, summary judgment was properly granted because the school district established its affirmative defense that the pay disparity was based on relevant administrative experience, a legitimate "factor other than sex."
3. Equal Protection (Disparate Treatment): Summary judgment for Cherry Creek was proper because Maccagnan failed to allege an official policy or custom of discrimination required for municipal liability under § 1983, and the district court properly retained discretion to revise its interlocutory ruling before final judgment.
4. Comparator Evidence: The exclusion of evidence regarding Ryan Langdon was proper because he and Maccagnan were not similarly situated—they had different direct supervisors (Mullner vs. Roybal) who made the disparate treatment decisions, and the supervisors' different responses to similar Listening Tour concerns could be explained by non-discriminatory motives.
5. Dr. Roybal's Notes: The notes were properly admitted as non-hearsay evidence of their effect on the decision-makers' state of mind, and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
6. Judgment as a Matter of Law: JMOL was properly granted on both disparate treatment and sex stereotyping claims because: (a) the trial evidence showed Maccagnan was treated the same as a similarly-situated female principal and the same or worse than male principals, failing to establish disparate treatment; and (b) Maccagnan's sex stereotyping evidence was minimal, consisting of unattributed comments and gender-neutral terminology that she merely characterized as stereotypical without corroborating support, and even if stereotypes were present, Defendants' testimony established they did not rely on gender in making the demotion decision.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Charles Littlejohn challenges his five-year prison sentence for unlawfully disclosing the tax records of President Donald Trump and approximately 7,600 wealthy Americans. Littlejohn obtained a position at the IRS specifically to access and leak the President's tax information to influence the 2020 election and to expose tax avoidance by wealthy individuals.

1. Whether the district court predetermined Littlejohn's sentence, thereby violating procedural fairness
2. Whether the district court relied on clearly erroneous factual findings regarding the political motivation and targeting of the President
3. Whether the district court impermissibly considered a letter from members of Congress requesting the maximum sentence
4. Whether the district court adequately explained its upward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range (1-1.5 years) to the statutory maximum (5 years)
5. Whether the five-year sentence was substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors
6. Whether the sentence created unwarranted disparities compared to similar cases

The Court of Appeals affirmed the five-year sentence, finding it both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Procedural Reasonableness: The court rejected all of Littlejohn's procedural challenges. It found no evidence of predetermined sentencing, noting the district court's careful deliberation, sympathetic comments about Littlejohn's character, and probing questions suggesting an open mind. Although the off-the-record communications should have been on the record, they contained indications of indecision and were not evidence of predetermined sentencing. The court's factual findings—that the crime was politically motivated, targeted a sitting President, attacked constitutional democracy, and was intended to harm thousands—were not clearly erroneous based on Littlejohn's own statements about his motives. The district court explicitly stated it would not base its decision on the congressional letter and that it had "zero impact" on the sentence. The court adequately explained the upward variance by citing specific aggravating factors: intentional targeting of the President, targeting of thousands of other victims, the elaborate multi-year scheme, and ongoing harm to victims fearing future disclosures. Substantive Reasonableness: Applying the six statutory sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court found the sentence reasonable. The offense was far more serious than typical tax record disclosures because it targeted the presidency itself and thousands of Americans on an unprecedented scale. Littlejohn's characteristics as a sophisticated IRS consultant who received training on data protection and criminal consequences supported an upward variance. The sentence appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offense and provided adequate deterrence against government officials taking the law into their own hands. Although factors weighing against an upward variance (public protection and correctional treatment) existed, they were significantly outweighed by other sentencing purposes. The court properly considered the Guidelines range and found no comparable cases involving disclosure of a sitting President's tax information, making sentence disparity arguments inapplicable.

This is a criminal appeal concerning the sentencing of Ahmed Abu Khatallah for his role in leading the 2012 terrorist attack on the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya. The case involves the government's challenge to a 28-year sentence as unreasonably lenient, and Khatallah's cross-appeal challenging the procedural validity of the resentencing.

1. Whether the district court procedurally erred by imposing a higher sentence on remand while expressing belief that the original 22-year sentence was appropriate
2. Whether the 28-year sentence is substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors
3. The proper application of the sentencing-package doctrine when combining section 924(c) offenses with predicate offenses
4. Whether the district court properly applied the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4
5. The appropriate treatment of acquitted conduct in calculating the Guidelines range
6. Whether the district court properly declined to impose consecutive sentences under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d)
7. Whether deportable alien status justifies a downward variance in sentencing

The Court of Appeals vacated the 28-year sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held:

1. Procedural Error (Cross-Appeal): Khatallah's claim of procedural error was rejected. The district court did not plainly err by imposing a higher sentence to comply with the appellate mandate that the original sentence was "shockingly low."
2. Substantive Reasonableness (Government's Appeal): The 28-year sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court's four justifications cannot support the variance from the 40-year-to-life Guidelines range:
   • Sentencing-Package Doctrine: While the doctrine is permissible, the court's three supporting rationales are unpersuasive. The seriousness of Khatallah's offenses—leading a premeditated armed attack on a U.S. diplomatic outpost with intent to kill Americans—is not adequately reflected in a 28-year sentence. The "unique context" of the Libyan civil war does not reduce the need to deter attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities. And the court's public-safety rationale, based on Khatallah's age, is undermined by the court's own findings that he might resort to violence to achieve political or religious goals and could reconnect with contacts in Libya.
   • Concurrent Sentences: The district court's purported exception to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) based on "same conduct" cannot justify the sentence because the sentence remains substantively unreasonable under § 3553(a).
   • Terrorism Enhancement: The district court erred in concluding that Khatallah did not warrant the full terrorism enhancement. The statutory definition of federal crimes of terrorism encompasses offenses that do not require realized harm to persons. Khatallah's conduct—leading an armed attack on a U.S. diplomatic outpost with the goal of killing Americans—is a quintessential act of terrorism regardless of whether harm was actually inflicted.
   • Deportable Alien Status: While a modest downward departure (approximately six months) is permissible under prior precedent for deportable aliens, this cannot justify the full variance imposed.
3. Sentencing Factors: The court emphasized that on remand, the district court must give greater weight to: (1) the grave seriousness of Khatallah's offenses as a terrorist attack leader; (2) deterrence considerations, particularly the need to ensure that those contemplating attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel face severe consequences; and (3) the accurate characterization of Khatallah's conduct as a terrorist attack, not "essentially a property crime."

This case involves environmental groups' challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's extension of compliance deadlines for steel mill hazardous air emission standards. The EPA initially promulgated emission standards in 2024 with compliance deadlines of one to two years, then issued an interim rule extending those deadlines to April 3, 2027, citing technological infeasibility, and subsequently promulgated a final rule reaffirming the extensions.

1. Whether EPA had statutory authority under the Clean Air Act to extend compliance deadlines beyond the three-month limit permitted for stays pending reconsideration
2. Whether the extended deadlines comply with the Clean Air Act's requirement that EPA set deadlines providing for compliance "as expeditiously as practicable, but in no event later than 3 years"
3. Whether EPA's use of the "good cause" exception to bypass notice and comment procedures for the interim rule was procedurally valid
4. Whether petitioners had standing to challenge the rules

The court upheld EPA's deadline extensions and denied the petitions for review. The court held that:

1. EPA had authority to extend the compliance deadlines through rulemaking based on its regulatory authority to establish compliance dates, distinguishing this case from Air Alliance where EPA relied solely on the need for reconsideration time. EPA's specific findings regarding technological infeasibility and compliance challenges provided a valid basis for the extensions.
2. The extended deadlines were reasonable and consistent with the Clean Air Act. EPA identified specific technical problems with each standard—including incomplete data used to set opacity limits for bleeder valves, new information showing bell seals could produce unexpected emissions, ambiguities in furnace monitoring requirements, and operational challenges for slag processing and beaching—that demonstrated compliance within the original timeframes was impracticable. The three-year extension period satisfied the statutory requirement for expeditious compliance.
3. The procedural challenge to the interim rule was moot because EPA subsequently promulgated an identical final rule after providing notice and comment, which cured any procedural defect.
4. The fenceline monitoring deadline challenge was dismissed as moot because the deadline under the 2024 Rule and the Final Rule became identical with the passage of time, providing no meaningful relief.
5. Petitioners had associational standing to bring the challenge based on declarations from members living near steel mills who experienced health and environmental harms from air pollution.

This is a criminal appeal in which the United States challenges a district court's exclusion of evidence of the defendant's prior child molestation conviction in a case involving charges of distributing child pornography and attempting to sexually exploit a minor. The government appeals the district court's in limine rulings that excluded evidence of the defendant's prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 414.

1. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the government's appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, given the timeliness of the notice of appeal.
2. Whether the district court erred in its legal analysis of the relationship between Federal Rule of Evidence 414 (which permits propensity evidence in child molestation cases) and Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (which permits exclusion of relevant evidence when probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice).
3. Whether evidence of the defendant's prior child molestation conviction should be excluded under Rule 403 as unfairly prejudicial.

The Court of Appeals held that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the government timely filed its notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court's final ruling on the evidence. The court vacated the district court's exclusion of the prior-conviction evidence, finding that the district court misunderstood the legal relationship between Rules 403 and 414. Specifically, the court held that Rule 414 creates an exception to Rule 404(b)'s general ban on propensity evidence in child molestation cases, meaning that a propensity inference can no longer be treated as categorically "unfair" under Rule 403. The district court erred by conducting its Rule 403 analysis as if Rule 414 did not remove the categorical bar against propensity evidence. The court remanded the case for the district court to reassess the admissibility of the evidence under the correct legal standard, instructing the district court to give due weight to the probative value of the evidence (which is significant for showing intent and identity) while still considering whether other Rule 403 concerns—such as the risk that the jury will convict out of retribution rather than guilt—warrant exclusion.

This is a defamation case in which Rinat Akhmetshin sued Sir William Browder for allegedly defamatory statements made about Akhmetshin being a Russian spy or intelligence operative. The central issue is whether Browder's statements subjected him to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia.

1. Whether D.C. local courts should apply the International Shoe minimum-contacts test (applicable to state courts) or a more flexible jurisdictional standard applicable to federal courts under the Fifth Amendment
2. Whether Browder formed jurisdictionally significant contacts with D.C. through the "effects test" established in Calder v. Jones, based on his statement that Akhmetshin was a "spy operator in Washington"
3. Whether Browder's other contacts with D.C. were sufficiently related to the defamation claim to establish personal jurisdiction under Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court
4. Whether Browder was entitled to attorney's fees under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act after prevailing on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and denied attorney's fees.

1. Personal Jurisdiction - D.C. Courts Apply International Shoe Test: The court held that D.C. local courts, like state courts, have territorially constrained sovereign authority and must apply the International Shoe minimum-contacts test. Although the Fifth Amendment applies to D.C. courts (unlike the Fourteenth Amendment for state courts), the Supreme Court's recent decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization did not establish a different jurisdictional standard for D.C. courts because Fuld addressed federal courts, which wield nationwide and extraterritorial authority distinct from D.C.'s local, territorial authority.
2. Calder Effects Test Does Not Apply: Browder did not form jurisdictionally significant contacts with D.C. under Calder. Although Browder made a single statement calling Akhmetshin a "spy operator in Washington," this off-hand remark during a six-minute interview was not sufficient. The focal point of Browder's statements was the Trump Tower meeting in New York, not D.C. events. Under Walden v. Fiore's clarification of Calder, the forum must be the focal point of both the story and the harm. Here, D.C. was merely incidentally mentioned, while the narrative centered on New York events occurring 200 miles away.
3. Ford Relatedness Test Does Not Apply: Browder's other D.C. contacts (such as speaking at think tank events about U.S.-Russia relations) did not establish the "strong relationship" required by Ford. Ford requires both systematic contacts with the forum and conduct extraordinarily similar to the conduct giving rise to the claim. Browder's D.C. contacts were isolated or sporadic and involved thematic relatedness only, not the type of systematic market conduct Ford contemplated. Chatting about U.S.-Russia relations at think tanks is not remotely similar to making disparaging comments about D.C. residents over mass media.
4. No Attorney's Fees Under Anti-SLAPP Act: Browder was not entitled to attorney's fees because he prevailed on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, not on a motion under D.C. Code § 16-5502 (the Anti-SLAPP Act's special motion to dismiss procedure). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure displace the Anti-SLAPP Act's special motion procedure in federal court because they answer the same question about dismissal differently. The Anti-SLAPP Act explicitly provides attorney's fees only to parties who prevail on a § 16-5502 motion, not to those who obtain dismissal through other means such as Rule 12(b)(2).

This is a Delaware Court of Chancery case involving a dispute between David Namdar and Immutable Holdings Inc. over an employment agreement and alleged compensation obligations. The court addresses whether Namdar's counter-counterclaim for breach of contract should be dismissed based on procedural and substantive grounds.

1. Whether the Court of Chancery Rules permit the filing of a "counter-counterclaim" (counterclaim in reply to a counterclaim) as a procedurally proper pleading
2. Whether the counter-counterclaim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata
3. Whether the counter-counterclaim is time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims and the equitable doctrine of laches
4. Whether the amended counter-counterclaim relates back to the original counter-counterclaim under Rule 15(c) for relation-back purposes

The court recommended denying Immutable's motion to dismiss. The court held that: (1) the Court of Chancery Rules, when read together with Rules 7 and 13, permit counterclaims to be asserted in a reply to a counterclaim based on plain language interpretation; (2) res judicata does not apply because it requires a prior action litigated to finality, and this counter-counterclaim is part of the same ongoing case; and (3) the amended counter-counterclaim is timely because it relates back to the original counter-counterclaim filed on July 14, 2025, under Rule 15(c), as Immutable had fair notice of the breach of contract claim from the original pleading. The court rejected the alternative tolling argument based on Delaware law that counterclaims seeking affirmative relief must independently satisfy the statute of limitations.

This is a procedural order in a family law matter where the court addresses the timeliness of exceptions filed by the defendant to a magistrate's final report. The defendant's initial exceptions were filed late, and her subsequent attempt to challenge the dismissal of those exceptions was also untimely.

1. Whether the defendant's initial exceptions to the magistrate's final report were timely filed under Court of Chancery Rule 144(d)(1)
2. Whether the defendant's subsequent exceptions to the magistrate's addendum recommending dismissal were timely filed
3. Whether the defendant demonstrated excusable neglect sufficient to excuse the untimely filings

The court denied both sets of exceptions as untimely. The defendant's first exceptions were filed on April 9, two days after the April 7 deadline. The defendant's second exceptions, challenging the dismissal of the first exceptions, were filed on May 8, nine days after the April 29 deadline. The court found that the defendant's explanations—self-representation, a misplaced mailbox key, and a family emergency—did not constitute excusable neglect under the applicable standard, particularly given the nine-day delay. The court noted that reasonable diligence would have required the defendant to meet the deadline or seek an extension before it passed, even for a self-represented party.

This is a breach of contract case in which a minority member of a Delaware limited liability company seeks specific performance of the company's obligation to make quarterly tax distributions to its members under the operating agreement. The plaintiff, a rollover shareholder who received phantom income tax liability despite the company's operational losses, claims the company wrongfully withheld required tax distributions from 2022 through 2025.

1. Whether the company breached its obligation under Section 6.6 of the operating agreement to make quarterly tax distributions to members when the company had "cash available after taking into account reasonable reserves as determined in the good faith discretion of the Board"
2. Whether the board acted in subjective good faith when determining the company lacked available cash for tax distributions, given the highly deferential contractual definition of good faith requiring only that a majority of directors subjectively believe the decision is in or not opposed to the company's best interests
3. Whether the board withheld distributions as a pretext to force a buyout of the plaintiff's equity at a discount
4. Whether the company breached its obligation to make commercially reasonable efforts to ensure financing documents allowed for tax distributions
5. Whether the company breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

The court entered judgment for the defendant company, denying the plaintiff's request for specific performance and damages. The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove a breach of the operating agreement under any theory.

1. Good Faith Determination of Available Cash: The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove the board acted in bad faith when determining the company lacked "cash available after taking into account reasonable reserves." The board made repeated determinations throughout the relevant period that the company lacked sufficient cash, supported by contemporaneous financial analysis. The court found the board's testimony credible that it subjectively believed withholding distributions was in the company's best interests. The plaintiff's primary theory—that the board withheld distributions to coerce a buyout—failed because the record showed OceanSound never made a formal offer and the plaintiff had substantial financial resources from other sources.
2. Predicate Determinations: The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the board failed to make formal quarterly determinations of available cash. The board held a special meeting on August 7, 2023, and continuously monitored the company's cash position through daily updates, monthly financial reporting, and 13-week cash flow forecasts. The board repeatedly decided not to pay distributions, and in November 2024 executed a written consent memorializing these determinations.
3. Cash Position Analysis: The court found the company's cash position supported the board's rational decision. From September 2023 to October 2025, the company's average minimum forecasted cash balance was $2.1 million. If the company had paid the full tax distributions due, it would have had negative cash balances on multiple occasions. The board's decision to use sale proceeds from the commercial division to pay down debt rather than make distributions was a rational business judgment, not evidence of bad faith.
4. Debt Financing: The court held that the board's decision not to incur additional debt to fund tax distributions did not evidence bad faith. The decision whether to take on company debt is a quintessential board function, and disagreement with that decision does not show bad faith.
5. Commercially Reasonable Efforts: The court found no breach of the obligation to make commercially reasonable efforts to ensure financing documents allowed for tax distributions. The Limited Consent to the credit agreement did not prohibit tax distributions, and the company's actual leverage ratio after the commercial division sale was 3.24x, below the 3.75x threshold, meaning the company could have made distributions without violating covenants. The board's decision not to pay distributions was based on lack of available cash, not financing restrictions.
6. Implied Covenant: The court rejected the plaintiff's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim because the factual premise—that the company used tax distributions to coerce a buyout—did not bear out at trial.

This is a stockholder dispute arising from a merger between FBSciences Holdings, Inc. and Valent BioSciences LLC. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that release provisions in the Merger Agreement and Letter of Transmittal are invalid and unenforceable, and requested interest on the Merger Consideration they ultimately received.

1. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the Merger Consideration despite an express contractual provision prohibiting interest accumulation
2. Whether the court should issue a declaratory judgment regarding the validity and enforceability of release provisions in the Merger Agreement and Letter of Transmittal
3. Whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge provisions in the Letter of Transmittal that they did not sign
4. Whether claims against defendants are time-barred under the Merger Agreement

1. Plaintiffs' request for interest on the Merger Consideration is DENIED. The court found that plaintiffs waived the issue by failing to brief it in their opening brief. Additionally, Section 3.5(c) of the Merger Agreement expressly provides that "[n]o interest shall accumulate on any cash payable in connection with the Merger," and plaintiffs provided no legal basis for ignoring this contractual provision. The court also noted that plaintiffs' delay of more than a year before rejecting the release provisions and filing suit undermined any equitable argument for an interest award.
2. Plaintiffs' claim for a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of release provisions is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as unripe. The court determined that because plaintiffs have not filed other claims implicating the letter of transmittal or releases, and defendants have not raised the releases as a defense to any claim, issuing a declaratory judgment would constitute an improper advisory opinion.
3. To the extent plaintiffs seek to invalidate provisions in the Letter of Transmittal, dismissal is appropriate because plaintiffs did not sign the Letter of Transmittal, are not parties to it, and therefore lack standing to challenge its provisions. Since plaintiffs received the Merger Consideration without signing the Letter of Transmittal and suffered no harm, they lack the concrete and actual injury required for standing.
4. The court did not reach defendants' argument that claims are time-barred under Section 3.5(f) of the Merger Agreement because the action was dismissed on other grounds.

This is a constitutional rights case in which eight incarcerated individuals sued the Delaware Department of Correction Commissioner, alleging that correction officers repeatedly used oleoresin capsicum (OC/pepper spray) on prisoners without providing adequate decontamination afterward, in violation of the Delaware Constitution's Cruel Punishment Clause. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit future OC use without proper decontamination policies.

1. Whether the plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief against future OC use without decontamination
2. Whether the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief is ripe for judicial determination
3. Whether a private right of action exists under the Delaware Constitution's Cruel Punishment Clause
4. Whether the Department's adoption of a decontamination policy during litigation moots the case
5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction

The court held that: (1) the plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief under Delaware's more flexible "reasonable-apprehension test," which requires only that the facts create a reasonable apprehension of future wrong, rather than the stricter federal standard of "certainly impending" harm; (2) the request for declaratory relief is ripe because the dispute is sufficiently concrete and mature, the plaintiffs have alleged a pattern of deficient decontamination despite grievances, and the narrow legal issue—whether lack of decontamination after compliance violates the Cruel Punishment Clause—is capable of resolution; and (3) a private right of action exists under the Cruel Punishment Clause to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, though the court did not reach the more difficult question of whether damages are available. The court rejected the Commissioner's probabilistic arguments that the plaintiffs were unlikely to be harmed again, reasoning that mathematical discounting of minority rights contradicts constitutional protections. The court deferred ruling on mootness and preliminary injunction issues to a separate decision after considering evidence from the hearing.

This case involves a breach of merger agreement claim brought by a stockholders' representative against Triller Group Inc. (formerly AGBA Group Holding Limited) for failing to secure a promised $500 million equity investment and register millions of shares issued to former noteholders following a merger that closed in October 2024.

1. Whether Triller Group breached the Investment Covenant by failing to secure a $500 million equity investment post-merger
2. Whether Triller Group breached the Registration Covenant by failing to file a registration statement for shares held by former convertible noteholders
3. The appropriate measure and calculation of damages for each breach, including whether the "New York Rule" (highest intermediate price) applies and how to account for market absorption and trading volume constraints
4. Whether expectation damages can be proven with reasonable certainty for each covenant breach
5. The appropriate rate and calculation of pre- and post-judgment interest

The court entered a default judgment against Triller Group for breaching both covenants. However, the damages awards differed significantly:

1. Investment Covenant Breach: The court awarded only nominal damages of $1.00. Although Triller Group clearly breached by failing to secure the $500 million investment, the plaintiff failed to prove damages with reasonable certainty. The expert's methodology was flawed because it: (a) sought to place stockholders in a superior position to what contract performance would have provided; (b) ignored the massive dilution that would have resulted from issuing new equity to raise $500 million; and (c) lacked evidentiary support for the valuation assumptions used.
2. Registration Covenant Breach: The court awarded $25,701,066.00 in damages. The court rejected all three of the plaintiff's proposed methodologies:
   • The "New York Rule" (highest intermediate price of $4.75 per share applied to all 30.4 million shares) was rejected because it ignored realistic market absorption constraints and would have required liquidating tens of millions of shares in a low-volume market without any price impact.
   • The "dribble-out" VWAP model was rejected because it lacked a blockage discount to account for the price depression caused by selling such a massive block and artificially cut off the analysis before the company's financial collapse.
   • The Black-Scholes put option model was rejected as unreliable because it used only a one-week lookback period to measure volatility, which is insufficient for estimating expected volatility over the relevant period.
   Instead, the court fashioned its own remedy by: (a) determining that stockholders could realistically have sold only 5,711,348 shares (approximately 20% participation rate applied to average daily trading volume of 1,019,883.5 shares over 28 trading days from October 17 to November 25, 2024, before the company's collapse); (b) applying the $4.75 highest intermediate price to these shares, yielding $27,128,903.00; and (c) deducting the current residual value of $0.25 per share ($1,427,837.00) for a net award of $25,701,066.00. The court held that for the remaining millions of shares, the plaintiff failed to prove that their loss in value was caused by the registration breach rather than the company's subsequent defaults and operational failures.
3. Interest: The court awarded pre- and post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate, compounded quarterly, accruing from October 17, 2024 (the approximate date of the registration covenant breach) until payment.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Kevin Jadiel Figueroa-Roman challenges his 108-month sentence for aiding and abetting multiple carjackings. Figueroa-Roman argues the sentence is procedurally unreasonable due to inadequate explanation of the sentencing rationale and reliance on unsupported factors.

1. Whether the district court adequately explained its sentencing rationale, specifically regarding its reference to Figueroa-Roman's "association with convicted felons"
2. Whether the sentencing court relied on factors that were either already accounted for in the guidelines calculations or unsupported by the record
3. The standard of appellate review when a sentencing court's reasoning is ambiguous and susceptible to multiple interpretations

The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded for clarification. The court found that the district court's reference to Figueroa-Roman's "association with convicted felons" was ambiguous and unclear in multiple respects—including who the "convicted felons" were, when they were convicted, and what significance this association had to the sentencing determination. The court concluded that without clarification of this statement, meaningful appellate review was frustrated and impossible. The court emphasized it was not ruling on the adequacy of the sentencing explanation or other issues raised on appeal, but rather remanding solely for the district court to clarify what it meant by this particular statement so that appellate review could proceed. The court noted that even under plain error review, the ambiguity prevented proper appellate analysis.

This is an immigration appeal case in which a Guatemalan national petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. The petitioner claimed he feared persecution based on his membership in social groups defined as Guatemalan youth and youth who resist gang recruitment.

1. Whether the petitioner established a nexus between his well-founded fear of persecution and his membership in a particular social group required for asylum eligibility
2. Whether the petitioner satisfied the higher "clear probability" standard for withholding of removal
3. Whether the petitioner proved he would more likely than not be tortured upon return to Guatemala with official acquiescence, as required for CAT protection
4. Whether the Board properly applied its standard of review in analyzing the CAT claim

The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's factual findings that were dispositive to all claims. Regarding asylum and withholding of removal, the court found that the gang targeted the petitioner for economic reasons (extortion and recruitment) rather than because of his youth or resistance to recruitment. The petitioner's own testimony established that the gang did not single him out but treated him like everyone else in its territory who could not pay—he was recruited because he lacked funds, not because of a protected characteristic. Country conditions evidence about how gangs generally treat Guatemalan youth did not compel a contrary conclusion about why this particular gang targeted this particular petitioner. Regarding the CAT claim, the court found substantial evidence that Guatemalan officials attempt to combat gang violence and that the record did not compel a finding that officials would consent to, acquiesce in, or turn a blind eye to torture. The court also rejected the petitioner's procedural argument that the Board failed to properly separate factual from legal findings, finding that the Board's articulation adequately tracked the bifurcated standard of review.

This is an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case involving With Purpose, Inc. (formerly GloriFi), a financial technology start-up. The case concerns whether the Ayers parties violated the automatic stay by continuing to pursue a deposition of co-founder Toby Neugebauer in arbitration after the company filed for bankruptcy.

1. Whether Neugebauer has prudential standing to enforce the automatic stay and recover damages as a creditor and/or as an individual injured by the violation
2. Whether the Ayers parties willfully violated the automatic stay by pursuing Neugebauer's deposition in arbitration after the bankruptcy filing
3. Whether the fiduciary-duty claim pursued against Neugebauer constitutes property of the estate subject to the automatic stay
4. Whether the bankruptcy court properly awarded actual damages and attorney's fees for the violation

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The court held that: (1) Neugebauer has standing to enforce the automatic stay both as a creditor under St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. and as an individual injured by the violation under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k); (2) the Ayers parties willfully violated the automatic stay by continuing to pursue the fiduciary-duty claim against Neugebauer through depositions after the bankruptcy filing, as fiduciary-duty claims are property of the estate subject to the stay; (3) the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in calculating the damages award, including attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the stay and in related state-court proceedings; and (4) because the statute mandates an award of attorney's fees for willful violations, the proper standard of review is clear error, not abuse of discretion.

This is a criminal appeal in which a defendant convicted of felon in possession of a firearm challenges the search of a residence that yielded the firearms underlying his conviction. The defendant also raises a constitutional challenge to the felon-in-possession statute.

1. Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to search the defendant's unapproved residence while he was on supervised release, as required by the Fourth Amendment and applicable case law governing searches of supervised releasees.
2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms, is unconstitutional either facially or as applied to the defendant.

The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress and the conviction. On the search issue, the court held that officers had reasonable suspicion to search the Mahlon House based on the totality of circumstances: (1) a woman's specific report that the defendant had placed a firearm in her face at the house and removed firearms before police arrived; (2) the defendant's repeated concealment of his presence at the house despite spending significant time there, including lying to his probation officer about his whereabouts; (3) the defendant's prior weapons offenses; and (4) evidence suggesting drug trafficking activity at the residence, including the defendant's history of testing positive for drugs, location-monitoring data showing patterns consistent with drug trafficking, and a local officer's identification of the house as likely a drug house. The court reasoned that supervised releasees have diminished privacy expectations and that only reasonable suspicion—not probable cause—is required for such searches. On the constitutional challenge, the court rejected both the facial challenge (foreclosed by precedent) and the as-applied challenge. The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate plain error because the Second Amendment right to bear arms applies only to "ordinary, law-abiding citizens," and the defendant's predicate conviction for drug trafficking with a firearm—a dangerous combination that often leads to violence—sufficiently demonstrated he posed a danger to the community, justifying the firearm prohibition.

This is a federal criminal appeal involving the revocation of supervised release and resentencing of a defendant convicted of methamphetamine distribution. The defendant challenges the district court's sentencing on the grounds that the court impermissibly considered retributive factors when imposing the revocation sentence.

1. Whether the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) by impermissibly considering retributive factors under § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release, following the Supreme Court's decision in Esteras v. United States (2025)
2. The proper standard of review for sentencing errors not raised by the defendant in the district court, specifically the interpretation and application of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(a)
3. Whether statements by the district court regarding "consequences," "accountability," and "sending a message" constituted impermissible retributive sentencing

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's 24-month sentence and four-year supervised release term. The majority held that the district court did not impermissibly rely on retributive factors. The court's sentencing remarks, viewed holistically, focused on forward-looking purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence rather than retribution for the underlying offense. The court emphasized Stapleton's need to address his addiction and expressed hope he would change his behavior. The court's references to "consequences" and "accountability" related to Stapleton's violations of supervised release conditions and breach of the court's trust, not punishment for the original crime. Additionally, the court's decision to impose a within-guidelines sentence after deferring sentencing for treatment suggested a rehabilitative rather than retributive purpose. The concurring opinion by Judge Taibleson extensively critiques the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Rule 51(a), arguing that the circuit has incorrectly expanded the rule to excuse defendants from raising sentencing errors in the district court, contrary to the rule's original meaning and Supreme Court precedent, and calls for the circuit to reconsider its approach.

This is a First Amendment retaliation case in which a Chicago firefighter challenged his termination following an investigation into racially offensive posts on his public Facebook page. The court addressed whether the employee's speech was constitutionally protected and, if so, whether the employer's interest in efficiency outweighed the employee's free speech rights.

1. Whether the employee's thirteen Facebook posts constituted speech protected by the First Amendment under the Connick v. Myers standard for matters of public concern
2. Whether the City's interest in workplace efficiency and public trust outweighed the employee's speech interests under the Pickering v. Board of Education balancing test
3. The proper application of First Amendment protections to public employee speech on social media platforms
4. Whether the district court correctly analyzed the "matter of public concern" element by examining each post individually and considering the offensive nature of the speech

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the City lawfully terminated the employee's employment. Although the court found the district court erred in its analysis of whether the posts touched on matters of public concern, it concluded the City prevailed under Pickering balancing. The court assumed arguendo that all thirteen posts addressed matters of public concern but found that the City's interests substantially outweighed the employee's speech interests based on: (1) the racially offensive content of the posts; (2) the employee's prominent identification as a CFD firefighter on his public Facebook page; (3) his indiscriminate dissemination to a broad audience; (4) his targeting of racial groups he was assigned to serve in a predominantly Black neighborhood; and (5) the unique position of community trust necessary for the fire department's public safety mission. The court emphasized that while the first Pickering factor (workplace harmony) favored the employee due to lack of actual complaints or reasonable threat of disruption, the third factor (impact on job performance and public confidence) and seventh factor (whether the speaker should be regarded as a member of the general public) weighed heavily in the City's favor.

This is a bankruptcy appeal concerning the appropriate interest rate applicable to a tax purchaser's secured claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. The case involves Bernardo Romero, who filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy to prevent foreclosure after failing to pay property taxes, and Corona Investments, which purchased a tax certificate on his Chicago property.

1. Whether a tax purchaser's secured claim qualifies as a "tax claim" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 511(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
2. If it is a "tax claim," what interest rate applies under "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as required by § 511(a)
3. Whether the Till formula approach (which uses the prime rate plus a risk adjustment) should apply instead of a statutory rate

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The court held that: (1) Corona Investments' secured claim qualifies as a "tax claim" under § 511(a) because the tax purchaser acquired a right to collect Romero's overdue property taxes through the tax sale and effectively steps into the county's position; and (2) the applicable interest rate under Illinois nonbankruptcy law is 18% per year, as provided in 35 ILCS 200/21-15 (the delinquent tax rate for Cook County), rather than the Till formula rate. The court reasoned that when a tax purchaser obtains a Certificate of Purchase, it stands in the shoes of the county and is entitled to the same interest rate the county would receive on delinquent taxes. The court rejected the Till approach because § 511(a) explicitly requires "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to determine the rate, and Congress enacted § 511(a) after Till, suggesting an intent to move away from the Till formula for tax claims. Judge Hamilton dissented, arguing that the tax purchaser's claim should not be characterized as a "tax claim" because payments benefit the private purchaser rather than the public, and that even if it were a tax claim, the 18% rate never actually applies to tax purchasers outside of bankruptcy, making it inapplicable nonbankruptcy law.

This is a Title VII employment discrimination case in which Hakeem Abayomi, an African American clinical pharmacist, sued the Department of Veterans Affairs alleging he was terminated based on his race and in retaliation for filing an internal discrimination complaint. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department on both claims, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

1. Whether Abayomi established a prima facie case of race-based discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and whether the Department's stated reason for termination (medication errors) was pretextual.
2. Whether Abayomi's admission of making medication errors and his failure to identify similarly situated employees treated more favorably defeated his discrimination claim.
3. Whether Abayomi established a causal connection between his protected activity (filing an EEO complaint) and his termination for purposes of a retaliation claim.
4. Whether the timing between filing the EEO complaint and termination, combined with other evidence, created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding retaliatory motive.

The court affirmed summary judgment for the Department on both claims. Regarding the discrimination claim, the court held that Abayomi failed to show the Department's stated reason for termination (careless work performance and failure to follow procedures) was pretextual. Abayomi's own admissions during the Weingarten investigation that he made medication errors—including admitting he was "rushing" on the April 8 heparin error—made it difficult for a reasonable factfinder to conclude the Department's rationale masked discriminatory animus. The court also rejected Abayomi's comparator evidence, finding that the four other pharmacists he cited were not similarly situated due to differences in decision-makers, probationary status, and the nature of investigations conducted. Regarding the retaliation claim, although the court acknowledged that Abayomi's voluntary withdrawal of his EEO complaint did not preclude a retaliation claim, it found insufficient evidence of a causal connection between the protected activity and termination. The court noted that while the approximately two-month timeline between the complaint and termination could support an inference of retaliation, Abayomi provided no corroborating evidence of retaliatory motive to overcome the Department's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination—the medication errors to which Abayomi had admitted.

This is an environmental law case involving a challenge to the U.S. Forest Service's decision to categorically exempt the Hanna Flats Good Neighbor Authority Project from full National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review under the Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA). The central dispute concerns whether the project falls within the "wildland-urban interface" as defined by HFRA, and whether the plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies by raising this issue during the agency's scoping process.

1. Whether issue exhaustion (administrative waiver) should be judicially imposed for challenges to agency decisions made during HFRA scoping procedures when no statute or regulation explicitly requires it
2. Whether HFRA's scoping process is analogous to formal notice-and-comment rulemaking or informal rulemaking, and whether it is "adversarial" in nature
3. Whether the type of claim asserted—a challenge to the Forest Service's failure to apply the correct statutory definition of "wildland-urban interface"—is the kind that must normally be exhausted before the agency
4. Whether Vermont Yankee and Public Citizen precedents requiring issue exhaustion for NEPA alternatives challenges apply to statutory interpretation claims

The Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Forest Service. The court held that no judicially imposed issue-exhaustion requirement applies in this case for two independent reasons:

First, regarding the nature of the proceeding: The court concluded that HFRA scoping under 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(f) is analogous to informal non-notice-and-comment rulemaking, not formal notice-and-comment rulemaking. Following Alaska Survival v. Surface Transp. Bd., the court held that because the scoping process is informal and lacks an adversarial component, a judicially imposed issue-exhaustion requirement is improper. The court noted that nothing in HFRA or the Forest Service's Scoping Notice indicated that parties were required to comment during scoping to preserve the ability to challenge the final decision.

Second, regarding the type of claim: The court distinguished between claims that require issue exhaustion (such as NEPA alternatives claims under Vermont Yankee and Public Citizen, which require the agency to have an opportunity to consider proposed alternatives) and claims that do not. The court held that Alliance's challenge—that the Forest Service failed to apply the governing statutory definition of wildland-urban interface—is a statutory interpretation claim that does not depend on commenters offering information or options for the agency to weigh. Unlike alternatives claims, this type of claim does not require the development of a factual record or the exercise of administrative discretion in the same way. The court also noted that the Forest Service's Scoping Notice did not clearly indicate it was relying on Bonner County's definition rather than HFRA's definition, making it unfair to require Alliance to have raised the issue during scoping.

Reasoning: The majority applied the framework from Sims v. Apfel and Carr v. Saul, which hold that judicially imposed issue exhaustion depends on both the nature of the administrative proceeding and the nature of the claim. The court emphasized that issue exhaustion is not automatic when Congress and the agency have not imposed it, and that courts must carefully examine the characteristics of the particular administrative procedure. The court concluded that the rationale for requiring issue exhaustion is weakened for statutory-interpretation issues that do not require development of a factual record or application of agency expertise.

The court remanded the case for the district court to address the merits of Alliance's challenge—whether the Forest Service can establish that the categorical exclusion applies using the proper statutory definition of wildland-urban interface or whether the Forest Service arbitrarily and capriciously found that the Project is categorically excluded from NEPA review.

Dissent: Judge R. Nelson argued that the administrative waiver doctrine should apply because HFRA's notice-and-scoping process is informal rulemaking, and the administrative waiver doctrine applies to informal rulemaking unless there is an exception. The dissent contended that Alliance had adequate notice and opportunity to raise its wildland-urban-interface objection during scoping, and that fairness to the agency and respect for the APA's narrow scope of review require allowing the agency a fair opportunity to address all issues in the administrative forum before judicial review.

This is a habeas corpus appeal in which the State of Nevada sought to challenge a federal district court's order vacating Lamar Brown's felony conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel. After the district court's vacatur order, the State negotiated a new plea agreement with Brown, resulting in a misdemeanor conviction for the same offense.

1. Whether the State's appeal of the district court's habeas order should be dismissed as moot due to an intervening misdemeanor plea agreement and conviction.
2. Whether the State can unilaterally "unwind" or vacate Brown's misdemeanor plea agreement to restore his original felony conviction.
3. Whether a criminal defendant has a due process right to enforce the terms of a plea agreement.

The court dismissed the State's appeal as moot. The court reasoned that because the State voluntarily entered into a new legally binding plea agreement with Brown that resulted in a misdemeanor conviction and sentence, the court could provide no effective relief to the State by reversing the district court's habeas order. The court held that the State cannot unilaterally unwind the misdemeanor plea agreement, as Brown has a due process right under the federal constitution to enforce the terms of the plea agreement. Since the State has already received the benefit of the bargain through Brown's reconviction and sentence, any attempt to breach the agreement would result in specific performance of the plea agreement, not relief for the State. The court distinguished this case from Garding v. Montana Department of Corrections, where a new trial had not yet begun, whereas here the new plea agreement had already been fully executed.

This is a Second Amendment case challenging California's ban on carrying switchblade knives. The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the ban on different grounds than the district court, while multiple judges dissented from the denial of en banc rehearing, disagreeing with the panel's reasoning and the Ninth Circuit's broader pattern of rejecting Second Amendment challenges.

1. Whether California's total ban on carrying switchblade knives (both concealed and open carry) violates the Second Amendment under the two-step test established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen
2. Whether a historical tradition banning only concealed carry of weapons can justify a modern law banning all forms of carry (concealed and open)
3. Whether plaintiffs' facial challenge to the statute can succeed when at least one application of the law (concealed carry prohibition) may be constitutional
4. The proper standard for facial challenges to Second Amendment regulations and the level of historical analogy required under Bruen
5. Whether the Ninth Circuit has systematically resisted Supreme Court Second Amendment precedent through various analytical techniques

Panel Decision (Affirmed): The panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment upholding California's switchblade ban, but on different grounds. The panel assumed (without deciding) that switchblades are "arms" protected by the Second Amendment's plain text. However, it held that California satisfied the second step of Bruen by demonstrating a historical tradition supporting at least one application of the law—specifically, the prohibition on concealed carry of switchblades. The panel reasoned that because there was a historical tradition of banning concealed carry, the facial challenge must fail under the Salerno standard, which requires plaintiffs to show the law is unconstitutional in all its applications. Concurrence (Judge Wardlaw, joined by Judges Gould and Koh): The concurrence defended the panel's narrow ruling, emphasizing that plaintiffs chose to bring a facial challenge, which is "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully." The concurrence argued that under Rahimi and Salerno, plaintiffs must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the regulation would be valid. Since California's prohibition on concealed carry is consistent with historical tradition, the facial challenge fails. The concurrence noted that plaintiffs remain free to bring as-applied challenges to other applications of the law, such as open carry. Dissent (Judge VanDyke): Judge VanDyke dissented, arguing that the panel's decision was only possible because the Ninth Circuit's automatic vacatur practice enabled Hawaii to strategically moot a similar butterfly knife case (Teter v. Lopez), giving categorical knife bans a second chance before a more favorable panel. He criticized the Ninth Circuit's long history of rejecting Second Amendment challenges and proposed that the Supreme Court issue summary reversals ("benchslaps") to correct the circuit's persistent defiance of Second Amendment precedent. Dissent (Judge Tung, joined by seven other judges): Judge Tung's dissent argued that the panel's reasoning directly contradicts Bruen. He emphasized that Bruen expressly held that "concealed-carry prohibitions were constitutional only if they did not similarly prohibit open carry." A historical tradition banning only concealed carry cannot justify a total ban on all forms of carry. Judge Tung contended that there is no historical tradition of totally banning public carrying of knives, and the few laws cited by the panel that did so are outliers. He argued the panel's reasoning would essentially shield any categorical weapons ban from constitutional scrutiny if a single constitutional application could be identified, which would upend Bruen and violate the principle that the Second Amendment deserves equal protection as other constitutional rights. Outcome: The petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc was DENIED. The panel opinion stands, upholding California's switchblade ban.

This is a tax law case involving a conservation easement deduction. Savannah Shoals claimed a $23 million tax deduction for donating a conservation easement over 103 acres of land in Georgia, but the IRS rejected the deduction, arguing the property was significantly overvalued. The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and determined the easement was worth only $480,000, imposing a 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty.

1. Whether the Tax Court properly admitted and relied upon expert testimony and evidence regarding the property's potential use as an aggregate quarry
2. Whether the Tax Court applied the correct legal standard for determining a property's "highest and best use" in the context of conservation easement valuation
3. Whether the Tax Court's factual findings regarding the property's highest and best use were clearly erroneous and whether the court provided sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for appellate review

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision on all grounds. The court held that: (1) the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Commissioner's expert testimony and geological maps, as the expert was qualified in real estate valuation and the maps were proper subjects of judicial notice; (2) the Tax Court was not required to apply a strict four-factor appraisal test for highest and best use, and its market-demand analysis was consistent with applicable law and Treasury Regulations; and (3) the Tax Court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, as it properly evaluated whether the market would support a quarry operation and found that Savannah Shoals' experts had overestimated demand and failed to account for competition from existing quarries. The court reasoned that the Tax Court's qualitative analysis of market demand was sufficient to reject the quarry use as the property's highest and best use, and the court was not required to perform its own quantitative analysis to reach this conclusion.

This is a Delaware corporate law case involving a dispute over whether a former CEO and director is entitled to advancement of legal expenses under the Delaware General Corporation Law and the company's bylaws. The plaintiff sought advancement of $18,070 in legal fees incurred in responding to Small Business Administration communications regarding a loan change in ownership.

1. Whether SBA compliance communications and administrative proceedings constitute an "action, suit, or proceeding" within the meaning of the advancement statute and bylaws
2. Whether the plaintiff's demand for advancement was made "in advance of the final disposition" of the underlying matter, as required by the advancement provisions
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred in enforcing his advancement rights (fees-on-fees)

The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion. While the court found that the SBA compliance matter qualified as an "action, suit, or proceeding" and that the plaintiff incurred expenses "in defending" it, the court held that the plaintiff's demand for advancement was untimely because it was made after the final disposition of the matter. The plaintiff incurred fees from February through September 2025 but did not demand payment until November 17, 2025, after the SBA had issued preliminary approval and the administrative process had concluded. The court reasoned that advancement is only available when payment is sought "in advance of the final disposition," and that this timing requirement defines the scope of the advancement remedy itself, not merely the mechanics of payment. The court distinguished advancement from indemnification, noting that advancement permits payment before resolution while indemnification addresses reimbursement after resolution. Accordingly, any remaining claim would sound in indemnification rather than advancement. The court also denied the plaintiff's request for fees-on-fees because he was not entitled to advancement.

This is an appeal of criminal convictions for bank fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Two brothers used fake passports and identities to open bank accounts and deposit proceeds from romance scams, unemployment fraud schemes, and other fraud, then withdrew funds from those accounts.

1. Whether the government presented sufficient evidence to prove bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud, particularly whether the defendants' use of fake identities meant they were "customers" whose interests in deposited funds were superior to the banks' interests
2. Whether the district court's jury instruction on materiality for bank fraud charges was plainly erroneous
3. Whether the district court's response to jury questions about conspiracy elements was a misstatement of law or abuse of discretion
4. Whether the district court properly applied a two-level sentencing enhancement under the guidelines for use of authentication features (fake passports)
5. Whether the district court retained jurisdiction to enter restitution orders after the defendants appealed the initial judgment
6. Whether the restitution calculation was supported by reliable evidence and whether joint and several liability was appropriate

The court affirmed all convictions and sentences. On sufficiency of evidence, the court held that the defendants were not "customers" under bank fraud law because they used fake identities; the fake persons named in the fake passports were the customers, and the defendants' scheme deprived the banks of something of value. On the materiality instruction, the court found no plain error because the instruction was consistent with First Circuit precedent and the Maslenjak standard did not apply to bank fraud cases. Regarding conspiracy instructions, the court found the jury instructions, viewed as a whole, accurately conveyed the law and reminded jurors twice that they must find the conspiracy "as charged in the indictment." The sentencing enhancement for authentication features was proper because fake passports contain unique identifying numbers qualifying as authentication features under the guidelines. The district court retained jurisdiction to enter restitution orders because the MVRA permits deferral of restitution determinations for up to ninety days, and the court properly indicated it would defer the amount while imposing restitution. Finally, the restitution awards were supported by reliable evidence (trial testimony, victim impact statements, and FBI 302 forms), and joint and several liability was appropriate under the MVRA because both defendants contributed to the victims' losses.

This is a wrongful death case arising from the drowning of two hotel guests in ocean waters fronting the Courtyard Marriott Isla Verde Beach Resort in Puerto Rico. The family members of the deceased guests appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Iguana Sport Services, Corp., a contractor hired to provide beach and towel attendants, arguing that Iguana owed them a heightened duty of care.

1. Whether Iguana assumed a duty to protect hotel guests under its express or implied contractual agreements with Marriott
2. Whether the DNER Permit (Department of Natural and Environmental Resources permit) imposed a duty on Iguana to protect guests from dangerous ocean conditions
3. Whether Iguana, as an entity operating a hotel's beach area, owes a heightened duty of care to hotel guests under Puerto Rico law, either as an "innkeeper" or based on the nature of its services

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the contractual and permit-based duty claims. The court held that: (1) Iguana's written contract with Marriott limited its responsibilities to providing beach and towel attendants, with no express or implied duty to protect guests; and (2) the DNER Permit's safety obligations were limited to Iguana's 250-square-foot occupancy space and did not extend to the ocean area. However, regarding the heightened duty of care claim, the court found unresolved questions of Puerto Rico law and certified two questions to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court: (1) whether an entity providing services in a limited hotel area can assume "innkeeper" responsibilities, and (2) whether such an entity owes a heightened duty of care based on the nature of its services. The court retained jurisdiction pending the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's response.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from a final judgment in an insurance coverage dispute. Golden Corral sought to reopen a three-year-old judgment denying coverage for COVID-19 pandemic-related business losses, arguing that a subsequent North Carolina Supreme Court decision in a similar case constituted extraordinary circumstances warranting relief.

1. Whether a subsequent change in state decisional law constitutes "extraordinary circumstances" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) warranting relief from a final judgment
2. Whether the principle of finality of judgments can be overcome by a later state court ruling that diverges from a federal court's prior prediction of state law
3. Whether the narrow exception recognized in cases involving the same transaction or occurrence applies when different cases involve similar but distinct facts and parties
4. Whether a party's litigation strategy choices (declining to seek a stay pending another case) can constitute extraordinary circumstances

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Golden Corral's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The court held that a mere change in state decisional law, without more, does not provide a basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief. While acknowledging a narrow exception in cases arising from the same transaction or occurrence (as recognized in Pierce v. Cook & Co.), the court found that exception inapplicable here because Golden Corral's case and the North State Deli case involved different insured parties, different insurance providers, and different policies—despite both involving COVID-19 business interruption claims. The court reasoned that the district court properly applied then-existing North Carolina law when it ruled, and that allowing reopening based on subsequent state court decisions would undermine the fundamental principle of finality of judgments essential to the judicial system. The court also rejected Golden Corral's argument that its failure to seek a stay constituted an abuse of discretion, noting that calculated litigation choices do not warrant extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

Jeremy Scott Allred was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) by possessing a firearm after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction. He appealed on grounds that the statute exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority and violates the Second Amendment as applied to him.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause
2. Whether applying § 922(g)(9) to Allred violates the Second Amendment, particularly where his predicate offense could have been committed recklessly rather than intentionally
3. Whether courts should apply a categorical, "felony-by-felony" approach or conduct individualized assessments of a defendant's dangerousness when reviewing as-applied Second Amendment challenges

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Allred's conviction. The majority held that:

1. The Commerce Clause challenge was foreclosed by precedent (United States v. Alcantar), and the same reasoning applies to § 922(g)(9)
2. Section 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to Allred under the Second Amendment framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. The statute satisfies both prongs of the Bruen test: (a) the "why" — disarming domestic violence offenders addresses the serious problem of firearms escalating domestic violence to homicide, consistent with historical traditions of disarming those who pose threats to others; and (b) the "how" — the burden is comparable to historical analogues such as Founding-era surety and "going armed" laws that disarmed individuals found to threaten physical safety
3. Allred's conduct—intentionally swinging at his wife's phone while she called 911, striking her face—constitutes intentional use of force that recklessly caused injury, which falls within the scope of conduct that Justice Thomas's Voisine dissent would permit to be disarmed, and thus does not raise constitutional concerns about purely reckless conduct
4. A categorical approach based on the type of conviction (misdemeanor domestic violence) is appropriate, rather than examining the specific circumstances of each defendant's conduct

This is a criminal appeal in which Corrie Singleton challenges his 180-month sentence for Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during the commission of that robbery. Singleton argues that the district court failed to adequately consider his mitigating arguments and explain its reasoning for the sentence imposed.

1. Whether the district court committed procedural error by failing to consider Singleton's argument for a downward departure under U.S.S.G § 5H1.1 based on his youth and the U.S. Sentencing Commission's policy statement regarding youthful offenders.
2. Whether the district court adequately considered three individualized mitigating factors: (1) that this was Singleton's first custodial sentence; (2) his zero criminal history score and Category I criminal history; and (3) his young age at the time of the offense and potential for rehabilitation.
3. Whether a district court must specifically discuss grounds of recognized legal merit when imposing a sentence significantly below the applicable guidelines range.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, finding no procedural error. The court held that the district court adequately addressed Singleton's mitigating arguments, even if implicitly and imprecisely. The court noted that the district court: (1) acknowledged reviewing all submissions and hearing oral argument; (2) explicitly recognized Singleton's lack of criminal history and young age; (3) referenced Singleton's family support and rehabilitation potential; (4) acknowledged that the guidelines range was "stiffer" and did not properly account for mitigating factors; and (5) balanced these factors against the seriousness of the violent offense. The court reasoned that when a district court imposes a sentence significantly below the guidelines range after considering written and oral arguments, the requirement to specifically discuss grounds of recognized legal merit applies with less force. The court concluded that the district court's discussion, though imprecise, allowed for meaningful appellate review and demonstrated thoughtful consideration of Singleton's arguments.

The City of Chicago sued major fossil fuel companies for damages resulting from global warming, alleging the defendants misrepresented the effects of fossil fuel emissions and seeking recovery for harm caused by increased fuel consumption attributable to those misrepresentations. The defendants attempted to remove the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, claiming their historical and ongoing production of fossil fuels for the federal government provided federal jurisdiction, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's remand to state court.

1. Whether the defendants' historical and ongoing production of fossil fuels for the federal government (including military contracts dating back to World War II and current Strategic Petroleum Reserve management) satisfies the "relating to" requirement of the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)
2. Whether the connection between the defendants' federal work and Chicago's claims of deceptive advertising about climate change is sufficiently close to warrant removal to federal court
3. Whether the defendants' federal duties must relate specifically to the charged tortious conduct or more broadly to the lawsuit as a whole

The court affirmed the remand to state court, holding that the defendants' federal work is too attenuated from Chicago's claims to support removal. The court reasoned that: (1) the most significant federal work occurred decades before the alleged misconduct (1940s-1950s military production versus 1970s onward deceptive advertising); (2) the more recent federal work (Cold War contracts, Strategic Petroleum Reserve management, and federal land leases) lacks sufficient connection to consumer-directed false advertising claims; (3) Chicago's complaint expressly disclaims injuries arising from the defendants' federal work and seeks recovery only for harm from increased fuel consumption caused by deception directed at consumers, not the federal government; (4) enjoining the alleged false advertising would not compromise the defendants' federal operations; and (5) every circuit to consider similar climate-change deception suits has rejected federal officer removal, and the Supreme Court has recently approved this reasoning. The court noted that even under the broader interpretation of "relating to," the connection was insufficiently close to satisfy the removal statute.

This is a False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam action in which Relator, LLC alleged that CalCon Mutual Mortgage, LLC and its CEO made false statements in a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan application. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

1. Whether the FCA's public disclosure bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), barred Relator's claim based on information disclosed on PandemicOversight.gov regarding CalCon's NAICS code and PPP loan eligibility
2. Whether CalCon's own website qualifies as "news media" under the public disclosure bar
3. Whether Relator adequately pleaded that CalCon falsified its employee headcount in the PPP loan application
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Relator leave to amend its complaint

The court reversed the district court's dismissal on the following grounds:

1. Public Disclosure Bar - NAICS Code: The court held that the NAICS code alone does not reveal CalCon's categorical ineligibility for PPP funds because exceptions existed for certain mortgage lenders. The district court impermissibly assessed the claim "at the highest level of generality" by relying solely on the NAICS code without addressing whether Relator's specific allegations about CalCon's products (e.g., jumbo loans) and business practices were publicly disclosed.
2. Public Disclosure Bar - "News Media": The court established that "news media" refers to methods of communication used to convey information about recent events of public interest, as would commonly be found in newspapers or broadcasts. The court held that CalCon's own website does not qualify as "news media" because: (a) its primary purpose is not to disseminate information about recent events; (b) it publishes information about itself rather than curating third-party information; and (c) the public would not reasonably describe it as "news media" in everyday speech. The court remanded for the district court to determine whether other online sources qualify as news media.
3. Employee Headcount Claim: The court agreed with the district court that Relator failed to plead a facially plausible claim regarding falsified employee numbers, as the allegations rested on speculation and unreasonable inferences (calculating capacity based on only one of eleven offices without accounting for other locations or remote employees).
4. Leave to Amend: The court held the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. The court reasoned that a single failure to cure deficiencies after voluntary amendment does not establish futility; rather, "repeated failure" to cure deficiencies is required. Since Relator amended before receiving a court order identifying specific deficiencies, the district court should have granted leave to amend to address the employee headcount theory.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which James Terry Henrikson challenges his convictions for solicitation to commit a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 373(a), arguing that murder-for-hire resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) is not categorically a crime of violence and therefore cannot serve as a predicate offense for solicitation charges.

1. Whether the concurrent sentence doctrine applies in collateral review proceedings and, if so, whether the court should exercise discretion to review the merits when sentences run concurrently with unchallenged convictions.
2. Whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) resulting in death constitutes a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 373(a).
3. Whether the "death results" element of § 1958(a) contains an implicit mens rea requirement or whether Congress intentionally omitted a mens rea requirement for that element.
4. Whether the death-results element satisfies the mens rea requirement of § 373(a), which requires that a solicited offense involve conduct with "sufficiently culpable mens rea" to the use of force.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision. The court held that:

1. Concurrent Sentence Doctrine: Although the court did not definitively resolve whether the concurrent sentence doctrine applies in collateral review, it exercised its discretion to consider the merits because declining review would not significantly advance judicial economy, given that the district court had already resolved the claim on the merits and both parties had fully briefed and argued the issue.
2. Crime of Violence Analysis: A violation of § 1958(a) resulting in death is not categorically a crime of violence under § 373(a) and therefore cannot serve as a predicate offense for solicitation charges.
3. Mens Rea Requirement: The court held that Congress intentionally omitted a mens rea requirement in the "death results" element of § 1958(a). The text uses passive voice ("if death results"), lacks explicit intent language, and Congress included mens rea requirements elsewhere in the statute, indicating purposeful omission. This interpretation is consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Dean v. United States and the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. McDuffy.
4. Consequence: Because the death-results element lacks a mens rea requirement, a defendant may be convicted of § 1958(a) based on an accidental killing, which does not satisfy § 373(a)'s requirement that the solicited offense involve sufficiently culpable mens rea to the use of force. The court reversed the district court's denial of Henrikson's § 2255 motion as to Counts 7 and 8 (the convictions based on solicitations resulting in death) and remanded with instructions to vacate those convictions.

This is a discovery dispute in a trust breach case where Arden Trust Company seeks indemnification from Fifth Third Bank for costs incurred in defending against claims that Arden breached its fiduciary duties as trustee of trusts established by Congress for the benefit of the people of Bikini Atoll. The court addresses Arden's motion to compel discovery responses from Fifth Third and Fifth Third's motion to stay the indemnification claim and related discovery.

1. Whether the indemnification claim is ripe for adjudication or should be stayed as premature
2. Whether discovery concerning the indemnification claim should be stayed
3. Whether discovery concerning the underlying liability claims should be stayed as to Fifth Third
4. Whether the scope of Arden's discovery requests to Fifth Third should be limited

The court granted Fifth Third's motion to stay in part and denied it in part, and granted Arden's motion to compel. Specifically: (1) the indemnification claim is unripe because it depends on the outcome of the underlying liability claims, and therefore should be stayed pending resolution of those claims; (2) discovery concerning the indemnification claim is stayed because resolution of the liability claims may make the indemnification claim unnecessary; (3) discovery concerning the liability claims will proceed as to Fifth Third because Fifth Third failed to demonstrate that such discovery should be stayed—the fact that information may be available from other parties does not justify a stay, and information about Fifth Third's actions as trustee is relevant under Delaware's permissive discovery standard; and (4) Fifth Third's arguments for limiting the scope of discovery are unpersuasive, particularly given that Fifth Third waived burden objections and the plain language of Rule 26(b) permits discovery from any party regarding any claim or defense in the litigation.

This is an estate administration dispute in which a beneficiary (Plaintiff) challenged the co-executors' (Defendants) withholding of his undisputed share of the estate pending his execution of a release of claims. The court reviewed exceptions to a Magistrate's decision ordering distribution of the beneficiary's share and denying the co-executors' request for attorneys' fees.

1. Whether co-executors of an estate may condition distribution of a beneficiary's undisputed share upon execution of a release of claims
2. Whether Delaware law (12 Del. C. § 2312(b)) authorizes such conditioning
3. Whether co-executors' attorneys' fees should be surcharged (paid by the co-executors rather than the estate) when they wrongfully withhold a beneficiary's distribution
4. Whether new legal arguments may be raised for the first time during the exceptions process

The Court denied the Defendants' exceptions and affirmed the Magistrate's order requiring distribution of Plaintiff's undisputed share ($59,052.42) without conditioning it on execution of a release. The Court held that: (1) no legal authority supports conditioning distribution on a release; (2) Defendants' citation to Section 2312(b) was raised too late and cannot be considered for the first time on exceptions; (3) a surcharge of attorneys' fees was warranted, but only as to the specific matter of wrongfully withholding the distribution (not all fees as the Magistrate ordered). The Court reasoned that the co-executors' conduct of holding the beneficiary's money "hostage" pending execution of a release was improper fiduciary conduct, and therefore the co-executors should bear their own legal costs for defending that conduct rather than having those costs paid from the estate.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging the dismissal of a state prisoner's petition alleging that jury exposure to a Facebook post and courthouse demonstration violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The petitioner was convicted of rape and related charges after jury deliberations were interrupted by community outcry supporting the victim.

1. Whether the state court's finding of no jury prejudice was contrary to clearly established federal law regarding impartial juries under the Sixth Amendment
2. Whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in assessing whether extraneous material prejudiced the verdict
3. Whether the state court made an unreasonable factual determination regarding the credibility of Juror 7's testimony that she was influenced by community pressure
4. The proper standard for evaluating jury prejudice when a juror testifies to being influenced by extraneous information

The First Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, holding that the state court's decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law and did not constitute an unreasonable application of that law. The majority reasoned that: (1) Supreme Court precedent does not establish a per se rule that prejudice must be found whenever a juror testifies to outside influence; (2) the state court properly conducted a Remmer hearing and reasonably assessed prejudice by considering multiple factors including the content of the Facebook post, the brief nature of exposure, the absence of discussion during deliberations, and the strength of the evidence; (3) the trial court's credibility determination that Juror 7 was not credible regarding her own prejudice was supported by the record, including swift admonitions from other jurors, the lack of meaningful deliberative discussion of extraneous material, and Juror 7's acknowledgment of her duty to follow the law; and (4) the state court was entitled to deference in its factual findings, particularly credibility determinations. The dissent argued that the state court's rejection of Juror 7's sworn testimony about her own prejudice was unreasonable and unsupported by the record, and that a single juror's demonstrated partiality is sufficient to violate the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

This is a federal jurisdiction case involving a dispute over whether a toxic tort lawsuit alleging that a child developed leukemia from exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) manufactured and disposed of by General Electric should be litigated in federal or state court. The case turns on whether GE qualifies for removal under the federal officer removal statute based on its historical role as a government contractor during World War II.

1. Whether GE "acted under" a federal officer's authority by manufacturing PCB-containing electrical devices for the U.S. military during and after World War II, satisfying the first element of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)
2. Whether the plaintiff's claims are "for or relating to" GE's work under federal authority, satisfying the second element of the federal officer removal statute
3. Whether GE has presented a "colorable federal defense" to the suit, satisfying the third element required for removal
4. The proper interpretation of "acting under" in the context of government contractors and whether "strict control" is a necessary requirement
5. The scope of the "for or relating to" nexus requirement following the 2011 amendment to § 1442(a)(1), and whether a causal connection between the alleged conduct and government work is required

The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision denying removal and remanded the case to federal court. The court held:

1. Acting Under Element Satisfied: GE satisfied the "acting under" requirement because it manufactured specialized PCB-infused electrical devices (transformers, capacitors) for the U.S. military at the government's request and direction, particularly during World War II. The court rejected the district court's requirement of "strict control," holding that the statute must be "liberally construed." The relevant inquiry is whether the private contractor helps the government produce items it needs or perform basic governmental tasks. GE's dedication of its Pittsfield plant facilities to fulfill substantial military orders, customization of products to military specifications, and the government's reliance on GE's technical expertise established the requisite relationship. The court noted that military contractors are the "archetypal case" of entities acting under the United States.
2. For or Relating To Element Satisfied: GE satisfied the "for or relating to" nexus element because the plaintiff's claims relate to GE's use, manufacture, and design of PCB-containing products, which were directly contracted for by the federal government. The court emphasized that the 2011 amendment broadened the statute from "for" acts to include acts "relating to" federal authority, eliminating any strict causation requirement. The claims need only "stand in some relation" to or have "association with or connection with" GE's work for the government. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that removal requires the government to have specifically authorized improper disposal, finding that disposal "relates to" GE's use and manufacture of PCB products. The court also noted that the plaintiff's complaint includes multiple claims directly addressing GE's use, manufacture, and design of Pyranol products, not merely disposal.
3. Colorable Federal Defense: The court declined to address whether GE presented a colorable federal defense in the first instance, instead remanding to the district court to determine whether GE has a federal defense that is not "immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction" or "wholly insubstantial and frivolous."

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a civil action brought by Dawn Lusk against the United States Postal Service and its employees for injuries sustained when a postal employee assaulted her. The case involves the intersection of federal sovereign immunity law, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the Westfall Act.

1. Whether Lusk's negligence claim under the FTCA is barred by the intentional tort exception to sovereign immunity (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)), which excludes claims arising out of assault and battery
2. Whether the Sheridan exception permits a negligence claim against the Postmaster for negligently creating the risk of assault, independent of the direct tortfeasor's employment status
3. Whether Lusk's negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claim is barred by the FTCA's discretionary function exception
4. Whether Lusk can pursue a Bivens claim for Fourth Amendment violations
5. Whether Lusk's FOIA claim was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Specifically:

1. FTCA Negligence Claim Against Peppers (the Assailant): AFFIRMED. The intentional tort exception bars Lusk's negligence claim against Peppers because the gravamen of the claim is assault and battery, regardless of how it was pleaded. The form of the tort does not control; substance does.
2. FTCA Negligence Claim Against Merchant (the Postmaster): REVERSED AND REMANDED in part. While claims sounding in assault or battery against Merchant are barred by the intentional tort exception, the court reversed as to Merchant's alleged negligence in creating the risk of harm. Under the Sheridan exception, Merchant may be held liable for negligence where he owed an independent duty to Lusk unrelated to Peppers's employment status. The allegations that Merchant negligently created the risk by unlocking doors knowing Peppers would attack, and then failing to assist Lusk, state a claim under South Carolina law's exception for defendants who negligently create risks.
3. Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention Claim: AFFIRMED. This claim is barred by the FTCA's discretionary function exception because government hiring and supervisory decisions are discretionary functions. Lusk waived her ability to challenge this by failing to adequately object to the magistrate judge's recommendation.
4. Bivens Claim: AFFIRMED. The dismissal was proper because the Supreme Court has made clear that if there is any reason to pause before applying Bivens in a new context, courts may not recognize a Bivens remedy. The Court has repeatedly refused to extend Bivens even to excessive force cases involving law enforcement officers.
5. FOIA Claim: AFFIRMED. The dismissal was proper because Lusk failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing the Postal Service's fee determination, and exhaustion is mandatory even though it is not jurisdictional.

The court noted the harsh result: Lusk has no recourse against the postal employees in any civil lawsuit because the Westfall Act makes the FTCA the exclusive remedy for common-law tort claims by federal employees acting within the scope of employment, yet the FTCA's intentional tort exception bars her claims. The court emphasized this is a matter for Congress to address through legislation.

This case involves an insolvent Dutch life insurance company seeking to enforce a foreign arbitration award in federal court against respondents who failed to comply with the award. The company pursued enforcement through two routes: confirmation under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York Convention, and alternatively, recognition of a Dutch court judgment confirming the award under North Carolina law.

1. Whether the three-year statute of limitations in 9 U.S.C. § 207 for confirming foreign arbitration awards is mandatory or merely permissive
2. Whether a Dutch court judgment confirming an arbitration award constitutes a "foreign-country judgment" recognizable under the North Carolina Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
3. Whether the district court properly denied respondents' motion to dismiss the state-law enforcement claim

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award under the FAA, holding that the three-year statute of limitations in Section 207 is mandatory, not permissive, and the petition was time-barred. The court reasoned that while "may apply" grants discretion to seek confirmation, the phrase "within three years" imposes a mandatory temporal boundary on that discretion. The court rejected arguments based on judicial efficiency and policy favoring arbitration, noting that Congress explicitly imposed the time limit as part of the statute's purpose. The court distinguished its prior precedent in Sverdrup (which treated the one-year limitation in Section 9 as permissive for domestic arbitration) because Section 207 addresses international arbitration under a different statutory chapter enacted decades later, and foreign awards have alternative efficient enforcement mechanisms available. However, the court affirmed that the Dutch court judgment confirming the arbitration award qualifies as a "foreign-country judgment" under North Carolina law because it is a judgment of a foreign court granting enforcement of an arbitral award, is final and conclusive, and grants recovery of a sum of money. The court remanded for the district court to consider enforcement under the North Carolina Act.

This is a criminal appeal in which a physician convicted of unauthorized distribution of oxycodone challenges her convictions based on jury instruction language. The defendant argues that the instructions failed to require the jury to find that she knew her prescriptions deviated from her own professional practice, rather than from objective medical standards.

1. Whether jury instructions correctly stated the mens rea (mental state) requirement for unauthorized drug distribution under the Controlled Substances Act following the Supreme Court's decision in Ruan v. United States
2. Whether the removal of the possessive pronoun "her" from the phrase "her professional practice" in jury instructions improperly allowed conviction without proof that the defendant knew her prescriptions were unauthorized
3. Whether professional standards are objective or subjective in determining the scope of authorized prescribing authority
4. Whether the jury instructions, read as a whole, adequately conveyed that the government must prove the defendant's subjective knowledge that her prescriptions fell outside objective bounds of professional practice

The court affirmed the conviction. The court held that Ruan requires both an objective component and a subjective component: (1) objectively, whether the prescription fell outside the usual course of professional medical practice as defined by professional standards, and (2) subjectively, whether the defendant knew or intended that the prescription was unauthorized. The court rejected the defendant's argument that "her professional practice" means her own idiosyncratic practice, finding that the possessive pronoun refers to the medical profession generally, not to the individual physician's personal habits. The court concluded that while the individual instruction about distribution was somewhat ambiguous, the jury instructions read as a whole—including explicit language about subjective good faith, prohibition on conviction for negligence or mistake, and requirement that the defendant knew she was acting without authorization—adequately conveyed the correct legal standard and did not allow conviction based solely on objective deviation from medical standards.

This is an immigration appeal case in which a Jamaican national seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The petitioner argues that the immigration court violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights by preventing him from timely filing his motion to reopen despite his repeated good-faith attempts to do so.

1. Whether the petitioner has a cognizable liberty or property interest sufficient to bring a procedural due process claim under the Fifth Amendment
2. Whether the immigration court's refusal to accept the petitioner's motion to reopen—first electronically and then in person—rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair
3. Whether the petitioner demonstrated prejudice from the immigration court's actions, specifically whether he would have satisfied the requirements to reopen his removal proceedings had the court accepted his timely filing
4. Whether the BIA properly interpreted the statutory requirements for filing a VAWA (Violence Against Women Act) motion to reopen

The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, reversed the BIA's decision, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that:

1. The petitioner has a cognizable statutory right to file a motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), which creates a liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment
2. The record compels the conclusion that the immigration court prevented the petitioner from filing his motion on the deadline date through both its electronic filing system and a clerk's refusal to accept paper filing, rendering the proceedings fundamentally unfair
3. The petitioner established prejudice because the parties agreed that had either filing method been accepted on the deadline, the motion would have been timely under VAWA's one-year extension, and the government did not dispute that the petitioner articulated a prima facie case for reopening
4. The BIA improperly imposed a statutory requirement not found in the law by requiring that the petitioner have already filed his VAWA self-petition with USCIS; the statute permits filing a copy of a self-petition that "has been or will be filed"
5. An immigration court cannot prevent a petitioner from filing a motion and then penalize him for failing to do so, as this violates due process

This is a criminal appeal in which Stephen Snyder, a former prominent Maryland attorney, was convicted of attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act and violations of the Travel Act for threatening to run a damaging media campaign against a hospital's transplant program unless it paid him $25 million as a personal consultant. Snyder represented himself at trial despite evidence of cognitive decline and health issues.

1. Whether the district court erred in allowing Snyder to proceed pro se (represent himself) despite his cognitive impairment and declining health, and whether the court was required to revoke his self-representation rights sua sponte
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to give a "reliance-on-counsel" jury instruction based on Snyder's consultation with an ethics attorney
3. Whether limiting a witness's testimony due to a non-disclosure agreement violated Snyder's constitutional right to present evidence and confront witnesses
4. Whether the district court erred in refusing to voir dire the jury regarding potential exposure to news reports of Snyder's contempt arrest during trial

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction on all grounds. The court held:

1. Pro Se Representation: Although Snyder's appellate counsel conceded he was competent to stand trial, the court emphasized that a defendant competent to stand trial is necessarily competent to waive counsel. While courts may revoke self-representation rights under Indiana v. Edwards, they are not required to do so. The court rejected Snyder's argument that courts must revoke pro se status when a defendant will perform poorly at trial, noting this would create practical problems and contradict Faretta's principle that defendants cannot complain about the quality of their own defense on appeal.
2. Reliance-on-Counsel Instruction: The court affirmed the denial of the instruction because Snyder failed to establish the required foundation showing full disclosure to his ethics attorney. The attorney testified he knew little about the consultancy arrangement and explicitly stated he never advised Snyder that he could seek a consultancy by threatening to destroy the hospital's transplant department.
3. Witness Testimony Limitation: The court found no constitutional violation from limiting the witness's testimony to accommodate her non-disclosure agreement, as Snyder failed to demonstrate material prejudice. The excluded testimony was either cumulative to other evidence presented at trial or irrelevant to the elements of extortion.
4. Jury Voir Dire: The court upheld the district court's discretionary decision not to question jurors about exposure to news of Snyder's contempt arrest, noting that asking such questions might draw unwarranted attention to the publicity and that jurors are presumed to follow judicial admonitions to avoid media coverage.

This is an employment discrimination appeal in which Brenda Brenyah, a Black female nurse of Ghanaian origin, challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her Title VII, Section 1981, and ADA claims against her former employer, Corpus Christi Medical Center (CCMC). The Fifth Circuit affirms most of the dismissals but reverses the summary judgment on her hostile work environment claims.

1. Whether Brenyah exhausted her administrative remedies by timely filing EEOC charges
2. Whether Brenyah established a prima facie case of race and national origin discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981
3. Whether CCMC's stated reasons for extending Brenyah's probation were pretextual
4. Whether Brenyah established a Section 1981 contractual discrimination claim
5. Whether Brenyah established an ADA disability discrimination claim
6. Whether Brenyah established Title VII, Section 1981, and ADA retaliation claims
7. Whether Brenyah established an ADA interference claim
8. Whether CCMC failed to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA
9. Whether Brenyah established a hostile work environment claim under Title VII and Section 1981

The court AFFIRMED summary judgment on all claims except the Title VII and Section 1981 hostile work environment claims, which were REVERSED and REMANDED.

Reasoning:

1. Administrative Exhaustion: Brenyah's first EEOC charge (filed December 22, 2017, amended January 3, 2018) was timely and exhausted her administrative remedies for conduct through September 2017. Her second charge (filed February 12, 2019) was untimely and not saved by a government shutdown tolling argument. The court therefore only considered claims based on facts in the first charge.
2. Race/National Origin Discrimination (Title VII and Section 1981): Although Brenyah established a prima facie case regarding the extension of her probation as an adverse employment action, she failed to demonstrate pretext. CCMC provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons (time management and documentation issues supported by specific examples), and Brenyah's evidence of comparators was insufficient—the Hispanic nurses she cited extended their shifts far less frequently than she did.
3. Section 1981 Contractual Discrimination: Brenyah's claim failed because she actually received medical care at Doctors Regional Hospital, meaning she was not "thwarted" from completing her desired transaction. A completed transaction is not actionable under Section 1981.
4. ADA Disability Discrimination: Brenyah could not establish a causal connection between her disability and an adverse employment action because CCMC extended her probation before she developed her disability (herniated disc and torn knee ligament from an August 2017 car accident).
5. Retaliation Claims (Title VII, Section 1981, and ADA): Brenyah failed to establish "but for" causation—she provided no evidence that, absent her complaints to her supervisor Sewell, her probation would not have been extended. The record showed CCMC's decision was based on documented time management and documentation difficulties.
6. ADA Interference Claim: Because Brenyah received medical care at Doctors Regional, she could not show interference with a protected right under the ADA.
7. ADA Failure to Accommodate: Brenyah failed to clearly communicate her need for accommodations to CCMC. While she mentioned "light duty" in August 2017, by January-March 2018 when she sought to return to work, she requested only reorientation and training, not accommodations. Her doctor's records indicating restrictions only through January 7, 2018 further suggested no ongoing accommodations were needed.
8. Hostile Work Environment (Title VII and Section 1981) - REVERSED: Brenyah established a genuine dispute of material fact on the final two prongs:

   Severe or Pervasive Harassment Affecting Employment: Evidence showed harassment occurred almost every shift at Bay Area Hospital, including mocking of African food and accents, derogatory comments about Black employees, and expressions of preference for Filipino employees. Brenyah's testimony indicated her work performance suffered and she felt "less than human." The court found this met the objective and subjective standards for a hostile work environment, particularly when considering the totality of circumstances including second-hand harassment witnessed against co-worker Dike and the professional consequences from the Doctors Regional incident.

   Employer Knowledge and Inadequate Remedial Action: Although CCMC claimed it conducted a prompt investigation and offered a transfer, Brenyah presented evidence of significant deficiencies: discrepancies in supervisor testimony, missing investigation files and interview notes despite supervisors' claims to have created them, failure to interview a Black employee, omission of corroborating statements from the investigation summary, and supervisors' statement that "the cliques were not going anywhere." Evidence also showed harassing behavior continued after the investigation. A reasonable jury could find CCMC's investigation was insufficiently prompt and thorough and that remedial measures were not reasonably calculated to end the harassment.

9. Evidentiary Rulings: The court upheld the district court's rejection of Brenyah's spoliation objection (no evidence of bad faith destruction of Doctors Regional video footage) and admission of the EEOC's dismissal letter (Brenyah failed to identify specific grounds for inadmissibility).

This is a civil rights case arising from a police officer's shooting of a rescue puppy named Apollo during a domestic disturbance call in New Orleans. The owners sued the officer and the city for Fourth Amendment violations, and the jury returned verdicts finding the officer violated the owners' constitutional rights but was shielded by qualified immunity, while also finding the city liable despite determining that no city policy caused the dog's death.

1. Whether the district court properly submitted the qualified immunity defense to the jury when factual disputes existed regarding the officer's conduct
2. Whether the jury's proposed pretrial order carving out qualified immunity from jury consideration was binding
3. Whether the jury's inconsistent verdicts on municipal liability—finding the city liable while simultaneously finding that no city policy caused the injury—could stand

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the qualified immunity verdict for Officer Burmaster but reversed the municipal liability verdict against the City of New Orleans and remanded for a new trial. The court held that: (1) when factual disputes preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity, a properly instructed jury may resolve the fact-bound immunity question by applying clearly established law to the disputed facts, consistent with the framework established in Melear v. Spears and reaffirmed in Ramirez v. Killian; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b) in allowing the jury to consider qualified immunity despite the proposed pretrial order; and (3) the jury's verdicts on municipal liability were irreconcilable because municipal liability requires both municipal culpability and causation, and the jury could not logically find that no city policy caused Apollo's death while simultaneously holding the city liable for that death. The court reasoned that a special verdict must be internally consistent, and where no permissible interpretation can reconcile the answers, a new trial is required.

This is an appeal and mandamus petition in a 60-year-old school desegregation case where all remaining parties filed a stipulated dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), but the district court refused to honor it and scheduled evidentiary hearings to determine unitary status. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether a district court may continue adjudicating a case after all remaining parties have jointly dismissed it.

1. Whether the Fifth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the district court's orders refusing to accept the stipulated dismissal
2. Whether a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulated dismissal is self-executing and automatically strips the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction
3. Whether mandamus relief is appropriate to compel the district court to honor the stipulated dismissal despite concerns about public policy and constitutional interests in school desegregation cases
4. Whether a district court may impose additional requirements (such as evidentiary hearings on unitary status) before accepting a stipulated dismissal in desegregation cases

The court dismissed the direct appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction but granted the mandamus petition. The majority held that: (1) the direct appeal must be dismissed because the district court's orders were neither final decisions nor appealable collateral orders under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 or 1292; (2) a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation of dismissal is self-executing and effective immediately upon filing, automatically stripping the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction; (3) the district court had no authority to require further proceedings after the stipulation was filed; (4) the enumerated exceptions in Rule 41(a)(1)(A) (Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, 66, and applicable federal statutes) do not apply here, and courts cannot add implied exceptions based on public policy concerns; (5) Brown v. Board of Education and Green v. County School Board do not authorize courts to insist on adjudicating unitary status after all parties have dismissed the case; and (6) mandamus is appropriate because there is no adequate alternative remedy, the right to relief is clear and indisputable, and the issue has importance beyond the immediate case. The court ordered the district court to vacate its Memorandum Ruling and the order scheduling evidentiary hearings. Judge Stewart dissented, arguing that mandamus should not be used as a substitute for appeal, that adequate relief would be available after the evidentiary hearings, and that the district court should be given deference in managing this complex institutional case involving constitutional desegregation interests.

This is an appeal and mandamus petition arising from a 60-year-old school desegregation case in which all remaining parties filed a stipulated dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), but the district court refused to honor it and scheduled evidentiary hearings instead. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether a district court may continue adjudicating a case after all remaining parties have jointly dismissed it.

1. Whether the Fifth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the district court's orders refusing to accept the stipulated dismissal and scheduling evidentiary hearings
2. Whether a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulated dismissal is self-executing and immediately effective, or whether a district court may reject it based on public policy concerns
3. Whether mandamus relief is appropriate to compel the district court to honor the stipulated dismissal
4. Whether the district court retained jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings after the parties filed their joint dismissal stipulation

The court dismissed the direct appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction but granted the mandamus petition. The majority held that:

1. The challenged orders were not final decisions or appealable collateral orders, and Section 1292(a)(1) did not apply because the orders did not refuse to dissolve an injunction
2. A Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation of dismissal is self-executing and effective immediately upon filing, automatically stripping the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction
3. The district court may not reject a stipulated dismissal based on general public policy concerns; the Rule's enumerated exceptions (Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, 66, and applicable federal statutes) are the only limitations on self-executing dismissals
4. The School Board satisfied all three requirements for mandamus relief: (1) no adequate alternative remedy exists because any later appeal would be from a nullity; (2) the right to relief is clear and indisputable under binding Fifth Circuit precedent; and (3) mandamus is appropriate given the importance of the issue and inconsistent district court treatment
5. The district court was ordered to vacate its Memorandum Ruling and the order scheduling evidentiary hearings

This is an age discrimination case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in which Derrick McCoy, a terminated security officer, challenged the Department of Homeland Security's unfavorable suitability determination that prevented his reinstatement by his former employer. McCoy alleged that DHS discriminated against him based on his age when making the suitability determination.

1. Whether DHS was McCoy's employer or joint employer for purposes of ADEA liability
2. Whether McCoy established a prima facie case of age discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
3. Whether McCoy could identify a similarly situated, substantially younger employee treated more favorably
4. Whether McCoy's failure to disclose a comparator during discovery was harmless or substantially justified
5. Whether the record contained evidence that age caused DHS's adverse employment action under the holistic Ortiz approach
6. Whether a "cat's paw" theory of liability applied based on allegedly discriminatory comments by an FPS inspector

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for DHS. Although the court assumed without deciding that DHS could be considered McCoy's employer, it held that McCoy's ADEA claim failed on multiple grounds. First, McCoy failed to establish that he was meeting DHS's legitimate expectations and could not demonstrate that a similarly situated, substantially younger employee was treated more favorably. The court upheld the district court's exclusion of PSO Haywood as a comparator, finding no abuse of discretion in refusing to consider a comparator disclosed only after discovery closed. Even if Haywood had been allowed as a comparator, McCoy failed to show they were similarly situated. Second, under the holistic Ortiz approach, the record contained no evidence that McCoy's age caused the unfavorable suitability determination; rather, the determination was based on McCoy's conduct violations during the incident. The court rejected McCoy's cat's paw theory, finding that stray remarks by an uninvolved inspector were insufficient to create an inference of discrimination, and that the ultimate decision-maker was unaware of McCoy's age and conducted an independent review.

This is a class action appeal challenging the dismissal of claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act. The plaintiffs received unwanted marketing text messages from Blackstone Medical Services and sued under TCPA § 227(c)(5), which provides a private right of action for unwanted telephone calls.

1. Whether text messages constitute "telephone calls" within the meaning of TCPA § 227(c)(5)
2. Whether the ordinary public meaning of "telephone call" at the time of the TCPA's 1991 enactment extends to modern text messages
3. Whether the statutory context and surrounding provisions support including text messages within § 227(c)(5)'s private right of action
4. Whether prior Supreme Court and circuit court precedent interpreting other TCPA provisions applies to § 227(c)(5)
5. Whether the FCC's interpretation of "call" to include text messages is binding on the court's statutory interpretation

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that § 227(c)(5) does not create a private right of action for unwanted text messages. The court reasoned that:

1. The ordinary public meaning of "telephone call" in 1991 referred to sound-based communication via telephone, and text messages do not reproduce sounds
2. While statutory meaning is fixed at enactment, new applications may arise, but text messages do not qualify as a new application of "telephone call" because they are fundamentally different from sound-based calls
3. The statutory context shows Congress distinguished between "telephone calls" and "telephone messages" (including faxes), and § 227(c)(5) uses only the narrower term "calls," not the broader term "telephone solicitations" used elsewhere in the statute
4. Prior Supreme Court and circuit court decisions citing Campbell-Ewald either involved different TCPA provisions (§ 227(b)) or were decided before the Supreme Court clarified in Facebook v. Duguid that Campbell-Ewald did not resolve whether text messages are calls
5. The FCC's interpretation of "call" to include text messages is not binding because the FCC's extension of Do-Not-Call Registry protections to texts was pursuant to § 227(c)(3), which refers to "telephone solicitations," not § 227(c)(5)'s narrower "telephone calls" language
6. Congressional inaction in not amending § 227(c)(5) to explicitly cover text messages, despite amending other subsections to clarify text message coverage, does not support the plaintiffs' interpretation
7. The policy concern underlying the TCPA—preventing telemarketing calls from seizing telephone lines needed for emergency services—does not apply to text messages, making it reasonable that § 227(c)(5) covers only calls

This case involves a challenge to the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Corporate Group Rule, which imposed a $20 million aggregate lending cap on affiliated businesses under common control seeking Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans under the CARES Act. Nursing homes operated by commonly controlled entities appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the SBA.

1. Whether the Corporate Group Rule is authorized under Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act and the CARES Act's emergency rulemaking authority
2. Whether the rule violates the statutory language requiring eligibility for "any qualified small business concern"
3. Whether the rule is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
4. Whether the rule was applied retroactively to Oak Lawn's loan
5. Whether separately organized limited liability companies must be treated as independent business concerns under federal law

The court affirmed the district court's judgment for the SBA. The court held that: (1) the Corporate Group Rule is authorized by Section 7(a) in conjunction with the SBA's emergency rulemaking authority under the CARES Act, as the statute does not forbid aggregate limits; (2) the rule does not render any business ineligible for loans but rather limits the amount guaranteed, which is within the agency's discretion; (3) the rule is not arbitrary and capricious because the SBA provided a rational basis—ensuring limited resources reach the maximum number of borrowers—and the agency successfully guaranteed nearly 12 million loans totaling $800 billion; (4) the rule was not applied retroactively because Oak Lawn could have withdrawn its application or declined funds after the rule's effective date, and forgiveness determinations were prospective; and (5) federal agencies may treat affiliated businesses as a single corporate group for regulatory purposes, and the Gubin-Blisko partnership's majority ownership and control of all 203 nursing homes properly placed them in a single corporate group under the rule.

This is an appeal challenging the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Corporate Group Rule, which imposed a $20 million aggregate cap on Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans to affiliated businesses under common control during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nursing home operators sought forgiveness of PPP loans that exceeded this cap, arguing the rule was invalid and applied retroactively.

1. Whether the Corporate Group Rule is authorized by Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act and the CARES Act's emergency rulemaking authority
2. Whether the rule violates the statutory requirement that "any" qualified small business concern be eligible for loan guarantees
3. Whether the rule is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
4. Whether the rule was applied retroactively to Oak Lawn's loan
5. Whether a partnership can serve as a "corporate parent" under the rule's definition of "corporate group"

The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the SBA. The court held that: (1) the Corporate Group Rule is a valid exercise of the SBA's discretionary authority under Section 7(a) and the CARES Act's emergency rulemaking provisions, as the statute does not forbid aggregate limits; (2) the rule does not render any business ineligible for loans but merely limits the amount guaranteed, which is within the agency's discretion; (3) the rule is not arbitrary and capricious because the SBA provided a rational basis—ensuring limited resources reach the maximum number of borrowers—and the program's success demonstrates the rule's reasonableness; (4) the rule was not applied retroactively because Oak Lawn could have withdrawn its application or declined to draw funds after the rule's effective date, and forgiveness determinations were prospective; and (5) a partnership can constitute a "corporate parent" under the rule because partnerships are recognized legal entities capable of controlling affiliated businesses.

This case involves a challenge to the Small Business Administration's Corporate Group Rule, which imposed a $20 million aggregate cap on Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans to affiliated businesses under common control. Nursing home operators appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment upholding the rule and the SBA's denial of full loan forgiveness.

1. Whether the Corporate Group Rule is authorized by Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act and the CARES Act's emergency rulemaking authority
2. Whether the rule violates the statutory language requiring that "any qualified small business concern" be eligible for loan guarantees
3. Whether the rule is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
4. Whether the rule was applied retroactively to Oak Lawn's loan
5. Whether separately organized limited liability companies must be treated as independent business concerns under federal law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the SBA. The court held that: (1) the Corporate Group Rule is authorized by Section 7(a) in conjunction with the SBA's emergency rulemaking authority under the CARES Act; (2) the rule does not render any business ineligible for loans but rather determines the amount guaranteed, which the statute permits the agency to control; (3) the rule is not arbitrary and capricious because the SBA provided a rational basis—ensuring limited resources reach the maximum number of borrowers—and the agency successfully guaranteed nearly 12 million loans totaling approximately $800 billion; (4) the rule was not applied retroactively because Oak Lawn could have withdrawn its application or declined to draw funds after the rule's effective date, and forgiveness determinations were prospective; and (5) federal agencies have discretion to treat affiliated businesses as a single entity for regulatory purposes, and nothing in the statute requires reliance solely on state law corporate organization. The court noted that the Gubin-Blisko partnership controlled over 50% of all 203 nursing homes, making them a single corporate group under the rule.

This is a trade secret misappropriation case under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) in which Comet Technologies sued XP Power for stealing trade secrets related to radio frequency power generators and matching networks. A jury awarded Comet $40 million in damages, a permanent injunction, and over $17 million in attorney fees, but the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to an erroneous jury instruction.

1. Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury that XP bore the burden of proving that the alleged trade secrets were "readily ascertainable by proper means," an essential element of the DTSA claim
2. Whether XP invited the instructional error by proposing the flawed instruction
3. Whether the instructional error was harmless despite the jury's verdict
4. Whether awarding both unjust enrichment damages for avoided costs and a permanent injunction constitutes an impermissible double recovery under the DTSA

The court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The majority held that: (1) the district court erred by placing the burden of proving lack of ready ascertainability on XP rather than on Comet as the plaintiff, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); (2) XP did not invite the error because it timely objected when Comet dropped its state law claims, which changed the applicable burden of proof; and (3) the error was not harmless because conflicting expert testimony existed on whether the trade secrets could have been reverse-engineered, and the jury's verdict did not clearly indicate it would have reached the same result under proper instructions. The court noted that ready ascertainability depends on what competitors could theoretically do, not what XP actually did, making it a distinct question from misappropriation itself. In a concurring opinion, Judge Hamilton addressed XP's double recovery argument and held that awarding both unjust enrichment damages for avoided costs and a permanent injunction does not create impermissible double recovery because they remedy different harms—the former addresses past benefits the defendant avoided spending, while the latter prevents future business harm to the plaintiff. Judge Bumatay dissented, arguing the instructional error was harmless because overwhelming and largely undisputed evidence showed the trade secrets were not readily ascertainable, making a retrial unnecessary.

This is a trade secret misappropriation case in which Comet Technologies sued XP Power under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) after former Comet employees stole confidential documents and brought them to XP. A jury awarded Comet $40 million in damages, a permanent injunction, and over $17 million in attorney fees, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial due to an erroneous jury instruction.

1. Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury that XP bore the burden of proving that the alleged trade secrets were "readily ascertainable by proper means," an essential element of Comet's DTSA claims
2. Whether XP invited the instructional error by proposing or failing to object to the flawed instruction
3. Whether the instructional error was harmless despite the jury's verdict
4. Whether awarding both unjust enrichment damages for avoided costs and permanent injunctive relief constitutes an impermissible double recovery under the DTSA (addressed in the concurring opinion)

Majority Opinion (Judge Hamilton): The court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court held that: (1) the district court erred by placing the burden of proof on XP to disprove ready ascertainability, when the DTSA requires Comet as plaintiff to prove the trade secrets were not readily ascertainable; (2) XP did not invite the error because it made a timely and correct objection when Comet dropped its state law claims, and XP's later statements at the charging conference did not constitute invited error; and (3) the error was not harmless because the jury instructions were not accurate as a whole (the "independent economic value" and "readily ascertainable" elements are distinct), and conflicting expert testimony on whether the trade secrets could have been reverse-engineered presented factual disputes that a properly instructed jury must decide. The court vacated the damages awards, permanent injunction, and attorney fees award, and remanded for a new trial on Trade Secrets D, E, and L.

Concurring Opinion (Judge Hamilton): Judge Hamilton addressed XP's argument that awarding both unjust enrichment damages for avoided costs and permanent injunctive relief constitutes a double recovery. He concluded that no double recovery occurs because: (1) the DTSA's statutory text does not prohibit awarding both remedies; (2) unjust enrichment damages for avoided costs are retrospective relief addressing past benefits gained by the defendant, while injunctive relief is prospective relief preventing future harm to the plaintiff; (3) the Second Circuit's decision in Syntel Sterling is distinguishable on its facts; and (4) allowing a defendant to purchase a license to use stolen trade secrets by paying damages would undermine the DTSA's deterrent purpose. Judge Hamilton joined the Third and Seventh Circuits in holding that both remedies may be awarded together.

Dissenting Opinion (Judge Bumatay): Judge Bumatay agreed that the district court used an erroneous jury instruction but concluded the error was harmless. He argued that: (1) Comet presented overwhelming and largely uncontested evidence that the trade secrets were sophisticated, composed of voluminous technical data, and not readily ascertainable through reverse-engineering or public patents; (2) XP's expert testimony only addressed general physical architecture and functionality, not the detailed technical data stolen; (3) the jury's finding that the trade secrets had "independent economic value because it was secret" logically implies they were not readily ascertainable; (4) the jury's awards of $20 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages demonstrate the jury found the information could not have been easily obtained without misappropriation; and (5) the weight of evidence and jury findings point in one direction, making retrial unnecessary.

This is a trade secret misappropriation case under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) in which Comet Technologies sued XP Power for stealing trade secrets through departing employees. A jury awarded Comet $40 million in damages and a permanent injunction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial due to an erroneous jury instruction on burden of proof.

1. Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury that XP bore the burden of proving that the alleged trade secrets were "readily ascertainable by proper means," when the DTSA places this burden on the plaintiff (Comet)
2. Whether XP invited the instructional error by failing to properly object
3. Whether the instructional error was harmless despite the jury's verdict
4. Whether awarding both unjust enrichment damages for avoided costs and a permanent injunction constitutes an impermissible double recovery under the DTSA

The majority held that the district court committed reversible error by shifting the burden of proof on the "readily ascertainable" element to the defendant. The court rejected Comet's arguments that XP invited the error and that the error was harmless. The majority found that conflicting expert testimony on whether the trade secrets could have been reverse-engineered, combined with the jury's inability to clearly allocate damages among different trade secret components, made it impossible to determine whether a properly instructed jury would have reached the same verdict. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial on liability and damages for Trade Secrets D, E, and L. In a concurring opinion, Judge Hamilton addressed the double recovery issue and held that awarding both unjust enrichment damages for avoided costs and a permanent injunction does not create an impermissible double recovery under the DTSA, joining the Third and Seventh Circuits on this issue. Judge Bumatay dissented, arguing that the instructional error was harmless because overwhelming and undisputed evidence established that the trade secrets were not readily ascertainable, and the jury's verdict findings (including the compensatory and punitive damages awards) strongly suggested the jury would have reached the same result with proper instructions.

This is a false advertising case under the Lanham Act brought by KetoNatural Pet Foods against Hill's Pet Nutrition, alleging that Hill's and its partners (veterinarians and non-profit organizations) made false statements linking grain-free pet food to canine heart disease to harm KetoNatural's sales. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the appellate court partially reversed.

1. Whether statements by Hill's and its co-conspirators constitute "commercial speech" under the Lanham Act, which requires application of the Bolger test examining whether speech: (1) is an advertisement, (2) references a specific product, and (3) is made with economic motivation
2. Whether the challenged statements are "literally false" under the Lanham Act, including application of the "establishment claim doctrine" which permits falsity to be shown by demonstrating that underlying scientific studies do not support the assertions made
3. Whether Hill's is vicariously liable for false statements made by veterinarians and non-profit organizations
4. Whether a Lanham Act violation can serve as a predicate violation for a Kansas civil conspiracy claim

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Regarding Hill's own statements: The court reversed the dismissal, finding that KetoNatural plausibly alleged that Hill's webpages, hyperlinked content, and veterinary education materials constitute commercial speech. The statements disparaging grain-free pet food meet the Bolger factors because they: (1) function as advertisements by promoting Hill's grain-based alternative; (2) promote Hill's brand without explicit reference, similar to how market-dominant companies can promote products implicitly; and (3) were made with economic motivation given Hill's declining market share. The court also found KetoNatural plausibly alleged these statements are literally false under the establishment claim doctrine, as they implicitly rely on scientific data showing a link between grain-free diets and heart disease, but KetoNatural alleged no such data supports this correlation. Regarding veterinarians' statements: The court affirmed dismissal of claims based on veterinarians' public media statements, blog posts, and academic articles. These statements are not commercial speech because: (1) they do not function as advertisements for Hill's; (2) they are untethered from Hill's and do not promote Hill's brand; and (3) KetoNatural failed to allege the veterinarians made statements with direct economic motivation or quid pro quo compensation from Hill's. The court noted that scientific articles are generally protected opinion and not actionable commercial speech. Regarding the Facebook page and non-profits: The court affirmed dismissal of claims based on the Facebook page and associated website, and statements by the non-profit organizations, as these were too attenuated from Hill's to constitute commercial speech promoting Hill's products. Regarding civil conspiracy: The court remanded the Kansas civil conspiracy claim because it is contingent on the Lanham Act claim, which was partially reversed. The court did not resolve whether a Lanham Act violation can serve as a predicate violation for civil conspiracy. The court remanded for the district court to determine the appropriate pleading standard (Rule 9(b) or 12(b)(6)) and whether KetoNatural has successfully pleaded a complete Lanham Act claim.

This is an immigration law appeal involving two individuals challenging decisions by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services regarding their refugee status and admission to the United States. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has vacated its prior judgment in light of a recent Supreme Court decision and ordered supplemental briefing on jurisdictional and reviewability issues.

1. Whether the Supreme Court's holding in Mullin v. Doe regarding unreviewable final agency actions affects the court's prior holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) allows review of USCIS's subsidiary determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4)
2. Whether judicial review is available for USCIS's determination that the appellants were not refugees at the time of their admission to the United States, and if so, what basis supports such review
3. Whether USCIS's termination decision is reviewable in a petition for review, given the government's inconsistent positions on this issue throughout the litigation

The court granted the government's petition for panel rehearing and vacated the January 12, 2026 judgment. The court ordered supplemental briefing addressing the three questions above, recognizing that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mullin v. Doe may impact the court's jurisdiction and the reviewability of the agency actions at issue. The court set a deadline of 21 days for simultaneous supplemental briefs and indicated that oral argument would be scheduled before September 1, 2026.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which two individuals incarcerated in an Oklahoma county jail alleged they were sexually abused by jailers and sued the County Sheriff for municipal liability based on policies of inadequate staffing and supervision. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff, finding insufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to an obvious risk of sexual abuse.

1. Whether a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for employee misconduct based on facially lawful policies of inadequate jail staffing and supervision
2. The standard for establishing "deliberate indifference" in municipal liability cases—specifically, whether notice of a pattern of constitutional violations is required or whether a single prior incident suffices
3. Whether violations of jail policy and state criminal law (sexual misconduct between jailers and inmates) constitute notice of a pattern of constitutional violations for purposes of municipal liability
4. The role of consent as a defense to Eighth Amendment claims of sexual abuse by correctional officers

The court affirmed summary judgment for the Sheriff on the municipal liability claims. The court held that to establish municipal liability based on a facially lawful policy, plaintiffs must prove the municipality maintained the policy with "deliberate indifference"—meaning the municipality had actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act was substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation. Notice is typically established through a pattern of similar constitutional violations. The court found that: (1) Violations of jail policy and state criminal law do not establish notice of constitutional violations, since consensual sexual contact between jailers and inmates is not a constitutional violation under Tenth Circuit precedent; (2) Neither plaintiff established a pattern of nonconsensual sexual abuse at the jail. The prior sexual misconduct involving jailer Nichols appeared consensual based on inmate testimony, and a single prior incident is insufficient to establish a pattern; (3) Sexual abuse is not a "plainly obvious" consequence of single-staffing a jail, so the narrow exception to the pattern requirement does not apply; (4) Therefore, neither Sheriff Duncan nor Sheriff Hedgecock acted with deliberate indifference by maintaining the staffing and supervision policies, and municipal liability claims fail. The court noted that while it assumed the underlying constitutional violations occurred for purposes of the municipal liability analysis, the plaintiffs could not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard necessary to hold the municipality liable.

This is an appeal by an Oklahoma prisoner, Christopher Barnett, challenging the dismissal of his civil rights suit against prison officials. The central issue is whether Barnett qualifies for in forma pauperis status on appeal under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

1. Whether a prisoner with three or more prior dismissals for frivolousness or failure to state a claim can proceed in forma pauperis on appeal
2. Whether the "imminent danger of serious physical injury" exception to the three-strikes rule applies to Barnett's case
3. Whether a nexus (connection) must exist between the alleged imminent danger and the claims asserted in the complaint
4. Whether both "traceability" and "redressability" are required to satisfy the imminent danger exception

The Tenth Circuit denied Barnett's motion for in forma pauperis status. The court held that: (1) Barnett has at least three prior dismissals triggering the statutory bar under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); (2) a nexus requirement applies between the alleged danger and the complaint's claims; (3) both traceability and redressability must be shown, following the Second Circuit's approach used in standing doctrine; and (4) Barnett failed to satisfy redressability because his complaint alleged retaliation and access-to-courts violations that would not redress the alleged beatings and dangerous prison conditions, and because he was transferred to another prison during litigation, making relief against his former prison's officials inadequate to address dangers at his current location.

This is a federal criminal appeal challenging a sentencing enhancement applied to a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The defendant argues the district court erred in applying a four-point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on alleged possession of marijuana found in his vehicle.

1. Whether the categorical approach or factual approach applies to 21 U.S.C. § 844(c) when determining whether a defendant's prior state drug convictions qualify as "drug, narcotic, or chemical offense[s]" that elevate simple marijuana possession to a felony for sentencing enhancement purposes.
2. Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard for constructive possession by considering whether the defendant intended to exercise control over the marijuana, as required by Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622 (2015), or instead relied on the outdated knowledge-and-access standard.
3. Whether any error in applying the sentencing enhancement affected the defendant's substantial rights under the plain error standard of review.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant's 77-month sentence. The court held:

1. On the § 844(c) Issue: Although the court concluded the defendant demonstrated error by showing that the categorical approach should apply to § 844(c) based on the statute's use of "proscribes" language (similar to "prohibits" language in other statutes requiring the categorical approach), the error was not plain. Two unpublished circuit decisions (Shaw and Simmons) holding that the categorical approach does not apply to § 844 rendered the law on this issue "unsettled" rather than clearly established, preventing reversal under the demanding plain error standard.
2. On the Constructive Possession Issue: The court assumed without deciding that the district court erred by failing to explicitly consider whether the defendant intended to exercise control over the marijuana, as required by Henderson. The court found any such error was plain because constructive possession requires both knowledge/access and intent under well-settled law. However, the error did not affect substantial rights because, reviewing the trial evidence (the defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle, there was a significant quantity of marijuana in plain view in close proximity to him, and he immediately told the officer there was marijuana in the car), the district court would have found the defendant intended to exercise dominion and control over the marijuana even under the correct legal standard.
3. Disposition: The court rejected the defendant's argument that the district court's statement it would have imposed the same 77-month sentence regardless of the enhancement could insulate the sentencing decision from review, reaffirming that Guidelines errors can show a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

This case involves a challenge by several states and municipalities to operational changes made by the United States Postal Service in 2020, specifically whether the Postal Service was required to seek an advisory opinion from the Postal Regulatory Commission before implementing nationwide service changes. The central issue is whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear the states' claim or whether Congress's statutory review scheme channeled the claim exclusively to the Postal Regulatory Commission.

1. Whether Congress's creation of a specialized statutory review scheme for Postal Service policy challenges implicitly precludes district court jurisdiction and channels claims to the Postal Regulatory Commission
2. Whether the states' advisory opinion claim falls within the scope of the statutory review scheme or falls outside it as a collateral matter
3. Whether the urgency of obtaining relief before the November 2020 election creates an exception to the statutory review scheme's jurisdictional channeling
4. Whether the availability of appellate review of Postal Regulatory Commission decisions provides meaningful judicial review sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements

The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and vacated the permanent injunction. The court held that: (1) Congress created a detailed and comprehensive statutory review scheme that implicitly channels claims about Postal Service policy changes to the Postal Regulatory Commission for initial review, with subsequent appellate review in the D.C. Circuit, thereby displacing district court jurisdiction; (2) the states' advisory opinion claim falls squarely within the scope of this statutory scheme and is not collateral to it, as it implicates the Commission's core statutory responsibility; (3) the statutory review scheme provides meaningful judicial review through appellate review, and the court declined to create an "irreparable harm" exception that would allow parties to circumvent Congress's jurisdictional channeling; and (4) the Commission possesses distinctive expertise in administering advisory opinion requirements, supporting the conclusion that initial review should occur before the Commission. The court reasoned that when Congress channels claims to a particular forum, courts must respect that choice and enforce the timing and scope limitations that accompany it, even when doing so may result in delays or burdens on the parties.

This appeal challenges economic sanctions imposed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on German nationals who trade in precious metals, based on their alleged operation in Russia's metals and mining sector under Executive Order 14024. The case turns on whether purchasing finished precious metals constitutes "procuring geological materials" within the meaning of the applicable sanctions regulations.

1. Whether buying finished precious metals, including gold bars, constitutes "procuring geological materials" within the meaning of 31 C.F.R. § 589.325, which defines the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy
2. Whether the term "procuring" in the regulation encompasses the acquisition of refined metals or only mining equipment
3. Whether refined precious metals qualify as "geological materials" under the regulation
4. Whether the Diegelmanns' activities were sufficiently connected to Russia to justify the sanctions

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government. The court held that: (1) the Diegelmanns' argument that they did not engage in "procuring" is meritless, as the ordinary meaning of "procure" means to obtain or acquire, and purchasing precious metals constitutes procuring geological materials; (2) the Diegelmanns' alternative argument that refined metals are not "geological materials" was forfeited because it was not raised at the district court level, and the court declined to consider unpreserved arguments despite de novo review of summary judgment; and (3) the classified record adequately supported OFAC's determination that the Diegelmanns' activities were sufficiently connected to Russia, as they purchased precious metals from Russian nationals.

This is an administrative law case in which Alignment Healthcare, a Medicare Advantage plan provider, challenged the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) decision to refuse to discard or suppress survey results used to calculate the company's star ratings. Alignment claimed that survey administration errors resulted in Spanish-speaking enrollees receiving surveys in English despite their language preferences.

1. Whether CMS violated the Administrative Procedure Act by refusing to discard survey data allegedly infected by survey administration errors involving language preference mismatches
2. Whether CMS departed from its own Quality Assurance Protocols & Technical Specifications by failing to enforce requirements that Spanish-language questionnaires be made available to Spanish-speaking enrollees
3. Whether CMS treated Alignment inconsistently compared to other Medicare Advantage plans in similar circumstances
4. Whether CMS's delegation of survey administration to private vendors violated the private nondelegation doctrine
5. Whether CMS's investigation and explanation regarding the survey discrepancies were adequate

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CMS. The court held that: (1) even assuming the Protocols made Alignment's Spanish-materials request binding on the vendor, Alignment failed to demonstrate that CMS acted arbitrarily or capriciously because the vendor attested to matching language preference data to the sample file and Spanish-speaking enrollees responded at rates higher than average; (2) Alignment forfeited its argument that CMS could not rely on Protocol compliance grounds because it failed to raise this Chenery objection in the district court; (3) Alignment failed to show inconsistent treatment by not pointing to instances where CMS suppressed survey results in similar circumstances; (4) CMS's interpretation did not violate the private nondelegation doctrine because CMS retained ultimate authority to determine whether survey results were sufficiently accurate for inclusion in star ratings; and (5) CMS's investigation was adequate, as it examined the survey results, consulted with the vendor, found no evidence of errors, and provided plausible explanations for the data fluctuations during weeks of correspondence with Alignment.

This is an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) failure-to-hire case in which a deaf applicant challenged Brewster Ambulance Service's decision not to hire him for a Chair Car Driver position. The case involves claims of both discriminatory failure to hire and failure to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding reasonable accommodations.

1. Whether the applicant could perform the essential functions of the Chair Car Driver position with reasonable accommodations
2. Whether the requested accommodation (Video Relay Services and phone holder) would constitute an undue hardship to the employer
3. Whether the employer failed to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding accommodations
4. Whether alternative accommodations (tablet-based dispatch, visual monitoring protocols, or reassignment to Day Care Van Driver position) could have enabled the applicant to perform essential job functions without undue hardship

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Brewster Ambulance. The court held that no reasonable jury could conclude there was a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed Buccieri to perform the essential communications functions of either the Chair Car Driver or Day Care Van Driver positions without undue hardship to Brewster. The court found that: (1) the Chair Car Driver position requires frequent communication with dispatch, patients, and facility staff; (2) Buccieri's proposed VRS accommodation would pose safety risks and operational delays; (3) alternative accommodations such as tablet-based dispatch or visual-monitoring protocols would not adequately address the essential communication functions or would create undue safety risks; (4) the employer's radio-based dispatch system provides safety advantages over cell-phone-based alternatives by allowing drivers to maintain focus on the road; and (5) the employer engaged in a good faith interactive process, as evidenced by its consideration of the proposed accommodation, exploration of alternative positions, and openness to further discussions, which Buccieri never pursued. The court noted that under ADA law, an employer cannot be held liable on an interactive process theory where the record forecloses a finding that the employee could perform the job's essential duties with reasonable accommodation.

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case brought by Amro Farid, a Muslim Arab-Egyptian professor at Dartmouth College's Thayer School of Engineering, who challenged his tenure denial and subsequent research misconduct investigation under Title VII and New Hampshire employment discrimination law.

1. Whether Dartmouth discriminated against Farid based on his religion and national origin when denying him tenure
2. Whether Dartmouth retaliated against Farid for filing a discrimination complaint by initiating research misconduct proceedings against him
3. Whether Farid established a prima facie case of discrimination and, if so, whether Dartmouth's articulated reasons for denying tenure were pretextual
4. Whether Farid established a prima facie case of retaliation and whether Dartmouth's investigation was retaliatory in nature

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Dartmouth on all discrimination and retaliation claims. The court held that:

1. Discrimination Claims: Although Farid established a prima facie case of discrimination, he failed to demonstrate that Dartmouth's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for denying tenure were pretextual. The court found that: (a) Professor Vikrant Vaze, the comparator Farid relied upon, was not similarly situated because he had superior qualifications in both scholarship and teaching; (b) Dartmouth's alleged policy violations were not "inexplicable and troubling" because they either applied generally to all tenure applicants or were corrected by Dartmouth; and (c) Farid failed to connect alleged unfriendly work environment actions (discouragement from advising Muslim student group, removal from energy systems project) to discrimination based on religion or national origin, as the record showed these actions were motivated by his poor performance.
2. Retaliation Claims: Farid failed to establish that his protected activity (filing a discrimination complaint) was a but-for cause of the research misconduct investigation. The court found that: (a) the investigation was conducted on a separate track by individuals uninvolved in the tenure dispute; (b) Hegde independently submitted the research misconduct complaint; (c) Dartmouth's sequestration of evidence and other investigative procedures complied with the Research Misconduct Policy; (d) Director Frowein's comments, while critical, did not demonstrate retaliatory animus or undue influence over the investigation committee; (e) the committee's decision to decline Farid's 311-page Overleaf Report was reasonable given his failure to provide clear explanations and his refusal to participate in interviews; and (f) the committee's final report, which found no research misconduct, undermined any inference of retaliation.

This case involves a challenge to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) regulation requiring all dogs imported into the United States to be at least six months old. Dog rescue organizations operating in the Caribbean brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing the age requirement exceeds the CDC's statutory authority and is arbitrary and capricious.

1. Whether the CDC's six-month minimum age requirement for imported dogs falls within the agency's statutory authority under 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) to prevent the introduction of communicable diseases, particularly rabies, into the United States
2. Whether the age requirement, as applied to dogs imported from rabies-free Caribbean islands, is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
3. Whether the age requirement constitutes an import prohibition under 42 U.S.C. § 265 requiring country-specific findings of serious danger
4. Whether the CDC adequately considered the reliance interests of dog rescue organizations in adopting the regulation

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the CDC. The court held that:

1. Statutory Authority: The age requirement qualifies as an "inspection" measure authorized under § 264(a). The requirement directly facilitates disease prevention by: (a) making it easier to screen dogs for rabies, since uncoordinated movements in dogs over six months old are more likely to indicate rabies rather than normal puppy development; and (b) allowing veterinarians to accurately assess whether dogs are old enough to have been adequately vaccinated against rabies, as dogs lose their baby teeth by six months, enabling precise age determination. The court rejected the argument that dogs from rabies-free countries cannot carry rabies, noting that rabies could be reintroduced into such countries undetected or that importers could fraudulently misrepresent a dog's country of origin.
2. Not an Import Prohibition: The age requirement is a condition of entry, not an import prohibition under § 265. Once puppies reach six months old and meet other entry requirements, they are permitted entry. Therefore, the CDC was not required to make country-specific findings of serious danger.
3. Arbitrary and Capricious: The regulation is not arbitrary and capricious. The CDC articulated rational reasons for the requirement, including facilitating rabies detection and vaccination verification. The court applied highly deferential review and found the CDC's decision supported by a rational view of the record. The court rejected the argument that the regulation is overbroad as applied to rabies-free countries, finding it rational for the CDC to apply a global standard given documented instances of importers fraudulently routing dogs from high-risk countries through rabies-free countries like Canada and Mexico. The CDC adequately explained how the age requirement prevents fraud by allowing officials to verify that the dog presented matches its documentation. The court also found the CDC reasonably considered reliance interests by choosing a six-month requirement instead of the seven-month requirement recommended by some scientists.

This is a Fourth Amendment case challenging the warrantless manual search of a defendant's cell phones at an international airport border, where U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers discovered child sexual abuse material. The defendant was convicted of multiple counts related to child exploitation and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the cell phone search.

1. Whether manual searches of cell phones at the border constitute routine or nonroutine border searches under the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether individualized suspicion is required for manual cell phone searches at the border, given the heightened privacy interests in cell phones established in Riley v. California
3. How to balance individuals' privacy expectations in digital data against the government's paramount interest in preventing contraband from entering the country at the border
4. Whether the distinctions between manual and forensic searches of electronic devices affect the level of suspicion required

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, holding that manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine border searches that do not require individualized suspicion. The court reasoned that while forensic searches of cell phones are nonroutine (as established in United States v. Kolsuz), manual searches are fundamentally different in four critical respects: (1) a person conducts the search rather than a machine; (2) manual searches are limited in breadth by officer time and attention, whereas forensic searches are comprehensive; (3) manual searches only access what a user can see, while forensic searches recover deleted files and metadata; and (4) manual searches are subject to memory limitations, while forensic searches create permanent, portable copies. The court balanced the government's paramount interest in preventing contraband at the border against individuals' privacy expectations and concluded that the privacy concerns particular to forensic searches do not apply to brief manual searches. The court noted that all sister circuits that have addressed this issue have reached the same conclusion, establishing a consensus that manual cell phone searches at the border are routine and require no individualized suspicion.

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case in which Dr. Amy DiChiara, a gastroenterologist, was terminated by her employer after she shared confidential internal emails with a law firm challenging her employer's COVID-19 vaccination mandate. DiChiara sued for retaliation under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as various state law claims.

1. Whether DiChiara engaged in protected activity under Title VII and the ADA by forwarding confidential internal emails to a law firm challenging the employer's vaccination policy
2. Whether DiChiara's conduct constituted protected "participation" in a Title VII/ADA proceeding or protected "opposition" to unlawful discrimination
3. Whether DiChiara's termination violated Kentucky's wrongful discharge tort, which applies only to at-will employees
4. Whether DiChiara's termination breached her employment contract
5. Whether DiChiara's remaining state law claims for tortious interference and declaratory relief were viable

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. The court held that: (1) DiChiara did not engage in protected activity under Title VII or the ADA because her indirect assistance to a law firm did not constitute direct participation in a proceeding, and her subjective belief that the vaccination policy was unlawful was not objectively reasonable given the facts known to her at the time; (2) DiChiara's retaliation claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act failed for the same reasons as her federal claims; (3) DiChiara could not bring a wrongful discharge claim because she was a contract employee, not an at-will employee, and Kentucky law limits the wrongful discharge tort to at-will employees; (4) DiChiara breached her employment contract by misappropriating company property (internal emails), violating company communications and confidentiality policies, engaging in disruptive and unprofessional conduct, and breaching her duty of loyalty, thereby providing SEP with legitimate cause for termination; and (5) DiChiara's remaining state law claims failed because they were contingent on establishing a breach of contract.

This is a breach of contract case in which Teva Pharmaceuticals appeals the dismissal of its lawsuit against Eli Lilly for allegedly violating a 2018 settlement agreement that resolved an earlier patent infringement dispute over Lilly's drug Forteo. The central issue is whether the settlement agreement's covenants remained in effect after the underlying Forteo patents expired in August 2019, when Lilly allegedly took actions to block Teva's generic drug entry.

1. Whether a settlement agreement that does not specify an expiration date continues in effect after the patents at issue expire
2. Whether Teva's covenant not to sue and Lilly's covenant not to obstruct Teva's market entry survived the patent expiration
3. Whether the district court properly applied pleading standards under Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal by requiring Teva to specify an exact termination date for the agreement
4. Whether the settlement agreement should be interpreted as having "primary" provisions (tied to patent expiration) and "ancillary" provisions (surviving longer)

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case. The court held that under Indiana contract law, when a contract lacks an express termination date, it remains in effect for a "reasonable time" as determined by the circumstances. The court found that Teva plausibly alleged the settlement agreement's covenants remained in effect after August 19, 2019, based on several factors: (1) the agreement's silence on when it would end, contrasted with its explicit language pegging other provisions to patent expiration; (2) the likelihood that Teva's covenant not to sue survived the patent expiration, which would mean the agreement itself remained "in effect"; and (3) the substantive nature of Lilly's covenant not to obstruct Teva's market entry, which was central to the parties' compromise. The court rejected Lilly's argument that the agreement necessarily expired with the patents, finding this a question of fact inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. The court also clarified that Teva was not required to specify an exact termination date at the pleading stage, as the burden on a motion to dismiss rests with the moving party to show legal insufficiency even accepting all well-pleaded facts as true.

This is an employment discrimination case in which four former employees and job applicants sued Infosys Technologies for alleged discrimination against non-South Asian individuals in hiring and employment decisions. The plaintiffs relied primarily on expert statistical analysis to support their claims, but the district court excluded the expert testimony and granted summary judgment in favor of Infosys.

1. Whether an expert's statistical analysis using a "name-matching" methodology to identify South Asian employees was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard for expert testimony
2. Whether the plaintiffs could maintain a class certification motion without the excluded expert analysis
3. Whether plaintiffs could supplement their summary judgment briefing with previously unavailable demographic data after the expert testimony was excluded
4. Whether the individual plaintiffs established disparate treatment discrimination claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
5. Whether the plaintiffs established a pattern-and-practice discrimination claim under International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States
6. Whether the plaintiffs established disparate impact discrimination claims

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues. The court held:

1. Expert Testimony: The district court properly excluded the expert's statistical analysis under Rule 702 because: (a) the expert lacked qualifications to identify South Asian names, having admitted no experience or training in this area; and (b) the plaintiffs failed to present evidence demonstrating the reliability of the name-matching methodology, including its testing, error rate, peer review, or scientific acceptance. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the expert was qualified to identify "western" names, noting that identifying non-South Asian names does not qualify one to determine whether a name is also South Asian.
2. Class Certification: The denial of class certification was properly affirmed because the plaintiffs conceded they could not meet Rule 23 requirements without the excluded expert analysis.
3. Supplementing Summary Judgment Briefing: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to supplement the summary judgment briefing with PeopleFluent demographic data. Although the data existed since mid-2016, plaintiffs did not seek to supplement their briefing until late 2022, after the expert testimony was excluded. Additionally, a magistrate judge had repeatedly offered plaintiffs the opportunity to supplement their briefing in early 2017, which they rejected. The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that Rule 6(b) and the "excusable neglect" standard applied, finding the argument waived because plaintiffs never raised it before the district court.
4. Individual Disparate Treatment Claims: All four individual plaintiffs' claims failed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework at the pretext stage. Handloser could not rebut Infosys's legitimate reason for terminating him (poor performance rating during a reduction in force). Koehler and Parker could not demonstrate that Infosys's stated reasons for not hiring them (lack of required technical skills) were pretextual, as subjective belief in one's qualifications does not establish pretext. Bolten's constructive discharge claim failed because the harassment she experienced, while crude and mean-spirited, did not rise to the level of pervasive and extreme conduct necessary to render working conditions unbearable.
5. Pattern-and-Practice Claims: The Teamsters pattern-and-practice claims could not be maintained because they require class certification, which was properly denied.
6. Disparate Impact Claims: Koehler's and Parker's disparate impact claims failed because they lacked the necessary statistical evidence. Without the excluded expert analysis or the PeopleFluent data, plaintiffs could only rely on their individual experiences, which is insufficient to establish disparate impact.

This is an appeal of a class-action settlement approval in a biometric privacy case against Clearview AI, Inc., which scraped photographs from public websites to create a facial recognition database. Two class members objected to the district court's approval of the settlement and appealed.

1. Whether the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate despite the absence of injunctive relief and reliance on an uncertain equity stake as monetary compensation
2. Whether the allocation of settlement benefits among class members was equitable, particularly the disparity between state-specific subclasses and the nationwide class
3. Whether the lack of separate class representation for the nationwide class violated Rule 23 requirements for adequate representation

The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's settlement approval and remanded for further proceedings. While the court found no inherent substantive problems with the lack of injunctive relief or the equity-stake structure, it identified a critical procedural defect: the settlement allocated significantly greater monetary benefits to members of state-specific subclasses (Illinois, California, New York, and Virginia) compared to members of only the nationwide class, yet no class representative was appointed to represent solely the nationwide class's interests in these allocation negotiations. The court held that Rule 23 requires separate representation for identifiable groups within a class that have fundamentally conflicting interests regarding the allocation of settlement funds. Because the nationwide class members received only one share per person while subclass members received five to ten shares, and because this allocation was negotiated without separate counsel or representatives for the nationwide class, the structural assurances of fair and adequate representation were lacking. The court reasoned that absent class members can only be fairly bound to a settlement through representatives who understand they are representing solely their respective subgroups' interests.

This is an insurance coverage dispute in which a homeowner sought recovery under a homeowner's insurance policy for the loss of contents in his mansion that he had converted into a luxury lodging and events business. The insurer denied the full contents claim, applying a business-property exclusion and $25,000 sublimit.

1. Whether the contents of Pine Manor qualified as "business property" subject to a $25,000 sublimit under the homeowner's policy, despite the broad coverage grant for "personal property"
2. Whether the phrase "used to conduct your business" in the policy's definition of "business property" applies to property used partially or only wholly for business purposes
3. Whether the insurer's denial of the contents claim constituted "vexatious and unreasonable" conduct under the Illinois Insurance Code
4. Whether the insurer engaged in deceptive practices under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the insurer. The court held that: (1) the policy's definition of "business property" applies to any property used, whether partially or fully, to conduct the insured's business; (2) the phrase "used to conduct your business" modifies all categories in the property list, not just the final item; (3) Gibson operated Pine Manor as a commercial lodging and events business, and the mansion's furnishings, artwork, and decorations were overwhelmingly used to further that business by attracting guests and enhancing their experience; (4) the $25,000 sublimit properly applied to nearly all contents, with only items in locked personal areas (wine cellar, gun safe, and locked closets) excluded; (5) the insurer's coverage determination was justified and not vexatious, unreasonable, or deceptive; and (6) the insurer conducted a reasonable investigation. The court rejected Gibson's arguments that "business property" should be limited to traditional office equipment and that the policy's broad coverage grant created an ambiguity requiring liberal construction in his favor.

This is an appeal of a preliminary injunction granted by a district court in favor of Novedades y Servicios, Inc., a small money services business, and its owner, challenging a Geographic Targeting Order (GTO) issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) that requires reporting of cash transactions between $200 and $10,000 along the southwest border. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, while Judge Lee dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

1. Whether the Border GTO constitutes a "rule" requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), or an "order" under 31 U.S.C. § 5326, which does not require such procedures
2. Whether FinCEN was required to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking before issuing the Border GTO
3. Whether the Border GTO was adopted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by failing to consider the cost of compliance to regulated parties
4. Whether plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction
5. Whether the scope of the preliminary injunction should be limited to the Southern District of California or apply nationwide

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction on all grounds. The court held that:

1. Rule vs. Order: The Border GTO is likely a "rule" under the APA, not an "order" under § 5326, because it applies to unnamed and unspecified money services businesses in a geographic area with over one million people, rests on general facts rather than adjudication of particular disputed facts, and determines policy issues rather than resolving specific disputes between particular parties. The court rejected the government's argument that merely labeling the action an "order" is sufficient.
2. Notice and Comment: Because the Border GTO is a de facto rule, FinCEN was required to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553. The APA requires express statutory exemption from notice-and-comment procedures, which § 5326 does not provide.
3. Arbitrary and Capricious: The Border GTO was likely adopted arbitrarily and capriciously because FinCEN entirely failed to consider the cost of compliance to regulated parties, an important aspect of the problem. The court found that the March XX Memo, which the government cited as evidence of consideration, was in draft form with blank approval dates, heavily redacted, and the government could not establish that FinCEN actually relied upon it.
4. Irreparable Harm: Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm based on a "threat of extinction." The court found that Novedades faced unsustainable compliance burdens (14-17 additional hours per day of reporting work) and concrete loss of customers (50-60% of customers who learned of the requirements left during the single week the order was in effect). The court rejected the dissent's demand for more detailed financial analysis, noting that preliminary injunctions are granted on less formal procedures and incomplete evidence than trials on the merits.
5. Balance of Equities and Public Interest: The concrete and severe harm to Novedades's existence and the owner's livelihood outweighed the government's speculative assertions about national security and law enforcement benefits, particularly where the government failed to explain why it could not use other investigatory tools.
6. Scope of Injunction: The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the preliminary injunction to the Southern District of California. The court has authority under 5 U.S.C. § 705 to issue nationwide relief but may exercise discretion to limit the scope, particularly where weighty legal questions might benefit from development in different factual contexts and multiple appellate decisions.

This is an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) case in which a wheelchair-using plaintiff obtained a default judgment and injunctive relief requiring a Family Dollar store to make accessibility improvements, but the district court denied her motion for attorney's fees on the ground that she was not a "prevailing party." The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff was indeed a prevailing party entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees.

1. Whether a plaintiff qualifies as a "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. § 12205 of the ADA when she obtains injunctive relief requiring compliance with existing federal law requirements
2. Whether an injunction obtained through default judgment constitutes an "enforceable judgment on the merits" sufficient to confer prevailing party status
3. Whether a plaintiff can be a prevailing party based exclusively on injunctive relief without obtaining monetary damages
4. What factors should be considered in determining a reasonable attorney's fee award, including the quality of the attorney's work and diligence in preparing fee motions

The court reversed the district court's denial of attorney's fees and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that Price was a prevailing party by virtue of the final injunctive relief she obtained. Under Supreme Court precedent (Farrar v. Hobby), a plaintiff prevails when actual relief on the merits materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. The court rejected the district court's reasoning that the injunction did not confer prevailing party status merely because it required compliance with preexisting legal obligations. The court clarified that Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc. actually supported this conclusion, as the relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff obtained an enforceable judgment or settlement, not whether the defendant's underlying legal duty changed. The court also rejected arguments that the relief was merely "technical" or that default judgments cannot confer prevailing party status. On remand, the district court should determine a reasonable fee award while considering the quality of the plaintiff's counsel's work, noting that the recycled fee motion with copy-paste errors and lack of diligence may appropriately factor into the fee calculation.

This is an employment discrimination case in which Jerry Sharpe-Miller, a gay man, sued Walmart for discrimination and harassment based on his sexual orientation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New Mexico Human Rights Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all of Mr. Sharpe-Miller's claims.

1. Whether Mr. Sharpe-Miller's disparate-treatment claim based on his demotion was time-barred under Title VII and the NMHRA
2. Whether Mr. Sharpe-Miller's disparate-treatment claim based on his temporary termination constituted an adverse employment action
3. Whether Mr. Sharpe-Miller engaged in protected opposition to discrimination to support a retaliation claim
4. Whether Mr. Sharpe-Miller was subjected to a hostile work environment based on anti-gay harassment and discrimination
5. Whether discrete, independently actionable discriminatory acts (such as demotion and termination) can form part of a hostile-work-environment claim
6. Whether the "steady barrage" standard is the correct legal test for hostile-work-environment claims
7. Whether Walmart knew or should have known of the hostile work environment
8. Whether Mr. Sharpe-Miller was constructively discharged due to intolerable working conditions

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on most claims but reversed and remanded the hostile-work-environment claim. Specifically:

1. Demotion-Based Disparate Treatment: Affirmed as time-barred. The demotion occurred in August 2019, and the statute of limitations expired by October 2020, but Mr. Sharpe-Miller did not file suit until April 2022. The court distinguished between discrete acts of discrimination (which accrue on the date of the act) and hostile-work-environment claims (which involve cumulative acts).
2. Termination-Based Disparate Treatment: Affirmed. Mr. Sharpe-Miller waived his appellate challenge by failing to address the district court's finding that his brief, promptly remedied termination did not constitute an adverse employment action because he was reinstated the same day and suffered no loss of pay.
3. Retaliation Claim: Affirmed. Mr. Sharpe-Miller failed to establish that he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination. His complaint about supervisor favoritism did not relate to unlawful discrimination, his response to the sexual harassment investigation did not communicate concern about discriminatory animus, and his failure to respond to the demotion threat with opposition meant Title VII's retaliation provision did not apply.
4. Hostile-Work-Environment Claim: Reversed and remanded. The court found the district court committed multiple errors:
   1. The district court wrongly disregarded or discounted relevant discriminatory acts, including comments about Mr. Sharpe-Miller's "cat walk" and feminine appearance, the slur "Jerry the fairy," and comments by unidentified speakers
   2. The district court wrongly excluded comments not directed at Mr. Sharpe-Miller and comments that did not interfere with his work performance
   3. The district court wrongly applied a "steady barrage" requirement as a uniform frequency standard, when the proper test is whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions
   4. The district court wrongly excluded discrete acts (demotion, termination, resignation) from the hostile-work-environment analysis. The court held that discrete, independently actionable discriminatory acts can form part of a hostile-work-environment claim, relying on Supreme Court precedent in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan and Green v. Brennan
   5. The evidence, including an assistant manager's homophobic comments comparing homosexuality to pedophilia and bestiality, regular use of slurs like "faggot" and "butt pirate," a drawing depicting "FAGGOT" in capital letters on a break-room marker board that a supervisor witnessed and dismissed, and limp-wrist gestures by subordinates, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a hostile work environment
   6. Walmart knew or should have known of the hostile work environment because supervisors actively contributed to it and should have been aware of the routine use of homophobic slurs
5. Constructive-Discharge Claim: Affirmed. Mr. Sharpe-Miller did not meet the high standard for constructive discharge. Although he experienced repeated homophobic harassment, he was not prevented from performing his job, was not told he needed to quit, was not denied training or resources, and his brief termination was promptly remedied with no loss of pay. A reasonable person would not have felt compelled to resign.

The court emphasized that at summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and credibility determinations are for the jury. The court also clarified that hostile-work-environment claims do not require a specific number of incidents but depend on whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive, considering both quantitative and qualitative factors.

This is a tax whistleblower case in which Mary Trongone appealed the IRS's denial of her claim for a whistleblower award after she reported tax violations by two taxpayers. The central dispute concerns whether the IRS properly denied her award claim for tax years 2013-2017, which extended beyond the 2004-2012 period she originally alleged.

1. Whether the IRS's decision to deny Trongone's whistleblower award was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act standard of review.
2. Whether the administrative record adequately supported the IRS's conclusion that Trongone's application could not have contributed to the agency's investigation for tax years 2013-2017.
3. Whether the IRS properly relied on "taint" concerns (privileged or unlawfully obtained information) to deny the award for the later tax years without conducting a reasonable inquiry into the merits.
4. Whether the Tax Court erred in granting summary judgment on an inadequate administrative record and refusing to supplement the record with materials from tax years 2013-2017.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the IRS's decision was arbitrary and capricious because: (1) the administrative record did not support the IRS's conclusion that Trongone's application could not have aided the investigation for tax years 2013-2017; (2) although the IRS marked certain attachments as "tainted," it forwarded the Form 211 and cover letter to the exam team, which then considered the substance of Trongone's application; (3) the IRS failed to adequately explain why the exam team would not have considered Trongone's application for the later years when it had considered it for the earlier years; and (4) the IRS's reliance on a bare assertion about taint, without serious inquiry into the merits for tax years 2013-2017, constituted arbitrary agency action. The court emphasized that while the IRS may ultimately deny the award on remand, it must provide a reasoned explanation supported by the administrative record.

This is a Delaware corporate advancement case in which a former employee, officer, and director of Black Lives Matter Global Network Foundation seeks advancement of legal expenses incurred in defending against a federal Department of Justice criminal investigation. The court must determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to mandatory advancement of litigation costs under the corporation's bylaws and Delaware law.

1. Whether a DOJ criminal investigation into the plaintiff constitutes a "covered proceeding" under the corporation's advancement provisions
2. Whether the plaintiff's legal expenses bear a sufficient "nexus or causal connection" to his role as director and officer of the corporation, as required by Delaware Code Section 145(e)
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to advancement as an "agent" of the corporation under the bylaws, and whether consulting services agreements between the corporation and the plaintiff's consulting firm (BOWERS*) supersede or limit advancement rights
4. How to apportion legal fees between covered and non-covered activities when the scope of the investigation is ambiguous
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover fees and expenses incurred in bringing the advancement action itself

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on all issues. The court held that: (1) The DOJ investigation qualifies as a covered proceeding under the bylaws' advancement provision. (2) The plaintiff met his burden of demonstrating a nexus between the DOJ investigation and his role as director and officer based on: (a) the DOJ's investigation of potential embezzlement and fraud, which necessarily required the plaintiff's position as director to access corporate funds; (b) the plaintiff's signature on the corporation's Form 990 tax return in his capacity as director; (c) the plaintiff's ambiguous role in donor communications as corporate secretary; and (d) the temporal overlap between the investigation period and the plaintiff's tenure as director. (3) The plaintiff is entitled to advancement as an agent under the bylaws, and the consulting services agreements between the corporation and BOWERS* did not supersede the plaintiff's individual advancement rights under the bylaws. The court reasoned that the consulting agreements were executed with BOWERS* (the consulting firm), not the plaintiff individually, and the bylaws explicitly contemplate advancement for agents. (4) The plaintiff's counsel must make a good faith effort to apportion fees between covered activities (director/officer/agent roles) and non-covered activities (work solely for BOWERS*), with any expenses that cannot be reasonably apportioned to be advanced by the corporation, subject to potential recoupment at the indemnification stage. (5) The plaintiff is entitled to recover all fees and expenses incurred in bringing the advancement action itself, as he was "materially successful" in asserting his advancement claim. The court emphasized that advancement provisions should be construed broadly in favor of advancement, with disputes over the precise scope of entitlement deferred to later proceedings (the Fitracks process and indemnification stage) to avoid excessive litigation.

This is a cross-border intellectual property dispute between dmarcian, Inc. (a North Carolina software company) and DMARC Advisor BV (a Dutch company) involving allegations of trademark infringement, trade secret misappropriation, and tortious interference. The case addresses whether U.S. law applies to the defendant's conduct following the Supreme Court's decision in Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc.

1. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Abitron Austria, which shifted the extraterritoriality analysis from an "effects" test to a "conduct" test, allows a foreign defendant to escape liability under U.S. intellectual property law
2. Whether the defendant engaged in sufficient domestic conduct in the United States to bring it within the reach of the Lanham Act (trademark infringement), the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), and North Carolina common law (tortious interference)
3. Whether the second amended preliminary injunction satisfies the specificity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1)
4. Whether the court has appellate jurisdiction over the correction order and contempt order issued by the district court
5. Whether reassignment to a new district judge is warranted on remand

The court affirmed the second amended preliminary injunction and dismissed the remainder of the defendant's appeal. The court held:

1. Abitron Application: Although Abitron shifted the focus from "effects" to "conduct," the defendant's alleged theft involved significant conduct in the United States. The defendant maintained a website accessible in the United States featuring the plaintiff's trademark, targeted American customers with an "Americas" button, sent messages to U.S. customers, and successfully convinced at least one American company (Clarizen) to switch providers. This conduct was sufficient to bring the defendant within the reach of U.S. law under Abitron's new framework.
2. Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act § 1114(1)(a)): The defendant's conduct constituted "infringing use in commerce" in the United States. The definition encompasses not just direct sales but also marketing, advertising, and distribution activities. The defendant's website, targeted marketing to American customers, and successful conversion of an American customer satisfied this standard.
3. Trade Secret Misappropriation (DTSA): Although Abitron concerned the Lanham Act, the DTSA explicitly applies to conduct occurring outside the United States if the offender committed "an act in furtherance of the offense" in the United States. The defendant gained access to the plaintiff's trade secrets through U.S. servers, used those secrets to develop a competing product, and marketed that product to U.S. customers, satisfying the domestic conduct requirement.
4. Tortious Interference (North Carolina Common Law): State common law, like federal statutory law, must respect constitutional limits on territorial application. The defendant's conduct—cloning the plaintiff's website and targeting the plaintiff's customers—had sufficient contacts with North Carolina to justify application of North Carolina tort law.
5. Preliminary Injunction Scope: The second amended preliminary injunction appropriately matched the scope of the defendant's likely violations. The injunction's provisions restricting the defendant's services outside Europe, Africa, and Russia; prohibiting trademark use accessible to U.S. IP addresses; restricting changes to trade secret source code; and preventing customer interference were all supported by the plaintiff's claims.
6. Rule 65(d)(1) Specificity: The injunction's prohibition on "making changes to the trade secret source code" was sufficiently specific in context. The trade secret source code had been the subject of the likelihood of success finding throughout the litigation, providing adequate notice to the defendant.
7. Correction Order and Contempt Order: The court lacked appellate jurisdiction over both orders. The correction order was not a final order and did not meet the requirements for interlocutory appeal under § 1292(a)(1), the collateral order doctrine, or pendent appellate jurisdiction. The contempt order imposing a fine was subject to the settled rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals of civil contempt orders imposing fines. Both orders would be reviewable after a final judgment.
8. Reassignment: Reassignment to a new district judge was not warranted. The district judge had presided over the complex case for more than five years and had displayed a conscientious approach, including ruling in the defendant's favor on some issues. The defendant's dissatisfaction with rulings alone was insufficient grounds for reassignment.

This is a criminal appeal in which Charles Wable challenges his 180-month prison sentence for unlawful firearm possession and witness tampering. Wable argues that the district court incorrectly calculated his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines and failed to adequately consider his argument for a downward departure based on alleged mistreatment by correctional officers.

1. Whether the district court plainly erred in calculating Wable's base offense level by treating his 2006 West Virginia marijuana cultivation conviction as a qualifying controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1), particularly in light of the Fourth Circuit's precedent in United States v. Campbell regarding divisibility of drug statutes.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider Wable's nonfrivolous argument that his alleged "chemical assault" by correctional officers warranted a downward departure from the recommended sentencing range.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Wable's sentence. On the base offense level issue, the court held that: (1) the West Virginia Uniform Controlled Substances Act is divisible, listing separate offenses for manufacturing, delivering, and possessing with intent; (2) although the Campbell precedent precludes "delivery" convictions under the Act from qualifying as controlled substance offenses because delivery can encompass attempted conduct, manufacturing offenses do not suffer the same defect; (3) the Act's definition of "manufacturing" and "production" encompasses only substantive offenses and does not include attempt offenses; and (4) therefore, Wable's manufacturing conviction for cultivating marijuana properly qualifies as a controlled substance offense, and the district court did not plainly err. On the sentencing argument issue, the court found no abuse of discretion because the district court's sentencing record demonstrated that it had considered all of Wable's submissions and weighed the § 3553(a) factors, including his mitigation arguments regarding the alleged assault and other personal circumstances.

This is an appeal by attorney Pressly Millen from a civil contempt order and sanction imposed by the district court for his alleged failure to comply with a court order requiring him to submit a corrective statement to a Dutch court regarding misrepresentations made in parallel litigation. The case arises from a dispute between software companies Dmarcian, Inc. and DMARC Advisor BV involving claims of intellectual property infringement and trade secret misappropriation.

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal from a civil contempt order against a non-party attorney when no final judgment has been entered in the underlying case.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in holding Millen in civil contempt when the moving party failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that it had been harmed by Millen's alleged noncompliance with the correction order.
3. Whether a civil contempt sanction barring an attorney from practicing in federal court was remedial or punitive in nature.

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's civil contempt adjudication against Millen on two grounds. First, the court held it had jurisdiction to hear Millen's immediate appeal because, as a non-party to the underlying litigation, Millen could appeal the contempt order without awaiting final judgment in the case—distinguishing this situation from cases where parties are jointly liable for sanctions. Second, and more importantly, the court found the district court abused its discretion in imposing the contempt sanction because Dmarcian, Inc. failed to present clear and convincing evidence that it suffered harm from Millen's failure to file the separate statement. The court reasoned that civil contempt is remedial in nature and must be focused on either coercing compliance or compensating for losses, not punishing past conduct. The court noted that the correction order itself had been filed with the Dutch court and the Dutch court ultimately agreed with the North Carolina court's position despite Meijboom's contrary arguments, suggesting Millen's statement would not have changed the outcome. The court also found the sanction—temporarily barring Millen from practicing law in the Western District of North Carolina—was severe and effectively punitive rather than remedial, particularly given the district court's own characterization of Millen's actions as "one small slice" of the overall obstruction.

This is an employment discrimination case in which Dr. Mark Lee, a former Chair of Neurosurgery at West Virginia University, sued his employer University Health Associates (UHA) for age discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract after being removed from his position. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of UHA.

1. Whether Lee established age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) based on comments by a supervisor preferring a "younger" replacement with a longer "runway" to serve in the position
2. Whether Lee established retaliation under the ADEA and WVHRA for reporting age discrimination, specifically: (a) whether his removal as Chair was retaliatory, and (b) whether the acceleration of his removal timeline was retaliatory
3. Whether UHA breached three contractual provisions regarding a five-year commitment, 90-day notice requirements, and compensation adjustments
4. Whether Lee's removal from his WVU Chair position constituted an adverse action against his separate employment with UHA

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment on most claims but vacated and remanded on one issue:

1. Age Discrimination Claim (AFFIRMED): The court held that Lee failed to establish age discrimination. The supervisor's comments about wanting someone "younger" with a longer tenure were made in the context of succession planning after the decision to remove Lee had already been made, and therefore did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination. Circumstantial evidence also did not support age discrimination because: (a) the same person (Marsh) who hired Lee at age 59 made the decision to remove him at age 62; (b) Marsh was older than Lee; and (c) Lee's replacement (Konrad) was also in his sixties. Additionally, Lee's poor performance as Chair (absenteeism, lack of engagement, failure to follow procedures) provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for removal.
2. Retaliation for Initial Removal (AFFIRMED): The court held that Lee could not establish that his removal as Chair was retaliatory because the plan to remove him began months before he complained of age discrimination in his lawyer's letters of July 29 and August 12, 2021. The removal process was already underway by March 2021, when Marsh and Rezai decided to transition Lee out of the position.
3. Retaliation for Acceleration of Removal (VACATED AND REMANDED): The court found genuine disputes of material fact precluding summary judgment on Lee's claim that his removal was accelerated in retaliation for his complaints. While UHA argued the decision to accelerate the removal was made on July 22, 2021 (before Lee's July 29 complaint), the record contained conflicting evidence: (a) conflicting accounts of what happened at the July 22 meeting; (b) no documentary evidence that the acceleration decision was made on July 22; and (c) UHA's own August 18 removal notice stated the decision was made "[a]fter much thought about the issues raised in [the] August 12, 2021 letter," which included Lee's age discrimination complaints. These conflicts required a jury determination.
4. Constructive Discharge Claim (AFFIRMED): Lee's claim that reductions in compensation and benefits constituted a constructive discharge failed because these adjustments were tied to his loss of the Chair position and were authorized by the employment agreement.
5. Breach of Contract Claim (AFFIRMED): The court upheld summary judgment on all three breach theories: (a) a purported five-year commitment in a separate letter agreement was not clearly incorporated into the Professional Services Agreement and conflicted with express terms providing for one-year renewable terms; (b) the 90-day notice requirement applied only to non-renewal of the agreement, not removal from the Chair position; and (c) the compensation reduction was expressly authorized by the agreement when administrative duties changed.

This is a federal criminal appeal in which Juan Payne challenges his methamphetamine trafficking sentence, specifically contesting whether a state court expungement of his prior marijuana conviction should be counted in calculating his federal criminal history score for sentencing purposes.

1. Whether a state court expungement order obtained under Mississippi law qualifies as an "expungement" under the federal Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.2(j), which excludes expunged convictions from criminal history calculations.
2. Whether the underlying rationale for an expungement—specifically whether it was granted due to innocence or legal error versus other reasons like restoration of civil rights—determines whether it must be counted for federal sentencing purposes.
3. Whether any error in counting the expunged conviction was harmless given the district court's explicit statement that it would impose the same sentence regardless of which Guidelines range applied.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Payne's sentence and held that the district court properly counted his expunged marijuana conviction in calculating his criminal history score. The court reasoned that under Sentencing Guidelines Application Note 10, an expungement is only excluded from criminal history calculations if it was obtained due to constitutional invalidity, innocence, or errors of law. Mississippi's expungement statute § 99-19-71 is designed to restore civil rights and remove stigma from convictions, not to address innocence or legal errors. Therefore, Payne's expungement—which did not establish innocence or legal error and explicitly preserved non-public records—does not qualify as an expungement under the Guidelines. The court emphasized that federal sentencing uniformity requires examining the substance and rationale of state expungements rather than deferring to state nomenclature. Additionally, any error was harmless because the district court explicitly considered both Guidelines ranges and stated it would have imposed the same 180-month sentence regardless of which range applied.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a lawsuit brought by property owners challenging a permit condition requiring them to indemnify the State of Michigan. The Gmeiners sought to construct a walking path on their lakeside property and obtained a permit conditioned on an indemnification clause, which they challenged as an unconstitutional condition on their First Amendment right to petition and as ultra vires under state law.

1. Whether an indemnification clause imposed as a condition of a building permit violates the First Amendment's Petition Clause under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine
2. Whether the indemnification clause was authorized under Michigan law (ultra vires claim)
3. Whether Michigan's sovereign immunity bars the state-law claim in federal court
4. The proper unconstitutional-conditions test to apply to Petition Clause claims
5. The correct interpretation of the indemnification clause's scope

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of both claims. On the federal constitutional claim, the court held that: (1) the Gmeiners failed to establish that the takings-clause unconstitutional-conditions test applies to Petition Clause claims, though the court assumed without deciding that it does; (2) the indemnification clause, properly interpreted, applies only to claims arising from the Gmeiners' own acts or omissions, not to claims challenging the State's conduct; (3) even under the takings test, the clause satisfies the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" requirements because it requires the Gmeiners to internalize the costs of their own harmful conduct; and (4) the clause does not burden the Gmeiners' right to petition because it does not prevent them from suing the State for the State's own misconduct. On the state-law ultra vires claim, the court held that Michigan's sovereign immunity bars the claim in federal court. The Ex Parte Young exception does not apply because it permits suits against state officers only for violations of federal law, not state law. Congressional abrogation also does not apply because neither the supplemental jurisdiction statute nor the Declaratory Judgment Act contains unequivocal language abrogating state sovereign immunity. The court noted that the Gmeiners could have pursued their claims in state court to avoid duplicative litigation.

This is an appeal of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) in a class action lawsuit alleging that Gunnar Optiks violated Illinois's Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) by collecting facial geometry data through a "virtual try on" feature without proper consent. The central dispute concerns whether the data collection falls within BIPA's exclusion for information collected for health care purposes under HIPAA.

1. Whether facial geometry data collected through a "virtual try on" feature for eyeglasses falls within BIPA's exclusion for information collected for "health care treatment" under HIPAA
2. Whether the purpose of data collection (showing appearance versus facilitating medical treatment) determines whether the health care exclusion applies
3. Whether a company must comply with HIPAA's requirements to qualify for the health care exclusion, and whether this can be determined at the pleading stage
4. Whether accepting the defendant's factual assertions about the glasses' health benefits is appropriate when dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)

The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case. The court held that dismissal was premature because multiple factual and legal questions remain unresolved. First, the court noted that accepting Gunnar's unproven assertion that its glasses relieve eye strain is improper at the pleading stage. Second, even if the glasses provide health benefits, the data collected was for aesthetic purposes (showing appearance), not for medical treatment. Third, the court emphasized that the statutory exclusion requires compliance with HIPAA's collection and confidentiality rules, which cannot be determined from the complaint alone. The court reasoned that whether Gunnar actually complies with HIPAA and whether the "virtual try on" service serves a legitimate health care function are factual matters requiring discovery and summary judgment proceedings, not dismissal at the pleading stage.

This is an employment discrimination case brought by commercial aviation employees against their employers, Atlas Air and Flight Services International, challenging pandemic-era vaccine, testing, and masking policies. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

1. Whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over Flight Services International under general or specific jurisdiction doctrine
2. Whether the plaintiffs stated a plausible claim for hostile work environment under Title VII based on religious discrimination
3. Whether plaintiffs could bring claims under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act against a private employer
4. Whether a private company could be sued under § 1983 or Bivens for alleged constitutional violations
5. Whether the employer's disclosure of vaccination status to internal company administrators constituted tortious invasion of privacy under Florida law
6. Whether the employer's conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress

The court affirmed the dismissal on all grounds. Regarding jurisdiction, the court held that Flight Services International lacked sufficient contacts with Florida—mere attendance at annual training sessions did not establish general jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs' claims did not arise from those training sessions, so specific jurisdiction was unavailable. Regarding the merits, the court found: (1) the Title VII hostile work environment claim failed because the employer provided religious exemptions and the plaintiffs alleged only political, not religious, objections to masks and testing; (2) private parties cannot enforce the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; (3) § 1983 and Bivens claims against a private company fail as a matter of law; (4) the invasion of privacy claims failed because internal disclosure of medical information for work-related purposes does not constitute public disclosure required under Florida law; and (5) the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims failed because pandemic-related workplace safety measures do not constitute conduct "beyond all possible bounds of decency." The court also harshly criticized plaintiffs' counsel for submitting briefs containing multiple fabricated case citations generated by artificial intelligence without verification, violating professional ethical duties, and referred the matter to the Committee on Lawyer Qualifications and Conduct.

This case involves a dispute between Leo Investments Hong Kong Limited, a publicly traded Chinese company, and Tomales Bay Capital Anduril III, L.P. regarding Leo Group's removal from a fund that was attempting to invest in SpaceX. Leo Group sued for breach of fiduciary duties and breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement after being forced to withdraw from the fund when SpaceX objected to the investment due to Leo Group's public disclosure and China-based status.

1. Whether the defendants breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care by admitting Leo Group to the fund without disclosing the investment to SpaceX and subsequently forcing Leo Group's removal
2. Whether the business judgment rule applied to shield the defendants' actions from liability
3. Whether the defendants breached a "duty of candor" when communicating with Leo Group about the forced withdrawal
4. Whether the forum-selection provision in the Subscription Agreement was unilateral or bilateral
5. Whether attorneys' fees should be awarded to Leo Group based on the defendants' breach of fiduciary duty

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the trial court's holdings that: (1) the business judgment rule applied and Leo Group failed to rebut its presumption by proving breach of the duties of loyalty or care; (2) the forum-selection provision was unilateral, binding only Leo Group; and (3) the defendants breached their duty to communicate honestly with Leo Group after the call with SpaceX's CFO, resulting in nominal damages of $1. However, the court reversed the trial court's award of nearly $16 million in attorneys' fees, finding that such an award was inappropriate under the Saliba standard because Leo Group failed to prove causation or damages associated with the breach, prevailed on only a single issue raised sua sponte by the court, and lost on almost every other claim. The court reasoned that while the defendants' misrepresentations were improper, the unusual circumstances in Saliba—where plaintiffs recovered no monetary damages despite a successful breach claim—were not present here.

This is a Fourth Amendment case involving the search of a cell phone pursuant to a warrant. The defendant was charged with possessing child exploitation material after federal agents executed a search warrant for an iPhone 6s but instead seized and searched an iPhone 13 Pro Max belonging to the defendant.

1. Whether federal agents violated the Fourth Amendment by executing a search warrant for a specific iPhone model (iPhone 6s with a specific IMEI number) but instead seizing and searching a different iPhone model (iPhone 13 Pro Max) that had the same phone number.
2. Whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when agents knowingly seized a device different from the one specified in the warrant.
3. Whether the agents' failure to inquire about the discrepancy between the warranted device and the seized device demonstrates a lack of objective good faith.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order granting the defendant's motion to suppress. The court held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply because: (1) the warrant unambiguously described the iPhone 6s as the specific device to be searched, including its unique IMEI number; (2) the agents knew immediately upon seizing the phone that it was an iPhone 13, not the iPhone 6s specified in the warrant; and (3) the agents made no effort to resolve the discrepancy by asking the defendant clarifying questions about whether he still possessed the iPhone 6s or had upgraded to the iPhone 13. The court reasoned that once the agents realized they had seized the wrong device, they should have obtained a new warrant or at minimum asked clarifying questions before proceeding with the search. The court emphasized that smartphones are highly sensitive devices deserving careful Fourth Amendment protection, and that the agents' failure to make reasonable inquiries about the device discrepancy demonstrated a lack of objective good faith, even if unintentional. The court rejected the government's analogy to cases involving searches of residences with minor address discrepancies, finding that physical device specifications are critical in the context of electronic devices, particularly when an individual may possess multiple phones.

This is an Eighth Amendment civil rights case brought by the estate of Dashaun Simmons, an inmate who was fatally stabbed by another inmate at a South Carolina correctional facility. The plaintiff alleged that prison officials violated Simmons's constitutional rights through deliberate indifference to his safety and medical needs.

1. Whether Officer Gerald Bush violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to properly verify that inmates Dominick and Ransom were authorized workers before releasing them from their cells, thereby creating a substantial risk of harm to Simmons
2. Whether Officer Bush's failure to closely supervise the inmates after releasing them constituted deliberate indifference
3. Whether Officers Cheryl Youngquist and Dontai Parks violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide adequate medical care after Simmons was stabbed
4. Whether trainee Officer Michelle Mapp was deliberately indifferent to Simmons's safety
5. Whether Associate Warden Thomas Robertson was liable for supervisory negligence
6. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for all defendants. The majority held that:

1. Officer Bush: The court found no Eighth Amendment violation because Jackson failed to establish that Bush subjectively perceived a substantial risk of harm when releasing Dominick and Ransom. Although Bush violated prison protocol by failing to properly verify the inmates' worker status, mere policy violation does not constitute deliberate indifference. Bush testified he was unaware of Simmons's prior attacks and threats, and the court found no evidence that Bush knew Dominick was carrying a weapon. The court rejected the argument that the risk was "obvious" because Bush had not been exposed to information about Simmons's vulnerability or previously warned about the specific risks of improper verification procedures.
2. Officer Mapp: As a trainee without authority to open doors, Mapp reasonably relied on Bush's verification and was unaware of Simmons's history of attacks and threats. No deliberate indifference was established.
3. Officer Youngquist: Although Youngquist initially thought inmates calling for help were "playing," she responded reasonably within minutes by opening the door and calling for medical assistance. The court found no evidence that she knew Simmons needed medical attention when she arrived, and her response did not significantly delay his care.
4. Officer Parks: Parks's actions in transporting Simmons to first responders on a golf cart constituted good-faith efforts to help and did not pose any risk to Simmons's health or unduly delay treatment.
5. Associate Warden Robertson: Jackson failed to show that Robertson had actual or constructive knowledge that Bush was engaged in conduct posing a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury.
6. Since no underlying constitutional violation was established, all defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

This is an immigration law case concerning whether a conviction under Virginia's embezzlement statute constitutes an "aggravated felony" under federal immigration law, which would render a lawful permanent resident deportable. The Fourth Circuit reviewed the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision affirming Ramos's removal order.

1. Whether Virginia Code § 18.2-111 embezzlement categorically requires fraudulent or deceitful conduct as an element of the offense
2. The proper application of the "categorical approach" used in immigration law to determine if a state conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony
3. The meaning of "fraud or deceit" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), which defines certain fraud-based crimes as aggravated felonies
4. Whether the word "fraudulently" in Virginia's embezzlement statute refers to fraudulent conduct or merely wrongful intent
5. Whether concealment is a categorical element of Virginia embezzlement

The Fourth Circuit granted Ramos's petition, vacated his removal order, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that Virginia's embezzlement statute does not categorically require fraudulent or deceitful conduct. The court reasoned that: (1) the word "fraudulently" in § 18.2-111 means wrongful or felonious intent, not fraudulent conduct; (2) embezzlement under Virginia law is essentially a form of larceny beginning with lawful possession and does not require misrepresentation, trickery, or intentional concealment by its elements; (3) while many embezzlement cases may involve concealment, the statute does not require it—a person can be guilty of embezzlement even if they openly disclose their intent or actions; and (4) therefore, embezzlement is not categorically a crime of fraud or deceit and does not qualify as an aggravated felony under federal immigration law.

This is a criminal appeal involving a noncitizen convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The defendant challenged the validity of his underlying deportation order on the grounds that his immigration counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to timely file an appeal of the removal order.

1. Whether a noncitizen seeking to collaterally attack a removal order underlying an illegal reentry indictment must exhaust administrative remedies before challenging the removal order in federal court
2. Whether ineffective assistance of counsel by immigration counsel in failing to timely appeal a removal order excuses the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies
3. Whether an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must itself be presented to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) in compliance with the requirements established in Matter of Lozada before it can be raised in a collateral attack
4. Whether the defendant substantially complied with the Lozada requirements when he filed a motion to accept an untimely notice of appeal

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court held that: (1) to collaterally challenge a removal order, a noncitizen must exhaust three statutory elements, including exhausting available administrative remedies; (2) while procedural flaws in immigration proceedings may excuse exhaustion, the claim of ineffective assistance itself must be presented to the Board in compliance with Lozada requirements; (3) Lozada requires the noncitizen to provide an affidavit describing the agreement with counsel, inform counsel of the allegation and provide opportunity to respond, and indicate whether a disciplinary complaint was filed; (4) the defendant failed to substantially comply with Lozada because he did not provide an affidavit detailing his agreement with counsel, did not indicate whether a disciplinary complaint was filed, and did not expressly assert an ineffective-assistance claim to the Board; and (5) because the defendant failed to exhaust administrative remedies—a mandatory element—his collateral challenge to the removal order fails.

This is an appeal of a district court's denial of a writ of coram nobis in a wire fraud and aggravated identity theft case. Jonathan Giannone, convicted in 2007, sought to vacate his conviction based on allegedly withheld evidence discovered through FOIA requests filed years after his trial.

1. Whether Giannone had valid reasons for the eight-year delay between receiving FOIA documents in February 2016 and filing his coram nobis petition in August 2024
2. Whether the withheld evidence constituted Brady violations (suppressed evidence favorable to the defendant and material to the defense)
3. Whether any errors were "of the most fundamental character" warranting the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis relief
4. Whether suppressed evidence, considered cumulatively, was material enough to undermine confidence in the guilty verdict

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the coram nobis petition. The court held that Giannone failed to meet the second prong of the coram nobis test by not demonstrating valid reasons for the eight-year delay in filing. Even assuming the delay could be excused, the court found that Giannone failed to meet the fourth prong by not identifying errors of the most fundamental character. While the court acknowledged that the district court erred in failing to cumulatively consider four pieces of withheld evidence (trap and trace records, evidence of a hacked computer, evidence of unauthorized use of Giannone's credit card and driver's license, and chat logs discussing access to his account), the court determined that the cumulative materiality of this evidence was insufficient to undermine confidence in the guilty verdict. The substantial evidence linking Giannone to the criminal activity—including matched travel descriptions, credit card statements, and chat logs—remained compelling despite the withheld evidence.

This is a Title VII employment discrimination case in which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued SkyWest Airlines on behalf of Sarah Budd, who alleged she was subjected to severe sexual harassment by coworkers and that the employer failed to remedy the situation. The jury found in favor of Budd and awarded compensatory and punitive damages, and SkyWest appealed.

1. Whether text messages between Budd and others describing the harassment and her emotional state were properly admitted as evidence under the hearsay exceptions for present sense impressions and statements of mental/emotional condition.
2. Whether Title VII plaintiffs must mitigate damages for emotional distress as a condition of recovering compensatory damages.
3. Whether sufficient evidence supported the jury's award of punitive damages despite the jury's finding that SkyWest did not retaliate against Budd.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects. First, the court held that the text messages were properly admitted because they qualified as present sense impressions describing events as they occurred and as statements of Budd's then-existing mental and emotional state, which was relevant to whether she subjectively perceived the harassment as abusive. Second, the court held that Title VII plaintiffs have no duty to mitigate damages for emotional distress, finding that the statute's inclusion of a mitigation requirement for backpay but not for compensatory damages signaled Congressional intent to exclude such a duty, and that mitigation of emotional distress was not a well-established common law principle when the compensatory damages provision was adopted in 1991. Third, the court held that sufficient evidence supported punitive damages because Hansen, a manager, actively participated in the harassment and received sexual harassment training, demonstrating malice or reckless indifference, and because SkyWest failed to establish the good-faith defense through Dehais' inadequate investigation, which included failing to ask follow-up questions, randomly selecting witnesses, and issuing only written warnings without disciplining Hansen.

This is an appeal of a fatal police shooting in which Jalen Randle was shot by Houston Police Officer Shane Privette during the execution of felony arrest warrants. The family of Randle brought claims for excessive force, supervisory liability, and municipal liability, which were dismissed on summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

1. Whether Officer Privette's use of deadly force violated Randle's Fourth Amendment rights by being objectively unreasonable under the circumstances
2. Whether Privette is entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law at the time prohibiting his conduct
3. Whether existing precedent "squarely governs" or places "beyond debate" the specific facts of this split-second encounter involving a suspect with outstanding felony warrants who retrieved an object from a vehicle and turned toward officers

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Officer Privette on qualified immunity grounds. The court resolved the case on the second prong of qualified immunity—whether the right was clearly established—rather than addressing whether Privette's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that plaintiffs failed to provide factually analogous case law that would have placed the lawfulness of Privette's actions "beyond debate." The court distinguished three cases plaintiffs relied upon (Baker v. Putnal, Cole v. Carson, and Poole v. City of Shreveport) as factually distinguishable because: (1) the parties did not dispute that Randle held an object retrieved from the vehicle; (2) Randle was aware of police presence and was not shot from behind; (3) Randle had outstanding firearm-related warrants and a criminal history; and (4) plaintiffs provided no competent evidence to refute that Privette reasonably perceived Randle as armed. The court acknowledged the tragedy of the incident but concluded that the strictures of qualified immunity doctrine required affirmance.

This case involves a federal preemption challenge to Texas education laws that allow undocumented immigrants to pay in-state tuition rates. The United States sued Texas claiming that Texas Education Code sections 54.051(m) and 54.052(a) violate federal law (8 U.S.C. § 1623(a)), and the parties quickly settled via consent judgment. The court addressed whether advocacy groups and a student could intervene to defend the Texas law.

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) expressly preempts Texas laws allowing undocumented immigrants to qualify for in-state tuition based on state residency
2. Whether intervention motions should be denied as futile when the proposed intervenors cannot plausibly defend against a preemption claim
3. Whether the "on the basis of residence" language in § 1623(a) requires a but-for causation standard
4. Whether discounted in-state tuition constitutes a "postsecondary education benefit" under § 1623(a)
5. Whether isolated exceptions to Texas's in-state tuition rules defeat preemption
6. Whether § 1623(a) violates the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering doctrine (dissent)
7. Whether the district court had Article III jurisdiction over a consent judgment between parties who agreed on the constitutional question (dissent)

Majority Opinion (Affirmed): The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of intervention motions and dismissed remaining claims for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that:

1. Section 1623(a) contains an express preemption clause that preempts the Texas provisions because they grant in-state tuition benefits to undocumented immigrants based on state residency, while out-of-state U.S. citizens cannot access the same benefit regardless of residency.
2. Futility is a proper threshold analysis for both plaintiff-side and defense-side intervenors, and the proposed intervenors could not plausibly defend against the preemption claim.
3. Residency is a necessary condition for in-state tuition eligibility under Texas law, and the "on the basis of residence" language in § 1623(a) incorporates a but-for causation standard, which is satisfied here.
4. Discounted in-state tuition is a monetary benefit that qualifies as a "postsecondary education benefit" under § 1623(a).
5. Isolated exceptions allowing some out-of-state U.S. citizens to pay in-state tuition do not defeat preemption because § 1623(a) is a categorical prohibition requiring that all U.S. citizens be eligible for the benefit without regard to residency.
6. The presumption against preemption does not apply because § 1623(a) contains an express preemption clause.
7. Preemption does not violate the Tenth Amendment because § 1623(a) declares a limitation on illegal alien eligibility and does not directly regulate states or impose affirmative obligations.
8. Severability principles do not apply because the challenged provisions work in tandem and cannot be severed without changing the legislative intent.

1. The district court's jurisdiction under Article III is unclear because the United States and Texas agreed on the constitutional question from the beginning, potentially making this a non-justiciable "friendly suit" lacking genuine adversity.
2. The district court should have conducted a more complete futility analysis that addressed Appellants' jurisdictional arguments and Tenth Amendment defense.
3. Section 1623(a) violates the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering doctrine because it operates as a direct command to states prohibiting them from enacting certain laws, rather than regulating private actors as required for valid preemption provisions under Murphy v. NCAA.
4. The dissent would remand for the district court to evaluate jurisdiction in the first instance and, if jurisdiction exists, would reverse the denial of intervention because Appellants had a meritorious Tenth Amendment defense.

This is an appeal of a district court's dismissal of a trade secrets misappropriation and breach of contract suit brought by a dissolved Louisiana LLC against three defendants. The case involves questions of LLC capacity to sue, retroactive reinstatement under Louisiana law, and the proper sealing of court documents.

1. Whether a dissolved LLC lacks capacity to initiate a lawsuit under Texas law (the forum state)
2. Whether a Louisiana court would permit retroactive reinstatement of an LLC dissolved by affidavit to pursue claims that arose before dissolution but were filed after dissolution
3. Whether the district court should have stayed the proceedings to allow the LLC to seek reinstatement in Louisiana state court
4. Whether the district court properly denied defendants' request for leave to file motions for attorneys' fees
5. Whether the district court properly sealed court documents containing publicly available information without conducting the required balancing test

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the LLC's claims, holding that: (1) the LLC lacked capacity to sue because it was dissolved before filing suit and did not legally exist under Texas law; (2) retroactive reinstatement under Louisiana law is not available when the LLC member knew of the claims before dissolution but chose to dissolve by affidavit rather than pursue the claims or undergo formal liquidation; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing rather than staying the case, as retroactive reinstatement would likely be futile; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys' fees, as the basis for dismissal could have been discovered through a simple public records search; and (5) the district court abused its discretion by sealing documents without identifying the proper legal standards or providing sufficient reasons for the sealing decision, requiring remand for the court to conduct the required balancing test between the public's right of access and interests favoring nondisclosure.

This is an appeal of a district court's partial summary judgment order in a nuisance case brought by residents near a New Orleans hospital challenging the relocation of the hospital's helipad. The Fifth Circuit addresses whether it has jurisdiction to review the nonfinal order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which permits interlocutory appeals of orders granting, refusing, or modifying injunctions.

1. Whether the Fifth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order that has the practical effect of refusing a permanent injunction when no explicit motion for injunctive relief was before the court.
2. Whether the Carson v. American Brands factors—requiring a showing of serious, perhaps irreparable consequences and that the order may be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal—apply to orders denying permanent injunctive relief in partial summary judgment orders.
3. Whether plaintiffs' failure to seek preliminary injunctive relief, move for a separate final judgment, or request expedited review affects the analysis of irreparable harm.

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that while the district court's partial summary judgment order had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief by ruling that FAA regulations preempt a permanent injunction, the Carson factors apply to such orders. The court found that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Carson factors because: (1) they made no attempt to argue they met either factor; (2) they never sought preliminary injunctive relief, which weighs against showing serious or irreparable consequences; (3) they did not seek a separate final judgment, certify an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b), or request expedited trial or review; and (4) permanent injunctions are final remedies not designed to relieve irreparable harm pending trial, making it unlikely plaintiffs would suffer serious or irreparable consequences from waiting until final judgment. The court reasoned that § 1292(a)(1) "functions primarily" to allow interlocutory review of preliminary, not permanent, injunctions.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal concerning whether a pro se prisoner is entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition. Kyle Millis received conflicting communications from the Michigan Supreme Court about his application for leave to appeal, ultimately learning five months later that his application had been dismissed as untimely, which caused him to miss the federal filing deadline.

1. Whether Millis demonstrated reasonable diligence in pursuing his rights despite receiving conflicting letters from the Michigan Supreme Court clerk's office
2. Whether extraordinary circumstances beyond Millis's control prevented timely filing of his federal habeas petition
3. Whether the district court properly dismissed the petition under Rule 4 as plainly meritless without considering the merits of the equitable tolling claim
4. Whether a pro se petitioner must file a protective federal petition to demonstrate diligence when pursuing state postconviction relief

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that it is not plainly apparent from Millis's petition that he is not entitled to equitable tolling. The court reasoned that: (1) Millis demonstrated reasonable diligence by quickly filing his federal habeas petition after receiving the April 21, 2025 letter clarifying that his application was dismissed, and the conflicting communications from the clerk's office could have reasonably led a diligent person to believe his application was accepted; (2) extraordinary circumstances existed because the Michigan Supreme Court's confusing and contradictory communications—particularly the November 21 letter stating his application was "accepted for filing"—could constitute affirmative misleading by the court; (3) the district court improperly dismissed under Rule 4 because Millis's equitable tolling arguments are sufficiently weighty to warrant a response from the state; and (4) no case law requires a petitioner to file a protective petition to demonstrate diligence. The court declined to place on Millis the burden of independently confirming the accuracy of the clerk's communications, instead placing that burden on the courts.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Mace Davis sued the City of Elgin and police officers for allegedly using excessive force by shooting him four times with non-lethal ammunition during a standoff. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants based on qualified immunity.

1. Whether the officers violated Davis's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force
2. Whether any clearly established law placed the officers on notice that their conduct was unconstitutional
3. Whether qualified immunity shields the officers from civil liability
4. Whether the use of non-lethal impact weapons against Davis was proportional to the threat he posed

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Although Davis argued that precedent clearly established the officers' conduct was unreasonable, the court found that the case law Davis cited, particularly Phillips v. Community Ins. Corp., was distinguishable. The court reasoned that: (1) the officers had legitimate reasons to prevent Davis from retreating into his home where he might obtain a weapon; (2) Davis's level of incapacitation differed significantly from Phillips, as Davis was responsive and behaving aggressively rather than severely intoxicated; (3) the severity of the suspected crime (threatening someone with a rifle) was greater than in Phillips (suspected drunk driving); (4) Davis exhibited aggressive behavior and made threats, whereas Phillips posed no threat; and (5) the officers' actions must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene facing tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances. The court concluded that Davis failed to identify any clearly established constitutional rule that would have placed the officers on notice that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

This is a civil rights case brought by the estate of Jason Thomson against Green Bay police officers and the City of Green Bay, alleging excessive use of force and failure to provide adequate medical care during Thomson's arrest at a hospital, which resulted in his death from cardiac arrhythmia.

1. Whether the officers violated Thomson's Fourth Amendment right to adequate medical care at three stages: during arrest at the hospital, during transport to jail, and upon arrival at the jail
2. Whether the officers used excessive force in arresting Thomson and restraining him with a WRAP device
3. Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged constitutional violations
4. Whether the City of Green Bay can be held liable under Monell for failure to train its officers

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The court held that: (1) no reasonable jury could find the officers violated Thomson's right to adequate medical care because they monitored his condition, confirmed he was breathing, and took steps to ensure they were not restricting his airflow at the hospital; during transport, the officers reasonably relied on the medical clearance form and the fact that medical care was available at the jail within ten minutes; and at the jail, the officers were entitled to defer to Nurse Warren's professional medical judgment; (2) the officers did not use excessive force because Thomson was actively resisting arrest and continued to struggle even after being handcuffed, creating a safety risk that justified the use of the WRAP device; (3) even if constitutional violations could be established, the officers would be entitled to qualified immunity because the Estate failed to identify clearly analogous cases establishing the specific rights at issue; and (4) the Monell failure-to-train claim against Green Bay fails because no underlying constitutional violation was established.

This is a Fourth Amendment case in which a defendant challenges the use of a pole camera installed on public property to surveil his commercial business property. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to drug conspiracy charges while preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the pole camera evidence.

1. Whether the installation and use of a stationary pole camera to observe activities on commercial property constituted an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the activities captured by the pole camera
3. Whether the defendant had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy protected by society, particularly given that the property was commercial rather than residential
4. Whether probable cause existed independent of the pole camera footage to support the search warrant
5. Whether the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applied

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the suppression motion. The court held that the pole camera surveillance did not constitute an impermissible search because: (1) the defendant did not manifest a subjective expectation of privacy given the thirty-foot gap in the fence through which people and vehicles regularly passed; (2) the defendant had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the pole camera used common technology, was located on public property where officers were lawfully entitled to be, and captured events observable to ground-level passersby; (3) commercial property receives less Fourth Amendment protection than residential property; (4) the fence, with its large gap, did little to assert a privacy interest; and (5) the facts were distinguishable from the hypothetical cautioned against in United States v. Tuggle, as this involved a commercial property rather than a residence and the camera captured activities visible to passersby through the fence gap. The court also noted that probable cause existed independent of the pole camera footage, and the good-faith exception would apply even if the camera footage were deemed a search.

This is a consolidated appeal of four Second Amendment cases challenging Illinois's Protect Illinois Communities Act, which bans assault weapons (including AR-15s), large-capacity magazines, and certain firearm attachments. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's permanent injunction against the law, holding that the Act's restrictions on AR-15s and thirty-round rifle magazines are constitutional under the Second Amendment.

1. Whether AR-15s and large-capacity magazines constitute "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment's plain text under the first step of the Bruen test
2. Whether Illinois's restrictions on these weapons are consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation under the second step of the Bruen test
3. Whether the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the Act can succeed when they failed to address all weapons regulated by the statute
4. Whether the Act's registration requirement (endorsement affidavit) violates the Second Amendment
5. Whether a "more nuanced approach" to historical analysis is appropriate given dramatic technological changes and unprecedented societal concerns regarding mass shootings

The majority reversed the district court's injunction and upheld the Act as constitutional. The court held that: (1) the plaintiffs' facial challenge fails because they did not address every application of the Act's provisions, and no set of circumstances exists under which all regulated items would be unconstitutional; (2) assuming AR-15s and thirty-round magazines are protected "Arms," the Act is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of regulating particularly dangerous weapons, citing historical regulations of Bowie knives and other dangerous weapons; (3) the Act imposes a minimal burden on self-defense rights given the extremely rare actual use of AR-15s and large-capacity magazines in self-defense; (4) the Act's justification—protecting the public from especially dangerous weapons—is consistent with historical regulatory principles; (5) a more nuanced historical approach is appropriate given the dramatic technological advancement of AR-15s with large-capacity magazines and the unprecedented societal concern of mass shootings by lone shooters; and (6) the registration requirement is constitutional as a "shall-issue" licensing regime with no government discretion. The dissent argued that AR-15s are commonly owned for self-defense and thus protected under Heller's "common use" test, and that historical regulations of carry restrictions and Bowie knives do not justify a categorical ban on weapons in common use.

This is a consolidated Second Amendment case in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of Illinois's Protect Illinois Communities Act, which bans assault weapons (including AR-15s), large-capacity magazines, and related items. The court reversed the district court's permanent injunction that had struck down the law as unconstitutional.

1. Whether AR-15 rifles and thirty-round magazines are "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment under the plain text analysis in Bruen's first step
2. Whether Illinois's ban on these weapons is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation under Bruen's second step
3. Whether the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the Act can succeed when they failed to address every application of the challenged provisions
4. Whether a "more nuanced approach" to historical analysis is appropriate given dramatic technological changes and unprecedented societal concerns regarding mass shootings
5. Whether the Act's registration requirement (endorsement affidavit) violates the Second Amendment

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and upheld Illinois's ban on AR-15s and large-capacity magazines as constitutional. The majority held that: (1) the plaintiffs' facial challenge fails because they did not address every application of the Act's provisions, and no set of circumstances exists under which all regulated items would be invalid; (2) assuming AR-15s are "Arms" under the Second Amendment, the Act satisfies Bruen's second step by being consistent with the nation's historical tradition of restricting particularly dangerous weapons, as exemplified by historical Bowie knife regulations; (3) the Act imposes only a minimal burden on the right to armed self-defense given the extremely rare use of AR-15s and large-capacity magazines in actual self-defense scenarios; (4) a more nuanced historical approach is appropriate here because AR-15s with large-capacity magazines represent a dramatic technological change enabling unprecedented mass shooting incidents that did not exist during the Founding or Reconstruction eras; and (5) the registration requirement is constitutional as a "shall-issue" licensing regime with no government discretion. The court emphasized that perfect historical analogues are not required—only that modern regulations be consistent with the principles underlying historical traditions.

This is a Second Amendment case in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of Illinois's Protect Illinois Communities Act, which bans assault weapons (including AR-15s), large-capacity magazines, and related items. The court reversed the district court's injunction and upheld the Act as constitutional.

1. Whether AR-15 rifles and 30-round magazines are "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment under the plain text analysis of Bruen's first step
2. Whether Illinois's restrictions on these weapons are consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation under Bruen's second step
3. Whether the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the Act can succeed when they failed to address all applications of the challenged provisions
4. Whether dramatic technological changes and unprecedented societal concerns (mass shootings) warrant a more nuanced approach to the historical inquiry
5. Whether the Act's registration requirement (endorsement affidavit) violates the Second Amendment

The majority (Judges St. Eve, Easterbrook, and Brennan as to the disposition) reversed the district court's injunction and upheld the Act. The court held that: (1) assuming AR-15s and 30-round magazines are protected "Arms," the Act satisfies Bruen's second step by being consistent with the nation's historical tradition of restricting particularly dangerous weapons, citing historical regulations of Bowie knives and other weapons; (2) the plaintiffs' facial challenge fails because they did not address every application of the Act's operative provisions; (3) the Act imposes only a minimal burden on self-defense rights given that AR-15s and large-capacity magazines are rarely used in actual self-defense (only 4% of defensive gun uses involve rifles, and fewer than 2 incidents per 5,000 involved more than 10 rounds); (4) a more nuanced historical approach is appropriate given the dramatic technological changes enabling mass shootings and the unprecedented societal concern they pose; (5) the Act's restrictions are "relevantly similar" to historical regulations in both how they operate (targeted restrictions on dangerous weapons with exceptions for law enforcement) and why they are justified (protecting the public from particularly dangerous weapons); and (6) the registration requirement is constitutional as a free, non-discretionary "shall-issue" system akin to regimes approved in Bruen. Chief Judge Brennan dissented, arguing that AR-15s are protected "Arms" under the Second Amendment's plain text, that the "common use" test belongs at Bruen's second step rather than first, and that the historical analogues (particularly Bowie knife regulations) are insufficiently similar to a categorical ban on commonly owned firearms used for self-defense.

This is a consolidated appeal of four Second Amendment cases challenging Illinois's Protect Illinois Communities Act, which bans assault weapons (including AR-15s), large-capacity magazines, and related items. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's permanent injunction against the Act, holding that the restrictions are constitutional under the Second Amendment.

1. Whether AR-15 rifles and thirty-round magazines are "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment's plain text under the first step of the Bruen test
2. Whether Illinois's restrictions on these weapons are consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation under the second step of the Bruen test
3. Whether the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the Act can succeed when they failed to address every application of the challenged provisions
4. Whether the Act's registration requirement (endorsement affidavit) violates the Second Amendment
5. Whether a "more nuanced approach" to historical analysis is appropriate given dramatic technological changes and unprecedented societal concerns regarding mass shootings

Majority Opinion (St. Eve, Circuit Judge): The court reversed the district court's injunction and upheld the Act as constitutional. Key holdings include:

1. Facial Challenge Fails: The plaintiffs cannot satisfy the demanding standard for facial challenges because they failed to address every item regulated by the Act (e.g., grenade launchers, belt-fed weapons). However, the court proceeded to evaluate AR-15s and thirty-round magazines as the focus of the parties' briefing and record development.
2. Assumes "Arms" Status: The court assumed, without deciding, that AR-15s and large-capacity magazines qualify as "Arms" under the Second Amendment's plain text, thus presumptively protected under Bruen's first step.
3. Historical Tradition Supports the Ban: At Bruen's second step, the Act is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of regulating particularly dangerous weapons. The court relied on historical regulations of Bowie knives—which were widespread, used for lawful purposes including self-defense, but were restricted through carry bans, concealed carry prohibitions, and sales taxes because of their danger and lethality. The court found the Act's restrictions "relevantly similar" to these historical regulations in both "how" and "why" they burden the right to armed self-defense.
4. Burden on Self-Defense is Minimal: Although AR-15s have some self-defense utility, the burden imposed is minimal because evidence shows that use of AR-15s and more than ten rounds in self-defense is "extremely rare" (only 2 incidents in roughly 5,000 defensive gun uses, with only 4% of defenders using rifles versus 90% using handguns). The grandfather clause further mitigates the burden by allowing existing owners to keep their weapons.
5. Distinctions from Historical Analogues are Not Fatal: While the Act is not identical to historical regulations, the Supreme Court in Rahimi confirmed that a closer match to historical precursors is not necessary. The principles underlying the historical tradition—restricting particularly dangerous weapons while leaving many others available—justify the modern regulation.
6. More Nuanced Approach Reinforces the Holding: The court applied Bruen's recognition that cases involving dramatic technological changes and unprecedented societal concerns may require a more nuanced historical approach. AR-15s with large-capacity magazines represent a dramatic technological change from founding-era muskets and even nineteenth-century repeating rifles. The unprecedented societal concern of mass shootings carried out by lone shooters with these weapons—where 63-88% of mass shootings with higher fatality counts involve assault weapons and large-capacity magazines—supports applying a more nuanced analysis. The court emphasized that mass killings in the founding era were "group activities" requiring aggregated firepower, whereas modern mass shootings can be perpetrated by individuals with AR-15s and large-capacity magazines.
7. Registration Requirement is Constitutional: The endorsement affidavit requirement is constitutional because it is free, simple, subject to well-defined standards, and leaves no room for government discretion—akin to "shall-issue" licensing regimes approved in Bruen.
8. Common Use Does Not Immunize from Regulation: The court declined to base its assessment solely on the popularity of AR-15s, noting that Bruen proceeded to historical analysis even after confirming handguns are in common use.

Dissenting Opinion (Brennan, Chief Judge): Chief Judge Brennan argued that the Act violates the Second Amendment because:

1. AR-15s are "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment's plain text and should not be excluded based on a "common use" test at step one
2. The district court's comprehensive trial record—with nearly 200 pieces of evidence and 24 expert reports—established that AR-15s are materially distinct from M16s and are commonly owned for self-defense
3. The historical regulations cited by the majority (particularly Bowie knife restrictions) do not constitute a tradition of banning entire classes of weapons commonly owned for self-defense
4. The majority's "more nuanced approach" based on technological change and mass shooting concerns improperly deviates from Bruen's text-and-history methodology
5. The dissent emphasized that millions of Americans own AR-15s, they are legal in 41 states, and the Supreme Court has recognized them as "widely legal and bought by many ordinary consumers"

This is a wrongful death case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a father whose minor son died while in the mother's custody. The plaintiff alleges that employees of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services are liable for the death because they failed to properly investigate earlier allegations of abuse by the child's mother and her boyfriend.

1. Whether state actors can be held liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for failing to protect an individual from private acts of violence
2. Whether the state-created danger exception to the general rule of non-liability applies to the Department employees' conduct
3. Whether the plaintiff adequately pleaded the three elements of the state-created danger exception: (1) the state's affirmative acts created or increased danger, (2) the failure to protect caused the injury, and (3) the state's behavior shocked the conscience
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint and file a third amended complaint

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's federal claim. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a viable claim under the state-created danger exception because: (1) on the causation element, the plaintiff could not plausibly allege that the Department employees' conduct—including the home visit, school interview, case closure, and notification to the parents—actually or proximately caused the child's death. The temporal gap between the Department's actions (5-3 months before death) and the fatal assault was too attenuated to establish foreseeability. The court noted that the child was already in danger before state intervention and the state actors did not place the child in a worse position. (2) On the "shocks the conscience" element, the court found that the employees' investigative and reporting errors, while negligent, did not constitute the egregious conduct required by this stringent standard. The employees' actions complied with Illinois law, and mere negligence or bad decision-making is insufficient. The court also affirmed the denial of the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, finding no abuse of discretion where the plaintiff had already been given one opportunity to amend and the proposed third amendment failed to cure the pleading deficiencies.

This is an insurance coverage dispute in which Nautilus Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Bee Quality, a roofing contractor, for claims arising from a building collapse that killed two individuals. The dispute centers on whether a "Prior Work Exclusion" in the insurance policy bars coverage for work completed before the policy's inception date.

1. Whether the Prior Work Exclusion in the insurance policy bars coverage for bodily injury and property damage claims arising from work Bee Quality completed before February 8, 2022
2. Whether the Prior Work Exclusion renders the completed-operations coverage illusory and therefore unenforceable under Illinois law
3. Whether the court properly granted judgment on the pleadings without allowing discovery into the insurer's underwriting and premium calculations

The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Nautilus. The court held that the Prior Work Exclusion clearly and unambiguously bars coverage for claims arising from work completed before February 8, 2022, and that the exclusion does not render the coverage illusory. The court reasoned that under Illinois law, an exclusion is illusory only when it eliminates coverage entirely, not merely when it limits coverage to a subset of potential claims. Since the policy still provides "plenty of room for coverage" for work completed after the policy's inception date, the exclusion is enforceable. The court declined to rewrite the policy based on premium considerations or the parties' presumed intent, emphasizing that sophisticated parties are free to negotiate whatever coverage terms they desire and courts must enforce unambiguous policy language as written.

This is an immigration case in which three Honduran nationals petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision denying their motion to reopen proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioners' prior attorney failed to timely notify them of an adverse BIA decision and the deadline to file a petition for review, causing them to miss the appeal deadline.

1. Whether the BIA has authority to consider ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims involving conduct that occurred before a different tribunal (the Ninth Circuit).
2. Whether service of a courtesy copy of a BIA decision on petitioners is sufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice from counsel's deficient performance in failing to notify them of the decision and filing deadline.
3. Whether counsel's failure to timely inform clients of an adverse decision and appeal deadline constitutes deficient performance warranting reopening.

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition and remanded to the BIA. The court held that: (1) the BIA has discretion to consider IAC claims involving conduct before a different tribunal and abused its discretion by refusing to do so without reasoned explanation; (2) service of a courtesy copy of the BIA decision on petitioners was insufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice, as it was unreasonable to expect non-English speaking petitioners with limited education to understand the decision and filing deadline without their retained counsel's guidance; and (3) counsel's failure to notify petitioners of the BIA decision and appeal deadline constituted deficient performance that denied them their right to appeal, triggering a presumption of prejudice. The court reasoned that noncitizens reasonably rely on retained counsel to navigate the complex immigration process and that immigration regulations require service on counsel of record, not just clients.

This is a criminal appeal in which Richard Brillhart was convicted of distributing and possessing child pornography and sentenced to 480 months imprisonment. On appeal, Brillhart challenges the legality of the government's search of files identified by Google through automated hash-matching technology, as well as various evidentiary and sentencing decisions.

1. Whether Google's automated hash-value matching protocol constitutes a valid "private search" that permits subsequent warrantless government review of identified files under the Fourth Amendment
2. Whether charging both distribution and possession of child pornography violates the Double Jeopardy Clause
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support convictions on both counts
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting graphic child pornography images as evidence without first reviewing them
5. Whether the district court properly excluded emails from Brillhart's roommate as irrelevant and hearsay
6. Whether the district court erred in refusing a "theory of defense" jury instruction regarding framing
7. Whether the district court properly denied requests for additional psychological evaluations and a continuance before sentencing
8. Whether the district court properly applied a five-level "pattern of activity" sentencing enhancement

1. Hash-Matching as Private Search (AFFIRMED): The court held that Google's hash-value matching protocol constitutes a valid private search. A hash value is a unique digital fingerprint of a file with near-perfect accuracy (less than one in one billion chance of error). Because a Google employee had previously reviewed the file and determined it contained child pornography, the subsequent automated hash match merely replicated that determination digitally. The government's warrantless review of the file revealed nothing materially new, satisfying the "virtual certainty" standard from United States v. Jacobsen. The court rejected arguments from the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits that hash matching is merely a "label" or insufficient to qualify as a private search, emphasizing that a hash value is a transformation of the file's actual contents, not merely a description.
2. Double Jeopardy (AFFIRMED): The court held that possession and distribution of child pornography are distinct offenses under the Blockburger test. Distribution does not necessarily require possession, as a person could arrange or supervise delivery without possessing the material itself. Therefore, charging Brillhart with both offenses did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence (AFFIRMED): The evidence was ample for both counts. For distribution, the government presented evidence that Brillhart's Yahoo account (identified by his initials, birthdate, and phone number) transmitted child pornography, including a selfie of Brillhart that was forwarded to a recipient. For possession, child pornography was found on Brillhart's phone and SD card in his bedroom, and evidence showed Brillhart was using his phone to download such material during a specific time period when his roommate was hospitalized.
4. Admission of Child Pornography Images (AFFIRMED): The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting graphic images and videos depicting child pornography. Such evidence is probative of both the nature of the material possessed and the defendant's knowledge that it constitutes child pornography. The court was not required to review the images before ruling on a general objection under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
5. Exclusion of Emails (AFFIRMED): The district court properly excluded emails between Brillhart's roommate and the roommate's girlfriend as irrelevant and hearsay. The emails, exchanged a year after charges were filed, did not mention Brillhart's phone or digital accounts and were therefore irrelevant to the charged conduct.
6. Jury Instruction on Framing Theory (AFFIRMED): The district court properly refused Brillhart's proposed instruction that his roommate had downloaded the child pornography. The proposed instruction was more argument than a proper jury charge. The standard instruction that Brillhart could only be found guilty for what he personally did was sufficient.
7. Sentencing Requests (AFFIRMED): The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brillhart's requests for additional psychological evaluations and a continuance. The court had sufficient information from previous mental health evaluations, and Brillhart never claimed incompetence to stand trial or be sentenced.
8. Pattern-of-Activity Enhancement (VACATED AND REMANDED): The district court erred in applying the five-level pattern-of-activity enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5). Under United States v. Alberts, only conduct falling within statutory sections referenced in the Guidelines' application notes can justify this enhancement. Brillhart had only one qualifying episode (a conviction for fourth-degree sexual misconduct with a 15-year-old), and his other relevant violation (involving a 16-year-old) did not match any enumerated crimes. A pattern requires more than one instance, so the enhancement was improper.

This is a stockholder derivative action against officers and directors of Axsome Therapeutics, Inc. for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty based on materially false and misleading statements regarding the regulatory status of the company's drug candidate AXS-07. The case was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.

1. Whether the plaintiffs' derivative claims were timely filed within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and waste claims
2. Whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the plaintiffs' service of Section 220 books and records demands
3. Whether the defendants suffered presumptive prejudice from the late filing, and whether the plaintiffs could rebut that presumption with extraordinary circumstances

The Court of Chancery granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), finding the complaint time-barred by the doctrine of laches. The court held that: (1) the plaintiffs' claims accrued by April 22, 2022, when Axsome disclosed the FDA's concerns about the AXS-07 NDA, establishing the three-year limitations deadline of April 22, 2025; (2) the plaintiffs did not file suit until September 2025, well after the deadline; (3) while Section 220 books and records actions may toll the statute of limitations under certain circumstances, merely serving a demand letter—particularly an improperly served one—does not trigger tolling; tolling requires filing an actual Section 220 enforcement action and pursuing it diligently; (4) the plaintiffs' demands were served after the limitations period expired, and Wickstrom's initial email attempt was improper and followed by weeks of delay; (5) the defendants are entitled to a presumption of prejudice from the late filing, which the plaintiffs failed to rebut by demonstrating extraordinary circumstances; and (6) the existence of parallel federal litigation did not prevent the plaintiffs from suing in Delaware and therefore does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance excusing the delay.

This is an appeal of a maritime injury case in which the defendant, a Belizean dive company, sought to vacate a default judgment entered against it two years after the judgment was issued and nineteen months after the plaintiff attempted enforcement in Belize. The defendant argued the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).

1. Whether a motion to vacate a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) must comply with the "reasonable time" requirement of Rule 60(c)(1), following the Supreme Court's decision in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton
2. Whether the defendant's two-year delay (or nineteen-month delay measured from enforcement) in filing its Rule 60(b)(4) motion constitutes a reasonable time
3. Whether the defendant's justification for the delay—that counsel advised it the court lacked jurisdiction—excuses the untimeliness

The court affirmed the district court's rejection of the defendant's motion. The First Circuit held that: (1) Rule 60(b)(4) motions are now subject to the "reasonable time" requirement of Rule 60(c)(1) following the Supreme Court's recent decision in Coney Island Auto Parts; (2) the defendant's delay of nearly two years from judgment entry (or nineteen months from enforcement) was unreasonable as a matter of law; (3) the defendant's claimed justification—that counsel believed the court lacked jurisdiction—was insufficient because the court had already notified the defendant of its jurisdiction finding before the damages hearing, and disagreement with a court's jurisdictional finding does not justify ignoring it; and (4) the defendant made a knowing choice not to appear in U.S. court and "slept on its rights" in violation of Rule 60(b) principles. The court noted that while prejudice to the non-moving party is a relevant consideration, it is not the lodestar of the analysis, and the defendant's lack of meaningful justification for the delay alone supported the finding of unreasonableness.

This case involves a Sunni Muslim inmate at a Virginia state prison who sought to simultaneously observe Ramadan fasting and follow Orthodox Jewish Kashrut dietary laws. The inmate sued prison officials for violating his religious liberty rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) when they refused to accommodate both dietary requirements during Ramadan 2020, though they later provided the accommodation in 2021.

1. Whether the inmate had a clearly established constitutional right to a diet consistent with his sincerely held religious beliefs, including simultaneous observance of Ramadan fasting and Kashrut dietary laws
2. Whether the prison's failure to accommodate the inmate's religious dietary request in 2020 violated his Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment, and if so, whether such violation was justified by legitimate penological interests
3. Whether the inmate's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot given the prison's voluntary policy change in 2021
4. Whether the inmate stated valid claims under the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause
5. Whether the magistrate judge properly denied the inmate's motion to compel discovery regarding the history of the prison's Common Fare diet

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated and remanded in part:

1. Motion to Compel Discovery: Affirmed the denial of the motion to compel. The court found no abuse of discretion because the requested historical documentation about the Common Fare diet dating back twenty years was not relevant to the inmate's specific request made in March 2020 for a Ramadan-compliant Orthodox Jewish Kosher Diet.
2. Mootness of Injunctive and Declaratory Relief: Affirmed the district court's finding that these claims were moot. The prison voluntarily adopted a formal policy change in 2021 establishing a Ramadan-compliant Orthodox Jewish Kosher Diet, the inmate continues to receive this accommodation, and the prison submitted affidavits and oral argument assurances that it would not revert to the prior policy. The court found it "absolutely clear" that the violations could not reasonably be expected to recur.
3. Establishment Clause Claim: Affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate failed to make a prima facie showing because he did not provide historical evidence demonstrating that the prison's failure to accommodate his specific religious diet "would have historically been understood as an establishment of religion," as required by modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
4. Equal Protection Clause Claim: Affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate was not similarly situated to Orthodox Jewish inmates in all relevant respects because the prison accommodated all prisoners with sincerely held religious beliefs requiring the Orthodox Jewish Kosher Diet, regardless of religion or race. The inmate's inability to simultaneously observe Ramadan while on the Orthodox Jewish Kosher Diet meant he was not similarly situated to those on either diet alone.
5. Free Exercise Clause Claim: Reversed and remanded. The court held that:
   1. The inmate had a clearly established right to a diet consistent with his sincerely held religious beliefs, including simultaneous observance of Ramadan fasting and Kashrut dietary laws. The court rejected the district court's requirement that the inmate cite a case with identical facts, holding instead that a general constitutional rule may apply with obvious clarity to specific conduct.
   2. The district court erred by failing to apply the Turner v. Safley test, which requires that prison regulations impinging on inmates' constitutional rights be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. While RLUIPA provides greater protection through strict scrutiny, First Amendment Free Exercise claims in prison are subject to the more deferential Turner standard.
   3. The case was remanded for the district court to conduct a fact-intensive Turner analysis in the first instance to determine whether the prison's failure to accommodate the inmate's 2020 request was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, such as resource constraints and the impracticability of devising a new menu during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.

This is a Fourth Amendment case involving a warrantless seizure of a defendant based on an anonymous 911 tip reporting suspected drug activity. The court addresses whether police officers unlawfully seized Kevin Williams when they stopped their vehicles in a parking lot, and whether the seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

1. Whether the officers' act of stopping their vehicles in the roadway constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure of Williams
2. Whether Williams was "blocked in" by the police vehicles' positioning, considering the available exit routes and whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave
3. Whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify any seizure based on: (a) an anonymous 911 tip reporting suspected drug transactions, and (b) the location in a high-crime area
4. The reliability and weight of anonymous 911 tips in establishing reasonable suspicion, particularly when lacking predictive information or details of firsthand observation of criminal activity

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Williams's motion to suppress and vacated his conviction. The court held that: (1) Williams was seized when the officers stopped their vehicles in the roadway because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave; (2) the officers' positioning of their vehicles in the middle of the roadway, partially in front of Williams's car, effectively blocked him in, as he would have needed to perform special maneuvering (potentially a multipoint turn) to exit, creating a show of authority; (3) the anonymous 911 tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to establish reasonable suspicion because it contained no predictive information, no details suggesting firsthand observation of criminal activity, and consisted only of readily observable identifying details similar to those rejected in Florida v. J.L.; (4) the tip's use of the 911 system alone does not establish reliability without other factors present in cases like Navarette v. California (such as contemporaneous reporting of a dangerous, urgent situation); (5) presence in a high-crime area is a weak, generic factor that cannot alone or in combination with the unreliable tip establish reasonable suspicion; and (6) even considering all factors together, the officers lacked the specific, articulable facts necessary to justify the seizure, particularly given the vague allegation that occupants "appear[] to be making drug transactions" without any specific suspicious behavior described.

This is a federal habeas corpus appeal challenging a state conviction for sexual offenses against a foster child. The petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover certain records before trial that could have supported his defense theory.

1. Which state court decision receives deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) when multiple levels of state courts have adjudicated a claim, particularly when different courts address different prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel test.
2. Whether the undiscovered social services documents, counselor's notes, and medical records regarding the alleged victim would have created a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome under the Strickland v. Washington standard.
3. The proper standard of review for federal habeas courts when a state appellate court issues a reasoned decision addressing only one element of a multi-element claim.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief on alternative grounds. The court held that: (1) when a state appellate court issues a reasoned decision on one prong of a claim, that appellate decision is the controlling decision entitled to AEDPA deference, and unaddressed prongs must be reviewed de novo by the federal court; (2) the district court erred by deferring to the trial court's deficient performance analysis rather than the appellate court's prejudice analysis; and (3) the North Carolina Court of Appeals' conclusion that the undiscovered records would have been cumulative and thus failed to show prejudice was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court found that while fairminded jurists could disagree on whether the additional evidence would have changed the outcome, AEDPA requires deference to the state court's decision when reasonable minds can disagree.

This is an immigration case in which a native of El Salvador who entered the United States without authorization sought asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied all three forms of relief, and the petitioner appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

1. Whether the immigration judge properly applied the legal test for determining if a conviction constitutes a "particularly serious crime" that bars eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal
2. Whether the immigration judge's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence
3. Whether the petitioner established entitlement to protection under the Convention Against Torture

The court granted the petition in part and denied in part, vacating and remanding the case. The majority held that:

1. Particularly Serious Crime Bar: The immigration judge and BIA failed to properly apply the required two-step test when analyzing whether the petitioner's assault and battery conviction qualified as a particularly serious crime. The test requires first analyzing whether the elements of the offense fall within the ambit of a particularly serious crime, and only then considering the individual facts and circumstances. The immigration judge improperly skipped the first step and failed to meaningfully analyze the statutory elements before discussing the facts. The case was remanded for proper application of this test, though the agency may reach the same conclusion upon remand.
2. Credibility Determination: The immigration judge's adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence. The petitioner's testimony contained numerous implausible claims (such as discovering human hearts in a cooler, being released by kidnappers after praying, and surviving multiple gunshot wounds during an action-movie-style chase) and material inconsistencies with police reports and other evidence. The court found no due process violation in the hearing procedures.
3. Convention Against Torture: The immigration judge properly denied CAT relief. The petitioner failed to establish that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by the Zetas or the Salvadoran government if returned to El Salvador. The lack of contact with alleged persecutors for over eleven years, combined with the adverse credibility finding, supported the conclusion that torture was unlikely.

This is a procedural due process case in which Kenneth Deal, a member of the City of Monroe's board of adjustment, challenged his removal by City Council without notice or opportunity to be heard. Deal alleged his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated, but the district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding Deal lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in his board seat.

1. Whether Deal had a constitutionally protected property interest in his seat on the board of adjustment
2. Whether municipal discretion over board appointments and removal defeats a claim of entitlement to a board seat
3. Whether state law provisions regarding three-year terms for board members create a legitimate claim of entitlement to a board seat
4. Whether prior North Carolina cases (Board of Adjustment of Town of Swansboro and Frank v. Savage) establish a property interest in municipal board seats

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for the City of Monroe. The court held that Deal lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in his board seat because the City maintained broad discretion over the board of adjustment, including the discretion to create, abolish, determine the selection process, and remove members at any time with or without cause. Following the standard established in Gardner v. City of Baltimore, the court reasoned that when a local agency has any level of discretion over a benefit, a plaintiff's claim to that benefit is merely a unilateral expectation, not a legitimate claim of entitlement. The court rejected Deal's arguments that Board of Adjustment of Town of Swansboro and Frank v. Savage created a property interest in board seats, distinguishing those cases as not requiring such a holding. Because Deal failed to establish a property interest, the court did not need to address whether the procedures used for his removal were constitutionally adequate.

This case involves a constitutional challenge to a South Carolina budget provision (the "Proviso") that prohibits public schools from using state funds to teach certain race-related concepts. Black high school students, the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, and author Ibram Kendi sued to enjoin enforcement of the Proviso, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on the removal of an Advanced Placement African American Studies course and the removal of Kendi's book from school libraries.

1. Whether individual student plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the removal of the AP African American Studies course based on a First Amendment right to receive information
2. Whether the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP has representational standing to bring claims on behalf of its student members
3. Whether author Ibram Kendi has standing to challenge the removal of his book from school libraries based on First Amendment viewpoint discrimination
4. Whether the district court properly dismissed claims without addressing standing requirements for all alleged claims
5. Whether the Proviso violates the First Amendment (facial and as-applied challenges) and Fourteenth Amendment (void-for-vagueness and equal protection claims)

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions:

1. J.S. (Individual Student Plaintiff): Affirmed dismissal as moot because she graduated from high school after the complaint was filed, making her claims for prospective relief no longer justiciable.
2. T.R. (Individual Student Plaintiff): Affirmed dismissal of the as-applied right-to-receive-information claim because he failed to allege a sufficient injury in fact. His mere expression of intent to take AP AAS if offered constituted only speculative "some day" intentions rather than concrete and particularized harm.
3. SC NAACP (Representational Standing): Vacated and remanded. The court concluded that SC NAACP adequately alleged that at least one of its student members (A.G.) would have standing to sue individually because A.G. was enrolled in AP AAS and suffered an ongoing, concrete injury when the course code was removed. The court found A.G. satisfied all three standing elements: (1) injury in fact—she was denied access to the AP course she was enrolled in; (2) traceability—the Proviso was a plausible source of the injury; and (3) redressability—enjoining the Proviso would likely allow her to re-enroll. However, the court left to the district court on remand the determination of whether SC NAACP satisfied the other two requirements for representational standing: that the organization's interests are germane to its purpose and that the claim does not require individual member participation.
4. Kendi (Viewpoint Discrimination Claim): Reversed the dismissal. The court found Kendi adequately alleged standing to bring his First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim. He alleged a concrete injury (the removal of his book from circulation), traceability (the removal was based on the Proviso and his viewpoint), and redressability (enjoining the Proviso would likely result in the book's reinstatement). The court rejected District Three's argument that the Materials Selection Criteria provided an independent basis for removal, finding that the complaint plausibly alleged the Proviso was the actual reason for removal when viewed in light most favorable to Kendi.
5. Other Claims: Vacated and remanded the dismissal of: (1) the facial First Amendment right-to-receive-information challenge to the Proviso; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment void-for-vagueness claim; and (3) the equal protection claims. The district court failed to address standing as to these claims and must do so on remand.
6. Preliminary Injunction: Vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction motion and remanded for reconsideration.

This is a civil case brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 by Gert Kuiper against Mario Adalberto Reyes Mena, a former Salvadoran colonel, for the alleged extrajudicial killing of Kuiper's brother, a Dutch journalist, during El Salvador's civil war in 1982. The case addresses whether foreign official immunity protects a foreign official accused of violating jus cogens norms—peremptory norms of international law from which no derogation is permitted.

1. Whether a foreign official is entitled to conduct-based foreign official immunity for alleged violations of jus cogens norms, specifically extrajudicial killing
2. Whether jus cogens violations constitute sovereign acts protected by immunity
3. Whether the jus cogens exception to immunity applies in civil cases as well as criminal cases
4. Whether the status of the foreign government (recognized versus unrecognized) affects the application of jus cogens principles to immunity
5. Whether Congress's failure to include a jus cogens exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) precludes such an exception in common law immunity for individual officials

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of foreign official immunity. The court held that under international and domestic law, foreign officials are not entitled to conduct-based foreign official immunity for violations of jus cogens norms, even if the acts were performed in the defendant's official capacity. The court reasoned that jus cogens violations are not "exceptions" to immunity but rather conduct that does not constitute sovereign acts at all. Extrajudicial killing is a universally recognized jus cogens violation, and Reyes Mena's alleged ordering of the ambush and killing of the unarmed journalists constitutes such a violation. The court rejected Reyes Mena's arguments that: (1) Yousuf does not apply because El Salvador is a recognized government; (2) the absence of a jus cogens exception in the FSIA precludes such an exception in common law; (3) jus cogens applies only in criminal cases, not civil cases; and (4) Yousuf should be overruled. The court emphasized that the peremptory, universal nature of jus cogens norms means they apply regardless of whether proceedings are civil or criminal, and that the reasoning denying immunity for jus cogens violations does not depend on the context of the proceeding.

This is a Fourth Amendment case involving a traffic stop and frisk that resulted in the discovery of a firearm on a passenger. The defendant, Jermaine Derrick Carson, Jr., was charged with possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the firearm as evidence.

1. Whether the officers unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop beyond its lawful duration
2. Whether the frisk of Carson was supported by reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous
3. Whether an officer's investigative detours during a traffic stop can be justified by reasonable suspicion developed by another officer that was not communicated to the acting officer

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Carson's motion to suppress. The court held that:

1. Traffic Stop Duration: The traffic stop was not unlawfully prolonged. Officer Hayes detected the odor of marijuana at 11:25:52 p.m., which provided independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. Any alleged investigative detours by Officer Corthell occurred either simultaneously with or after Hayes's detection of marijuana, so they did not unlawfully extend the stop beyond its lawful duration.
2. Frisk: The frisk of Carson was constitutional because: (a) the officers lawfully seized Carson as a passenger during a traffic stop, and (b) under the Fourth Circuit's precedent in United States v. Sakyi, when an officer has reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in a vehicle, the officer may frisk the occupants for weapons to ensure safety. Here, Escobedo had reasonable suspicion that marijuana was in the vehicle when he frisked Carson.
3. Concurrence: Judge Berner concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to criticize the Sakyi presumption, arguing that the nexus between marijuana use and dangerousness has become attenuated given widespread marijuana legalization across states and the FDA's reclassification of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III. Judge Berner also disagreed with the majority's approach regarding Officer Hayes's uncommunicated observations, arguing that under United States v. Massenburg, an officer's investigative detours cannot be justified by another officer's uncommunicated reasonable suspicion.

This is a criminal appeal in which Jon Phillip Page, Jr. was convicted of conspiring to commit bank fraud and conspiring to commit money laundering after a week-long jury trial. He appeals on multiple grounds, including claims regarding judicial recusal, handling of co-conspirators, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial delay, jury instructions, and sufficiency of evidence.

1. Whether the district judge was required to recuse himself based on prior representation of the victim bank in unrelated civil matters under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
2. Whether the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when his co-defendant brother pleaded guilty at the start of trial (Bruton violation)
3. Whether co-conspirators' guilty pleas were improperly admitted as substantive evidence without adequate limiting instructions
4. Whether the denial of a motion to sever the defendant's case from his brother's was an abuse of discretion
5. Whether various pieces of evidence were properly admitted, including a prior consistent statement affidavit, a WhatsApp message, testimony about statements made by the defendants, photographs of homes, and financial summary charts
6. Whether the Government violated due process by adding a money laundering conspiracy charge in bad faith to prevent the defendant from calling his brother as a witness
7. Whether the late production of bank records violated due process
8. Whether the district court properly denied requested jury instructions on good faith reliance and apparent authority
9. Whether there was sufficient evidence of the defendant's knowing participation in the conspiracies

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the conviction on all counts. The court's reasoning on key issues includes:

1. Recusal: The defendant failed to show the judge was clearly or obviously required to recuse himself under Section 455(a). Prior representation of the victim bank in unrelated civil litigation did not require recusal, particularly where Section 455(b)(2) was inapplicable.
2. Bruton Violation: No Confrontation Clause violation occurred because the brother's guilty plea did not directly implicate the defendant; the jury had to make an inference using other information, and such inferences do not trigger Bruton protections.
3. Guilty Pleas as Evidence: Under the four-factor Black test, the admission of the co-conspirators' guilty pleas was proper. Limiting instructions were provided (though not contemporaneous), there was proper evidentiary purpose, the pleas were not improperly emphasized, and the defendant did not invite their admission. One errant prosecutorial reference to the plea as substantive evidence involved an uncontested fact and had minimal impact.
4. Severance: The denial of severance was not an abuse of discretion. Joint trials are preferred in conspiracy cases, and the defendant failed to show a serious risk that the joint trial would compromise his trial rights or prevent reliable jury judgment.
5. Evidentiary Rulings: All challenged evidence was properly admitted: (a) Wertz's 2019 affidavit was harmless error even if improperly admitted, as it was consistent with trial testimony; (b) the WhatsApp message was harmless as it only vaguely implicated the defendant and was corroborated by extensive testimony; (c) the "dancing with the devil" statement was highly probative of knowledge and involvement; (d) photographs of homes were admitted for a proper purpose and any error was harmless; and (e) financial summary charts met all Rule 1006 requirements and any methodological criticisms were properly left to jury assessment.
6. Pre-Indictment Delay: The defendant failed to establish bad faith in adding the money laundering charge. The Government's explanation that it reviewed evidence during trial preparation was plausible and not clearly erroneous. Additionally, the defendant failed to proffer what his brother would have testified to, preventing a showing of prejudice.
7. Late Bank Records: The defendant forfeited this argument by failing to explain why dismissal rather than lesser remedies was appropriate and by failing to cite relevant case law.
8. Jury Instructions: The district court properly denied the requested good faith reliance and apparent authority instructions because the willfulness instructions adequately covered these theories. The theory-of-the-case instruction was properly denied as it was narrative and cumulative rather than presenting a distinct legal principle.
9. Sufficiency of Evidence: Substantial evidence supported the conviction. The jury is the final arbiter of witness credibility, and Wertz's testimony, though from an interested witness with a plea agreement, was not so incredible as to require disregard. The uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator can support conviction if not incredible on its face.
10. Cumulative Error: The cumulative error doctrine did not justify reversal given the substantial evidence of guilt and the fair trial the defendant received.

This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the family of Darren Boykin sued three police officers for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Boykin died during police custody after suffering an Exercise Collapse Associated with Sickle Cell Trait (ECAST) event triggered by a foot chase, and the officers mistook his symptoms for exercise exhaustion.